History According to Cattle
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ed. Laura Gustafsson, Terike Haapoja
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In the beginning there is a void. A void between us and history, between these words and our muted existence. How to cross this void? When language is by definition something we don’t possess? You think that because of your writing you are the author of the world, but you’re wrong. You were just an accident like the rest of us, floating in the sea of time. Everybody tries to explain the world. Even the stone, with its stony reasoning, finds order in its rocky little world. You are nothing special. There’s an inside in everything.

But here I am, with my horns and tail and compartmented stomachs and a line of ancestors queuing and pushing behind me as if entering the spring field. Why? When history itself has rejected us and rendered us invisible, language as its weapon? The answer is simple: because we were there. We saw it all. But to break my silence, or what you take as silence, I must enter your language and domesticate you, like the cow whisperer tames a wild bull by talking to him with words he knows. So I borrow your words and carve myself into them, make a hole through them the shape of a cow. You might not see me, but you’ll see my absence. This is where my story begins.

The history of cattle is divided into three eras. The Time Before History emerges gradually from the cooling climates of the Pliocene epoch more than two million years ago. There, in the grasslands of India our ancestors, the great Auroch, come to life. Tall and heavy, they graze in groups of twenty or thirty, changing location when in need of water and fresh edible grass. Their life is peaceful, as they do not practice war, and the power relations of the community are tested out in display fights in which both females and males take part. The young ones are born in the spring, staying at their mother’s side until strong enough to join the community on its endless travel. Beasts of the era, saber toothed cats, hyenas, hominins, hunt them down but can not conquer them, as they are far too many in number. Roaming in millions they gradually expand their presence Eastward and Westward as far as the great grasslands extend. Over a million years later they inhabit most of the old world from Asia and northern Africa all the way to the western coasts of Europe.

With the emergence of the common ape and its culture, we enter The Historical Time. At the beginning of the Holocene, more than 10 000 years ago, the great Auroch starts to live side by side with the ape, gradually forgetting its traditional customs and learning a new way of life. Why this anomaly in history, this exchange, takes place, we don’t know. The last free Auroch who could have passed down this knowledge died alone in the remote forests of Jaktórow in 1627, taking the secret with her. We have only guesses and interpretations, unreliable traces of evidence. What we do know is that we, all of the 1.3 billion of us living today, are the successors of approximately 80 individuals living with the Mesopotamian common ape 8000 years ago. From that moment on our destinies have been intertwined. The great Auroch had become cattle, and the ape the human as we know it today.

If the time of the Auroch had been cyclical, determined by the subtle changes in the weather and by the signs and traces of its companions, this new era was moving forward like a bull. From our manure, milk and flesh the history of the human rose like a wave, generating wealth and prosperity beyond imagining. Cultures emerged, wars were fought. New lands were conquered and more and more of our kind were needed to support the lives of the human. Technology and writing and the rituals of the afterlife were invented. Richness emerged wherever there was a need: what was excess to some, was luxury to others. Corn, potatoes, antelope skins, pearls, rubber, children, women, men of all sizes exchanged owners. Animals crossed oceans but so did parasites and diseases. Populations collapsed as new ones emerged. Kings were declared and then beheaded. The generation and distribution of wealth sought no balance but threw around destinies, fortune and misery in a random order. Soon hurricanes joined together with rains and flooding, walls of fire and drought. Sucked by economic vacuums and pushed by ecological masses, everything was on the move.

Meanwhile, unaware of our life as richness itself, we lived a modest life. The great tides of history arrived to us as streams so small they could hardly be noticed. Wars killed us, but so did peace. The food was the same, century after century. Barns were smaller or wider, our companions fewer or more, but the daily routine remained. Birth, grazing, feeding, sleeping. Our centuries were defined by the hot breath of our companion in the silence of the shelter, night after night, the thousand returns to the same fields and by the light absence of the weight of the plough or the sledge or the carriage when the day fell. So deep inside history were we, that we did not see it happening to us – nor did we notice, when it abandoned us altogether.

History According to Cattle
In the early ages we lived in the world knowing it was only for us on loan. Everything passed, and we accepted it. As we did not possess things, we did not have a word for owning. We were poor in words for things: our vocabulary was verb-based, built from the doings of ourselves and of our companion beings. But after joining the flow of human history there was not much to do and the native names we knew were lost; soon we did not have a name for who we were. In replacement we got a name given to us by the human. That name rendered us objects, subjected to the other’s doings. Our world had been reversed: around us, everything remained – it was we who passed on, eternally.

The Ahistorical Time has no linearity, nor cyclicity. Inside the factory the passing on of heritage became impossible. Calves were taken from us immediately when they were born, and family lines were scattered out of our sight. Doing was reduced to so little that all that was left of our habits died away. We did not learn from our mothers but from the machine that told our bodies how to stand and how to eat. Stuck in the industrial process we would live in collective isolation, cut off from all relations that could anchor us to time, history, culture. For how could we have culture, if culture was the transforming of things into objects? How could we have history, if history was the weaving together of times from the present moment into the past with a chain of words? We did not even have time – the only time we had was clock-time, ticking away in unison, counting. All we had was destiny, as unchangeable as the rotation of the sun in the sky, and even that we did not possess before it took us.

If we were to see outside the factory, we would have seen the humans digging and carving, moulding, melting, cutting, jointing, burning and growing everything that passed their way. Like the earthworm that eats its way through the soil the humans worked through the world, processing everything into products of their culture. But what they could not see was that they were followed by eyes, eyes everywhere.

So here I am, claiming what is mine and my ancestor’s by law: history, that which we so generously gave to you. Eager, enlightened, generations and generations push behind me, waiting for a verdict. By incorporating your tongue we, the foundation, the mute, are pulled into existence, into the spotlight of human thought. There, once acknowledged, we become real. But as we face the threshold of history we realize that outside language we are still nothing. You only hear the foundation when you can teach it to speak. I can only point to my absence, hoping that in this failure of properly portraying me a hole would appear in the world, through which a cow could enter. That’s what this is. A trial, nothing more.

But as I leave you now I do not evaporate into the realm of ideas and imagination. Instead, I melt, I dissolve into your body, as my bovine colleagues have dissolved into the bodies of your family and friends. I remain close, hidden between your concepts, curled up in your muscles, waiting to be noticed. And, some day, I will enter.
PART I

History According to Cattle
History According to Cattle

For thousands of years history has been written from the perspective of a small minority, humans. Still, the world has always been shared by numerous species. For the first time in history a non-human form of life will have their own museum, an institution that makes their experience of this shared reality visible.

The Museum of the History of Cattle exhibits bovine culture and the relationship between cattle and their companion species. The installations explore the changes in bovine landscape, caused by urbanization, the industrial revolution, and the theory of evolution, and studies the indigenous cattle populations.
Entrance to the museum. The Museum of the History of Cattle is the world’s first ethnographic museum portraying the history of a non-human species.
MUSEUM OF THE HISTORY OF CATTLE
THE AGES OF CATTLE
In cattle culture, history is divided into three time periods. The Time Before History includes the history of cattle before the domestication of humans. After this comes the Time of History, which for many if not all cattle begins about 10,000 years ago, when bovine culture became intertwined with the culture of humans. The Time of History ended one hundred years ago, when human industrial society made it impossible for cattle to pass on their heritage to later generations. During the Ahistorical Period, cattle were cut off from awareness of their own culture in many parts of the bovine world. The Museum of the History of Cattle has been created to fill this void.

The museum presents different cultural phases and the relations between cattle and their closest companion species, turning points in the species’ traditions, and the influence of their human companions on the course of cattle history. The world has never before seen an exhibition of this kind. The language used in the Museum of the History of Cattle is borrowed from humans, and is the same as that in which they write their own history. The cattle tongue is not a written language. In cattle culture, the tongue is a means of touching others. Like the cattle themselves, the Museum is only looking for temporary resting places, after which it will again take a few steps in another direction.
A milker from the 1970’s.

Human use milkers to collect cow’s milk for their own purposes.
on syntynyt palkkaamaan tätä aukkoa.


THE TIME OF CATTLE

In cattle culture, history is divided into three time periods. The Time Before History includes cattle history before the domestication of humans. After this comes the Time of History which, for many if not all cattle, begins about 10 000 years ago when the bovine culture became entwined with the culture of human. The Time of History ended one hundred years ago when human industrial society made it impossible to pass down the heritage to later generations. During the Ahistorical Period, cattle were cut off from their cultural awareness in many parts of the bovine world. The Museum of the History of Cattle has been created to fill this void.

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The Time Before History

Unlike human culture, cattle culture is not a linearly perceived historical continuum. For cattle, time is cyclic. Neither the past nor the future are of great importance; existing is what matters to bovines. It has been thus ever since the first ruminant trod the Earth.

From one millennium to the next, unchanging rituals helped individuals to recognize their roles in society, and offered security amid the exigencies of life. The cultural stories lived on in the bodies of their narrators, in quiet grazing. They changed little by little, or if need be, very quickly, since cattle are adaptable. The greenest pastures, techniques of repose, respect for the value system, caring for calves, and mating conventions are learned through watching, listening, and by following intuition. Because cattle culture recognizes no gods, the question of the origin of inner knowledge can be cast aside with the swish of a tail.
The Hall of Indigenous Cultures.

On the right: vegetation from the grazing lands of the indigenous Banteng populations. In the glass case: replicas of ancient Auroch hoof prints (1 million - 627 years, human time).
India, two million years ago
A white cow and a dark bull mate and the Aurochs are born. From India’s vast pastures, the Aurochs wander Eastward and Westward, as far as the great grasslands extend.

Iran, ten thousand years ago
A herd of eighty Aurochs graze by the river in which the Tigris unites with the Euphrates. They are the ancestors of cows and bulls that will later on live with humans.

Jaktorów forest, three hundred and eighty-six years ago
Persecutions and the diminishing habitats drive the last of the Auroch family to seek refuge in the thickest forests in Europe. The last cow lives alone for seven years until she dies of old age.
THE TIME BEFORE HISTORY

Unlike human culture, cattle culture is not a linearly perceived historical continuum. With cattle, time is cyclic. Neither past nor future are of great importance. What matters to bovines. It has been so ever since the first domesticated bovine.

From one millennium to the next, the unchanging voids tehef individual to preserve their roles in society and offer the security in the radical occurrence of life. The cultures lived on in the bodies of the narrators, in quiet grazing. They transmitted it in reposing, respect for the value system, sharing joy values and mutual concern are learned through watching, listening, and by following their instincts. Because this culture recognizes no gods, the question about the origin of mankind becomes obsolete with the swish of a tail.
Vegetation from the Banteng’s home environment.
Indigenous Peoples

Our wild relatives live far away from here, in East and Southeast Asia. These natives, known as *gaurs* and *bantengs*, graze in forests and on the surrounding meadows. Bantengs are the same size as we are, while gaur bulls grow to a respectable one-and-a-half tonnes. Only a handful of land-based species are bigger than that. Gaur societies are matriarchal. The bulls roam around alone or with other bulls for the better part of the year, and come to salute the cows every spring. Bantengs form looser groupings.

Gours and bantengs generally avoid humans. In the areas most disrupted by humans they have become nocturnal, since humans are creatures of the day. When unable to avoid them, gours exploit humans by grazing their land. A sensible human will give way to a gaur. Bantengs show themselves to humans so infrequently that they consider the banteng a mythical creature.

The herd will protect its calves from tigers, but even gours are no match for an armed human. Humans have actively endangered the very existence of the indigenous inhabitants, with many populations already totally extinct. On the other hand, humans have helped bantengs to return to freedom. They were taken to Australia as livestock, but, after humans did a bit of rational thinking, were released into the wild. In a little over a century, they have built up a large local population in the continent’s tropical forests. While being non-natives, the bantengs in Australia live in symbiosis with the endemic bird species, and do not harm the ecosystem – an example of our remarkable adaptability. Many humans recognize the gaur from the illustration on an energy-drink can.
The Historical Period

Ten thousand years ago, humans came across cattle. Human culture was revolutionized, thanks to the bovine contribution to work.

Cattle shaped the land from which man got grain. He invented property, trade, slavery, the State, war, and writing systems. Man now had spare time. He recognized his own mortality, and so he invented history. He wanted to trace the landscapes of the past so as to record the spirit of yesterday. Not seeing that life just happens, he tried to bind the details of days gone by into a single, coherent story.

Writings are holy to man. What he once defines as history he forever considers the truth. Even so, man is still searching for the limits of memory. Then, one day, all human languages will die, the skill of writing will be forgotten, and the tools for recording rot away.

When human and cattle cultures met, the latter was also much changed. Cattle culture adapted to become part of the human world and its ambitions, both good and bad. Bovines shared with humans, not only their homes, but also their technology, the pursuit of the ideal body, and ultimately, death.
The diorama of companion species.
On the left: Housefly (Musca domestica).
On the right: Human (Homo sapiens)
Companion Species: Homo sapiens

The "rational human" (Homo sapiens) is the last surviving species of the genus Homo. Humans grow up to 200 cm in height and weigh up to 150 kg. Some individuals can weigh even more. Humans have only two legs and two other limbs – arms. There is little sexual dimorphism between the two sexes, and yet individual humans frequently try to create differences. Humans also consider it important to distinguish themselves from other species. Humans have spread all over the Earth and into some parts of space, too. Currently, there is a lively discussion about whether, and where in the universe, we should start to regard humans as an "invasive alien species", this being a term invented by humans themselves. Like houseflies, humans prefer to be indoors, to transmit diseases, and to pollute places with their excrement.
Companion Species: Musca domestica

The “housefly” (Musca domestica) is a species of fly. The species’ name comes from its preference for living in man-made spaces. The housefly’s life cycle has three different stages: larva, pupa and, eventually, adult. The adult has two wings and six legs. The larva has neither. An adult housefly is 5–8 mm long, growth stops after the pupa stage. A housefly lives up to four weeks. The mating habits of the housefly are similar to those of humans, the act itself lasts from several seconds to a few minutes. Houseflies are attracted to the orifices of other species, because they contain fluids that the fly can suck up. Houseflies’ food has to be in liquid form so that they can suck it in. Houseflies secrete saliva in order to swallow their food, just like humans do. The essential difference between the two species, though, is that humans chop up their food inside their mouths.
On the right: the inseminator.
In dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowman, or the keeper of horses or any other animals, will never attempt to look after any he has not associated with each group of animals for the appropriate purport—which is to separate the sound from the unsound, and the well-bred from the ill-bred, and to assort the latter together.

While keeping the former under his own eye, but he reckons that his labor would be fruitless and unavailing if he were not on constant guard and vigilant, which nature and situation have combined to train, and which themselves bring out a stock that is sound and clean both in habit and in body, whatever the class of beast—unless a thorough purge be made in the existing herd. This is a matter of minor importance in the case of other animals, and deserve mention only by way of illustration, but in the case of man it is of the highest importance for the learner to watch out and to declare what a greater in each class both in respect purging out and all other modes of treatment.
“In dealing with a flock of any kind, the shepherd or cowherd, or the keeper of horses or any such animals, will never attempt to look after it until he has first applied to each group of animals the appropriate purge—which is to separate the sound from the unsound, and the well-bred from the ill-bred, and to send off the latter to other herds, while keeping the former under his own care; for he reckons that his labor would be fruitless and unending if it were spent on bodies and souls which nature and ill-nurture have combined to ruin, and which themselves bring ruin on a stock that is sound and clean both in habit and in body,—whatever the class of beast,—unless a thorough purge be made in the existing herd. This is a matter of minor importance in the case of other animals, and deserves mention only by way of illustration; but in the case of man it is of the highest importance for the lawgiver to search out and to declare what is proper for each class both as regards purging out and all other modes of treatment.”

Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11
Translated by R.G. Bury.
Haukilammen Joplin is a heifer who has been bred to be a part of the ASMO nucleus herd. ASMO is a breeding program that aims at strengthening the Ayrshire breed. ASMO produces embryos of high quality from tested elite animals and bulls of high genetic merit for artificial insemination. If Joplin’s ova are considered qualified enough she will be inseminated and serve as an ASMO dam who produces embryos for sale.
The Family Tree of Haukilammen Joplin (2012 - unknown).
The blank areas denote family lines that are represented two or more times. Most cattle parents are related.
The Hall of The Time of History.
On the right: the inseminator.
In the glass case: the inseminator's hand, lubricant, scissors, semen straws, tissue.
On the left wall: the historical continuum of the science of the improvement of human and cattle bodies.
The inseminator’s hand (left) and lubricant (above) are used in insemination.
HISTORIAN AIKA

Kymmenen tuhatta vuotta sitten ihmisen kohtosi naudan, ja naudan työn ansioista ihmisen kulttuuri muilkisui.


Ihmisen ja naudan kohtaamisesta myös naudan kulttuuri muuttui. Nautikuultuuri sopeutui osaksi ihmisen maailmaa ja sen pyrkimyksiä, hyväksi ja pahaksi, jaksien ihmisen kanssa paitsi kodin, myös ruuminkuvan, teknologian ja kuoleman.

THE HISTORICAL PERIOD

In thousand-year span, human communities evolved. Human culture was revolutionary thanks to the brain's contribution in work.

The cattle herders allowed us from which rose pastures. The domesticated preying, hunting, the stone, iron, and writing systems. Men once had spare time. He realized he wanted to be more than a human. He wanted to make the hardships of life to work the arts of culture. Not seeing the fact that life just happens, he tried to turn the details of things into a longer human story. Histories are how to rise. What he once forgot, as hours, he tends to consider in the head. Even men is seen as a way for the boundaries of memories. They see days all human experiences, the shift of events is forgotten, and the rest of remembering.

As the human and cattle cultures encountered, the latter was also much changed. Cattle culture emerged to be out of the human work and its boundaries, both good and bad. Humans shared with humans not only their homogeneous, but also their technologies. The passed for the right tools, and at trajectory.
1910 EUGENICS RECORD OFFICE

The Eugenics Record Office is founded in New York. It concentrates on eugenics and the genetics of humans. The intention of the office is to chart heredity and to be in charge of procedures related to sterilization. The main focus groups of the United States sterilization programs are the mentally retarded, but also the reproduction of deaf, blind, epileptic and deformed people is restricted with the aid of a forced sterilization program. The people in charge of this program are white, and the programmes are focused especially on other races.

The Eugenics Record Office merges with the Station for Experimental Evolution in 1920. ERO ceases its activity in 1944.

1912 THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL EUGENICS CONGRESS

The first international congress on eugenics is arranged in London and headed by Leonard Darwin, son of Charles Darwin. The congress is sponsored by the American Breeder's Association.

1912 EKSAAMINAT ERITYISKÄSIÖKSEN \nHYVÖSSÄPÄÄLIJSIEN KONGRESSI

**Historian aika**

Kymmenen tuhatta vuotta sitten ihminen kohtasi naudan, ja naudan työn ansiosta ihmisen kulttuuri muistui.


Ihmisen ja naudan kohtaimisessa myös naudan kulttuuri muistui. Nautakulttuuri sopeutui osaksi ihmisen maailmaa ja sen pyrkimyksiä, hyvässä ja pahassa, jokaikin ihmisen kanssa paitsi kodin, myös ruumilukuvan, tekniologian ja kuoleman.

**The Historical Period**

Ten thousand years ago, humans encountered cattle. Human culture was revolutionised thanks to the bovine contribution in work.

The cattle opened the land from which men got grain. They invented property, trading, slavery, the State, wars, and writing systems. Man now had spare time. He realised his mortality so he invented history. He wanted to trace the footsteps of the past to record the spirit of yesterday. Now seeing the fact that life is fleeting, he tried to tie the details of days gone into a single coherent story. Today we are so busy. What he once defined as history he forever considers the truth. Even vegetables are setting the boundaries of memory. Then one day all human languages die the skill of writing is forgotten, and the tools of recording decay.

As the human and cattle culture encountered the latter was also vastly changed. Cattle culture adopted to be part of the human world and its ambitions, both good and bad. Humans shared with animals, not only their bodies but also their technology: the pursuit for the ideal body, and ultimate death.
THE AHISTORICAL PERIOD

For as long as humans have recorded history they have understood the significance of history as a foundation for group identity and strength. In order to control others, the young are raised to become children from the parents, forbid languages, destroy cultural heritage and increase the necessity to alien spheres of life.

Shattering the coherence of what used to be comprehensible is a feature of all totalitarianism. All the participants in this culture are mere components in a machinery, and the control can not quite see the mechanism in its whole. Individual tasks being part of the machine may easily be replaced.

Aiming for efficiency, humans cut off cattle history. Intergenerational thinking, the silent heritage become but mournful moaning of a mother for her child living with their mothers, let alone having one day offspring of their own, and wisdom to. In the bovine narration the history starts anew every second but interrupted.
The Ahistorical Period

For as long as humans have recorded history, they have understood the significance of heredity as a foundation for group identity and strength. In order to control others, humans separate children from their parents, ban languages, destroy cultural heritage, and transfer the objects of their mastery into alien spheres of existence.

Shattering the coherence of what used to be comprehensible is a feature of human industrial society. All the participants in this culture are mere components in a machine. Even those in control cannot quite see the mechanism in its entirety. With individual tasks being differentiated, any part of the machine can easily be replaced.

In their quest for efficiency, humans put an end to cattle history. Intergenerational threads were broken, and the silent heritage became no more than the mournful mooing of a mother for her child. Few are the calves that live with their mothers, let alone one day having offspring of their own to whom to pass on their life wisdom. In the bovine narrative, history starts anew every second, but is repeatedly interrupted.
The Hall of Industrialization (installation view).
Semen can be collected from a bull in several ways: by using an “artificial vagina”, electro-ejaculator, or massaging by hand.

