THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY

V

c.1198 - c.1300

EDITED BY DAVID ABULAFIA
The fifth volume of *The New Cambridge Medieval History* brings together studies of the political, religious, social and economic history of the whole of Europe and of the Mediterranean world between about 1198 and 1300.

Comprehensive coverage of the developments in western Europe is balanced by attention to the east of Europe, including the Byzantine world, and the Islamic lands in Spain, North Africa and the Levant. Thematic articles look at the fine arts, the vernacular, communications and other aspects of a period in which the frontiers of Latin Christendom were expanding vigorously outwards; and attention is paid to the frontier societies that emerged in Spain, the Baltic and the Mediterranean islands.
The New Cambridge Medieval History

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Volume v \textit{c. 1198–c. 1300}
Frontispiece

Augustalis coin of Emperor Frederick II, issued for his Sicilian kingdom in or after 1231 (Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge)
THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY

Volume V c. 1198–c. 1300

EDITED BY
DAVID ABULAFIA
Reader in Mediterranean History in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Gonville and Cains College

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
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CONTRIBUTORS

DAVID ABULAFIA: Reader in Mediterranean History, Cambridge University, and Fellow of Gonville and Caius College
MICHAEL ANGOLD: Professor of Byzantine History, University of Edinburgh
SVERRE BAGGE: Professor of History, Bergen University
ROBERT BARTLETT: Professor of Medieval History, University of St Andrews
PAUL BINSKI: University Lecturer in History of Art and Fellow of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
WIM BLOCKMANS: Professor of History, State University of Leiden
MICHAEL BRETT: Senior Lecturer in History, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
MICHAEL BURLEIGH: Research Professor in the School of History and Archaeology, University of Wales
D.A. CARPENTER: Reader in History, King’s College, University of London
EUGENE COX: formerly Professor of History, Wellesley College, Massachusetts
TREVOR DEAN: Reader in History, Roehampton Institute, London
ALAIN DUCELLIER: Professor of Byzantine History, Unité d’Enseignement et de Recherche d’Histoire, Histoire de l’Art et Archéologie, Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail
PETER EDBURY: Reader in Medieval History, University of Wales, Cardiff
STEVEN A. EPSTEIN: Professor of History, University of Colorado at Boulder
SIMON FRANKLIN: University Lecturer in Russian and Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge
LOUIS GREEN: Senior Lecturer in History, Monash University
BERNARD HAMILTON: Professor of Crusading History, University of Nottingham

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List of contributors

Norman Housley: Professor of History, University of Leicester
Robert Irwin: formerly Lecturer in Mediaeval History, University of St Andrews
Peter Jackson: Senior Lecturer in History, Keele University
David Jacoby: Professor of History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
William Chester Jordan: Professor of History, Princeton University
Peter Linehan: Fellow of St John’s College, Cambridge
John H. Pryor: Associate Professor of History, University of Sydney
Kathryn L. Reyerson: Professor of History, University of Minnesota
S.C. Rowell: Lecturer at the Centre for West Lithuanian and Prussian History, Klaipeda
Gerard Sivéry: formerly Professor of History, Université de Lille III
The late Colin C. Smith: Emeritus Professor of Spanish, Cambridge University, and Fellow of St Catharine’s College
Robert Stacey: Professor of History, University of Washington, Seattle
Kenneth R. Stow: Professor of Jewish History, University of Haifa
Marco Tangheroni: Professor of Medieval History, Università degli Studi di Pisa
Michael Toch: Professor of History, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
André Vauchez: Director of the Ecole Francaise de Rome
Jacques Verger: Professor of History, Université de Paris X
J.A. Watt: Emeritus Professor of Medieval History, University of Newcastle upon Tyne
The volume of the original *Cambridge Medieval History* dealing with the thirteenth century was published seventy years before this one, and carried as its subtitle *The Victory of the Papacy*. The thirteenth century was characterised as an age of ‘completion’, when early medieval barbarism was at last laid to rest and the great institutions of the Middle Ages, notably papacy and empire, reached their apogee, even if the empire after Frederick II entered a long and steep decline. One reflection of this sense that the thirteenth century was the time of ‘completion’ was the editors’ decision to include a number of chapters on cultural developments across a much wider time span. Jessie Weston, the author of a controversial study of the Grail notable for its influence on T.S. Eliot, was commissioned to write on ‘The legendary cycles of the Middle Ages’, and there were chapters on political ideas, chivalry and the art of war. Space was found for the treatment of Spain, Poland, Hungary, Bohemia and Scandinavia from the middle of the eleventh century onwards. However, Byzantine history was reserved for the separate fourth volume, itself re-edited in 1966. The contributors represent a galaxy of the distinguished historians of the time: Pirenne, Petit-Dutaillis, Powicke, Clapham, A.L. Poole, Jacob, Rashdall, Altamira, with Oxford for some reason so well represented that it seems more the Oxford than the *Cambridge Medieval History*.

The subtitles used by the volumes in the *New Cambridge Medieval History*, in this case ‘c. 1198–c. 1300’, seem by contrast extremely cautious, even if, as has been explained in the introduction, the present volume has been constructed on the principle that the interaction between frontier regions and the old heart of western Europe is a fundamental theme in the study of the thirteenth century. Indeed, this is not simply a history of western Europe, and full advantage has been taken of the flourishing state of Byzantine, Slavic and Islamic studies so as to include important and lengthy chapters on eastern Europe and on the Muslim neighbours of the Christian states. Rus’, the Teutonic Knights and the east European kingdoms have all been granted some attention, as have
the Celtic lands, whose position at the end of the volume is a poor recognition of the great expansion of distinguished research on this region. Overall, the geographical range of this volume is far wider than that of the old *Cambridge Medieval History*. Europe itself, as Norman Davies has reminded readers of his massive *History of Europe* of 1996, is capable of being defined culturally and geographically in any number of ways, and a generous definition has been used here. The editor takes it as axiomatic that the history of Europe is not simply the history of the Latin Christian legacy to modern times; rather than this ‘vertical’ view of European history, a horizontal perspective has been adopted, in which an attempt has been made to identify and treat adequately the regions and topics that were important to the thirteenth century itself; hence, indeed, the space devoted to the Balkans in Professor Ducellier’s chapter. So, too, the further shores of the Mediterranean, including not merely the states established by the crusaders but Mamluk Egypt and the Muslim states in the Maghrib, which had such close, if not necessarily friendly, relations with Latin Europe, have been given space in this volume. Nor would it make sense to omit the Mongol empire from such a volume.

All this adds up to a more demanding agenda than that which the editors of the old *Cambridge Medieval History* set when treating this period. Some chapters simply cannot be presented, in the space available, in quite the concentrated and detailed form that characterised the old version of this work, especially if some space is to be found for the results of recent research in the social, economic and cultural history of thirteenth-century Europe and the Mediterranean. Clearly a limit had to be drawn somewhere, and treatment of the Seljuq Turks, who at this time were heavily involved in the Iranian world, or of Armenia and Georgia, which have only recently once again been admitted into the ranks of European nations, seemed (though with some regret) to the present editor to threaten to throw the volume off balance; still, for the Turks plenty of relevant material will be found in chapters on Byzantine, Mongol and Near Eastern affairs. Given the extraordinary richness of research on Italy, it has seemed right to devote separate sections to different aspects of thirteenth-century Italy, including one section by Louis Green devoted mainly to Florence. The current tendency to speak not of ‘Spain’ but of the ‘Spanish kingdoms’ or of the Iberian peninsula is reflected in the separation of the history of Castile and its lesser neighbours, in the hands of Peter Linehan, from that of Catalonia-Aragon, in my own hands. The major brief accorded to authors has been the provision of a balanced and authoritative coverage of political history, with a good leavening of economic, social and cultural topics as well, integrated where possible into the wider account of political developments. Most chapters are kept within the confines of the thirteenth century (with ragged ends), but in some cases, where corresponding chapters could not
be found in other volumes, it has made sense to extend the time range, as in the chapter by Marco Tangheroni on Sardinia and Corsica, and as in Colin Smith’s piece on the vernacular. On the other hand, W.C. Jordan’s chapter on the Capetians picks up from the previous volume in 1223, the obvious date. This is not to pretend that there is anything magical about the dates 1200 and 1300. Topics such as the presence of the Jews in Christian society have been treated the same way; authors have been invited to find room for such issues within their chapters. In addition, several thematic chapters, devoted to major economic and social developments and to religious changes in the period, are intended to set the scene for the political history that follows. Naturally, the existence of the Cambridge Economic History of Europe, of which a new edition of volume ii appeared in 1987, has meant that readers could be referred elsewhere for rich assessments of economic developments in the thirteenth century, and the excellent Cambridge History of Political Thought has also covered much ground that it has not been thought necessary to survey once again here.

Warmest thanks are due to the authors, so many of whom diligently provided drafts, final texts and bibliographies without fuss. This is a far more international, indeed intercontinental, project than the original volume of 1929, with authors resident in Australia, the United States, Israel, Italy, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Lithuania, as well as the United Kingdom; the 1929 edition had no American authors at all, surprising then, and inconceivable now. Where possible, I have tried to obtain the services of scholars who have not already provided a survey of the topic about which they are writing, so that this volume is not, by and large, a summary of what can be read from the same pen elsewhere. As editor, I crave the indulgence of the individual contributors when, as a result of overlap or other considerations, their contribution has been altered in some way. Inevitably, some contributors have wanted fuller annotation or bibliographies than others, and in some cases this also reflects the very different state of research in various areas of medieval scholarship. It is a particular pleasure to thank Dr Stephen Rowell of the University of Klaipeda, Lithuania, for stepping in at short notice to replace the author of the one chapter which failed to arrive. Professor Roger Wright of Liverpool University kindly offered his help in preparing for press Colin Smith’s chapter on the vernacular, after Professor Smith sadly died in 1997. Mrs Sandra Smith expertly translated the two chapters by André Vauchez and those by Professors Sivéry and Verger; I myself took the responsibility for translating the chapters by Alain Ducellier and Marco Tangheroni. Many contributors to the preceding and following volumes, especially Michael Jones, editor of volume vi, have been extremely helpful in discussions of where to make the joins between corresponding chapters.

Transliteration from other alphabets has followed the basic rule that an
effort should be made to reproduce the rough pronunciation of the term or name. In Arabic, the sound change that accompanies the fourteen ‘sun’ letters has been respected: ad-din rather than al-din; as-Salih rather than al-Salih. The emphatic S, T, D, and DH have not been indicated, though ‘ayn generally has been. In Greek, the model has been classical Greek rather than the Latinised forms often current: Komnenos rather than Comnenus, Doukas rather than Ducas. However, late medieval pronunciation has not been consistently represented: Basileus is used rather than Vassilefs, but all the same the form Vatatzes is used (though some bibliographical entries do give Batatzes). Most accents are now out of fashion in Greek, and little effort has been made to incorporate them systematically when printing words in the Greek alphabet, though the breathings ‘ (for h) and ‘ (silent) have been respected. In Hebrew, transliteration follows the norms of modern Sephardi or Israeli Hebrew, which are fairly close. In Russian, the distinctive sign ‘ indicates the ‘soft sign’ Ь, as in Русь, Рус’. In Icelandic, þ and þ have been retained for unvoiced th, ð and ð for dh (voiced th). The German ß, indicating ‘ss’ or more properly ‘sz’, has generally been retained. As for languages written in the Latin alphabet, Catalan forms have been used in those cases where they have now been revived and English usage is flexible: Girona, not Gerona, Penyafort, not Peñafort, but names of rulers are given in English forms (James not Jaume or Jaime).

This book presents to view a thirteenth century which is more than the conflict of popes and emperors that dominated the vision of the editors in 1929. Medieval horizons have expanded. They continue to expand. This volume will at least enable its readers to see where the horizon is now thought to be, and, I hope, to pick out some of the details in the fuller picture as well.

David Abulafia
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has been long in the making, and the main acknowledgement must be to the authors of the chapters for their patience, particularly after one chapter had to be recommissioned. It is, too, with great regret that I have to record the death of Colin Smith, whose chapter was kindly reread by Roger Wright, to whom I am indebted also for the relevant bibliography. Sandra Smith translated some of the chapters from French; I translated some chapters from French and Italian, and should like to apologise for any violence done to the intended meaning of those contributions. William Davies has been a model publisher, combining encouragement with the right sense of urgency. On the Board of Editors, Peter Linehan has constantly reminded us that we must not entrap ourselves in the delays and arguments that bedevilled the original Cambridge Medieval History. Linda Randall has been a spectacularly meticulous copy-editor, identifying a host of inconsistencies, unintelligibilities and uncertainties in text, notes and bibliography. The Computer Office at Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, facilitated access to the Vatican, British Library and other catalogues, thanks to which I have tried to resolve most of those inconsistencies with what I hope is a fair degree of accuracy. Catherine Holmes and Edna Pilmer in Caius patiently xeroxed or retyped a good many chapters on which I had wielded my red pen. Without all this teamwork, I cannot imagine that this volume would have appeared in the twentieth century.

David Abulafia
### ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<td><em>Annales ESC</em></td>
<td><em>Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>BEFAR</td>
<td>Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d’Athènes de Rome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIHR</td>
<td><em>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSOAS</td>
<td><em>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAJ</td>
<td><em>Central Asiatic Journal</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td><em>Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>DOP</td>
<td><em>Dumbarton Oaks Papers</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>EcHR</em></td>
<td><em>Economic History Review</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>EHR</em></td>
<td><em>English Historical Review</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>EIr</em></td>
<td><em>Encyclopaedia Iranica</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>JA</em></td>
<td><em>Journal asiatique</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JEH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Economic History</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Medieval History</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>MGH</td>
<td><em>Monumenta Germaniae historica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Epp. XIII</em></td>
<td><em>Epistolae saeculi XIII e regestis pontificum romanorum selectae</em>, 3 vols.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td><em>Scriptores</em>, 32 vols.</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td><em>Past and Present</em></td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office, London</td>
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<tr>
<td>RISS²</td>
<td><em>Rerum italicarum scriptores</em>, 2nd series, Città di Castello and Bologna (1900–)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROL</td>
<td><em>Revue de l'Orient latin</em></td>
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<td>RS</td>
<td>Rolls Series</td>
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The dominant theme in the history of thirteenth-century Europe is arguably that of expansion: the expansion of Latin Christendom, to encompass Orthodox, Muslim and pagan lands previously on its outer fringes; the expansion of the economy, as western merchants (Italian, German, Catalan) penetrated deeper into the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the European land mass; the expansion too of population, to which a halt was called only around 1300; the expansion also of government, as rulers in western Europe consolidated their hold over their territories, and as the papacy made consistent claims to its own authority even over secular rulers. By the end of the thirteenth century the political and demographic expansion of powerful European kingdoms could be felt, too, on the edges of the British Isles, as the English king posed an ever sharper threat to the autonomy of the Welsh princes and the Scottish kings. To see the thirteenth century in this light is not simply to see it from a western, Latin, perspective. It will be obvious already that a major feature of the period is the encroachment of the Latin west upon the Greek and Slavonic east, as upon the Muslim world: this was the era of major crusades, under royal and princely direction, against Egypt, Tunis, Muslim Spain and indeed pagan Prussia and Livonia, but it was also the period in which a diverted crusade, aiming originally at the mouth of the Nile, found itself able to overwhelm Constantinople, fragmenting the already fragile Byzantine empire and imposing (not very successfully) the authority of the bishop of Rome over the Orthodox Church in Greece. Nowhere in Europe, nor indeed in the Mediterranean, were the Latins totally invisible. Even if it were not the case that the history of medieval Europe can only be written after paying attention to the east of Europe (including Byzantium), and the Islamic lands bordering on Europe, it is hard to see how a volume on the thirteenth century could lack detailed attention to areas far from the Ile-de-France, and issues remote from the conflict of popes and emperors, the theme that has dominated many surveys of this period.1

1 See the old *Cambridge medieval history, vi: The victory of the papacy* (Cambridge, 1929).
The successes, military and commercial, of Latin Christendom engendered new types of relationships, between the westerners and those now subject to their authority. There were now large areas of Spain under Latin rule but possessing a Muslim majority; and a similar situation prevailed in Greece, where Franks exercised dominion over resentful Orthodox, who showed little appreciation of unsubtle attempts by the Franks to force the union of the Churches (indeed, such efforts only increased the gap between the communities). Greater awareness of the existence of barely suspected peoples in the Asian steppes also led the western Church to cast its eyes eastwards, hoping for an alliance with the Mongols against Islam, hoping too that rumours of Christian kings far to the east had substance; yet at the same time it was difficult to equate the terrifying Mongol hordes that swept into eastern Europe in 1243 with the Christian armies of Prester John so long and eagerly awaited. Among the kingdoms that found themselves in the Mongol path, Hungary was a borderland between not two but many worlds, with its mixed population of Catholic Christians, Orthodox Christians, Jews, Muslims and also pagans. Western rulers can be seen taking a greater interest in missionary activities, strongly encouraged by the Franciscans and Dominicans; but this involvement with missions was not simply directed outwards to Asia, and those who have treated the missionary activities of the friars only in relation to the Mongol threat (thinking of Giovanni di Pian Carpini, the Polos and others) have seriously underestimated the range and purpose of their activities. Indeed, evangelisation was needed within western Europe as well, not merely against heretics and infidels, but also as a necessary and urgent way to strengthen the religious awareness of Catholics tending all too easily towards sin. As the career of Ramon Llull, at the end of the century, would show, the act of evangelisation was itself a way of bringing a deeper Christian awareness to those, within the Church or at princely courts, or indeed in city streets, who gave their assent and support to such efforts.

The existence of non-Christian groups elicited a variety of responses. In some regions, notably Sicily, Muslims were cleared off the land altogether. Within western Europe, the one significant non-Christian group to persist outside Spain, the Jews, were under increasingly ruthless pressure to convert, as the traditional ‘Augustinian’ guarantee of the right to live in a subordinate condition within Christian society gave way to denunciations of contemporary Jewish beliefs and practices, and as fantastic accusations against the Jews began to gain a following; the blood libel and accusations of child murder, which had begun to spread in the mid-twelfth century, were unsuccessfully challenged by rulers such as Frederick II and Pope Innocent IV, who were aware of their lack of foundation. On the other hand, the Talmud was increasingly targeted as proof of the contempt Jews felt for Christianity. Jews could also be seen as
lacking in reason, by virtue of their failure to accept the ‘reasonable truth’ that Christianity professed itself to be. Lacking in reason, they might even appear to be lacking in humanity, if reason were the outstanding characteristic of humanity. Jews, Muslims, Greeks, pagans under Latin rule were not simply a marginalised ‘other’, and the Jews in particular had been granted a place, though a difficult one, in Christian eschatology; but by defining these groups as outsiders western rulers and churchmen sought to define as well their expectations of their Latin Christian subjects and followers. Indeed, it was in the thirteenth century that vigorous attempts were first made to combat the spread of heresy, not just the blatantly anti-Catholic beliefs of the Cathars, but the misdirected (as it seemed) evangelism of Waldensians and of wayward Humiliati or beguines: by fire and the sword during the Albigensian Crusade; by the relentlessly thorough investigations of inquisitors in southern France, Germany and Italy. The thirteenth century is the period in which Catharism was virtually driven off the map, persisting into the next century only in remote villages, of which the best recorded was Montaillou in the Pyrenees; but new challenges emerged, some of them from the heart of the Church itself, as the Spiritual wing of the Franciscans became more insistent upon the need for absolute poverty. The worries of the Spirituals were themeselves a loud echo of the many voices that were questioning the commercialisation of society, from the late twelfth century onwards. Indeed, such worries had themselves been a major element in Francis of Assisi’s career. The dilemma about the treatment of usurers, and indeed the definition of usury, was addressed by such influential figures as Ramon de Penyafort, for a time the Dominican general, and by Thomas Aquinas. In sum, the Church needed to find ways to satisfy the spiritual yearnings of Christians, and to ensure that these yearnings did not turn into challenges against the teaching of the Church. Already at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 the text of the creed was laid out, in the first canon of the Council, not merely in Latin but also in Greek, to meet the needs of the Uniate Church which had been so greatly and reluctantly expanded after the fall of Constantinople.

The Church insisted upon the duty of secular rulers such as the counts of Toulouse or Frederick II to join in the active suppression of heresy; usury too often came within the purview of enthusiastic princes such as Louis IX of France. The problem of heresy itself opened up once again the difficult issue of the right of the Church, and in particular the papacy, to command secular rulers. The tension between increasingly powerful secular authorities and the Church was not a novelty in the thirteenth century, but the bitterness with which both Frederick II in the 1230s and 1240s and Philip the Fair of France around 1300 attacked papal pretensions surpassed anything visible in the so-called Investiture Dispute of the late eleventh century. Propaganda machines
came into existence which made full use of the skills of rhetoricians trained in the emergent universities. The harnessing of arguments based on Roman law gave the councils a much sharper edge, as the secular rulers found themselves increasingly able to argue a case which appeared to have its own set of consistent principles, upon which the safety of the entire social structure appeared to rest. The conflicts between Frederick II and the papacy were accentuated by Frederick's role as king of Sicily as well as German emperor; the engagement between the leading secular power and assertive popes revealed that the papacy was not prepared to allow itself to be scared away from the most severe challenge: war with a ruler who might prove able to dominate all of Italy, including the Papal State, who, moreover, had the will and the means to persuade other Christian monarchs not to offer more support to the papacy against the empire. Apocalyptic images of Frederick as Antichrist had their propaganda value, as well as reflecting deeply held beliefs in some factions close to the pope; it was in the thirteenth century that secular rulers too began to harness propaganda campaigns, culminating in Philip IV's defamation of Boniface VIII and the Order of the Temple. Probably Frederick had no serious intention of reducing the papacy to an imperial chaplaincy. What matters, none the less, is how the papacy reacted to a supposed threat. The struggle between the universal powers of papacy and empire was, in another sense, anachronistic. Frederick's own conception of his imperial authority was concerned more with the trappings of Romanism, with pomp and display, than with any serious claim to or exercise of universal power; it was far from clear whether even his Sicilian kingdom formed part of the Roman empire. The collapse of Byzantium had effectively solved the Zweikaiserproblem, the problem of the existence of two claimants to the title of Roman emperor, which had so exercised Frederick's namesake and grandfather. But, as has been seen, the appeal to Roman law (with the help of legal professors in Bologna and, rather less successfully, of Frederick's own university in Naples) justified the claims to authority of the princeps, but they could be used by other princes than the emperor, as the career of Edward I of England, Alfonso X of Castile or Philip IV of France would in different ways reveal, and as is also amply revealed by the development of canon law. Rulers were increasingly seen as kings of territories: rex Francie rather than rex Francorum, rex Anglie rather than rex Anglorum; in some kingdoms, the increasing use of the vernacular in public documents such as law codes helped further to define a growing sense of nationhood, even if it was not yet by any means coterminous with political boundaries. In this world, the German kingdom, ruled by a rex Romanorum, king of the Romans, eligible for papal coronation as Roman emperor, was increasingly obviously the oddity, a kingdom whose method of succession to the throne (by ever more bitterly contested elections), whose royal power base, whose bureaucracy – or lack of
one – placed it apart from centralising monarchies with capital cities at Paris, Westminster, Naples, centres in which they were able to glorify the dynasty by erecting monuments on the scale of the Sainte-Chapelle, Westminster Abbey or Santa Chiara in Naples. Art glorified dynasties but also, by the end of the century, individual rulers, whose images became diffused and, at the top end of the scale of piety, acquired reputations for sanctity which could help overcome political crises not merely in their own lifetime but in that of their heirs. ‘Saint Louis a-t-il existé?’ Jacques Le Goff has pertinently asked. What mattered was the way a royal saint gave sanction to his successors’ ambitions, not merely in France but in any kingdom whose ruler could claim Capetian blood.

Yet royal authority was easier to declare than to enforce. The search for funds to achieve royal objectives (ranging from crusades to wedding bills) forced rulers into the arms of their more influential subjects, by way of assemblies with which different rulers experienced very different relationships. The estates in France were quite different in character to what emerged elsewhere, and they never achieved the degree of leverage exercised by the Lords and (in due time) by the Commons in England. In Aragon-Catalonia the existence of different corts or cortes for the ruler’s different realms did not, as might be expected, permit a policy of divide-and-rule by which the king could make himself master of his subjects; contrasting political aims, the crushing cost of the ambitious Aragonese-Catalan wars, and a distinctive theory of state origins, enabled these parliaments to exercise an unusual degree of influence over royal policy. Often an issue was the king’s advisers: there were campaigns to exclude Jews from office in Aragon, and ‘foreigners’ from office in England (led by one who was himself a foreigner, Simon de Montfort). The appeal to the authority of a Roman princeps was thus not always pressed successfully. In some cases, too, the authority of one king over another became a crucial issue: in Scotland the issue that had to be confronted was whether the king of Scots paid homage to the king of England for his English lands or for his entire kingdom; the relationship between the king of Aragon and the king of Majorca was no less fraught with complication.

Nor were these exclusively phenomena of the Christian world: in the Muslim lands on and beyond the edges of Europe, old universalisms were challenged, and local kingdoms, ruled by Nasrids in Granada, Marinids in Morocco, Hafsid Almohads in Tunis, replaced the unitary, theologically unitarian, Almohad empire that had conquered much of the Maghrib and southern Spain in the mid to late twelfth century. There, as in Egypt, caliphs were at best a cipher, and local bureaucracies, anxious to exploit to the full local economic resources, helped build states of remarkable longevity. The Mongol invasions rocked but did not destroy the Mamluk state in Egypt and Syria, whose military strength would remain surprisingly sound until the Turkish irruptions around
1500, thanks in part to the willingness with which the Genoese and others provided Circassian slaves for the military elite.

Turning back to western Europe, there were also the areas that escaped royal supervision: imperial cities in Germany, in theory accountable directly to the emperor; cities in northern and central Italy, mostly under the nominal authority of emperor, pope or some other ruler of stature, but in the case of Venice quite clearly independent of any higher authority. By the end of the thirteenth century, the Swiss rural communes, later joined by several major towns, insisted on rejecting local lords, forming a union that was to acquire formidable physical strength. In the thirteenth century appeals to Hohenstaufen emperors, Angevin kings of Naples and popes by the citizens of the Italian towns formed part of a wider network of alliances among the faction-ridden urban elites. One solution seemed to lie in the submission of the commune to the authority of a local lord, such as the Este in Ferrara, the della Torre in Milan, the della Scala in Verona, who would often leave existing communal institutions in place, but would offer an end to internal strife. The coming of the signori was not universally welcomed; Florence and Genoa generally managed to keep the traditional commune alive, along with its vendettas and turbulence. In these cities, as elsewhere, the claims of the wealthier artisans to a political voice, often expressed through the mechanism of the popola, contributed further to tensions. What is thoroughly remarkable is that Florence and Genoa remained important centres of industry and of trade in the face of such profound political fragmentation. Yet royal involvement in city life was not necessarily a threat to economic success. Barcelona flourished precisely because king and citizens possessed a community of interests. Marseilles, on the other hand, suffered at the hands of its Angevin rulers, by being transformed from a role as a trading entrepot into one where its naval arsenal became the prime source of profit. Moreover, it was Barcelona (like Venice and Genoa) that exercised influence far afield through a network of consulates, warehouses and diplomatic leverage that Marseilles had no ability to match. Overseas possessions, whether the Genoese and Pisan lands in Sardinia and Corsica, Venetian ownership of Crete or Catalan penetration under the Aragonese flag into Majorca and Valencia, and ultimately Palermo too, brought access to foodstuffs, raw materials and captive markets. Western producers bought eastern cotton through Venice, Ancona and elsewhere, processing it, dyeing it with eastern dyes such as indigo and reselling it in eastern markets; this way the industrial ascendancy of the west was gradually being expressed, though there were endless dogfights as (for instance) Venice tried to limit the access of Ancona to eastern markets. By contrast, the German merchants of the incipient Hansa adopted a less overtly competitive framework for their trade, though there were tensions between German towns such as Cologne and Lübeck, and there were lengthy periods of
peace between supposedly inveterate Mediterranean rivals such as Genoa and Venice. As in the classic Mediterranean, trade within the ‘Mediterranean of the North’ constituted by the Baltic and the North Sea was characterised by exchanges of luxury goods for basic raw materials and for grain; crusaders pressed ahead (in this arena, the Teutonic Knights most notably), and cleared spaces for the traders. Trade and crusade together conquered the Baltic.

The Mediterranean itself became the battle ground of emergent empires: Aragonese-Catalan expansion in the west was challenged by the aspirations of the French house of Anjou (and France itself celebrated its arrival on the shores of the Mediterranean with the building of the port of Aigues-Mortes). Further east, the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem became embroiled in the conflict of two new forces, the Mongols, of limitless ambitions, and the Mamluks, clear in their desire to sweep the Franks into the sea. The fall of Acre to the Mamluks in 1291 did not undermine fervour for a crusade; but without a firm bridgehead beyond Cyprus a crusade for the recovery of Jerusalem became increasingly difficult to set in motion. It does mark a major moment in the history of the crusades, the point at which (except for the allied state of Cilician Armenia) the Latin presence on the shores of Syria and the Holy Land came to a decisive end. A great variety of objectives had, in any case, come to compete for crusading manpower since Innocent III launched the Albigensian Crusade: crusades against Christian lay powers (‘political crusades’), notably those against the Hohenstaufen dynasty in Germany and Italy; crusades in the Baltic and in Spain, the former of which contained an unusually strong conversionist element. Even if the crusade to Jerusalem retained a special reputation and glory, the possibility of redeeming crusade vows in other theatres of war could be, for the more cynical, practically very opportune. On the outermost edges of Europe crusading and political conquest became easily intertwined, and elaborate theories were easily transmuted into broad, gross justifications, whether of Swedish wars against Orthodox Russians (led by the nearly legendary Alexander Nevski), or Norwegian wars against pagan Lapps. Naked ambition, too, propelled Norway’s rulers to acquire their claim to Iceland and even Greenland, though in Man and the Hebrides it was the Scottish rather than the Norwegian king who won the day. And, as has been seen, trade and crusade became closely intermingled in attempts to gain authority in Finland, Estonia and along the fur trappers’ routes into Russia.

These areas seem remote from the Latin Christian heartlands that are the focus of so much that has been written on the thirteenth century. It is hard to remember that France and England were the only significant kingdoms without non-Christian inhabitants (their Jews apart) or without neighbours who were non-Latin; however, there was an occasional wicked temptation to compensate by classifying the Irish as to all intents pagan. In Spain, southern
Italy, eastern Germany awareness of the Muslim, Orthodox or pagan neighbour was a fact of life. This is not to say that such awareness translated easily into toleration, which, when practised at all (as in Valencia or Sicily), was highly pragmatic, conditional and based on the firm assumption that Latin Christians took precedence. It was this sense of the integrity of Latin society, professing one faith or ‘law’, that remained from the aggressive universalism of the late eleventh- and twelfth-century Church, and that still formed a significant core of the teaching of such lawyer popes as Innocent III and IV and Boniface VIII. But by the end of the century, in Boniface’s years as pope, it was western kings – in France, England, Castile, Naples and so on – who emphatically utilised this awareness of Christian identity in order to enhance their own, and not the pope’s, authority. In extreme cases, such as the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290, or the sale as slaves of the inhabitants of Muslim Lucera by King Charles II of Naples in 1300, the insistence on the Christian identity of the kingdom could lead to terrible hardship for outsiders.

The papacy began and ended the century with clarion calls for the submission of the Christian flock to its one shepherd, Peter. In his bull *Unam sanctam*, Pope Boniface insisted that such submission was entirely necessary for salvation. But it was secular rulers who most successfully took up the message of submission to higher authority to serve their own ends, and to bring their own subjects more securely under their own authority: not Peter’s deputy, but anointed kings, found themselves in the best position to achieve moral reform, on their own terms, in a society which they brought increasingly tightly under their own control.
PART I

COMMON THEMES
The thirteenth century was an era of growing population, extensive land clearance, expanding towns and rapid social mobility. Governments grew more powerful and legal systems more complex. Distinctions of legal and social rank also became more elaborate. All these developments affected the aristocracy of thirteenth-century Europe, but none will serve to define the aristocracy itself as a group within society. Rather, the aristocracy of thirteenth-century Europe defined itself by its self-conscious adherence to a European-wide set of common cultural values and assumptions embodied in the cult of chivalric knighthood. Before we discuss how the aristocracy changed, we must first know who they were. It is with chivalry, therefore, that we must begin.

By the end of the twelfth century, the ideology of *chevalerie* had gained widespread acceptance among the mounted, heavily armoured warriors of western Europe. Contemporaries were increasingly aware that together these *chevaliers* could be conceived of as constituting a distinctive order within society. Like the other orders of late twelfth-century society, this *ordo militaris* comprised a very wide range of social ranks, from kings and emperors at the top, down to the landless warriors who in turn shaded off into the ranks of the wealthier peasantry. Chivalric ideology did not originate with the great lords, and in the empire particularly they were latecomers to it. But by the last decades of the twelfth century it was these great lords who, through their patronage of tournaments, heraldry and literature, fostered a notion of *chevalerie* as a social order which bound together men of such otherwise disparate status in life, and who, by identifying themselves with it, identified *chevalerie* with true *nobilissima*. Not all the men called *milites* in Latin sources were noble in the year 1200, and not all nobles would have been flattered to be called *milites* or even *chevaliers*. But by 1200, nearly everywhere in Europe, those who fought in heavy armour while mounted on horseback shared in a common ideology of chivalry which associated them in some manner with kings and princes, and distinguished them...
utterly from peasants, from whom some at least would on any other grounds have been entirely indistinguishable.

Chivalry was thus established by 1200 as the self-conscious ideology by which the aristocracy of thirteenth-century Europe would define itself and its boundaries. By emphasising qualities of loyalty, generosity, military prowess and courtly style as constituent elements in true nobility, chivalry facilitated the incorporation of the chevaliers into the ranks of an aristocracy to which many had not been born. This was no small thing in a society as socially mobile as that of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe, and helps to explain why thirteenth-century commentators were so tenacious in their efforts to devise schemes of social classification that justified the essential unity of the chevaliers as an aristocratic order, yet acknowledged the enormous differences in wealth, power and status that differentiated the mounted retainer from his lord, and that in many areas continued to divide the ancient families of noble lineage from the knightly families who had risen in their service. We must not mistake such prescriptive schemas for descriptive reportage, however. The elaborate hierarchical gradations of noble rank enshrined in the German Heerschildordnung, in Eike von Repgow’s Sachsenspiegel (c. 1225) or the later Schwabenspiegel (c. 1270), or in Alfonso X’s Siete partidas (c. 1260), reflect some of the ways contemporaries thought about their world, but they tell us little about the real complexities of thirteenth-century aristocratic social structures. Nor will any single ‘model’ for aristocratic social change be equally valid for all of Europe. Regional, even local, variation is everywhere apparent. In a very general way, however, the association of chivalric ideology with the greatest lords of the age raised the prestige of knighthood in thirteenth-century society, while raising also the requirements of descent, status and display necessary to enter into and sustain it. As a result, the number of men who took up formal knighthood declined in most areas, more rapidly as the century proceeded. This process of social elevation and exclusion had begun already by the end of the twelfth century, and continued into the fourteenth. By 1300, however, nearly everywhere in Europe, it had transformed the meaning of knighthood. Chevalerie began the century as the ideology of an ordo; the chevaliers ended the century as a social class, reduced in numbers, but now securely installed in the lower ranks of the nobility.

This transformation occurred first and most clearly in northern and central France, where chivalric ideology struck its earliest and deepest roots, and where the growing power of the crown fostered the development during the thirteenth century of clear criteria for noble status. Here, the unfree mounted warriors who could still be found in parts of Flanders, Champagne, Berry and the Paris basin in the first half of the twelfth century were gone by 1200. By about 1250 the milites were widely recognised as domini, extracting revenues from
their dependent peasantry, living in fortified houses and addressed indifferently with counts and dukes as ‘lord’, messire. When French contemporaries sought to express the quality these domini shared, they spoke usually of gentillesse, ‘gentility’, a flexible concept which combined knightly descent with an aristocratic style of life and behaviour. Nobilitas was more controversial. It is true that in southern Burgundy nobles and milites were interchangeable terms by 1100. But elsewhere nobilitas was ascribed indifferently to all milites in the formal language of charter witness lists only from the late thirteenth century on, as intermarriage between the knights and the pre-1150 aristocracy at last began to displace the endogamous traditions of these ancient noble families. As the standard descriptive term for this emerging class of lords, however, noblesse triumphed over gentillesse only around 1300, as ‘nobility’ in France achieved a distinct legal status conveying specific fiscal, judicial and military immunities to its possessor.

In practice, however, definitions of nobility in northern and central France were worked out on a case-by-case basis throughout the thirteenth century, when someone—a royal official, or sometimes another noble—had reason to challenge someone else’s claim to noble status. Such cases became increasingly common from the mid-thirteenth century on, as restrictive taxes were imposed on fiefhold property sold to ‘non-nobles’. Genealogical descent, possession of existing lordships or fiefs, style of life and local reputation were all relevant to determining ‘nobility’, although lineage became an increasingly important criterion as the century progressed. As the king’s power to tax non-nobles grew, the parlement of Paris emerged as the normal tribunal which adjudicated claims by families aspiring to the tax exemptions accorded those of noble rank. The development of royal patents of ennoblement under Philip the Fair marks a further stage in the emergence in France of a notion of nobility as a legal rank defined by royally sanctioned privilege. So too do the Leagues of 1314–15 in their elaboration and defence of nobility as a heritable legal status possessed by a social class. It was not until the last half of the fourteenth century, however, that criteria of nobility were fully established in law, that knightly descent or a patent of nobility became the sine qua non of noble status, and that derogation from nobility became a matter of legal consequence. These developments were well advanced by 1300, but they were far from irreversible.

The legal unity of the French nobility was the product of royal fiscal and judicial policy. It did not reflect the structural realities of aristocratic society. Great disparities of wealth and power separated the simple knights from the great lords in 1200. The gulf grew larger as the century progressed. Lordships multiplied rapidly in the first decades of the century, some with rights of low justice, but others with no jurisdictional revenues beyond their rents. At the same time, the claims of the king and a few other great territorial lords to a monopoly of banal authority were depriving many long-established lords of
their rights to impose tolls and taxes and to exercise high justice within their localities. The result was a marked levelling of seigneurial authority in the countryside. As inflation ate away the value of fixed rents, however, especially after 1270, only the great lords who had retained their banal privileges were able to compensate for their declining agricultural income by increasing their jurisdictional revenues. Lesser lords were increasingly unable to keep up with the rising contemporary standards for an appropriately noble style of life. By 1300 there are clear signs of crisis amongst the numerous petty lords of areas like Picardy and Flanders.

Some knights responded by entering the service of greater lords or of the king, and those who prospered were sometimes able to re-establish their positions from the proceeds of office holding. Marriages with prosperous burghers or peasants were another route to survival and to continuing social mobility. Others moved to the towns and branched out into commerce, a phenomenon well known in southern Europe, but more widespread in northern Europe than is often realised. The prejudices that declared commerce incompatible with nobility were still taking shape when the thirteenth century ended. They did not become legally enforceable until the end of the fourteenth century, and even then, only in France, Castile and parts of east central Europe. In the thirteenth century, commerce remained an avenue of opportunity open even to the greatest lords throughout western Europe.

Lords threatened by the declining real value of fixed rents cut costs where they could; and from the mid-thirteenth century on, we find growing numbers of lesser knights’ sons in France failing to take up knighthood, remaining instead as armigeri, damoiseau, ‘squires’. By 1250, more than half the fief holders in Forez were unknighted squires, while in the Mâconnais the undubbed sons of knights made up more than half the aristocracy. In Picardy, dubbing remained customary until about 1270, but squires multiplied rapidly thereafter in all but the greatest families. The ranks of squires were further increased by the fact that thirteenth-century French knightly families frequently divided their estates amongst all their children, or at least all their sons, rather than concentrating their inheritances in the hands of a single heir. Customs varied by region, and in areas like the Beauvaisis and the Vexin, primogeniture was carefully preserved. But in most areas, partible inheritance had long been practised by the greatest aristocratic lineages even where customary law might appear to dictate otherwise. As the knights became more firmly a part of this aristocratic elite, they adopted its succession practices also. In thirteenth-century Champagne primogeniture was actually prohibited with respect to fiefs. Elsewhere, as with Picardy, changes in inheritance customs can be traced only by their results. The results, however, were clear: a markedly increased number of small lordships, whose holders proved especially vulnerable to the eco-
nomic difficulties of the later thirteenth century; fragmentation of the great estates, which facilitated their acquisition by the crown or other lords; and high extinction rates among aristocratic lineages. In Forez, 66 of the 215 aristocratic families disappeared during the thirteenth century. In Picardy, only twelve of the fifty greatest families in 1190 survived in the male line to 1290; but they had been joined in the meantime by no less than sixty-four other families who had risen into aristocratic ranks.

By 1300, the chevaliers of France were securely a part of the nobility, and their privileged legal status was increasingly seen as heritable even by their undubbed descendants. As a social class, however, the nobility itself was still in flux, and would remain so. By 1300, the wealthiest men in France were merchants, not nobles; and although newly constructed distinctions of legal rank might retard the merchants' entrance into the ranks of the nobility, they could do little to counteract the changing balance of economic power between them.

Patterns of change among the English aristocracy were broadly similar to those of northern France. Here too the years between 1180 and 1240 were the critical ones for the assimilation of local knightly families into the ranks of the domini. It is in these years too that it became fashionable for the greatest lords to style themselves as milites, a chivalric acknowledgement of the common values that united them with the often landless knights who comprised their retinues. More clearly than in France, however, the rising status of the knights in England rested on the massive transfer of land from tenants-in-chief to their knightly followers which took place in the century prior to 1180. Such transfers may have purchased loyalty initially, but as these heritable grants were passed down to children and grandchildren, the links which bound knightly tenants to their honorial lords became increasingly attenuated. In Ireland and on the Welsh marches, continuing colonisation and military necessity preserved these links rather longer. But in England itself, the tenurial security provided by royal justice combined with the increasing value of their landed resources to render most shire knights substantially independent of lordly control by about 1225. Thereafter, great lords who aspired to control the localities generally had to achieve this in partnership with local knightly families, offering fees, offices and patronage at court in return for their service and support. Always, however, the power of the king and his agents stood as a potential counterweight to such territorial ambitions. As a result, the shire knights emerged in the thirteenth century as a distinctive political group, whose independence from both the king and the great lords can be traced in parliamentary negotiations from the late 1260s onward.

Notwithstanding the knights’ developing role in parliament as spokesmen for ‘the commons’, knights themselves were securely a part of the English aristocracy, increasingly so as their numbers diminished from perhaps 3,000 in
to around 1,100 in the early fourteenth century. The rising costs of aristocratic display, the administrative burdens imposed on shire knights by the crown and the desire to avoid personal summonses to military service all played a role in the rapid decline of knightly numbers in the countryside. From the 1240s on, kings responded by periodically attempting to coerce all £15, £20 or £40 freeholders to accept knighthood. Exemptions were easily purchased, and so the policy had little effect on the overall numbers of knights, but it did help to keep open the lower boundary of the English aristocracy to the rapidly growing number of squires. As in France, the landed wealth and local reputation of these thirteenth-century squires were sufficient to rank them among the gentle-born, although in England it was not until the fourteenth century that the squires moved fully into aristocratic ranks by taking up heraldic insignia. In England, however, gentility never gave way to nobility as the characteristic quality of this aristocracy, because in England nobility never became a term of legal art. From the thirteenth century on, the English ‘nobility’ enjoyed no exemptions from royal taxation, no judicial rights of consequence beyond their manorial courts and no privileges in legal procedure beyond a right to be tried by their peers, a guarantee provided to all free men by Magna Carta, but which came to mean that lords summoned personally to parliament should be tried only by the king himself or by their lordly ‘peers’ in parliament. In some respects, for example in their freedom to sell fee hold property, the great lords of late thirteenth-century England were even more tightly bound by legal restrictions than were lesser men because they were more likely to hold their lands directly from the crown.