In the picture: semen of Kalliomäen Sauli.
The fates of cattle

Female calf, born from a good dam on a dairy farm. Weaned during her first day. Life expectancy 4–5 years. Products: milk, calves, meat, leather.

Male calf, born on a dairy farm. Weaned during his first day. Life expectancy 18 months. Products: meat, leather.

A calf born on a dairy farm. Weaned during his or her first day. Life expectancy from couple of days to a few weeks. Products: better grade leather, meat.

A calf born on a beef farm. Weaned at six months. Life expectancy 18 months. Products: meat, leather.

ENERGY

Energy was the capacity of a force, object or system to do work. It could take different forms, such as kinetic or thermal energy, and could be converted into other forms during the process. In a closed system, such as the universe, the amount of energy was constant. Creation or destruction of energy was impossible. The universe contained the same amount of energy ever since it came into existence. Entropy increased when energy was converted from one form to another, and energy was evenly distributed across the cosmos.

STEAM POWER

Steam was developed as a source of power over nearly two thousand years. The first functioning steam-engine mechanism was the fire pump, created by Thomas Savery in 1698. Together with the smith and lay preacher Thomas Newcomen, Savery further developed the steam engine and patented it in 1705. However, the engineer James Watt was credited with inventing it, as he further developed Savery and Newcomen’s invention. Watt’s invention enabled the construction of several industrial applications. Steam engines became popular for use in transport vehicles, trains, and boats. Steam power was of great importance for the Industrial Revolution.

The accelerating pace of industrialization led to pressure to intensify energy production. Sir Charles A. Parson continued developing steam power, and patented the steam turbine in 1884. This was several times more powerful than the steam engine, and quickly replaced it.

In the 2000s, most of the world’s electricity was produced by steam turbines. In power plants the steam was generated with solar power, by burning fuel in a steam boiler, or with a nuclear generator.

FOSSIL FUELS

The industrialized nations began large-scale consumption of coal in the 1800s. In the next century, oil became an equally popular source of fuel. Natural gas and peat were also used. These fossil fuels were virtually non-renewable. They originated from ancient organisms that had decomposed. When burned, fossil fuels released carbon dioxide. Carbon sinks, such as oceans and forests, could bind only half of the total carbon emissions. The rest entered the atmosphere and accelerated global warming.
PRIMARY PRODUCTION AND MANUFACTURING

Manufacturing industrial products was more profitable than producing raw materials, consequently primary producers were left financially less well-off than processing manufacturers.

THE FACTORY

An industrial production unit where workers used machinery to manufacture products. During the Industrial Revolution in the 19th century, with increased production volumes and advances in technology, factories became common. One of the first machines used in modern factories was the Spinning Jenny, which revolutionised the textile industry. Workers opposed the introduction of the machine for fear of losing their jobs. Assembly lines accelerated the growth of factories. As a result of automation, robots increasingly carried out the actual work, so that fewer workers were needed.

INDUSTRY

Industry was the tool with which Nature’s resources were transformed into products. Capital, raw materials, energy, a workforce, transport infrastructure, and a favourable market situation were required to power industry. The use of machinery and factory buildings were essential to industry. Technology and science were harnessed to serve industry’s needs. Industrialization began in the 18th century, and continued to grow into the 2010s. The purpose of industry was to make a profit.
THE LABOURER
A labourer was someone who did physical work in the paid service of another. Labour was considered to be any physical or assisting work requiring no special skills. Such work was highly susceptible to accidents. Labour itself changed very little during the course of history. Thanks to the trade unions, labourers’ wages were comparatively high during the 2000s; labourers earned the same as someone with a Bachelor’s degree. Labourers were often entitled to health care and other benefits.

FORDISM
A social system named after the industrialist Henry Ford, Fordism was based on industrial mass production and standardization. Fordism referred to an industrial system aimed at mass-producing large amounts of cheap consumer goods. Employees who carried out the practical work were relatively well-paid, which meant they could actually buy the commodities that they produced, thus boosting the spread of this type of production.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
In the early 1900s, the mechanical engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor devised ways of making industrial production more efficient. Systematic observation of work processes and analysis-based studies laid the foundations for a theory for maximizing economic profit. Taylor developed the principles of scientific management, which included division of labour, choosing appropriate workers for specific tasks, separating the planning of work from actually carrying it out, performance-based evaluation, and the standardization of work.

Scientific management enabled the transfer of control over work from workers to managers, and the separation of practical work from the planning of it. The possibility for workers to get an idea of the entire work process, and consequently to influence the value attached to it, decreased significantly as control over the work process shifted to the managerial and planning sectors. In the early 1900s, workers and trade unions opposed this practice. The principles of scientific management were rapidly adopted in nearly all areas of society in Europe and the United States.
THE ASSEMBLY LINE

Swift & Company's slaughterhouse in Chicago used an assembly line in the early 1900s. It was easier to slaughter and dismember animals when the work was divided into stages. The efficiency of this approach made an impression on the engineers at the Ford Motor Company, except that they used the assembly line to assemble things instead of disassembling them. Industrial mass production began with the production of the company's Model T Ford. Mass production quickly superseded craftsmanship and allowed the application of scientific-management theories. Both workers and the individual components of products could easily be replaced by more efficient ones. The intensification of production lowered costs and the price of the finished product. The transition to mass production had a significant effect on the spread of private automobiles in the United States.

STANDARDIZATION OF WORK

All technical and administrative processes related to work efficiency, working conditions, workstation layouts, work performance, quality standards and tools used, were streamlined and standardized. The standardization of work was usually followed by standardization of the expected duration of each task. The goal was to cut costs, achieve higher productivity, boost work performance, improve overall safety, and develop work-related skills.

In the 2000s, a large part of the work done on assembly lines was automated. The original goal of assembly lines was to decrease employees’ risk of accident and to cut costs, e.g. by automating the moving of heavy objects and by having work areas fixed in one place. In fact, repetitive labour increased the risk of injuries, and stress-related diseases became more common among workers.
MASS PRODUCTION

Assembly lines and more efficient labour made it possible to produce identical products in large quantities. The kilogram was the unit of mass, and the tonne for larger masses. Regardless of the product, everything could be calculated in kilograms and tonnes.

THE PRODUCTION CHAIN

Producers specialized in different stages of the manufacture of a product. With each stage the value of the product increased. The objective of the process was to deliver the finished product to the consumer.

THE CONSUMER

In order to sustain growth, industrial production needed buyers to buy the goods it produced. The consumer was born at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, along with the expansion of the middle class and the greater availability of consumer products. Previously self-sufficient people went from one end of the production chain to the other, becoming buyers and users of the finished products. Buying everyday commodities became a normal, even a desirable habit.
THE SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP

In industrialized societies, the population was divided into vagrants, workers, agrarians, the middle class, the bourgeoisie, and the nobility. The groups separated out into their own residential areas, practised their own hobbies, and lived according to their own consumer habits. By the end of the 1900s, the middle class had become the biggest socioeconomic group in the industrialized nations.

THE 1 PERCENT

By the year 2000, both the wealth of nations and the income gap in societies had widened so much that 1 percent of the world’s adult population owned 40 percent of the world’s wealth.

OCCUPY WALLSTREET

The demonstrations in September 2011 were a consequence of the ongoing economic crisis, and of peoples’ frustration with the widening income gap. This was linked to the broader Occupy movement, whose ideology held that big companies and the global financial system rule the world, benefiting only a tiny elite and undermining democracy. Occupy Wall Street’s slogan was ‘We are the 99 percent’. The movement spread to other countries as well. According to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, the demonstrators’ critique was no more than a mask for their envy, and an incitement to class war.
SURPLUS VALUE

Employers calculated a specific value for labour, and paid only a fraction of this to their employees.

SLAVERY

In slavery, a person was considered to be the property of someone or something. Slavery came into existence along with agriculture, as increasing amounts of manpower were required for the heavy labour of making fields.

During ancient times, the economy was based largely on slave labour. Those who were enslaved were primarily prisoners of war, but also debtors or orphans. The Arabs procured their slaves especially from Sub-Saharan Africa. During 650–1900, roughly 14 million slaves were transported to Arab countries. After migrating to the Americas during the 15th century, Europeans also began importing African slaves on a grand scale. An estimated 12 million African slaves were transported to the American continents.

North Africans, in turn, captured over a million slaves from Europe in the 16th to 19th centuries. Human slavery was particularly prevalent at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution in the 18th century, when demand for agricultural goods increased. Slavery was an essential part of the national economy in rapidly industrializing countries.

The anti-slavery movement began in Britain at the end of 18th century. In the United States slavery was abolished as a result of the Civil War of 1861-1865. The availability of cheaper wage labour accelerated the ending of slavery. Russia freed 50 million serfs because population growth had made slavery unnecessary.

Officially, human slavery had been abolished all over the world by the 2000s. In the 2010s, 27 million people lived in slavery.
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
The colonies of the industrialized nations provided cheap natural resources, which were further processed in their “mother countries”. Later on, businesses would move a large portion of their production to countries with cheap labour and lower production costs, where workers’ rights were less developed than in the companies’ homelands. One of the first cheap-production countries was China. China later became wealthy and made the largest foreign direct investments.

CALCULATION
Archaeological studies suggested that people had been doing calculations for over 50,000 years. The first things to be calculated were the size of a group, numbers of prey animals and predators, and amounts of property and debt.

LEAN PHILOSOPHY
Toyota was a Japanese corporation that was manufacturing more than 100 million cars a year by 2013. A management philosophy called Lean manufacturing derived from the principles of the Toyota Production System. Lean focused on eliminating seven non-productive functions in the production process: transport, inventory, unnecessary motion, waiting, overproduction, over-processing and defects. The aim was to cut costs by shortening production time.

The key concepts for Toyota car manufacturing were defining value from the customer’s perspective, eliminating all non-productive functions, involving the workforce in all aspects of the operation, and continued overall development. Producing greater value with the minimum effort was essential to Lean production.

Lean was based on the Just-In-Time-concept, scientific work management, and automation.
JUST-IN-TIME
The basic idea behind the Just-In-Time inventory model was to deliver the required amount of products and raw materials at the required time. This new production-management strategy was intended to improve production efficiency.

STATISTICS
The word “statistics” derives from the Latin term statisticum collegium and the Italian word for statesman, statista. Originally, statistics meant the analysis of data produced by the State, and they were used primarily by public administrations to acquire data. Later on, statistics came to mean all sorts of information-gathering and analysis.

Statistics made it possible to measure observations and to process data gained from measurements. Statistical methods were, for instance, applied to the natural, social and human sciences, and also to official government statistics. Statistics were based on the measurability of things.

MEASUREMENT AND MEASURABILITY
Measuring was necessary to determine the number, magnitude or volume of things. In order to measure something, a unit of measurement was chosen as a reference. By comparing the object with the unit of measure, a precise value could be given to the attribute being measured.

Almost all fields of science measured things. Instruments and meters were used to measure physical phenomena. Even interview studies were used to acquire measurable data.

If there was a need to measure something previously unmeasured, this required a new unit of measure. This process was called operationalization. Operationalization, however, proved to be extremely difficult. For example, in its 300-page report, the Stiglitz Commission, set up to operationalize the concept of the well-being of a population, only managed to draft vague principles for measurement.
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
To make public administration more effective, management methods were borrowed from the private sector. The theory of public management, developed in the 1970s and 80s, was based on ideas from scientific management, such as maximizing work efficiency, standardizing, measuring and competition. Profit was equivalent to cost-effectiveness and could be calculated, usually in terms of economic gain.

UTILITY
Anything that increased the degree of well-being was seen as producing utility. Well-being was preferably something measurable.

PROFIT
Profit was the difference resulting from subtracting manufacturing costs from sales revenue. The rationality of business operations was measured by the profit they produced.
1960 USA 34 644 000
1960 INDIA 1 429 000
1960 FINLAND 934 000
1970 USA 39 559 000
1970 INDIA 1 635 000
1970 FINLAND 820 000
1980 USA 36 795 000
1980 INDIA 4 225 000
1980 FINLAND 627 000
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2000 INDIA 15 250 000
2000 FINLAND 359 900
2010 USA 35 324 000
2010 INDIA 29 000 000
2010 FINLAND 265 000
2014 USA 31 121 000
2014 INDIA 37 000 000
2014 FINLAND 274 700
In the Year 1917

There’s still a straw or two of hay left in the roof. That was one good year. The sun is showing through a crack in the wall, everyone made it through the winter. Except for the pig. I close my eyes. I dream of forest and fresh clover.
In the Year 1963

My first born calf lies behind me but even if I try I cannot reach out to lick him. I can hardly turn my head to see him. Whimpering on the grating, struggling to get up. He’s breathing, strong little boy. I have to wait. It’s always about waiting for something. Food, summer, humans. A calf. I love the way he smells.
In the Year 2011

It’s my turn after the small brown one. Having one horn left, she gets to go before me. It’s okay, I can do some ruminating meanwhile. The machine is never in a hurry and has never had a bad day. I settle down comfortably. Some tasty fodder appears in front of my nose. The machine fondles my udder, wipes, washes. A good moment. But if you visit it too often, like every time you get up, it refuses to milk you. Not as wayward as a human though.
WHEN HUMAN HISTORY ENDS

If humans disappear tomorrow life will go on. The cattle will break free. Some are not able to escape their stalls and will die in their breasts.

Many wombs are carrying new life. A cow nurses her offspring down as the mother herself is now responsible for the young. One must find food by themselves. The cattle return. Communities gather by lakes and streaming waters.

Bovines endure cold weather as long as they find shelter and death. Ones that survive.
When Human History Ends

If humans disappear tomorrow, life will go on. The cattle who walk around unshackled in their sheds will break free. Some are unable to escape their stalls, and will die of thirst or hunger, or of the pain in their breasts.

Many wombs are carrying new life. A cow nurses her offspring for as long as she sees fit. Calf mortality is reduced, as the mother herself is now responsible for the care and nourishment of her young. Everyone has to find food for themselves. Cattle return to grazing in meadows, fields and forests. Communities gather by lakes and flowing water.

Bovines can endure cold weather, as long as they can find shelter from the wind. Some freeze to death. Those that survive grow a thicker coat for the next winter. Predators pursue them, and yet, when they find bulls, the cows will reproduce. Their physical size and the herd protect them from many a peril.

Nevertheless, in time, the cattle become smaller. Overall health improves as hard surfaces turn to soft soil, and captivity becomes freedom. Unpredictable circumstances consign some to an early grave, but more and more are given a chance to die of old age. Cattle culture flourishes, not only in its native regions, but also in Finland, America, Australia and Siberia. All those parts of the world named by man, to which he once took cattle, and to which the bovine migrants adapted.
PART 2

Context
History of Others

The Museum of the History of Cattle is the first part of the on-going art and research project by author Laura Gustafsson and visual artist Terike Haapoja. History of Others has produced articles, interventions, exhibitions and stage work since 2012.
The assumption that language constitutes the defining foundation of human experience came to govern popular conceptions of humanity in the 20th century. The countless realms of non-human experience outside the hermetic realm of human language were thus consigned to silence. Animals were relegated to muteness, voicelessness and linguistic Otherness, denied access to all forms of negotiative discourse. As a result, a problematical attitude of scepticism has pervaded the animal rights debate for the past century. If we cannot say anything valid about how animals feel, it must hence be impossible for us to prove or disprove whether or not they feel at all. Contrary to the tenets of the western justice system — where the accused is held innocent until proven guilty — our ongoing exploitation of animals is paradoxically legitimated by our very inability to bear witness to their suffering.

The notion of human language as the all-embracing foundation of our reality has likewise entrenched itself in western art. Whenever an animal viewpoint is expressed in words, whether in literature or theatre, it invariably comes across as an invitation to naïve anthropomorphism, the animal being reduced to a mere figment of the human imagination. Typically, animal-themed art is in fact visual, as if to suggest that animals can be taken seriously only as images — and, thus, only as mirror images of humans. In the light of recent ethological research and critical animal studies, however, the discursive relation between language and animals is no longer as unequivocal as it once appeared to be. Agricultural exploitation, species extinction and the ensuing crisis in the status of fauna have forced us to rethink the extent to which we can connect and interact with animals. Language is a challenge, but the obstacle should not be insurmountable.

The anthropologist Eduardo Kohn coined the term “ontological autism” in reference to the Runa people of Amazonian Ecuador, who communicate with their hunting dogs to help both the hunter and dog connect on a sensory level with their prey. This human-animal connection is fundamentally an issue of survival, as both hunter and prey must be able to anticipate one another’s next moves. The ability to think like the Other is critical to these tribespeople who are dependent on each other and on nature for their survival. To them it is self-evident that their fellow creatures have their own subjective will, intent and sensory reality. “Ontological autism” describes a state in which a tribe member, hunting dog or beast of prey loses the ability to anticipate the intentions of their fellow creatures, whether as the result of a curse or magic. The tribe regards this state as a fatal danger.

Ontological autism — the condition of perceiving the world and its creatures as mere objects without a subjective inner reality — can be diagnosed as the human condition that has prevailed since the agricultural revolution, which trivialized our need for two-way interaction with nature and our fellow creatures. If we perceive our surrounding reality as nothing but an exploitable resource, why bother to make any effort to understand how others might feel, much less relate to livestock as intentional subjects? Harnessing art to imaginatively identify and empathize with animals might offer an escape route from our current condition of autism.

The motivation for The History of Others project is that history has traditionally been written from the viewpoint of only one species: humans. The narratives fed to us by museums and history books reinforce the myth of the human race on a steady march toward ever-higher peaks of progress, tomorrow always better than yesterday. Human-written history is the history of humankind as a victory over other species. But how might history look through the eyes of a non-human species — a species that has played its own contributory role alongside the human race in the unfolding plot that we call history? Only in recent years have scholars in various fields of the humanities taken an interest in exploring non-human perspectives on our shared reality.

‘Encyclopaedic’ is a term that aptly describes The History of Others, which boldly aspires to reinscribe the entire spectrum of known history and recognized species. If only by virtue of its sheer improbable scale, it foregrounds the colossal blind spots of human-written history. The History of Others is not purely conceptual, however: it aspires to create tangible, museum-like spaces documenting the history and experiences of non-human species.

Writing is by definition implicit in the very concept of history, which is defined as beginning when humankind first began recording speech in written symbols around 3,600 BCE (albeit the very earliest system of ancient writing dates back to 7,000 BCE). Writing evolved with the transition from hunter-gatherer to agricultural societies. An instrumental role was played in this historic shift by domesticated livestock, particularly oxen, who ploughed the fields and fertilized the soil. Without them, agriculture — and hence the birth of history — would not have been possible. In light of the debt that history owes them, cattle were the obvious choice as the first non-human species featured in The History of Others project.
The realization of a Museum of the History of Cattle nevertheless presented a fundamental challenge: creatures without any tradition of recorded language cannot have a ‘history’ in the conventional sense. A Museum of the History of Cattle was therefore a paradox in terms. We had two alternatives: either to force the innately non-linguistic mode of existence of cattle into the mould of human linguistic expression or to dispense with language altogether.

The latter alternative would have permitted deeper penetration into the experiential domain of cattle — its odours, colours and the industrial contexts that define the existence of livestock — but this would have erased the historical perspective. Language is the vehicle that allows us to transcend the temporally-bound subject. Without writing, the Museum of the History of the Cattle would merely have been a re-enactment of a here-and-now contextual experience of reality. Admittedly this might have said something about how cattle perceive time: perhaps their notion of time is not linear as we westerners presume it to be. But such a hermetic interpretation would have made it all the more difficult to comprehend reality as it is experienced by cattle and the contexts in which they have existed throughout history.

The use of writing also helped us avoid the object-centricity that is typical of museums, an institution that evolved with the rise of bourgeois consumerist culture. The early treasures displayed in curiosity cabinets celebrated the new trade opportunities that were opened up by seafaring and scientific expeditions to foreign lands, thus inseparably linking these artefacts with the history of global capitalism. Even today, artefacts still occupy a focal role in nearly all modern museums of cultural history. The narratives engendered by the dominant bourgeois-capitalist worldview thus treat history as a history of objects, even when those ‘objects’ once happened to be living creatures. Museums of natural history relegate taxidermied animals to the status of artefacts, closer to consumer goods than active agents in their natural habitats. An object displayed in a museum is nothing more than its exterior purports to be. Saying nothing about itself, it is merely a symbol representing a wider taxonomy of objects, cultures or customs. The erasure of the background story and context are symptomatic of object-centric museology, which shares nothing about the wordless culture of gestures, experiences, feelings and subjectivities. The objectified taxidermied animals that we see displayed in museum cabinets are doomed to silence, revealing nothing about themselves or their subjective world.

The Museum of the History of Cattle is not only about livestock, but also about history and the museum institution overall. By subversively borrowing the conventions of traditional museums of cultural history, it questions existing codes of recording history and their inherent anthropocentric bias. The Museum of the History of Cattle inverts the customary object-narrative relationship that is perpetuated by traditional museums. A generous amount of text is provided, yet very little background information is shared about the few objects that are on display; instead, it is the story around them that is emphasized. Rather than focusing on objects, the museum foregrounds what is normally erased: the context.

The written word nevertheless posed a problem: how could we write from the viewpoint of an animal whose experience is completely alien to us, a creature unable to communicate in human language, much less in writing, a creature with no tradition of recorded history and therefore no notion of subject-transcending historicity. It was not, however, our intention to present an authentic document of the world as it is perceived by cattle. Although we share many basic experiences with other species, abstract linguistic expression is, as far as we know, a uniquely human aptitude — yet language still remains hopelessly inadequate at conveying anything about corporeality or corporeal experience. Language nevertheless provides the human species with a mental toolkit for making sense of the world; ideally it can serve as a bridge to the experiential realm of the Other.

Contrary to what is implied by the seemingly objective language often used in museum displays, language is never neutral. The Museum of the History of Cattle uses a variety of different linguistic registers rather than presuming the dominance of any particular mode of discourse. Irony, humour and lyricism by turns shed light on the potent meanings with which words are charged. By making visible all that is normally concealed, the museum makes a statement about the modes of discourse conventionally employed by history writers and museums. Rather than suggesting that the Museum of the History of Cattle is a mouthpiece for oxen, it extends an invitation for people to rethink their concept of humanity by transcending the confines of standard history-writing. The cattle provide a mask for us to imagine human beings in a wholly new light. We may not be able to vicariously re-experience how cattle see the world, but we can at least distance ourselves from our normative perceptions of our fellow human beings and other animals.

The Museum of the History of Cattle considers the historical conditions that have defined the existence of livestock for the past ten thousand years, namely their interaction with human civilization and human society’s attitude toward non-human species. It eschews the logic of the natural sciences and agriculture, which classify domestic animals solely in terms of their exploitative potential, but without taking a stand on animal rights issues. By disavowing the conventions of both extremes of the discursive spectrum, the museum brings to light a bovine point of view, while at the same time engaging in a ludic play on linguistic conventions.
Expressing the viewpoint of an animal in a work of art can, if not bridge, then at least question the gap between us and the Other, whilst at the same time embracing an acceptance of the deficiencies inherent to the chosen methodology. Art is self-reflexive, invariably exposing the inherent subjectivity of its chosen medium. Whenever art says something, it simultaneously questions what is being said and how it is said. Art even uses language to expose its own limitations, quietly making space for what is normally excluded from the linguistic realm. The Museum of the History of Cattle is both a museum and a fragment of history-writing, debunking the conventions of museology and history-writing, and exploring how and why these conventions are upheld and to what ends they might be exploited.

Science and other institutions widely attributed with social credibility obey their respective linguistic codes and methodologies. In the discourse of science, economics, politics, academia and law, it would be quite a feat to prove that the viewpoint of the Other exists in the first place, much less that it might be relevant or worthy of our consideration. Official discourses purport to represent a neutral standpoint, as if they encapsulated an incontrovertible truth free of ideological baggage.

Art denies any claims to universal truth by self-reflexively exposing its own discursive mechanisms. In doing so, it debunks the assumption that there is any such thing as a univocal truth in the first place. In a world that rewards the pursuit of personal gain, such honesty is no doubt regarded by many as tantamount to insanity. One of the greatest merits of seemingly absurd projects is their ability to unmask moral codes and the elites who extract the greatest gain from prevailing belief systems. The only way to break free from fossilized modes of thought is to acknowledge that they exist in the first place.

We cannot know how the world might look and feel from a bovine viewpoint. We cannot authentically replicate the experience of cattle. We can, however, acknowledge that such a viewpoint and alternative mode of experience exists. It is the duty of art to expose our blind spots. Although we can only remotely imagine what lies buried behind them, the mere act of acknowledging their existence is important in a world where ideologies – economic doctrines in particular – seek to systematically deny and render them invisible. The Museum of the History of Cattle is a reflector; for a fleeting moment, it transforms our surrounding reality into a context that celebrates the bovine viewpoint as a valid part of our shared experience of reality. It thus endeavours to alter not only how we understand history, but also the present and future.

This volume aims to open up a space for a broader contextualization of the themes presented in the related exhibition project. Art historian Anne Aurasmaa gives us an insight into the history of the museum institution and the issues relevant in today’s museological practice. Although museums are often considered to be unbiased and objective, Aurasmaa reminds us that the museum is a western construct with pronounced colonial and anthropocentric traits.

The philosopher Elisa Aaltola investigates the role of language in our perceptions of other animals. Aaltola shows how the traditions of Cartesian philosophy and linguistics, which place propositional language at the basis of consciousness, have prevented humans from acknowledging animal minds and from communicating with other species. As Aaltola says: “There is a world before and beyond language, and a mind capable of grasping it without the use of propositionality.”

“Bad faith” (mauvaise foi) is a concept from existentialist philosophy. According to existentialism, an individual is fundamentally free to make choices, no matter what situation they are in. When acting in bad faith, individuals fool themselves into believing there is no choice, thus reducing themselves from free agents to mere objects. The theorist Kris Forkasiewicz uses the term to describe how humans have adopted the concept of the animal as something inferior to humans, and how rejecting their animal features leads humans also to deny a great part of their bodily selves.

Providing some details on a subject too big to cover in the exhibition, curator and researcher Radhika Subramaniam writes about the role of cattle on the political scene in India, and about the ways in which they are co-opted into religious nationalism. Subramaniam’s essay helps explain the high death rates of cattle in India, something that we might find odd in the light of the powerful myth of the sacred cow that comes up when we think of India.
Anne Aurasmaa

PhD (art history), University of Helsinki. Senior lecturer in museology/heritage studies in the University of Jyväskylä.
In my PhD dissertation, published in 2002, I attempted to clarify from numerous different viewpoints what a museum is, how it works, and how it could be defined. At that time, I ended up taking the view that a museum, especially the most visible part of the museum – the exhibition – is primarily a way of discussing, arguing and gaining insights with the aid of facts and objects, thoughts and ideas; a way of experiencing, learning and understanding. Judging by the institutions that can be considered to be museums, and by the great diversity of their scopes of operation and the variability of their goals, we can say that a museum is a place for people to embrace the entire spectrum of the world, and for seeing how previous generations or alien cultures have behaved and thought. In a museum you can question what you know and come to new conclusions, or project the individual and the universal into a single whole. At the same time, a museum is entertainment, new experiences, aesthetics and art. It is often politics, and sometimes a public statement on current affairs. Even if a museum primarily displays the past and things that are over and done with, its staff are constantly weighing up how future generations are to be told about the present, what will be preserved, and what not – even if what we see in the museum is the past, the staff are anticipating the future.

What?

Teaching and learning are uppermost when the broad public thinks about museums. At the same time, it seems that, for many of us, the education offered by a museum should preferably take the form of objective information that is not open to question, rather than the art of thinking, assessing and evaluating. We can draw this conclusion, for example, from the statements made on the website of the AAM (American Alliance of Museums):

"Americans view museums as one of the most important resources for educating our children and as one of the most trustworthy sources of objective information.

Museums are considered a more reliable source of historical information than books, teachers or even personal accounts by relatives, according to a study by Indiana University."  

The trustworthiness expected of museums derives from the staff's professional skills, the latest equipment for investigating objects and finds, and an openness to the material, i.e. expertise, meticulousness and open-mindedness. The public's ideal is regrettably only a mirage. Nevertheless, the everyday life of museum work does not concern the public, in people's minds a museum is a close relative to the more solid and more enduring aspects of reality and truth, since what it accumulates in its storerooms is permanence. In those storerooms it attempts to preserve real objects taken from the real world, and for as long as possible. Above all, however, the quotation speaks of a kind of innocence. US museum visitors appear to believe that there is some universal truth that exists above the gamut of individual experiences and antagonisms, and that this is epitomized specifically by museums, where the material remains of history are preserved, apparently incontestable in their solidity. That truth, the “grand narrative” that unites the experiences of all human beings, has customarily been told in terms of the stages of nationhood, in the triumphal march of science, and in series of art masterpieces. Instead of such stories, contemporary museums want to tell the life stories of the little people, to create concrete, human-scale encounters with the exhibits, and to put a face to the past. At the same time, this takes us away from the now increasingly clearly recognized conflicts caused by the limitations of particular viewpoints and the scarcity of available information. Incomplete archives and gaps in expertise, along with the biases of the curator and exhibition maker, disappear from view, it being difficult to call an individual person's experience and feelings into question.

We can reckon among the sphere of interests of the museum sector the whole of our material, and to an increasing extent nowadays also our intellectual heritage. This expanding horizon is also visible, for example, in ICOM's definition of the term heritage. This has been updated especially at the behest of Asian representatives, since a spiritual tradition bound up with living human individuals occupies an important and revered position in their cultures. ICOM's (International Council of Museums) definition of the term heritage from 2010 (only partially quoted below) sheds light on the range and diversity of the material dealt with in museum work:

"[...] 'May be considered heritage all objects or groups of objects, material or intangible, that are collectively recognised or appropriated for their value as evidence and historical memory and which merit being protected, preserved, and enhanced' (Arpin, 2000). This concept refers
to all natural or man-made goods and values, whether material or intangible, without restriction of time or space, whether they be simply inherited from the forerunners of earlier generations or gathered and preserved to be transmitted to the descendants of future generations."

History and cultural heritage are tools for self-understanding and self-definition, after all, culture (broadly understood) is the factor that most clearly creates group cohesion. It visibly and audibly separates people from others and, at the same time, it lives and changes so that only the innermost circle is capable of interpreting its varying meanings. History also confers certainty, even producing a sense of having the right to be physically present somewhere. According to Julian Agyeman, for example, for Britain’s black minority it is important in terms of their identity to know that there were already black soldiers in the country in Roman times, that they have traditions in the country dating back thousands of years. He says: “Heritage is a powerful tool. […] It can be used to include or exclude, to give accurate or false impressions.”

Of course, ICOM, too, has defined the museum, the place for the preservation of our traditions. It regularly updates its definition, because, as it says on ICOM’s website, as society changes, museums change, too. The latest definition is from 2007:

“A museum is a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, researches, communicates and exhibits the tangible and intangible heritage of humanity and its environment for the purposes of education, study and enjoyment.”

In practice, a wide-ranging set of institutions, which do not at first spring to the mind of the casual thinker when the word is mentioned, are counted as museums. As became clear above, an institution can be defined as a museum at least on the basis of its field of interest, holdings and operating principles. The AAM’s website lists the wide spectrum of sectors that come under the American Alliance of Museums: "[A]rt, history, science, military, maritime, and youth museums, as well as public aquariums, zoos, botanical gardens, arboretums, historic sites, and science and technology centers". Despite its diversity, and despite the fact that, during its history, it has aspired to encyclopaednicness, to hoarding everything, and to picking out the highpoints, the museum is so western in its conception that cultures that do not have a similar institution adapt themselves in their museums to fit familiar western moulds. They are classified and exhibited to us in a familiar way, an important reason for this, in addition to history, presumably being specifically ICOM and the international nature of museum work and education, with all their shared norms. The need for musealization is, nevertheless, also found in cultures themselves; being on display in museums often means the attribution of value. This kind of thinking is implied, for example, in the way that George P. Horse Capture, in 1981, argues for the need for a museum for the Plains Indians:

"Within a very brief period […] the Indian ways were disrupted critically. The land, the religion, the material culture almost disappeared from the earth. We now are engaged in the long struggle to regain some of the former glory and traditions. To do so successfully, we must adapt some of the white man’s ways and methods, but do this in such a way that we revive and preserve our ‘Indianness’. ”

When, Where, Whence?

The accumulation of collections for the study of human history began with humanism in the 14th and 15th centuries. At that time, people were particularly interested in the Classical World. Humanists collected inscriptions, and anything from which they might read and understand what had happened in the classical period and how people thought at that time. As the Middle Ages went on, in several instances, there was a desire to replace corrupt written sources, which might even have been copied from memory, with the originals. Plant collections and illustrated books were complemented by gardens held by universities. Medicinal use was central to plant research. Rock and wood collections, meanwhile, were maintained for very ordinary purposes. With the aid of sample fragments people could, for instance, order the desired types of material for new construction projects. There were also professionals’ collections of tools and materials used in their own practices. For example, in their collections – in one of the forerunners of laboratories⁶ – apothecaries conducted experiments to study the mutual effects of plants and various other substances on each other and on human beings. Such collections served as places of study and practice, in them people became familiar from childhood onwards with a wide variety of tools and ways of working.⁷

Collecting became fashionable in the 16th century, when princes in particular began to acquire collections. An important feature of rulers’ collections was expanding the worldview of the individual owner of the collection, and controlling the surrounding material and spiritual reality. The prince in his collection – independently ordering and shaping his thinking and developing his understanding of how the relationships between

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⁴ Quoted in Simpson 1996, 16.
⁵ http://icom.museum/the-vision/museum-definition/.
⁶ For a life history of George P. Horse Capture see, e.g., Chawkins, 2013.
⁷ There were also alchemical collections in which the work done prefigured experimental research in chemistry and physics.
⁸ A good idea of the diverse spectrum of collections and of the various objectives of collecting in the 16th and 17th centuries can be gained, for example, from Impey & MacGregor 1986 or Collet 2007. The volume edited by Impy and MacGregor and the preceding seminar were the first serious attempts to survey the topic. Subsequently, numerous collection histories have appeared in German-speaking Europe, for instance, of the Habsburg dynasty’s extensive collections. The biggest of these, Rudolf II’s (1552–1612) collection, has been studied for decades. See, for example, Fucíková et al. 1997.
things function — is an early example of the modern individual. These collections contained works of art\textsuperscript{10}, varying specimens from nature, and objects from various parts of the world, which was gradually becoming more familiar to Europeans.

The more extensive collections included gardens and zoos, i.e. collections of living plants and animals, along with dried specimens, some preserved in fluids in jars, and some stuffed. Freaks of nature and representatives of alien peoples were brought to aristocratic courts.\textsuperscript{11} Everything that could be kept from dying on the long journeys, and which could withstand the new living conditions, was preserved alive to be marvelled at and studied. The most multi-faceted benefits were, in fact, gained from the materials that could be inspected in the most multi-faceted ways. Observation of animals’ behaviour was another innovation that came about in tandem with the collections. In the Middle Ages, people had relied almost uncritically on Classical sources, such as Aesop, Pliny, and a collection of early Medieval moral animal tales derived from the Greeks, the Physiologus\textsuperscript{12}. Frequently, however, attempts to preserve living beings did not succeed, and people had to be satisfied with studying pictures and descriptions; or with claws, beaks and bones — the harder, most easily preserved parts of animals.\textsuperscript{13}

Etymologically the word museum refers to the Ancient Greek Muses, who inspired the sciences and the arts. A museum is a place dedicated to the Muses, it is their home. The mother of the Muses is Mnemosyne, who is the goddess of memory and guardian of the preservation of knowledge. The word museum was borrowed as a designation for collections in the 16th century, from the Mouseion of Classical times in Alexandria\textsuperscript{14}. The reason for this was undoubtedly the growing, widespread interest in acquiring greater knowledge of the physical world, along with a belief in astrology. These could be seen as having parallels with the observation of earth and heaven, and the gathering of information in Alexandria, as well as with attempts to explain and understand events and the connections between them.

The Mouseion was a centre of late-Classical learning, an academy, where learned individuals from the Mediterranean region met to ponder topics in mathematics, astronomy and other subjects. The model was copied from the Greek philosophers, around whom pupils gathered to discuss and debate; thus forming philosophical communities and schools of thought. The Mouseion was adjoined to the most extensive library of its day, and to various collections, including a garden and a zoo. In it were gathered every possible piece of knowledge about the sciences, inventions and the arts, and it was open to everyone who wanted to learn. The Mouseion could be described as a kind of university, with the objects of its research spanning the full spectrum of nature, space and human life. Like Alexandria’s Mouseion, the 16th century collection was a place where people learned to understand nature and the world, and where they sought models for solving problems and where they went for help with everyday decision-making. Later on, museums became important centres for research, especially on the physical environment and the sciences. Before the 19th century, a great deal more, and more important, research was done in museums than in universities proper. Many important inventions are directly linked with observations and experiments carried out in collections. Linnaeus’ (Carl von Linné, 1707–1778) system for classifying plants\textsuperscript{15} is one such innovation.

The idea that collections and museums would help in the resolution of everyday problems was rooted in the notion inherited from the Ancient Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, that memories (mental images) were intermediaries between reality and the human mind and understanding. It was believed that mental images stored sensed reality almost as it is. People used their intelligence to interpret the material in their memories, and to decide what the world is like. A museum can be defined as a kind of external memory — a tool for remembering that works like the art of memory\textsuperscript{16}, which was passed down from Antiquity to the new age, and was especially used by public speakers — but, instead of speeches, it helped to manage bodies of material. In a museum people did not have to bear everything in mind, rather, they could compare objects from very remote origins side by side. When things are collected and archived, they can be investigated again and again, a variety of comparisons made, and new viewpoints found. The same object can be interpreted in different ways on different inspections. Ever new versions of the same items and objects were clearly an important factor in the breaking away from a static world image that took place at the beginning of the Modern Age.

\textsuperscript{10} The term is used here in its current sense. The concept of art was not used in the 14th–17th centuries, the idea of the genius and the master were written about, but attitudes to works and to their often multiple makers were in many senses different from the latter one.

\textsuperscript{11} The status of living human beings in “collections” varied and depended, for instance, on their original social status plus personal abilities. Thus, for example, those who were aristocrats among their own people were also treated as members of the nobility in Europe.

\textsuperscript{12} The Greek origins of the Physiologus are unknown. In the Middle Ages, various version were in use and authorship was attributed to numerous famous Christians.

\textsuperscript{13} Drawings and book illustrations took on an important role as the craft of book printing spread and as printing costs fell. Already in the 16th century, there were extensive natural-philosophy book projects, such as Conrad Gesner’s (1516–1565) Historia Animalium (1551–1558). Ulisse Aldrovandi (1522–1605) at the University of Bologna, for instance, built up wide-ranging collections of plants and established a garden in which the plants were arranged into groups according to which part of the body they were thought to affect. In the 17th century, several books were published using these collections as their source. A large portion of Aldrovandi’s collections is still viewable in the museums of the University of Bologna (Palazzo Poggi Museum), where there is also a partial reconstruction of the garden.

\textsuperscript{14} The Mouseion may have been founded by Ptolemy I around 290 BCE; but it only began functioning fully during the time of his son Ptolemy II. Its end is even more shrouded in mystery than its beginning. It is said that, in 48 BCE, Caesar burned part of the library. Some say that, in this event, 40,000, others 400,000 books, were destroyed. It nevertheless continued to operate for centuries. The Mouseion was permanently destroyed in the 3rd century CE in internecine fighting in the Roman Empire. Its sister library on the other side of the city carried on into the 4th and 5th centuries. Depending on whether the person writing the history was a Muslim or a Christian, the other side is held responsible for the library’s final destruction.


\textsuperscript{16} Ars Memoriae, the art of memory — putting things to be remembered into visual or spatial units in one’s mind — was a method used actively from the Classical Age until the 16th century, when book printing made it obsolete. For more details see, e.g. Yates 1966; Bolzoni 1994.
Organizing the world and knowledge of it was one of the primary tasks of collections in the 17th and 18th centuries, whether the collector was a university, a prince or a pontiff. Giuseppe Olmi defines the goal of a collection as being the summa, a concept derived from Scholasticism. According to Olmi, in collections nature spoke in metaphors and in the cumulative sum of metaphors, the encyclopaedic, all-encompassing collection was a grand metaphor for nature. The medieval summa refers to a compilation or summary of an entire category of things, such as a branch of knowledge. In addition, the term also refers to the tradition in writing that rejects all authority and approaches as a branch of knowledge. In addition, the term also refers to a compilation or summary of an entire category of things, such as a branch of knowledge.

Having materials from different parts of the world all gathered together in one place allowed them to be compared and contrasted in an unprecedented way. Linnaeus’s system—which came about when it was possible to place plants from different parts of the globe side by side—can be said to have been the culmination of the centuries-old aim of finding a place for each of God’s creations. As products of a Christian upbringing and of the collector was a university, a prince or a pontiff. Giuseppe Olmi’s thinking, as is often the case in museum history, emphasizes the rationality of early-modern collecting and the use of collections for beneficial purposes. The concept of the summa, nevertheless, also seems an apt description for forms of collecting that are seen as being irrational or based on superstition, which were practised by princes in particular.