The absence of a legally privileged nobility from thirteenth-century England is conventionally seen as a sign of the overwhelming power of the English crown. It may also reflect the enormous prosperity of these great lords. Direct exploitation of their estates made them the beneficiaries of the rising prices for agricultural produce which characterised the century. Their continuing connections with towns and trade provided them with markets for their produce and substantial cash incomes from markets, tolls and fairs. Some, like the earls of Arundel and Pembroke, engaged in trade directly, especially with Ireland and the Low Countries, sometimes even with their own ships. Others developed urban property, especially in London, or founded new towns. Nowhere were the lines between the aristocracy and the townsfolk clearly drawn. Knights and townsfolk sat together in thirteenth-century parliaments as the representatives of shires and boroughs; the ruling oligarchies in the towns were often drawn from country families; while the men of London and the Cinque Ports were conventionally addressed as ‘barons’. Tax burdens on the aristocracy were light until the 1290s, and the stability of the English currency lessened the impact of inflation on their fixed rents, which made up a
far smaller proportion of their incomes anyway than for the lords of northern France.

Among the knights and squires, stability was somewhat less than it was among the greatest families. In the shires, the improvident and the unlucky disappeared, and new families took their place, rising through royal favour, administrative service, trade, land purchase, marriage and successful litigation. Political miscalculations could be disastrous, and in the wake of the mid-century civil wars, an extraordinary redistribution of landed resources took place within aristocratic ranks. But the structure of the aristocracy itself did not change dramatically. No systematic crisis overtook the English aristocracy of the sort we see by 1300 in northern France. In France, the construction of a noble class in law was in part a response to the nobility’s own perception of threat. In England, where no such threats materialised, no legally protected nobility emerged.

In the German-speaking lands of the empire, by contrast, it was free knights who were rare by 1200; by 1300 in many areas they had disappeared altogether as a distinguishable group within aristocratic society. The ranks of the chevalerie were instead filled by the legally unfree ministeriales, whose military and political influence and aristocratic style of life corresponded fully to those of their knightly counterparts in France, but whose legal status continued in principle to distinguish them from the free nobility until the fourteenth century. In the early twelfth century, when a distinctive ordo ministerialis took shape in Germany, the ministerials’ unfreedom had involved three principal restrictions on their conduct: they could not alienate their lands except to other ministerials of the same lord; they could not do homage to or hold fiefs from any other lord without their personal lord’s permission; and they could not marry outside the lordship, again without their lord’s permission. By 1200, these restrictions on alienation of lands, homage and on multiple fief holding had already largely broken down, and were even further relaxed in the troubled years between 1197 and 1218. Werner von Bolanden, imperial ministerial under Frederick Barbarossa, held land from more than forty different lords in addition to Barbarossa; and in practice, especially in areas like the Rhineland, ministerials by 1200 were freely alienating their property through sales, donations and sub-infeudations, subject only to a customary requirement that they recompense their lord for his ‘loss’ with lands of equal value. Despite their legal unfreedom, ministerials were thus in practice freer by 1200 in their ability to alienate feudal property by sale or gift than were the knights of northern France or England, and continued to be so until the end of the thirteenth century. Their rights of inheritance were also firmly secured in local custom, so much so that on occasion free men voluntarily took on ministerial status apparently so as to safeguard the succession of their estates.
Nor were the restrictions on their marital freedom unusual when compared to customs elsewhere in northern Europe, at least prior to the late twelfth century. Thereafter, however, we note a change. Whereas in northern France and England seigneurial control over knightly marriage increasingly broke down from the mid-twelfth century on, in Germany this legal limitation was preserved; and although in fact a great many thirteenth-century ministerials did marry outside their lordships without their lord’s permission, a ministerial who did so had no legal defence if his lord chose later to make an issue of his unsanctioned marriage by confiscating his fiefs. Indeed, as the principalities of late thirteenth-century Germany assumed more precisely defined boundaries, restrictions on ministerial marriages were sometimes applied with even greater rigour by lords like the archbishop of Salzburg, struggling to assert and maintain the territorial integrity of his terra, and anxious not to lose control of valuable ministerial inheritances through marriages with dependants of competing lords.

Like their knightly counterparts elsewhere, the ministerials rose in the world through the service of greater lords. Their unfree status derived from their role as vassals in a seigneurial familia, but the services they performed were the honourable ones of fighting on horseback, office holding and administration; and as ties of vassalage spread during the twelfth century to encompass free knights, counts and even dukes, traditional equations of ‘nobility’ with ‘freedom’ became increasingly irrelevant to the realities of aristocratic German life. As ministerials acquired fiefs, they also began to acquire the heraldic insignia linked with fief holding. As with the other knights of thirteenth-century Europe, the assimilation of the German ministerials into the ranks of the aristocracy was marked by their adoption of heritable armorial bearings. In Germany, the arms borne by ministerials in the thirteenth century were often derived from the arms of their principal lord, symbolising their unfreedom, but emphasising their potentially ennobling proximity to the upper ranks of the ‘free’ aristocracy. The standing of ministerials in the thirteenth century was a complex mixture of both these elements.

Despite great disparities in wealth and social standing, ministerials in the twelfth century were widely perceived by contemporaries as constituting a single and distinctive order within German society. In the thirteenth century, however, this unity broke down. The most powerful ministerial families, those holding fiefs of many lords, in possession of castles and exercising seigneurial authority in the countryside, had already begun to style themselves as nobiles in the twelfth century. And although such claims would not be generally accepted in aristocratic society until the fourteenth century, they were addressed as domini from about 1200 on in common with the free nobility. Free knights continued to enter the ranks of the ministerials throughout the thirteenth century, especially in areas where strong princes were successfully consolidating their
authority. Elsewhere, the most powerful ministerials were beginning to establish a *de facto* independence from their lords, a development hastened in areas where the extinction of comital or ducal lineages left them without a personal lord altogether. After 1254, the extinction of the Staufen emperors released a new flood of lordless imperial ministerials into German society. By the end of the thirteenth century, the greatest ministerial families had merged with the remaining free nobility of the countryside, to constitute in areas like Austria, Styria and the Rhineland an ‘estate of lords’ (*Herrenstand*). The majority of lesser ministerials, however, either attached themselves to other lords and merged with their own retainers to constitute an ‘estate of knights’, the late medieval *Ritterstand*, or else dropped back into the ranks of the peasantry. Above them both, of course, stood the *Reichsfürstenstand*, the estate of imperial princes, whose ranks were defined by a series of royal edicts between 1180 and 1237, with continuing adjustments thereafter. Not every region witnessed this split between knights and lords; and in areas where a single prince predominated, like Salzburg, or in the expanding areas of eastern settlement, like Brandenburg, Mecklenburg and Meissen where an ‘old’ nobility had never existed, only a single lordly estate of knighthood formed.

Regional peculiarities should not obscure the general phenomenon, however. Like the knights of England and northern France, the German ministerials by 1300 had risen into the ranks of the hereditary nobility, dividing as they did so into an upper and a lower stratum. Except in a few outlying areas like Guelders and Zutphen, where ministerials survived until the sixteenth century, they shed the remaining vestiges of their unfreedom during the fourteenth century. As with the free nobility, the thirteenth-century prosperity of the *ministeriales* which enabled them to rise rested on three main props: their possession of landed wealth, acquired as fiefs and through purchase, but vastly increased through internal colonisation and land reclamation; their control over castles; and their connections with towns, where many twelfth-century ministerial families were installed by their lords as administrators. The result, especially in the old settlement areas of Swabia, Franconia, northern Bavaria and the Rhineland, was the emergence during the thirteenth century of a very important urban nobility, living in fortified townhouses, engaging in commerce, but closely associated with the nobility of the surrounding countryside. As it was in northern Italy, the Low Countries and north-eastern France, chivalry in late medieval Germany was as much an urban enthusiasm as a rural one. Everywhere in western Europe, however, it remained the distinctive ideology of an increasingly self-conscious noble class.

Against this background, the often-alleged distinctiveness of the urban-dwelling, commercially oriented nobility of northern and central Italy loses
much of its force. Long-standing relationships of vassalage and service between the nobility of the countryside and the administrators and merchants of the towns had created an important urban nobility in the Italian towns by 1100. These links between town and contado were further strengthened by the involvement of the rural nobility in urban commercial ventures, and by the efforts of the new communal governments to encourage the nobility of the contado to reside in the towns. Not all agreed to do so, and throughout the thirteenth century about half the rural nobility resisted any significant connection with commerce or the communes. By the thirteenth century, however, the communes themselves were dominated by closely integrated patriciates drawn from both the landed nobility of the countryside and the wealthy merchants and moneylenders of the towns. These urban magnates lived in fortified towers in the city while drawing much of their wealth from rural property. They maintained networks of clients and kin throughout the contado, and lived by a code of honour and vendetta that by the 1240s posed a serious challenge to political stability. But what principally distinguished them from their fellow citizens was their self-conscious allegiance to the cult of chivalry, the French origins of which paradoxically increased its importance in Italy as a marker of aristocratic solidarity. Even more markedly than elsewhere in Europe, chivalry in northern and central Italy defined and unified an elite of extraordinarily disparate social origins around a common set of aristocratic cultural values.

In most Italian cities, mounted military service was compulsory for all male citizens above a set level of wealth. The incessant warfare that characterised thirteenth-century Italian life thus helped to maintain knighthood as a means of entry into aristocratic society open even to former serfs. It was thus not mounted military service itself, but rather the full ceremonial trappings of chivalric knighthood that came to distinguish the merely wealthy from the truly noble families among the thirteenth-century urban patriciate. Dubbing to knighthood became the accepted ritual by which a family proclaimed its magnate status, and remained so until the 1330s, despite the efforts of several communal governments (most famously Florence) from the 1280s on to limit the power of magnate families by banning dubbed knights and their lineages from political office. Throughout the century, however, it remained possible for new families to enter the patriciate by adopting the chivalric values of the urban nobility. The social narrowing of knightly ranks visible elsewhere in Europe during the thirteenth century appears clearly in Italy only in the fourteenth, when it coincided with a general ‘re-feudalisation’ of rural society and, in Tuscany, with an economic crisis for the lesser nobility.

In southern Italy, by contrast, chivalry was less often an urban phenomenon, and knighthood more often restricted to the descendants of knights. Urban life itself was far less developed, and the structures of rural lordship were more
securely in the hands of a territorialised nobility. In northern Italy, the growth of property taxes during the thirteenth century reduced the fiscal privileges attendant upon nobility, making nobility more than ever a matter of values and style. In the south, however, the opposite occurred. Tax exemptions on feudal property became more securely established, and a growing prejudice against noble involvement in commerce increased the economic dependence of the nobility on their estates. Inheritance customs differed also, indivisibility in the south preserving the integrity of powerful noble lordships, while the partible inheritance customs of the north acted to dissolve them.

The closest parallels with northern Italian knighthood during the thirteenth century were thus not with the south, but with Spain. In Castile, an ancient nobility defined by heritable fiscal privileges, descent and knightly service existed by the eleventh century, divided into a small group of *ricos homines* (from Gothic *reiks*, meaning ‘powerful’), and a much larger group of lesser *hidalgos* or *infanzones*. In the north the *hidalgos* remained a largely rural group. The word *bidalgo* was itself derived from *fijo d’alguno*, ‘son of somebody’. In central and southern Castile, however, kings recruited mounted troops and settlers for the *Reconquista* by offering the privileges of *hidalguía* to any frontier townson who fought on his own horse with knightly arms. In theory, the knightly status and attendant tax exemptions of these *caballeros villanos* did not pass automatically to their descendants; status was to this extent strictly dependent upon service, and so distinct from *hidalguía*, which was heritable. In practice, however, mounted service in frontier towns was obligatory for all males wealthy enough to sustain its requirements; and since horses, arms and wealth were heritable, the distinctions between *bidalgo* and *caballero* families in the towns became increasingly blurred. By the early thirteenth century, an effectively hereditary group of *caballeros villanos* dominated most towns, along with a much smaller group of urban *hidalgos*. Their mounted service secured for them the largest share of the booty from raids and conquests, while their monopoly of local offices guaranteed them the lion’s share of the tax revenues from the surrounding countryside. Their dominance was further encouraged by the efforts of Ferdinand III and Alfonso X to fuse these two groups into a single, closed urban aristocracy of ‘knights by lineage’ (*caballeros de linaje*), by increasing their tax exemptions, relaxing military service requirements and insisting that they alone could hold urban offices and represent their towns in the *cortes*.

The rich opportunities for plunder and conquest offered by the *Reconquista* made mounted military service a continuing avenue for social advancement within the towns, particularly during the first half of the century. After mid-century, however, we find a growing insistence in Castile on the necessity of a knightly lineage to true nobility (*hidalguía*). This was partly a matter of maintaining urban tax rolls, but it also reflected developments within Castilian
society: lessening military opportunity as the Reconquista came to an end; the declining economic position of the hidalgos, especially in the north where they were most numerous; and the growing power and wealth of the urban patriciate, composed largely of caballeros villanos, but in Andalusia comprising also merchants whose status as caballeros was dependent on their wealth. Alfonso X’s very deliberate efforts, through sumptuary legislation, court ceremonial and the Siete partidas, to define chivalric values, to identify them with true nobility, and to focus them on his court, were attempts to construct a cultural unity for this new Castilian nobility he sought to promote. His success is apparent in the cult of the Cid, the particular hero of the caballeros villanos, who emerged by 1300 as the pre-eminent chivalric hero for the entire Castilian nobility as well. By 1300, the caballeros villanos were securely a part of a hereditary nobility that would thereafter define itself increasingly strictly by birth and lineage. In the late medieval cortes, this knightly nobility would sit together as a single estate.

Social change amongst the Aragonese aristocracy was much less marked. The small group of ricos hombres in Aragon proper remained fairly stable throughout the thirteenth century, tightening their grip on their dependent tenants, and increasingly assertive of their independence from the crown. Neither they nor the larger group of lesser nobles (infanzones) profited much from King James I’s conquests of Majorca and Valencia, while the non-heritability of their tenancies appeared even more unjust when contrasted with the heritable fiefs of Catalonia. The towns of Aragon grew markedly in the first half of the century, but remained too small to accommodate the ambitions of more than a few families of urban knights. Knighthood in Aragon therefore remained an almost exclusively noble enterprise, notwithstanding the presence of a few caballeros villanos along the twelfth-century borderlands. Divisions between the greater and lesser nobility are reflected in the Aragonese cortes, in which these two groups sat in separate estates. Their mutual alienation from the crown grew steadily, however, producing in 1265 at Ejea and in the 1283 Union a co-operative defence of the tax exemptions and judicial privileges that characterised their joint nobility.

In Catalonia, by contrast, the ancient nobility of counts and viscounts declined dramatically during the twelfth century. In their place arose a much larger group of castellans (hence, perhaps, the very name ‘Catalonia’), whose noble status was well enough established by 1200 to allow invidious comparisons between the true nobility of counts and castellans, and the pretensions of an arriviste group of knights who had risen as the agents of the crown’s expanding authority in the last few decades of the century. The conquests of King James I brought new opportunities to all three groups; but what really transformed thirteenth-century Catalan society was the explosive growth of the city of Barcelona. Like the great cities of northern Italy, Barcelona was controlled
by a tightly knit patriciate of ‘honourable citizens’, here drawn overwhelmingly from the city itself. But despite important differences in family structure between the urban patriciate and the rural nobility, some noble families, such as the Moncada, did participate in the urban development of Barcelona and the commercial expansion of the Catalan empire. Even more importantly, both the Barcelonan patriciate and the rural nobility shared in the common cultural and political world of the Catalan court, acting together as lenders, office holders and emissaries in the interests of the count-kings. One of the consequences of such co-operation around the court was intermarriage between merchant and noble families, which remained common throughout the century and helped in turn to promote the remarkable social mobility apparent at almost every rank of thirteenth-century Catalan society. Knighthood may have been less common among the ‘honourable citizens’ of Barcelona than it was among their Italian counterparts, but the example of Ramon Llull suggests that chivalric knighthood was indeed an aspiration among patrician families, perhaps especially in the new world of conquered Majorca. We know too little as yet about the cultural life of either the rural nobility or the urban elites of Catalonia to determine with confidence the extent to which a common chivalric culture defined and united them. But in a culture so cosmopolitan as that of thirteenth-century Catalonia, it would be surprising indeed if chivalric values did not in some measure contribute, as they did nearly everywhere else in Europe, to the process by which a socially diverse aristocracy of barons, knights and urban magnates became a noble class.
The line between urban and rural society, the small town and the big village, is a fine one and traditionally depends on whether or not a majority of the population supported itself other than by fishing, farming, mining or tending herds. In the past, there has been a tendency to identify towns solely by their legal status; this is not entirely satisfactory. Some unusual villages contained 1,000 people; a small town might not have much more. Thousands of small market towns existed across Europe and fulfilled the vital local functions of providing a place where people could exchange goods and supplies, repair their farm implements, have their children baptised or attend a fair. At around 5,000 people (in more densely settled regions) a city assumed certain features more characteristic of urban society, but in Scandinavia or eastern Europe even smaller places were impressive in local terms. A symbiotic relationship existed between all cities and their countrysides; any contrast between urban and rural society runs the risk of posing a false dichotomy. Arbitrary chronology is also a problem; the years 1198 and 1300 do not mark any decisive events affecting urban society across Europe.

Europe in the thirteenth century remained an overwhelmingly rural society, and so cities were still distinctive islands in a sea of villages and hamlets. The theme of urban societies must not turn these cities into generic types. Important regional differences must not be obscured, and nor should these places be rendered so typical as to conceal the process of change. On the most basic level, western Europe had more cities than the east, but this century marks the rise of some newly significant places as distant as Moscow. Many of Europe’s largest cities dotted the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to the Bosphorus, but a similar band of newer towns followed the sea coast from the English Channel to the Gulf of Finland. Differences in climate and geography account for some special features of urban life; the canals of Venice do not freeze; the steep roofs in Bergen do not resemble the tiled ones in Valencia; rainfall would help to clean the streets of London but not Palermo; some
marshy areas, like the Maremma near Pisa, remained so malarial as to stifle successful urban life near them. Different physical appearances of cities help to mark regional flavours; the Mediterranean city does not look like one in the Low Countries. Yet some features of life cut across boundaries of space and weather. Walls or water surrounded most thirteenth-century cities. In every Christian city the biggest building was generally a church, almost invariably either a partially completed Gothic cathedral or a Romanesque basilica. A rough line from the Baltic to the Mediterranean fixed, from east to west, whether the language of the Mass in that church was Greek or Latin, whether the people looked to Constantinople or Rome for spiritual guidance. And of course Jews everywhere and Muslims in Spain and Sicily followed their own religious practices, in synagogues and mosques that did not tend to thrive where Christians ruled.

The thirteenth century witnessed a rapid growth of population, and this increase fuelled an expansion of Europe’s cities. No census or reliable estimate of population survives for any thirteenth-century city. Some contemporary figures provide a basis for guessing the size of the population. Tax lists give the number of households; military service yields the number of men capable of bearing arms; city walls may define the main inhabited area. These more or less reliable figures generally require a multiplier – average household size, gender and age distribution in the population, people per hectare – to produce the hypothetical figures. Small differences in the number of people per household or how many people can fit into an urban hectare can lead to great differences in the gross numbers. More useful are simple orders of magnitude – from a few thousand to 100,000 covers the range. Since the larger cities were generally dangerous and unhealthy places, infant mortality was high and hence much of the increase in urban population resulted not so much from city people reproducing themselves as from people migrating from the countryside or small towns. By 1200 the vast majority of Europe’s cities already existed in some form, and in the following century these places would mostly continue to expand, while a few notable new towns like Stratford-upon-Avon were founded by enterprising lords. In the east, places like Vienna, Prague and Warsaw serve as examples of rapid growth from more obscure origins. On the Iberian frontier traditional Muslim cities such as Valencia, Seville, Córdoba and Ciutat de Mallorca were reborn, in some cases with a new population, as Christian centres of social and economic life.

The giant city of Europe was Paris, at about 200,000 people by 1300; Venice and Florence reached a population of around 100,000, a ceiling of sorts in medieval society, probably set by the problems of transporting food to such
huge centres. In the next rank are cities like Cologne, Milan, Bruges, Genoa and London, with populations of half or more that of Florence and Venice. Two areas of Europe, northern Italy, and the Low Countries and lower Rhineland, had more sizeable cities by region than the rest of Europe. Constantinople, probably the largest city in Europe in 1200, wrecked by the Fourth Crusade in 1204 and badly ruled by a French dynasty for most of the century, was by 1300 a shadow of its former self. Three other cities, Rome, Naples and Palermo, still giants or nearly so for most of the thirteenth century, drew much of their strength from their role as centres of government. Many other places, like Pavia or some small ports on the southern English coast, did not grow very much in the century and are not so much examples of failures as they are witnesses to the success of their neighbours. The case of Buda and Pest, each developing on its bank of the Danube, highlights two important features of urban growth: the importance of being at a geographical point where roads intersect or the method of transport altered; a substantial town generally precluded another one in the vicinity (in this example the Danube defined the limit). Port cities are clear examples of places thriving on necessary changes in transport. But the expansion of cities requires a closer look at some individual cases.

Capital cities of national monarchies, like London or Paris, or of important lordships, like Cologne or Munich (capital of Bavaria from 1255), highlight the advantages of having a royal, episcopal or ducal household and bureaucracy present at times, but the peripatetic kings of Aragon, for example, did not remain in one place long enough to make Saragossa into a great capital. A city’s size also benefited from having an important bishop, as did Lincoln and Rouen, or a university, like Bologna and Oxford. The most important bishop of all, the pope, ruled a city that was also the leading goal of pilgrimage in Europe, but other places like Santiago de Compostela and Canterbury also benefited economically from pilgrimages. These special characteristics, being a capital or a holy place, can account for a city’s existence, but by themselves they no longer guaranteed substantial growth.

Cities also served as regional centres of production, distribution and consumption. Port cities illustrate how these factors fostered growth. Venice’s fleet enabled it to draw upon food supplies from as far away as Crete, and the city supplied, from sources as far away as Egypt, cotton and spices to another hinterland in southern Germany. Profiting from sea and river links, Venice became great through trade, but also led the way in manufacturing on a massive scale a complex and labour-intensive product: the medieval galley. Venice used its position and its naval power to establish by the late thirteenth century mastery over much of the Adriatic and Aegean, but other towns such as Marseilles, Genoa, Barcelona, Pisa, Bremen and Lübeck, and smaller ports like
Dublin and Lisbon, also served large regions by collecting and distributing the products of the city's own region, as well as the goods of more distant ones. Foodstuffs and wool were the most distinctive products. Every city acted as a magnet for people who drove cattle and pigs along the roads or brought grain in carts or barges to a centre of consumption. Bordeaux thrived on the local production of wine and other places did so through the collection of wheat from a fertile countryside. The cities that consolidated supplies of food in turn enabled the classic manufacturing towns to thrive. In the thirteenth century the leading industry of Europe, and alongside wool one of its great items of trade, was woollen cloth. Florence, Bruges, Ypres, Ghent and others were major cloth-manufacturing towns, while at the same time serving as regional centres of distribution. Masters and artisans weaving wool into cloth required many people in their home towns and other places to manage the difficult logistics of keeping them supplied with food and wool. England and the Spanish kingdoms exported wool and enabled weavers in the Low Countries and Italy to make a living.

The developing interconnections of medieval cities, principally through trade but also from migration of artisans, help to explain this rapid increase in size in the thirteenth century. Cities were magnets for people and food. Immigration depended on as well as fostered the decline of serfdom in the rural areas – another sign of the dynamic relationship between city and countryside. Migration from rural areas filled up new neighbourhoods, uprooted people from their primordial kinship networks, and hence also forced people at times to rely upon impersonal urban institutions for help. The food trade required wider use of another distinctive urban product – coins – and hence more cash filtered into agricultural, livestock-rearing and fishing regions. The crucial point is that no one planned this growth or its consequences. Hence people everywhere had to react to the challenges of unforeseen growth. These changes in turn led to competition and specialisation in cities.

Successful cities continued to grow in this century by meeting the challenges of creating and defending their physical space. One great problem was urban infrastructure; larger cities required new walls to protect the suburbs and faubourgs that grew up around the older centres. Town maps reveal the new urban sprawl, which on old sites in the west often still had a Roman grid at the centre, as at Florence. Larger ports and bridges were required to handle the increasing volume of transport. The spiritual needs of these larger cities demanded more and bigger churches. Increases in walls and harbour size punctuated the rhythm of growth. Immense building projects of the thirteenth century – the cathedrals, walls, bridges and harbour mole – resulted in enormous expenditure that was a tribute to the prosperity, patience and piety of urban people.
The city also played a distinctive role in marginalising certain groups of people. Because cities were, in Richard Sennett’s words, ‘a milieu in which strangers were likely to meet’, thirteenth-century townspeople began to insist that certain ‘undesirable persons’ – Muslims, Jews, lepers, prostitutes – identify themselves to the unwary public. Distinctive clothing, badges and bells helped urban people to recognise and to avoid strangers and also to keep these undesirables out of respectable neighbourhoods. In Avignon and Arles, prostitutes were not allowed to wear veils – that Mediterranean badge of respectable modesty. By the end of the thirteenth century areas were set aside for Jews in some cities, for example the closely regulated Call of Mallorca. Clothing and veils marked men and women, and the long tradition of special clothes for specific trades and professions is an urban legacy. These cities contained the first anonymous crowds in medieval Europe, but also some fresh signs of personal expression intended to establish a social identity. Funerals designed by the deceased, family burial chapels or crypts, the increasing use of surnames, sumptuary laws and other aspects of city life testify to the desire of some to carve out a familial or personal space even though such opportunities were limited to the better sort.

The typical thirteenth-century city was a cluster of neighbourhoods organised along craft or professional lines, common rural origins or membership in some sort of urban group or religious minority. Street names in some cases still preserve the names of crafts that dominated particular neighbourhoods: in 1285 the prostitutes of Montpellier were directed to live on what earned the name The Hot Street; the gold trade of Florence has been on the Ponte Vecchio for more than seven centuries. Although most urban development was unplanned, ‘dirty’ trades like slaughtering, tanning and fulling cloth tended to be located on the outskirts of town or at least downstream from sources of drinking water. Thus James I of Aragon obliged Jewish dyers to move their workshops to the edges of Barcelona. Cities with extensive metal-working industries endured the sound of hammering at the forge during daylight hours and frequently into the night. The location of various trades in particular parts of cities meant that urban parishes, which themselves helped to define neighbourhoods, often included a high proportion of people in the same craft or business. These urban neighbourhoods, particularly in the ‘old city’, tended to include a mix of people from all social levels. A rare account of a neighbourhood meeting in Bergamo in 1292 reveals people concerned at such humble but important matters as the condition of their fountain. Ideas about public money and property involved ordinary people at the grassroots. The

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neighbourhood around the church of San Matteo in Genoa is an example of vertical social stratification with its small parish church in the centre of a cluster of fortified towers. (These towers, famous examples of which survive in Bologna and San Gimignano, were typical of cities in which land was at a premium or civic strife endemic: Genoa was an example of both.) In this neighbourhood lived the Doria clan, powerful nobles, and their allies and dependants. The family drew on two sources of strength, the Scrivia valley north of the city and the area of the Riviera to the east of the city near San Fruttuoso. Migrants from these areas tended to settle in San Matteo. Buildings three or four storeys tall mimicked the vertical social organisation of the quarter: poorer folk on the noisy, gloomy bottom floors and alleyways, the more exalted on the upper floors paid higher rents. This social mixture helped to foster an urban paternalism in which wealthy and powerful people looked out for the interests of their wards, quarters and neighbourhoods.

Perhaps the most distinctive, and relatively recent, feature of urban society was the large number of people who supported themselves through wage labour. Casual labourers, journeymen and women, and apprentices worked in small shops and some large enterprises like shipyards for masters who had frequently organised themselves into guilds. A variety of vernacular terms (métier, gild, arte, Zunft) conceal a general pattern of corporate organisation so characteristic of medieval society. Urban men and women had to support themselves in some way, and for most the daily wage, paid on the payday of the six-day week, Saturday, was the method by which many lived or simply survived. Coinage, the rise of markets and the division of labour helped to foster an increasingly specialised economy. Paris had at least a hundred different guilds organised according to some very specific trades: for example only a university town could support an organised, if small, craft devoted to making book clasps. The thirteenth century witnesses the rise and elaboration of guilds across Europe. The system of apprenticeship helped young boys and girls to acquire some vocational education, often at no expense to their parents, while supplying extra hands to some thriving entrepreneurs in the trades. Once the apprentice completed the term, the majority faced a life of journeyman status, especially in those trades in which capital requirements for operating a shop meant that most people would have to spend a lifetime working for others. At the top of the hierarchy stood the masters, usually independent entrepreneurs but still in a sense working for their customers, or in the case of the building trades, working for the king, city government or the Church. Being a master was no guarantee of security. Accidents, illness or the decline of a

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trade might bring individuals or entire groups into unemployment or poverty. Much work remained outside this system, but everywhere in western Europe the guild system of employment was a distinctive feature of social and economic life, particularly in the manufacturing towns and centres of distribution. Guilds existed in the port towns as well, but tended to be weakened by trade and the competition it introduced into local economies.

Much medieval work depended on daylight, so cities began to stir at daybreak. Church bells helped to define the working day, and sundials were a ubiquitous if occasionally confusing (on cloudy days) feature of thirteenth-century towns. Some work was seasonal. The sailing seasons dominated the pace of urban work along the Baltic and North Seas, and in parts of the Mediterranean, and seafaring took thousands of men away from their towns for months at a time. Nearly every day bread was baked in the great ovens scattered across the city, firewood and other necessities hawked in the streets, vats of urine emptied. In Paris and other northern cities town criers shouted out the price of wine in taverns every day (except on Good Friday or when the monarch or a member of his family happened to die). Some neighbourhoods were dominated by the clatter of the loom or the newly prominent cotton and silk industries and the smells on some streets advertised the trades practised there. Wine and ale were consumed in enormous quantities and served as a means of temporary escape from the drudgeries of daily life.

In the midst of all this noisy artisan activity other urban groups functioned as well. The merchants, that mixed bag of nobles who moved into town from the countryside and interested themselves in trade, as well as the proverbial self-made men, struck deals, and exchanged money at rudimentary banks; these new institutions first appeared in Italian cities like Florence, Lucca, Piacenza and Siena, and then in the north. The daily round of religious observances in the urban churches and monasteries found a new expression in the growing number of the distinctively urban Franciscan and Dominican convents. As night fell, some work continued and crime increased; candles were expensive and firelight rather dim. Night watchmen kept a vigil on the dark and dangerous streets. Sundays and church feasts, by the thirteenth century amounting to some seventy or eighty days a year, provided some rest and enjoyment for those who could afford it, but for the many paid by the day, they were unpaid holidays. The richness and variety of urban life attracted bored nobles, religious innovators, runaway serfs and paupers alike.

Although the principal theme of thirteenth-century urban society is, in most places, the challenge of population growth, perhaps the most decisive changes in urban society reflect what responses were made to the problems of growth;

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9 Lespinasse and Bonnardot (1879), p. 23.
most importantly the health and welfare of the inhabitants. All the constants of urban life – illness, poverty, crime, sanitation, fraud, ignorance – did not lend themselves to neat or simplistic solutions that were the same throughout Europe. In order to make sense of disparate problems and attempted solutions, some preliminary observations will be helpful. One international, and hence interurban institution, the Church, remained responsible for dispensing much of urban charity, and hence imposed some common features on the many cities under review. Poor, sick, abandoned people turned to urban parishes, monasteries, the Franciscans and Dominicans, orders like the Hospitallers, or the leper houses established by the new order of St Lazarus. Abandonment of children increased in the thirteenth century as pressures on the urban poor became more intense. A hospital in Troyes decreed in 1263 that it would not accept abandoned children for fear of being overwhelmed by them. Most guilds took care of their own distressed members and some donated goods, food or money to the broader community. Christ’s poor were the business of the Church; in general city governments were not providers of social services to the needy. Surviving thirteenth-century documents like wills and statutes for hospitals and guilds reveal that urban people handed over many problems to the Church. But legacies and charitable donations enabled the Church, with its trained bureaucracy and sustaining ideology, to provide a level of assistance that saved some, if not all, from starvation, abandonment or a solitary death.

In other ways cities themselves provided service to the inhabitants, mostly in public health and safety. Night watches and town criers, sometimes private people drafted into public responsibilities, sometimes employees of the government, helped to make cities safer and to spread the news. The Assizes of Bread and Ale in London took an interest in the price and quality of these vital commodities. During the thirteenth century Henry III and Edward I encouraged the city authorities to guarantee the hygiene of the meat markets and to look into the broader issues of urban sanitation. Regulating the price of bread and the quality of loaves was in many cities public business, as was the difficult problem of urban refuse. Guilds of butchers, bakers and retailers of prepared food provided convenient groups of men and women to be made responsible for maintaining standards of quality and controlling prices. Rudimentary committees of citizens also attempted to take charge of these problems. Cities, assuming the burden of keeping the public peace, also needed to establish and to pay for courts and jails, which in turn brought in some income and provided jobs to lawyers, guards and executioners. The careers of men like Etienne Boileau, the prévôt of Paris for Louis IX, or the many who worked as podestà

(city manager) for Italian towns demonstrate the increasing professionalisation of public service.

During the thirteenth century cities across Europe witnessed an explosion of education, from the humble apprentices learning a craft to the expanding number of leading universities. Once again, public authorities left much of education, and especially universities, in the hands of the Church. The masters of the guilds regulated the training in the crafts. The pace of business increasingly required some men and women to be literate and capable of using an abacus; city life rewarded the educated at all levels, at least if they were men. The professional writers, the notaries and scriveners, found jobs outside the Church, either as individuals or as the paid employees of the small bureaucracies of city government. In towns such as Lucca and Genoa parish schools and entrepreneurial schoolmasters provided the elementary level of literacy and arithmetic, but the records everywhere are sadly uninformative about the basic system of urban education. However, the most pervasive system of teaching and learning in pre-industrial Europe, the vocational training by the guild masters, provided thousands of young men and women with the skills necessary to support themselves in the crafts and trades. Urban work enabled some women (forerunners of Chaucer’s Wife of Bath) to learn and to live independent lives outside the convent, but their wages remained low and the guilds circumscribed their formal role and rights in the crafts. By 1300, a majority of urban people probably experienced some sort of apprenticeship, and in places like London serving an apprenticeship was one possible path to citizenship.

In southern Europe some cities in the Iberian peninsula and at least till the 1220s Sicily had substantial Muslim populations, and in these areas as well as southern France, the Rhineland and elsewhere, small urban Jewish communities also existed. The Jews even more than the Muslims were an urban phenomenon. Jews and Muslims lived in these cities in their own distinctive neighbourhoods. The densely populated medieval cities brought these religious differences into sharp focus and probably fuelled animosities in the workplace and social intolerance. Cities also served as incubators for experimental groups among the Christians: most notably the beguines and beghards in Liège and cities along the Rhine like Cologne, Frankfurt and Mainz, and the Humiliati in northern Italy, with important communities in Milan and Cremona. The heretical Cathars, living along the arc from the Pyrenees to the Apennines, were not exclusively urban, but at first they formed a substantial if undercover segment of the population in Béziers and Florence, and were present in St Francis’s native Assisi. Francis himself exemplifies how the urban environment, with its wealth and moral problems, helped to forge new, distinctive religious ideas. The expansion of the money economy generated concern at the growing materialism of urban society, expressed in vigorous
ecclesiastical condemnation of usury and in the mendicants’ uncompromising message that the renunciation of worldly goods would open the road to heaven. The Franciscans and Dominicans frequently built their new churches in the fast-growing suburbs where the poor and recent migrants lived and needed the most attention.

During the thirteenth century cities across Europe continued to face the problems of self-government. Rare cities like Genoa and Venice were absolutely free while virtually all others were subject to some external power. Nearly all cities, even those like Paris firmly under royal control, had some form of self-rule to manage those affairs of little or no interest in the more lofty levels of government. Cities which were in effect states, like many of the communes in northern Italy, were the exception, and in most areas of Europe cities remained a part of some larger political entity or were in the process of being incorporated into one. These varying circumstances imperil generalisations about urban society. But in the context of self-rule, however narrow in scope, a principal urban theme was the rise of the people or popolo (the non-noble citizens, a trend taking its name from Italian history but one having wide significance across Europe. To the extent that cities managed their own affairs, tensions inevitably developed over just which people would do the managing.

Cities with a functioning commune had to decide, or have decided for them, who had the right to participate in decisions. The concept of urban citizenship was as yet a hazy notion, but in places where the city was the state, being a citizen conferred advantages. Although there remained a residual idea that all free adult men had some right to participate in the affairs of their city, in practice the summoning of a great assembly or parliament of the people was reserved for especially solemn or fraudulent occasions and did not provide any democratic basis for rule in a city. Hence on a practical level the issues were: who ruled cities, made laws, administered justice and paid taxes? In the thirteenth century women, religious minorities and slaves were excluded from a political role, but not necessarily denied the obligation to pay taxes. But people viewed society in various ways, depending on their own status, and the line dividing their own numbers into participants and subjects might be drawn in different places.

A fundamental distinction was between the relatively small number of nobles and magnates on the one hand, and the great mass of commoners, simple or little people on the other. The structure of guilds also suggested a natural line between those who provided employment and those who took it. Moreover, those who were not members of guilds might enjoy fewer political opportunities than those who were members, irrespective of relative prosperity. The central issue was the source of power in urban society, and how new
ideas about sovereignty changed traditional views of rulership. Power descended from higher social levels and did not flow up from the bottom of society. The trends of the twelfth century continued to emphasise that cities were places of personal freedom – in the succinct German formulation *Stadtluft macht frei* (city air makes one free). Although the actual opportunities ordinary people had to participate in civic affairs varied immensely, the occasional chance to have a say was new and important.

This political and economic freedom was an ambiguous benefit to half of urban society: women. Here again regional differences must be kept in mind. In northern Europe the law in most cities and states sharply limited the right of married women to make contracts without the husband’s consent; in England it was increasingly difficult for a married woman to act as a legal person at all. Some of these strictures held in the south as well, but women seem to have had a wider scope of personal activity in Languedoc and northern Italy. Urban society offered some single women new opportunities, either through religious experimentation or the burgeoning wage economy, to live in ways not completely shaped by men. Widows were in the best position to take advantage of all this, but of course poor women remained the most desperate members of urban society. Political freedom had few practical consequences for urban women of any class. Economic opportunities and the new range of occupations – silkweavers, spinners of gold thread, inn keepers, and many others – made certain ways of living possible in cities that would have been difficult and even suspect in the countryside. Outside artisan trades, many women found a refuge as domestic servants in the households of the wealthy merchants and prosperous artisans, and poorer women could supplement their incomes by wetnursing the children of others. These new choices in the urban economy offered some women independence. Women who had apprentices, ran shops or invested in trading ventures participated in urban society but were also attracting, as the century progressed, increasing restrictions on the scope of their freedom.

All these broad trends and generalisations apply in varying degrees to the lives of millions of people who lived in cities in the thirteenth century. Only biography evokes the richness of this collective experience. While in a Genoese prison in the 1290s, the Venetian Marco Polo told tall tales about his travels, including the cities of China, to a Pisan writer who put it all down in French. Dante’s remarkable blend of love sonnets, autobiography and literary criticism, the *Vita nuova*, was available to readers in the early 1290s and revealed the state of love in a city, and in the model of Beatrice gave future city women another reason to be veiled in church. In the academic centres men like Thomas Aquinas in Paris, Robert Grosseteste in Oxford and Albertus Magnus in Cologne extended the frontiers of theology and science while also establish-
ing the fact that, with some astonishing exceptions, great cities have great schools. The well-born St Clare of Assisi found a path that made her more important than most noble women, and her contemporary Marie d’Oignies was also a city woman active in the earliest phase of what would be the beguine movement. These prominent people exemplify on the grander scale the lives of thousands of ordinary merchants, notaries, schoolteachers, nuns and working women whose individual efforts made urban society.

During the thirteenth century most of Europe’s cities became wealthier and bigger places, even as in the 1290s there were signs of strain and stagnation in some urban economies. The wealth of the prosperous urban classes made cities more impressive in a physical sense as the medieval building boom reached its zenith, and in a spiritual sense as urban charity became more effective, just as it faced bigger challenges from the growing ranks of the poor. Individual cities grew more distinctive, and their citizens were more interested in edifying foundation stories and maintaining civic pride. Even where the city was not coterminous with a state, by 1300 urban people were more conscious of local loyalties. Cities fostered the money and wage economy, rewarded literacy and encouraged the idea that some people could rise through individual effort and merit. Urban men valued personal freedom even as they created a world of light and shadows for the minorities and downtrodden in their midst.

research carried out over the past few decades no longer allows rural society in the thirteenth century to be described according to the simple supposition that general developments were the same everywhere. Of course, there were fundamental influences that were felt almost everywhere in western Europe by a rural population which represented approximately 90 per cent of the total population at the beginning of the century and 85 per cent towards 1300, figures which emphasise the relative numerical insignificance of city dwellers. One has only to look at the Florentine contado and at Flanders, where the urban population was only about 30 per cent of the total at the end of the thirteenth century, to see that even in heavily urbanised areas a very high proportion of the inhabitants were engaged in rural occupations. In fact, despite consistent features that characterised seigneurial societies at this period, the general factors inducing change sometimes came up against obstacles, and often took on different forms, depending on the region, the level of access to the more important markets, their age-old traditions and the strength of the influence of political institutions.

**The Fundamental Trends in the Development of Rural Society**

*Population growth*

The population continued to grow in the thirteenth century, but more unevenly and less strongly than in the past, measured both in time and in space. The growth rate of the population as a whole dropped from approximately 15 per cent to 10 per cent between 1200 and 1300, but rural depopulation reduced this percentage even more in the countryside, and it appears that there was a levelling off of growth in England, as well as in Picardy and in the Ile-de-France. There were also many periods when mortality rates were extremely
high, and the years 1257–8 in western France and England were especially traum-
atic, with great floods causing many deaths. There was also an abundance of
epidemics (seven in England, four in the former Low Countries) as well as
famines, even though these were local (six in the Escaut and Meuse regions,
seven in the Rhineland). In many areas, the era of land clearance came to an
end in about 1250, but the extension of the polders along the North Sea con-
tinued, while eastern Europe was still attracting a great number of pioneers
and offered the locatores, who were lively entrepreneurs organising the settle-
ment of the east, immense landed opportunities. In addition, in the Iberian
peninsula, handsome privileges were handed out in the lands conquered from
Islam, and some areas such as Andalusia remained lightly populated in the late
thirteenth century. The situation was very different in the well-populated
regions of north-western Europe, where the optimum threshold of inhabi-
tants is generally argued to have been exceeded.

The social consequences of the rural population explosion

Examination of the social consequences of the rural population explosion has
led the previous generation of historians to engage in a wide variety of theoret-
ical debates. For some historians, the increase in the rural population brought
only misery to the villages, accompanied by a widespread decrease in land-
holding. On the other hand, population growth has been seen by some histor-
ians almost exclusively as a source of progress. In truth, the situation was
rather more complex. On the one hand, on each estate, some of the larger
peasant holdings resisted this trend. On the other hand, the proportion of
small tenures was often much greater in north-western Europe than in
England. Certainly, taking England overall, 46 per cent of tenures were
between two and four hectares, but in the manors of the diocese of
Winchester, 45 per cent of the tenant farmers worked four to six hectares, in
other words, they had access to an amount of land that was adequate to sustain
rural family life. In Havering, Essex, a quarter of the tenant farmers had hold-
ings that consisted of twelve hectares or more. In the north-west such propor-
tions were unknown. In Haltinne, in the region of Namur, only 15 per cent of
villagers had holdings of 5.5 hectares or more, and in Herchies, in the Hainault
region, the situation was even worse. In 1267, out of 255 tenures, 60 per cent of
the total, i.e. 152, had less than 1.12 hectares, and 56 had between 1.12 and 4.48
hectares. In other words, 81 per cent of the villagers could not support their
families by farming alone. On the other hand, only twenty-two tenures of ten
hectares or more are recorded in the territory, and only 8.5 per cent of the
tenant farmers owned a proper plough with at least two horses, had access to
skilled labourers and could count on producing a surplus which they could sell
on the open market. Once the clearing of land of the great neighbouring assart had been completed, the situation of the worst-off did not really improve, since the tenant farmers of the former estate actually received new land in proportion to the surface area of their previous holdings. How can this disparity be explained? In two ways, which both lead to the same conclusion: the influence exerted by the most well-off, and each individual’s opportunity to work, which depended on his tools and the importance of the work he did.