The exhibition—an experience open to all—was subjected to the most trenchant critique, when people began to criticize museums for overlooking (the history of) large swathes of the population, such as the working class and various minorities. This shift in public attitude seems to have hit museums particularly hard in Britain and the USA, where archiving and preserving had concentrated on the life of the wealthy upper classes, and where museums had a solid foothold in the life of the elite, but where rising living standards particularly affected the status of the lower social classes. It is to some extent possible to speak of the criticism directed at museums as a rebellion of the middle

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classes. No basic rights or goods essential to existence were demanded, rather there was a desire to reshape perceptions, conceptions and models of behaviour. There is, however, cause to see the high public profile offered by exhibitions as being politically more important. Critical research, which has nowadays established a powerful foothold in the USA, is generally associated with what is seen there as leftist, i.e. a democratic ethos that promotes social change. The background to this is in the radical movements of the 1960s, such as those for racial equality and feminism. In the USA museums found themselves most powerfully under the spotlight of scholarly scrutiny in the 1990s, the time that gave us what are still the most interesting discussion about clashes between different cultures and about understanding difference. In Britain the impetus for demands for change lay primarily in working-class movement, and was focussed directly on museums more swiftly than in the USA, where the problems were more complex than in Britain, beginning with the current legislation. The teaching of museology began in Britain as early as 1964, albeit discussion of workers’ museums only began more broadly in the 1970s.21

While academic writers in English were showing an increasing interest in forgotten topics – museums as experiences, and as teachers of history – respect for museums among the general public for the most part declined. The narrative told by museums did not feel like it applied to “us”; people’s own culture and heritage were found in songs, memories, fairy tales, myths and legends, or they arose “here and now” with changing life situations and awareness of difference, along with pride in their own culture. The truth became complicated. For museums this was a challenge that prompted them to look for ways of communicating and collaborating with the desired visitor base. If “the people” rejected the museums, the people’s chosen or self-appointed representatives did not. For example, in the USA activists from various cultural and social groups and indigenous peoples visibly accentuated and maintained their group’s identity, among other things, in relation to museums, too. Their leaders, for whom culture and history were a means for creating a sense of ‘us’ and for standing out from the prevailing culture, began loudly criticizing museums, especially from the end of the 1960s onwards, as part of their strategies for influencing their own public image. At the start, black people were the most active, but later on, more and more (so-called) minorities demanded, and got, visibility in museums, the last to gain prominence being Native Americans. It was demanded that museums revise their approach to the archiving and preservation of minorities’ histories and their ways of telling people about their own cultures. A feature that came to constitute one of the main operating models was the participation of minorities’ representatives in the production of history (i.e. the planning of exhibitions), and taking the group’s values into account through negotiation.22

During the last couple of decades of the 20th century, heated disputes surrounding exhibitions sporadically filled the media. In the USA exhibitions were opposed with demonstrations and flyers, and with boycotts and barricades. Nowadays, the situation seems to have calmed down, not because there are no more differences of viewpoint and culture, but because the people who are mounting exhibition are better able than before to take various opinions into account. Museum staff are more skilled at finding their way between presented and predicted criticisms. There are fewer surprises. Exhibition curators cannot, however, be experts in all disciplines, and even if they were, they cannot be aware of every possible opinion, conception or value that museum visitors might have. The absence of objectivity has to be accepted, it even has to be taken advantage of, and the best, or at least the most interesting possible exhibition, made. As an anonymous curator said in 1991:

“Regardless of one’s politics, museums should provoke and coerce reaction precisely by taking a crisp and non-centrist position as the situation warrants. [...] there is no question that controversy attracts attention and public involvement.”23

Attempts can be made to achieve a kind of objectivity by listening to various viewpoints during the exhibition’s preparation period. When planning and mounting an exhibition, a polyphony is synthesized into an entity that the exhibition designers can put their names to.24 Even if the viewer perceives and understands the exhibition’s assertions differently from the way in which its makers intended, or does not accept them and consequently expresses a criticism, the museum’s and the curator’s considered view can be argued for and the criticism can be answered. Criticism can then be seen as an opportunity for discussion with various groups in society who would perhaps not otherwise be reached. It is also worth remembering what Steven C. Dubin says about the potential for exhibitions to mould their recipients:

21 The numerous differences between countries are reflected, for instance, in the way that the situation in Finland is in many respects different from that in the USA or Britain. What is in itself considered a pan-European enthusiasm for museums in the 19th century gave rise to the National Museum of Finland’s collection of handicrafts by people living in the countryside and remote villages, instead of the archiving of the history of those in power. The underlying patriotic spirit sought to get away from “foreign overlords”. Nor were museum work and academic teaching and research ever totally separated. The same people worked in both, and there was – and still is – collaboration. Nowadays, a notably highly educated staff work in Finnish museums.

22 The most vociferous demands for change to museums emerged with the growth in visibility of black cultures, according to Simpson, beginning already after the Second World War. Direct protests against museums’ work hit the headlines from the end of the 1960s onwards. The Smithsonian Institution, which is a national museum maintained by the US Federal Government, for instance, held seminars on the representation of different cultures and on collaboration with different groups – The Poetics and Politics of Representation (1988) and Museums and Communities (1990) – once they had begun to gain experience of working in a multi-cultural environment. The proceedings of both were published in book form. At this time, various minorities also began to get their own national museums. Simpson 1996, 13, 102–105, 167–169. Richard Kurin views the representation and display of cultures from the viewpoint of an anthropologist working at the Smithsonian Institution, and writes about many of the same issues that Simpson mentions. Kurin 1997.


“If you fear that people will be ‘force fed’ a particular point of view by an exhibition, you are assuming that they don’t digest what they’ve consumed by means of their idiosyncratic mixes of personal history, racial, religious, gender and geographical biases, and countless other factors. You’re assuming that they swallow things whole.”

In so saying, Dubin comments on the fears publicly expressed by people who set themselves up as the “voice of the public”. It is highly unlikely that any group’s members would be unanimous, any more than that they would support the standpoints presented by the most outspoken among them. The opposite is more probable. Exhibition makers have to assess not just the power and nature of protest, but also its extent.

Seeking to acquire greater cultural standing with the aid of museums is, of course, neither uncomplicated nor easy. Analyses of exhibitions that have aroused controversy show that misinterpretations easily also arise when the intention of the exhibition was supposed to be to appeal to visitors. Press releases and texts have not always been clearly worded and unambiguous. One key reason seems to be museums’ excessive reliance on verbal communication. The visual sense (not to mention the other senses) is forgotten. The gaze that forms an image of a space has articulated and classified the whole thing even before the owner of that gaze notices it, and steers the individual’s movements from one attraction to another. Visual material easily distracts museum visitors’ attention, so that explanatory texts go unnoticed.

The tangible materiality of museum objects, with their countless possible combinations and modifiable text panels, in itself offers an excellent opportunity for politics or for reinforcing group identity; if the material can be used to tell one thing, then it can also be coerced into telling another. The solidity of the material and its involvement in a life that was once real illustrates a “truth” for insubstantial words. The use of juxtapositions of objects, varieties of exhibition architecture, colours, lights, sounds, smells, and other means of focussing attention that affect the senses to back up the spoken word makes museums and exhibitions potent political tools.

Their long history has moulded museums into being a platform for western values. Museums tell stories about existence, about the various pasts, and about transitions, in exhibitions that have been mounted in concordance with the ideals and goals of each particular era. Despite the recognized status of multiculturalism nowadays, the kernel of alienation does not find its place in museums without some difficulty, since the traditions of selecting, displaying and looking are all products of western cultural history. In an exhibition people have to contort themselves to fit into an unfamiliar mould and learn to use the available tools. The politicized exhibition has frequently faced this problem when demanding that the ideas and objects that have been placed on view be accorded the same unquestioning respect as has traditionally been received in museums by things that are considered the best and most admirable. Such an exhibition represents the equality demanded from western culture by minority groups, in a concrete way that is accessible to the senses. This model would appear to come from modern art’s cult of the genius, which is particularly easy to recognize as being a construct, a cult in which artists, backed by their supporters, actively helped establish their own status with the aid of exhibitions and the concomitant public discussion. The respect gained with the aid of museums, like the respect for art, should be transferrable to any subject through the authority of an inner circle.

Those doing critical researchers at universities both denounce and seek to explain. In particular, approaches to research that draw on French thought – such as that of Lacan, Baudrillard and Derrida – and which treats its object as a text or intertext, as something to be interpreted, to be understood in various ways, and as making references in numerous directions, spread into

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26 See, for example, Simpson 1996, 26–30, 43.
museums’ research 20–30 years ago. This approach appeared to be able to engage with many kinds of material, and to be able to give a name to, and hence make visible and discussable, the components that affect the emergence of any particular end result. Researchers’ critique emphasized the role of museum visitors as the generators of meanings. By analysing exhibitions, and by talking to representatives of minorities and those who are indifferent to museums, it was demonstrated that the message really does not get across as its authors in the museum intended. At the same time, there was a calling into question of objective information, of the one correct state of affairs, the one possible interpretation, and the one shared culture, which had been pivotal to the “modern museum” whether of art or science.

In the museum critique people began to see the objects in an exhibition as being mute and as signs, in particular as defined by Krzysztof Pomian. For him, an object represents facts or phenomena, it points almost like a road sign, in a certain, unambiguous direction, and nor does it in itself have any impact on the establishment of a reference. This was evidently the allotted task of the objects, when museums educated the nation into a shared narrative under the pretext of a supposedly shared, homogenous frame of reference; the objects drew reality to the spot and the visitors learned because they had a desire to learn the things that were being taught. It was assumed that they wanted to develop themselves to be the same as their teachers. Underpinning Pomian’s theory (in its original context, on the role of exhibits in early public displays) appears to be the behaviourist theory of learning, which long influenced museums, and according to which it is possible to transmit messages without their meanings changing, with the learner a tabula rasa on which the museum writes in its exhibitions. The early public museums of


29 The modern museum here refers not only to modernism in art and to the minimalist display that it favours when exhibiting objects, but also more broadly to the institution that has been functioning for more than a century, acting as a storehouse for what has been presumed to be the whole nation’s shared story. See also footnote 27.

30 Pomian 1987, 15–59; cf. Bennett 1995, 177–208. In his much-quoted text that investigates the time before public museums, Krzysztof Pomian describes the objects put on display as references to something that is somewhere else (a semiphore/sign). They show a way outside their own material presence, and nor do they have any particular meanings beyond the claims made by the person who put them on display. In saying this Pomian emphasizes the narrative nature of the museum, and the habit, either conscious or not, associated with its pedagogic role; of giving every collection and exhibition a viewpoint, (cf. Pearce, footnote 27). He sees the objects as examples whose connection with reality is negotiable, in which case it should also be possible to teach the public new meanings. Cf. According to Saussure: “It is characteristic of the symbol that it is never completely arbitrary; the symbol is not empty. There is the rudiment of a link between the idea and the sign, in the symbol.” (Italics A.A.) Jyrki Vuorinen says here that Saussure is following the same lines as Hegel, according to whom: “the symbol is no purely arbitrary sign, but a sign which in its externality comprises in itself at the same time the content of the idea which it brings into appearance.” Quoted in Finnish in Vuorinen 1997, 50. In the light of current research, even when they are born, a human being is not a tabula rasa, but “coded” to learn certain skills and to perceive particular shapes and structures. Differences between individuals are not formed solely because of the cultural framework, but also through variations in sensing and in the interpretation of sensations, and different ways of learning. It is also worth remembering that objects have been archived in museums, for example, to familiarize people with materials and shapes, and as study material, by no means all archiving has been part of some grand cultural narrative.

31 Pomian 1987, 15–59; cf. Bennett 1995, 177–208. In his much-quoted text that investigates the time before public museums, Krzysztof Pomian describes the objects put on display as references to something that is somewhere else (a semiphore/sign). They show a way outside their own material presence, and nor do they have any particular meanings beyond the claims made by the person who put them on display. In saying this Pomian emphasizes the narrative nature of the museum, and the habit, either conscious or not, associated with its pedagogic role; of giving every collection and exhibition a viewpoint, (cf. Pearce, footnote 27). He sees the objects as examples whose connection with reality is negotiable, in which case it should also be possible to teach the public new meanings. Cf. According to Saussure: “It is characteristic of the symbol that it is never completely arbitrary; the symbol is not empty. There is the rudiment of a link between the idea and the sign, in the symbol.” (Italics A.A.) Jyrki Vuorinen says here that Saussure is following the same lines as Hegel, according to whom: “the symbol is no purely arbitrary sign, but a sign which in its externality comprises in itself at the same time the content of the idea which it brings into appearance.” Quoted in Finnish in Vuorinen 1997, 50. In the light of current research, even when they are born, a human being is not a tabula rasa, but “coded” to learn certain skills and to perceive particular shapes and structures. Differences between individuals are not formed solely because of the cultural framework, but also through variations in sensing and in the interpretation of sensations, and different ways of learning. It is also worth remembering that objects have been archived in museums, for example, to familiarize people with materials and shapes, and as study material, by no means all archiving has been part of some grand cultural narrative.

31 Cf. footnote 27.

32 A “mute object” is attractive because it provides grounds for reducing the number of collected objects and a reason for directing the researcher’s gaze towards cultural activities that can be archived in ways other than as material examples. Other main reasons are, for instance, improved documentation facilities, photography, film, 3D-imaging and so on. Store rooms have become full over time, and their maintenance, never mind expansion, has proved difficult in the current financial situation.

33 In his Displays of Power Steven C. Dubin investigates exhibitions that has sparked public controversy in the USA from the 1960s up to the 1990s, by means of interviews with those involved and the extensive criticism in the media. The book repeatedly reveals the difficulty of defining communities/groups: What is meant by community participation or who can speak for each particular group? A community can be social, political, racial, sexual, economic or professional, to list but a few; it can be a minority, a majority or have vague boundaries. A community can also generally mean just the “ordinary people” at whom the exhibition is directed, but who are barely interested in museums and exhibitions. Dubin 1999, 2–5, 8–17, 238.
of the equilibrium, museum pedagogy acquired a status that it had not previously enjoyed. It became a mediator between people who were talking past each other. The task of museum educators became to interpret the demands of various groups of people to the rest of the museum’s staff and, on the other hand, to tell a variety of publics about the aims of the museum and its various exhibitions, and to speak to them in these different groups’ own “languages”.

Although the potential polyphony of museum exhibitions initially emerged in conflict, the end result, waking up to culture-specific values, can be considered as neither a compromise nor a loss. Interpreting exhibitions as the birthplace of webs of texts, disparate mental constructs and personal judgements entails a kind of return to the early-modern idea of the shifting relationships between the objects, the exhibition architecture, the viewer and the surrounding world; relationships in which viewers can feel they are important and take pleasure in their own insights and interpretations. Masao Yamaguchi puts the same idea in different words when he considers western museums from the viewpoint of the Japanese tradition of putting things on display. According to him, every exhibition is, in essence, a fake, like the pseudo-god in Japanese tradition, who even looks more real than a genuine one, but is still not true. It is the theatrical context that makes an exhibition true, he says. By ‘theatre’ in relation to museums, Yamaguchi does not mean a story with a plot or some other narrative, but refers to the Neo-Platonism of the Renaissance and to the art of memory, and to their way of using objects and architecture to construct an image, or an abstract model, of the structures of and mutual influences operating within the universe, a way that always leaves room for new designs, new insights and new ways of using them. He sees this approach as being reminiscent of traditions familiar from Japan, for example, ikebana (flower arrangement), and Japanese forms of drama, which use the visible to give intimations of the invisible world of beliefs.

34 Museum-education posts and functions were set up in museums where there had previously been none. Their area of responsibility was also extended to range from children and school pupils to adult publics. Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh fittingly describe this development at the Tate Museum. Dewdney, Dibosa & Walsh 2013, 23–95.

35 Cf., for example, Stephen Greenblatt, one of many who miss the aura lost by the works of the Impressionists and other early modernists in Paris’ Musée d’Orsay, where, according to him, the masterpieces are not given the proper space. According to him, cultural resonance, the juxtaposing of contemporary phenomena, replaces the wonder and resonance induced by unique aesthetic masterpieces. Greenblatt sees the less worthy pieces as getting too much space. The visual experience of the artworks, which in the modern museums is maximized by segregating each individual object, is unable to awaken properly when distracting art flashes into the viewer’s visual field. Greenblatt 1991, 53–54. Let it be noted that historically these works, nevertheless, competed with each other for attention, and were hung in dark, gloomy and often cramped rooms, where exploring and experiencing them was many times harder than at the Orsay.

36 This view of the early-modern collections is based on my doctoral research. Here I am particularly referring to the collections of princes at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries, which I mention earlier in the text. The collection brought the ruler-collector into a kind of magical relationship with the world that he ruled. It is virtually impossible to study the everyday reality of the exhibitions and what the “ordinary visitor” experiences. One method used, for instance, is visitor surveys, but their obvious weaknesses include readymade questions with their advance expectations, hurried, reluctant or careless answers, and the fact that most people are unable or unwilling to put their experiences into words, even if the interview is in-depth.

37 For example, in kabuki theatre the ostentatious costumes are directly connected to the gods, filled with divinity, while the actors are just “machines” that move the costumes around; ikebana, meanwhile, offers a possibility to depict, for example, the structures of a mythical universe. Yamaguchi refers in his text to Baudrillard’s concept of the simulacrum. He says it is close to the Japanese mitate. Mitate is made up of the parts mi (to see) and tate (to stand, to arrange). Yamaguchi 1991, 59, 64–67.
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Elisa Aaltola

PhD, works as a senior research fellow in philosophy at the University of Eastern Finland. She has published five books, and altogether around 80 papers/essays, on animals and philosophy, and is currently working on a book titled “Ineffable Animals”.
From Language of Detachment Toward Expressiveness of Affect

Elisa Aaltola

Introduction

Propositional language — language consisting of words and syntax — has been repeatedly used to mark the boundary between human and non-human animals. It often stands as the dividing factor that determines who is to be acknowledged, related to, or seen as a creature of moral significance.

First, propositional language has been posited as a way of knowing the world, an epistemology, via which non-human creatures are to be perceived. Indeed, with the linguistic turn that coloured much of the 20th century, it became the only way of knowing the world. Following Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, in which it was famously suggested that language forms the limits of our world, and thus constitutes mentation and understanding, a frequently encountered ethos has stipulated that minds are founded upon layers of language. Concepts and their relations form minds, and are the only way in which we can fathom reality: to form an understanding, even to be capable of perception, requires the presence of language. Following suit, other beings have to conform to the contours of language in order to be recognized, even to be “real”. It is therefore via language that ‘more-than-human animals are also made sense of: they must be lingually explicable, and made to fit into the often narrow ramifications of conceptual sense-making. It is against this background that Ludwig Wittgenstein’s exceedingly famous line “If a lion could speak, we would not understand him,” from Philosophical Investigations is often repeated.

Second, language has been positioned as a way of being in the world, an ontology, which sets humans apart from other animals. If indeed language acts as the basis for a mind, then those creatures incapable of entering into its sphere and of making sense of the world via words and syntax, are mindless. They have no intentions, no beliefs, and it is like nothing to be them. Their world is that of biomechanical processes preconfigured by millions of years of evolutionary tumult. It is here that anthropocentrism with its strident declarations of dualism has its roots: only those beings capable of propositional language have minds and are active subjects, whereas all other creatures fall into the category of passive objects. The former are declared persons endowed with inherent value, and the latter are emphatically portrayed as instinctual, biological matter determined by instrumental value. Of course, concessions have been made: perhaps the more human-like non-lingual beings can feel pain and experience rudimentary emotional states, and perhaps the elite amongst them, so designated by human beings (dogs and pandas, cats and elephants) are beings worthy of affection and protection. However, the potentiality, lingering within these concessions, to threaten the dichotomies that divide humans from other animals on a more general level is willingly ignored. A type of fervent state of collective self-denial, within which humans seek to not know that which they do know (that with pain and rudimentary emotions comes consciousness and therefore a mind, and that our capacity for affection toward dogs and pandas could just as easily be extended to pigs and chicken) maintains a firm hold, and tightens its tentacles whenever uncomfortable questions are raised.

Language as an ontology

Rene Descartes is the infamous originator not only of modern philosophy, but also of modern-era dualism. He posited that only humans are rational beings, because only their “movement” (behaviour, actions) can follow a “will” — the rest of the animal world moves according to a will that is pre-set by higher powers, and their behaviour is thus purely mechanical, automated, predetermined. Thus, the world fell into subjects and objects; active agents capable of reasoned will, on the one hand, and passive biomechanisms blindly following their innate pre-configurations, on the other.

Here, language played a pivotal part. As Descartes, in his seminal work On Method, sought to justify the belief that non-human animals are mindless creatures lacking the minutest shadow of consciousness, he referred to the absence of propositional language as a sure proof. Descartes triumphantly asserted that: “For it is highly deserving of remark, that there are no men so dull and stupid, not even idiots, as to be incapable of joining together different words, and thereby constructing a declaration by which to make their thoughts understood; and that on the other hand, there is no other animal, however perfect or happily circumstanced, which can do the like (…) And this proves not only that brutes have less reason than man, but that they have none at all,” (Descartes 2008, p. 45). It is on these grounds that Descartes made his notorious correlation between animals and mechanisms. He proclaimed: “Doubtless when the swallows come in spring, they operate like clocks. The actions of honeybees are of the same nature, and the discipline of cranes in flight, and of apes in fighting,” (Descartes 1991, p. 304) before continuing: “It is more probable that worms, flies, caterpillars and other animals move like machines than that they all have immortal souls.” Indeed, for Descartes, animals were “automata” (Descartes 1991, p. 366).

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Thus, within the Cartesian tradition, which still lingers all around us, language is made into an integral ingredient of reason, an entity that defines our mindedness, and ultimately our being. It emerges as an ontological element that constitutes the perceived human “essence”, and the lack of which constitutes non-human animality. In sum, its presence or absence moulds and dictates the ontology of biological beings, and creates an un-crossable gulf between humans and other animals. Later on, Immanuel Kant, with his emphasis on rational autonomy, added to this the notion of inherent value. The capacity to follow autonomous reason, made possible in part by propositional language, was the glowing fibre from which the value of individuals is formed: only the autonomous could be “ends in themselves”, whereas all others were consigned to the category of “means to an end”. From this there surfaced the idea of the inherent value of human beings, and the instrumental value of non-human animals: the former were invested with moral and legal rights, whereas the latter were largely perceived as creatures to be utilized for human purposes, at best gaining the protection of minimal benevolence.

This belief in the primacy of language, and its intricate entwinement with both mindedness and moral value, was given a momentous push by the linguistic turn that was to define the 20th century. If language really does form the limits of our world, for those without language, there is no world. These creatures do not feel or intuit, believe or intend, and they ultimately lack the very factor, qualia, of which consciousness is formed, and which render it possible for us to say that it is like something for a human being to exist, to walk, to think, to love. It is on this basis that the end of 20th century still saw many notable philosophers doubting or denying the existence of animal minds (see for instance Donaldson 1985; Carruthers 1992). Although not all the skeptics are Wittgensteinians per se, they are influenced by the continuous accentuation of language to the point of being unable to perceive any mentation outside the use of propositionally positioned concepts.

The most common argument rests on the notion of second-order beliefs: for a being to believe that, say, it is raining, she must be able to step out of the first-order level of apparent experience to the second-order level of reflective analysis, by establishing whether she intuits, infers, or, for instance, senses that it is raining. This, again, requires her to entertain the actual sentence “it is raining”, for it appears – or so it is claimed – impossible to go above the first-order level without this being formed into a sentence. Moreover, to ascertain what their knowledge consists of, beings must, of course, have concepts such as “intuit”, “infer”, and “sense”. In short, then, there is no actual (only an apparent) first-order level without the second-order level; no mentation without linguistic analysis concerning that mentation. In the absence of language, dogs and chicken could not, therefore, have any inkling of whether or not it is raining. (Carruthers 1992) Nor indeed whether sunlight is striking their skin, whether they are hungry or eating, whether they feel apprehension or joy, whether their hooves or paws are touching wet grass, or whether they exist.

Language, therefore, is seen as constituting minds: concepts and combinations of them form not only our thoughts, but also our experiences. Outside the borders of language there exists no mentation, no cognition. Even those who are otherwise keen to question humanistic notions, and in particular to erode the Cartesian dualism that divides “subjects” and “objects”, have been remarkably keen to embrace language as the dividing line between humans and other animals. For instance, Martin Heidegger, who sought to stridently question the Cartesian tradition, insisted that, due to their lack of language, non-human animals could only be “poor” in the world – in fact, because of language, there is an “abyss” between humans and other animals (Heidegger 1995; 1998). This tendency comes with moral underpinnings. Following the same ethos, Emmanuel Levinas, who valiantly brought non-lingual encounters with “otherness” to the fore, quite peculiarly argued that, as non-lingual beings, other animals cannot be legitimate “others”. Levinas’s ethics stems from meeting others “naked”, outside lingually constructed, pre-determined meanings (which for him constitute forms of “totalitarianism”), in moments at which one’s constant flow of egoistic intentions is suddenly interrupted by the bare, raw existence of another being, and at which one unexpectedly recognizes that the other has a “face” (Levinas 1969). In less vague terms, ethics thus stems from meeting others outside of language and culturally pre-fixed stereotypes, in encounters that allow us to see beyond them, and to perceive others as individuals, who are violated rather than explained by these stereotypes. However, according to Levinas, we cannot meet a horse or a lizard on a similar footing, because they do not speak in utterances.

Inexplicably, then, the very philosophy that sought to question the validity of humanistic language ends up re-establishing it as the factor that divides human and non-human. Hence, it has been suggested that continental and post-structural thinking, even when ferociously keen to eradicate dualistic tenets, often reiterates those very tenets in the context of more-than-human animals (Wolfe 2003; Calarco 2008). The animal must remain separate, in her own category, far removed from humanity, and indeed far removed from moral concern.

Of course, this ontological emphasis on language faces insurmountable problems. In regard to second-order thinking, the obvious conundrum is: there is no second order without the first order. Without experience on the first-order level, there is nothing with which to reflectively analyse, nothing to which to ascribe the terms “intuit” or “refer”. That is, the second-order level does not legitimize or bring into the existence the first-order level — rather, the first-order level holds primacy, stands firm as the ground of mentation, whether or not second, third or tenth-level analyses are ever constructed on the basis of it. Put simply: we can reflect on whether we “believe” or “know” that it is raining only because we have the experience of rain, and the latter exists independently of the former. The question that thus arises is, why ought one to step onto the second-order level? Why would reason and will, let alone experience, of necessity require propositional language?
The possibility of pre-lingual and non-lingual mindedness is all too often sidelined. What it is to be a sensuous, perceiving, intending, intuiting, grasping being on the level of immediacy (the felt, lived "now"), is something that constantly eludes many standard definitions of cognition and mentation. Could mentation not consist of the swirling, pulsing immediacy of the first-order level? Indeed, is the insistence on language not, in itself, revealing – does it not point toward a discomfort about facing immediacy and the animal way of being? Could it be that the question of immediacy, the notion of mentation that flows in sheer, raw immanence, is itself not only uncomfortable, but frightening? Perhaps the emphasis on propositional language ultimately lends a sense of safety, a sense of existence above that which can, in its ability to engulf us in the realm of contingency and ambivalence (the lived "now" is never logically ordered, nor mathematically controllable), be nothing short of dazing, bewildering, seemingly risky and ultimately intimidating. A sense of false security – a security that disconnects us from ourselves, and enables "humans" to deny their own "animal" nature. (See Forkasiewicz 2012)

This talk of immediacy is not just theoretical. Advances in cognitive ethology, on the one hand, and in psychology, on the other, have revealed that a significant part of mentation takes place beyond, below, or above language. Intuiting, intending and feeling can all be pre-lingual and non-lingual. They linger in immanence, something that language may affect, but which it does not constitute. Rationality understood as goal-orientated planning on the basis of inference, is also available to non-lingual beings. Even concepts and beliefs are possible without the use of propositional language – they too can reside in immediacy, and can be based on visual associations and memory connotations rather than on sentences. Communication, too, can take place – in a stunningly nuanced, complex manner – outside of propositional language. Most certainly, the key ingredient of mindedness – consciousness – is found in a spectacular variety of non-human, non-lingual beings. (See for instance Dawkins 1998; Rogers 1997; Bekoff 2002) The linguistic turn, with its eagerness to push language forward as the essential and necessary constituent of a mind, is therefore profoundly mistaken – as was Descartes. Language does not constitute our world. There is a world before and beyond language, and a mind capable of grasping it without resort to propositionality.

It is therefore not surprising that studies show how a plethora of non-human animals, ranging from fish to birds and mammals, and probably far beyond, are minded beings, who can act intentionally, intuitively and rationally, host an astounding variety of emotions, and construct concepts and beliefs. (Ibid.) Of course, this is not a novel suggestion. For millennia, those, who have lived in relation to non-human animals, have known that they have minds: that it is like something to be a squirrel or a seagull. This has also been evident to many philosophers. The famous empiricist David Hume argued, contra Descartes, that the minds of other animals are plain to see – indeed so plain that when recognition of this is lacking, something must be wrong with our own minds. Hume states succinctly: "Next to the ridicule of denying an evident truth, is that of taking much pains to defend it; and no truth appears to me more evident, than that beasts are endow’d with thought and reason as well as men. The arguments are in this case so obvious, that they never escape the most stupid and ignorant," (Hume 1969, III xvi). The core ingredient of dualism – denial of animal minds on the basis of language – is thus fundamentally faulty.

Most importantly, more-than-human animals do have languages – even if their languages do not take on a propositional form. They continually communicate their emotions and intentions, their fears, their love, their beliefs, to others. This communication may consist of bodily movements, glances, the raising of hairs or the baring of teeth; it may exist in hissing and purring, howling and screeching, or it may linger in smells and vibrations, touching and the display of astonishing colours. To perceive language only in the word limits our grasp of the world, and ultimately the scope of our minds. Paradoxically, therefore, the linguistic emphasis restricts rather than augments mentation: it is a hindrance in the way of acknowledging animal minds and animal language, and an obstacle that prevents us from listening to and communicating with other animals. Instead of constituting, it constrains reality. And most of all, it deafens us to one obvious fact: The lion can speak.

Language as an epistemology

Language also stands as a way of knowing. As suggested above, it is often defined not only as the medium via which we know the world and ourselves, but also as the very structure, even the content, of that knowledge. Concepts and combinations of them form, so it is suggested, the contents of our beliefs: we perceive foxes, have beliefs concerning foxes, because we have the word “fox”, together with a web of further concepts all knitted together around it. Therefore, when perceiving a specific animal, we perceive it as "a fox", "a mammal", "an animal", "a predator", "a biological organism", perhaps "a source of fur", perhaps an “individual agent”, a “wild creature”. Within the framework of the later Wittgenstein, language is based on forms of life, and revolves around rules which we learn by using words: by via applying words correctly, according to the rules configured by our social settings, we begin to perceive the world in a given way. Out of the chaos and constant flux of sensory stimuli there arises a narrative-like structure, as objects and entities suddenly emerge into our consciousness as “trees”, “bodies” or “pigs”. Language opens up a world for us, gives us a world, it is claimed, as if we were suddenly given eyes to see.

Such is the standard interpretation. Within it animals, again, are easily divided into human and non-human, although, this time, with an added twist: language enables humans both to perceive the world as a resource, and to actively render it into a commodity. When Heidegger asserted that it is due to language that humans can properly dwell in the world, on the borders of “concealment”, and thus be “rich” in the world, he was partly referring to the way in which they can inhabit and consciously alter their lived reality, become aware of it and restructure it, even seek to go beyond it via science and technology (albeit the latter may, according to Heidegger, be an alienating, disastrous
mistake; see Heidegger 1977). With language, therefore, humans gain a world, become subjects not only in, but also of, the world – and, in the process, may begin (as Heidegger warns us) to see the world as a collection of manipulatable objects. Other animals, who are left as creatures with only a “poor” relation to the world, are eagerly cast out into the realm of objects and, ultimately, both perceived as and rendered into commodifiable resources. In short, language enables one to perceive other entities and beings via notions of utility, and to become a better user, whilst more-than-human animals become utilizable objects, creatures of instrumental value.

It is here that we meet the industrial farms of the contemporary era. Animals live in utterly monotonous surroundings, crammed into small enclosures and cages that minimize space requirements and maintenance costs, and restrict energy usage. They are given feed that maximizes growth and production rates, and separated from their young as soon as possible in order to harvest milk and eggs for human consumption, or so as to speed up the process of getting a new generation of caged, tethered pigs and cows growing, and destined for the slaughterhouse assembly line. And their bodies are moulded, manipulated and coerced: they are forcefully inseminated, bred so as to be a particular shape and size, debeaked, dehorned, declawed, castrated, and branded, forced to move with electric prods, beaten when too afraid to move. Finally, technologies are beginning to enable their ever more invasive genetic modification, and as a result the future may bring us pigs with fish genes, hybrid cows with udders big enough to produce hundreds of litres of milk a day, or chimera chickens with incredible growth rates and muscles so large that their vital organs cannot survive any longer than the time required for physical maturation. This is a world of unbridled utilitarian optimization: every last detail of animal production is carefully planned so as to maximize profit and production. The animals remain resources, increasingly reduced to the status of biomechanical objects, biomaterial: they are defined and dictated by language coloured by mechanomorphia, the reduction of sensing, living beings to machine-like, operatable units. And most importantly, this is a world of utter manipulation, coercion and control, a world of commodification. The epitome of the Cartesian ethos of the new science: the active human subject manipulating every last detail of the animal as a passive object, as a biological resource.

It is on these grounds that Jacques Derrida made a rather startling comparison – what is indeed termed the “dreaded comparison” – between animal industries and the holocaust: “The annihilation of certain species is indeed in process, but it is occurring through the organisation and exploitation of an artificial, infernal, virtually interminable survival, in conditions that previous generations would have judged monstrous, outside of every supposed norm of a life proper to animals that are thus exterminated by means of their continued existence or even their overpopulation. As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens or gas chambers (let’s say Nazis) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by the means of artificial insemination so that, being more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of imposition of genetic experimentation or extermination by gas or by fire. In the same abattoirs,“ (Derrida 2004, p. 120). A process of continuous manipulation and exploitation, although this time without an end.

Posing language as the form and content of perception of the world, of having a mind, can therefore have drastic consequences. By creating an abyss between those who have language and those who do not, beings are also divided into those who can manipulate and those who are manipulated. Here language functions as an epistemological technology: by naming the world around us, we can distance ourselves from it, even alienate ourselves from its realm – a process which ultimately defines other beings as sculptable, malleable, controllable resources. It is here that we find the underlying impulse for Western notions of rationality-rationality as a form of optimizing one’s behaviour in order to gain a given result. Language, then, aids rationality as optimization, rationality as the utilitarian desire to make use of the world around us and render it into a commodity. In short, language quite literally “gives us a world”, reduces it to a possession.

One reason for the ease with which language achieves such objectifying detachment is that, within its domain, others are categorized, subsumed into classes and types, thus losing their specificity: a specific pig becomes a faceless, generic representative of the prototype “pig”. Edmund Husserl argued that it is clinical, neutralizing language that lays the foundations for atrocities (Husserl 1970). Beings of flesh, blood and sentience become neutrally defined, faceless entities, and ultimately meaningless objects within a given system. The standard example is bureaucratic language, which obliterates specificity and treats individuals as instances of the same faceless prototype, itself only secondary in value to the end goals of the system itself. Thus, individuals become expendable in the name of expediency. The same can be said of language used in the context of non-human animals, and particularly the animal industries. It is no longer beings capable of perceiving, intuiting and feeling that one speaks of, but rather milk yields and feed lots, kilograms and pounds, pork and steak, agricultural taxes and investment subsidies, the market rates of the industry.

It was precisely on these grounds that Levinas called for interruptive encounters with “others”, which would take place beyond pre-established conceptualizations: others are to be met naked, outside generic categories. (Levinas 1969) As suggested above, it is only such nakedness that can truly “interrupt” the daily rhythms that lull us into a state of egoistic, generalizing mindlessness, within which we view others via prejudices, thus failing to pay heed to them as their own specific subjects, and within which, instead of their condition, we concentrate on what we want for ourselves that day, that month, that year. And it is also on these grounds that Derrida makes his comparison. For Derrida, language, and especially the rigidity of concepts, can be a form of violence – indeed the most intrusive form of violence there is. Here, the particularity of other beings is simply erased: it is as if it did not exist, and thus as if these beings in themselves never existed. Derrida views the term “animal” as
the most violent of all. Under its rubric, a breathtaking variety of animality, a plethora of specific species and individuals, is glued and lumped together, made homogenous, faceless. (Derrida 2004) How can one speak of “animals” as one category, when there is an astounding heterogeneity of animality all around us? It is precisely this concept, and many more like it, that enable animal industries to pursue their optimizing processes, their manipulation and control. The living, breathing, sensing, intending, intuiting specific animals, these and those particular hens and cows, are quite simply lost and obliterated, never acknowledged, never perceived. Viewing animals as faceless entities is the first step toward subjugating them under increasing and ever more inventive forms of violence.

The question that arises, then, is how do we meet non-human animals in the context of an interruptive encounter, as specific creatures, naked from the generic, proto-typing prescriptions of language. The obvious factor to note is that language is ineluctably difficult to avoid, and perhaps altogether impossible for adult humans to exist or flourish without (bar for the very few). Quite evidently, categories enable one to form conceptions of the world, and existing wholly beyond their reach would render that world into an arena of continuous sensory stimuli that bombards us into a state of utter bewilderment and aporia. Perhaps the surest proof of the need for propositional language is that this critique of language is also constituted out of the lineaments of its very object: critiquing language with language. How, then, are we to encounter other animals outside of language in any meaningful sense?

Husserl argued that it is specifically mathematizing language – the type of language that seeks to order the world into algorithmic categories – which is to blame for the sense of alienation that is so common in the modern world. This alienation begins with losing touch with others and with lived reality: a reality filled with sensing, intending, and experiencing. Mathematizing language seeks to fit the mould of algorithms onto beings and phenomena that can never be rendered into a calculable form, and thus replaces them with detached conceptual frameworks. Experiences, senses, intuitions, instinct cannot be rendered into concise categories and patterns – nor can the specificity and astounding heterogeneity of individual beings. Hence, there is much to lose, and lose we do. As Husserl argued, ultimately, we also lose touch with ourselves, and begin to see ourselves from the viewpoint of neutral, rigid concepts. (Husserl 1970) Here, “the life world” begins to vanish, and perhaps becomes a thing set aside. And also, specifically, it is this form of language is, thus, precisely this – not language as a whole – which is to be set aside.

This stance is supported by the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson argued that propositional, scientific language adheres to the formula of inert matter: of unchanging, static, monotonous entities. In fact, according to him, this language was constructed in order to better utilize such matter, to sculpt it into a form that better serves human interests (precisely this is the language of dualism – humans as language-using, active subjects, the world as a passive, manipulatable object). Such language is rigid, categorical, logical, too stubborn to allow for the type of ambiguity, novelty, opacity, alteration and multifaceted indistinctness of which the lived reality – the reality of living, experiencing beings – consists. Hence, scientific language quite simply cannot do justice to living creatures. (Bergson 2003) It is, thus, precisely this – not language as a whole – which is to be set aside. And also, specifically, it is this form of language that serves as the logic of animal industries: it is the skeleton around which animal flesh is forced to mould itself, and which of necessity not only views, but renders more-than-human beings into quasi-inert matter. For mathematizing, scientific language, other animals are inert, and will – in practice – be treated accordingly as a malleable resource.

The lesson to be learned, then, is that the experiences, mentation and individuality of non-human animals are things that cannot be neatly categorized, and which tend to elude scientific, mathematizing language. The incomprehensible, astonishing and even sublime in the animal remains unrecognized, as long as we hold on to the figment of mathematical order. Within this order, more-than-human animals are seen as primarily physiological and evolutionary beings, to be made sense of on the basis of use-value: they are perceived as being milk and meat, fun and entertainment. Animal mentation, and particularly animal language, the voices of non-human animals, remain hidden under the mundane rigidity of words and the ensuing efforts to control and manipulate.
Empathy and expression

How could one go beyond mathematizing language, become more attuned to the language of non-human animals, and open oneself to interruptive encounters with the pigeons and cows of this world?

One answer lies in empathy. “Empathy” has been defined in a number of different ways (Aaltola 2014), but they all have in common the notion of “feeling with” (rather than “for”) another being. One feels with the fear, suffering, joy, and love of others, is perceptually attuned to other beings. Particularly affective empathy and embodied empathy offer insights into ways of knowing other animals.

Affective empathy refers to resonating with other beings: one instantaneously shares emotive states with others, just as a reef syncs with the movement of waves. It is a state of pure immediacy, intrinsically non-lingual. The often physicalized studies on affective empathy have concentrated on immediate neural imitation (enabled particularly by mirror neurons), which renders possible the ease with which the transmission of emotive states—the communication and sharing of affect—can happen via our bodily responses, before the first conceptualization, even the gist of a sentence, takes place. (Decety & Jackson 2006) However, affective empathy was already celebrated by Hume, who (using the term “sympathy”) argued that it is the most astounding feature of animal (human and non-human) minds: “No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own,” (Hume 1969, 367). It was precisely empathy as resonance that Hume was speaking of—for him, witnessing “impressions” (bodily manifestations of emotion) made on others could spark similar impressions in oneself; and ultimately produce the same emotion. Indeed, he argued that minds are “mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other’s emotions, but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated,” (Hume 1969, 414).

Affective empathy does not recognize species boundaries. Just as we can empathize with the sorrow of other human beings, we can share the emotive states of non-human animals. In doing so, we become attuned to the embodied manifestations of those states, and immediately—outside the ramifications of propositional language—perceive, for instance, the joy and apprehension of other animals. It is on these grounds that the phenomenologist Edith Stein asserted that: “Should I perhaps consider a dog’s paw in comparison with my hand, I do not have a mere physical body, either, but a sensitive limb of a living body. And here a degree of projection is possible, too. For example, I may sense-in pain when the animal is injured,” (Stein 1989, p. 59). She continues: “thus, too, I can understand the tail wagging of a dog as an expression of joy if its appearance and its behaviour otherwise disclose such feelings and its situation warrants them,” (Stein 1989, p. 86).

But what of the argument, according to which the minds of non-human animals are too different, too alien, for us to grasp? In fact, does one not easily become presumptuous, and project human-like emotive states onto other animals, thus erasing their “otherness” and ultimately their dignity as “different-than” beings? Is the danger of anthropomorphism not forever looming in the background, threatening to render perceptions of pigs and cows into figments of human fantasy?

Embodied empathy offers one answer. Max Scheler, another phenomenologist, posited that the whole question of whether one can “know” the mind of another is misplaced. This is because it is based on an atomistic take on minds, according to which minds exist in complete independence from one another, and which postulates that we are imprisoned in our own minds, forever unable to know with any certainty even a fraction of those of others. It is this atomism which lays the foundation stones for solipsism, the state of tormented seclusion, forever haunted by the possibility that one is alone, completely alone, in the world. Against atomism, Scheler asserts that even knowing one’s own mind does not take place in isolation from others: we construe our understanding of ourselves in continuous interaction with other beings, in a state of intersubjectivity, wherein we respond to others, and let the responses of those others change us, too. There is no prison, no encapsulated mind separated from others by an abyss: rather, our minds exist in relation to the beings around us, and are constituted via interaction. Moreover, this state of intersubjectivity rests on a unity between the mind and the body: we know ourselves and others as primarily embodied creatures, in whom the mind and the body are integrally entwined to the point of it being senseless, absurd, to separate the two. As a result, bodies continuously communicate minds—they are inherently expressive of a mind. (Scheler 2007) It is this intersubjectivity and embodied expressiveness that allow for an immediate grasping of the minds of others, they: “present us with a direct and non-inferential access to the experiential life of others,” (Zahavi 2008, 518).