Chance, poverty and technological progress

There are many examples of such micro-societies found in villages: in Havering, half of the tenant farmers may have had surplus goods to sell, but elsewhere, and most often, the great majority could not do so, which meant they could not benefit from technological advances, such as heavy ploughs, the opportunity to rotate crops (which was indispensable for cultivating the land), purchase of seeds, etc. On the other hand, the larger tenant farmers were able to take advantages of these possibilities, and the dependence of the smaller land-holders on these coqs de villages was highlighted in the scope of their work and illustrated by the fact that the leaders of the rural communities (mayors, magistrates, jurors, members of associations, consuls) were counted among the better-off tenant farmers. Technological progress, therefore, only served to amplify the divisions in prosperity.

Even in the villages which were well placed in relation to the urban markets, the small landowners had no surplus to sell; in fact, they barely had enough to survive. If disease struck or the father of the family died, and the head of the family could not find work as a manual labourer on a large nearby farm, or as a craftsman, for example in rural cloth making, the family would fall into the category of paupers, who were more and more often supported by the rural community. Previously, charitable institutions were mainly located in the cities, but in the thirteenth century, community coffers for the poor were established in a growing number of villages. However, this trend was not strong enough to prevent popular disturbances, such as the so-called Children’s Crusade of 1212, and the movement of the Pastoureaux in 1251, which saw the roads of France and the Low Countries filled with thousands of people in severe difficulty because of overpopulation and crises in grain production or in the cloth-making industries.

Religions and cultural aspects of rural society

It is worth asking whether the development of charitable funds to cope with emergencies in the villages is linked in some way to the increasing
Christianisation of rural society. Rural societies were strongly aware of the need to defend their cohesive character, and this was something that had to be maintained at all costs, despite the tensions which already existed or were about to erupt in these village micro-societies. None the less, it is certain that the appearance and distribution of the Gospel in the vulgate and prayer books were a great help to the rural priests, who were often ill-suited to their duties, and that such literature contributed to a better understanding of Christianity and the duty to be charitable.

A small number of villagers could read and write. In the Cambrésis region, the *Pater* and the *Credo* were inscribed on large panels and placed in front of the cemeteries near churches, so that the faithful could learn them by reading them. Small rural schools were already forming in villages near to abbeys, but throughout the thirteenth century, others began to become established in villages which were further away from the monasteries and were generally situated in areas more favourable to stock farming. Nevertheless, even in regions which had the least involvement in commerce, a certain amount of culture was beginning to spread. After the official liquidation of the Cathar heresy in the Midi region of France around 1242, itinerant preachers taught reading and writing, as did the parish priests in other localities. There are further indications of a distinct improvement in the cultural level of the rural population. Rural charters from the thirteenth century are more detailed in their description of collective morality and insist more on precise details than do earlier charters. The act of confession by the laity, which was made obligatory by the Lateran Council of 1215, marks an important stage in the development of lay psychology. The construction of new churches to replace older ones, or the building of brand new churches in recently established villages as soon as they were densely enough populated to be granted parish status, offered the country people an everyday visual reminder of the role of the Church and of religion in society.

Without forgetting the silent communities which brought together in the same house brothers with their wives and children, and which were common in the southern regions, the family – the ultimate unit of rural society – became more and more monogamous. After the Lateran Council of 1215, there was stricter observance of the obligation to prevent marriages between close blood relations. This favoured exogamy and obliged landlords no longer to oppose marriages of their tenant farmers and their children outside the seigneurie.

The diverse fortunes of the country people were reflected in their houses. It was not the materials used (wood, straw and mud, stones, bricks), which mainly depended on the region, but rather the size and layout of the dwellings which reflected the various groups within society. The humble one-room abode of certain manual labourers stood in contrast to houses with several rooms,
sometimes on more than one floor. Chimneys became more widespread, but were still not very commonplace outside the northern areas by 1300. Nevertheless, this did not prevent the use of heating, thanks to the herd of cows separated from the living room by a low partition, even in the manor houses of seigneurs of moderate social standing.

The use of a family name became more and more commonplace in the countryside. In the villages with a very high population, the Christian name and a simple indication of the parentage by using the father’s Christian name (John, son of Peter) was no longer sufficient. The addition of the father’s surname occurred as often in free families as in those that were not free.

The decline of serfdom

The decline of serfdom within this period is very noticeable in numerous areas in the west, but it can now be seen that the thirteenth century did not see the end of serfdom. In fact, sometimes the conditions of the country people deteriorated, notably in England where the revival of direct farming which was so successful on the open fields incited manorial lords to impose duties on free men, who found themselves becoming ‘villeins’, and no longer free. In northern Spain, Germany, the Mâcon region, Aquitaine, the Lyons area, Champagne and Brie, peasants were considered serfs as soon as they settled on dependent tenures. This ‘new serfdom’ was only linked to a tenure and did not extend to the children of the tenants, so it was very different from the real serfdom which was passed on from generation to generation through the father or mother and which was far more related to an accident of birth than to specific duties. But true serfdom increased in Poland and Catalonia and continued to exist elsewhere, for example on the isolated plateaux of Burgundy, in certain foothills in the Ardennes region, and in a certain number of English open-field manors. Even in regions reputed to be the most ‘liberal’, there were still sometimes little islands of resistance where serfdom continued. Around 1270, 20 per cent of the rural population was still bound by serfdom in the Paris region. In the Ponthieu and the Hainault regions, rare cases of inherited serfdom persisted. Perhaps there were families in these areas which did not wish to follow the common trend towards personal liberty. There is no doubt this was the case in central Hainault where families of serfs of the counts of Hainault were set apart from the other serfs by certain benefits, for example the stipends of the canons of the cathedral chapter of Tournai were distributed to their sons.

All of this must not overshadow a profound and intense movement of liberation from serfdom. This was accomplished in Flanders and most of Picardy around 1200, but it was still in full swing in Sweden, Hungary and Italy, and on the contado lands which were dominated by the cities even though the lay
seigneurs were opposed. In England, the common practice in Kent recognised by the monarchy in 1293 confirmed that ‘all men of Kent should be free’; other free lands were Devon and Cornwall, which were still being colonised in the thirteenth century. How can this expansion of personal liberty be explained? Despite the persistence of real slavery in a certain number of cities and rural farms confined to the southern portion of Christendom, the influence of Christianity was much more clearly felt in the early and total disappearance of slavery in many lands than in the struggle against serfdom, which, in fact, recognised certain fundamental rights of men and women, such as the right to marry and have legitimate children. On the other hand, the great increase in the population had an undeniable affect: the privileges accorded the original cultivators meant that the lords of those lands which had been cultivated for a long time were forced to grant personal freedom to their serfs in order to keep them in their seigneuries. In certain places, the granting of freedom was infectious, as was an extension of benefits awarded in these areas to the free men of former estates, such as the suppression of arbitrary taxation. Moreover, the intermingling of the populations helped create confusion in the statutes. In Bavaria there were peasants who enjoyed limited freedom. Towards the middle of the thirteenth century in Vermandois, the landlords could no longer tell whether certain families were serfs or free. While in preceding centuries the confusion worked against free men, who were often merged with the serfs, on the continent, the serfs were classed as free men. With the loss of the majority of their grain reserves, many seigneurs only required that their serfs perform the labour required of free men (three or four days a year). Finally, the public authorities (kings, lords of the great feudal families, leaders of certain cities) withdrew from the lords of the manors and other influential seigneurs usurped royal privileges (criminal justice, mobilisation of men, unfair taxation), which reduced their power and diminished their influence. On the other hand, in England, where royal power was becoming weaker in the thirteenth century, the power of persuasion of a certain number of seigneurs who wanted to return to direct farming was increasing.

Charters granting freedom to individual serfs exist, but there are many more which apply to entire groups. The sale of rural products also allowed the villagers to buy their freedom. Nevertheless, liberation was not always easy: witness the bitter debates between the abbot of Saint-Pierre de Sens and his serfs on the subject of the price to be paid for their freedom. Sometimes these debates could even be described as true battles for freedom. For example in 1251 when the League of 2,000 free men and serfs fought the chapter of Notre-Dame de Paris in the Orly region. On this occasion, as on others, the French royal authority which had freed many of its own serfs supported the demands of the serfs belonging to other seigneurs because this meant gaining the support of
the peasants and limiting seigneurial powers. In some areas, the distinction between the ‘mainmorte libre’ (the herlot: by which the seigneur inherited some of his serfs’ goods, the right of inheritance consisting only of one animal from the livestock, one object) and the ‘mainmorte servile’ (by which he had a right to all the serf’s possessions) was an additional incentive for the serfs to wish to obtain their personal freedom.

Since the kings and masters of the great territorial domains preferred a wealthy peasant who could purchase armour and a war horse to an impoverished nobleman incapable of buying such costly items, the common people gradually managed to escape from their previous condition as peasants.

The effects of growing commercialisation

Social transformation was more profound and happened much faster in those rural regions rendered prosperous through the widespread sale of rural products. In areas which remained on the edge of subsistence, without active trade and lacking an incentive to produce a significant surplus, traditional features persisted. In regions which participated more in economic growth, in credit, in extensive sales to cities near and far of products such as wheat, wine or wool, social status based on socio-professional groups, or groups differentiated by their income was more rapidly, more profoundly and more obviously replacing classification by birth and by legal standing, both of which went into decline. Here is one example: the peasants who farmed sufficiently large lands and were motivated to produce more had enough money to buy themselves tools and various objects from craftsmen, who were becoming more numerous in the villages. The smiths who were constructing ploughs were working in more and more villages and their surrounding areas, and making tools – notably mould boards – which were indispensable in many areas for increasing production. Moreover, the number of water and wind mills was growing, and the miller became an important element in village life and culture.

The types of tenant farmers and farms also became more diversified more quickly in those areas which enjoyed vigorous economic expansion and had better-established commercial activities. However, development was uneven, and two principal areas can be distinguished. The first corresponds to the southern fringe of western Europe and, more generally, to the Mediterranean regions. Their ancient heritage and secular customs left the responsibility for supplying provisions to the cities and their leaders. The bishops, rich merchants and noblemen living in the city retained their ownership of the lands of the contado, in particular thanks to the mezzadria (or share-cropping) which in exchange for indispensable crops, livestock, tools and capital guaranteed them an important part of the harvest (often half) and allowed them to control the
price of provisions, especially grain, which normally only varied significantly in times of famine.

Certainly, share-cropping was found in other areas apart from Italy, for example in western France where financial weakness and the irregularity of the grain harvests provided favourable conditions for it. But it appeared only rarely in north-western Europe and surrounding areas. Here the situation was quite different. The urban authorities of both the new cities and those well-established cities which were experiencing a renaissance had to introduce changes. They limited themselves to setting maximum tariffs at times when increases in the prices of grain were too extreme, but they did not control the provision of food or raw materials. Instead, they left that responsibility to the merchants and rural producers, who adjusted supply and demand in the light of their constantly changing prices. Thus at the end of the twelfth century in England, which exported much of its grain and wool, as well as in north-western Europe, a new type of economy emerged, a distinctive feature of which was the existence of cyclical phases of high prices. When price increases happened extremely quickly, a crisis resulted, which reversed the tendency and led to a decrease, harsh at first, but gradually lessening before a new period of growth. The consequences were considerable within the world of the producers, landlords and tenant farmers. In England, the lords of the manor returned to direct farming, but on the continent, many seigneurs had been aware since the twelfth century of the increase in grain prices, as well as how much easier it was to have work done using more expensive equipment to increase production. For these reasons, they kept their woods and prairies under the system of direct farming, but gave over a large part of their land for grain production. Showing a distrust of cash payments (cens) which were rapidly decreasing in value, they preferred tenant farmers, who owed a part of their payments in goods, or even better, tenants à champart or à terrage (tenant farmers who paid in grain or other products), who would give them part of their harvest. These types of tenant farmers were rarely found in the polders or in areas where great forests had been cleared (rent-paying tenants were preferred in those areas), but they existed in great numbers in territories more favourable to the production of cereal grain, either on that part of the seigneurial land which had been cultivated for a long time, or in an area which had recently been cleared. Tenure à part de fruits (with payment in fruit) was rare in England, perhaps because there was less inflation.

Nevertheless, the most progressive form of rural farming was temporary tenant farming. The tenant farming of rather long duration known in England in the twelfth century was modified at the beginning of the next century in the southern Escaut basin and became a strictly temporary transfer of seigneurial reserves (most often limited to a period of nine years). Once the lease had expired, the seigneur had the option of returning to direct farming. However,
this rarely happened and, in fact, a new social class emerged in the countryside: the farmer, a true entrepreneur who owned his own livestock, equipment and capital. He would farm the land for nine years, and when the lease expired, he would agree new terms and renew it, or move on; but in either case, he had to make a higher bid than the other farmers if he wanted to carry on farming. In addition, the decreasing – and sometimes total disappearance – of the villikatto (linking the land and the farmers through tied labour) led to the evolution of the wage earner, who eventually became the only means of direct farming in the wine-growing and pastoral sectors of the most fertile regions of Lombardy and in the great stock-farming areas of the count of Hainaut at the end of the thirteenth century, notably in the southern valley of the Sambre and in the area around the Mormal forest.

The urban demand for products related to stock farming was the motivation behind the development of companies or associations of butchers and rural stock farmers, which gave rise to the bail à cheptel vif (leasing of land for rearing livestock). In the regions rich in pasture and grazing lands, the unified single herd – which was often first seen in ecclesiastical seigneuries – brought with it clashes and alterations to the countryside and rural society. The villagers fought to keep their common land, sometimes ignoring the seigneurial boundaries, and discovering, in their turn, the advantages of the single herd. Differences then began to emerge. In the north of the Thiérache, the rural stock farmers resisted and soon imposed their own boundaries. In England, generally speaking, seigneurial stock farming won out, and the landlords began enforcing their boundaries, evicting a good number of small tenant farmers. Yet in a manor like Havering and often in those areas most favourable to stock farming (the south-west, Kent and its surrounding area) stock farming by the country people persisted.

In those areas where the financial situation was favourable, an economy based on money and credit developed. The lenders earmarked loans based on a particular piece of land, thus guaranteeing themselves a portion of the harvest. The village micro-societies in particular became very complex in these regions, thanks to the diversity of professional categories and the large variety of social groups. Positions were determined by the role each person assumed: the local seigneur, the parish priest (who often took the part of the tenant farmers in disagreements with the seigneur), country people who might be freeholders, share-croppers, farmers or tenant farmers (cottars, bordars, virgaters or semi-virgaters, stockmen, tenant farmers who paid in rent or in produce, etc.).¹ Very

¹ With the orchards and vineyards there also arose the tenure en complant (plantation tenancy): the seigneur would give some land to a tenant farmer who would plant trees or vines; as soon as the plantation became productive, the seigneur and the tenant farmer would have equal shares of the yield.
small tenant farmers could even live off their meagre holdings if they produced wine which could be sold at far-off markets, or if they developed market gardening near to the cities. The rural wage earners increased in numbers, and from among them permanent elements in the rural population emerged: the stewards, secretaries, carters, milkmaids, serving girls, herders of horses, cows, pigs, sheep, as well as seasonal workers at times when there was the most work to do. These seasonal workers sometimes formed teams of harvesters or reapers, often engaging in price wars. There also emerged the administrative assistants to the rural world (the sergeants of the landlords, clerks of the rural or parish communities), skilled craftsmen (smiths, masons, roofers, etc.), farmers producing basic provisions (millers, bakers), carters, inn keepers, merchants of livestock, grain, butter and cheese, who rarely specialised in a single product. In a certain number of villages there were also skilled fabric and cloth makers, and men paid to work in the quarries, brick works and tile works.

The basic distinction between lords and peasants was no longer determined by a rural society linked to a market economy. It was possible to be a peasant and rich, a nobleman and in debt. Various social groups emerged, determined by the resources they had to hand, or generated by sheer chance. Apart from the poor people whom it was considered necessary to help, there were the petits (manual workers, those on a low salary), then the aisés (workers or high men who might have been landowners, farmers, tenant farmers of large properties or even owners of some fiefdoms). This category of the comfortable also included curates, clerks, secretaries/scribes, sergeants and sometimes even less important seigneurs. The next social class included the wealthy: great stock breeders, farmers with large estates, important merchants and seigneurs of middling rank. The very great seigneurs who owned several seigneuries fell into a separate, distinct category, which was less and less an integral part of rural society.

*Modifications and disruptions in the framework of the rural micro-societies*

Rural communities existed before the seigneuries; others were born during the great period of land clearing. Moreover, in the thirteenth century, the number of areas under the jurisdiction of a single seigneure became rare in the over-populated regions. However, despite the presence in a village of several seigneurs (only one of whom owned the right of ‘ban’), the rural community remained unique, as did the parish community, with only a few exceptions. Moreover, the French royalty came to use the term ‘parish’ to indicate the inhabitants of an area under the jurisdiction of a single seigneurie, thus emphasising the decreasing power of the seigneurs.

The relationship between seigneurs and peasants could not be defined in the
same way in all areas. On the plateaux of the river banks which sometimes existed since prehistoric times, the privileged areas of the Carolingian villae, the custom of obeying a master had facilitated the transition to the seigneurie of the feudal period. In the thirteenth century, on the continent, without being totally silent, the rural communities of the open fields favourable to grain production scarcely opposed their seigneurs, who appointed mayors and magistrates chosen from among the peasants and the more comfortably off. After the loss of parcels of land usurped by royal authorities, the seigneurs found ways of maintaining part of their power by controlling common goods (mills, ovens) and in the management of the obligatory crop rotation (which was intended to compel people to respect the fallow land and was necessary for obtaining good crops), and in the responsibility of reallocating the fields under rotation into quarters, or sometimes into three large portions (Cambrésis, Artois, south-west Hainault, etc.). These rural communities held fast to their customs and refused to set them down in writing for a long time.

On the other hand, the territories favourable to stock breeding located on polders and cleared lands were often characterised by freedom and great autonomy. The Frisians and the Flemings in the coastal areas were very strongly independent communities. In the fens, the ‘circles’ formed by the great rural communities comprised several villages and controlled the pasture-lands. Violent incidents were recorded after the end of the thirteenth century in the villages of eastern England, where stock breeding held an important place. The servitude of the peasantry in Old Catalonia was in direct opposition to the rural freedom of New Catalonia, which had been repopulated after the Reconquista. In this area, the tradition of obedience to a master had been lost, but elsewhere it was completely unknown, and the descendants of the pioneers often violently opposed the seigneurs who wished to impose it. These rural communities only recognised the authority of the public powers (lords of the manor, counts and kings) who gave them charters of freedom and sometimes charters to establish free towns. Their privileges were, therefore, guaranteed in writing, and these communities did not have public ovens and only sometimes owned mills. The charters of Lorris, Prisches and Beaumont had many offshoots in the thirteenth century. The rural communities also organised themselves into federations of communes; for example in 1290, in Nouvion-en-Thiérache, four neighbouring villages adopted the charter of Prisches and

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2 In southern Germany and Switzerland, the seigneur justicier (administrative seigneur) was forbidden from entering the protected boundaries of the inhabited areas; this seemed primarily linked to regions that were more favourable to stock farming or wine growing. But the origin of the great German commune, as it appeared in the thirteenth century, remains very controversial: for Dopsch, it is related to the association between the réserve tenures; for Blicke, it is linked to the suppression of tied labour; for Bader, its origins date back to the High Middle Ages (see Bibliography).
were even accorded power over life and death. In the Laonnais region, there were also several federations of communes of villages and vineyards, and the federation of the Andorran villages, along with its customs, has survived into the twentieth century. The rural communities of the Alpine villages (in Briançonnais, for example) bought the seigneurial rights from the abbeys, which benefited the peasant stock farmers who could move into pasturelands on the higher altitudes and begin farming them. The differences between the outlook of the villagers of the open-field regions and those of the lands better adapted to stock farming are clear. But many of the villages cultivated a mixture of lands: open spaces which had long been under the plough, and newly cleared areas. The writing down of their customs and privileges after the thirteenth century (charters of freedom, reports of laws, records of customs) often prevented the abusive expansion of the rights of the seigneur, especially where land was concerned. In France, the revival of royal power which favoured the personal freedom of the peasantry was accompanied by an increase in the financial demands and abuses of the king’s agents in his domain, as is witnessed by the complaints revealed in the responses to enquiries ordered by Louis IX in 1247.

In the thirteenth century, the rural societies of the Byzantine empire and the Islamic countries apparently underwent less obvious transformations than those in the west. In these regions, there was no revival of royal powers by states which had always retained them, even in the concession of *iqta* in the Islamic countries, or in the socially stratified regions of the Byzantine empire. In the Islamic countries, the dual life of the nomad-oasis persisted without great changes, and the rural exodus towards the cities which allowed the departure of the surplus rural population was especially cause for concern in the cities.

4 Vaillant (1967).
WITH the undisputed revival of long-distance commerce in tenth- and eleventh-century western Europe, communications between north and south intensified. Historians such as Robert Lopez have categorised this era as the beginning of a commercial revolution. For two centuries Europe enjoyed undisputed prosperity even if the crises of the late Middle Ages can be found in embryo before the year 1300. Scholars have discerned the emergence of a new economy in this period, one grounded in the burgeoning cities and towns, sustained by artisan industrial production, and inextricably linked to international trade. The new commercial economy existed side by side with the traditional rural economy which would survive in many areas until the effects of the Industrial Revolution were generalised in the nineteenth century.

For most economic historians the thirteenth century represents the apogee of medieval economic expansion. The early fourteenth-century famines, with their culmination in the deadly famine of 1315–17, ushered in an era of late medieval crises. Prior to this period, there is general scholarly agreement that for about two hundred years, from the eleventh century well into the thirteenth, medieval Europe was in a phase of economic growth. By contrast, historians disagree about the nature of economic change thereafter in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. The fruits of the commercial revolution were fully evident in the thirteenth century. As Gérard Sivéry has remarked, the new economy was, by the thirteenth century, characterised by cycles which are best detected in this pre-statistical era in the evolution of grain prices and in that of cloth exports. Significant inflation was evident in the thirteenth century.

Traditionally, economists divide the economy into three sectors: a primary sector concerned with raw materials and agriculture; a secondary sector concerned with industry, construction and public works; and a tertiary sector which involved transport, commerce and services. In the Middle Ages the primary sector was the prime mover of economic change. The motor of eco-
nomic growth has been variously identified: the revival of international trade, population growth, technological innovation, the emergence of a spirit of entrepreneurship, the crusades. Of these, the demographic increase was perhaps the most significant, affecting all three economic sectors. European population tripled from the eleventh to the early fourteenth century; European cities were the primary beneficiaries of population growth.

A certain threshold of agricultural productivity was necessary before there could be significant urban growth. The spread of technological innovations, some realised much earlier, such as the heavy plough, the horse harness and possibly the three-field system, contributed to greater agricultural productivity. By the end of the thirteenth century overpopulation outstripped food resources. For most of the thirteenth century, however, Europe experienced optimum economic conditions, propitious for urban growth and the expansion of trade. Although Europe's population remained only about 10 per cent urbanised, perhaps 30 per cent in the areas of greatest density of population in the Low Countries and in northern Italy, the impact of urban civilisation was far greater than numbers alone would tell. Cities would be the locus of commerce and communications.

A propitious environment for trade and travel resulted also from the progression of law and order; the process was inaugurated in the eleventh century with the Peace and Truce of God, and acquired new vigour with the re-emergence of concepts of political theory in the thirteenth century, fostering the growth of states. The development of larger political units and the concomitant greater power of rulers permitted a wider scope of policed territory over which trade might pass and communication take place.

There has been a tendency until recently to see a gulf between the urban and rural worlds of the Middle Ages. An anecdote from the exempla literature illustrates this dichotomy. A villein leading donkeys along the Street of the Spice Merchants in Montpellier fainted before a shop where apprentices were mixing spices, overcome by the unaccustomed odours. To bring him back to consciousness, a shovelful of manure was placed under his nose. He revived immediately, and the medieval moral of ‘to each his place’ was drawn. Such an anecdote suggests a great divorce between town and country, reinforced by the symbolic and substantive separation (walls, crossroads, commerce, urban law), but this contrast is, in all likelihood, exaggerated. In spite of the co-existence of the new urban and traditional rural economies, there were many linkages of the urban and rural worlds through immigration of surplus rural population and significant urban/rural commercial exchange. Particularly in the provisioning of towns in foodstuffs, urban/rural links were vital. Grain imports formed an important source of urban mercantile fortune.

Permanent population movements can be discerned in thirteenth-century
Europe. Surviving manorial records contain the category of newcomer or foreigner, a permanent resident, called hôte, or any one of a number of other names, according to the locale. A specific legal status was often attached to such newcomers and their lands. Surplus population clogged the rural landscape in the thirteenth century. Medieval towns enjoyed an enormous influx of population from the surrounding countryside and from much farther afield, particularly as the medieval population expanded in the thirteenth century. The Massif Central region of France sent its surplus population west towards Toulouse and south towards the Mediterranean and Montpellier. Towns such as Metz drew heavily on the surrounding countryside for newcomers. Traditionally devourers of people, given their dismal hygienic conditions, dangers of contagion, malnutrition and disease, medieval cities, as all pre-industrial cities, were dependent on continuous immigration in order to sustain population, let alone expand in numbers.

Colonisation movements pushed the frontiers of the old Carolingian geography far to the east in central Europe. But frontier colonisation alone did not suffice in the thirteenth century, and the effects of demographic expansion were felt increasingly in town and country, within the European core. Most historians would agree that Europe in the thirteenth century proved unable to develop solutions to the deepening Malthusian crisis. Europeans travelled a great deal in the Middle Ages, belying the stereotype of the peasant who ventured no farther than the nearest modest town on market day. Refugees and vagrants peopled the highways and byways of medieval Europe. The crusades continued to attract large numbers of people of every social group to the Near East in the thirteenth century. Within Europe people of all stations made vows of pilgrimage and travelled to venerate famous shrines near and far. The miracles of a local saint could inspire a cult of the body in a nearby town. The search for a cure drove many people to travel to saints’ shrines to implore assistance.

The major sites of Christian worship, Rome, Jerusalem and Santiago de Compostela, attracted many a medieval pilgrim. The four pilgrimage roads traversing France in the direction of Santiago, three winding down from the north, one, the Cami Roumieu, stretching across Provence and Languedoc in the south of France, are perhaps the most famous medieval thoroughfares. All four roads crossed the Pyrenees and joined to traverse northern Spain as far as Galicia. Major religious edifices, among others Autun, Vézelay, Cluny, Moissac, Sainte-Foy de Conques, Saint-Sernin of Toulouse, Saint-Michel de Cuxa, Léon, Burgos and Santiago itself, were influenced by the cultural interchange that forms the great movement of Romanesque art in western Europe. Travelling ateliers of stonemasons and artists transmitted similarities of style within regional variations. Along these and other routes flowed much inter-
change across cultures, intra- and extra-European. In the thirteenth century it would be from urban centre to urban centre that flowed the new cathedral style of Gothic. Again, the travelling architects of this style – epitomised by architect and engineer Villard d’Honnecourt – studied the great monuments, digesting innovations, and spreading them across Europe. Students travelled widely in the thirteenth century, with the major university centres witnessing the presence of large numbers of foreign students. The University of Bologna Law School attracted students from the south of France and Catalonia in the 1260s. The faculties of theology and philosophy in Paris counted many a foreigner, such as Thomas Aquinas, among students and masters in the thirteenth century.

Monks and secular clergy were great travellers from the earliest times of the Middle Ages. Information flowed freely along the monastic grapevine, orally and in written letters. St Bernard, in his ample correspondence of the twelfth century, bemoaned the lack of stability among his own monks, first and foremost. The merchant/foreigner was often the mediator between cultures, bringing new material objects and techniques as part of his trade; he also transmitted ideas, cultural, aesthetic and moral values, and religious beliefs in the course of his contacts with indigenous inhabitants. The newcomer brought with him or her a cultural mindset but was also transformed by experiences within the culture with which he or she interacted. Some European cultures were more receptive to newcomers than others. In Genoa it sufficed to take an oath to the city administration, providing property qualifications were met, to be admitted into citizenship. In Venice, twenty-five years of residence were necessary before one could qualify for citizenship. Thus communication and commerce were part and parcel of medieval life, in spite of the arduous nature of travel. Great precision and co-ordination of action were possible; one need only recall the arrest in 1307 of Templars all over France on the same day at the same hour by officers of Philip the Fair.

THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF COMMERCE AND TRAVEL

The Middle Ages witnessed the continued use of Roman road systems and the addition of many secondary routes creating a dense network across western Europe. North/south communications in western Europe were based on overland and river travel until the introduction of the Atlantic sea route linking the Mediterranean with the English Channel and the North Sea in the late thirteenth century. The great river systems of western Europe, the Rhine, Meuse, Moselle, Weser, Oder, Main in imperial territory, the Scheldt in Belgium, the Seine, Loire, Rhone and Garonne in France, the Po in Lombardy, the Thames in England, were an enormous boon to commerce with the decline of Roman
roads and bridges. Less useful were the rivers of southern Europe which dried up in summer months and became torrents in spring and autumn.

Bridges were strung across most of the significant rivers of Europe. Some, such as the Pont du Saint-Esprit over the Rhone river near Avignon, became particularly famous as the objects of medieval charity. The nomenclature of bridges was evocative of the mentality of the time. The many Ponts du Diable suggested the treachery of rivers which might swell to flood stage in the rains of the wet seasons.

By the thirteenth century medieval Europe had a well-developed road system. Medieval roads, in contrast to the Roman roads running between important urban centres, wandered from the straight line of communication to serve towns of middling importance. Italy and the south of France were linked with the Champagne fairs by two main routes: the Rhone valley route and the Regordane. The Rhone route, involving travel partly on water, partly on land, lay for the most part in imperial territory. The Regordane route, used by many medieval merchants, lay entirely within France and stretched from Montpellier or Nîmes to Alès and north across the Cévennes to Le Puy, Brioude, Issoire, Clermont and beyond. Passage further west between the Mediterranean and Paris ran through Lodève, Millau, Rodez, as far west as Figeac and then back north-east to Aurillac and from there north through La Force to Clermont. The Massif Central region of France, rich in contact with the Mediterranean coast throughout the Middle Ages, contained many roads twisting across the mountains.

Travel time between the Mediterranean coast of France and Paris was between twenty and twenty-four days for the caravan merchant, though this distance could be traversed in twelve days by a messenger on horseback. The condition of the roads was a source of constant concern for travellers. About twenty days was necessary for merchant caravans to reach the fairs of Champagne. From Lower Languedoc medieval merchants travelling overland to the Atlantic coast of France normally chose one of three different routes. Francesco Balduccio di Pegolotti, in his famous commercial manual of about 1320, *La pratica della mercatura*, indicated a route from Montpellier north-west to Cahors and from Cahors to Libourne, which was used frequently by merchants since the twelfth century. Another ran from Montpellier to Toulouse, following the Mediterranean coast through Béziers to Narbonne and from Narbonne inland to Carcassonne through Castelnaudary to Toulouse. An alternative road led from Narbonne through the Montagne Noire via Saint-Pons to Toulouse. From Toulouse it was possible to reach the Atlantic either through Agen and the valley of the Garonne as far as Libourne and Bordeaux, or further south to cross through Auch to Bayonne. Sea travel to England was then possible.

Already in 1237 the overland route across the Reuss and through the Saint-
Gothard pass had made possible travel from northern Italy via the Rhine to Flanders, bypassing Champagne. Travel in Europe was revolutionised by the opening of the Atlantic sea route in 1277 when the first Genoese, Nicolozzo Spinola, reached Bruges. England was the destination in 1278. Majorcans too sailed this route by 1281. By 1298 the Genoese had a regular maritime service to Bruges and London. The savings of maritime transport were enormous, the distance from London to Libourne by sea costing only one seventh of that overland from Libourne to the Lower Languedocian centre of Montpellier.

With the reign of Philip VI of Valois (1328–50) in France, royal policy towards Italians in Champagne was relaxed somewhat, reversing the tight control exercised from the time of Philip III (1270–85), who had required Italians to use the port of Aigues-Mortes and to reside in Nîmes. Philip of Valois, none the less, obliged Italians to pass through the sénéchaussées of Carcassonne or Beaucaire to reach Champagne if they desired safe-conducts. This order, in effect, outlawed the Rhone valley route and the passage over the northern Italian Alps because these two itineraries lay outside French territory. Across the south of France east to west from Italy ran the Via Domitia, the old Roman road which travelled inland from the coast. Once in Italy on the Francigena, one descended to Rome via Lucca, Siena and Viterbo. To reach Rome from northern France one went to Lake Geneva, crossing the Jura at the Cluse de Jouge, then following the Upper Rhone, crossing the Alps at the Great Saint-Bernard pass and descending into the valley of Aosta to the Po river plain and on to Vercelli. One could also cross the Alps at the Simplon pass and go on to Milan and finally to Venice across the Po plain. Other crossings of the Alps were possible at the Little Saint-Bernard pass and at the Mont Cenis pass. To reach Rome from Germany and central Europe, one went from Arezzo to Orvieto and then joined the Francigena at Viterbo. There were many passes across the Alpines. Local age-old routes frequently supplemented the old Roman road system in a particular geographic area. In the vicinity of Montpellier the Cami Salinié or salt road left the Via Domitia above Lunel and ran south to the inland bays below Mauguio, linking the salt-producing areas of Villeneuve-lès-Maguelone, Maguelone and Vic-la-Gardiole.

The surviving itineraries of famous medieval travellers provide further information on the routes of communication of the thirteenth century. Yves Renouard traced the travels of Eudes Rigaud, archbishop of Rouen (1248–69), to Rome. Promoted to the episcopate on the eve of St Louis’s 1248 crusade, Rigaud travelled widely within his archiepiscopal province, but his longest trip was a voyage to Rome just after Christmas, 1253, with an entourage of perhaps ten people, returning to Rouen in early September. His purpose was not pleasure, but rather to reach the pope before the latter made a decision about the
appeal of suffragan bishops of the diocese against the jurisdictional power of the archbishop to hear direct appeals.

The trip to Rome included several detours and was not rushed, taking seventy-three days with an average of twenty-five kilometres a day; the return trip took sixty days with an average of twenty-nine kilometres a day. The mapping of the Rigaud trip suggested that the prelate used the major commercial axes by section, departing according to his curiosity and taste, reflecting his position as French archbishop, of Franciscan and university background. A hundred years later, the trip of the merchant of Montauban Barthélémy Bonis to Rome as a pilgrim for the 1350 Jubilee, probably on horseback, was at a more rapid pace, fifty-four kilometres a day; it was also more direct, inspired, it would seem, by a pilgrim’s guide for the trip from the papal residence of Avignon to Rome.

In addition to significant travel within the continent of Europe, Europeans, particularly merchants and missionaries, explored well beyond the European frontiers by the end of the thirteenth century. Genoa established commercial outposts as far east as the Black Sea port of Trebizond and at Caffa in the Crimea; the Venetians traded at Alexandria in Egypt and had outposts as far east as Tana on the Caspian Sea. Trebizond was the destination of caravan routes from central Asia; Alexandria was the western endpoint of routes from southern Asia, including India and the Arab world. In the thirteenth century European merchants would travel far afield to India and China – the voyages of Giovanni di Pian Carpini, William of Rubruck and Marco Polo are well known. The medieval expansion of Europe had begun in earnest in the thirteenth century. Italians, admittedly few in number, were trading in China by the end of the thirteenth century, but this ephemeral European access was dependent on the vast political structure of the Mongol empire, which disintegrated in the first half of the fourteenth century.

**Methods of transport and transaction costs**

Professional transporters handled a portion of medieval overland- and river-based trade. Such transporters worked the Champagne fairs and all towns feeding into them. There was a swift traffic in beasts of burden in most medieval towns, particularly the pack mules which were so valuable to the caravan traders. The geographical origins of carriers in the commercial transport contracts of Montpellier favoured the Massif Central – Mende, Saint-Flour, Millau, Vabre and Rodez. Other muleteers came from the region of Montpellier and of Nîmes. In the High Middle Ages, caravans of merchants roamed the highways and byways using inns and hospices as did pilgrims and official travellers on royal or ecclesiastical missions.
Water travel was substantially less expensive than overland transportation. Mediterranean maritime travel was dominated by two main types of ships, the galley and the nef. Galleys, demanding large crews, were driven by sails, though they carried oars as well. They transported freight of several hundred tons at most. Nefs were sailing ships, necessitating fewer crew members, often with greater cargo capacity than the galley; they were suited to bulky trade items. Sails evolved from the square sail to the lateen sail, making the ship more manoeuvrable. The North Sea–Baltic trade network used the round cog with a single mast and generous cargo capacity, and rough imitations of the cog were sailing the Mediterranean by the early fourteenth century.

The transaction costs of medieval commerce were greatly enhanced by transportation expenses and import/export duties. The dangers of natural catastrophe during travel further increased the difficulties of doing business. Moreover, robbery on the roadways was a constant concern of merchants and travellers in general. While water transport – especially maritime over long distances – greatly reduced expenses, risks on the open seas were high. Piracy was a way of life in the Mediterranean. Pisans, Genoese, Majorcans, Catalans and Aragonese turned coat quickly from merchant to pirate, according to the circumstances. By the regulations of the law of marque, with the techniques of aubaine and reprisal, sovereigns and individual towns could confiscate the merchandise of compatriots if offenders had not compensated injured merchants and given satisfaction through the normal legal channels. Such tactics may have created sufficient peer pressure on privateers to curb some of these disruptive activities; yet law suits abounded, and treaties between Mediterranean towns sought constantly to regulate delicate mutual relations, often disturbed by incidents of aggression and piracy. The towns of southern Europe developed veritable diplomatic relations with one another, governing by agreement the commercial fate of their citizens in foreign ports and markets.

The kings of France indulged periodically in export prohibitions, forbidding the exit of raw materials from France to the Low Countries or to Italy, or refusing the importation of specific goods. For a price, merchants could obtain exemptions from these regulations. In such a way, regional industries could be favoured or penalised, and necessities could be controlled in times of war. In England the king dictated the wool export policy so essential to the cloth industry of the Low Countries. Outside England, where public works remained a responsibility of the monarchy in the Middle Ages, in most regions of Europe the maintenance of roads and bridges fell to the local lord. River tolls, levied by these lords, were a plague on traffic. Monastic tolls were common from the Carolingian period. By the thirteenth century princes had developed toll stations as a source of significant revenues. By the end of the Middle Ages river tolls had become so burdensome as to stifle trade which was
then redirected to the roads. Staple rights were another bane of water transport; they laid ships under an obligation to put in and unload and sell their goods before moving on. Transit tolls were everywhere evident, not just on rivers, but at ports, at specific toll stations, at the entrance to and exit from towns. Sales taxes on transactions at local urban markets also increased the cost of goods. Royal and regional lords’ taxes on transactions at fairs further burdened traffic. The existence of monopolies obliged foreigners to reside in certain localities, such as the Flemish staple at London and the English staple at Bruges. The tight regulation of artisan industrial production in specific trades introduced further restrictions on free trade. The trade mentality of the Middle Ages discouraged competition and undoubtedly maintained prices at a high level. By the same token, access to particular trades became increasingly limited in the late medieval period by the requirement of inheritance of trades from father to son.

With few exceptions – the textile industries being the most significant, whether wool, silk, or cotton – import substitution was not a common medieval trade phenomenon. The favoured goods of the Mediterranean luxury trade – spices, drugs, exotic goods of all kinds – were climate-specific and could not be duplicated in western Europe.

**Medieval towns: foci of communication and sites of trade**

Medieval towns were the sites *par excellence* of international trade, and of much regional traffic as well. Urban revival had reached an impressive stage of maturity by the thirteenth century. Towns were enjoying the greatest political autonomy of the Middle Ages in the early thirteenth century in kingdoms such as France, where by mid-century royal control would begin to make inroads on urban independence. Thanks to the political conquests of the northern French during the Albigensian Crusade, significant new territories were added to Capetian rule: Lower Languedoc after the Treaty of Paris-Meaux in 1229, with the exception of the Aragonese enclave of Montpellier; Upper Languedoc at the death of Alphonse of Poitiers and his wife Jeanne, daughter and heir of Count Raymond VII of Toulouse. French administrative structures, the *sénéchaussées* of Beaucaire–Nîmes, Carcassonne–Béziers and Toulouse brought Parisian directives to the Midi. The quasi-autonomous towns of the south were soon to experience the inroads of French royal rule, particularly through the vehicle of the law courts. But the politics of the thirteenth-century French kings, St Louis (1226–70) in particular, allowed considerable free rein to the bourgeois commercial dynasties of the French towns.

The needs of the royal budget were most severely felt in the region of Paris where a town such as Beauvais suffered from royal fiscal policy. Beauvais fell
victim to its own internal investment strategies, as well. In the striking parallel between Genoa and Beauvais, established by Robert Lopez, profits of the Beauvais cloth industry were invested in excessively ambitious cathedral building. The disastrous collapses of the over-tall Beauvais cathedral nave, combined with royal financial pressure, led to a decline in the Beauvais cloth industry by the end of the thirteenth century. Genoa, by contrast, reinvested the fruits of its commercial success in more trade. Even the archbishop of Genoa privileged commercial investment over church building, remaining content with a small cathedral.

In the thirteenth century one finds the first codification of corporate statutes, regulating the life of the medieval trade guilds with significant impact on commerce and industry. Urban administrations in France, first installed by communal revolution in the north and by consular agreement in the south, managed local resources, collected taxes, policed the fairs and markets within their jurisdiction, oversaw the maintenance of the roads, regulated the use of scarce urban space within the walls and oversaw the construction of those same fortifications, often enlarging on eleventh-century structures which had long since been bypassed by the expanding urban population. The medieval commercial economy was founded on trust, on the willingness of merchants to honour obligations. Medieval towns enacted charters which outlawed monopolies, regrating, engrossing and forestalling. Decent business practice was enforced by municipal officials who prosecuted fraud when it was uncovered. At the heart of the town governments were members of the merchant class. Medieval urban governments, far from being participatory democracies, were oligarchies of exclusion which communicated their separateness and their dominance through ritual and ceremony. Urban governments, composed of échevins, consuls, capitouls, and so on, were drawn from the privileged sectors of the community. Towns issued charters of bourgeoisie for their most prestigious citizens and for favoured foreign merchants. Urban enfranchisement was based upon property qualifications. Strict rules controlled access to the urban executive councils while general urban citizenship gave access to the large assemblies.

Towns and countries developed protectionist policies with regard to their trade specialities. England required special permits for foreigners to do business, yet London had large colonies of foreign merchants, Italians and Flemish in particular. The Rolls Series reveals the presence in England of highly specialised foreign practitioners such as the Montpellierain who made spiced wine for the English royal court in the mid-thirteenth century. German towns prohibited foreigners from engaging in what would be termed today the ‘retail trade’. Many cities designated specific geographical areas where foreign merchants were cloistered; so too Jewish quarters, where they developed or were
created, were often centres of crafts and of trade. Shrovetide was the only time of year in Ghent when foreigners could trade freely anywhere in the city.

Trade statutes often took a very restrictive position on the participation of foreigners. The scarlet dyeing industry of Montpellier, the pinnacle of the finishing trade for which the town was reputed and the products of which were sold from the early thirteenth century in the markets of Genoa and exported in the Mediterranean world, prohibited foreigners, by an article in the 1204 municipal consuetudines, from using the cochineal dye of the scrub oak parasite to colour wool cloth. By 1225 a new statute allowed foreigners to dye cloths with this scarlet dye if they had resided in the town for five years. By 1251 the industry had opened up, for the delay of residence was reduced to two years, with the proviso that the candidate had to have a fortune of at least £300 melgoriens and agree to reside in the town for ten years. The quality of the dyeing process was apparently declining over the thirteenth century since in 1265 King James I of Aragon required dyers to increase the amount of dye they were using, but this ordinance was not enough to stem the tide against substitution of dye from garance for the scrub oak cochineal. The drop in sales visible in the notarial evidence from Genoa in the later thirteenth century reflected these changes in technique and quality.

While the major conquests of the European crusaders were confined to the end of the eleventh and the early twelfth centuries, the effects of the crusader phenomenon took the form of commercial entrepôts and markets created among a crusader populace along the Syrian coast, and this had a significant economic impact in the thirteenth century. Even the fall of Acre in 1291 did not put this to an end, since thereafter trading stations at Famagusta in Cyprus and in Lesser Armenia and continuing contacts with Constantinople kept the Levant trade alive. The network put in place by Genoa, Pisa and Venice, in the aftermath of the First Crusade of 1096–9, was seconded by the participation of southern French towns, such as Marseilles and Montpellier, in the late twelfth century. This network was sustained in large measure, in spite of territorial losses, throughout the thirteenth and into the fourteenth century. The other side of the coin was the exposure of many Europeans to new cultural experiences, with the attendant development of their tastes to include an appetite for the luxury goods of the eastern Mediterranean and the Far East.

The thirteenth century represented in many respects the heyday of the Mediterranean trading network, when expectations were still high, the return on voyages significant. The prosecution of interest-bearing investments was not yet in full swing. The great diversity of trading operations evident at mid-century in Marseilles through the records of the notary Amalric and the documents of the Manduel family provide a window on this world from the
perspective of what is now southern France. Acre was the destination of many a ship setting out from Marseilles. *Commenda* partnerships financed this trade, permitting the modest investments of large numbers of Marseillais, men and women, as the cargo of the *Saint Esprit*, sailing in 1248, demonstrated. Spawning much of this commercial activity were the preparations for and actual departure of St Louis’s first crusade from Aigues-Mortes in July of 1248. Though the crusade was a fiasco, the movement of people and cargo was a stimulus to the international economy. Sea loans among international merchants also facilitated this trade. The products of the Near East – silks and spices, purchased on the voyages east – were redistributed in the western Mediterranean, as far afield as Bougie and Ceuta. Trade flourished with Naples and southern Italy, as well. Merchants from other towns, such as Montpellier and Narbonne, utilised the port of Marseilles as did northern Italians, Genoese, Pisans and Venetians. For Marseilles this commercial heyday was stifled by the growing dominance of the Angevins from the 1260s. Charles of Anjou co-opted the fleet of Marseilles for his own political purposes. The trade of Marseilles would never recover the same prominence in the Middle Ages, after suffering the fallout of Angevin dreams of Mediterranean hegemony.

Privileged trading status was sought by mercantile towns. Venice was the most successful of all in garnering customs reductions with the Byzantine empire in 992 and finally, in 1082, an exemption from customs taxes and thus a significant trading advantage. These privileges, however, did not prevent the expulsion of the Venetians from Constantinople in 1172. The 1204 crusade gave Venice up to three-eighths of the Byzantine empire to enjoy as part of the dubious Latin conquest of Constantinople, an incredible commercial coup which would be only partially reversed by the Genoese-supported reconquest of the Byzantine capital by Michael VIII Palaiologos in 1261. Genoese/Venetian commercial rivalries blossomed into military conflicts with regularity in the thirteenth century. Particularly acute conflicts occurred between Genoa and Venice in the years 1261 to 1270 and 1294 to 1299, foreshadowing the War of Chioggia in the years 1377 to 1381.

The Genoese and the Pisans were also arch-rivals in the eastern and western Mediterranean. Their duel for commercial hegemony over the present-day south of France was thwarted by the assertion of independence of southern French towns such as Marseilles, Toulon, Hyères, Narbonne and Montpellier in the first quarter of the thirteenth century. The rivalry of Genoa and Pisa climaxed at the battle of La Meloria in 1284 when the Genoese defeated the Pisans, taking significant captives and returning to Genoa with the great chain of the harbour of Porto Pisano in tow. Pisa never again challenged Genoese preeminence, though the Tuscan town did not cease trading in the

The North Sea/Baltic trading network experienced growth in the thirteenth century after the founding of Lübeck in the twelfth century. Commercial ties stretching from England to Novgorod had long characterised this northern trading network. The administrative structure of the Hanseatic League was just beginning to appear in the thirteenth century and would enjoy much development in the later Middle Ages. Earlier twelfth-century trading links between Cologne, Bremen and England were now expanded with the introduction of the so-called Easterlings in the thirteenth century, including merchants of Lübeck, along with traders from Visby, Rostock, Stralsund and as far east as Riga. The sea link around the Jutland peninsula was inaugurated, replacing the older overland route from Hamburg to Lübeck. The three Hansas of Cologne, Hamburg and Lübeck were united in one German Hansa in London in 1281. The implantation of Hanseatics in the Low Countries was also an affair of the thirteenth century; trading privileges were accorded to them in mid-century by Countess Marguerite of Flanders. In contrast to the Steelyard at London and the Peterhof, or St Peter's Court, at Novgorod, where they were confined, Germans intermingled with the population at Bruges.

The thirteenth century witnessed the contact of the Mediterranean trading network with the commerce of northern Europe both overland and, by the end of the century, by sea. Italians were resident in all the regions of northwestern Europe by the end of the century. Bruges became the keystone to this interaction of northern European and Mediterranean trading networks and the successor to that great medieval crossroads, the Champagne fairs. The objects traded in the two vast trading networks of the thirteenth century, the northern North Sea/Baltic network (the ‘Mediterranean of the North’) and the Mediterranean sphere were significantly different. Mediterranean trade was dominated by the luxury trade with important movement of grain in times of shortage. Fine wool cloths of Flemish and northern French fabrication, armaments, agricultural goods and raw materials, along with precious metals, formed the primary European exports to the Near East while products sought included silks and spices, drugs and exotic fruits, dyestuffs, some of these products of Near Eastern, some of Far Eastern origin. In the northern sphere, bulky goods, grain, tar, pitch, wax, furs, fish, wood were shipped from east to west. Grain was traded to the urbanised centres of Flanders and the Low Countries from the Baltic lands, England and the provinces of the productive northern French plain. Wool cloths and wine were among the western products in demand. Wool was traded from England to Flanders. The land salt of Lüneburg was expensive and insufficient in quantity for the demand of north-
ern markets. Hence, Atlantic sea salt from Bourgneuf and Guérande was sent to Bergen, Riga and as far afield as Novgorod.

**Merchants and Mechanisms of Commerce**

The growth of international trade in the commercial revolution of the eleventh century was underpinned by the existence of recording methods sufficient to permit complex business transactions at a distance. This century experienced an information explosion, whether one takes note of the re-emergence of rural records on a par with the great ninth-century estate inventories or of the beginning of commercial records in the hands of notaries and scribes. Preservation of records of obligations, indebtedness, transfers, sales becomes more common as we move into the twelfth century. In southern Europe these take the form of notarial acts, generally surviving in registers. The written law tradition inherited from the Romans had not been completely lost in the Mediterranean world. In northern France urban échevins signed sealed private law documents, including business contracts, which were preserved as chirographs in urban archives. The literacy of medieval urban inhabitants is, in effect, affirmed by the existence of chirographs in the vernacular, which private citizens in litigation had to bring to the town hall for verification of legitimacy. The growth of princely and royal legislative acts can be noted concurrently. By the thirteenth century, the habit of writing down records, the written inquest, written proof, the notarial act, the chirograph, were well established in medieval European society. More generalised literacy among members of the growing merchant class led to their greater technical expertise in the use of instruments of commerce and methods of financing and in long-distance communication, permitting the orchestration of complex commercial transactions. Literacy was a great motor of the growth of trade in western Europe. From the mid-twelfth century Genoese notarial acts became more numerous and are preserved by the thousand in the thirteenth century. Other Italian towns, such as Lucca and Pisa, also enjoy the preservation of multiple notarial registers for the thirteenth and later centuries. Southern French notarial registers are preserved in smaller numbers from the mid-thirteenth century. The same period finds the survival of significant notarial archives in Catalonia and Majorca, as well. Genoese notaries were active in this same era in outposts of European Mediterranean commerce in the Near East, as far away as the Black Sea. The commercial instruments used by medieval merchants were thus appropriately recorded. Accounting techniques – double entry book-keeping – were developed from the later thirteenth century, providing concomitant support for the burgeoning commercial economy. Fragments of accounts have survived – especially in the fourteenth century – for Italian companies.
such as the Peruzzi, and for individual merchants, such as the Brothers Bonis of Montauban, Ugo Teralh of Forcalquier and Jean Saval of Carcassonne.

Partnership techniques greatly facilitated the conduct of local and international commerce. The early diffusion of partnership as a means of financing trade cannot be dated precisely. Already in the ninth-century will of the Venetian doge Giustiniano Partecipazio there is reference to investments in maritime trade. Examples of the Venetian commenda or collegantia partnership survive from the late eleventh century, and Genoese commenda and societas contracts are preserved in notarial registers from the mid-twelfth century. The commenda, the origins of which are complex, as John Pryor has shown (see ch. 15(a) in this volume), involved in its prevalent high medieval maritime form, an investing partner who contributed the capital to a venture and derived three-fourths of the profits, and a travelling partner whose contribution was his labour and whose remuneration was one fourth of the profits of the affair after reimbursement of the initial investment. This contract was a particularly flexible vehicle for the stimulus of trade, allowing those without fortune, but with energy and ambition, to reap considerable success from one voyage, financed by multiple commenda partnerships. The earliest extant notarial register of southern Europe, that of Giovanni Scriba of Genoa of the mid-twelfth century, already contains many examples of this type of contract. The thirteenth-century Manduel contracts of Marseilles and the Amalric cartulary of 1248 demonstrate the use of partnership in the south of France slightly later. The commenda had a land form, which in Venice in the early fourteenth century was criticised as usurious in view of its similarities to the simple loan or mutuum, but in the heyday of high medieval commerce, from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, the maritime form escaped the usury condemnation because of the element of risk involved. The societas contract, of Roman origin, appeared in land and maritime forms. It offered a less one-sided division of investment with both partners generally contributing to the capital of a commercial enterprise. Profits were apportioned according to the percentage invested by each of the partners.

Hand in hand with the commenda and the societas went other contractual innovations such as the sea loan and the money exchange contract (cambium). The notarial contract of exchange, as it was employed in the thirteenth century, involved four parties, a debtor and creditor on the initiating marketplace and a corresponding payor and payee at another financial market in another town. At least one economic historian, Raymond de Roover, viewed the medieval Church’s stance on usury as formative of an international banking system in Europe, based not on lending through mutuum loans, but on foreign exchange contracts which left their trace in notarial registers before 1300 as instrumenta ex causa cambii and later appeared as letters of exchange. Other interpretations
place less importance on the influence of the usury condemnation of the Church, maintaining that medieval merchants (and many another with money in his or her pocket) lent money at interest in spite of ecclesiastical opprobrium, though in some cases not without repentance on their death-beds; and in others, such as that of Italian companies like the Bardi, with columns in their account books for charitable donations per Messer Domeneddio. Exchange operations crisscrossed Europe, fuelling commercial interchange between the south and the north, with the liquidation of many obligations in the later thirteenth century at the great European financial clearing house of the Champagne fairs. The medieval economy was grounded in credit, a necessity given the limited European precious metal reserves which plagued merchant and king alike. Sea loans, present in considerable numbers in the notarial evidence of twelfth-century Genoa and mid-thirteenth-century Marseilles, were repayable only if the ship came safely to its port of destination. Such financial instruments helped to distribute more broadly the risks of trade. The concept of insurance developed at the end of the thirteenth century, again an invention of the Italians. A notary of Palermo in 1287 wrote an early insurance contract. At first, only a percentage of the value of a ship’s cargo was covered. The sharing of risks helped stimulate economic growth. Along with moneylending and foreign exchange, medieval deposit banking was another fuel for the commercial economy. Term deposits and ‘on demand’ deposits were both present in medieval banking by the thirteenth century. Interest was in all likelihood anticipated on such deposits. For merchant bankers the acceptance of deposits represented one way of acquiring capital necessary to finance the expensive operations of international trade. With the development of a concept of representation, the ability to do business at a distance was greatly enhanced. The representative’s mandate could be narrow or broad, according to the terms of the appointment. Procuratores, nunci, negotiorum gestores and factores permitted the free flow of medieval trade along with partnership arrangements in commenda and societas. Notarial registers are replete with contracts of procuration in particular, designating intermediaries for the performance of business acts. The later Middle Ages witnessed the appearance of negotiable credit instruments in the form of bearer contracts and of endorsement.

While little has survived of merchant correspondence in the thirteenth century, and certainly nothing to compare to the remarkable collection of letters of Francesco da Marco Datini of Prato at the end of the fourteenth century, scattered letters remain for earlier merchants, such as the Vezian family of Montpellier, who in the mid-thirteenth century corresponded about an order of rose water from the queen of France. It was imperative for merchants to be informed about business conditions at distant markets in order to take advantage of demand. Merchant manuals have survived from the end of
the thirteenth century. Information about the commercial situation at the most prominent trade centres throughout Europe was vital for the successful operation of medieval merchants. Pegolotti about 1320 even gave precise information about the silk road across Asia to China. Products in vogue, rates of currency exchange, weights and measures, and shifts in volatile market conditions necessitated reliable sources of information.

The mentality of medieval merchants was another essential ingredient in the commercial expansion of Europe. Whether in the early example of Godric of Finchale or in the epitome of medieval merchants – the thirteenth-century Italian individualists like Benedetto Zaccaria or partners like the Tolomei of Siena, and the Bardi and Peruzzi of Florence – there was a willingness to take risks, explore new markets, interact and co-operate with colleagues, which accompanied a keen business sense, a grounding in accounting and in most merchants a basic literacy. Merchants, through their networks of communication, had to keep abreast of market changes and the relative rise and fall of the multiple European monies. France alone in 1300 counted perhaps forty such separate currencies. Merchants needed some comprehension of the widely differing systems of measurement in use from town to town, let alone from region to region. In their purest entrepreneurial incarnation, medieval merchants espoused the Pegolotti maxim: ‘E scarso comperare et largo venda’ (‘Buy cheap and sell dear’). Wealth became the motive and motor of mercantile society and an underlying foundation of European bourgeois society in the late Middle Ages and beyond. At times the result was unpleasant. Anton Boinebroke of Douai represented an extreme case in the thirteenth century of an exploitative proto-capitalist in the medieval cloth industry.

Imbedded in medieval commerce was a willingness to accept risks, along with great versatility of mercantile orientation. Merchants built the idea of risk into their partnerships. The twelfth-century Venetian merchant Romano Mairano made and lost several fortunes in his lifetime, perhaps dying with modest assets. The well-known Benedetto Zaccaria was alternately admiral, merchant and pirate, in good Genoese tradition. The great diversity of his activities and investments – ships, alum mines in Phocaea, mastic plantations, public debt securities, real properties – suggests the multiple dimensions of the medieval European economy and the far-reaching horizons of Mediterranean trade. But medieval merchant culture was not without its more conservative instincts also. The emergence of a rentier class of former merchants, particularly in northern Europe, reveals a more moderate approach to trade and wealth and a desire for integration into the upper echelons of the feudal hierarchy. The sedentarisation of medieval trade can also be noted by the end of the thirteenth century as commercial practices evolved from the caravan trade
mode of the travelling merchants to the branch office, agent-oriented form of commerce of the great Italian commercial companies, the Bardi and Peruzzi, and later the Medici, of Florence. The basis of these later partnerships was, however, fundamentally different. The Tolomei of Siena and the Bardi and Peruzzi partners assumed unlimited liability for the activities of their members, a practice which ultimately led to their bankruptcy and downfall, respectively, at the end of the thirteenth century and in the early 1340s.

Italians, particularly the Genoese, Pisans and Venetians, led the field in maritime commerce in the thirteenth century but were joined in merchant banking and overland trade by merchants of Lombardy and Tuscany and by members of other national groups such as the Cahorsins, whose reputation was on a par with that of the Lombards. The large number of towns associated with the Champagne fairs suggests the intense involvement of even small urban centres in trade. Merchants of Aurillac were important intermediaries between the markets of Montpellier and Paris, particularly in the spice trade. Merchants of Saint-Antonin specialised in the trade in Flemish cloths in Languedoc, Roussillon and Catalonia, trading to Perpignan. The great gathering point for all these groups in the thirteenth century was Champagne.

**The European Fairs**

The phenomenon of the medieval fair represents the best laboratory for the study of commerce and communications in thirteenth-century Europe. Medieval fairs had their antecedents in the *nundinæ romanae*. Among the earliest was the seventh-century Merovingian October fair at Saint-Denis which was joined by the *lendit* fair in the eleventh century. The Merovingian and Carolingian periods witnessed the *mercatum palatii* as well. In England the king issued over 2,200 charters to markets and fairs in the period 1200 to 1270. Of all the European fairs which stretch beyond the later chronological boundaries of the Middle Ages, the Champagne fairs in the towns of Troyes, Provins, Lagny and Bar-sur-Aube represent the premier exponents.

Situated in east-north-central France, the fairs, though not equidistant from the Low Countries and Italy, lay none the less within convenient access of both. Beginning as agricultural fairs by the twelfth century, they benefited throughout their development from the consistent patronage of the counts of Champagne. The relatively primitive commercial economy of the time, beset by difficulties of communication and transportation, dangers of travel and a lack of guarantee in commercial transactions, was well served by the fair system. A geographical and temporal focus eliminated some of the insecurities in an age when permanent commerce on a large scale had not yet been established. One of the death knells of the Champagne fairs would be the
development of permanent branch offices of the Italian merchant banking companies in cities such as Bruges in the early fourteenth century and the concomitant decline of the caravan trade upon which the fairs were based.

It is possible to periodise the development of the Champagne fairs. There were three eras: from the early to the last quarter of the twelfth century; the period extending to 1260; and the era from 1260 to 1350 when the last Italians, merchants of Piacenza, ceased to frequent them. The fairs experienced a decline about 1260 from the strictly commercial standpoint, but at this point there was a change in orientation of the fairs from a place of commercial exchange to that of financial clearing house of western Europe. The highpoint of this financial market continued until about 1315–20. In the heyday of the medieval fair economy, Champagne was the crux of the caravan trade of western Europe, which permitted the exchange of high-quality wool cloths of the Low Countries and northern France for the products of the luxury trade of the Mediterranean world, spices, exotic drugs and other avoir-du-poids and fabrics, especially silks and damasks. Robert Reynolds identified four sets of merchants involved in this traffic, which was also facilitated by service trades in Champagne itself. The northern cloth exporters of the Low Countries collected cloth in Flanders and brought it to Champagne; the caravan merchants or transporters from northern Italian towns, such as Asti and Vercelli, bought the cloths and sold goods that they had brought up from Italy. They then sent the cloth to Genoa where cloth merchants purchased it, finished it perhaps, and exported it in the Mediterranean world. The importers of Genoa, important capitalists, were the fourth type of merchant, providing credit to the caravan merchants whom they supplied with Mediterranean wares to take to the fairs. Access to the fairs was controlled by the conductus or safe-conduct, accorded to foreign merchants, first by the counts of Champagne and then by the kings of France.

This commercial network was established by the end of the twelfth century when an Italian presence can be detected in Champagne. The Italian towns, Parma, Piacenza, Venice, Florence, Genoa, Siena, Rome, Lucca, Asti, Cremona and others, were organised under consuls at first and then, after the mid-thirteenth century, in a general union under a captain. Among the Italian companies represented at the fairs were the Peruzzi and the Bardi of Florence and the Tolomei of Siena. Northern European towns frequenting Champagne banded together in a Hansa of seventeen towns. Southern European towns under the leadership of a captain from Montpellier were also represented at the fairs.

The six fairs were organised in an annual cycle beginning with the Lagny fair on 2 January. With each fair lasting about fifty days, the cycle continued with the fair at Bar-sur-Aube, the May fair at Provins, the ‘Hot’ fair of St Jean at
Troyes, the St Ayoul fair at Provins, beginning in November and concluding just before Christmas with the ‘Cold’ fair of St Rémy at Troyes.

The administrative and jurisdictional structure of the fairs evolved considerably during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The counts of Champagne and the religious establishments who were the sponsors of the fairs retained most jurisdictional competence outside police duty and the enforcement of fair regulations. The comital or ecclesiastical courts were the tribunal for conflicts between merchants. Officials in charge of the fairs were numerous. Highest in command were the wardens – often two – with competence for all six fairs. They were often chosen from among the bourgeois or nobility of the fair towns. Under the wardens were numerous lesser officials, sergeants with police responsibilities, clerks with notarial functions, measurers, weighers, porters and tax collectors.

While criminal competence remained in the hands of the counts of Champagne and later the kings of France for the most part, after 1260, the jurisdiction of the wardens increased in one respect; it fell to them to enforce the fair contracts, or lettres de foires, sealed officially by the wardens’ seal and recorded in the fair registers. Jurisdiction was limited to persons frequenting the fairs. Justice was harsh and rapid, the epitome of the piepowder court of the itinerant medieval merchant. Some of the normal protections of the law were eliminated, such as the right to delay a trial or to claim immunity from a particular tribunal. Courts of appeal existed in the grands jours de Troyes and later in parlement. Evidence admitted in court included the battle duel, the witnessed proof, the written oath, the lettres de foires and, finally, the evidence of the fair registers themselves. Fugitives from the justice of the fairs were harshly treated. Wardens sent a requisition to the home jurisdiction, demanding the seizure of the goods of the fugitive and their public sale with the profits used to honour the fair contracts. The last resort of the fair warden’s justice was the prohibition of attendance at the fairs for compatriots of the accused, in the tradition of the law of marque. Parallel to the courts in Champagne, other courts of voluntary jurisdiction designed to serve commercial and urban law cases, the so-called sceaux rigoureux, emerged in the south of France (Cour de Petit Scel in Montpellier, Cour des Conventions in Nîmes).

The decline of the fairs has elicited several explanations. The onerous fiscality of the count of Champagne, and, from 1285, the king of France, may have taken its toll on traffic. Moreover, in the late 1270s Philip III of France favoured Nîmes and Aigues-Mortes over Montpellier (an Aragonese or Majorcan lordship) as ports of entry for Mediterranean goods, whereas southern trade with Champagne had been focused on Montpellier. In 1277 he issued a prohibition on the export of wine, grains, wool and other goods from France.

A further complication for the great cloth-finishing trade of Italy was the
emergence of a totally Italian cloth industry, producing cloth from raw wool itself. The new Italian industry, epitomised by the prospering Arte della Lana of Florence, was a fierce competitor against the Flemish and northern French industries and contributed to the decadence of the Florentine Arte della Calimala, the principal importer of Flemish cloth via Champagne and the largest client of the fairs. French export prohibitions also hampered the trade of the Arte della Calimala.

The opening of the Atlantic sea route in 1277–81 with the departure of the first Genoese galleys from the Mediterranean, accompanied by the Majorcans, offered an alternative route to England and Flanders, bypassing Champagne, as had the overland route across the Reuss and through the Saint-Gothard pass. The development of Paris and Avignon as French royal and papal capitals, respectively, also contributed to the decline of the fairs, as did municipal unrest in the fair town of Provins. The establishment of permanent branch houses by the Italians in Bruges in the early fourteenth century was an indication of a general shift in commercial business techniques. Merchants tended to settle in the important urban centres. Italian merchant banking companies installed factors in these centres.

The decline of the Champagne fairs did not signal the end of the fair phenomenon in Europe. Smaller fairs continued in Champagne and important fairs grew at Geneva, Frankfurt, Beaucaire and later at Lyons and continued into the early modern era. Nor were the Champagne fairs the only significant fairs. Regional fairs such as the Languedocian fairs at Pézenas and Montagnac saw intense trading in the late Middle Ages.

**Conclusion**

The thirteenth century has been called, in economic terms, the autumn of the Middle Ages. And a brilliant autumn it was. The gains of the era of medieval expansion would never be lost, though the crises of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries would slow and, at times, temporarily reverse the direction of development. With the close of the medieval era, sophistication of commercial and financial methods and improvement in communications, which had first matured in the thirteenth century, would, with further breakthroughs in maritime technology, position western Europe for the Age of Discovery.
CHAPTER 3

THE VERNACULAR

Colin C. Smith

The rise of the vernaculars of Europe towards their thirteenth-century maturity in relation to (and eventually in competition with) Latin as the language of international religion, literature, learning, administration, and much else, was far from being a uniform or steady process in terms of time and place: in a full survey it would be necessary to consider each century and each region one by one.

In broad terms a first distinction may be made between the areas of the old Roman empire which remained Latin-speaking – and absorbed Germanic and other invaders and settlers to the extent that these rapidly or eventually adopted Latin speech – and areas of Celtic, Germanic and Slavonic speech. In the former, even though literacy must have declined sharply in the fifth century, the Latin alphabet and the ability to use it to write in Latin (with whatever novelties or deviations from classical norms) survived and was strongly buttressed by Christianity as it spread and as the Church took over many functions of the extinct secular state, Latin being the sole language of the Bible (at first, though early translations were very important), the liturgy, preaching and administration. In the other areas a distinction existed between Celtic regions and the rest, in that in post-Roman Britain enough Christianity and Latinity (both written and, for a short period, spoken) survived to sustain what became known as the ‘Celtic Church’ in the west of Britain and notably in Ireland from the days of St Patrick, this passing to Saxon Northumbria and introducing both Christianity and written Latinity there. The mission of Augustine accomplished the same in the southern Anglo-Saxon realms and soon more widely. The evangelisation of the Netherlands, of parts of Germany and later of Scandinavia and Iceland, of Hungary, carried the spoken and written Latin of the Church to those regions, while the Slavic peoples were first evangelised in Greek from Byzantium.

The need to write the vernaculars, some of which sustained a rich bardic culture of heroic verse, praise-poems, folktale, and the like, together with
orally maintained ritual and juridical practices, was presumably felt first by still pagan peoples as they became aware of the existence of Latin and Greek writing in the empire and the usefulness of a comparable system of signs for brief inscriptions which could be cut on stone or other durable materials: hence the invention, in unknown circumstances, of Irish ogham and Germanic runic alphabets. These led to early but always very limited habits of literacy and survived for a long time the invention of Latin-based systems with which to write long texts in the corresponding vernaculars on parchment and vellum.

The moment, place and manner of this invention are unknown but can be conjectured in some cases: thus for Common Neo-Brittonic (which would develop into Old Welsh, etc.) someone, probably in Wales but possibly in Cumbria, must have invented a way of writing the vernacular in Latin letters at some point in the mid-sixth century, the better to represent increasingly non-Latin proper names and apocopated forms, and later to convert previously oral verse into written forms (or indeed to stimulate new written compositions such as the Gododdin). Here and elsewhere the invention would have been the work of clerics and there would have been formal training for novice scribes, concerned in the first instance with the keeping of genealogies, king-lists and other records for royal and noble courts and for landowners, but literary cultivation followed quite soon. The adaptation of the Latin alphabet for writing in Old Irish seems to have taken place about 600 and a strong vernacular literary tradition developed beside the monastic Latin one.

For continental Germanic, the earliest alphabet replacing runes was that devised by Ulfilas in the mid-fourth century for his translation of the Bible into Gothic; it has twenty-seven symbols mostly based on Greek uncial, with a few from runic script and from Latin. Old High German seems to have been first written in a monastery of southern Germany in the later eighth century, and Old Saxon in northern Germany in the early ninth. From about 1150 there grew and flourished the Middle High German literary culture of the Minnesänger and of courtly epic and romance. In Anglo-Saxon England the vernacular might have been written to a small degree in Kentish charters of the seventh century, and more extensively in the famous Northumbrian schools, but these were extinguished by the Danish invaders and only a few fragmentary specimens of vernacular writing (such as Caedmon’s hymn and Bede’s death-song) survive. The important contribution of Mercia from the late seventh century has recently been emphasised, surviving documents including the Tribal Hidage and glosses and glossaries; in eighth-century Mercia writing of any sort in the king’s name was a significant means of assert-

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1 Recent studies include those of Koch (1985–6); Harvey (1990); Bruford (1992). On the implications of oral versus written transmission of king-lists, etc., see Dumville (1977).
ing the royal power.\(^2\) The re-creation of vernacular writing in its West Saxon form, doubtless stimulated by the decline of Latin culture under pressure from the invaders in the east and south, is owed to King Alfred, under whom extensive literary texts (including the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle) and translations from Latin were produced. Alfred commented in the preface to the translation of the *Cura pastoralis* on the decline of Latin learning and the fact that many could read English writing. The tradition of literary creation and of writing in English was almost extinguished for a long time by the Norman Conquest. The system of signs was basically that of Latin with adjustments such as the addition of the old runic ‘wynn’ symbol Þ (replacing Latin u, v) and ‘eth’ ð and ‘thorn’ ᵢ (voiced and voiceless modern th), while h did duty for the guttural sound of ch in loch, and digraphs sc represented the initial sound in, e.g., modern ship and cg the final sound in, e.g., hedge. For Icelandic, after official evangelisation in 1000, the Latin alphabet was adapted for writing the vernacular by missionaries from Britain and Germany at some date before 1100, and by 1300 there existed an exceptionally rich literature in various genres of prose and verse; we learn that in the pre-literary stage the law code of Ulfiþr of about 930 was recited at regular intervals by the ‘law-speaker’ (the president of the assembly) and that the writing of this was ordered in 1117.

The first system of writing for the Slavic languages was created in the mid-ninth century by St Cyril (hence Cyrillic) and Methodius of Thessalonika following a request for missionaries and teachers for Moravia; they devised the system on the basis of the Greek alphabet for what is now known as Old Church Slavonic, translating into it the Bible, the liturgy and homilies.

In the Latin-speaking regions our view of developments has been much influenced in recent years by the ideas of Roger Wright, still the subject of controversy but also widely accepted.\(^3\) The fragmentation of the old unity of spoken Latin into what were to become the Romance languages is to be placed later than was long thought, or, rather, the awareness of such fragmentation and divergence from the Latin parent among speakers and literate authorities is to be placed relatively late. Up to about 800 the Latin writing system had served to meet the needs of all users not only in writing but also in spoken discourse: a Latin text in standard international orthography could be read aloud to listeners (in church, in law court, in the marketplace or for literary entertainment) in whatever form and with whatever modifications were needed to be comprehensible. The process would be automatic, just as today a text in standard

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\(^2\) This is discussed by Toon (1983), especially pp. 16–43.

\(^3\) Wright (1982), supplemented by many papers in Wright (1991), and by further papers of his own gathered in Wright (1994). Wright’s views of 1982 are assessed in the wider cultural context by McKitterick (1989); she appears to accept Wright’s approach but has queries about Alcuin’s precise role and the operation of the reform (pp. 11–12).
written English can be read with varying pronunciations from Scotland to the Caribbean and from Alaska (with the slight adjustments of American spelling) to India, and just as right and through are read out without the long-fossilised gh graphs causing a moment’s difficulty.

It was the effort of Charlemagne’s religious and educational advisers, especially of his minister Alcuin recruited from cultivated Northumbrian York, to impose good standards in the performance of the liturgy throughout his empire that wrought a profound change, not so much by edict as by example and texts (Alcuin’s De orthographia) and by fostering schooling in the new system. This accompanied the notable revival of classical learning and the copying of ancient texts stimulated by the Frankish imperial court and Church. Alcuin insisted on each Latin letter being given a clear phonetic value in chanting and in recitation, in line with what were assumed to be classical values and in order to cease giving offence to God by mispronouncing sacred texts. The unintended consequence was to ‘create’ what is usually known as ‘medieval Latin’ as a language to be firmly marked off from the spoken vernaculars – early Romance – with their elisions and lack of synthetic case-endings and abundant post-classical vocabulary. The reformed system and new awareness of differentiation may have taken hold at once in some parts but in others, especially after the collapse of centralised Frankish rule, the old habits doubtless continued for a long time. In the first case it was early realised that if the liturgy in its new stilted pronunciation was much less comprehensible to most people in a congregation – the unlettered – it was necessary to stipulate that the sermon should now be in the vernacular, either Romance or Frankish depending on the region, as in a famous disposition of the Council of Tours in 813.4

The Carolingian reform of Latin pronunciation of the liturgy was extended to Spain beyond Catalonia (a Frankish domain since the capture of Barcelona c. 800) by the Council of Burgos in 1080, when the ‘Mozarabic’ liturgy which had existed since Visigothic times was replaced by the standard Roman form. In Spain outside Catalonia, then, the use of would-be correct Latin writing intended to be read aloud with all manner of Romance adjustments continued longer than in Frankish lands, and probably in some parts until about 1200.

On this basis a charitable view can be taken of the hosts of legal documents – charters, donations, bills of sale, conveyances and the like – from Romance-speaking lands which have correct Latin formulae at the start and the end but which enclose much Romance vocabulary and phrasing and syntax under a vaguely Latinate morphological covering (e.g. ‘Hec est noditia de ganato de

4 Quoted by Wright (1982), p. 120: ‘ut easdem omelas quisque aperte transferre student in rusticam Romanam linguam aut Thiotiscam, quo facilius cuncti possint intellegere quae dicuntur’, with discussion of the meaning of ‘transferre’ here. This interpretation is challenged within the very detailed survey of the whole language situation of Carolingian times by Banniard (1995).
sancta Maria de Uec de Maruan que leuarunt jnde sajones. Id est, una mula cum sua sella”—about 1050, province of Zamora, western Spain), spelled in a would-be Latin way, a conventional mixture adequate for the legal record and intelligible to the illiterate parties and witnesses to whom it was read out before being signed or marked.

The evidence from north and central Italy shows that the Carolingian reforms were accepted there, and Wright (p. 144) quotes several tenth-century sources which record the difference perceived between Latin and spoken Romance in various regions, including four documents of about 960 which show an experimental effort (soon discontinued) to write the vernacular as an aid to comprehension by legal parties.

As in the Germanic areas, some manipulation of the Latin alphabet was needed if the non-classical sounds of Romance were to be represented. At first this proceeded by isolated ad hoc methods, as when the versions of the Oaths of Strasbourg were set down in 842 and in the examples of early old French verse from the later ninth and tenth centuries. By the time of the full flowering of the chanson de geste and romance in the second half of the twelfth century it is clear that an agreed system—presumably taught in schools for scribes—existed for the writing of texts, this embodying a few concessions to Latin (such as final t of verb-endings, vient, when this was no longer pronounced, just as later written s before a consonant was long retained in espee, etc.). In Castilian one cannot speak of a system at that date but only of tentative efforts in the Romance versions of the local fueros: within that of Avilés (Asturias), first composed in Latin in 1155 but surviving in a vernacular text of about a century later, one finds, for example, the same sound represented in the same word as directo, dreito, dreito. The Poema de mio Cid probably of 1207 (known only in a single manuscript of the fourteenth century) still shows a variety of graphs for the palatal consonants which in modern Spanish are written ll (l, ll) and ñ (n, nn, ñ), with a very fluctuating use of purely scribal h, but more regularly in the use of ch, ç and z for non-Latin sounds. Standardisation of Castilian was to be the work of the scribes of the court of Alfonso X from 1252; it is recorded (though not until the sixteenth century) that the king ruled in 1253 that in cases of doubt the norms of Toledo, then the chief city of New Castile, should apply. A further factor favoured such a process in all countries. Early diversity of dialects had not mattered greatly when minstrels performing memorised texts or orally generated pieces, or other presenters reciting from manuscripts, had adjusted their delivery to suit their listening publics, but standardisation became needful when the growth of lay literacy encouraged the production of manuscripts designed for private reading, and when central authorities undertook the reform of national law codes.

The progress of the vernaculars as written and literary languages depended
greatly on political circumstance. In England the Conquest brought a new aristocracy and military caste whose language was French and whose literature was for a time a common possession with France, English being the tongue of the unlettered folk which was eventually able to emerge (after isolated attempts in the thirteenth century) to full literary respectability in the fourteenth. After Norman French ceased to be a naturally spoken language in England it remained secure for a long time as the medium of law and administration, having become a learned (and learned) language just as Latin was. In France the status of Paris as capital and residence of the court ensured the eventual triumph of the dialect of its region, francien, over others which even in the thirteenth century presented competition: Picard, Champenois, Norman, Burgundian, etc. It also seems likely that the First Crusade gave a strong stimulus to the development of Old French. Since the commanders and a majority of the soldiers were French, their language must have been that solely used in the chain of command, and whatever literature was produced in that and later crusades in Latin was more than balanced by that in the vernacular, whether crusading songs or epic (although it is still the subject of debate, it seems logical to place the composition of the prime ‘Oxford’ version of the *Chanson de Roland* at about 1100 and to associate it firmly with the spirit of the First Crusade). Later, the Knights of St John organised the various sections of the defences of their fortresses, as they did their hostels, according to nationes each with its own language, and a confessor for each language was made available in cathedrals in such pilgrim centres as Compostela.

In Spain the fragmented nature of political control among the diverse Christian states and the need for all to fight against the menace of revolutionary Islam from Africa (from 1086 the Almoravids, from 1146 the Almohads) sufficiently points the contrast with France and explains the relative lateness of vernacular developments: there was greater security after the victory of Las Navas in 1212, and union of Castile with León in 1230, the chief progress and literary maturity of Castilian coming in the second half of the thirteenth century. The growth of the crown of Aragon with the conquest of Valencia in 1238 and of Sicily in 1282, and the trading prosperity of Barcelona, encouraged the flowering of writing in Catalan in the same period.

The situation of Italian in the even more fragmented peninsula is similarly illustrative. Rustichello wrote the account of Marco Polo’s travels in French, presumably considering this more prestigious than Polo’s Venetian dialect when this lacked literary cultivation. The eventual triumph of the Tuscan

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5 A useful discussion is that of Rothwell (1985). The reference is to the title of M.K. Pope’s book of 1934, a title which continued with special consideration of Anglo-Norman. Of interest also is Rothwell (1980), with references at p. 125 to the linguistic complexities of life in medieval England drawn from the fundamental study of Clanchy (1979).
dialect depended partly on its being recognised as having special virtues but more, one assumes, on the sheer expressive and intellectual power of Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio. Dante’s *Convivio* and especially his *De vulgari eloquentia* of 1304–7 present the most detailed and penetrating consideration of all these questions which we find anywhere in the Middle Ages.

If Latin had the enormous advantage that its texts – papal bulls, canon law, theology, saints’ lives, science and any other kind of serious learning, modern epics to rival the classics, playlets, Goliardic lyrics – travelled without barriers through the universal Church and the schools, some vernacular literary genres travelled almost equally well and had considerable stimulating effects. The first literary texts in Provençal show regional features, the Boecis poem composed about 1000 being probably from Limoges while the next, the Sainte Foi poem of the mid-eleventh century, was composed at the other extreme in the region of Narbonne; but when courtly lyric is first recorded a literary Koine was already in existence. The poets and performers of the lyric and music of Provence with its *fin’amors* ethos pervaded courtly circles widely in the twelfth century, setting off imitative lyric explosions and encouraging the polishing of existing native traditions of song not only in northern France but also as far afield as Galicia-Portugal (the *cantigas d’amor, cantigas de amigo*, also satirical and scurrilous verse at court level), southern Germany, and later Sicily under Frederick II (1194–1250). It still provided important models of technique and of sensibility for Dante and Petrarch. The northern French chansons de geste travelled widely too both in their original language (memorised by minstrels for oral delivery, and later written in manuscripts) and in translation: thus the *Roland* was known in several parts of northern Spain by the mid-twelfth century, and versions were translated or adapted into Navarrese (*Roncesvalles*), German (*Rolandslied*), Norse (as part of the prose *Karlamagnussaga*), Icelandic, Middle English and Welsh. The example of French epic at its zenith in about 1200 stimulated the creation of Castilian epic in the thirteenth century and its themes eventually joined native ones in ballads, prose chronicles, massive compilations such as *Gran conquista de ultramar*, and tales, whose popularity continued into Renaissance times.

Indeed, the very internationalism of Latin seems to have fostered a similar spirit among the vernaculars, certainly up to 1200, if not in the early thirteenth century. The amount of interchange of literary forms, motifs, themes and personages down the ages and across linguistic borders in both Latin and the vernaculars is astonishing.6 Since a language was not necessarily linked in the modern way to a political or regional frontier and had scant connotations of national identity (though this too would change by 1300), a literary vernacular

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6 Various books by von Richthofen document these processes, the latest being (1989).
which served a particular genre could extend its use with surprising ease (the use of Italian in opera world-wide, or of Anglo-American in pop song, provide modern parallels of a sort). Thus we find Galician and presumably its musical modes used for much lyric composed in Castile from the thirteenth to early fifteenth centuries, Provençal used by some Catalan poets and by Sordello in northern Italy, and a mixed Franco-Italian language devised for the re-creation of French epic themes in Italy in the fourteenth century.

Rather than as competition, the relationship of any vernacular to Latin is best seen as a productive symbiosis. Translation of the Bible (by parts or as a whole) from Latin was essential to early proselytising and was not regarded with suspicion until a very late stage. All manner of classical and ‘medieval Latin’ texts were translated or adapted for a variety of purposes and often produced rich vernacular developments, as when Geoffrey of Monmouth’s *Historia regum Britanniae* appeared as Wace’s *Brut* in French (1155) and in turn as *Layamon’s Brut* in Middle English in the early thirteenth century, and – with accretions from independent Welsh and Breton sources – may be said to have begun the vast cult of Arthur which continues today. Much of it entered – and bedevilled – European historiography, as did Book IV of the *Liber sancti Jacobi* (about 1140?), the *Chronica Turpini*, both in its original Latin and in any one of the five translations which were made into French. The *Disciplina clericalis* of the Aragonese Jew Petrus Alfonsi, who was born about 1062 and converted to Christianity in 1106, is a collection of *exempla* drawn mainly from oriental sources; it was translated into a number of vernaculars and was widely influential. The foundation of universities in Italy and soon elsewhere demanded high language standards, since the study of law (civil and canon) and of humanities was based on Latin texts ancient and modern, and all teaching in every subject was in Latin; if one extra-curricular result was the flowering of ‘Goliardic’ lyric in Latin (chiefly a product of Germans), another was the stimulation of new sensibilities and styles in the vernaculars, as when school study of Ovid produced a whole *aetas ovidiana*, vernacular versions such as that of the *Ars amatoria* by Chrétien de Troyes, the *Roman de la Rose*, and much else. The *artes poetriae* composed as teaching manuals for verse production in Latin soon enriched composition in the vernaculars.

In Spain Arabic, whose texts preserved Greek philosophy and science both in pure form and as augmented by recent study, constituted for Christians a ‘classical’ language at least as important as Latin. An early period of translation from Arabic into Latin under Church patronage (at first that of the French archbishop Raimundo, 1125–52) in the twelfth century at Toledo was followed by a period of translation from Arabic into Castilian under the patronage of Alfonso X (1252–84) at Toledo, Seville and elsewhere. Use of the vernacular for all writing except international diplomacy was a matter of royal policy, but it
may have been favoured in this case by the fact that some important intermediaries in translation were learned Jews who commanded Arabic and a Spanish vernacular, and of course Hebrew, but who had no Latin or refused to use it because it was the language of the Christian Church. In Sicily in these times Arabic was equally important, but translations from it seem to have been made always into Latin.

Translations meant, beyond content and themes and spirit, enrichment of the receiving language in lexis and often in syntax too. Even glosses of words and phrases into a vernacular may proceed by loan-translation or may stimulate the creation of new abstracts and compounds, Celtic and Germanic vernaculars being affected in this way from the earliest times. In Romance one can hardly speak of learned and half-learned forms until after the beginnings of distinctive vernacular writing, after which the (re)introduction of words from written Latin (and of course from Arabic and other languages) was common. Everywhere a stratum of essential Christian vocabulary (much of it Greek in origin) entered early. Later, a neologism might appear as an isolated technicism which has to be glossed, as in much work produced in Castilian under Alfonso X, passing then into literary usage and finally into spoken discourse. Legal terminology shows the same development, as when we find *entención* ‘allegation’ drawn from the *intentio* of Roman law and used in the Poema de mio Cid (line 3464) in a courtroom scene whose objective may have been (beyond the purely literary one) to exemplify a juridical reforming programme. In vernacular literary genres Latinisms might appear with ennobling or decorative functions, as when Gonzalo de Berceo in his Milagros de nuestra señora in the mid-thirteenth century describes the Virgin as ‘estrella matutina’ (31b). In syntax, translating complex Latin sentences with their wealth of subsidiary clauses introduced by conjunctions fostered imitations and new creations in the receiving vernaculars. Not all the traffic was one-way: dictionaries of ‘medieval Latin’ are needed precisely in order to record and explain quantities of classical words in non-classical senses owed to the vernaculars and words newly formed on the basis of Romance and Germanic, etc. Similarly Anglo-Norman even at a late stage was not a ‘dead’ language but one capable of innovation and further divergence from continental French norms of the time.