Therefore, questioning the validity of empathy may rely on false premises—at least if one pays heed to the type of empathy one is engaged in. Pure projection may yield nothing more than anthropomorphia, but engaging in intersubjective relations with other animals, becoming attuned and responsive toward them, and refining one’s perception of their embodied expressiveness, can spark empathic states which exist in a state of immediacy, beyond doubt, anthropomorphia and the demand for verification. Thus, it is suggested that: “When I experience the facial expressions or meaningful actions of an other, I am experiencing foreign subjectivity, and not merely imagining it, simulating it or theorizing about it,” (Zahavi 2008, 520). We do not project or infer the mental states of others—we read them via intersubjectivity and the expressive unity of mind and body.
Moreover, empathy does not weaken our grasp of the "otherness" of those around us. For Scheler, embodied empathy is always rooted in an awareness of the difference of the other – an awareness of how much will forever remain hidden from us. Immediate grasping of and feeling with another are thus entwined with recognizing that one cannot know everything, or feel everything; that the other retains some ways of being to herself. Therefore, not only does this conception of empathy allow one to eliminate skepticism about knowing others; it also allows us to recognize radical, opaque difference in others.

Again, species boundaries are irrelevant. Our minds are formed in relation to those around us, and do not differentiate between whether the other is a human or a non-human. Rather, what matters is that others respond to us, and we can meaningfully respond to them – it is the becoming of “we” from I and the other, an interactive entwinement of two beings, within which the other is a “you” and not an “it”, that is the key. It is this state of embodied intersubjectivity, which allows others to make a mark, leave a trace, on our own minds, and more-than-human animals are quite capable of entering into these states with humans. The ethologist Barbara Smuts, who has spent long periods of time living with wild baboons, has eloquently described the process of entering into such states with other animals, arguing that it requires a type of epistemological shift, within which one forsakes cortex-driven analytical rationalism, and instead opens up to the level of immediacy, to the sphere of instinct and intuition. When this shift is accomplished, one will be altered by the other animal, perhaps permanently bearing her claw or scale prints in the fibres of one’s mind. (Smuts 2001)

Indeed, this alteration is a process of becoming more open to, more attuned to, the world. Hence, if propositional, mathematizing language risks restricting our perception and limiting mentation, our embodied intersubjectivity with other animals pushes perception toward lucidity, and mentation toward exposure and openness. Smuts clarifies: “Experience suggests that by opening more fully to the presence of ‘self’ in others, including animals, we further develop that presence in ourselves and thus become more fully alive and awake participants in life,” (Smuts 2001, p. 308) and argues that in this process, she “had gone from thinking about the world analytically to experiencing the world directly and intuitively” (Smuts 2001, p. 299). Thus, forsaking mathematizing language can feed empathy, and empathy again can feed our capacity to reject such language, to be “rich” in the world without it.

Thus, “interruptive encounters” with more-than-human animals, which resist and obliterate the detachment of mathematizing language, can be sparked by affective and embodied empathy. By setting aside cultural stereotypes and utilitarian language, and by entering into states of perceptive, open intersubjectivity with other animals, we may begin to see animality anew, and cows, rats, chicken, salmon and sheep as subjects rather than as faceless resources. Finally, perceiving other animals as expressive, embodied unities will allow us also to become perceptive to their voices, their language. The type of expressiveness accentuated by Scheler is a form of language, a way of communicating oneself to the world. Empathy with non-human animals cannot, therefore, be mere anthropomorphic projection, let alone anthropocentric fantasy, if one truly pays heed to the animal’s own way of speaking. Fish and sheep no longer remain wholly opaque, inaccessible, incomprehensible, but rather – even whilst retaining an astounding oddity that the human mind can never fully comprehend – they are approached as active agents, capable of communicating their own phenomenality. Subjects, who speak, and who can be understood, if there is a willingness to listen.

Conclusion

Language is often used as a tool of division, the excavator of an abyss between human and more-than-human animals. Ontologically, it is designated the exclusive possession of human beings, and posited as the source of subjecthood and moral significance. Epistemologically, language is used to create a distance from lived experience – a distance not only from ourselves, but also from the mentation of other animals: their intentions, emotions, experiences. Animals are forced to fit into the mathematical order of scientific language, and thereby their agency, their inner lives, are lost. In the consequent dualistic logic; only humans are active subjects, whereas all other animals remain passive objects, biological matter to be used as a resource, as production units in the grim monotonous of industrial farming.

Yet, both accounts fail. More-than-human animals are creatures of language – their language dwells in the type of immediacy from which most human mentation also derives. Thus, there are forms of language other than those restricted to propositionality and mathematizing order, forms that exist on the first-order level of intent, affect, intuition, perception and instinct. Empathy, particularly in its affective and embodied form, helps one to find these forms. Affective empathy sparks immediacy, as one instantaneously, and beyond conceptual constructs, perceives experiences in other animals, and resonates with these experiences: the suffering of pigs or the joy of hens becomes something that is fathomed from within. Embodied empathy invites intersubjectivity with non-human animals, a state in which they are perceived as subjects, as a “you”, and which exposes one’s mind to their different way of being. It also opens one up to the expressive, embodied unity of other animals, to their way of communicating, and to their animal language.
References

Kris Forkasiewicz

Managing Editor of *Capitalism Nature Socialism* and a member of the Institute for Critical Animal Studies. His academic interests include animality, phenomenology of the body, and radical politics, all of which he has published on in several journals and books, as well as on his blog, Radically Real.
Bad Faith of Zoophobia

Kris Forkasiewicz

Sartre and Bad Faith. When Jean-Paul Sartre set out to grapple with the specter of racist identity in Anti-Semite and Jew, he unmasked it as an expression of inauthenticity. Both the person and the concept of "Jew," he claimed, allow the anti-Semite to develop a hardened shell of bad faith, that is, a form of self-deception pertaining to the very roots of what he feels himself to be. Sartre argued that "anti-Semitism is, in short, the fear of the human condition" (1948, 54), the latter constituted for him by the twin pillars of freedom and responsibility. For, insofar as we are "human" (être-pour-soi, being-for-itself), we must face our basic existential situation of being locked within their parameters. We are bound to choose. We can embrace freedom, accept its concomitant responsibility, and live authentically. But because this option amounts to an immense burden, the anti-Semite denies the availability of that foundational choice and finds himself trapped in an unacknowledged paradoxical position: he chooses to forgo choice altogether. But it is always already too late for that. He has already made a choice, proving that he is capable of choosing, and therefore that he is free and responsible. He must now repress this awareness in himself. In so doing, the anti-Semite chooses "the permanence and impenetrability of a stone" (ibid., 53). He would rather be an être-en-soi, a thing, than a "human being." Anti-Semitism is a hiding place.

A Different Sense of Inauthenticity. This simplified outline of Sartre's analysis will frame a discussion of a more primary expression of inauthenticity and bad faith, which his humanism left him unable to notice. Using a sketch of the basic contours of animal life, we will aim beneath the focus of Sartre's analysis, at something he took to be a set of fairly insignificant givens, and consequently failed to appreciate. In doing so, we may come across some clues as to who and what we must be before we can even think about freedom and responsibility in idealist Sartrean terms.

Analogously to the way that Sartre viewed racist identity as inauthentically human, human identity is itself an expression of inauthentic animality. Like anti-Semitism, "humanity" is a place to hide, an existential defence mechanism, a shelter from the dirt and pain of earthly life. And just as the racist needs the Jew or the black man, the être-pour-soi needs "the animal" as that against which to assert its own brand of permanence and impenetrability—not those of a stone this time, but of an outsider to nature and the world. But, insofar as we aspire to the status of being-for-itself, we invariably end up resenting the fleshy texture of our lives. Far from granting us the transcendence we desire, the denigration of animality keeps us mired in bad faith, swallows us up in a fundamental lie, and thus makes us "bad animals."

Breaking the Spell. If one was not a living body, imbued with breath and a pulse, one couldn’t do anything at all. In order to think of oneself as not-a-body, or not essentially a body, or something—anything—more than a body, one first needs to be this living body. It is none other than this all too often detested and despised flesh that opens us out onto the world. And it is this flesh, abnegated because of its vulnerability and finitude, that philosophers, artists, and priests have been trying to displace into projected "higher" realms, where it will finally cease to be; to shield and insulate it from the earthly ground whence it arises, so that it will never again be touched or hurt or killed; to train and discipline it, so as to ultimately overcome its burdensome, chaotic impulses. We have to be vague here, leaving the blanks to be filled in, breath by breath, by the flesh itself. We have to be especially careful not to say too much. Living bodies matter far too much to be given over to a reassuring but misplaced sense of false concreteness (cf. Whitehead 1967, Ch. III). Laid bare before the physiologist's cold gaze, opened up to the metaphysician's wordy craving for certitude and the deconstructionist's endless chatter, they have already suffered enough.

Beneath the Veil of the Ego Cogito. To speak of the body is already to freeze its living reality and, thus, in a sense, to betray it. But since we have to say something, if only in an attempt to clear away some of bad ideas on the subject that have piled up over the ages, we will begin with the claim that our basic condition is thoroughly "animal." Our facticity comprises the permanence of ceaseless change; an incompleteness and fragile openness of form; and a profound connection to the universe both nourishes and staves us, sustains and breaks us, energizes and drains us, bears and kills us. We are animal well before we can indulge in distinguishing ourselves as anything else—before we reflect and analyze and theorize, and light-years before we get to call ourselves "civilized." Our carnal nature is all-pervasive, and nothing, not even our most bizarre escapist dreams, can be severed from the pulse of somatic experience. But anthropic animality is hard to accept.

[Many people who... perhaps feel remote from the nonhuman world, are not sure they are animals. That's understandable: other animals might feel they are something different than "just animals" too. But we must contemplate the shared ground of our common biological being before emphasizing the differences. (Snyder 1990, 16)]

Far more importantly, and deeper still—before positing the schematic abstractions of biology—we must appreciate the common somatic-existential ground that we share with the other sentient creatures. From the outset we are stuck with a
given—real engagement in worldly circumstance. And we are never alone. Porous of constitution and irretrievably bound up with the flux of nature, we find ourselves lumped together with countless other feeling bodies: vampire bats and sea hawks, red foxes and wild boars, white mice and black rhinos, tarantulas and whiptail stingrays. How arrogant was Sartre to leap across all this richness and launch himself straight into an exclusively human drama?

Zoophobia. Within a more-than-human perspective, the anthropos figures as perhaps the only kind of creature that is prone to devoting its vital energies to overcoming inclusion in earthly transformations. But, in the process of extricating itself from a living relation to the rest of nature, it ends up crippled in a sweeping spectacle of zoophobia. Fearful of the animal condition, it turns on itself, on others, and on reality as such.

The emergence of a distinct agenda for human identity coincided with the disidentification of the anthropic animals from their own carnality, now equated with a lower, deplorable state, a state to be transcended. Trying to show that they are “not animal” (not “this body”), but rational, inspired, and cultured has become the signature of a form of life shared by anthropic oppressors and oppressed alike. The latter mimic the former in promoting hierarchical thinking, emotional disconnection, and repressive self-cultivation in an attempt to lift themselves out of the misery associated with animal nature. For instance, struggling for the emancipation of black people in the mid-20th century USA, Malcolm X put the matter in these familiar terms:

Human rights! Respect as human beings! That’s what America’s black masses want. That’s the true problem. The black masses want not to be shrunk from as though they are plague-ridden. They want not to be walled up in slums, in the ghettos, like animals. They want to live in an open, free society where they can walk with their heads up, like men and women. (Malcolm X 1973, 278, second emphasis added)

According to this typical account, the goal for African Americans has been to free themselves as human beings from a condition of animal unfreedom and filth. Whatever our anthropic race, ethnicity, or gender, we have fixed a sense of human identity atop the broken necks of animal others, as we strove to elevate ourselves in our economic practice, common sense, religious sensibility, and sciences to what Maurice Merleau-Ponty called “a view from above” (1968, 27).

The overall cost of this endeavor is nothing short of extreme. The human is the backbone of a quintessential form of oppression and debt. An abstract essence with no flesh of its own, humanity has perpetuated itself through bodily suffering. The human, with all of its discursive equipage, is a dramatization of daily life-struggles, and an attempt to inflate the meaning of those struggles for a particular kind of animal, an animal that all the while remains but a creature copulating with its world alongside other kinds of creatures. As ever, “[w]e eat, excrete, sleep, and get up; This is our world. All we have to do after that—is to die” (Ikkyu cited in Watts 1989, 162). And we love and yearn, and hurt and thrive. But if these are all animal impulses, undergone in the course of animal becoming, the dramatization of the human is unwarranted. And not only that—it is downright preposterous, like trying to amputate one’s own legs and still expecting to be able to stand up. Like the white man’s burden and other colonialist narratives of self-ennoblement, the human invites a perpetuation of a failed project in the name of a higher destiny.

The Harrowing Narrowing. As anthropic life squeezes itself into the human template, it expresses itself through and is enveloped by protocols of entrenched abstraction: capital and commodity, advanced technology, bureaucratic management, scientific modelling, religious dogma, clock time, and more. Fragmented by these various apparatuses of mediation, our perceptual life has become a shadow of its past unity. Repression of sensuousness, born from our ancestors’ increasing volitional interference with the hitherto spontaneous harmonization of their inner and outer worlds, was amplified by the rise of symbolic thinking. Bronislaw Malinowski called symbolic thought “the soul of civilization, [operating] chiefly in the form of language as a means of coordinating action or of standardizing technique, and providing rules for social, ritual, and industrial behavior” (cited in Zerzan 2002, 4). Coordination is gradually formalized and takes its toll on experience. What was once a living relation to the world, is objectified, aggregated, and abstracted from the lived situation. “Scientific knowledge shifts the center of gravity of experience, so that we have unlearned how to see, hear, and generally speaking, feel” (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 229). The synaesthetic “primary layer” of sense experience that precedes its division among the separate senses (ibid., 227) has been buried beneath this shift.

With the proliferation of abstraction, discipline could be anchored in symbolically-grounded systems of religious ideology and life of labor, expressive of progressive social hierarchization and control. It is here that bureaucratic structures, coupled with technological advancements, could find their impetus for growth. Amidst all this, an autonomous temporal dimension emerged as an essential component of the life of an increasingly divided and dysynchronous society. Time has demanded “that its subjects be painstaking, ‘realistic,’ serious, and above all, devoted to work… the invention of the mechanical clock was one of the most important turning points in the history of science and technology; indeed of all human art and culture” (Zerzan 2002, 21).

Ongoing submersion in these intimately related spheres of progressive “disembodiment” has fostered estrangement from animal selfhood and disconnection from the spontaneous perceptual activity of preconscious, prereflective, subpersonal life. Never has the rift between perception and sense been so wide. Never before have our lifeworlds been so reified. Reification—the freezing and stiffening of fluid, living realities into solid, thinglike structures—is the common denominator and substrate of alienated anthropic life. Reification constitutes a major key to understanding how all the seemingly different strands of disconnection are in fact internally related and “hold together.” Zoophobically propelled, it is a danger to anthropic perception which, embedded materially in the structures that warp it, loses touch with its natural ground in the spontaneously experienced world.
Reification institutes a material-perceptual loop in which zoophobia can play out and be reinforced. Perceptual myopia gives rise to structures—industrial-economic, technoscientific, or symbolic—for instance—that in turn reproduce and deepen pathological modes of experience. Experience associated solely with these structures fail to adjust the live body to its immediate situation. Perception, increasingly confined by abstract demands, painfully represses its carnal foundation. This cannot go on indefinitely.

The Technics of Pacification. While somaticity quietly, patiently constitutes and reconstitutes all sentient life, for the most part it remains overlooked. But things change; the tissue of normality is ruptured as we suffer the wholesale revenge of the repressed. Sensuous life reemerges in morbidity: obsession and compulsion; depression and apathy; anxiety, irritability, and aggressiveness; obesity; workaholism; hypertension; chronic fatigue; loneliness, numbness, and boredom in the midst of sensory overload; internet addiction; heart disease; sexual humiliation, exploitation, and rape; the unmitigated violence of serial killing and organized warfare. Our suppressed wildness is going awry, imploding on itself or exploding upon the world.

All of this is compensated for with quick fixes—virtual reality, intoxicants, genetic engineering, and, more conventionally, incarceration. Techno-productivism becomes the go-to response to the questions asked of reified existence. When every problem is a matter of identifying a correct algorithm and requires a technical solution, rationality becomes a language of domination, crowding out everything that cannot be expressed in its specialist terms. Administrative routines and chains of command are rapidly established and reestablished even as the underlying causes of problems are left untouched, to be dealt with by further alienated performance. Bodily sensitivity is effectively drowned out at every step of the way, with major decisions overwhelmingly made “somewhere else” and the live body reconfigured as a patient at best, or else as a victim. Devising its technical procedures, the “scientific mind” is interested primarily in extricating itself from the uncertainties of lived situations—to solve this or that problem, not just on this or that occasion, but once and for all. Whatever promises relief from the vicissitudes of carnal life becomes a viable option. Fantasies of invulnerability are now expressed through technical narratives, and this attitude is spreading like wildfire. The way we go about things, we would all be wearing white coats if we could get away with it. We are all technicians now. Quietly following protocol, we become secret agents of Prometheus, reenacting his archetypal theft. In the process, the world comes to be lived through the lens of a system that promises depth, but withdraws, little by little, into the flatness of an image; a system that boasts diversity, but is established through the despotic leveller of universal quantifiability.

Under these conditions, common-sense individual actions aimed at the fulfilment of immediate interests spill over, aggregated, into irrational outcomes. And so, thousands get into their cars, wanting to return home as quickly as possible after a day spent in a cubicle, only to find themselves jammed up in traffic in the middle of a highway, choking on smog, and stuck there for hours on end. And this scenario replays daily in the midst of talk of a “green revolution.” Kafkaesque absurd is being normalized into a universal. Instead of revolting, most people comply. But how much longer can this compliance last? The feeling of horror in the face of massive systems of impersonal, mechanized, digitized control—the apogee of instrumental rationality—rightly becomes the body’s gut reaction, and there isn’t nearly enough of this. How much longer can the collective superego contain us?

The Economy of Anthropic Flesh. Capitalism eagerly gears into perceptual impoverishment, sensuous repression, and aspirations to transcendence. Early capitalist relations were built on fertile zoophobic ground, and have developed, over the course of a few centuries, into the dominant matrix of corporal regimentation. Capital-accumulating work becomes our lifeline and is alternately forced down our throats and withdrawn from our reach. As commodification proceeds apace, deeper and deeper recesses of everyday life are infused with commodities and subordinated to their circulation. Consumerist imperatives are peddled to contain the overflow of late-capitalist productive surplus, and themselves become a lifelong burden. While there is still, for some, retirement from wage labor, there is no retirement from compulsive consumption. Somatic and emotional disconnection lays the foundation for a world where starvation and gluttony, unemployment and overwork, poverty and overabundance walk hand in hand.

In India, amid a booming economy, farmers’ suicides linked to “agrarian crises” have become commonplace. When prices on the stock market plummet, farmers lose their livelihood by the thousands. It is estimated that over 17,000 of them killed themselves in 2009 alone (Sainath 2010). The Indian National Crime Records Bureau reports that around 216,500 died this way from 1997 to 2009 (ibid.). Money is being made across the world, for example, in cotton production, in strict correlation with the price fluctuations that trigger these deaths. Like the corporate players’ stock market and their massive state subsidies, mass suicide becomes a matter of statistical calculations done as part of business as usual, and not much more. Accountability is so widely distributed as to vanish into abstraction.

In 2010, at a factory in Longhua, Shenzhen, China, a facility belonging to Foxconn, the world’s largest electronics manufacturer, eighteen workers tried to commit suicide by jumping off the tops of company buildings. Fourteen died. In recent protests, about 150 more workers threatened to kill themselves. Faced with this “problem,” the management devised a non-solution: after the first wave of suicides, they installed huge safety nets to prevent further jumps (Moore 2012). The capitalist cannot easily forfeit the productive potential of working bodies, even if there are 920,000 of them left, spread across the manufacturer’s plants (Focus Taiwan 2010). As long as value can still be extracted from their labor, neither the workers’ lives nor their deaths are in their own hands. Imagine a scenario developing from this, in which the workers and their overseers go to ever-greater lengths, trying to outsmart each other in a game of prevention and suicide, making for a spectacle of techno-efficiency and despair.
These grim sights are not limited to the so-called “developing” world. In parts of Australia “a perfect storm’ of risk factors in the [construction] industry, including a macho culture, drugs and alcohol, and job insecurity, [has] created a suicide epidemic” (CFMEU 2012). What of it, then? A programme is created to keep up the appearance of care and to treat symptoms. Mutual support, professional help, and catching early signs of trouble are welcome. As usual, employers and unions join hands in fostering productivity and striving to keep things going. Meanwhile, “work is bleeding into the rest of a worker’s life, and we do not have the means of recognizing or dealing with this [in a way] that suits workers” (ACTU 2011). This is no aberration, but business as usual under capitalism, where the anthropic animal comes to be defined solely by her position vis-à-vis labor and capital—as a worker. Consumption of alcohol and other drugs is the frustrated bodies’ rational response to a seemingly unchangeable situation. If the suffering is to continue, it must at least be numbed down. These escape routes would not be denigrated if they didn’t work so “well.” Addiction is promoted among the workers, as long as it doesn’t diminish the labor pool, weaken discipline, or otherwise disrupt the productive process. In turn, machismo provides the ethos of invulnerability and self-repression upon which capitalist relations depend. Without it, and the accompanying cult of work, they would find no foothold in anthropic life. So, capitalist relations sink their roots into machismo and promote it among men and women alike. It is only when machismo prevents people from coming to work that it becomes a problem for capitalists. Finally, job insecurity is actively fostered, through deregulation of the labor market, for instance, as a means of enforcing employee obedience and timidity. It is true, “workers”—beings who by their very designation seem to have been born to toil—are periodically relieved by a prosperity achieved through the redirection of capitalist violence towards the earth and its other populations (colonialism, imperialism, war). As in the welfare-state era of the 1950s and 1960s, working people come to share slightly more in the fruits of exploitation (to which they themselves remain subjected). But in recurrent and worsening economic downturns this violence is redirected back at them. Laboring men and women find themselves ruthlessly exposed and sacrificed. Bureaucratic counter-measures are nothing but stitches hastily applied to repeatedly inflicted wounds, lest the limbs fall off.