Vernacular writing began on a basis of simple needs, and vernacular literatures grew because of popular demand which paid performers could meet and because patrons stimulated composition for the entertainment or instruction of themselves, their families, courts and retainers, and later (if able to pay the considerable costs of copying and of book production in general) for private

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7 An example begins Partida II.1.x: ‘Tirano tanto quiere decir como señor cruel, que es apoderado en algún regno o tierra por fuerza o por engaño o por traicion.’ See van Scoy (1940).
reading. The Church had an interest in the instruction of the laity and also in entertaining it with respectable materials not concerned with the aggrandisement of secular heroes or with erotic yearnings. Political propaganda (as in Spanish ballads concerned with the civil war of the mid-fourteenth century), feuds between noble families (as in the *Poema de mio Cid* if we accept that it is a pro-Lara and anti-Castro work), and the need to assert royal power or to re-examine and exemplify aspects of the law by re-creation of the heroic age of Charlemagne (in French epic), are all common motives too. The progress of the vernaculars can, however, be best calibrated by a study of those kinds of writing which were most directly in the charge of the great authorities of state and Church.

The foremost of these for the crown or other authority, municipal or comital, was the statement and operation of the law. While great centralised kingdoms remained strongly conservative in this naturally conservative matter, employing Latin (or in England, Latin and Anglo-Norman) till a late stage, one finds in Romance lands enough confidence in the vernacular for what seem to be – apart from the isolated Italian examples mentioned above – new departures, though great care is to be taken in dating surviving examples, many or all of which may be later (thirteenth-century) translations of lost Latin originals. A donation of 1102 from Rodez has come down to us entirely in Provençal. This soon became common practice in the whole region. In Castile and León the local fueros of municipal laws were authorised by the crown as readily in the vernacular as in Latin: among the earliest vernacular texts known are the fueros of Madrid, the original of which dates from before 1141, of Avilés in 1155 and of Oviedo in the period 1171–80. The fuero of Uclés in New Castile was issued by royal authority in 1157–8 or at the latest before 1163 according to its latest editor, but was replaced by a revised Latin one in 1179 when the Order of Calatrava took control of the town; even if several of these texts were first issued in Latin, the coming of vernacular translations demonstrates that there was a rising interest in non-Latin versions too.9 In some cases bilingual Latin vernacular texts were produced. In the corpus of royal documents of Alfonso VIII of Castile (1158–1214) the first in Romance (part-Leônese) is the record drawn up at Carrión in 1194 of evidence presented by local people about the bounds of Ledigos; in all previous and for a time later cases of this kind, people naturally testified in the vernacular but their evidence was set down by the notaries in Latin. On 26 March 1206 the Treaty of Cabreros between Castile and León was drawn up, apparently in Castilian only, and constitutes the first ‘high-level’ testimony of this kind. Early in 1207 a royal ordinance,

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recently discovered, for the regulation of the market of Toledo was drawn up in Castilian. On 1 January 1214 it appears to have been decreed that only the vernacular – presumably now amply proven in all aspects of its written usage – should be employed in the royal chancellery of Castile. In the matter of national codes, the ancient Forum judicum of the Visigoths, by which León had been governed for centuries, was by royal order translated into Castilian in 1241, as a prelude to the production of a national code for Castile-León (finally united in 1230). This reform was undertaken by Alfonso X, first in the work entitled Espéculo and then in the great corpus of the Siete partidas from 1256 to 1263, both entirely in the vernacular.

While heroic verse and sagas might well embody historical fact, and certainly include much material thought at the time to be historical, serious historiography was in prose and in the early centuries in most countries was in Latin written in monasteries, at first in the form of annals and brief chronicles. The exception was provided by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle begun in Alfred’s time; it is not known whether the materials on which it was based were in Latin or the vernacular. The first text of vernacular historiography in French was Villehardouin’s on the Fourth Crusade, written about 1210. Soon after, certain Latin histories were translated into French; and weariness with the ever more fabulous chansons de geste in a now discerning and increasingly literate aristocratic and bourgeois public able to read for itself seems to have stimulated an appetite for ‘true’ historical texts in vernacular prose, these being deemed rich in moral lessons too. Of central importance was the translation of the collection of Latin texts made in the mid-thirteenth century at Saint-Denis, the prime royal abbey of France (BN MS lat. 5925), as the Grandes chroniques de France. The translation was requested by St Louis (who died in 1270) and was presented to his successor on completion in 1274. It is clear that the Latin original was regarded as authoritative while the vernacular text was intended for wide dissemination. In Spain brief historical writings in the vernacular appeared shortly before 1200 in Navarre, and soon after this the Aragonese Liber regum (a summary of universal history) and the Castilian Anales toledanos primeros. National histories by churchmen continued in Latin, the last great compilation being the De rebus Hispaniae of Rodrigo Jiménez de Toledo in 1243. This with its predecessors formed the basis for the Estoria de España on which work by Alfonso X’s team of scholars began in 1270; it was unfinished

10 The background to this process is examined by Lomax (1971). On Alfonso X’s policy, see Niederehe (1987) and a number of papers in Burns (1990).
11 Nicolas de Senlis remarked in presenting his French translation of the Chronica Turpini (1202) that ‘Nus contes rimés n’est verais; tot ert mençongie ço qu’il en dient.’ (The Latin chronicle was as mendacious as any rhymed tale.) For a recent survey, see Buridant (1990).
when the chief effort was transferred to the vast undertaking of the General estoria, also far from completed at Alfonso’s death. Not all was for private reading: in the following century Don Juan Manuel recommended that those preparing to be besieged in a castle should lay in a good supply of chronicles, presumably so that their story content and heroic tales could entertain and inspire troops and families when read out to them.

For most of the Middle Ages the attitude of the Church to the vernaculars was a tolerant and even encouraging one. The liturgy and all theological writing and administration were naturally in Latin, but there was no bar on translations of the Scriptures (until at a late stage this became tainted with heresy) and these were often powerful instruments in early conversions and for preaching at all times. Saints’ lives and collections of miracles began in Latin in most parts but were soon translated into the vernaculars as essential improving literature for the laity, being often destined for public recitation in this form when versified. In this last respect considerable stimulation was given by the IV Lateran Council of 1215 with its concern for (among much else) the Christian education of the people: among the few practical results of this in Spain may be reckoned the extensive poetic work of Gonzalo de Berceo from about 1220 to 1250, consisting of saints’ lives and Marian materials, all specifically offered to a listening public in its own language. This also coincided with the revolutionary efforts of the new orders of friars to bring religion to the masses by their preaching and in other ways. Sermons even when known to us only in Latin forms were often prepared and delivered in the vernacular, unless delivered to a learned congregation. Much was probably not prepared or recorded at all, if the example of Abbot Samson of St Edmund’s Abbey in Suffolk was common: he was apparently illiterate, but fluent in Latin and French discourse, and able to preach powerfully to the townsfolk in their dialect of English.

There has been no mention so far of one powerful factor which conditioned the rise of the vernacular: a very human laziness about learning and using Latin. Increasingly as time passed one finds references to poor Latin in use, even among responsible churchmen. Eventually the vernacular crept into the monasteries. At San Pedro de Cardeña near Burgos in Old Castile, which considered itself the shrine of national history, it was natural that the Estoria del Cid fabricated there probably in 1272 should be in the vernacular, since it was des-

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14 These can be found even in learned France. In Spain for a variety of reasons literary Latin had always been poorly taught and studied, and even Cluniac reforms brought from France in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries had only a modest impact on standards, as did the work of the first university, that of Palencia, during its brief existence from 1210 to 1246 (this may in fact have provided greater stimulation for the creation of the vernacular verse mester de clerecía about 1220). Production of Latin literature of all kinds from the eleventh century onward was far smaller in Spain than in other western countries.
tined for incorporation in the vernacular royal chronicles and, in parts, to be read out to visitors to the hero’s tomb in the abbey church; but soon after this one finds the monastery’s internal records being kept in Castilian too. A decreasing complement of Benedictine monks, here and in parts elsewhere, was beginning to live like retired country gentlemen attended by their servants, with just enough Latin for their chapel duties. The Latin pass was being sold by its traditional defenders and the onrush of the vernacular forces would follow.15

15 This chapter has been revised for publication with the help of Professor Roger Wright, following the death of Professor Smith in 1997. The editor expresses his sincere thanks to Dr Wright for his helpful comments.
The visual culture of thirteenth-century western Europe saw the refinement and spread of the Gothic style throughout much of north-west Europe, and in this sense it consolidated and extended the substantial achievements of the twelfth. But while the dominant currents of patronage and thought in the twelfth century can be traced primarily in the sphere of reformed monasticism, by 1200 creative initiative was passing increasingly into the hands of the cathedrals, the cities and the lay aristocracy. This new pattern of initiative reflected the strengthening and centralisation of secular power, especially monarchy, the immense power of cathedral chapters especially in northern Europe, and the increasing momentum lent to patronage of all types by expanding urban economies. As a result, some of the outstanding creative accomplishments of the century of Innocent III and Boniface VIII can be ascribed to a new urban milieu; one line of thought on the Gothic style has seen it as essentially both royal and urban in inspiration. Nevertheless, clerical, and especially episcopal, patronage remained absolutely central, and we are fully entitled to see the main symbol of the creative energies of the century, the Gothic cathedral, as a sign of the triumphalist mood of a newly militant universalising Church.

Some authorities have chosen to see the major developments of the century most especially in the light of the relatively new sphere of royal court patronage, dominated by Paris.¹ To an extent this is justified. By 1200 Paris had already seen major innovations in visual, intellectual and musical culture which arguably rendered it the most dynamic artistic centre in northern Europe at a time when previously seminal cities, notably Rome and Constantinople, were witnessing a period of stagnation or decline.² The collapse of important art patronage in Rome until the last decades of the century should remind us that centres whose administrative and political power was if anything gaining in importance were not necessarily themselves flourishing culturally at the same

time. Dynamics of patronage varied from place to place. A full understanding of the period also requires attention to the interaction of secular and religious patronage, since in the latter sphere especially the period witnessed substantial efforts by the Church to spread at a broader pastoral level the intellectual, theological and aesthetic accomplishments of the twelfth century. To some, these efforts have been seen as innocently reformist; to others, they have represented the efforts of clerical elitists to sustain their dominance in the definition of social and religious norms. This melding of secular patronage and thought with new stimuli in the field of religious imagination has marked the century out as one simultaneously of integration and systematisation. ‘Qui pense XIIIe siècle pense aussitôt raison’, wrote Génicot of the century which produced the great systematisations of Aquinas, Durand, Voragine and the encyclopaedists; a century which in contrast to the fourteenth has been regarded more often as one of order than of conflict.

CATHEDRAL CHAPTERS AND THE GOTHIC STYLE

Inevitably we begin with building. Since the late eleventh century, north-western Europe had experienced what some analysts have called a ‘building boom’ which benefited monastic establishments and the expanding cities; and it was this boom which underlay the massive architectural developments undertaken by monasteries and cathedral chapters in both the Romanesque and Gothic styles. Giant church building was a phenomenon first of the wealthiest monastic orders, as at Cluny in Burgundy, where the third church built on the site easily surpassed in scale the earliest contemporary twelfth-century buildings begun in the Gothic style of north-eastern France. The trend towards constructing truly large-scale buildings in the Gothic style, which had first emerged in Paris c. 1130–40, was primarily a phenomenon of cathedral chapters in the larger and richer dioceses north of the Alps. The Gothic style itself – in 1200 still predominantly an Anglo-French phenomenon – had been born in the milieu of reformed monastic patronage, and specifically in the Paris of Abbot Suger of Saint-Denis (d. 1151). Hitherto, in contrast to much of Romanesque northern Europe and Italy, Paris had been singularly devoid of deep-rooted traditions of church building and had not witnessed the range and sheer scale of building in England, Normandy, Burgundy and the region of the Rhine. But this may have rendered Paris a more fertile and unfettered base for experiment. In origin if not necessarily character, Gothic was both monastic and urban. The new style seems to have departed selfconsciously enough from northern European Romanesque art to

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be described as a counterpart to the reforming vision of contemporary churchmen. Its appropriation for the cathedral was rapid: it has justly been noted that ‘the list of thirteen bishops invited to dedicate the new choir [of Saint-Denis] in 1144 reads like a roll-call of the cathedrals which would be rebuilt within the next hundred years’.5

The first truly large-scale church building in the Gothic style, Notre-Dame in Paris, under way from c. 1160, set the fashion for gargantuan building throughout the archdioceses of Sens, Rheims, Cologne and Canterbury (plate 1) for the next century or so.6 By about 1200 Gothic great churches of this type were notable for concerted displays of stained glass and portal statuary, the latter, with its victorious representations of the saints, best representing the trend to consciously triumphal self-representation by the Church. Yet at a deeper level this trait was less innovative than at first sight appears. Excavations at Notre-Dame have revealed that the earliest fourth- or fifth-century basilica on the site possessed five aisles on the model of the Constantinian basilicas of Rome, exactly of the type taken over by the new twelfth-century Gothic plan. Recent commentators have increasingly stressed the dialectic in the formation of the Gothic style between structural and aesthetic innovation, and the restatement of traditions of late antique origin in ground planning and the use of classicising columnar supports in the design of the main elevations of great churches (as at Saint-Denis c. 1140, and Notre-Dame c. 1160).7 It is worth recalling that in this period the yardsticks of scale and excellence in building were still held, as for example by Abbot Suger, to be the great monuments of Rome and Justinian’s mighty sixth-century Haghia Sophia in Constantinople. Though in one sense developed as a reformed post-Romanesque idiom of building, the Gothic style from its earliest period still invoked older and aesthetically outmoded exemplars precisely to reinforce its new authoritative stance.

Until 1200, only France and England had produced distinctive versions of the great Gothic church, primarily in the service either of monastic pilgrimage churches (Saint-Denis, Canterbury, c. 1174) or secular chapters. Throughout the thirteenth century, numerous factors then contributed to the growth of a variety of Gothic styles elsewhere. Differences in design and planning reflected either regional or national preference and tradition, or the needs of new religious institutions, notably the urban Mendicant Orders, whose patronage took on mounting importance from about 1240. Indeed, until well into the thirteenth century, Gothic architecture in Germany, Spain and Italy was known primarily through an austere French Cistercian variant of the idiom which had

originated in Burgundy. This marked the Cistercian order out as ‘missionaries’ of the style until the triumph of thirteenth-century Parisian Gothic more generally in Europe from c. 1250. By the later years of the century Mendicant architecture, though never of formative importance, became influential in some spheres, as for example in the design of Albi cathedral in southern France which resembles the friars’ churches in Toulouse; it was also important in Italy and arguably influenced the design of some English parish churches.

Though the fashion for truly large-scale church building persisted in France, England, Germany and Spain until the later years of the thirteenth century, the period 1200–50 witnessed greater emphasis upon the refinement and systematisation of Gothic architectural design than upon sheer scale. In fact one frequently asserted viewpoint is that by about 1240, the key period of experimentation in Gothic structure and design, centred on Paris and north-eastern France, was over. A small number of cathedrals, beginning with Notre-Dame in Paris, then Laon and Chartres, had by 1200 attained unprecedented interior heights and economy of structure, the final outcome of the development of the rib vault, flying buttress and expanded window begun in the Île-de-France in the mid-twelfth century. By the 1230s the idiom was dominated by a core group of monuments, at the centre of which stood Chartres cathedral (begun 1194) (plate 2), which established the main design principles of its successors, Rheims cathedral in Champagne (begun 1211), and Amiens cathedral in Picardy (begun 1220) (plate 3). These few monuments marked the ‘classic’, heroic, phase of Gothic great church design, a phase which reached its nemesis with the fall of the great vaults of Beauvais cathedral – the greatest interior space conceived in western Europe since the erection of the Pantheon in Rome – in 1284. Thereafter, with a relative slowdown in the economy which left many major projects unfinished until the sixteenth century, and with the apparent satisfaction of the internal imperatives of the Gothic ‘system’ of building, the path of development was marked in France by the aesthetic refinement associated with the Rayonnant style of extreme thinness and precision, and by the growing importance of other regional variants of the Gothic style, notably in England from the last years of the thirteenth century when the emergence of the internationally significant Decorated Style marked a return to the vigour of Anglo-Norman building two centuries earlier.

The relationship between the central Gothic movement of northern France and England, and increasing diversity of regional patterns and control of patronage, is of growing importance in the assessment of the period. France still produced the largest and most obviously visionary structures. But it did not for the most part produce the richest; luxuriant interior finishes of the type

which characterise the major thirteenth-century English cathedrals, notably Lincoln (plate 4), reflect the peculiar wealth of English diocesan chapters at this time, and contrast markedly with the patterns of building of most Italian dioceses of the period, which were generally smaller and poorer. Nor is it now so easy to accept the widely held view that within France there was created something like a canon of buildings — represented especially by Chartres and its scions — which offered a yardstick by which all other Gothic churches might be judged. The high-minded analyses by Panofsky and von Simson of the Gothic style as an idealising embodiment either of quasi-scholastic forms of discourse, or of Neoplatonic aesthetic principles, were centred upon a relatively narrow range of exemplars which reinforced the sense of a single narrative for the style. Canons are always acknowledged retrospectively, of course, and there is some evidence that by the later Middle Ages precisely this group of buildings did indeed represent a point of reference. When the master mason Bleuet of Rheims was asked in 1455 by the canons of Troyes cathedral for his opinion as to the design of the new west façade of their church, he replied that it would be necessary first to visit the churches of Rheims, Amiens and Notre-Dame in Paris, buildings which still possessed the most remarkable (or at least the richest) façades of the Gothic period. There was indeed no want of acknowledgement of the French achievement even in the thirteenth century: in the 1260s the French Pope Clement IV, when founding Narbonne cathedral (built in a southern inflection of the so-called Rayonnant style which evolved c. 1230 around Paris), praised its marvellous beauty, emulating the ‘magnificently worked’ churches then ‘being raised in the kingdom of France’. In the same vein a late thirteenth-century German chronicler of St Peter’s in Wimpfen-im-Thal wrote of its wondrous new church of French workmanship, opere Francigeno.

Yet the emphasis by modern commentators on the spread on opus Francigenum itself reveals a certain cultural politics which are at once both Francocentric and, as we shall see later, courtly in focus. Chartres cathedral, though in no sense a courtly building, continues to stand as a symbol of a certain type of medieval French cultural supremacy. Chartres is an important building because it preserves much of its early thirteenth-century stained glass and sculpture (plate 5); since the writings of Émile Mâle it has stood as a coher-

12 Panofsky (1951); Von Simson (1956); Page (1993), pp. xv–xxiv, 1–42.
13 ‘Qu’il seroit bon de visiter plusieurs églises comme Rains, Amiens et Nostre Dame de Paris et se la fait il donrot son advis’: Murray (1987), p. 149.
ent visionary symbol of French medievalism. But more recently Chartres, precisely because of this apparently unimpeachable status, has emerged as a site of tension. On the one hand it has continued to be regarded as a seminal monument shaping its successor buildings, notably Rheims and Amiens cathedrals. On the other hand it tends to obscure the importance of alternative contemporary visions of great church building no less well furnished with surviving sculpture and glass, notably Bourges cathedral (begun c. 1195) whose planning and design principles are essentially different and whose influence in western France, Spain and even Italy has been increasingly recognised.15 And with this reorientation of interest towards alternative visions of Gothic has come a certain ideological scepticism: Chartres has recently been debunked as a brilliant but in some ways incoherent building, built by gangs of anonymous contractors and not under the aegis of a master mason; as a basis for the projection of the new intolerant value systems of the clerical class; and as fodder for neo-Marxist interpretations of its image-systems. A once-serene sign of thirteenth-century harmony has re-emerged as a site of fragmentation, ideological division and ultimately social repression.16

The debate on Chartres is one characteristic sign of a tension in contemporary criticism of medieval art between the authority of the centre and the margin. It has to be said that this revisionism is probably healthy. Defining the canon has served to sap the study of French regional, and indeed non-French, Gothic building of much of its energy: thus thirteenth-century Spanish Gothic art remains to an astonishing extent *terra incognita* in the English-speaking world. As the study of the Gothic style widens, deepens and fragments, its heterogeneity becomes more apparent. As attention shifts to the diversification of the Gothic ‘movement’ in the regions – in northern and western England, in Normandy and Anjou, in Germany and Angevin Naples and in Mendicant Italy – so it turns also to the deeper structural premises of all art production in the period: to issues of nationality, decorum, ideology, production methods, and ultimately identity. The possibility of a single Gothic idiom representing an ‘essential’ thirteenth century now seems both improbable and unnecessary.17

**RELIGIOUS ART AND DOCTRINAL CHANGE**

Though the thirteenth century saw enormous regional variations in the way the great church was conceived, the period was in other ways marked by increasing standardisation. Between 1100 and 1300 urban cathedral churches throughout

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16 James (1979–81); Camille (1989); Williams (1993).
17 Page (1993), pp. 1–42.
western Europe became highly centralised buildings, integrating beneath one roof religious practices previously dispersed across the complex of cathedral buildings (contrast the survival of separate baptisteries in Italy, for example).

The period was also one of growing uniformity in liturgical practice, prompted by the widespread drive by the clerical and episcopal classes to regulate and reform clerical and lay behaviour. One instance of this would be the spread of the early thirteenth-century Use of Sarum, first developed by Bishop Richard Poore of Salisbury, throughout much of England. The process of formal canonisation of saints at Rome, as opposed to merely locally, now became a norm, and the lives of the saints attained a convenient format in the widely cited *Golden Legend*, produced c. 1260 by the Dominican Jacobus de Voragine. The thirteenth century was one in which the relationship between the local and the universal underwent a crisis partly because the centre was defining itself with a vigour and authority never before seen – the canons of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 are held to be a central document of this process of systematic definition of orthodoxy in the face of heterodox belief. Notwithstanding what has been said already about the importance of seigneurial art, the patronage of the bishops in sustaining cathedral construction and the innovation of such genres as the canopied effigial tomb appears more important than ever.

The relationship between this clerical drive to order and the aesthetic and religious experience of the laity was now vital. We can trace it in three areas especially: the use and dissemination of images, the theology of the sacraments and the doctrine of Purgatory.

We turn first to the function and character of images. By the thirteenth century the cultural traditions of Latin and Greek Christianity which concerned images and relics had begun to converge. Early medieval western Christianity had accorded to the relics of the saints an importance which the Greek Church attached to images, icons especially. Latin art and architecture had thus focused to a great extent on shrines and pilgrimage. In the Greek Church images were ontologically closer to relics, and in a sense enjoyed greater power for this reason. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the eastern and western approaches to relics and images drew closer together. Latin spirituality, especially that fostered within the monastic orders by such figures as St Anselm and St Bernard, was coming to lay greater emphasis on the importance of the humanity of Christ. It is for this reason that issues such as the sacrament of the Mass and the theology of the resurrection and of the bodily Assumption of the Virgin Mary enjoyed such prominence in twelfth-

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century theological debate. This theology of the Christian body was stimulated further by the spread from eastern Orthodox monasticism of liturgical and devotional practices which placed a premium on the role of images within liturgical and meditative practice. By 1200, and certainly after the sack of Constantinople in 1204, the images associated with these practices – principally icons – became much more widely known in the west, at first in clerical and then in lay circles.

The outcome of these developments was the gradual emergence of the ‘image-relic’, and so of a visual culture increasingly common both to Latin and Orthodox Christianity. This culture sustained an interest in local subjects and sites of devotion – the power of the saints was as widely felt in the thirteenth century as before – but supplemented it with a more universal imagery of Christ and the Virgin Mary. Image-relics like the Roman image of the Veronica, the Holy Face of Christ, provided a vital arena of devotional and imaginative liberation (plate 6), and it is in this period that essentially late medieval themes such as the Man of Sorrows and the Arma Christi gained additional importance by having indulgences attached to them, like that composed by Innocent III for the Veronica. The image-relic, then, was implicated not only in the rise of the economy of Purgatorial indulgence, but also in a quite fundamental shift in the focuses of religious attention towards the universal holy body of Christ.

The impact of these changes was widespread. Access to images (which meant primarily their reproduction) gained in importance as a means to salvation. This favoured the mass-production of those painted panels and illuminated manuscripts which included images of this new devotional type. The expressive content of images changed too: as theological emphasis shifted progressively towards meditation upon the humanity, joy and suffering of Christ and Mary, so the expressive range of images widened to reflect new rhetorical ideals, and in such a way as to implicate the spectator at a more intimate level. Images address psychological states of mind in the thirteenth century in a way not true previously, and this new attention is intimately bound up with what is often called Gothic naturalism: thus religious images for the first time in western art smile, or express grief. The intense, pathetic world of the icon and the lamentation image became a common visual currency, which the thirteenth-century Latin Church helped to consolidate and institutionalise. Their most outstanding visual expressions were eventually to be found in central Italian wall and panel painting from the late thirteenth century, though the tendency can also be followed from the mid-century in northern Gothic art, as for example in the sculptures of the rood screen at Naumburg cathedral (plate 7) and on the west façade of Rheims cathedral. Even the most

conservative commentators, such as Matthew Paris, the xenophobic mid-thirteenth-century Benedictine historian-artist at St Albans Abbey, took note. Matthew’s *Chronica Majora* of c. 1250 includes some of the first western representations of the Man of Sorrows and the Stigmatisation of St Francis (in 1224), perhaps the most widely known manifestation of the new theology of the body.

The interest of the thirteenth century lies secondly in the coalescence of these representational changes, however we account for them, and formal doctrinal change enforced by episcopal legislation, for at heart both embody a form of universalism in aspiration, if not always in practice. Here the doctrines of Transubstantiation, Penance and Purgatory are critical. The thirteenth century saw no attempts by the Church to regulate the production of art of the sort promulgated in the sixteenth century during the Tridentine reforms. Those regulations which did appear, such as English episcopal regulations about the dedication and maintenance of altars, chancels and liturgical equipment, were comparatively general and therefore versatile; they represented a lowest common denominator of regulated decency, which visitation records indicate were frequently themselves hopelessly optimistic.25 Roman prescriptions of the period are represented by those of Durandus, bishop of Mende (d. 1296) and more specialised legislation was produced by the Cistercian and Mendicant Orders. The functional character of art was affected substantively, if gradually, by formal doctrinal statements by the Church. The canons of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215 are typically regarded as central to this process.26 Nothing in the canons of the Council pertained directly to the visual arts, though indirectly their impact on the contemporary understanding of the theology of the sacraments is likely to have been significant. Canons 1 and 21 of the Council are the most relevant, the first stating that ‘Jesus Christ is both the priest and the sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the species of bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated into the body and the wine into blood by the divine power’, the second requiring that all Christians should confess privately once a year and receive the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter, on pain of debarral from church and deprivation of Christian burial. Formalised attention to the salvific importance of private and communal Masses, and of devotion to the sacraments, was reinforced by the formal acknowledgement of the feast of Corpus Christi in 1264, a major new element in the contemporary theology of the body.27 Though lay reception of the consecrated elements was restricted throughout the period, the consequences of these formalisations can be traced in the growing scale and elaboration of altar-decoration, especially with retable altarpieces, which developed with extraordinary speed in both northern

Europe and Italy before 1300; and in new pastoral literature on lay conduct at Mass (especially vernacular lay folk’s Mass Books) which aimed to articulate lay experience of Eucharistic devotion before what was still predominantly a clerical activity (plate 8). The growing importance in England and France from the second half of the century of the illuminated Book of Hours, a lay person’s concise equivalent of the clerical Breviary or office-book, also demonstrated the rising importance of lay patronage of illustrated and increasingly mass-produced spiritual material.28 By such means forms of structured devotional life originating in earlier medieval monastic life penetrated the routines of the laity for the first time on a widespread basis. A key instance of this was Marian devotion. In keeping with most liturgical developments of this time the period saw an expansion in the scale and duration of liturgical practice of this type: thus the thirteenth century also witnessed the addition to, or within, cathedrals of chapels catering specially for lay devotion to the Virgin Mary. High altars in churches of all ranks were now to be equipped with an image of the Virgin Mary as well as of the titular saint, and Lateran IV further added the Ave Maria to the expectation that the laity should know the Pater noster and Creed. Marian devotion, earlier focused by the Cistercians in the twelfth century, was thus broadened and institutionalised.

Lateran IV’s requirement of annual auricular confession and penance is also regarded as a watershed in the development of late medieval spirituality, literature and art. It is to thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century illuminated manuscripts and parish church wall paintings that we look for some of the first signs of a new and increasingly lay penitential culture. This culture was informed by episcopal reform programmes of the type promoted from 1238 by Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, which enjoined the clerics, and thereby the faithful, to know the Ten Commandments, the Seven Deadly Sins and the Seven Sacraments. Formalised statements of minimum levels of knowledge – for the formal structuring of sin was of course a form of education – were aided by the preaching of the Mendicant Orders.29 The highest, especially royal, patrons were beginning to take Franciscans and Dominicans as personal confessors. The exact steps of confession and penance, once set out in penitentials, were now systematised in mnemonically clear diagrams suitable for inclusion in devotional psalters like that made for Baron Robert de Lisle early the next century.30 And general evidence of lay supervision at parochial level is supplied by thematically novel church and domestic wall paintings which offered lay people pictorial homilies. The earliest examples of popular macabre images like the Three Living and the Three Dead, whose basis is essentially penitential, originated in this climate of reform.

In addition to sacramental theology, the formal codification of the doctrine of Purgatory, first enunciated dogmatically at the second Council of Lyons in 1274, added a final element to the progressive forces operating in the period. Though the key elements of the doctrine – that Purgatory was a provisional state of cleansing of the soul after death, and that its duration could be shortened by the performance by the living of suffrages, typically prayers and Masses – were already in place by about 1200, at the level of doctrinal debate, social and religious practice rapidly accepted the dynamics of the doctrine irrespective of its gradual dogmatic formalisation by the Church. Its importance was manifold. It added importance to the sacrament of Mass by placing Masses and Offices, especially the Office of the Dead, at the centre of the economy of salvation from Purgatory. In addition to the special annexation of spaces within greater churches, the endowment of specific private Masses to be chanted for the dead became increasingly common during the century. Specialised altar-spaces suitable for the commemoration of families or other groups were emerging in France, England and Italy by 1300, as in the case of the chapels at the east end of Santa Croce in Florence. Burial in church, as opposed to in the churchyard, became an accepted form of social and spiritual recognition. Although already of long-standing validity, church burial attained new importance as the focus of the development, again first among the clerical classes, of the effigial tomb as a focus of memory and a stimulus to the performance of suffrages. Tombs of this type were additionally important as a legitimate part of the dossier of sanctity for potential saints in a period when clerical canonisation and so the recording of miracles at tombs remained of formidable importance.

Monasteries, which benefited economically from the possession of the saints’ relics and aristocratic remains, continued, with the new Mendicant Orders, to compete for lay burial. The thirteenth century saw the formation of royal mausolea under the protection of religious orders: the French royal family and sovereigns were buried at Cistercian Royaumont and Benedictine Saint-Denis respectively; the house of Castile was commemorated at Cistercian Las Huelgas, near Burgos; and the Plantagenets formed a royal mausoleum at Benedictine Westminster (plate 9). All were accompanied by unprecedentedly rich tomb programmes, and the tendency remained to focus such mausolea on the shrines of saints of national importance. Burial was in this sense tied up with the construction of national history. By the thirteenth century the older Benedictine burial establishments, notably Saint-Denis and Westminster, were all centres of formal chronicle writing. As royal mausolea came to express notions of dynastic continuity, so too the process of historical

writing could substantiate this formalised presentation of the past. But the pull of devotional loyalty to other religious orders in the thirteenth century was sufficiently strong to warrant the division of royal bodies by mortuary practice in such a way that the head and body of a sovereign (which in canon law marked the official place of burial) could go to the established mausoleum, the heart (the focus of devotional loyalty) to a Cistercian or Mendicant house. Bodily subdivision, of which a remarkable example is provided by the multiple burials and associated monuments of Queen Eleanor of Castile (d. 1290) at Lincoln, Westminster and the Dominican house in London, was a solution to the complexities of competing historical and devotional loyalties. Its importance was such that Boniface VIII’s attempt in 1299 to ban this essentially aristocratic practice failed.34

Doctrinal change, together with the new momentum lent to lay spirituality by episcopal legislation and the Mendicant Orders, was thus implicated in the development of several artistic genres, altarpieces, Books of Hours, illustrated penitential manuals, tombs and chantries being amongst the most important. All these genres served instrumentally to support the implications of clarified sacramental and purgatorial doctrine. Changes in the Gothic system of representation which served to stress the rhetorical projection of spiritual states in a new naturalistic vein served equally the instrumental power of these new images, and formed the basis for the development of much late medieval religious art.

Court Art

In tandem with these changes, the thirteenth century witnessed transformations in the bases of art production and patronage. As we have already seen, the first part of the century was dominated by widespread campaigns of church construction and by the consolidation of the Gothic style throughout most of northern Europe, and also Italy. The professionalisation of the trade of architecture was marked by the growing influence of master masons. The production of figurative art was increasingly centred on urban professional, rather than monastic, organisations. This reflected the general growth of the urban economy, but it also accompanied the new forces which were acting to expand demand for art production, again within the city. Paris, for example, was becoming an important centre of organised production of illuminated manuscripts, the more modest of which served the needs of its university. Books produced under these new conditions, notably the Bible, became increasingly standardised in form and content.35 Civic patronage in the new

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city-states of Italy towards 1300 also encouraged the supply of panel and wall paintings in the service of communal patronage of church and civic buildings, and the organisation of painters’ workshops in this period appears to have become professionalised, though not as yet dominated by a formal guild structure. Finally, the concentration of courtly culture at major centres of power like Paris and London served further to galvanise the importance of the urban artistic economy. By 1300 the evidence of Parisian tax records indicates the scale, specialisation and wealth of the city’s community of practising artists.

A major, if not the sole, factor in the rise to prominence of cities like Paris is likely to have been the presence of royal courts. Though kingship was administratively still largely itinerant, Paris and Westminster, and in the fourteenth century Prague, were emerging as both practical and symbolic concentrations of power, emblematic of the centre of the realm.36 This has raised the possibility that the thirteenth-century palace was itself a major centre of art production, though research has tended of late to minimise, or even deny, the importance of so-called court schools of art production on the lines of those attributed by some scholars to the earlier court of Charlemagne. Palace art appears rather to have participated in the visual milieu of the city at large, and the era of the formalised post of court artist had yet to dawn.

Nevertheless, the study of thirteenth-century French art in particular has tended to preserve a view of the absolute centrality of seigneurial patronage. This has conditioned theories about the initial development and spread of the style. ‘It is a fair assumption’, wrote Robert Fawtier, ‘that the prestige of the Capetian monarchy helped to create a preference for the artistic styles favoured in the royal domain and the great royal city of Paris.’37 Robert Branner, under the influence of Fawtier and the German scholar Sedlmayr, extended this notion to the thirteenth century in discussing the birth of the Rayonnant Style in and around Paris – a style of Gothic great church building emerging c. 1230 which took its name from the radiating spokes of the newest rose windows – as an essentially courtly phenomenon whereby masons employed by the court now stood in the vanguard of artistic developments previously nurtured by clerical patrons. The clerical Gothic of Chartres was now displaced by a courtly Gothic, the Gothic of the thirteenth-century rebuilding of Saint-Denis and of the Sainte-Chapelle erected by Louis IX in Paris in the 1240s (plate 10); and it was this new modernised and urbane style that led finally to the export of the French ‘system’ of courtly building abroad, to England, Germany and Spain, at the expense of local traditions. The greatest churches of the 1240s in northern Europe, Westminster Abbey (begun 1245) (plate 11) and Cologne cathedral (begun 1248) were thus expatriated variants of the French Court Style,

symbols of France’s absolute cultural hegemony and of a wider genuflection before the most Christian monarchy of St Louis.  

Branner’s argument is powerful and in many ways correct. Yet though arguments of this type make for brilliant visual analysis of buildings, they have at their core a view of the history of art which emphasises abstract developments of styles of art, and not their social and cultural (in other words more broadly historical) environment. Branner saw the patronage of the thirteenth-century French court as basically monostylar, and tended to marginalise the phenomenal role of the clerical classes in the conception and commissioning of Rayonnant Gothic churches. His position was that of an internationalist who promoted French court patronage as a form of ‘meta-patronage’ to which other forms of power were naturally subject until the French courtly movement in architecture was itself creatively exhausted. Jean Bony’s suggestion that the architectural hegemony of French Gothic was exhausted by about 1300, and assumed instead by England under the impetus of its own Court Style in the early fourteenth century, was thus a natural development of Branner’s analysis.  

At many levels this position looks increasingly unsupportable. The identification of a specifically courtly idiom in England and France, either in architecture or the figurative arts, is problematical: the evidence suggests that the provision of architecture and painting for the court was the responsibility of favoured artists whose organisational framework was urban, not courtly, and whose origins were far flung. The patronage of thirteenth-century kings is marked far more by the principles of variety and complexity common to high clerical patronage than by a specific single official idiom. No two court buildings of Louis IX’s reign – such as the chapel at Saint-Germain-en-Laye (1230s) and the remarkable Sainte-Chapelle (1240s) in Paris – look alike. Nor does the evidence of thirteenth-century French court manuscript production of works like the Bibles moralisées or devotional Psalters sustain the view of a dominant idiom remotely comparable to what was to occur under Valois patronage in the next century when extensive royal libraries appear to have been formed for the first time.

It is testimony to the eclecticism of court patronage that one of its central monuments, Henry III’s Westminster Abbey begun in 1245, is also aesthetically one of the most diverse in its origins: far from being merely a copy of the French Court Style as Branner indicated, Westminster’s range of reference to French architecture is wider and more ideologically motivated than a simple concern with modernity might suggest. The reasons for this are clear, and lie at the heart of any theory of courtly cultural production. First the virtues of

varietas were central to the richest patronage at any level. The central statements of aesthetic decorum produced within monastic debate in the previous century had already identified simplicity with poverty, complexity and diversity with wealth and symbolic density. Second, royal patrons enjoyed relatively much greater capacity to command and appropriate various idioms by virtue of their international dynastic links. An excellent instance of this is provided by the adoption by Henry III and Edward I at Westminster Abbey of thirteenth-century Roman mosaics of papal character for floors, tombs and the shrine of the English patron saint Edward the Confessor in the 1260s and 1270s. Exceptionally exotic choices of this type can only be the product of idiosyncrasies of patronage. In England they may be accounted for by the Mediterranean dimension of Henry III’s foreign policies, and by the crusading activities and imperialist policies of Edward I, who had the Theodosian walls of Constantinople copied at his major castle at Caernarfon, which secured his Welsh campaigns (plate 12).

But more broadly, aesthetic exchanges of this type reveal the deeper claims made by monarchy itself. Henry III’s choice of a papal tomb-type for his burial may emphasise his quasi-clerical conception of monarchy. The possibility that the tomb was designed by the workshop of the major Italian sculptor Arnolfo di Cambio places it in the sphere of Arnolfo’s contemporary work in Italy for Charles of Anjou and later for Boniface VIII, and reminds us that Philip IV of France was the first patron north of the Alps to employ Roman painters. Allegiances of this type indicate the role of art in substantiating the claims of power, and also the growing tendency in the imagery of contemporary power to deploy similar art forms and images for royal and papal patrons whose patronage might otherwise have been thought to be distinct. In this sense the courtly milieu was internationalist, but it was also based on the premise of an increasingly common syncretic language of symbolic reference.

Notwithstanding this growing universalism and authoritarianism, the specific imagery of court art revealed equal attention to local sources and preoccupations. At one level these were as diverse as those developing amongst the aristocracy at large. Lay reading habits favoured romances, especially of the Arthurian canon, Bible narratives (plate 13), specially translated into the vernacular and racily illustrated, and historical works. In England the crusading activities of Richard I were painted on palace walls for Henry III and his queen. Illustrated hagiography was increasingly popular as pastoral and edificatory material. In France and England the great national saints, St Denis, St Thomas and St Edward, were the subject of commemoration in stained-glass cycles and illuminated manuscripts. The Lives of royal saints like Louis and Edward the Confessor (plate 8) enjoyed a special role both in celebrating ideals of national
cohesion and in expressing, albeit informally, ideals of royal conduct. Although the great age of royal canonisation was drawing to a close, the Life of a figure such as St Edward offered the English court a model of precedent and behaviour, harking back to the Anglo-Saxon links of the Plantagenet dynasty and celebrating a specific vision of idealised monarchical conduct, in a period of recurrent political instability. Much the same can be said of the vision of virtue and piety offered by the Life of St Louis formulated after his canonisation in 1297. Narratives of this sort were bolstered by large-scale displays of royal historical tradition, like the immense sculpted genealogy of the kings of France commissioned in the 1290s by Philip IV for the great hall of the Palais de la Cité in Paris. Historical confrontations of this type at the royal courts correspond to the new awareness in papal Rome in exactly this period of the city’s magnificent apostolic past.

The role of art in articulating ideals and mythologies of identity was developed further by its use at a more didactic level. Most royal image-systems of the period were not in any significant sense propagandistic; their chief aim was to confront the court itself at an absolutely elite level. As a result, an important and increasingly widespread role of texts and images, to which royal hagiography contributed at the level of pastoral self-understanding, was to offer a self-reflexive homily on power itself. The public face of authoritarian rule was now accompanied by a correspondingly sophisticated internal mechanism of criticism. The period saw the emergence of new genres of admonitory literature advising princes how to conduct themselves ethically, commonly Aristotelian in derivation and known as ‘mirror’ literature. In the case of Giles of Rome’s Liber de regimine principum, written under the influence of Aquinas, and translated c. 1280 into French at the behest of Philip IV, texts of this type could be illustrated. The Augustinian tradition of salutary commentary on the evils of tyranny, implicit in writings on English court life like those of Giraldus Cambrensis and Walter Map, is manifest in thirteenth-century wall paintings about bad Old Testament kings of the type which once adorned the Palace of Westminster in the 1290s. Such inventive amalgams of imagery were fundamentally compatible with the spiritual, edificatory and essentially private tone of the late thirteenth-century Dominican Somme le roi (plate 14). This notion of the ideal court and household, perhaps best symbolised by the Life of St Louis as presented to us by his biographer Joinville, was to be cruelly (and very funny) parodied within a very few years by the false court in the Parisian Roman de Fauvel (1310–14) with its cast of moral reprobates, perverts and syco-phants. The secular political thrust of such works as Brunetto Latini’s Trésor of the 1260s, also read in royal circles, was to be felt in the civic art of central Italy in the next century.
ITALY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

In 1200 much of western Europe remained a magnificent archive of the cultural activity of the Roman empire. The heritage was palpable: outside Italy, Roman buildings could be studied in Provence and Burgundy, and antique gemstones, cameos and metalwork glimmered in the treasuries of great churches, as at Saint-Denis and Auxerre. In England, the fashion for setting antique gems in the rings of bishops is attested by the grave goods of Hubert Walter, archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1205); Matthew Paris drew a great Roman cameo in the possession of St Albans Abbey in the 1250s, and the French draughtsman Villard d’Honnecourt reproduced a Roman tomb in his sketchbook. Antique cameos were a favourite form of decoration for the shrines of saints. The aesthetic, medical and scientific heritage of Rome – as in the works of Vitruvius and Pliny – remained a fundamental benchmark of thoroughness, along with the standards of Ciceronian Latin. Rome’s own physical heritage, though dangerously tainted with paganism, was noted as an object of wonder by travellers and pilgrims like Master Gregorius. Even by the mid-twelfth century, monastic patrons at Montecassino, Saint-Denis and Fleury regarded Rome and Byzantium as sources for enriching spolia to be carted off and reinstalled elsewhere.