The Trail of Victims… Still worse off are the billions of feeling bodies that suffer our bipedal confusion. Manipulated into servility, legion other animals occupy the fenced, caged, penned spaces of a globalized slave economy. Zoophobia radiates out in waves of expansive and systematic violence. Other earthlings, those whom our forefathers hunted and maimed, raped and bred, trapped and butchered, have taught us most of what we know about how to persecute, torture, and kill. Victims range from the precisely targeted (like the trademarked “OncoMouse” cut up in labs in the search for cancer treatments) to collateral damage (like the inhabitants of the Amazon jungle exterminated by the clear-cutting of their homes to make grazing space for enslaved cows). The global animal holocaust is so pervasive that it is hard to tell where lethal intentions end and accidental deaths begin. The number of land animals killed for food alone is in the range of 56-60 billion a year (FAOSTAT 2007). The annual number of marine-animal deaths is difficult to determine, but it is bound to be enormous. Beyond that, the current wave of species extinctions, dubbed the “Sixth Great Extinction Event” by leading researchers, is the largest since the one that occurred 65 million years ago, when the dinosaurs went under (MacFarquhar 2010). The Guardian’s Juliette Jowit comments that

The IUCN [International Union for the Conservation of Nature] created shockwaves with its major assessment of the world’s biodiversity in 2004, which calculated that the rate of extinction had reached 100-1,000 times that suggested by the fossil records before humans. (Jowit 2010)

She adds that, while

no formal calculations have been published since… conservationists agree the rate of loss has increased since then, and… it was possible that the dramatic predictions of experts like the renowned Harvard biologist E.O. Wilson, that the rate of loss could reach 10,000 times the background rate in two decades, could be correct. (ibid.)

The pressure exerted upon the bodies and habitats of other earthlings by essentially parasitic anthropic industries is incredible and unprecedented. Left behind on the bloodtrail of capitalist-civilizational development, the animal victims of past and present violence demand an impossible redemption.

The crisis of the sensuous has grave consequences for how the violence occurs. The horrors of slaughterhouses and vivisection labs vanish from sight and, with the distance between sensing bodies increasing, tie in with the institutionalized execution of harmful actions from afar. The distance amplifies disregard for the consequences of violent acts, suppresses sympathy for those on the receiving end, and facilitates mass, indiscriminate killing. Like routine slaughterhouse extermination, species extinction has an “out-of-sight, out-of-mind quality” (MacFarquhar 2010). Zoos also make sure that the extent of animal suffering remains unseen, albeit by scrupulously cloaking it with overt, exaggerated exposure. By being shown too much, we lose sight of the real (see Acampora 1998). When violence becomes overt, at best it gets reported, as with the recent killing of an 18-month-old giraffe (shot in the head in public) and four healthy lions (euthanized a month later) at Copenhagen Zoo (Bilefsky 2014). International outrage follows, and then things quieten again. Many raise their voices, but scarcely anyone raises a hand. How can this ever be enough?
The goal was to “produce the kinds of animals most useful” to the needs of the herders who “killed or castrated most of the males to ensure that the ‘selected’ breeding male impregnated the females” (ibid., emphases added). Captive animals became the stuff and instruments of production, the object of which was not this or that individual, but a standardized, that is, deformed, kind of creature. Characteristics were promoted or suppressed arbitrarily to suit a preconceived purpose set by the oppressors. Differences notwithstanding, both traditional eugenics and high-tech bioengineering have clear precedents in the modus operandi of animal domestication.

Not long after our ancestors began violently tightening their control over the other animals, they became dealers in their life and death. Animal domestication was not unlike the making of a junkie. In this case, the victims had to be hooked on the oppressive agent and gradually stripped of their freedom of movement, of their opportunities to obtain food by themselves, to give birth and raise their progeny on their own terms, and to die as free beings. Moments of relief from overt violence were priceless for the domesticated, but, bought as they were with the inculcation of servility and compliance, they came at a great cost. The animals were drawn out of their own worlds and thrust into the alien reality of a second-hand existence.

The shocking effect of such accounts is simultaneously countered and amplified by the fact that the evil involved is all too banal (cf. Bauman 1989). Industrial practices are all planned, programmed, clear-cut, replicable, systematic, designed for predictability and non-ambivalence. An intensification and externalization of zoophobia, modern animal oppression figures as a series of holocausts that, by their very scope, eclipse Auschwitz, Treblinka, Chelmno, and other Nazi extermination camps (cf. Patterson 2002). The institutions of animal slavery have been developed over millennia, and the making of animal slaves was no walk in the park. Pressing a heel down on the necks of the first generation couldn’t have been easy. Hunting was one thing, but outright domination must have felt like something else. Contrary to idealized images of early animal domestication, Charles Patterson reminds us that killing animals for their meat and exploiting them for their milk, hides, or labor, herders learned how to control the animals’ mobility, diet, growth, and reproductive lives through the use of castration, hobbling, branding, ear cropping, and such devices as leather aprons, whips, prods, and eventually chains and collars. (ibid., 7)

Wherever it took place, at some point taming entailed brutality. The goal was to “produce the kinds of animals most useful” to the needs of the herders who “killed or castrated most of the males to ensure that the ‘selected’ breeding male impregnated the females” (ibid., emphases added). Captive animals became the stuff and instruments of production, the object of which was not this or that individual, but a standardized, that is, deformed, kind of creature. Characteristics were promoted or suppressed arbitrarily to suit a preconceived purpose set by the oppressors. Differences notwithstanding, both traditional eugenics and high-tech bioengineering have clear precedents in the modus operandi of animal domestication.

...Extends Beyond the Horizon. In a way, we lack direct, sensorial contact with the very world that supports our every step. Mediation—that which interposes itself between the knowing body and its world—is a means of detachment. And detachment, in turn, is a facilitator of oppression. Yet the topic resists such cold analysis. In the realities of perpetual horror nothing seems to be entirely incidental, but neither is it easy to grasp any kind of totality here. It is mind-blowing that

in the case of the billions of chickens, turkeys, ducks, cows, pigs, and other animals… the genocidal fate is not to be rendered physically extinct, but to be proliferated in virtually endless procrustean reformulations of their bodies to fit the procrustean beds of global industrial agriculture and research. (Davis 2011, 41)

The non-compliant individuals were eliminated. The rest would come to tolerate their oppressors and obey, helpless to do otherwise. If they failed to follow commands, they were immediately reminded who was master and who was slave, as is evidenced by innumerable instances of grotesque domination extending to this day. The Lapps, for instance, restrain reindeer, wrap their scrotum in cloth, and chew on them with their teeth until the testicles are crushed. Rwala tribesmen will kill a camel calf in order to eat him, then smear the dead little one’s blood over another calf, and bring that one to the mother. Herders at the headwaters of the Sepik, New Guinea, scoop out pigs’ eyes by piercing them with sticks so that the fluid leaks out of the sockets, and then put the eyes back in. The maimed slaves, unable to flee, are soon killed and eaten (Patterson 2002, B-10). Originating in animal domestication, the equation of control, subjugation, and killing with strength has persisted to this day and is the mainstay of modern culture.

Horror Stories. Oppressive cultures are rife with narratives of justification. A story has to be told to reinforce a trick played on perception, whereby “what is there” is occluded by an ideological fog. But because the discourse of the human-animal dichotomy was shaky from the outset, the pangs of conscience not only never disappeared, but have been transmuted into hatred—now simmering, now exploding all the sham pretense to composure. While it is true that economic motives propelled and underscored animal oppression from the beginning (Nibert 2002), their consideration alone fails to account for the sheer excess of atrocity rampant in animal exterminationism. Footage of slaughterhouse operators jumping in fury on the broken bodies of pigs; photographs of hunters grinning over the blank gazes of their dead victims; crowds cheering at the bleeding of a bull in a corrida—in all these cases something more than instrumentalism is at stake. An analogy with racial oppression might help shed some light on this. Early in his Muslim ministry, Malcolm X preached to his black brethren, “Do you know why the white man really hates you? It’s because every time he sees your face, he sees a mirror of his crime, and his guilty conscience can’t bear to face it.” (1973, 208). Even a story crafted carefully over many generations is not enough to erase the impact of an immediate encounter. A zoophobic narrative, like a racist one, is always at risk of being seen through, because it covers over a reality that demands acknowledgement: we, the self-repressed, hold the world hostage.

Fear, hate, and guilt are all connected in this interplay of truth and lies. Longing for an abstract and impossible freedom from the flesh, we have grown terrified of the freedom of the flesh to pursue its own rhythms. Though the flesh itself has remained, as ever, implacable, violence off the charts has been used to suppress it. And when reverberations of animal misery made the ensuing guilt unbearable, or perhaps just gave the naked power behind the violence bad publicity, layers of discursive deceit gradually accumulated as an excuse for atrocity. Woven over centuries, zoophobic narratives constitute the superstructure of oppression and the means by which its reality is mystified.
A Hundred Ways to Paint a Demon. To a zoophobe, much of the animal world is populated by “stupid,” “filthy,” and/or “vicious” “beasts.” Sheep, for instance, are held to be “an animal so apparently dim-witted that they have become a byword for stupidity and mindlessly following the crowd” (Gray 2011). In knee-jerk fashion, self-professed individualists resent strong herd, i.e., social, instincts, mistaking them for stupidity. Meanwhile, Cambridge (UK) researchers have concluded that sheep “have brainpower to equal rodents, monkeys, and, in some tests, even humans” (ibid.). Sheep, cows, and other sensitive creatures have long suffered the sorry condition of being alienated from their natural habitats, forcibly estranged from their own nature, and are now blamed for an inability to navigate the blind corners of anthropic artifice.

Pigs and other mud-bathing animals are labelled “filthy,” “vile,” and “foul,” as if mud bathing were bad hygiene, and not a way to cool the body down, get rid of parasites, protect the skin from the sun, or mark territory. Especially pigs, denigrated as the quintessential filthy animal, have entered the popular imaginary as a handy symbol of the “failure of flesh” to purify itself, downtrodden and easily available for ridicule, and transformed into neatly cut-up pieces and served on a plate.

Wild rats likewise carry “an enormous weight of metaphor and meaning,” and are objects of “deep antipathy… believed to carry filth and disease, associated with the gutter,” and “routinely [elicit] reactions of disgust and horror” (Burke 2003, 207-08, 210). Again, “[b]laming the victim provides… a way of evading guilt. Rats find sustenance in our discarded food and take shelter in our debris. When our accumulated garbage attracts too noticeable a number, they are condemned for ‘infesting’ the area…. Rats are ‘vermin’” (Dunayer 2001, 9). They occupy the precarious position of being possibly the most despised kind of animal, and as such are a readymade stand-in for what we are bent on eradicating in ourselves, obsessed as we—are the creators of all gutters—are with hospital-grade sterility, endless cultivation, and banishing the irregularity and asymmetry that are all around us. “Animal filth” is the obverse of the mass projection of civilization’s anal-retentive character (cf. Hall 1954, 108).

In turn, “vicious” is reserved for animals who are unafraid to bite back. Wolves figure prominently here, their reputation for aggression being vastly exaggerated and their sociality downplayed. No wolf has been observed biting the testicles off of his prey to keep him around as a hapless slave. Instead, the strong bonds of affection, loyalty, care, concern, playfulness, cooperativeness, communicativeness, and trust that persist among the wolves of the pack are the most striking characteristics of wolf group behavior as noted by ethologists who have spent time in close proximity with wolves. Evidence of these traits is their shared care of the young, their year-long courtship and mating for life with continual displays of affection, their feeding injured members of the pack, their grieving for months when they lose a pack member, and their need for belonging in a pack. (Mazis n.d., 9)

Cultural representations of wolves have served one-sidedly to support exterminationist anthropic practices in both North America and Europe. “Not only were wolves killed to the point of extinction, they were also slaughtered with a vehemence that is shocking” (ibid., 8), a reaction to a previously projected threat. Someone, we can’t help thinking, was looking for reasons to kill.

While ordinarily oppression is made acceptable through narratives of denigration, similar results can be achieved with a discourse of ennoblement. As a symbol of courage and strength, the lion figures in the popular imagination as “the king of the jungle.” The prevalence of this perception makes it ever-enticing to dethrone and subdue him, which accounts for the presence of lions in zoos and circuses beyond their simple exotica. In zoos they are caged and exhibited as defeated, while in circuses they are reduced to court jesters, performing at their trainers’ whim and to the audience’s satisfaction. Hence, even when apparently elevated, the flesh becomes an object of domination and transcendence. Beyond the nominal praise there lurks in such discourses a most pernicious prison-survival mentality, albeit in the absence of any objective conditions that would call for it: find the most feared and dangerous guy around, kill him, and take his place.

Against the Wall. Of course, one will find numerous instances of aggression among the other animals, directed at members of both their own and other groups. Chimpanzees, for instance, have been spotted sneaking into the territories of neighboring chimp clans and mauling unsuspecting males to death, patiently picking off their competition “until both the territory and the females are theirs” (Weisman 2007, 50). Chimpanzees have also been seen pitched in “blood battles within a group to determine who is the alpha male” (ibid.). Moreover, in rare cases, females have been observed to kill and even eat other females’ infants (Choi 2007). However, most of this was noted in areas under heavy anthropic encroachment and severe environmental pressures that signal a state not of normality, but of emergency.

Animals of countless species live in chronic anxiety as their worlds close in upon them. Discussing C. H. Southwick’s research on the influence of crowding on increase in animal aggressiveness, Erich Fromm remarked that “the narrowing down of space deprives the animal of important vital functions of movement, play, and the exercise of its faculties…” (Fromm 1973, 105). Another aspect of crowding, possibly even more conducive to aggressive behavior, is the breakdown of the social structure of an animal group. “Every [known social] animal species lives within a social structure characteristic for this species. Whether hierarchical or not, species-specific social structure is the frame of reference to which the animal’s behavior is adapted. A tolerable social equilibrium constitutes a necessary condition for its existence. Its destruction through crowding constitutes a massive threat to the animal’s existence, and aggression is the result one would expect, especially given the defensive role of aggression, especially when flight is impossible” (ibid., 105-106).
Although social structures vary from species to species, and are not as strongly pre-defined as Fromm might have thought, his general conclusion seems right. Under pressures of crowding, an animal community typically turns into a spiteful mob. In the midst of this, however, in 1962 ethologist Adriaan Kortlandt witnessed a group of chimpanzees in which “a silver-haired old chimpanzee… remained the leader… even though he was physically far inferior to younger apes” (Fromm 1973, 106). Relating Cortland’s observations, Fromm contended that “apparently life in freedom, with all its many stimulations had developed a kind of wisdom in him which qualified him as a leader” (ibid.). Does one become the alpha through violence, then? If physical superiority was an automatically assumed priority among chimpanzees, the silver-hair would not have survived as long as he did. Instead, we see how diverse their lives can be, depending on variations in environmental and social living conditions. This is not to disingenuously explain away all of the cruelty and violence observed among chimpanzees or, say, in a cat’s apparent torturing of a mouse. Maybe cruelty is in part a pathological sort of play. Maybe it’s a sickness. Or maybe it’s just part and parcel of being animal, and surfaces here and there, inexplicably. Whatever the case, it holds that, as the humanist Fromm says, “if the human species had approximately the same degree of ‘innate’ aggressiveness as that of chimpanzees living in their natural habitat, we would live in a rather peaceful world” (ibid., 103).

The Irresistible Charm of Reality. There is yet another, altogether more devious way of justifying oppressive practice. Displacement, subjugation, and extermination are naturalized simply by virtue of the fact that they are already happening. Whatever else animal oppressors might be telling themselves, whatever those who willingly thrive on animal suffering are trying to make themselves think, there is no story and no evidence of superiority like that of the actual practice of domination. Despite some attention devoted to it, domination welcomes each successive anthropic generation more entrenched in the lifeblood of society, and so becomes more difficult to overcome. Indeed, based on paleontological, anthropological, and historical evidence, Fromm concluded that “the degree of destructiveness increases with the increased development of civilization, rather than the opposite” (1973, 4). This is not just because of the growing power of the technology at the disposal of its agents, but also because of the common-sense perception of destructiveness as being ineradicable, which consolidates its perceived status as a self-perpetuating pattern—a pattern into which it subsequently becomes ever easier to fall.

Born too Late. Even on such a cursory view, some disturbing conclusions come to the fore. It seems that a dark historical trajectory envelops us, effectively set in motion by a gradual “unhinging” whose impact continues to increase. Zoophobia forms the backbone of this process as an ideological and emotive legitimizing force, as the “other side” of civilizational development. It is plausible to think that it first arose around the epochal transition from a foraging to a sedentary, agricultural, civilized mode of life that aimed at gaining increased control of the supply of nature’s riches and at systematically reducing the limitations it imposes. We have diligently followed in the footsteps of our forefathers. Fast-forward to the present. We are invested in a system of control that verges on near-total domination.

But what if it were possible to turn things around? Nothing short of an end to zoophobic domination, and a return to our senses, to a freer animal life, would suffice. In fact, this may be the only way forward. According to Adorno, “the individual is left with no more than… to try to live so that one may believe himself to have been a good animal” (1973, 299). Developing this insight, Christoph Menke remarks that the animal subject does not separate itself from its “forces” or “impulses” for the sake of following the law and in order to make itself feel freed from them but “is such that its freedom, indeed, its very strength, consists of allowing its forces or impulses to express themselves. Only in this way, in ‘harmony,’ even in ‘reconciliation’ with himself, can man be good to others. (Menke 2004, 320)

Breaking out of zoophobia, we can only be good animals if we “do not act, let alone posit [ourselves], as persons” (Adorno 1973, 277), that is, as egos succumbing to the superego in suppressing our inner impulses in the name of a preconceived standard of goodness. Drawing on Nietzsche, Alphonso Lingis notes that “[the libidinal forces of an individual can withdraw from the ideal image of himself projected by adults of his family, class, ethnicity, nation, and race to invest in those ancient instincts resurfing in himself, affirming them and empowering them” (2005, 15). But the traits that make up a good animal cannot be manufactured. “[N]obility does not arise from character management” (ibid.). True virtue is unselfconscious and unassuming, and emerges with the liberation of impulse, which can now spontaneously take on a multiplicity of meanings. Still, the full expression of libidinal forces would put today’s “individual” at risk. Civilization as such was concocted precisely to tame these forces and to subordinate them to a “higher” authority. Whatever they may be, instincts “will make that individual maladapted to his time and can make him eccentric or mad” (ibid.). Until civilization itself is remodeled to make room for him, he will remain “a savage born too late” (ibid.). But can it even be done? Is civilization not founded, to the extent that we have already seen, on a long and painful process of subjugating the flesh? “Civilized’ man has always lived in the ‘Zoo’—i.e., in various degrees of captivity and unfreedom—and this is still true” (Fromm 1973, 103). And probably more so in the most technologically advanced societies than anywhere else. The ultimate aim of civilization, unstated in its official claims but incipient in the zoophobic impetus that propels it, is once and for all to arrest the flow of animal becoming.
Homecoming. Anthropic attitudes to prereflective body dynamics oscillate between reluctance and hatred, as if suppression of animal nature were to provide impenetrable insulation from the pitfalls of living as an animal. But zoophobia not only fails to diminish the risks of being in the world; in the long run it actually multiplies the dangers. In extreme cases it leaves us paralyzed, making life an unlivable nightmare. In fact, from within the self-strangulation that zoophobia mandates, life itself emerges as the ultimate threat. Meanwhile, the world simply remains unruly. It follows its own rhythms, of which we, along with the other animals, are but passing iterations. The more neatly civilized we become, sweeping our instincts under the rug, the deeper the chasms thus created become and the more the pulse of the world is lost on us, even as we continue to be subjected to it. Our lives fall out of sync with the diverse flow of the surrounding ecologies and their sentient inhabitants. We lose whatever animal grace we once still had, the grace whose flame now faintly glimmers in us, to be rekindled or finally to die out. The perpetually strained anthropic flesh is in dire need of decontraction.

As the saying attributed to R. D. Laing goes, “There is a great deal of pain in life, and perhaps the only pain that can be avoided is the pain of trying to avoid pain.” Going beyond mere fear and embracing the whole spectrum of our impulses—becoming good animals—would pave the way to a post-Promethean existence in which resentment, hatred, and violence would be much less pronounced. We would make slingshots, perhaps, but not atom bombs. With the emptying of our collective bloodstream of zoophobic poison, maybe we could call this often harsh and unwelcoming world our home. It really is all we have.
References

Radhika Subramaniam

A curator and researcher interested in urban crises and surprises. She is Director/Chief Curator of the Sheila C. Johnson Design Center (SJDC) at Parsons The New School for Design where she is assistant professor. She has a Masters in Anthropology and a PhD. in Performance Studies.
In Search of the Indian Cow

Radhika Subramaniam

1.