The pattern of antique survival and reappraisal in the thirteenth century observed unsystematic bricolage and true assimilation, and can loosely be understood in relation to what is sometimes called the ‘twelfth-century Renaissance’. Late-antique figurative art had already informed Carolingian art, and it was this species of Frankish classicism which resurfaced in northeastern France and Lotharingia in the hands of twelfth-century metalworkers like Nicholas of Verdun, and which passed thence into the repertory of sculptors employed by French cathedral workshops in the 1200s, as at Rheims. The earliest sculpted figures executed for the façades of Rheims cathedral begun in 1211 (plate 15) are triumphs less of romanitas than of an essentially medieval Frankish sensibility. In the south, in Provence, stood churches in Arles and elsewhere whose direct reference to local antique remains is, however, clear; when carved stones were carried from Marseilles to Auxerre in the form of spolia, their antique form and subject-matter were introduced into the sculptures on Auxerre cathedral’s astonishing west façade executed in the second half of the thirteenth century.

There was in fact no single pattern of appraisal of the antique, for Hellenic art, and the durable and versatile formulae which it preserved, were pondered and interpreted quite as much locally as universally, and ideologically as

aesthetically. Broadly the formulae were two in origin, via Byzantine and provincial Roman art respectively. The consolidation of Norman power in Sicily and the Mediterranean was a major factor in guaranteeing the impact of regional Byzantine art, frequently of magnificent quality, in Norman England, the Iberian peninsula (as in the wall paintings at Sigena) and the Holy Roman Empire. Though the Cistercians were already spreading a variant of Burgundian Gothic to Germany, the figurative arts produced there in fact retained a decisively Byzantine inflection throughout most of the thirteenth century. It was only at specific centres, such as Bamberg, that sculptors acknowledged the achievements of Rheims cathedral’s artists by the middle years of the century.

Roger II of Sicily, though a Latin ruler, had encouraged the production of Greek-style mosaics and Byzantine ruler-imagery in his own commissions, doubtless reflecting the fact that he was a parvenu; and the extent of broader Mediterranean influences, notably Islamic ones, in his building projects is no less evident. This appropriative spirit also characterises the patronage of his most notable successor, Frederick II, Hohenstaufen king of Sicily and Holy Roman Emperor (d. 1250). Frederick’s patronage is sometimes held up as a counterpart to the classicism of Rheims. But its ad hoc nature separates it radically from the Gothic achievement in aesthetic outcome. Frederick’s neo-antique Augustalis coins made in the 1230s, and the decorations of the great Gate at Capua also of the 1230s, can be interpreted as manifestations of an imperial classicism. But their quality and extent are limited, and their programmatic outlook of self-conscious reflection on the form and objectives of government belongs essentially within Italian tradition. Thus the images of Frederick II as Augustus, together with the personification of Justice on the Capuan Gate, anticipate the proto-humanism of the fourteenth-century murals in Siena’s Palazzo Pubblico. Local and perhaps even provincial in character, Frederick’s art is no more remarkable in its romanitas than that of his dynastic partners, and is certainly inferior technically and aesthetically to the slightly later work of central Italian sculptors like Niccolo Pisano (who was however of south Italian origin), where antique style and technique are well emulated. As we have seen, Frederick’s brother-in-law Henry III of England, whose own brother Richard was elected king of the Romans in 1257, commissioned medieval Roman artworks at Westminster whose sources lay ultimately in the antique and Byzantine sphere, all the more self-consciously for marking a complete breach with local tradition. Here was a more daring universalism. Frederick II, in appropriating Roger II’s giant porphyry sarcophagus for his

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own burial, was acting no differently from those thirteenth-century popes who valued antique sarcophagi above all others. Frederick’s work at Capua anticipated his successor Charles of Anjou’s patronage of quasi-imperial seated images of himself, of which one, possibly by Arnolfo di Cambio, was designed for the Capitol in Rome (plate 16); and it was from here that Boniface VIII’s programme of self-representation in and around Rome developed to the point that Philip IV of France could accuse him, in effect, of idolatry. Philip, in the tradition of a French monarchy skilled at promoting its links to the Carolingian past, was keenly aware of the power of images: he himself was eventually depicted in Notre-Dame in Paris as an equestrian emperor-king in the guise of Marcus Aurelius or Charlemagne, or of a Hohenstaufen equestrian figure of the type erected at Magdeburg or Bamberg.

The case of late thirteenth-century Italy, and specifically of Rome, demands special attention. In the second half of the thirteenth century the papacy was occupied by two successive issues: the power of the Hohenstaufen and, later, the influence of Charles of Anjou. The presence of French popes, notably Urban IV and Clement IV (plate 17), was also felt, though their patronage in France (both were associated with significant Gothic church building, at Saint-Urbain at Troyes and Narbonne cathedral respectively) differed somewhat from that in Italy. In the work of Arnolfo di Cambio and the Pisani, ostensibly northern Gothic elements mingle with antique ones. But from the 1270s the reassertion of Roman control of the papacy, a closing of ranks by Roman families, notably the Orsini and Colonna, and a restriction of the Senate to Romans and not Angevins or Plantagenets, presaged a striking artistic risorgimento. This surfaced in the work of Cavallini, Cimabue and Giotto, monumental decorators in fresco and mosaic well versed in the local Roman traditions of large-scale pictorial display, and employed under the aegis of the papacy and major curial families like the Stefaneschi before the collapse of Roman patronage with the commencement of the Avignonese papacy in the 1300s. To an extent this galvanising reflects exactly the same concentrations of talent growing up around court centres in the north. The surviving showcase monument of this phase of Roman patronage, the murals in the upper church of S. Francesco in Assisi, reveals the coalescence of Roman decorative principles and Franciscan spirituality in a new narrative style inaugurated probably under Nicholas IV (1288–92), the first Franciscan pope, a style which already demonstrates all the essential components of the Giottesque revolution (plate 18).

In Rome itself, the early Christian basilicas and Franciscan churches saw extensive redecoration, a veritable recuperation of a splendid past, that of early

Christian Rome. But the artistic personalities, the names, are redolent of progress, of the Renaissance. The mythology of Giotto (?c. 1267–1337), as promoted in the early years of the fourteenth century by Francesco da Barberino and Dante, is central to the Renaissance notion of the artist. Yet Giotto’s early association with Rome points backwards, to a culture of reaction which produced astonishing yet in some respects old-fashioned pictures, summaries, to an extent, of the empathetic spiritual currents of the previous century and of yet older notions of pictorial authority. Where northern Gothic stood for an ideal of modernity, Roman painting was self-consciously antique, seeking out its own historical identity, and deploying older Byzantine formulae to its own ends. But as with many conservative revolutions (and one might think too of Abbot Suger) atavism provided a fertile basis for absolutely radical novelty: Giotto was both the first of the moderns, and the last of the ancients.49

In comparison with the widespread influence throughout fourteenth-century northern Europe of Sienese art, the art produced in Rome, Umbria and Florence around 1300 and associated centrally with Giotto, remained of relevance primarily within medieval Italy. Rome’s collapse as a papal city led to a diaspora of artists attracted to other centres, notably Angevin Naples and eventually Avignon, and Sienese painting was to have a far broader impact. Nevertheless, the art produced by the painters in the circle of Giotto was important in representing the first revolutionary pictorial culture to synthesise many of the important devotional and representational traits of the period, discussed earlier. In turning basically late-antique notions of pictorial space, lighting and rhetoric to the service of the new devotional art, its role was less to manifest a scientific agenda in the figurative arts – and the new open light and coherent space of late thirteenth-century Roman painting have been ‘explained’ by reference to neo-Aristotelian theories of light and the sensory apprehension of data, and thus to a modernising natural science – than to give coherent expression to the theologies of the body which had developed in western Christendom in this period.50 Arguably, therefore, the character of thirteenth-century naturalism was essentially metaphysical. It is characteristic of this period that the most prominent Aristotelians, such as Robert Grosseteste, were also outstanding Platonists. Italian figurative art, like that of the Gothic north, was not nominalist in character; rather, both were in their different ways the outcome of a particular understanding of the oldest Christian philosophical system, that of Neoplatonism which, by means of the theology of its medieval inheritors the Cistercians and the Franciscans, was effecting a revolution in the way the importance of the body to religious feeling

was understood. The most modern images of Christ’s humanity were born not in a spirit of nominalist rationality or humanist proto-Renaissance, but rather in the ascetic thinking of the Cistercians and the Franciscans; for it was Franciscans like St Bonaventure who in this period developed the most commonsensical approach to the material world and its implications for the theology of the Resurrection, one with which the work of Dante in the next century easily harmonised. The mythology of a scientific Renaissance beginning with a reappraisal of nature in the work of Giotto from c. 1300 is a Renaissance, not a medieval, creation.
PART II

THE CHURCH IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
The thirteenth century holds a significant place in the history of papal monarchy.¹ This period saw the papacy reach the peak of the effectiveness towards which it had been moving throughout the twelfth century. However, it also saw the beginnings of the decline of that effectiveness, which was to gather momentum in the later Middle Ages.

The papacy was a unique sort of monarchy in that it claimed jurisdiction in both spiritual and temporal affairs. It claimed primacy of jurisdiction as ‘monarch of all Churches’, headship of the ecclesiastical world. It did not claim a comparable jurisdiction over the secular world because it did not doubt that a division of spiritual and temporal powers had been decreed by God himself. But it did claim a right to judge lay rulers and, at its own assessment of need, otherwise to intervene authoritatively in the temporal order. In addition to these two types of jurisdiction, spiritual and temporal, it laid claim to a third: over a state of its own. By virtue of the Patrimony of St Peter, it possessed in its own right territorial jurisdiction over a central Italian state, wherein the pope ruled like any other European monarch.

During the thirteenth century, each of these three types of papal jurisdiction underwent important change. In the opening decades of the century, especially in the pontificates of Innocent III (1198–1216), Honorius III (1216–27) and Gregory IX (1227–41), the papacy either initiated, or very quickly associated itself with, the new religious and intellectual movements of the age.² Papal government extended its range and improved its quality to an extent unprecedented in earlier papal history. In the political sphere, similarly, it was involved more deeply and widely than previously. It sought to expand and effectively to control the Papal State with a vigour which was new.

Increasingly enmeshed in local Italian affairs, however, the papacy appeared

¹ Stimulating summary in Ullmann (1972), pp. 201–26, 251–78.
² Some important aspects of which are treated elsewhere in this volume (see chs. 9 and 10).
Map 2  The Papal States
by the end of the century to have lost much of its capacity for creating and encouraging innovative forces. Its political claims were spectacularly rebuffed by kings strong in the support of their Church and nation. As to the success of its policies in the Papal State and Italy, the withdrawal to Avignon in the fourteenth century is commentary enough.

How popes understood the nature of papal authority, how they exercised it and how it was challenged, particularly in the political sphere, must form the main theme of this chapter. But the papacy was an elective monarchy in this period. The electoral college, the College of Cardinals, was also the papal equivalent of the councils of contemporary kings, the body of ministers and senior officials concerned with the day-to-day conduct of government. The corporate body of pope and cardinals formed the Roman Church; there were oligarchic tendencies in the working of the papal monarchy.

Problems arise in presenting in outline form a theme of such variety and complexity over so long a period. This chapter has as its organising principle a characteristic feature of thirteenth-century papal government: the use of general councils as a major instrument of policy. There were three of them: Lateran IV (1215); Lyons I (1245); Lyons II (1274). In these assemblies of the bishops of the universal Church, reinforced by other clerical estates and by representatives of lay powers, the papacy confronted crisis, articulated and publicised what it expected of clergy and laity and sought to win minds and hearts to the support of its policies. To assess the nature and implementation of the programmes initiated at these assemblies is to delineate much of the fortune and misfortune of the papal monarchy in our period.

**THE MAKING OF POPES IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY**

Between the accession of Innocent III in January 1198 and the death of Boniface VIII in October 1303, eighteen popes ruled the Church. Three were Italian, four were French and one was Portuguese. This mixture of nationalities itself indicates that a variety of routes led to the papacy in this period. Rise to the headship of the Church could be meteoric: after the death of his wife, Gui Foulques (Clement IV) was priest, bishop, archbishop, cardinal and pope all within a decade (1255–65). It could be even more unexpected: Tedaldo Visconti (Gregory X), archdeacon of Liège, though not a priest, was serving with the crusaders in the Holy Land when elected in 1271. It could be more unpredictable still: Pietro Morrone, a hermit-monk with a reputation for miraculous healing, was well advanced into his eighties when brought down from his cave in the Abruzzi mountains and installed as Celestine V in 1294.

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The electoral system, then, could spring surprises. For the most part, however, it ran true to form. It was service in the Sacred College (as the College of Cardinals came to be called in this period) that counted for most in the choice of popes in this century. The cardinals formed what, from the eleventh century, had been commonly described as the Senate of the Roman Church. Its role as senate was to counsel and assist the pope in running the affairs of the universal Church. It was aided by this Senate that the popes ordinarily exercised their legislative, judicial and administrative authority. As the Roman senators had been described as part of the body of the emperor, so it became commonplace to describe the College as a member of the pope’s body, sharing his universal pastoral charge, participating in the exercise of the plenitude of his governmental power. The thirteenth-century cardinals were full-time curial officials. The College was always a relatively small body (some 130 promotions only in the century as a whole; 77 in the period 1198–1268). The cardinals were worked hard in a wide variety of roles. Corporately, they acted with the pope for the dispatch of business in consistory. Individually, they might hold the top ministerial posts, treasurer, penitentiary, vice-chancellor; be commissioned as legates to carry the apostolic authority all over Christendom; be appointed ad hoc to hear legal cases, serve on committees of investigation (of candidates for canonisation, for example), govern provinces of the Papal State, act as protectors of religious orders. They were true sharers in the burden of the papal office (to echo another contemporary description of their role). Convention and common sense dictated that the cardinal-electors should look first for popes from their own ranks, from those with most experience of papal government.

In fact, only three of the eighteen popes of this century had not been cardinals (Urban IV as well as Gregory X and Celestine V). The remaining fifteen had between them amassed an impressive tally of service in the papal curia as cardinals. Nicholas III had been one for thirty-three years, Gregory IX for twenty-nine, Adrian V for twenty-five, Honorius IV for twenty-four, Honorius III for twenty-three, Martin IV for twenty. Five more had between ten and sixteen years. Only four had less than ten years (Innocent III, Clement IV, Innocent V, John XXI). Such figures would lead us to expect an essential continuity of papal policies in this century.

While lengthy membership of the College was the strongest predisposing factor in the making of popes in this period, it was not the only factor at work. There was a distinct dynastic element in the composition of the College of

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5 Lecler (1964); Watt (1980).
6 Details for the century as a whole, Eubel (1913), pp. 3–17. Important for more limited periods, Bagliani (1972); Maleczek (1984).
Cardinals. There was nepotism, if not on any grand scale. Twelve of the eighteen popes were to create cardinals; eight of them appointed one or two relatives. Innocent III appointed three, as did Boniface VIII. Several of these family creations were to become popes. Innocent III created cardinal the future Gregory IX who promoted the future Alexander IV; all Conti relatives. Innocent IV of the Genoese Fieschi made his brother's son a cardinal and he was to become Hadrian V. Each of those made cardinal by a relative and subsequently elected pope had proved himself worthy of the office in long curial service. The prominence in the Sacred College throughout the century of families of the city and Papal State – Conti, Savelli, Orsini, Capocci, Annibaldi, Caetani – was not due simply to popes promoting their own relatives. Among the cardinals created by the French pope Urban IV was an Orsini, a Savelli and an Annibaldi. It was recognised that such families could be of powerful assistance in the papacy’s endemic local problems: the achievement and maintenance of papal security in Rome, the establishment of the authority of the central government in the Papal State.

That there were dangers in these local associations is evident enough. Popes could be tempted to a dynastic policy, subjecting the general good to family aggrandisement. Such, most conspicuously, was the charge against the Orsini, Nicholas III, given its classical form in Dante’s *Inferno* xix. More insidious still was the danger of family rivalries springing from purely local and dynastic considerations, escalating into the heart of papal government. Such rivalries would explain electoral delays and no doubt influenced many papal decisions about Italian affairs. The most overt and damaging example of such escalation of family feuding into the papacy itself can be seen, at the end of the century, when Caetani–Colonna quarrels led to the expulsion of the two Colonna cardinals from the Sacred College and their becoming Boniface VIII’s dedicated and ruthless enemies, challenging the legality of his election and even, through a Colonna relative, seriously threatening to take his life.

Nevertheless, despite the importance of family influences within the Sacred College, it can be said with some confidence that no pope in this period was elected as the pawn of any self-interest group or individual. For better or for worse, though the cardinals were rarely totally free from external pressures, occasionally of a severe kind, the real choices were made by the College as a whole and reflect quite closely the composition of the College itself. With the major exception of Celestine V, who abdicated five months after election, they chose men whose quality of life and competence in papal affairs had been well attested in practical experience.

Well portrayed by Brentano (1974).

‘… veramente fui figliuol dell’orsa, / cupido si per avanzar li orsatti, / che su l’avere, e qui me misi in borsa,’ *Inferno*, Canto xix, lines 71–2.
This is not to say that the College, in its capacity as elector of popes, always did its work well. More often than it should have been, it was dilatory in choosing a new pope. There were perhaps extenuating circumstances for the delay of twenty months in finding a successor to Celestine IV (d. 1241), because Frederick II was holding two cardinals captive. There were none, however, for the longest vacancy in papal history – nearly three years between the death of Clement IV in 1268 and the election of Gregory X in 1271. Nor for the vacancy of over two years before finding a successor to Nicholas IV (1292–4). On two other occasions, on the deaths of John XXI (1277) and of Nicholas III (1280), the vacancies lasted six months. These delays, particularly that of 1268–71, led to widespread criticism of the cardinals and a demand for electoral reform which, when introduced in 1274, the cardinals vigorously opposed, thwarting its immediate implementation.

There is one other factor to be considered when examining the making of popes in the thirteenth century: the importance of the accidental. An unusually high proportion of the pontificates of this period were extremely short. Celestine IV died in 1241 before his enthronement, as did Hadrian V in 1276 (even before there was a chance to ordain him priest). Indeed, in the year 1276, no less than four popes held office. Six more popes had reigns of less than four years and a seventh barely achieved a four-year pontificate. Only four pontificates stretched to ten years or more; and all of these fell in the first half of the century.

The most recent law regulating papal elections had been promulgated in general council, Lateran III (1179). *Licet de vitanda* decreed that if there were no unanimity among the electors, a two-thirds majority of the cardinals present would suffice for a valid election.\(^9\) The constitution had nothing to say about the actual conduct of the election itself. But essentially, a papal election was an episcopal election like any other. The procedure at such elections was standardised at Lateran IV.\(^10\) Electors could make up their minds by way of any of three procedures.

The College of Cardinals might make its choice quite spontaneously when, without the formality of recording votes, all in unison spontaneously acclaimed someone as pope. This method can be described as choice ‘through inspiration’\(^11\) ‘as though divinely inspired’ as Gregory IX, the only pope to be so chosen in this period, was to express it in his letter announcing his election to the Church.\(^12\) The normal way envisaged was that by formal voting procedure,
supervised by canonically appointed scrutineers: election per formam scrutinii. Voting could go on until a candidate received the necessary two-thirds majority. Whether the two-thirds could be achieved with the inclusion of the elect’s own vote was often discussed by canonists without a decisive ruling being made on the point. The method of scrutiny could of course be a lengthy business. But there was an alternative method available to help to break any impasse which use of the scrutiny procedure had encountered. This was the method of delegation (per formam compromissi), whereby the electors entrusted their authority to elect to a small group chosen from among themselves and bound themselves to abide by its choice. The precise size of the group had not in this period been officially regulated. The decision to proceed by delegation had to be unanimous, as had its choice of elect. It was used three times in the thirteenth century (at the elections of Honorius III, Clement IV and Gregory X).

It was expected that elections would be completed quickly. The ordo Romanus, updated by the future Honorius III in the last decade of the twelfth century, specified that the election should take place on the third day after the death of a pope, with consecration following on the next Sunday. In fact, the elections of Innocent III, Honorius III13 and Gregory IX were even quicker. One feature of the election of Honorius III, however, suggests that there was no very general confidence that the cardinals could be trusted to go about their business with alacrity. It had long been axiomatic that papal elections should proceed without lay interference. But in 1216 the Perugians, following a procedure not uncommon in Italian city elections, ‘enclosed’ the cardinals, thus encouraging them to an early decision. The Perugians were to do the same in 1265 for the election of Clement IV. The senator of Rome took it on himself to enclose the cardinals in 1241 (with unfortunate results; the cardinals were physically abused), as did the podestà of Naples more helpfully in 1254 for the election of Alexander IV. Thus the substance of what the new electoral decree Ubi periculum, introduced in 1274, would call a ‘conclave’ had appeared informally, and technically uncanonically, much earlier.14 Protection of the electors slid easily into pressurising them to act speedily with a firm if usually fairly mild

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113 The papacy


form of confinement. No doubt it also allowed interested parties to offer their views as to who might be elected.

**POPE INNOCENT III AND THE CONCEPT OF PAPAL PRIMACY**

Popes were elected to succeed St Peter. They were heirs to all that authority which Christ had assigned to the leader of the Apostles when he appointed him as head of his newly founded Church. Such was the basic principle of papal authority, as the papacy itself saw it, already many centuries old before our period. It had of course received more extensive formulation, with explanations of its precise scriptural origins and explorations of its precise implications in ecclesiastical government. Successive papal generations had evolved a self-understanding of the nature of the papal office and a terminology in which to express it which had become classical. The popes of our period adopted these traditional expressions but they did not simply echo them unreflectingly. Innocent III, for example, preached frequently on the theme of papal primacy. Honorius III, less often, did the same. Innocent IV, continuing his *Commentary* on the canon law during his pontificate, wrote illuminatingly on his understanding of the concept of papal authority, especially in temporal affairs. The papal chancery itself fashioned a conventional terminology concerning the papal office, appropriate for use in its correspondence. And backing up these formulations was the work of the scholastics, theologians and canonists alike, who in considering the nature of the Church and its hierarchy shaped a concept of what might be best called apostolic sovereignty.

It was Innocent III, of all the popes of the thirteenth century, who contributed most to the evolving theory of papal monarchy. Not that he ever wrote a single comprehensive treatise on the subject. The logic of his vision of papal primacy has to be reconstructed from a variety of sources. These are of two main types. The first is made up of his personal writings: parts of his treatise *On the sacred mystery of the altar* (discussing the ecclesiastical hierarchy) and *On the four kinds of marriage* (in the context of the spiritual marriage of the episcopate to the universal Church) and especially in his sermons. In these latter, he returned

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16 Pacaut (1960); Cantini (1961); Tierney (1965); Watt (1965a), pp. 61–73, 97–105.
17 Pennington (1984), pp. 13, 33: ‘Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) transformed the theory of papal monarchy and, to a lesser extent, changed the practice of papal government during his pontificate... The early thirteenth century was a key period in the language of papal power. Prodded by a pope of genius and their own growing sophistication, the canonists shaped a description of papal authority that lasted to the end of the Middle Ages and beyond’; Morris (1989), pp. 413–51.
18 *De sacro altaris mysterio* i. cviii. *De primatu Romani pontificis*, PL 217,778–9.
19 *De quadripartita specie nuptiarum*, PL 217,933, 965–8.
repeatedly to the concept of papal primacy: sometimes when he marked the anniversary of his consecration as pope,20 sometimes to celebrate the feast days which had a particular relevance to the papacy, such as feasts of the Apostles or of the great saint-popes of the past.21 The second type is composed of the letters issued by the papal chancery, the personal element of which is less discernible, but they were official letters, underwritten by papal authority. Very many of these make reference to the concept of papal primacy, seeking to clarify it in application to specific situations. For example, letters concerning the translation of a bishop from one diocese to another, or other occasions when the spiritual bond between the bishop and his see had to be severed, afforded an especially important occasion to assert an exclusively papal prerogative.22 Some letters were concerned with the primacy as such. Two of these are of particular interest: one was a reply to certain objections to the papal view of Peter’s primacy put to Innocent by the patriarch of Constantinople, John X Kamateros.23 In the other Innocent III instructed the Catholicos of Armenia in the papal view of the relationship between his patriarchate and the Roman see.24 This variety of sources — treatises, sermons, letters polemical, didactic, routine — yields as comprehensive a statement of how the thirteenth-century papacy conceptualised itself as can be found in any purely papal writings in this period.25

Innocent III saw in the papacy the fulfilment of a divine plan for the government of God’s people.26 Prefigured in the Old Testament in the rulership of the first Chosen People, it achieved its consummation in the second, the Christian Church. Christ himself was the first and especial foundation of the Church (1 Cor. 3:11). The Apostles collectively were the secondary foundation in the sense of which St Paul wrote about the Church as ‘built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief cornerstone’ (Eph. 2:19–20).27 It was to the ‘apostolic order’ and its successor, the universal episcopate, that Christ had committed the government of his Church.28 But to Peter, as first among the Apostles and their leader, had been committed so special a position as to make him individually the secondary foundation on which Christ founded his Church.29

20 Four in all, PL 217,653–72.
21 PL 217,481–4 (St Sylvester), 513–22 (St Gregory), 545–8 (St Peter), 547–51, 553–8 (SS Peter and Paul).
22 In particular, Quanto personam (Decretales 1.7.3), the especial focus of Pennington (1984).
23 PL 216,1186–91 (the collection of Innocentian decreals compiled by Rainer of Pomposa).
24 PL 214,776–8.
26 Congar (1957).
27 ‘Sane licet Christus sit primum et praecipuum fundamentum ecclesiae, de quo dicit Apostolus: “Fundamentum posuit est, praeter quod aliud poni non potest, quod est Christus Jesus” [1 Cor. 3.11], apostoli tamen sunt secunda et secundaria fundamenta, de quibus dicit Psalmista: ‘Fundamentum eius in montibus sanctis . . .’ [Ps. 86.1]. PL 217,602.
29 PL 216,1186.
The Gospels recorded how Christ at regular intervals through his ministry had singled out Peter as pre-eminent. The Acts of the Apostles then recorded how his leadership was manifested in the practice of the primitive Church, assumed by him as of right and acknowledged as such by the Apostles. There followed the consecration of Rome as the apostolic see invested with Peter’s primacy, through the merits of Peter’s martyrdom.30

Innocent III marshalled the title-deeds of the primacy under three headings: Christ’s major pronouncements before, during and after his Passion.31 Before: when he said, ‘Thou art Peter and upon this rock I will build my church and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed also in heaven’ (Matt. 16: 18,19). For Innocent, this text demonstrated in particular Peter’s ‘height of power’ (sublimitas potestatis) and requires further examination later. At the time of the Passion: when Christ stated, ‘Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat’, he was speaking to the Apostles collectively. But in continuing with an express command, he was addressing Peter personally: ‘But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not’, adding immediately, ‘and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren.’ This text, Innocent commented, demonstrated Peter’s ‘immutability of faith’ (constantia dei). It was his faith which had made him the foundation of the Church. It followed, in Innocent’s view, that his successors would never at any time stray from the path of the true faith; they would recall the strayed and strengthen the doubting.32

The teaching authority of the apostolic see (apostolicae sedis magisterium) settled doubts about the faith. This teaching authority lay in the papal office as such. Innocent III repeatedly made clear that a pope as an individual could lapse into heresy and deserve to be deposed.33 After the Passion: when Christ said a third

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30 PL 216.1188.
33 ‘In tantum enim fides mihi necessaria est, ut cum de ceteris peccatis solum Deum iudicem habeam, propter solum peccatum quod in fide committitur possem ab ecclesia iudicari. Nam qui non credit, iam indicatus est’ [John 3:18].’ PL 217.656. See also, PL 217.665, 670.
time to Peter, ‘If you love me, feed my sheep’, adding ‘Follow me’ (John 21:15–17, 19). Thus was demonstrated Peter’s pastorate (pastura gregis), his headship over the whole of Christ’s flock. This too Innocent linked with the papal teaching office (ordo magisterii). He linked it especially to the maintenance of unity; Peter’s headship and his teaching office preserved the flock from division.34

These then were the three key scriptural passages. Innocent added further instances where he argued that the Gospels showed Peter responding to the Lord as spokesman of the Twelve or taking the initiative in action. To these texts he added the evidence of Peter’s special role of leadership in the first Christian community. His martyrdom in Rome transformed that ‘headship of error’ to ‘teacher of truth’.35

Innocent III’s chosen term to express the papal ‘height of power’ was ‘fullness of power’ (plenitudo potestatis). It recurs again and again throughout all his writing, personal and chancery alike, and is central to the understanding of his concept of the primacy.36 He did not invent it. Its history as a term in the papal vocabulary begins in the fifth century.37 It was not an assertion that all power in both spiritual and temporal affairs had been granted to the pope (nor did Innocent III think it had). By mid-twelfth century it was established in theological writing (notably in St Bernard’s and in Gratian’s Decretum) as the term which expressed the universality of papal jurisdiction as contrasted with episcopal jurisdiction limited to a single diocese. It contrasted that care of all the churches committed to the pope with the restricted authority of a bishop, called to a share in the universal pastoral responsibility. Characteristically, Innocent III favoured an anthropomorphic image. Accepting a known if minority interpretation of ‘Cephas’ in John 1:42 as ‘head’, so that the text could be read as the Lord saying to Peter, ‘thou shalt be called head’, he could argue that ‘just as the head contains the fullness of the senses and the remaining members of the body receive a part of that fullness, so other priests are called to a share in the pastorate, but the pope has plenitude of power’.38

Detached from this contrast of universal and particular jurisdictions, the term ‘plenitude of power’ meant simply the supreme ruling authority in the Church. It could be more juridically formulated and this Innocent III did

34 ‘... ne post ascensionem eius secairetur (ecclesia) in partes et ne unum in eius fide divideretur ovile, uni commissit apostolorum principi gubernandum, quem solum sibi Dominus et in officio vicarium et in magisterio constituit successorem’. PL 214.777.
35 Sermo XXII, in festo SS Petri et Pauli (PL 217.555–8) is dedicated particularly to this theme.
37 Benson (1967).
often by associating it with another term, ‘universal ordinary’ (\textit{iudex ordinarius}; ‘ordinary judge’ of all the faithful or of all the Churches). The term expressed the immediacy of papal jurisdiction – immediate in the sense that it could be exercised without need of intermediary jurisdictions. It was with this term that Innocent III chose to make his most authoritative statements of papal jurisdictional primacy, that of the Fourth Lateran Council: ‘God disposed that the Roman Church holds the pre-eminence of ordinary power over all other churches, as being mother and teacher of all Christ’s faithful.’\footnote{C. 5: ‘Antiqua patriarchalium sedium privilegia renovantes, sacra universali synodo approbante sancimus, ut post Romanam ecclesiam, quae disponente Domino super omnes alias ordinariae potestatis obtinet principatum, utpote mater universorum Christi fidelium et magistra.’ \textit{COD}, p. 236; \textit{Decretales} 153323. On \textit{iudex ordinarius}, Maitland (1898), pp. 100–31; Watt (1965a), pp. 92–7.} Or otherwise expressed, the Roman Church holds plenitude of power.\footnote{‘Praeterea cum sedes apostolica caput omnium ecclesiarum existat, et Romanus pontifex iudex sit ordinarius singulorum, quando de ipsa quis assumitur in praelatum alterius, ei obiici posse non videtur, propter capitis privilegium quod obtinet plenitudinem potestatis.’ \textit{PL} 216.1192.}

There was another term which under Innocent III’s impetus became, in the thirteenth century, part of the standard defining terminology of papal primacy: ‘vicar of Christ’ (\textit{vicarius Christi}).\footnote{Maccarrone (1952), pp. 109–40.} Innocent III used it in different contexts of which the common element was his wish to give especial emphasis to the uniqueness of papal authority. The pope, he claimed in a characteristic phrase, ‘acted not in the place of mere man but of the true God on earth’\footnote{‘. . . quo non puri hominis, sed veri Dei vicem gerit in terris’. \textit{Quanto personam} (\textit{Decretales} 173).} positioned ‘as mediator between God and man, beneath God, but above man: less than God but greater than man’.\footnote{‘. . . inter Deum et hominem medius constitutus, citra Deum, sed ultra hominem: minor Deo, sed maior homine . . .’. \textit{Sermo III, in consecr. pont. max.}, \textit{PL} 217.648.} In dealing with the patriarch of Constantinople and the Catholicos of Armenia he associated the vicariate of Christ with the teaching authority of Peter: ‘it was Peter alone whom the Lord established as his own substitute both in the office of vicar and as his successor in teaching’.\footnote{‘. . . solum Petrum substituit sibi Dominus et in officio vicarium et in magisterio successorem’. \textit{PL} 216.}

\footnote{40 ‘. . . solum Petrum substituit sibi Dominus et in officio vicarium et in magisterio successorem’. \textit{PL} 216.}
Innocent III was no mere theorist of papal leadership. He was also its leading thirteenth-century exponent. The nature and purposes of the leadership to which he aspired were never better exemplified than at the Fourth Lateran Council which met throughout the month of November in 1215. This was the best-attended medieval general council, the most ambitious in its programme and the most influential in its effects. Historians have been unanimous in seeing it as the culmination of Innocent III’s pontificate. It might also be seen as the most comprehensive expression of the classical policies of the medieval papacy in its heyday, at once typifying its major aspirations and identifying its goals.

In his letter of summons to the Council, *Vineam Domini*, the pope called on God to witness ‘that of all the longings of our heart in this life, we strive especially after two, the successful recovery of the Holy Land and the reform of the universal Church’. Crusade and reform, then, were to be the substance of the work of the great assembly Innocent had in mind when he called it ‘according to ancient custom’. By this reference to the practice of the Fathers, he was remembering those councils of the past which had met specifically to redefine and defend the true faith against the assaults of contemporary heretics. But Lateran IV had also more specifically Roman roots. It marked the final term in an evolution which had seen the local, Roman synod, renovated to advance the Gregorian reform movement which had expanded to embrace the consultation of the whole Latin episcopate over the whole range of papal government. A century and more of experience had made the papally directed council a major instrument of reform endeavour.

In its composition and procedure, there is much about the Council analogous to the kings’ parliaments which developed in later thirteenth-century Europe. At the heart of the Council, its core and essence, was the pope assisted by his nineteen cardinals. They had drawn up the agenda, arranged the order of business, scrutinised the submissions requested by Innocent in preparation for the Council and prepared the draft legislation which was later to be promulgated in the name of the pope personally. Summoned ex officio was the episcopate, ‘part of the pope’s body’, his natural advisers in the government of the universal Church: some 369 bishops drawn from 81 provinces, stretching across Christendom from Tuam in the west of Ireland to Gniezno in Poland, including the Latin patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch and Jerusalem and...
the missionary sees of Livonia and Estonia. Also summoned were the heads of the major religious orders. A new feature was the attendance of representatives of cathedral chapters, summoned rather as were to be the commons of Edward I’s parliaments: all in all, a conciliar body of some 1,200 churchmen. There was also a modest but significant lay attendance, representatives of civil authorities. This was because there were important political decisions to be finalised and promulgated – concerning the succession to the Holy Roman Empire, the disposition of the county of Toulouse in the wake of the Albigensian Crusade, and the protection of King John against rebel barons and French invaders of England – partly also because there was to be legislation concerning violations of ecclesiastical liberty, specially by Italian towns, and partly to gather support, especially financial support, for the crusade.

The Council’s day of decision was 30 November 1215 when, in the third and last solemn session, Innocent pronounced on the three major political issues affecting the empire, Toulouse and England. This political dimension of the Council will be considered later in a broader context. At the same time, Innocent III promulgated seventy-one decrees, one concerning the new crusade project, the remainder constituting Innocent’s reform programme, the provisions whereby he hoped ‘to uproot vices and to implant virtues [Jer. 1:10], to correct abuses and reform morals, to eliminate heresies and to strengthen faith’.

In implanting virtues and strengthening the faith, Innocent III saw the crusade as playing a crucial part. Along with Vineam Domini, the summons to the Council, he had despatched Quia maior, a call for general participation in a new, mighty effort to liberate the Holy Land from the shameful disgrace of continuing Saracen occupation. Quia maior is the classical papal document of crusading exhortation. Its distinctive note is its emphasis on the crusade as an instrument of spiritual renewal: ‘the ancient expedient of Jesus Christ for the salvation of his faithful which he has designed to renew in these days’. These were days, it was urged, when wickedness superabounded and love in the hearts of many had gone cold. Christ now offered them the crusade to awaken them from the sleep of death in sin to a life of repentance. The crusade was a test of faith, a hope of salvation, an act of charity to those brothers in Christ enslaved by the followers of ‘the son of perdition, the false prophet Muhammad’. Those who spurned this opportunity to win salvation would fully deserve to be damned at the Last Judgement.

Quia maior was not simply an emotive attempt to touch hearts grown cold and ungrateful. It looked to practicalities. Crusade preachers were to be appointed, financial arrangements set in hand, prayers for success ordered, to be said at every Mass, monthly penitential processions organised. Those who could only contribute towards expenses could fully share in the indulgence.
Crusader privileges were systematised. *Quia maior* is a nice blend, surely bearing the stamp of Innocent III himself, of passionate preaching of the crusade as a way to repentance, along with legal precision and detailed practical administrative arrangements; the whole realistically conceived – except perhaps when the rulers of Christendom, the better to gird themselves for the fray, were ordered to keep the peace for at least four years. A distillation of *Quia maior*, appropriately updated, was to form c. 71, *Ad liberandam*, of the Council’s legislation.

*Vineam Domini* referred to the destruction of the Lord’s vineyard by ‘many kinds of wild animal’, so that the vines had become diseased and capable of producing only wild grapes (see Is. 5:2). It is certain that among the ravaging beasts, he numbered especially heretics. A major part of the work of Lateran IV was concerned with heresy which was attacked from a number of angles. One, the consequence of the Albigensian Crusade, was to bring the destiny of the county of Toulouse before the Council. Another, given pride of place at the head of the canons, was the drawing-up of a new Profession of Faith, a summary of basic Christian belief, restated in a way which explicitly rejected current heretical opinions. Thus against the Cathar, dualist doctrine of creation, it reaffirmed ‘the one principle of the universe’ God creator of all things, spiritual and material, and the traditional doctrine of how sin came into the world. It went on to reaffirm traditional ecclesiology and sacramental theology – the whole logic of how God has provided the means of salvation to fallen mankind – to which the Cathars were seeking to present an alternative. It was a creed manifestly framed for testing the orthodoxy of those suspected of heresy and for removing any confusion from the minds of those at risk of conversion to heresy. A third approach adopted by the Council brought the condemnation of specific doctrines – Joachim of Fiore’s doctrine of the Trinity, and those of the sect which followed the pantheistic teaching of Amaury of Bène. Then in c. 3 *Excommunicamus* there was drawn up a compendium of anti-heretical measures covering episcopal obligations in supervising dioceses, Church–state co-operation and a penal code for those found guilty of heresy, favouring heretics or for being negligent in pursuit of heretics. On a more positive note, the Council sought to strengthen the faith by its emphasis on the doctrine of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist (the term ‘transubstantiation’ made its first appearance in an official statement of doctrine) and by its insistence on an annual minimum reception of Holy Communion and the sacrament of Penance. Innocent’s personal encouragement of Dominic and his embryonic Order of Preachers, soon to emerge as the leaders of the anti-heretical campaign, should also be included as one of the Council’s initiatives in this context of dealing with heresy.

When it came to reform, it is not difficult to discover what Innocent thought was wrong with the contemporary Church and his explanation for the growth
of heresy and other evils. He spoke his mind very emphatically in the sermon with which he opened the Council. Referring to the general corruption of the people of Israel denounced by Hosea (see especially Hos. 4:1–11), he declared that ‘all corruption begins chiefly with the clergy’. Like the prophet, he laid the responsibility for evils on unworthy priests, ‘the source of all evils in the Christian people’. Reform, then, for Innocent, meant especially the achievement and maintenance of clerical discipline. It is no surprise that his reform measures began with the episcopate, for many a letter in Innocent’s Register demonstrates that this pope never pulled his punches when denunciation of episcopal negligence or incompetence was called for.

‘Nothing is more injurious to God’s Church than the appointment of unworthy prelates for the direction of souls’ he declared in c. 26 of Lateran IV. Hence the procedure for electing bishops was to be overhauled and standardised. It was to be by majority vote of the cathedral chapter, with ballot, delegation and inspiration as the permitted procedures. No one was to be elected by abuse of the secular power’s right and anyone seeking advancement by such means made himself ineligible for future promotion; there were penalties too for those electors who co-operated with an illegal election. Of particular importance was the vigilance of the metropolitan whose duty it was to examine both the process of the election to ensure it had not violated any canonical rule and the suitability of the elect to hold his key office. Those charged with this scrutiny were to be punished if through their negligence unworthy bishops were appointed. If the electors themselves were negligent and left their diocese without a bishop for longer than three months, the right to appoint devolved on the immediate superior (normally, the metropolitan, or in the case of a metropolitan, the pope).

The Council laid special stress on the responsibility of bishops for the selection and training of ordinands and for refusing ordination to unworthy and ignorant candidates. Better, it was urged, to ordain the few who would make good priests than the many who would not. Episcopal responsibility for clerical discipline continued after ordination: the annual provincial synod, commanded by the Council, was an especially appropriate occasion for removing unsuitable priests and suspending from office those guilty of conferring benefices on such men. Unchaste clergy were not to be supported nor promoted nor allowed to pass on their benefices to their sons. Bishops were required to provide for the education of those preparing for the priesthood and for in-service clerical training by appointing appropriate teachers and theologians in cathedral schools. Chapters were to co-operate in making financial provision for such appointments.

There followed a disciplinary code detailing the life style and conduct required of the clergy. They were to be celibate, sober, free of secular encum-
brances, forbidden taverns and other resorts of potential dissipation, hunting, fowling and gambling, careful to keep their churches, sacred vessels and vestments seemly and the consecrated bread and the chrism secure under lock and key lest they be put to ‘impious and blasphemous uses’, dressed and tonsured as clergymen, avoiding lay fashions, attentive to their liturgical duties, scrupulous about maintaining the secrecy of the confessional. They were not to shed blood by being associated with legal procedures or surgery involving blood. The veto on their participation in judicial ordeals was to lead to significant change towards more rational procedures in the civil courts of medieval Europe. They were to be severely punished for simony and greed – exacting payment for funerals, weddings and administration of the sacraments was particularly condemned. On the other hand, the Council tried to ensure that parish clergy were adequately funded, accepting the realistic argument that when clergy were badly paid, their quality was poor. Hence parish clergy were to receive the tithes that were their due from bishops, patrons and religious orders who were helping themselves to the entitlement of the local clergy.

Among the decrees condemning different types of simony was one which forbade monks and nuns demanding a fee for reception of novices into their ranks. The Council looked to reform of religious orders in other directions. One was of considerable importance: those congregations which had not been in the habit of holding general chapters of abbots and priors to regulate the discipline of constituent monasteries were now required to set them up. A visitatorial system was also to be introduced. Cistercian monks, among whom the holding of chapters was long established, were to advise on the implementation of this decree. A further regulation put a brake on the proliferation of religious rules: all new entrants to the religious life and those wishing to found a new religious house must choose among the existing approved orders.

Reforms of the clergy in all its varied ranks would redound to the spiritual good of the laity. But the laity figured specifically in a number of ways. One, the annual sacramental participation, has already been mentioned. There were important decrees about marriage. The rules of kinship disqualification for marriage were made less severe. A determined effort was made to bring the making of the marriage contract under ecclesiastical supervision and subject to uniform rules of canon law: clandestine marriages were forbidden, banns were to be called. The effect of some decrees, notably those concerning simony, was to protect the laity against exploitation by the clergy. A similar intention lay behind the decree against the sale of bogus relics and fraudulent alms-seekers.

One group of canons was devoted to an issue of particular importance to all clergy: liberty of the Church, or freedom from lay intervention in ecclesiastical affairs. The decrees in this category laid down canonical punishments for laymen abusing their offices and powers in the areas of ecclesiastical property
and jurisdiction. One decree was of special future significance; it sought to remove arbitrariness from lay taxation of the clergy. It was permitted for clergy to pay taxes to the civil authority on a voluntary basis where there was perceived to be genuine need for the good of the community. But first, the pope, ‘on whom falls responsibility to make provision for the common good’, must be consulted. The Council also legislated against abuse of the principle of liberty of the Church. It forbade clergy, under the pretext of legitimate defence of clerical immunity, to seek to usurp lay jurisdiction. The clergy were required ‘to render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s’ (Matt. 22:21).

This was not the only occasion that the Council drew attention to the need to respect the boundaries of jurisdiction. It did so in favour of bishops against infringement of their jurisdiction by abbots. It strengthened the jurisdiction of metropolitans of provinces, particularly in respect of episcopal elections. It confirmed that the Latin patriarchs of eastern sees had the right, saving that of the papacy, of hearing appeals within their jurisdiction. These definitions were one aspect of an important part of the Council’s work: the clarification and improvement of the ecclesiastical juridical order. Another aspect saw it amending and unifying the procedures which gave bishops, often required by their office to make unpopular decisions, better protection against malicious complaints, and offered protection to those vulnerable in other ways through changes in the procedures governing appeals, excommunication and proceedings by judges-delegate.

Crusade; reform of the Church, understood particularly as improvement of the pastoral ministry (‘the guidance of souls is the art of arts’); defence of the faith against heretics, teachers of false doctrine in the schools, schismsatics (Greeks who show contempt for Latin rites and Roman authority) and Jews (‘blasphemers of Christ’); liberty of the Church; servicing of the ecclesiastical legal machinery, made up the Council’s agenda. They established the policy priorities for the thirteenth-century papacy. Innocent III held the mastery of Lateran IV. But it would be wrong to see the conciliar programme as simply an imposition from above. It was an amalgam of the policy objectives and decrees of Lateran III and subsequent legislation, of the teaching of the schools and of the experience of the universal episcopate. The priorities systematised by Innocent III and Lateran IV were established by the Latin Church itself.

How far the papacy was able to maintain the impetus in each of the priority areas indicated by Lateran IV is the very stuff of the history of the institution throughout the thirteenth century. One major policy objective came early to full fruition: reform and reorganisation of the law of the Church.47

Important as was the legislation of Lateran IV, it constituted but a small collection of laws relative to the legal decisions issuing from the papal curia since the pontificate of Alexander III (1159–81) or even relative to legislation promulgated by Innocent III. Already in 1209–10, Innocent had ordered a collection of his decretals to be received as officially approved legislation for use in the ecclesiastical courts and law schools. This collection (Compilatio IIIa) contained no less than 482 responses to requests put to him for decision on doubtful points of ecclesiastical law. Lateran IV has to be seen in the context of this sort of evolving systematisation of the law of the Church; the efficacy of its programme is only fully realised from its incorporation into the totality of canon law. That process of systematisation reached its most recent and decisive phase when canon lawyers began to collect decretals as supplementary to Gratian’s Decretum. Five collections of decretals (Quinque compilationes antiquae), assembled between c. 1191 and 1226 formed the high-points of this evolution (Lateran IV found its place as the substance of Compilatio IVa). The Five collections amassed a total of 2,139 laws and there were other collections, though of lesser importance, also in use. The impetus behind this growth was the interaction between local ecclesiastical authorities, especially the bishops, and the papal centre. The immense growth in consultation of the papal curia for settlement of doubts is evidence both of the growing maturity of local ecclesiastical government and of the perceived role of the papacy as the sovereign authority. Canon law was a papal creation but it was not a system imposed on the universal Church; it grew out of the necessities of the times and the role of the papacy itself was shaped by general demand for solutions to problems encountered in actual practice.

The Five collections soon came to outlive their usefulness. They had developed somewhat haphazardly. There were inevitably omissions, duplications, contradictions, textual uncertainties. It was Gregory IX in 1230 who decided to replace them with a single, authoritative text. He entrusted the work of codification to Ramon de Penyafort and on 5 September 1234 was able to promulgate the Five books of the Decretals, one of the great achievements of the thirteenth-century papacy. A sixth book was to be added by Boniface VIII in 1298, to form the basic code of canon law down to the nineteenth century.

The Five collections provided the bulk of the material for the Gregorian codex. Each of its five books was divided into subsections or titles, 185 in all, and the texts themselves, mostly of papal origin but including patristic and conciliar material, amounted to 1,971 laws altogether. The biggest single contributor was Innocent III with 596 texts.

The new compilation was prefaced by Gregory IX’s bull of promulgation Rex pacificus which opened with a resounding declaration of the inseparability of law from morality and of that idea of justice which Roman imperial law had defined for Roman papal law, and which canon law sought to implement. It
closed with a severe warning that no one should use any new canon law collection without the special authority of the Roman see. The first book began with the Profession of Faith of Lateran IV, considered the nature of law, written and customary, before assembling the law governing various offices in the Church, especially the different jurisdictions, such as that of legates and judges-delegate. The important Lateran IV legislation concerning episcopal elections, responsibility for ordinands and for correction of episcopal negligence all find their appropriate place in this book. Book II was concerned especially with judicial procedure and pleading in the ecclesiastical courts; all to do with the conduct of cases in those courts. Book III, where Lateran IV made its largest contribution, treated of the discipline and conduct of the diocesan clergy and the religious orders, of the administration of sacraments, of the law of ecclesiastical buildings, clerical income and property. Book IV was dedicated to marriage and related questions. The subject of Book V was ecclesiastical crime (such as heresy and simony) and its punishment. The law of excommunication was a major title in this book.

Thus, in all its detail of principle and practice, was formed a universal uniform law for the right ordering of ecclesiastical society and its hierarchy. It was at once the most effective single act for the realisation of Roman unity and the basis of the new academic discipline of canonical jurisprudence which provided the intellectual formation of ecclesiastical leadership; ‘the most important volume ever produced for the government of the Church’.

Lateran IV was not least a major political occasion. Three important decisions taken then serve well to introduce the subject of papal involvement in secular politics.

The counts of Toulouse and Foix appeared before the Council to plead, on their knees, for the restitution of their lands, currently held in wardship, on papal instructions, by the leader of the Albigensian Crusade, Simon de Montfort. After fierce debate, Raymond VI was adjudged guilty of harbouring heretics and highway robbers (routiers) and sentenced to forfeiture of his lands; Simon de Montfort was pronounced count of Toulouse. Decision on Foix was deferred; Count Raymond-Roger was soon to repossess his territory. There was a clear link between the Toulouse decision and c. 3 Excommunicamus of the Council which enacted that if a ruler, after due admonition, continued to


neglect to act against heretics in his territory he was to be excommunicated. If after a year, he still had not acted, he was to be reported to the pope who might, with the proviso of safeguarding the rights of any suzerain, ‘declare the ruler’s vassals absolved from their allegiance and offer the territory to be ruled by one orthodox in faith’. In other words, a ruler who persistently failed to act against heretics could be punished by deposition.

Loss of temporal office was also at issue in a second major political decision of Lateran IV: succession to the Holy Roman Empire. The German princes in September 1211 had repudiated Emperor Otto IV who had been under papal excommunication since 1210 for violation of his oath to the Roman Church, and had elected the young Hohenstaufen Frederick, king of Sicily, to succeed him. Ambassadors of Otto, citizens of Milan, were allowed to plead his case before the Council. They read a letter of Otto repenting of his offences, supplicating the lifting of his excommunication and declaring his willingness to be obedient to the pope in future. Innocent III, however, recognised Frederick as emperor-elect and with that recognition, Otto’s cause was effectively irretrievable.

Deposition of rulers, arbitration between contending rulers, protection of a ruler against rebellious subjects: these were indeed major interventions into secular politics. They were not, however, the only issues involving the relations of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities in which the Council was concerned. Within the conciliar decrees themselves, three more areas can be identified which, though less dramatic than the three already noted, raised important principles about that relationship and how the papacy viewed its authority in the temporal sphere.

Several canons of Lateran IV show the papacy claiming to set limits to the operation of lay authority. Secular rulers were expected to observe ‘the immunity of ecclesiastical liberty’, and there were ecclesiastical sanctions if they did not. Where lay rulers arbitrarily seized ecclesiastical properties or financial rights, usurped ecclesiastical jurisdiction or imposed taxation on the clergy without appropriate papal authorisation, those responsible were to be excommunicated (cc. 44, 46). C. 25 decreed that, were a bishop to be elected by abuse of the lay power, the appointment was ipso iure void. That the canon did not specifically lay down any penalty for the ruler who had exerted undue pressure on the electors should not be taken to mean that none must apply. The celebrated Canterbury election case when King John’s refusal to accept Stephen Langton as archbishop led to his excommunication in 1206 and six years of interdict for the kingdom of England50 proves that the omission did not signify that ecclesiastical sanctions were ruled out.

50 Cheney (1976), pp. 294–325.
The assumption underlying these canons was that the spiritual power had the right to define the limits of lay intervention in the ecclesiastical sphere. By extension, there was also the claim, though it was not asserted in this particular context, that the ecclesiastical power had the deciding voice in any dispute about the border-line dividing the respective jurisdictions.

A different assumption lay behind c. 41. This canon was concerned with prescription, that is, with title to property acquired by long use or possession. The Council ruled that anyone holding property by prescriptive right must do so in good faith, that is without knowledge that another person had legitimate title. To maintain prescriptive right in bad faith was mortally sinful and a sinful act should not be upheld by the law. Hence any civil law which permitted prescription in bad faith should be accounted invalid and withdrawn. It was for the Church to rule in matters of sin and for the civil authority to abandon a law contrary to Christian morality.

The Council’s legislation concerning Jews also contained principles about the relationship of ecclesiastical authority to the secular order. Canon 69 commanded under pain of excommunication that lay rulers should cease to allow Jews to hold public office (Spain and Languedoc were the main offending regions), ‘for it is just too incongruous that a blasphemer of Christ should exercise the force of power over Christians’. Canon 67 claimed what canonists called indirect jurisdiction over Jews. Since Jews were not members of the Church, they could hardly suffer the penalty of loss of membership which was what excommunication meant. But they could be pressured indirectly. If Jews were found to be extorting immoderate usury or refusing to pay tithes or other dues payable to the clergy on properties now held by Jews, they should be subjected to boycott by Christians. Christians themselves, under penalty of excommunication, would be forbidden commercial or personal contacts with Jews in order to force them to obey the canons. It was assumed that the lay power would co-operate in enforcing any ecclesiastical decree ordering the isolation of Jewish communities adjudged guilty of violating the canon law.\footnote{Watt (1992), pp. 101–2.}

It was, however, c. 3 \emph{Excommunicamus} which most strikingly laid down the obligation of the lay power to co-operate with the ecclesiastical power when its assistance was required. The context was the crucial matter of heresy; its suppression could not be achieved without the police action of the secular arm. Secular powers were required under pain of excommunication to take an oath that they would strive their utmost to prosecute heretics in the lands or cities subject to them whenever the ecclesiastical authorities should call on
them. Should they persist in refusing this request they were to be excommunicated. The co-operation of the lay power was not voluntary; refusal meant that the culpable were not to be ‘esteemed and numbered among the faithful’.

The most important political decision of the Fourth Lateran Council was to go disastrously wrong for the papacy. It had accepted Frederick II as emperor-designate. Thirty years later, another general council was to reject him. The First Council of Lyons summoned by Innocent IV in 1245 put Frederick on trial, declared him guilty as charged and ordered him to be replaced in both his office as emperor and his kingship of Sicily. The deposition of Frederick II was the most drastic of all the thirteenth-century papacy’s political acts; how he regressed from papal choice as emperor in 1215 to deposition in 1245, and the consequences of that decision, must therefore be accorded the central position in any account of the papacy’s involvement in politics. For in the making and breaking of Frederick II as Holy Roman Emperor and king of Sicily, and in the search to replace him in each of these offices, there came together virtually all the principles, policies and prejudices which formed the papacy’s own conception of its authority in the temporal sphere and how it tried to translate them into practice.

When Innocent III put himself forward as arbitrator in the disputed imperial election, Frederick was far from being his preferred choice. It was not merely that Frederick was still an infant. More importantly, his membership of the Hohenstaufen family was itself a disqualification. For Innocent, the Hohenstaufen were persecutors of the Church whose misdeeds through the generations he could list at length. Hohenstaufen imperial rule had shown itself at every step as a rejection of the papacy’s own view of the empire–papacy relationship and a major threat to its territorial interests in central and southern Italy.

The most recent Hohenstaufen imperial career, that of Frederick’s father Henry VI, had caused especial alarm to the papal curia. When in 1194, Tancred king of Sicily and his eldest son Roger both died suddenly, Henry had secured the succession and coronation in Palermo. A personal union of empire and kingdom had been accomplished by one who had never hesitated from ruthless rule in the papal Patrimony. He had also shown himself aggressively hostile to the exercise of papal ecclesiastical authority in the Sicilian kingdom. Tancred had agreed to a relaxation of the traditionally tight control of the

Sicilian Church by the Norman kings as the price for papal recognition of his kingship. Henry VI paid no such price and made his intentions clear by countermanding the privilege by which Tancred had ordered the relaxation.

On Henry VI’s death, his widow Constance had persuaded Innocent in his capacity as suzerain of Sicily to agree to the succession of Frederick to the Sicilian kingship. The substance of Tancred’s privilege having been conceded, Frederick was crowned on 17 May 1198. When Constance herself died in November 1198, Frederick, aged four, became ward of the papacy. In these circumstances, potentially so favourable for the future papal position in Italy, allowing Frederick to become emperor was no part of Innocent’s thinking. He put his case against Frederick’s candidature succinctly enough:

That it was not expedient for him to obtain the empire is clear from the fact that thereby the kingdom of Sicily would be united to the empire and by this union the church would be brought to disorder. For not to mention other dangers, he would refuse fidelity and homage to the Church for the kingdom of Sicily on account of the dignity of the empire, just as his father had done.  

The union was feared, then, because it would weaken papal political control of southern Italy. There was the further danger that control of the Papal State, the enlargement and consolidation of which was one of Innocent’s most cherished objectives, would be imperilled. The autonomy of that territory seemed a necessary precondition of the papacy’s independence and the essential material basis of its rule. Among the other dangers which Innocent chose not to specify on this occasion was no doubt the threat to the liberty of the Sicilian Church, not least to freedom of episcopal elections in the kingdom – no small matter in a Church whose episcopate approached 150 members.

Fear of Hohenstaufen domination of Italy by way of the union of empire and kingdom made it obvious also to Innocent that the candidature of a more serious Hohenstaufen aspirant to the imperial throne must be opposed. Of Frederick’s uncle, his father’s brother, Philip of Swabia, Innocent declared: ‘Since he was a persecutor of the Church, sprung from a dynasty of persecutors, if we did not oppose him, it would seem that we were arming a mad man against ourselves and giving him a sword to put to our heads.’

54 ‘Quod non expediat ipsum imperium obtinere patet ex eo quod per hoc regnum Sicilie uniretur imperio, et ex ipsa unione confundetur ecclesia. Nam, ut cetera pericula taceamus, ipse propter dignitatem imperii nollet ecclesiæ de regno Sicilie fidelitatem et hominum exhibere, sicut noluit pater eius’. Deliberatio domini pape Innocentii super facto imperii de tribus electis, in Regestum Innocenti III papae super negotio Romani imperii, ed. F. Kempf, Rome (1947), no. 29, p. 79.

claims, however, could not be ignored because of the relative lack of support attracted in Germany by Innocent’s own candidate, the Welf Otto of Brunswick. Despite his preference, the pope might well have been forced to acknowledge the Hohenstaufen’s success, had not chance, so prominent a feature of papal political history in these decades, supervened with the assassination of Philip of Swabia in June 1208, a crime quite unconnected with the disputed imperial succession. Innocent III was then very content to put all his influence into encouraging the swing of support to Otto and to crown him emperor in St Peter’s on 21 October 1209. With Otto IV as emperor and Frederick, his ward, as king of Sicily, now deemed to have come of age, the curia had some reason for thinking the crisis over the imperial succession had been resolved in its favour, that the prospects for harmony between empire and papacy, on papal terms, were favourable and that the union of empire and kingdom had been avoided.

Any such expectations were to be disappointed. In violation of the obligations into which he had entered both before and at his imperial coronation, Otto IV invaded the Papal State and set about planning to conquer Sicily in order to make himself king. Innocent excommunicated him and released his subjects from their oaths of obedience. Otto’s support in Germany melted away. With Innocent’s weight behind him, Frederick found himself elected and crowned king of the Romans. Lateran IV formally completed the process of Otto’s deposition and endorsed the emergence of Frederick as the final victor in the protracted struggle for the imperial office.

The emperor-elect, ‘nourished as the son of the Roman Church’ in papal language, was left in no doubt as to what was expected of him. In a succession of solemn undertakings, Frederick was required to swear to preserve and advance all the papacy’s major ecclesiastical and territorial interests. These were spelled out in detail: first in Messina in February 1212, then in Rome to the pope personally in the following April, then in most solemn form, with the supporting oaths of the leading German princes in the Golden Bull of Eger (1213). To the end, Innocent was exacting sworn guarantees from Frederick; there were two more in the month of the pope’s death, July 1216.

Frederick was binding himself to the papal view of an emperor’s place in the Italian political order. Territorially, this meant acknowledgement of the autonomy of the Papal State (generally unrecognised by the Hohenstaufen), as enhanced by the ‘restitutions’ of provinces (notably the duchy of Spoleto and the March of Ancona) whose rule, the curia had begun to argue recently, had been conceded to the papacy by imperial grants in remoter days. It meant, too, acknowledgement of papal suzerainty over the kingdom of Sicily.

56 MGH Leg. iv Const., 11, no. 48. 57 Waley (1961), pp. 1–67; Robinson (1990), pp. 3–32.
And not least, it meant no union of empire and kingdom. Ecclesiastically, it meant respect for ‘liberty of the Church’, more specifically as unimpeded access to the papacy’s appellate jurisdiction and to free and canonical episcopal elections. That these freedoms were to apply in Germany is clear from their inclusion in the promises required of Otto IV. But they had even more relevance to Sicily where the papacy had been successfully loosening the grip established long previously by the Norman kings. Politically, it meant acceptance of the papal view of empire, a view which made of the Holy Roman Empire a papally created office, and of the emperor, the pope’s advocate or special defender. In the course of the succession crisis Innocent III had articulated this papal view with a new clarity. He had spelled out the special relationship of emperor to pope as comprehended within the Translation of Empire theory.\(^{58}\) Essentially, this was an interpretation of the coronation of Charlemagne by Leo III on Christmas Day, 800. By this act, it was argued, the papacy had translated the Roman Empire from the ineffectual hands of the Greeks to the Germans, investing the electoral princes with their right to choose an emperor-elect. It was the pope’s right to crown the proffered candidate. But, on the analogy of an episcopal election, it was for the one who did the consecrating to examine the validity of the election and the suitability of the elect, with authority, where appropriate, to quash the one and reject the other.\(^{59}\) It was on this principle that Innocent had based his intervention throughout the succession dispute. Now that it had been resolved, it was time to bring into play the functional aspect of emperorship. It was specifically for the defence of the Roman Church that the Translation had taken place. In the obligations asked of Frederick, this defensive role had particular reference to the maintenance of, and where necessary to the achievement of, the papacy’s rights in the Papal State, in the kingdom of Sicily, in Corsica and Sardinia. And there was the additional obligation to act as the police arm in combating heresy.

It is clear that of all the demands laid on Frederick by Innocent III that of renouncing the union of the empire with Sicily was the single most important one, after the guarantee of the autonomy of the Papal State. In Strasbourg on 1 July 1216 an imperial Golden Bull articulated exactly what the pope had in

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mind. Frederick agreed that on being crowned emperor he would immediately relinquish his Sicilian kingship in favour of his son Henry, already crowned king of Sicily at papal command. He would hold the kingdom as fief of the Roman Church and from that time, Frederick would not be king of Sicily. Until Henry came of age, there would be a regent, appointed with papal approval. Government of the kingdom should be in accord with the rights of the Roman Church, to whom alone lordship of that kingdom belonged, and of service to it.60

This transfer of power never took place. The curia did not insist on the literal fulfilment of the Strasbourg pledge. The reason for this failure was not due, as so often suggested, to the indulgence of Honorius III’s weak paternalism towards Frederick. Nor to any departure from the priorities for Italy established by his predecessor. Honorius III did his best to keep Frederick II moving along the lines Innocent III had marked out, repeatedly demanding renewal of his sworn obligations.61 But there was another factor in the diplomatic situation, not less an Innocentian legacy, which at least in the short term was given over-riding priority: the crusade. It had been no doing of the papacy (or so Gregory IX was to state categorically later)62 that Frederick had taken the cross on the occasion of his German coronation at Aachen (25 July 1215). Once he had taken the vow, however, Honorius III insisted he honour it.63 Frederick seemed its one hope of rescue from disaster. For the sake of the crusade, the curia was prepared apparently to soft-pedal the Strasbourg undertaking. When Honorius III crowned Frederick as Holy Roman Emperor in November 1220 there was no question of Frederick’s renouncing the kingship of Sicily. He was held to formal acknowledgement of the status of Sicily as a fief of the Roman Church and not an intrinsic part of the empire. There was to be no union of administrations; the governments of the empire and of the kingdom were to be kept separate.64 In addition, there was papal assent to the election of Frederick’s son Henry, still a minor, as rex Romanorum, an act the German princes had performed, Frederick claimed, without his knowledge. So much then for Innocent III’s plan for separate rulership of empire and kingdom. Within four years of his death, not merely was Frederick II both emperor and king of Sicily; his son Henry who had already been crowned king of Sicily was now emperor-designate. All with papal acquiescence.

Papal pressure on Frederick to depart on crusade, fairly persistent before the

60 MGH Leg. iv Const., ii, no. 58.
61 MGH Leg. iv Const., ii, nos. 65, 66, 70, 85 (on the occasion of his imperial coronation), 90.
62 MGH Epp. s. xiii, no. 368.
63 The first time Honorius threatened Frederick with excommunication for non-fulfilment of his vow seems to have been in February 1219, MGH Epp. s. xiii, no. 95.
64 MGH Leg. iv Const., ii, no. 84 (Nov. 1220).
imperial coronation, increased after he had then renewed his vow and even more so as the Fifth Crusade headed increasingly towards disaster (Damietta was lost in September 1221). Frederick’s governmental problems in Germany and Sicily were more than adequate excuse for his continuing to delay the departure. Nevertheless, the papacy continued to press and Frederick finally bound himself to leave in August 1227 and to suffer excommunication if he failed so to do.65

In early September 1227, Frederick made to set out on crusade but disembarked, pleading serious illness and declaring his departure postponed until the following May. Gregory IX, declining to give him the benefit of any doubt or indeed even apparently to listen dispassionately to his excuse, held him to the very letter of his commitment and excommunicated him on 29 September 1227.66 There was to follow the extraordinary spectacle of an excommunicate emperor, denounced and boycotted by the clergy, accomplishing a resounding diplomatic success for the crusaders with the sultan of Egypt which was condemned by the pope, while open war between papal and imperial forces broke out in the Papal State and the kingdom of Sicily. When peace was eventually achieved in July 1230 – the Treaty of San Germano had Frederick reiterating the usual guarantees of the autonomy of the Papal State and the liberty of the Church in Sicily in return for the lifting of excommunication67 – it seemed highly probable that any chance of genuine mutual trust between the papal curia and Frederick II had gone for good.

Yet for some years after the treaty of peace, relations were relatively harmonious. Pope and emperor collaborated in the suppression of heresy; Frederick protected Gregory when the citizens forced him to leave Rome; Gregory supported Frederick when the emperor was faced with the rebellion of his son Henry; the pope facilitated Frederick’s marriage to Isabella, sister of Henry III, king of England.

This accord, however, was not to last. The deterioration of the relationship began to show itself in 1236.68 It was then that Frederick was first accused by Gregory of the charges69 which were to be finalised when Frederick was again

65 MGH Leg. iv ‘Const., ii, nos. 102, 103 (July 1225).
excommunicated in March 1239. Frederick had complained that the papal legate in Lombardy, far from observing the impartiality required of an arbitrator, was supporting rebellion against imperial authority. Gregory replied with an assault on Frederick as an oppressor of the Church, especially in Sicily, ‘where no one can move hand or foot without your command’, and accusing him of stirring up anti-papal factions in Rome. A significant part of the letter was its recourse to the Donation of Constantine, linked by Gregory to the Translation of Empire theory to provide a historical account of how popes had come to be superior to emperors. The reference to Constantine’s alleged grant to the papacy when he transferred the seat of empire to Constantinople was designed to remind Frederick that authority in Rome and its surrounding territory had been made over to the pope – as also authority over all of Italy, now made subject to ‘apostolic direction’. It was not for an emperor to challenge what the papacy ruled as right for the peace of Italy; the emperor must accept papal arbitration of the conflict between the Lombard League and the emperor.\(^{70}\)

Gregory was to continue to assert that it was Frederick’s misdeeds in Sicily ‘the special Patrimony of Peter’, reduced by him ‘as if to embers and ashes’ according to the pope, which was the nub of Frederick’s offence. In Frederick’s eyes, however, it was Gregory’s alleged encouragement of the Lombard League to resist him which motivated his growing hostility to the pope. There was some history to fuel Frederick’s suspicions. Lombardy was no new bone of contention between the curia and the Hohenstaufen. The Lombard League had been formed first to withstand Frederick I and had received the wholehearted support of Alexander III. Innocent III had consistently linked Hohenstaufen oppression of the Church with their oppression of the Lombard towns. If for the popes the Hohenstaufen were traditionally oppressors of the Church, for the Hohenstaufen, popes were traditionally supporters of Lombard rebels.

When Frederick’s attempt to reassert imperial authority in northern Italy escalated into open war with the Lombard League, his cause at first prospered. He inflicted a crushing defeat on the League at Cortenuova (27 November 1237). His subsequent flamboyant letters addressed to the city of Rome promising to make it again the heart of the imperial universe formed a counterblast to Gregory’s resort to the Donation of Constantine. Such promises, however, lacked conviction as Frederick began to lose ground militarily in Lombardy. But he had alarmed the curia and had again pushed Gregory beyond his limited toleration of Frederick’s Italian policies and attitudes.

What proved to be the final breakdown of the relationship was signalled by a

\(^{70}\) MGH Epp. i. xiii, no. 705 (23 Oct. 1236).
resounding exchange of broadsides in March 1239. First, Frederick addressed himself to the College of Cardinals, claiming in a novel and unsound constitutional doctrine that as successors of the Apostles they were equal participants in the exercise of papal authority. He urged them to use that authority to stop ‘sentence of deposition’ being passed on him and to prevent ‘the spiritual sword’ from being wielded on behalf of the Lombard ‘rebels’. Ten days later, Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick for the second time.

There were sixteen charges. Eleven of them related to Frederick’s alleged misconduct towards the Sicilian Church. The other five were a mixed bag: impeding a cardinal-legate from proceeding on his way to Albigensian territory; preventing the nephew of the king of Tunis from going to the papal curia to be baptised; occupation of church lands in violation of his treaty obligations; obstruction of the Holy Land crusade and aid to the Latin empire of Constantinople. Heading the list was the charge that ‘he had stirred up revolt in Rome against the Roman Church with the intention of driving out the pope and cardinals’. The decree ended with the release of the emperor’s subjects from their oaths of allegiance, an admonition that he should desist forthwith from oppressing his Sicilian subjects and the threat of a further investigation into the orthodoxy of the emperor’s Christian belief.

This charge sheet was not an examination of the fundamental issue at stake between emperor and pope, nor was it meant to be. The real issue came down to this: whether in Sicily, the city of Rome, the Papal State or in Lombardy, Frederick had come to be seen as the enemy of the Roman Church: the inexorable enemy as it was to prove, for when Frederick died in 1250 he was still unreconciled to the papacy.

Frederick was as little daunted by his second excommunication in 1239 as he had been by his first in 1227. He moved to the offensive against Gregory, now his declared enemy. He frankly adopted a policy of reannexing to the empire the duchy of Spoleto and the March of Ancona (essential corridor territories to link the imperial north with the kingdom of Sicily) ‘and the other lands which had long belonged to the empire and had been stolen from it’. In other words, he was threatening to take over the Papal State. He set particular store on gaining general European sympathy and even support in his anti-papal stance, denouncing Gregory as personally unfitted for his high apostolic office while declaring his respect for that office in itself. Gregory responded in kind. Blast and counter-blast shared common features: each reviewed the history of imperial–papal relations to demonstrate the treachery and double-dealing of the other party; each condemned the other’s fitness for the office he held; both claimed God was on their side; each plundered the colourful language of the

71 MGH Leg. iv Const., ii, no. 214.  
Apocalypse’s images of Antichrist to denounce the other. 73 If Christendom was impressed, it was not sufficiently moved to intervene decisively on one side or the other.

Both parties apparently agreed, however, that there was one possible way out of the impasse. That the dispute should be adjudicated by a general council was first mooted by Frederick himself. In April 1239 he called on the College of Cardinals to summon ‘a general council of prelates and others of Christ’s faithful’ before whom he was prepared to prove his own innocence and Gregory’s guilt. 74 This attempt to drive a wedge between the College and the pope came to nothing. But when in August 1240 Gregory himself convoked a general council to be held in Rome the Easter following, Frederick opposed it, issuing instructions to all his subjects to prevent it assembling. 75 With land access to Rome from France thus made dangerous, two cardinals and numerous bishops attempted the sea route, only to fall into Frederick’s hands and find themselves imprisoned. Gregory’s council was thus still-born. There could be no early attempt at resumption because the papal vacancy that followed Gregory’s death (22 August 1241) effectively lasted until the election of Innocent IV (25 June 1243), for Celestine IV reigned only from 25 October to 10 November 1241.

**The First Council of Lyons 1245**

Innocent IV (1243–54) was very much Gregory IX’s man. He had served in his curia throughout his working life, rising steadily through the ranks of the papal judiciary, becoming one of Gregory IX’s first promotions to the cardinalate in 1227, acting as rector of the March of Ancona (1235–40). With this background it was not to be expected that he would readily compromise with an excommunicate emperor who had virtually taken over the Papal State, made frequent public profession of his contempt both for Gregory personally and for his sentence of excommunication, used two captured cardinals in an attempt to influence papal elections, continued to hold clerical hostages and enjoyed, in the eyes of curial officials, a long record of broken promises. 76

Nevertheless, serious negotiations did take place, culminating in Rome on Maundy Thursday, 1244. Frederick’s chief ministers, Piero della Vigna and Taddeo da Suessa, acting with the emperor’s full authority, achieved an agreed peace which was affirmed publicly in the presence of the pope and cardinals...
and a throng of Roman notables and distinguished visitors in Rome for the Holy Week ceremonies.\textsuperscript{77} It came to nothing. Both pope and emperor were later to give their own versions of why it failed. Frederick claimed it was because the pope would not allow him his legitimate imperial jurisdiction in settling the conflict with the Lombard League. Innocent claimed that Frederick had simply failed to honour the agreement and had never had any intention of doing so.\textsuperscript{78}

With this failure, the curia’s distrust of Frederick became insuperable. Innocent IV gave dramatic proof that his suspicions and fears of Frederick had reached panic proportions when at dead of night he slipped away from Rome in strictest secrecy, accompanied only by a few relatives, attendants and bodyguards. Reaching the west coast by a circuitous route he took ship to his native Genoa, arriving there on 7 July 1244. There he fell seriously ill and for a time his life was despaired of. In the autumn, however, he slowly and painfully crossed the Alps to take refuge in Lyons, where from early December 1244, with his curia reassembled in full working order, he was to remain until he felt that the death of Frederick (13 December 1250) made it safe for him to return to Italy (April 1251).

The security black-out surrounding the pope’s flight from Rome means there is a shortage of hard information about what exactly precipitated it, especially as to whether it was long-planned or suddenly decided, giving rise to much speculation both among contemporaries and modern historians. One who actually accompanied Innocent when he left Rome was his chaplain and confessor, the Franciscan Nicola da Calvi, later bishop of Assisi and the pope’s biographer. His account of Innocent’s hurried departure from Rome is the principal source for its route, timing and much personal detail about the pope’s fragile health. As for the reason for the flight, Nicola stated simply that it was necessary because Frederick was plotting to seize the pope and cardinals.\textsuperscript{79}

That fear of capture drove Innocent to flee does not strain belief. Whether his fear was justified and there was in fact an imperial plot to seize the curia cannot be determined.

In a sermon delivered in Lyons cathedral on 27 December 1244, Innocent IV announced his intention of summoning a general council for the following June. The formal invitations to attend followed in early January. Both in the

\textsuperscript{77} ‘... in die cene Domini in platea Lateranensi coram domino papa et fratribus suis, presentibus clarissimo Constantinopolitano imperatore, cetu non modico prelatorum, senatoribus etiam populoque romano et maxima multitudine aliorum, qui ea die propter instantem Pasche sollemnitatem de diversis mundi partibus convenenter ad apostolorum limina visitanda, ipsius domini pape ecclesiasticum mandatis et plenius pariturum per predictos nuntios, ab ipso super hoc speciale mandatum habentes, in anima sua iuramento promisit’. ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, ed. Panotti, pp. 84–5.

\textsuperscript{78} MGH Leg. iv Const., xi, no. 252; MGH Epp. s. XIII, xi, no. 63.

\textsuperscript{79} ‘... tendens insidias, ipsosque capere machinans’. ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, ed. Panotti, p. 86.
letters of summons and in the sermon with which he opened the Council (28 June 1245), Innocent presented a picture of the Church in crisis, identifying the dangers that threatened: the depravity of clergy and laity; the parlous state of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem and of the Latin empire of Constantinople; the incursion of the Mongols into eastern and central Europe; the persecution of the Church by Frederick II. In the event it was this last which was the Council’s main preoccupation. The other issues were raised in the Council but little was accomplished in these areas. The cause of the Holy Land crusade was indeed to be given new life; but that was Louis IX’s doing. Constantinople continued to be in imminent danger of recapture by the Greeks. The lifting of the Mongol threat was due entirely to decisions taken in the Mongolian world. The conciliar reform legislation, measured by the standards of Lateran IV, was unambitious and largely limited to technical adjustments of the ecclesiastical juridical machinery. It is symptomatic of the lack of impact of the Council’s handling of these issues that Nicola da Calvi, Innocent’s biographer, made no mention of it in his account of the Council. What did make an impact, and that resoundingly throughout Christendom, not just in Nicola’s biography, were the proceedings against Frederick II.

These proceedings figured prominently in all three of the formal sessions of Lyons I. The official papal chancery _Relatio_ of the Council (the title _Brevis nota_ is used by some historians) provides a clear if all-too-brief account of how Innocent IV went about the condemnation and deposition of Frederick II.

In the sermon with which he opened the first session of the Council, Innocent itemised ‘the sorrows in my heart’ (cf. Ps. 93:19) which had brought the Church into crisis and commented on each of the five. Turning to the ‘persecution’ of the Church by the emperor, he referred to Frederick’s contention, made in his open letters to the Christian world, that his hostility had not been to the Church generally but to Gregory IX personally; the pope charged that the falsity of the claim had been demonstrated when he had stepped up the persecution during the papal vacancy. He referred also to the numerous occasions when Frederick had acknowledged that he held Sicily, ‘the special Patrimony of St Peter’, as a fief of the Roman Church, pledging himself to observe the liberties of the Sicilian Church, especially in episcopal elections and clerical fiscal immunity. He had also acknowledged the papal definition of the territories and boundaries of the Papal State and guaranteed its autonomy. He had made and likewise broken other promises. Innocent apparently enumerated them, though the _Relatio_ left them unspecified. The pope was

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80 _Relatio de concilio Lugdunensi, MGH Leg. iv. Const., ii, no. 401._

81 ‘Primus erat de deformitate prelatorum et subditorum, secundus de insolentia Sarracenorum, tertius de scismate Graecorum, quartus de sevitià Tartarorum, quintus de persecutione Frederici imperatoris.’ _Relatio_, p. 513.
better able to give chapter and verse of the documents in question because he had caused to be drawn up at the Council a codification (Transsumpta) of the privileges and deeds granted by European rulers to the Roman Church.82 This stock-taking comprised ninety-one grants, some two-thirds of which had been issued by German kings and emperors, of which over half had been granted by Frederick II. The session closed with Frederick’s counsel, Taddeo da Suessa, challenging various contentions just made against the emperor by the pope who, according to the Relatio, replied well to each point made, but without giving any detail as to the precise objections made.

The second formal session of the Council (5 July 1245) was devoted entirely to the matter of Frederick II. A Sicilian bishop was allowed a diatribe against Frederick, denouncing him as one who had led an evil life from his very boyhood and as one whose declared intention was to return the clergy to that poverty which had been the clerical lot in the primitive Church. Taddeo da Suessa discredited this witness as one whose brother and nephew had been hanged for treason in Sicily. But the senior Spanish bishop rose to urge Innocent to proceed against Frederick as a despoiler of the Church,83 promising the support of all the numerous Spanish bishops present. Taddeo asked for a postponement of the third session of the Council so as to allow Frederick to appear in person, particularly since, as to the charge of heresy, no one was in a position to represent him. The Relatio stated that Innocent agreed to the postponement in the face of considerable opposition from the prelates. Matthew Paris, not an eye-witness, reported the pope as receiving this request with dismay: ‘I fear snares that cannot be avoided. If he were to come, I would leave immediately. I do not desire, nor do I feel prepared for, martyrdom or prison custody.’84 The English and French lay representatives were said to have overcome his fears; he allowed the postponement.

Frederick, however, did not manage to appear. The Council resumed its formal sessions on the agreed rearranged date of 17 July 1245. Taddeo interjected an appeal to a future pope and general council. Innocent replied that such an appeal was inadmissible because the present Council was a lawful general council. If it was deficient in numbers, this was because all those bishops within the emperor’s jurisdiction had been prevented from attending. The pope then protested that such was his love for Frederick, both before and after he became pope, and even after summoning the Council, that some people would find it hard to believe that he could ever bring himself to pass

83 Claiming of Frederick, that ‘tota sua fuerat intentio ut deprimeret ecclesiam iuxta posse’. Relatio, p. 533.
sentence against him.85 But pass sentence he did; first orally, then by a formal reading of the decree of deposition. Matthew Paris had it that this was accompanied by all the prelates extinguishing and reversing candles in ritual disapprobation of the excommunicate and deposed Frederick.

Innocent IV was later to defend himself against the charge that he had acted precipitately and without advice. He claimed that he could not recall a case weighed more carefully, first among the cardinals who had divided among themselves to conduct a university-style disputation from which, Innocent claimed, truth had emerged.86 The Relatio recounted how at the Council itself the opinion of each prelate was sought individually as to whether the pope had power to depose emperors, and if he did, whether Frederick as charged merited deposition and as to whether a sentence of deposition would be expedient. There is independent evidence from the bishop who was later to become cardinal-bishop of Ostia, the great canonist Hostiensis, that this was done.87 ‘All agreed on deposition’, continued the Relatio (echoed by Nicola da Calvi), ‘and each put his seal to a written form of the sentence’, so that at its promulgation about 150 seals were attached to the document.88

In its strictly juridical aspect, the deposition decree Ad apostolice dignitatis,89 held Frederick to be guilty on four charges, chosen, it was asserted, from his (unspecified) longer catalogue of crimes: perjury, violation of the peace, sacrilege and suspicion of heresy. Because of his sinfulness on these counts, God had rejected him from acting as emperor or king of Sicily. The successor of Peter, commissioned by Christ to bind and loose upon earth and in heaven (Matt. 18:19) and vicar of Christ, with the advice of the Council, was simply making formal public declaration of that divine repudiation. No one in future was to hold Frederick as either emperor or king or obey him as such under pain of excommunication. The imperial electors were called on to proceed to appoint a successor to Frederick as Holy Roman Emperor. The pope as suzerain of Sicily would himself find a successor to be its king.

The decree was also a manifesto, an apologia for this most drastic of political actions, laid before Christendom. It took the form of a compendium, arranged under the headings of the four charges, of Frederick’s acts from hostility to or defiance of the authority of the Roman Church, beginning with the breaking of his oath of fidelity to Innocent III at Messina and Rome in 1212 and continuing to his failure to honour the peace agreed in Rome on Maundy Thursday 1244.

The charge of perjury referred particularly to his non-observance of the

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1212 oaths and his imperial coronation oath of 1220. He had sworn to protect to the utmost of his ability the honours, laws and possessions of the Roman Church. His defamation of Gregory IX, capture of two cardinals, contempt for the papal sentence of excommunication, attacks on the Papal State and his forcing subjects of the Roman Church to abjure the fidelity they owed it, all demonstrated his signal failure to honour his solemn obligations, obligations which so far as the papacy was concerned were of the essence of the imperial office. The charge of violation of the peace was simply a continuation of this theme of oath-breaking – under this heading, the Peace of San Germano agreed in 1230 after Frederick’s return from the Holy Land. Particular emphasis was given to the violation of its terms relating to the liberties of the Sicilian clergy, namely, free canonical episcopal elections, clerical privileged exemptions from lay jurisdiction and taxation, spoliation of church properties. The charge of sacrilege related to the capture and imprisonment of the clergy en route for Gregory IX’s Council, some of whom, the decree asserted, had died as a result of their maltreatment. The suspicion that Frederick was a heretic was attributed to a wide variety of actions which allegedly proved his hostility to the Roman Church: contempt for its sentence of excommunication; over-familiar and over-indulgent relations with Saracens, in Sicily, at his court and especially demonstrated by his making a treaty with al-Kamil at the time of his crusade which allowed Islamic worship on the Temple Mount; marriage of his daughter to the Greek emperor of Nicaea, schismatic and excommunicate enemy of the Roman Church; alleged conspiracy to have the duke of Austria, well known for his loyalty to the papacy, assassinated. Further ground for suspicion of heresy was his failure to promote those charitable works by which a Christian prince gave witness to his faith: protection of the poor; patronage of churches, religious houses and hospitals. Finally, there was added, in effect, a fifth charge: the tyranny of his rule over the kingdom of Sicily. He had reduced it to slavery and poverty, driving its most honourable men into exile.

In passing sentence, Innocent made reference to his authority as vicar of Christ and his power of universal jurisdiction as deduced from Matt. 16:19 (‘binding and loosing’). There was no attempt at any more detailed exposition of the grounds on which the deposing power was based. There is no shortage of evidence, however, for a more detailed scrutiny of these grounds in sources directly related to the sentence passed at Lyons I. Of especial relevance are the consultatio from the Council which Hostiensis preserved and the commentary which Innocent IV himself wrote, as a private doctor, on his own deposition decree.90

90 Carlyle and Carlyle (1938), p. 314; Watt (1965b). See also the curial pamphlet Ager cui lenia, Herde (1967).
Fundamental to the whole logic of the papal deposing power was an interpretation of the power of binding and loosing which Christ had granted to Peter and hence, it was argued, to his successors. It could be easily conceded, and Frederick II in his response to *Ad apostolice dignitatis* did so concede, that Christ had intended to give Peter full power in spiritual matters to punish sinners, spiritually, by infliction of penances. But it was another matter altogether, Frederick argued, no doubt with the full support of the European rulers to whom he was continually appealing, to claim that this power gave him authority to punish rulers, temporally, by deposing them from their thrones. Innocent IV was not the first pope to make such a claim. Gregory VII in seeking to justify his deposition of Henry IV had called rhetorically on Saints Peter and Paul: ‘if you can bind and loose in heaven, you can on earth when so deserved take away empires, kingdoms, principalities, dukedoms, marches, counties, the possessions of all men, and grant them to another’. Innocent III’s anti-heretical legislation and particularly the action of Lateran IV with its deprivation of the count of Toulouse and the transfer of the lordship of his territory to Simon de Montfort had been of crucial importance in consolidating the Gregorian view. So too, in a different way, had been Innocent III’s adoption of the Translation of Empire theory and its acceptance in practice, again at Lateran IV, with the transfer of imperial authority from Otto IV to Frederick II. If the office of emperor in the logic of the Translation theory was essentially a papal creation, how could it be denied that it should be withdrawn from one who had conspicuously failed to fulfil the role allocated to him? But the decisive argument remained the interpretation of the power of the keys given to Peter. That power allowed the pope to excommunicate, to exclude from membership of the Christian community. Deposition was inextricably linked to excommunication. Excommunication in itself went close to deposition, as Gregory IX had made abundantly clear in his second excommunication of Frederick in 1239. This sentence had explicitly released Frederick’s subjects from their oaths of allegiance to him and had forbidden them to show him fidelity so long as he remained excommunicate. Exclusion from the Christian community, then, did not simply exclude the private individual from participation in the sacramental and ritual life of the Church; it meant also loss of his public function in the community. Perhaps the essential difference was this: excommunication was to be a temporary form of deposition; temporary in the sense that the excommunication and therefore the suspension from public office would be lifted on repentance. A sentence of deposition was permanent

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91 *MGH Leg.*, iv: *Constit.*, ii, no. 262.