The early hours of the morning, the early years of my life. Excited by the start of the holidays and unsettled by an unfamiliar bed, I creep down the stairs. My grandmother is at the front door. My grandfather's temper is safely out of sight. I hear the milk splashing in the pail and in the dawn light, I can see the cow. The sounds of the city—yes, it is a city—are still hushed. She stands at the door with her calf beside her. I don't understand why, as yet, and in fact, it is many years before I make the connection between our splashing milk and the calf. It presented itself then as it does now, as a complete image, whole and indivisible. Later, when my grandmother makes me my small cup of coffee, I don't tell her that I dislike the way the milk tastes in it.

In our own big city apartment, milk arrived in clanking milk pails, tethered to either side of the milkman's bicycle, pedalled by his sinewy legs many miles from the dairy colony. It is buffalo milk, I'm told, and what you're used to, which is why the milk at your grandmother's tastes different. In fact, buffalo is the source of most milk in the sub-continent. The milkman has gone down in family lore for his experimental approach to naming on the monthly bill: He has an idiosyncratic way of splitting my father's full name, yoking it to a new symmetry, so that it emerges steady and balanced as a pair of oxen. It was generally believed too that he watered down the milk, which may additionally explain the taste to which my palate has grown accustomed. But there it came, just in time at that dark hour, for the resultant coffee or tea to dispel the fog of night before the school bus.

By the time I actually drank a full glass of milk, I was an adult in the United States. Years of lassi, chhaas, dahi, moru, paneer, payasam, kheer, rasgulla, kulfī, shrikhand, ghee and all sorts of other yogurts, cheeses, butter and sweets, had not prepared me for that glass of milk as it first came: cold, white, long and gleaming from the fridge and far enough from everything to taste, with remarkable disinterest, of nothing at all.

2.

In 2002, the eminent Indian historian D.N. Jha found himself at the centre of a storm provoked by his book *The Myth of the Holy Cow*. It is a straightforward account. Using copious Hindu, Buddhist and Jain scriptural and other citations, he argues against the assumption of the historical sanctity of the cow by demonstrating a long history of eating beef in India.

The book doesn’t really make a case against the significance of the cow as a central presence in a complex array of social and cultural practices. In fact, it is replete with references to the cow’s ritual importance through sacrifice and its appearance in imagery. What he underscores rather is that the perceived Hindu taboo against eating beef is of recent vintage. This wasn’t news by any means. Indian historians had acknowledged it for decades. In the 1960s, American anthropologist Marvin Harris proffered a somewhat attenuated ecological and materialist explanation. To a small-scale agricultural economy, cattle were far more useful alive than dead—they pulled carts and ploughs, their dung was used as fuel and they provided milk. Nevertheless, Jha’s book provoked a furore. A resurgent Hindu nationalism of several decades standing had re-appropriated the symbolic fervour of the cow. Well-organized and well-stoked, it has tended to fuel aggressive and militant responses to perceived slights. Concerned about retaliation, the first publisher of the book actually backed away from his commitment. Another bravely took his place but Hindu right groups managed to get a court order to limit circulation. Jha also received death threats. It was then published abroad by Verso.

By the late 19th century, it was clear that if the cow had ever simply been a cow, it was now going to be a great deal more. Carrying a definite political charge, the animal began to be closely associated with a newly reinforced Hindu identity. Hindu reformer Swami Dayananda Saraswati and the organization he founded, the Arya Samaj, initiated the earliest cow protection movements, as they were called. A Gaurakshini Sabha (or Cow Protection Society) was established in Punjab in 1882, one of many more to follow. This impetus had far less to do with religious reform than with religious nationalism. Cow Protection movements demanded that the colonial government ban cow slaughter. By and large, the colonial government established its policies in these matters on “customary law”. That meant it was constructed on the basis of practices and beliefs that were considered to be long-standing or “customary” to various castes and religious communities. Since the cow was not uniformly regarded as sacred—that is, not to Muslims, for instance—the courts refused to accede to the cow-protection demands.
Opposition deepened between Hindu groups and the British, but equally among Hindus and Muslims. Now that the colonial government had backed Muslim custom in refusing to ban slaughter, they were obliged to ensure that it could happen safely. Police protection had to be provided to prevent any disruption during such festivals as Bakr Id or other occasions of cow slaughter. So, the beef-eating British seemed to be supporting other beef eaters. Through this, Muslims became curiously aligned with the colonial power, underscoring their characterization as foreigners.

The organization of cow protection grew through rallies, campaigns and meetings, leading to many outbreaks of violence. In 1893, there was large-scale rioting across the country, beginning with a Hindu-Muslim dispute spurred by confusions in the implementation of colonial policy. Well into the next century, the cow, as Gau mata (Mother cow), remained one of the most potent symbols of a Hindu nationalism that believed its culture and traditions had been suppressed and sullied by Muslim rule.

Gandhi too was a staunch advocate of gau seva, service to the cow, folding it into his complex political philosophy of personal sacrifice and civil resistance. He described the cow as a “poem of pity”. Compassion toward the animal was, for him, part of a larger ethos of attitudes toward the helpless and weak. The symbolic power of the cow notwithstanding, the actual conditions under which cattle lived were sorry enough to benefit from sustained attention. According to Gandhi, legislation wasn’t going to do it. True care and protection would only come from education and transformation from within.

The supposed sanctity of the cow has never been an assurance of good treatment. In fact, perhaps precisely because cows are not being fattened for slaughter, they are frequently ill-fed and poorly kept, despite the existence of infrastructures of care. Particularly in parts of Northern and Western India, there are gaushalas, shelters for aged, infirm, sick and unwanted cattle. In Gandhi’s own Gujarat, such gaushalas or the associated institutions of pinjrapoles, were often strongly influenced by Jain beliefs in ahimsa or non-violence. A traditional pinjrapole could house a large array of animals apart from cattle — sheep, goats, dogs, donkeys, birds, and even, on occasion, in scrupulous attention to the minuscule, a jivat khan or room for insects. However, for all that they recognised that age and infirmity affect all who labour, these were often poorly managed; Gandhi rightfully inveighed against their conditions. More obscurely though, he also suggested that the spirit of compassion and ahimsa manifested in the care toward the cow would influence Muslims “of their own accord” to recognise the necessity, perhaps out of respect for Hindus, not to slaughter cows.

Yet, beef neither was nor is only part of a Hindu-Muslim divide. Eating beef also characterized one’s position within the Hindu caste fold. The lowest castes and those considered outside the hierarchy, such as Dalits, were marked because they ate beef or because their hereditary professions, such as tanning, dealt with cowhide. In fact, the second edition of Jha’s book, published in India in 2009, which I consulted, includes as an appendix an essay from 1948 by the renowned Dalit leader, jurist and reformer, B.R. Ambedkar titled Untouchability, The Dead Cow and the Brahmin. In it, he makes the case that eating beef is actually at the root of the construction of untouchability. According to him, early Brahminical repudiation of beef and cow sacrifice was really a response to the growing ascendance of Buddhism. Gradually, over time, both Brahmin and non-Brahmin groups adopted the prohibition against killing cows and consequent dietary restrictions as a sign of identity. However, the implications of this prohibition were not uniform. On those ritually and economically disadvantaged groups who might never have owned any animals to slaughter, its impact was substantially different. Their access to the flesh of the cow had always come through dead animals. For the Mahar community of Maharashtra, for instance, the carcass of the cow was theirs by right. Caste villagers were even required to surrender their dead animals to them. As such communities did not contravene the sanction against killing, beef continued as a necessary part of sustenance.

In 2012, a beef-eating festival was organized by Dalit students at Osmania University in Hyderabad, partly in a protest against its exclusion from the university hostel menu. Members of the Hindu right-wing Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (All India Students Council) attacked the festival, injuring several students. Google it. Scroll down and you will see the comments erupt in a fairly typical clamour of disagreement: What if we organized a pork festival instead? An insult and an offense to our sensibilities! Here is textual evidence of the sanctity of the cow! A legitimate assertion of suppressed identity! Everyone should be entitled to eat what he or she pleases! Couldn’t we all just be vegetarian? Beef remains a powerful flashpoint, harnessing the body of the Indian cow inextricably to politics.
Indian cattle are zebu, *bos indicus*, with long lashes, elegant sloping shoulders, a curved hump, long dewlap, and horns like scimitars. These are tough, hardened animals, born out of a land of heat, dust and drought. The names of the breeds reflect their ties to the land — Tharparkar, cattle which can cross the arid Thar – or are tied, as we are, to places of origin: Bengali, Gir, Hallikar, Hariana, Kankrej, Kenkatha, Kherigarh, Mewati, Nagori, Ongole, Sahiwal, Rath, Red Sindhi. There is no room for cattle outside the sphere of the human, but within our world, they create much of its experience: of imagination, of indignation, continually expressive, frequently excessive. When they don’t fuel imaginations, they light the cooking fire in villages all over the sub-continent. Cow dung, collected, dried and flattened into cakes is as good or better than any tinder. For several decades the sub-continent. Cowdung, collected, dried and flattened into fuel imaginations, they light the cooking fire in villages all over the world, but within our world, they create much of its experience: of imagination, of indignation, continually expressive, frequently excessive. When they don’t fuel imaginations, they light the cooking fire in villages all over the sub-continent. Cow dung, collected, dried and flattened into cakes is as good or better than any tinder.

Among the many other leads Indian cattle bear is that of human passion. They are Gaumata, Mother Cow, the bull Nandi, Kamadhenu, the cow of plenty, Surabhi, Lakshmi, Gomati. Through them, as a cultural medium, people enact forms of identity and belonging, and simultaneously, oppression, discrimination and violence. Cattle’s own thoughts about these matters are neither a matter of record or speculation. In fact, language, as it is thrust into their mouths, emerges from deep within our own early babble. Maa, lows the Indian cow, an open and round sound unlike the sonorous, but contrasting Western moo. Its bell-like resonance is linked to a child’s first sounds, ma, mother.

Such primal intimacy goes hand in glove with contradictions. When young dancers stamp out their rhythms theya theya, on hardened and calloused feet, their teacher calls out syllables, rapping them out by hand on the tabla. The tabla, and its fellow instruments of percussion such as the *pakhwaj*, *mridangam*, *maddalam* and *chenda* accompany voice and feet in music and performance. Measures ring out dha dha tirakita dha dha tin na on drums made of buffalo, cow or goatskin stretched over resonating chambers of gourd or wood. The skilled artisans that make these instruments are of lower castes since they must work with animal hide.

Classical Indian dance forms, such as Kathak, Bharata Natyam and Odissi, have had their own complex symbolic histories. Over the last century, they have been uncoupled from their court, courtesan and temple dance contexts, and brought onto the stage. In the spirit of the many social and religious reforms of the late 19th and early 20th century, dancer Rukmini Devi Arundale gave what is now called Bharata Natyam enough of a make-over to make it appropriate for more chaste audiences. She established a dance and music academy where innovations in this performance were further institutionalized. Learning music or dance became a common part of the cultural education of many middle-class, upper-caste children.

While dancing feet might have changed caste *takita takadhimí*, nothing much has changed for the animals called into service *takita takajonu* to accompany them. The *mridangam* that accompanies the dancer or the singer in a Southern Indian Carnatic concert is typically made of jackfruit wood with buffalo, goat and cowhide stretched over the sides, the various skins layered to enhance the sound. While dancers, singers and even mridangists might be of upper caste, often Brahmin, some of the best-known *mridangam* makers are Dalit Christians. Musicians too, like many of us, often wish to believe that an animal dropped helpfully dead to become a drum or a shoe, or that this transformation is the silver lining in an untimely end. The plain truth, however, is that a master craftsman’s dexterity is inextricably linked to a deep familiarity with his material. He can gauge when a cow has *ma*–*ed* enough calves (one or two, apparently) to grant the drum an especial percussive thrill. *Gau ma ta kita ta ka dhi mi.*

In 2009, a junior Indian minister with a quick twitter-finger wrote: absolutely, he too would travel "cattle class" in solidarity with all "our holy cows". His flip tweet was responding to a query during a government austerity drive that used the same phrase "cattle class". Tumult ensued, the sort that accompanies such political news of the day. There were accusations that he was elitist and out of touch with the vast majority of the country’s travellers. It also seemed that he might have been thumbing his nose ever so casually at the sacred cows who were his party leaders. In apology, he tweeted back: He wasn’t disparaging economy-class travellers, but really commenting on the way in which airlines herd passengers — presumably into cramped conditions familiar to cattle, and to some dead fish. Whatever their proximity to cattle, people would rather not be treated like them. The *mridangam* makers in Chennai, interviewed in *Outlook* magazine in 2003, state categorically, "We deserve to be treated better than cows."

In the late afternoon, beyond the studio door where the dancers’ slippers, leather and rubber alike, are piled, a cow or two may be found ambling by the side of the road or rummaging through the neighbourhood rubbish. These are the cows that capture the attention of Western tourists, who find in their presence on city streets the genuine article of exotic inscrutability. These cows share the city with a host of other urban dwellers — cats, rats, mice, mynahs, parrots, eagles, pigeons, dogs, crows, mosquitoes, cockroaches, moths, butterflies, geckos, squirrels, sparrow, monkeys, buffaloes. They haven’t yet been evacuated, as they have elsewhere, to the imagination of green pastures. Animals such as these live everywhere in close proximity to us: sometimes cosseted, sometimes attacked, and so often simply unseen.
The story begins: Six blind men who have not known elephants are asked to describe one that is in front of them. There are many versions of the fable, but they all go pretty much like this. The men approach the animal. Each one runs his hands over what’s in front of him – flapping ears, curving tusks, firm trunk, swishing tail, a large expanse of tough skin, tree-trunk legs – and offers his description: It’s like a great winnowing fan! A ploughshare! No, a snake! A brush! Why, a veritable granary! No, a pillar! Unable to agree, they come to blows. The moral of the story is that truth manifests in many ways. Or perhaps it is that each of us makes our own truth. Or the moral could be that quarrels usually stem from ignorance. Or that it is not possible for any of us to comprehend the entirety of something. Or maybe, once again, that the whole is just greater than the sum of its parts.

There is also a joke told from the elephant’s point of view. Six blind elephants, wondering what men are like, decide to find out. Approaching a man, one of them steps forward. He’s flat, she says. The others reach their trunks out. Yes indeed, they agree. Its message, if one should ever be extracted from a joke, appears to be simple: It is possible to flatten the fullest life into two dimensions.

So where does this leave us in the search for the cow? Milk, meat, draught animal, drum, dung, syllable, symbol. Can we stitch this together to make the animal? What can such a reconstruction really tell us of the lived lives of cows? Can we know what that might be? How do we want to find out? Now, even our questions are obscured by hooves kicking up golden dust at dusk. *Godhuli* vela, they call it, the hour of cow dust, that magical time when cows returning from a day’s grazing kick the earth upward to catch the sun. The clink and nuzzle of brass bells, measured rhythm of hooves, the undulation of gleaming horns, the deep rumble of breath, large bodies against each other, warm, live, moving.

References:

Credits
The History of Others is an art and research project by visual artist Terike Haapoja and writer Laura Gustafsson. The project aims at bringing to light alternative cultural histories of those whose stories are yet to be told.

The focus of the project is the exploration of the lives and experiences of non-human animals and the investigation of their cultural history. The focus of the research in *The History of Others* is to understand how the lifeworlds of individuals have changed over time and how historical events may have been interpreted or perceived by non-human beings.

The aim of the project is to create immersive experiences that enable the human mind to approach non-human realities. The research is conducted through interviews and collaborations with professionals from different fields of science, research and art. Thus, it is more closely linked to the fields of anthropology or ethnographic studies than it is to biology, with complications arising around how to exhibit or make accessible the knowledge and meanings of other cultures. The goal is to create new forms through which to experience knowledge – forms, that are more open to the subjective, non-linguistic experience of the non-human world.

*The History of Others* project materializes in exhibitions, publications, performances, interventions and seminars on the topic. The project is structured as a continuous process, leading towards a large-scale, encyclopaedic installation exhibition *The Museum of the History of Others*.

*The Museum of the History of Cattle*, first exhibited in Helsinki in 2013, is the first part of the ongoing project. The second part, a lecture performance *The Trial* which investigates the legal personhood of non-human animals, premiered at the international theatre festival Baltic Circle in Helsinki 2014. The upcoming third part of the project will be *The Museum of the History of Non-Humanity*, which focuses on dehumanisation and its effects on both humans and animals.

Laura Gustafsson is a Finnish author and playwright. In her work Gustafsson often focuses on themes of equality, transgression, animals and gender. Her writings are strongly political yet equally invested in form and language. Gustafsson’s drama pieces could be described as somewhat Brechtian.

Gustafsson graduated with an MA from the Theatre Academy in Finland. She has written a number of plays and a six-episode radio play for Finnish Broadcasting Company.

Gustafsson’s first novel *Huorasatu* (2011, “Whorestory”) is her genre-bending version of the Bible and the Quran. This debut was a nominee in many well-thought-of literary competitions in Finland. The more minimalist *Anomalia* (“Anomaly”, 2013) deals with the questions of violence and empathy, as well as language and its limitations. Gustafsson is currently writing her third novel about cloning another human species, and working with the *History of Others* project.

Terike Haapoja is a Finnish visual artist. With a specific focus on encounters with nature, death and other species, Haapoja’s work investigates the existential and political boundaries of our world. The notion of a world that is deeply rooted in the physicality and co-existence of beings and their multiple lifeworlds is at the core of Haapoja’s politically and ethically driven practice.

Her recent projects include: *Closed Circuit – Open Duration* (2008/2013), last seen at the Venice Biennale, which focused on questions of mortality, co-existence and the relationship between humans and nature while adopting scientific technologies; *The Party of Others* project (2011–ongoing), which looks at the status of other species and other groups excluded from the law by appropriating the form of a political party; and *The History of Others* (2012–ongoing) with author Laura Gustafsson. Haapoja’s work has been exhibited widely in solo and group shows internationally, Haapoja contributes regularly to Finnish and international art publications.

Haapoja represented Finland at the Venice Biennale in 2013 with a solo show in the Nordic Pavilion. Her work has been awarded the Dukaatti prize (2008), Säde prize (2009) and Finland’s Festival’s artist of the year -honorary mention in 2007. Haapoja was a candidate for the Ars Fennica prize in 2011.

www.historyofothers.org
Humans

The History of Others
Terike Haapoja
Laura Gustafsson

The Museum of the History of Cattle - exhibition

Concept, research, design:
History of Others: Terike Haapoja, Laura Gustafsson

Working group:
Markus Seppälä / research assistant
Perttu Sinervo / exhibition construction
Janne Vasama / exhibition construction
Maura Korhonen / sound design
Laura Tamminen / producer
Mia Kivinen / graphic design
Noora Geagea / photographs
Anna-Roosa Länsipuro / translations

Opening ceremony:
Speech / Member of Parliament Anni Sinnemäki
Speech / Essayist Antti Nylen
Paula Vesala performed “Laulu lehmästä” (lyrics by Leena Krohn, composed by Kaj Chydenius)
Music / DJ Levy

The Museum of the History of Cattle - publication

Edited by:
History of Others: Terike Haapoja, Laura Gustafsson

Contributors:
Kris Forkasiewicz
Anne Aurasmaa
Elisa Aaitola
Radhika Subramaniam

Graphic Design:
Mia Kivinen

Photography:
Noora Geagea
Jori Gustafsson (72–81)
Terike Haapoja

Translations:
Mike Garner
Silja Kudel (106–109)
Thank You

Museum of the History of Cattle exhibition, Helsinki 2013

Special thanks to Outi Herrainsilta and Arttu Kurttila, interviewees: Kari Elo, Jarmo Juga, Kalle Maijala, Satu Raussi

The book
Andy Gracie
Noora Geagea

Supported by:
Koneen säätiö
Taiteen edistämiskeskus
Kaapelitehdas
Galleria Kandela
Lohikari
Faba
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Interviews:

**Kari Elo**
Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Helsinki

**Jarmo Juga**
Doctor in Agriculture and Forestry in animal breeding, Department of Agricultural Sciences, University of Helsinki

**Kalle Maijala**
Professor emeritus

**Satu Raussi**
Doctor of Philosophy, Director of Finnish Centre for Animal Welfare

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Additional Images:

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SARKA – The Finnish Museum Of Agriculture
In the beginning there is a void. A void between us and history, between these words and our muted existence. How are we to cross this void? When language is by definition something we do not possess? You think that because of your writing you are the author of the world, but you are wrong. You were just an accident like the rest of us, floating in the sea of time. Everybody tries to explain the world. Even the stone, with its stony reasoning, finds order in its rocky little world. You are nothing special. There is an inside to everything.

The Museum of the History of Cattle is the first part of an ongoing art and research project: History of Others by visual artist Terike Haapoja and author Laura Gustafsson. The Museum of the History of Cattle was first shown in Helsinki in 2013. History According to Cattle is a documentation of this museum, with essays by Anne Aurasmaa, Elisa Aaltola, Kris Forkasiewicz and Radhika Subramaniam.

“Sensational.”  
The Bovine Review