92 There was also approved the appointment of the brother of the king of Portugal as ‘coadiutor et conservator regni’ because of the inadequacy of the king himself, ‘Vita Innocentii IV’, ed. Panotti, p. 96; Peters (1970).
and irrevocable, even if the guilty party came to repentance. Hence Innocent IV’s instruction to the electors to proceed immediately to choosing another emperor-elect.

Finding successors to Frederick’s two monarchies proved lengthy and complex. In the choice of king of the Romans, the papacy at first supported the candidatures of ambitious princelings: Henry Raspe (d. 1247) and then William of Holland (d. 1256). Thereafter the European powers began to involve themselves: Alfonso X, king of Castile, and Richard of Cornwall, brother of the king of England, both managed to have themselves elected king of the Romans in 1256 and 1257 respectively. The interregnum came to an end with the uncontested recognition of Rudolf of Habsburg (1273–91) in that office, vigorously backed by Gregory X. But no king of the Romans was to leave Germany for Rome and imperial coronation for the rest of the thirteenth century.

This in itself did not remove the danger which haunted the papacy and lay at the root of the clash with Frederick II, ultimately making any modus vivendi impossible. This was the union of empire and kingdom of Sicily, dreaded as a threat to papal ecclesiastical and territorial autonomy when both northern and southern Italy were controlled by the same ruler, considered hostile and untrustworthy. Each of Frederick’s surviving sons, Conrad IV (d. 1254) and Manfred (d. 1266) and even a young grandson, Conradin (d. 1268), kept alive the hopes of their dynasty. Most threatening was Manfred, crowned in Palermo in August 1258 and as his power in the south grew, extending his ambitions into the city of Rome, Tuscany and Lombardy and expressing claims over imperial lands. The papacy excommunicated him and adapted the recruiting attractions and techniques of the Holy Land crusade to raise soldiers and money to combat him. Manfred became the especial target of the ‘political’ or ‘Italian’ crusades, themselves a logical application of the papacy’s view of the crusade as any holy war it authorised as such.93 The really urgent need, however, was to find a credible and effective opponent to Manfred.

For its choice as king of Sicily the papacy had cast its net widely. In 1255 it enfeoffed Edmund, second son of Henry III. Since he was still a boy, it was scarcely an immediate solution to the problem and founder when it proved ruinous to the finances of the king of England and the political stability of his country. It was not until 1264 that Urban IV found a champion who was to prove successful against Manfred. This was Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX. It was quite a coup to secure the backing of the most powerful royal dynasty in Europe. Charles of Anjou, his Italian crusade largely financed by taxation of the French Church, soon put paid to the Hohenstaufen. But there were risks in adopting as Sicilian client a man as strong and ambitious as Charles. The papacy did its best to minimise them by insisting on Charles

93 Housley (1982).
accepting strict conditions of tenure before investiture as king of Sicily.\textsuperscript{94} The terms of the agreement negotiated dealt first with matters of the timing, finance and logistics of his future campaign in Italy. But there were weightier matters to be settled. Those papal Italian interests which the Hohenstaufen had so endangered had to be spelled out anew, and respect for them guaranteed, to constitute the terms on which the Sicilian kingship was to be held.

First, there had to be acknowledgement of the territories and boundaries of the Papal State as the papacy defined them. Charles was to be totally excluded from holding any office or possessing any territory therein. Then he had to recognise the pope as his suzerain to whom he owed liege homage for his kingship. An annual census was owed; penalty for failure to pay it within two months was excommunication. Further, the Sicilian Church was to have all its liberties – in episcopal elections, operation of the ecclesiastical courts, clerical privileges. The laws of Frederick, Conrad and Manfred that appeared to challenge ecclesiastical liberty were to be repealed. Above all, there must be no union of empire and kingdom. Neither Charles nor his heirs might ever be candidates for the empire or German kingship or lordship of Tuscany or Lombardy under pain of forfeiture of the kingship of Sicily. Finally, the king of Sicily would act as the papal secular arm, providing an army for papal service at need. His oath of fidelity would bind him to act as the pope’s particular protector in maintaining and defending all papal rights, helping to recover them if lost. All those undertakings were to apply to the Angevin dynasty as a whole. Penalty for breach of contract was loss of the throne.

Crowned king of Sicily in January 1266, Charles of Anjou quickly disposed of Manfred in February 1266 and had removed any danger from Conradin by August 1268. Thereafter, his reign, combined with the absence of any German intervention, ensured a relatively crisis-free period for the papacy in Italy. This was to last until revolt against Charles of Anjou in March 1282 brought the invasion of the island of Sicily by the crown of Aragon and the inauguration of a new period of papal entanglement in the affairs of southern Italy.

\textbf{The Second Council of Lyons (1274) and its aftermath}\textsuperscript{95}

The death of Clement IV in Viterbo (29 November 1268) was followed by a vacancy of two years nine months, almost certainly the longest in papal history.

\textsuperscript{94} Text in Jordan (1909), pp. 20–6, apt comment by Runciman (1958), p. 77: ‘Charles himself had no qualms, even at the exorbitant terms demanded by the Papacy. He knew he could adjust them later to suit his convenience.’

None of the participating cardinals offered any explanation for the long delay. Among the many conjectures put forward, we might perhaps settle for that which puts the emphasis on personal and dynastic rivalries, probably compounded by external pressures, especially from Charles of Anjou, rather than any major clash of principle, whether political or ecclesiastical. Whatever the precise explanation, there is no good reason for acquitting the cardinals of gross irresponsibility. Only virtual imprisonment by the Viterbese at long last forced a decision out of them. Using the delegation procedure, they elected on 1 September 1271 from outside their own ranks Tedaldo Visconti of Piacenza, archdeacon of Liège, a man of proven value in the middle rank of curial service. He was consecrated and crowned Gregory X on 27 March 1272. The reason for the further delay, between election and consecration, was that at the time he was chosen he was in the Holy Land. He left this region promising to do his utmost as pope for the beleaguered Christians there.

Gregory X sought to return the papacy to its classic thirteenth-century policy. His personal enthusiasm for the recovery of the holy places, which had its origins in his earlier close contacts with both the Capetian and Plantagenet courts, put the crusade back to the head of the papal agenda. Within days of his consecration, he announced to his astonished and unenthusiastic cardinals his intention of calling a general council whose primary purpose would be to organise a new initiative to restore the fortunes of the Latin kingdom and repossess Jerusalem. Union of the Latin and Greek Churches would be sought, certainly as an end in itself, but also because it held out the hope of Byzantine co-operation in the crusade. Moral reform of clergy and laity was also to be the Council’s concern. When on 7 May 1274 Gregory X formally opened his Council, and chose the same text for his inaugural sermon as had Innocent III in the Lateran in 1215, he was making clear the source of his inspiration. When Gregory chose Lyons for the Council rather than Rome, it was not, as it had been for Innocent IV, as refuge from a hostile emperor but because it seemed more advantageous to the cause of the crusade to hold it closer to where he expected the bulk of his support. He was looking particularly to three kings who had already seen active service as crusaders: Charles of Anjou, Philip III of France and especially Edward I, with whom he had served in the Latin kingdom.

At the opening of the Council, Gregory reiterated its triple aim: relief to the Holy Land, union with the Greeks, reform of the Church. His own deep commitment to the crusade shone through Zelus fidei, the Council’s compendium of crusading preparations promulgated in the second session (18 May

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\textsuperscript{96} Primary sources: Brevis nota, in G.D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova at amplissima collectio, 31 vols., Paris (1900— ), xxiv, cols. 61—8; Franchi (1965); constitutions, COD, pp. 285—307.
The decree in its specific instructions was largely based on Lateran IV’s *Ad liberandam*, but Gregory X vivified its tone with his personal testimony to the sufferings of Christians, the insults to Christianity which he had witnessed; crying out for vengeance he called urgently for the liberation of that land which Christ had consecrated with His blood in the cause of mankind’s redemption. Much of the decree was concerned with finance. No more than Innocent III was Gregory X seeking to rouse any mass exodus of unsoldierly pilgrims from Europe to Jerusalem. Christendom as a whole participated by prayer and cash: the manner and style of crusading was undergoing significant changes. The money was to go to provide the means whereby a specialist task force would do the actual fighting. To this end some financial arrangements had already been carefully secured. Between the first and second sessions of the Council, the pope and cardinals systematically obtained from representatives of each ecclesiastical province agreement to a crusading tenth to be levied on all clerical revenues for each of six consecutive years.

The task of persuading Europe’s kings and aristocracies to launch themselves against Islam yet again had still to bear fruit. One ruler, however, was quick to promise troops, money and supplies for the crusade. This was the eastern emperor, Michael VIII Palaiologos.97 His decision was remarkable in that the Greeks had never shared the western European concept of the holy war; nor had their experiences of crusading armies been such as to persuade them to do so. But it was not so much Michael VIII’s commitment to the crusade which was remarkable, as the very presence at Lyons of an official Greek delegation, a delegation moreover mandated to accept Roman terms for the healing of the schism between the Latin and Greek Churches. For the Greeks were still recovering from almost sixty years of western occupation, with the empire parcelled out among the Latin invaders, its glorious capital ransacked and a usurping Latin patriarch and emperor until recently established therein. With this traumatic humiliation the papacy was fully identified.98 The diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople in 1204 had not been made on papal orders nor even with tacit papal connivance. But the papacy had warmly welcomed the results of the diversion: ‘the work of God, wonderful to our eyes’, claimed Innocent III. For Innocent believed, and his view remained the characteristic standpoint of the curia, that it was the Greeks who bore the responsibility for the schism between the Churches – they had left the unity of the apostolic see to make another Church for themselves. It was the Greeks who had rent the seamless garment of Christ. And now with the seizure of Constantinople and the establishment of a Latin empire and a Latin hierarchy, they had been given the opportunity to return to unity ‘like a daughter to her mother’.

97 Geanakoplos (1959), p. 287. 98 Gill (1973) and (1979), pp. 27–32.
It had not of course worked out like that. The existence of the Latin empire and patriarchate of Constantinople widened rather than bridged the gulf dividing the eastern and western Churches. But the Latin empire proved feeble, inefficient and inadequately supported by the west. It must have fallen long before July 1261 had the Greeks been able to present a united front against it. The papacy was reluctant to acknowledge the finality of the loss of Constantinople. Its initial reaction was to preach a crusade for its recovery. Nothing came of this. But Michael VIII was alert to the potential threat from the west; and, recognising the importance of the papacy as launcher of crusades, he responded immediately with a first version of what became his policy towards the papacy for the rest of his reign: to hold out the prospect of union between the Churches in return for the recognition of the restored Byzantine empire and a papal veto on any attempts to reinstate a Latin emperor.

The military threat from the west became suddenly more real with the consolidation of Angevin power in Italy and the rapid consequence of it: the steady build-up of Charles of Anjou’s ambitions to reimpose Latin rule in Constantinople.99 Fifteen months after the defeat of Manfred, his intentions were made clear beyond doubt. He reached an agreement with the dispossessed Latin Emperor Baldwin, his son and heir Philip of Courtenay and William of Villehardouin, still clinging to his principedom of Achaea against the attempts of Michael VIII to drive the Latins completely from the empire.100 They declared themselves ready ‘to take on the sacred work of restoring the noble limb cut off by the schismatics from the body of our common mother, the Holy Roman Church’. The resultant treaties, underwritten by Pope Clement IV and actually signed in the papal palace at Viterbo in May 1267, would have made Charles of Anjou the effective controller of a restored Latin emperor, had the plans come to fruition.

At the same time as Clement IV was supporting Charles of Anjou, he was offering Michael VIII an escape route.101 Already in March 1267, responding to Michael’s overtures, he was offering terms. He held out the prospect of political understanding but insisted that union of the Churches must precede it. Union could only be said to exist when both Churches were at one in the faith they professed. Hence he despatched the text of a profession of faith, adherence to which by the emperor, the Byzantine Church and people was the necessary precondition of political negotiation. The bulk of the articles of this profession concerned shared dogma and was uncontroversial. But the document was notable for its emphatic assertion of the Roman position on issues long considered to be points of difference between Rome and Constantinople:

99 Excellent coverage of the rivalry of Charles and Michael, Geanakoplos (1939), pp. 189–257.
100 Geanakoplos (1939), pp. 197–199.
101 On Clement IV’s attitude to the Greeks, Gill (1979), pp. 112–19.
the theology of the Trinity with particular reference to the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son; the doctrine of Purgatory; the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist; and papal primacy. It was clear from both the text and from Clement IV’s covering letter that here was no creed agreed by two equal Churches having searched together for a basis of agreement. Rather it was ‘the mother and mistress of all Churches’ articulating the faith for an errant daughter whose return to obedience was being demanded. The profession contained a succinct summary of the doctrine of papal primacy as it had come to be formalised by thirteenth-century popes and their theologians and canonists. Characteristically juridical in formulation, its essence lay in the term ‘fullness of power’ (plenitudo potestatis), applied at the same time to the general concept of papal headship and to its more restricted application as an expression of papal jurisdiction relative to other episcopal sees; in this case, we see asserted the claim that the Roman Church was the source of the jurisdiction and privileges of all other episcopal, including patriarchal, sees. This concept carried with it the authority to decide disputed articles of faith, and, in the ecclesiastical order, to act as a universal court of appeal. There is no thirteenth-century text that states more clearly how the papacy understood its own jurisdiction in this period:

This holy Roman Church possesses highest and fullest primacy and authority over the whole universal Church, acknowledging in truth and humility that it has received it with fullness of power from the Lord himself in St Peter, chief and head of the Apostles, of whom the Roman pontiff is successor. And just as the duty of defending the truth of the faith lies more heavily on it than on others, so if any doubts about the faith should arise, they must be referred to its judgement for settlement. Anyone who is oppressed may appeal to it in those matters which belong to the ecclesiastical forum and recourse may be had to its judgement in all cases where ecclesiastical judgement is appropriate, and all Churches are subject to it and their prelates give it obedience and reverence. In this respect fullness of power means that it admits other Churches to a share in the pastoral charge; many of which, and especially the patriarchal Churches, the Roman Church has honoured with various privileges, saving always its own prerogatives as established both in general councils and otherwise.102

102 ‘Ipse sancta Romana ecclesia summum et plenum primatum et principatum super universam ecclesiam catholicam obtinet; quem se ab ipso Domino in beato Petro apostolorum principe sive vertice, euis Romanus pontifex est successor, cum potestatis plenitudine recepisse veraciter et humiliter recognoscit. Et sicut prae ceteris tenetur fidei veritatem defendere: sic et si quae de fide subortae fuerint quaestiones, suo debent iudicio definiri. Ad quam potest gravatus quilibet super negotios ad ecclesiasticum forum pertinentibus appellare: et in omnibus causis ad examen ecclesiasticum spectantibus ad ipsius potest iudicium recurri: et eidem omnes ecclesiae sunt subjectae, ipsis praelati obedientiam et reverentiam sibi dant. Ad hanc autem sic potestatis plenitudine consistit, quod ecclesias ceteras ad sollicitudinem partem admissit; quorum multas et patriarchales praecloure diversis privilegiis eadem Romana ecclesia honoravit, sua tamen observata praerogativa tum in generalibus concilis, tum in aliquibus aliis semper salva.’ Denzinger (1911), p. 204.
It was fear of Charles of Anjou and his unbounded ambition that stopped Michael VIII winning easy popularity with his subjects by rejecting out of hand so emphatic a Latin position on the disputed doctrines and so uncompromising a statement of papal primacy. Following the Viterbo treaties of 1267, Charles lost no opportunity to press ahead with preparations for an attack on Byzantium: consolidation of territories across the Adriatic, alliance with western powers with something to gain from a restored Latin Empire, agreements with Balkan powers to encircle the Byzantines, even reaching out to the Mongols. He had his best opportunities during the protracted vacancy following Clement IV’s death. The accession of Gregory X, however, with his determination both to achieve union with the Greeks and obtain their cooperation in a new crusade, checked his plans. Michael VIII now had his chance to make the temporary check permanent. Hence his support for the crusade. Hence the presence at Lyons of a Greek delegation briefed to communicate the emperor’s acceptance of Clement IV’s profession of faith and the Greek Church’s acceptance of Roman primacy. ‘It was clear that the emperor sought union only for fear of Charles’, wrote the well-positioned contemporary Greek observer, Pachymeres, ‘otherwise it would never have entered his mind.’

Michael VIII did not find it easy to persuade his clergy and people to share his conviction that defence against the Angevin threat was worth the price being demanded. He argued that union involved only three concessions, none of which would matter very much in practice: recognition of papal primacy in principle (phrased in very general terminology); of the papacy’s appellate jurisdiction (which distance would nullify); commemoration of the pope in the liturgy (hardly an affront to Orthodoxy). But this was too pragmatic an approach for the majority of Greek churchmen. Compromises with the faith, no matter how politically expedient, were unacceptable. To agree even to Michael’s minimalist concessions would still amount to tolerating heresy (the matter of *filioque*) and blasphemy (the Latins adding it to their creed), while to accept papal primacy, however vague the formulation of the principle, ran the grave risk of the introduction of Latinising innovations into the deeply cherished practices in worship and discipline of the Orthodox Church. And there was, of course, always the memory of the humiliations inflicted by Latin conquest and occupation to influence emotion. The opposition was strong enough to force Michael VIII to resort to the imprisonment and public humiliation of its leading spokesmen. By February 1274 he concluded he had mustered enough support from his bishops – at most some 40 out of 144 – to confirm to Gregory X that a Greek delegation would be going to Lyons.

It arrived there on 24 June to be greeted in ceremonial friendship by the
whole body of the Council and the kiss of peace from Gregory X. On the feast of Saints Peter and Paul (29 June) Gregory X celebrated High Mass at which the creed was sung in Latin and Greek with the controversial phrase and addition *qui ex patre filioque procedit* sung three times by all present, including the two leading Greek prelates, the former patriarch Germanos and Theophanes, metropolitan of Nicaea. On 6 July Gregory opened the Council's fourth session with an address welcoming the Greeks and the union about to be accomplished. He allowed himself a note of personal satisfaction that he had confounded the sceptics (‘just about everybody’) who had doubted whether the Greeks would ever put in an appearance. He did not, however, change sceptical opinion when he averred that the Greeks came from purely spiritual reasons, without ulterior reasons in mind.

The Greek delegation had brought three letters, acceptance of which by Gregory X after they had been read in Council in Latin translation constituted the making of the union. The first was from the emperor himself and endorsed his unqualified acceptance of the profession of faith first sent to him by Clement IV and thereafter by Gregory X. He went on to make a request which even the pro-unionist minority of his bishops had made a condition of their co-operation – that the Orthodox Church should be allowed to continue to recite the creed as it had always done, and that it should retain all its other long-established rites and usages, none being against the faith. A second letter communicated the agreement of Michael’s son, the future Emperor Andronikos II, with his father’s position. The third was the letter of the unionist Greek bishops. Even they apparently could not bring themselves to accept the profession of faith in its entirety; their letter ignored it and made no reference to Trinitarian theology, nor to any of the other points of difference between the Churches to which the papacy had been requiring adherence. They did, however, acknowledge their acceptance of the

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103 ‘Omnes prelati qui erant in concilio cum familiaribus suis, camerarius cum tota familia pape, vice-cancellarius et omnes notarii, et omnis familia cardinalium, exixerunt eis obviam, et eos usque ad palatium domini pape honorifice conduxerunt: qui ab eodem domino papa stante in aula eiusdem palatii cum omnibus cardinalibus, et multis prelatis, ad pacis osculum honorifice recepti: et eis representaverunt litteras imperatoris Graecorum bullatas bulla aurea, et alias litteras prelatorum, et dixerunt in praesentia domini pape, quod veniebant ad omnimodam obedientiam sancte Romane ecclesie, et ad recognitionem fidei, quam ipsa ecclesie tenet, et primatum ipsius, etc.’ *Brevis nota*, col. 64.


105 ‘... post cuius sermonem dominus papa allocutus est concilium, narrans predictas tres causas vocations concilii, et dicens qualiter contra opinionem quasi omnium, Graeci libere veniebant ad obedientiam Romane ecclesie, profitendo fideem, et recognoscendo primatum ipsius, nihilque temporale petendo: de quo multum dubitatur’. *Brevis nota*, col. 65.
concept of papal primacy, though in a minimalist and very general form – conceding only ‘whatever our fathers showed to those who ruled the Apostolic see before the schism’ and not the doctrine of plenitude of power enunciated in the profession of faith. But it satisfied Gregory X (though not his successors). The session included the singing once again of the creed in Latin and Greek, with repetition of the controversial *filioque* phrase. The last stage of the union proceedings took place at the sixth and final session (17 July 1274) when a definition of the doctrine of the Trinity was promulgated. It may well have been formulated in consultation with the Greeks, informally between sessions, but there is no evidence for this. But the text can be read as an attempt to allay Greek suspicion that the Latins argued for a double procession of the Holy Spirit when they used the expression *ex patre filioque*, which would have been heretical. The text made it clear that the Roman Church, like the Orthodox Church, adhered unambiguously to a single spiration and thus to the unity of the Trinity.

At this last session, Gregory closed the Council. He declared himself satisfied with progress made towards the organisation of the crusade and again gave heartfelt welcome to the healing of the schism. He was less satisfied, however, with what had been achieved in reforming the Church. He declared his intention of returning to this area of concern at a later date. He was severe (again, we may detect an echo of Innocent III) on the shortcomings of bishops.

Like Innocent III, Gregory X had asked the Council in advance for advice about issues needing its attention. The decrees to a certain extent reflect this general consultation, though the last word was very decisively that of the curia. The legislation was issued in batches at different sessions of the Council, to be later tidied up at the curia and promulgated, with some additions, in final form on 1 November 1274. The most important canons were: the Trinitarian definition already mentioned; a radical reform of the law and procedure of papal elections (*Ubi periculum*, to be considered below); and a decree designed to stop the proliferation of small, ill-organised religious groupings by limiting the number of orders of mendicants to four (Franciscan, Dominican, Carmelite, Augustinian). The bulk of the canons reflected one of Gregory’s primary pastoral concerns (as it had been Innocent III’s), that of improving the quality of the episcopate by way of improving the law governing episcopal elections and with the standards of public conduct required of bishops. There was further legislation regulating the conduct of other office holders: members of cathedral chapters, parish priests, ecclesiastical lawyers. There was also legislation on moral matters, with particular reference to usury:

106 Kuttner (1949).
all in all, legislation on the pattern of Lateran IV without achieving quite the range of that reforming Council, but certainly more impressive than that of Lyons I.

The last quarter of the century did not go well for the papacy. The high expectations of Gregory X and Lyons II were to be disappointed. The planned crusade was never launched and time ran out for the remaining Christian outposts in Islamic territory: Tripoli in 1289, Acre in 1291. The union between Rome and Constantinople collapsed in a failure so abject that it could only widen the gulf between them. Gregory X’s death within eighteen months of the closing of the Council followed by a succession of frustratingly short pontificates took the impetus from the revivified reform programme. Mention must be made, however, in this context, of the promulgation by Boniface VIII in 1298 of the 359 decrees of a volume additional to the code of canon law (Liber Sextus). It formed a significant contribution to the reform process.

The union of Lyons failed because it did not command the support of the Greek Church and people. It was seen in Byzantium, intellectually, as a betrayal of Orthodoxy and, emotionally, as a sell-out to the Latin aggressor. The more Michael VIII resorted to imprisonment, torture and mutilation to enforce it, the more the Greeks were steeled to reject it. Opposition to the union, present in the imperial family itself, commanded the support of the majority of the Greek bishops and parochial clergy and the whole body of the monks, the most powerful propagandists for its rejection. In the face of such widespread hostility, it is difficult to see how Michael’s appeasement policy could have succeeded, even if the papacy had handled his situation with imagination and sensitivity. But it did not. The sceptics, those in the curia who had always distrusted Michael, momentarily silenced by Gregory X’s apparent success at the Lyons Council, dictated policy after his death. Papal policy now was to exert continuous pressure on Michael to complete the union by securing the sworn adherence to it of the whole of the Greek clergy. In urging this, the curia was asking more than had Gregory X. There were further demands of which that requiring the addition of filioque to the creed in Greek use was the most resented and resisted. It was a demand guaranteed to confirm all earlier Greek fears that they were being asked to be Latinised in an accommodation with heresy and blasphemy.

Of the popes, it was perhaps Martin IV (1281–5) who did most to frustrate the union and crusade plans of Lyons II. A former keeper of the seals (chancellor) of Louis IX, elected pope in circumstances noteworthy for the vigorous lobbying of Charles of Anjou, his Angevin sympathies were soon in evidence.

Within months of Martin’s election, Charles of Anjou together with the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople (his son-in-law, Philip of Courtenay) and Venice had concluded an alliance to repossess Constantinople. Their pact was signed in the papal curia, then at Orvieto (3 July 1281). This was to be followed by the excommunication of Michael VIII by Martin IV on 18 October 1281 (sentence renewed, 7 May and 18 November 1282), as a supporter of schismatics and, thus, of heretics. In March 1282 Martin authorised the diversion of crusading finance for the use of the Angevin–Venetian attack on Constantinople. On 11 December 1282, Michael VIII died, still under the papal ban. He was buried hastily by his son and successor Andronikos without the customary imperial ceremony. His rejection by the authorities of both Churches is sufficient symbol of the failure of Gregory X to heal the schism.

It is no doubt going too far to blame Martin IV solely for Christendom’s failure to launch a Holy Land Crusade. Nevertheless, decisions taken by his curia made it very much less likely that the passagium generale would come about. The refusal to allow Edmund, the English king’s brother, to function as an alternative leader to Edward I himself seems, in hindsight, to have significantly reduced the likelihood of any English participation. The possibility of Capetian participation was killed off by decisions owing much to Martin IV, in circumstances that had consequences for future papal policy in Italy.

In March 1282, even as Martin IV was increasing his support for the restoration of Latin rule in Constantinople, insurrection in Sicily against Angevin rule was making this impossible. Street rioting in Palermo escalated into island-wide massacres of the French, and general revolt. The papacy was now faced with a wholly new power shift in Italian politics.

Peter III, king of Aragon, was married to a Hohenstaufen, Constance, daughter of Manfred, which ensured his long-standing interest in Sicily, an interest which Michael VIII had taken care to encourage as part of his anti-Angevin diplomacy. The Sicilian rebels had hoped to secure the support of their papal suzerain, but when Martin IV indignantly rebuffed them, they turned to Aragon. And not in vain. On 30 August 1282, King Peter landed at Trapani. Two months later Martin IV excommunicated him and in January 1283 elevated the war to eject the Aragonese from Sicily into a crusade. He went further. On 21 March 1283 he declared Peter deposed from the throne of Aragon. Charles of Anjou, meanwhile, abetted by the pope, had been negotiating for the support of his nephew Philip III to regain the island. Following Peter’s deposition, Philip was persuaded to accept the crown of Aragon for his youngest son, Charles of Valois. The expedition to implement his claim was declared a crusade by Martin IV, who agreed to finance it. The Aragonese

The failure of Philip III’s crusade was also the failure of the papacy’s response to the challenge to its Italian policy posed by the Aragonese occupation of the island of Sicily. Honorius IV (1285–7) was the first pope to face this new situation. Should he recognise the de facto position and acknowledge the legitimacy of the rule as king of Aragon of the excommunicated Alfonso III who had succeeded his father in Peter’s Spanish lands, and that of his brother, James, who had succeeded as king of Sicily? Honorius chose the Angevin option by refusing to lift the excommunication of Alfonso and by excommunicating James in turn when he had himself crowned king in Palermo in February 1286. Charles of Anjou had died in 1285. His heir was a prisoner in Aragon. When, in return for his freedom, he recognised James’s claim to Sicily, the pope rejected the agreement.110

The curia persisted in its support for an Angevin reconquest of the island, even despite the disinclination of the Angevins themselves. It obstinately refused to tolerate any seizure of power in what it always considered to be the special Patrimony of St Peter and stuck tenaciously to its anti-Aragonese policy through thick and thin. It was to be left to Boniface VIII to bring himself to acknowledge the inevitable, and by the Treaty of Caltabellotta in 1302 to recognise Frederick of Aragon as ruler of the island of Sicily. For sixteen years the papacy had tried to restore the territory to the Angevin Charles II. The consequences of this obstinacy can be read in the papal registers. This policy dominated papal attention, a major distraction from other aspects of papal government, in a way that even in the most hectic days of the struggles with the Hohenstaufen had not happened.

There is one further setback to the Lyons II programme which must be noticed, because its non-implementation affected the history of the papacy for much of the remainder of the century. As has been seen, Gregory X’s election had come only after an inordinately long vacancy for which there was no explanation other than the shortcomings of the College of Cardinals. That some reform of the electoral system was necessary to avoid any repetition of the leadership vacuum of 1268–71 had begun to be acknowledged, not least by some of the papacy’s most loyal supporters: Hostiensis, senior cardinal and leading academic canonist for one, the former master-general of the Dominicans, Humbert of Romans, for another.

At Lyons, Gregory X introduced a constitution designed to minimise delay in electing a new pope.\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ubi periculum} presented itself as merely a supplement to \textit{Licet de vitanda}. It remedied certain procedural defects which recent experience had shown up, clarifying ambiguities about absentee voters, where an election should take place, how long should be allowed to lapse before the electors settled down to business. These matters had their importance but were secondary to the main content of the new decree, the introduction of regulations designed to discourage the cardinals from taking too leisurely an approach to the matter of choosing a new pope.

The election was to take place, normally, in the palace in which the pope had been living. Within this building, the cardinals accompanied in ordinary circumstances by only one servant must come together in a single locked room (\textit{unum conclave}), undivided by any partition or curtain. The room was to be sealed off so that no one could pass in or out. No one should have access to the cardinals nor were they allowed to receive any letters. Severance from the outside world was to be complete and automatic excommunication the penalty for anyone who sought to breach it. A small window was to be left in the sealed room through which food could be passed; it was not to be large enough for anyone to gain admittance through it. The cardinals were thus consigned to a period of uncomfortable communal living.

There followed a draconian regulation. If after three days the cardinals had reached no decision, their food was to be rationed, one dish only at each of two meals being allowed. After five days of this restricted diet, if there were still no pope elected, the cardinals would have to make do on bread, water and wine until they made up their minds. \textit{Ubi periculum} adopted the view that the way to electing a new pope might lie through the cardinals’ stomachs.

Or through their pockets. The constitution proceeded to forbid the cardinals to receive any revenue from the curial camera or from any other source. The cardinals too must refrain from concerning themselves with any business other than the election, unless some urgent matter imperilling the Church should arise which all the cardinals agreed should be attended to.

\textit{Ubi periculum} frankly acknowledged that the regime of isolation and dietary restriction it envisaged required careful policing and that this could only happen if the lay power were trusted to act without taking advantage of the position of strength accorded it. The rulers of the town in which the election was to take place were to take an oath before the clergy and people of the town that they would honourably implement the constitution and that they would not coerce the cardinals beyond the limits laid down in it. There were drastic penalties for violation: the guilty would be excommunicated, declared infa-

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{COD}, pp. 240–4; \textit{Decretales vito} 1.6.3.
mous, excluded from holding any public office and deprived of any lands they held of the Church. The city itself would be placed under interdict and deprived of its bishopric.

All this was too much for the cardinals. When at Lyons they were presented with the text of *Ubi periculum* (it would seem that Gregory X had not taken them into his confidence when drawing it up) they rejected it and began intensive lobbying of the bishops at the Council to persuade them to combine in opposition. But Gregory X was a match for them. Calling before him the bishops by turn in their national hierarchies, he explained what he was about and secured their support, their seals affixed to the text being evidence of it.112

*Ubi periculum* thus became the law of the Church, though the College of Cardinals had not reconciled itself to acceptance of it. On the death of Gregory X, the new electoral rules were applied and Innocent V was elected within the day. But he suspended the constitution on grounds of its severity, declaring his intention of replacing it with a more acceptable reform decree. He died before this could be done and his successor, John XXI, renewed the suspension.

Within the eighteen-year period when *Ubi periculum* was in abeyance, there were seven papal elections. For some four years of that period, the papacy was vacant. This included a vacancy of twenty-seven months (4 April 1292 – 5 July 1294) marked by infighting among the cardinals of a particularly irresponsible kind, and was concluded by the most patently unsuitable appointment made in the thirteenth century. The election of Celestine V proved that for a head of the Church, personal sanctity was not enough. It needed to be matched by qualities appropriate for rulership, which (despite some attempts to ascribe political sense to him) most historians insist Celestine sorely lacked. Incapable through old age and inexperience in the world of affairs, a pawn in the hands of the Angevins, he spent his pontificate immured in Naples; but after five months of mounting personal anguish and approaching chaos in papal

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112 ‘... dominus papa ostendit cardinalibus constitutionem quam fecerat super electione Romani pontificis, per quam orta est dissensio inter eum et cardinales in privato, que postmodum venit in publico. Nam dominus papa vocavit prelatos sine cardinalibus et vocavit prelatos [Mansi reads ‘cardinales’] per nationes et cardinales in consistorio. Omnis die conveniebant sine papa, et simuliter allocuti sunt aliquos prelatos super constitutione prefata in consistorio: et rogaverunt, quod si dominus papa eorum assensus requireret super ipsa constitutione, quod non darent definitivum consilium, vel consensum, donec rationes ipsorum audirent, et similiter multi ex cardinalibus per nationes vocarunt prelatos in domibus suis, petentes ab eis consilium quid esset super hoc facienda, et auxilium si necessesse esset, modo predicto. Et dominus papa similiter vocatis prelatis, ut supra dictum est, et exposita intentione sua, prius inunxit eis in virtute sancte obedientie sub excommunicationis poena, quod nemini revelarent illa quod audirent, et viderent, et facerent tunc ibi cum eo. Et fecit eos consentire illi constitutioni, et mandavit, quod singuli sua sigilla apponere constitutioni predicte, quod et fecerunt. Nam facte sunt schedule per regna et provincias, quibus omnes prelati sua sigilla apposuerunt.’ *Brevis nota*, cols. 66–7.
government, he had the strength to abdicate, insisting that *Ubi periculum*
bere enforced in the election of his successor.

**THE ATTACK ON POPE BONIFACE VIII, 1297–1303**

That successor was Boniface VIII, chosen within twenty-four hours of the
conclave being organised in the Castel Nuovo of Naples. He brought to his
appointment a lifetime of varied curial service – since the 1260s with thirteen
years’ membership of the College of Cardinals – and a reputation of being its
outstanding canonist. His experience of the whole range of papal government,
his strong personality and independence of mind were needed by a papacy
whose continuity and quality of leadership had suffered much by the unusually
high number of short pontificates of recent decades: eight in eighteen years
between the death of Gregory X (10 January 1276) and Boniface’s own elec-
tion (24 December 1294), compounded by the cardinals’ too frequent failures
to ensure quick succession and by the disastrous pontificate of Celestine V.
Any such hopes of a revival of Innocentian-style papal government, however,
were doomed to bitter disappointment.

The use of general councils as a major instrument of policy was a character-
istic feature of thirteenth-century papal government, as has been seen. In the
course of the century, however, an alternative view of the role of the general
council had made its appearance. As already mentioned, in April 1239
Frederick II responded to his second sentence of excommunication by calling
on the College of Cardinals to summon a general council before which he
claimed he would establish Gregory IX’s unworthiness to continue as pope.
The idea that appeal against the fitness of a pope to rule lay to a general council
was no novel and bizarre constitutional theory. Innocent III himself had
acknowledged that a pope in heresy had disquali-

[113] Von Schulte (1871); Martin (1937); Tierney (1955); Sieben (1984).
diplomatic failures was otherwise conventional enough, not least in the quality of his legal work, epitomised in the admirable Liber Sextus. What made these extraordinary assaults on his credibility as pope even more remarkable was that they came from sources where normally the papacy could look for its strongest support: from within the College of Cardinals, which had elected him and from the established champion of the Roman Church against heresy and in crusading endeavour, the Capetian monarchy.

The first demand for a general council to bring him down came from Cardinals Giacomo and Pietro Colonna. The structure of the Roman Church had always harboured a potential danger, now actualised. So long as cardinals were created and popes chosen from Roman families with an eye to the government of the City and the Papal State, there was always the possibility that the dynastic feuds and territorial rivalries of these families would be fought out in the papal curia itself, charging papal affairs with the bitterness of petty personal hates. There can be little doubt that such enmities had played their part in prolonging vacancies in the papacy in the second half of the century. But it was in the pontificate of Boniface VIII that the danger was most fully manifested.

Cardinal Benedetto Caetani had already taken the lead in improving the standing of his family before he became pope. His pursuit of territorial aggrandisement, necessarily at the expense of even grander families, inevitably aroused their hostility. Colonna opposition, long-smouldering, blazed in early May 1297 when Stefano Colonna seized a consignment of Caetani money, the purchase price of another estate.

Boniface chose to regard what was essentially a clash of family interests as an attack on himself as pope, on the papacy itself. Holding the two Colonna cardinals primarily responsible for the conduct of the whole family he threatened them with expulsion from the College of Cardinals if Stefano Colonna and the chief of Colonna towns were not surrendered. This ultimatum was rejected. The Colonna cardinals responded with a denial of the validity of the abdication of Celestine V and thus of the election of Boniface VIII. They called for the suspension of Boniface as pope until a general council could be assembled and the election issue decided. The appeal to a general council was renewed in a second manifesto (16 May 1297) which added the accusation that Boniface had so ill-treated the former Celestine V as to cause his death.

The College of Cardinals rallied to Boniface, testifying that the abdication had been voluntary, the election of Boniface canonical, that the Colonna cardinals had agreed with the choice and exchanged the kiss of peace with the new

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pope. They associated themselves with the sentence expelling them from the College and the excommunication of all the Colonna. Before the end of 1297 papal legates throughout Italy were preaching a crusade against them.

The Colonna communicated their accusation against Boniface and their demand for a general council to France: to the University of Paris by open manifesto, to Philip IV by confidential letter. The Manifesto (15 June 1297) made a clear bid for the support of the lay power by playing on French political sensitivities, and by accusing Boniface of boasting that kings and kingdoms were subject to him even in temporal matters. But for the present, after Boniface had been forced to back down in a dispute with Philip IV over his taxation of the clergy, there was peace between France and the papacy, an accord solemnised by the canonisation of Louis IX on 11 August 1297.

This peace did not last. In July 1301 after the arrest of Bernard Saisset, the bishop of Pamiers accused of treason, Boniface sought to bring to bear on Philip IV the full coercive force of the sacerdotal power for what he saw as a gross violation of ecclesiastical liberty. Ausculta fili (5 December 1301) listed the violations of ecclesiastical liberty, beginning with the arrest and incarceration of Saisset of which Philip was accused, asserted the papal right as head of the Church to judge the conduct of rulers and summoned the French bishops and prominent churchmen to a Council in Rome which would discuss and advise on ‘what would seem to us profitable to the honour of God, of the apostolic see, to the promotion of the Catholic faith, the preservation of ecclesiastical liberty, the reform of the king and kingdom, the correction of abuses and the good government of the kingdom’.115

It was an imprudent challenge.116 Boniface’s case was far from strong. Philip IV released Saisset and sent him off to Rome. To the remaining charges of violations of ecclesiastical liberty which covered numerous issues concerning royal jurisdiction over clerical persons, courts and property, the king could and did reply, quite fairly, that in principle he was doing no more than conform to established usages as they were understood by his saintly grandfather whose example he was following. If it were found that royal officials had overstepped the agreed limits of royal jurisdiction he would correct them. But the weakness of Boniface’s position went further than the ground on which he had elected to challenge the French king. Papal success in bringing Philip to account depended on the French Church, or at least a substantial part of it, putting obedience to the pope before fidelity to the king.

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The pope commanded the French higher clergy to come to Rome to attend the Council. The king forbade their attendance. The French bishops urged Boniface to abandon his project, pleading its inopportuneness at a time when lay hostility to the clergy was so intense. Boniface denounced their pusillanimity and stuck to his plan. Compromise was far from his mind. In a speech to French ambassadors in consistory at Anagni (24 June 1302), he made a violent personal attack on Pierre Flotte, whom he saw as the evil genius poisoning the king’s mind against himself, asserted papal supreme jurisdiction over every Christian by ‘reason of sin’ (*ratione peccati*), making its political relevance clear with the menacing warning that just as his predecessors had deposed three kings of France, so a king guilty of as much as they had been, and more, might be deposed ‘like a stable-boy’ (*sicut garcionem*).117

In the event the Rome Council which met in early November 1302 was an anti-climax. The French bishops, by far the majority, whose *temporalia* could be sequestrated by royal officials and otherwise readily be pressurised in the king’s interest, conspicuously absented themselves. The attendance was virtually confined to bishops in the southern regions, distanced from royal control – thirty-nine bishops (including six already in Rome) out of a total of seventy-nine. If there was any examination of Philip’s conduct at the Council or any move towards his excommunication, nothing was made public. What was promulgated later in the month (18 November 1302) was a document, *Unam sanctam*, into which Boniface had distilled the totality of his understanding of papal prerogatives, especially in relation to the lay power.118

For each of its individual propositions, Boniface could claim respectable intellectual ancestry: Hugh of St Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Thomas Aquinas and much of the antecedent canonist tradition had all contributed to its formulation. But in its totality, it was an unqualified extreme statement of papal monarchy, fashioned to overawe the disobedient by sheer weight of sacerdotal authority. This it was to do especially with its climactic declaration: ‘Moreover we declare, state, determine and pronounce that it is wholly necessary for salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman pontiff.’ In other words, he who disobeys the pope risks eternal damnation. The bull began with ecclesiology, positing the essential unity of the Church, ‘outside of which there is neither salvation nor forgiveness of sins’, one body whose head was ‘Christ and his vicar Peter and Peter’s successor’. The premise was thus established from which the conclusion was to follow. The logic was pursued through more directly political argumentation. The ‘two swords’ allegory was used to establish the principles of the relationship of the spiritual and temporal

117 Dupuy (1651), pp. 77–9.
powers. Using the formula of Bernard and Aquinas, the bull argued that both
swords were

In the power of the Church, namely the spiritual and the temporal. But the one ought
to be exercised for the benefit of the Church, the other by the Church; the one by the
hand of the priest, the other by the hand of kings and soldiers but at the command of,
and with the permission of, the priest. It is necessary for one sword to be subject to the
other and the temporal to be subject to the spiritual authority.

This relationship of superior–inferior introduced a strong reiteration of
what Boniface had been telling Philip IV continuously and vehemently: the
spiritual power has authority to judge the temporal. The bull added, no doubt
with Colonna propaganda in mind, that the temporal had no reciprocal author-
ity to judge the spiritual.

Far from reducing the French to obedience, *Unam sanctam* incensed them,
confirming them in their conviction that Boniface was trying to foist on them a
new and wholly unacceptable view of the relationship of the papacy and the
French crown. Their response was an offensive of a ferocity unmatched by any
previous opponent of papal jurisdiction over rulers.

The storm broke over Boniface at a Louvre assembly in March 1303, when
Guillaume de Nogaret denounced him as a criminal – a heretic, simoniae,
usurper of the papal office – called for his immediate suspension and for Philip
to summon a general council to condemn him and provide the Church with a
legitimate pastor. At a second Louvre assembly held in June, Guillaume de
Plaisians repeated the demand for a general council to end Boniface’s reign,
further blackening his name with a concoction of twenty-nine crimes of which
he was held to be guilty.

That the French were in earnest about a general council was soon made
manifest. Before the end of June, the bishops in Paris for the assembly, the
University of Paris, the chapter of Notre-Dame, the Franciscan and
Dominican houses in Paris and the city itself had endorsed the appeal to a
general council. Royal agents then toured the country systematically gathering
signatures to the petition they had prepared calling on the king to act against
Boniface.119 There were few refusals. Philip IV could claim the French Church
and nation were solidly behind him. For the first time in European history a
national Church in virtual unanimity had toed the line of its royal master in
opposition to the head of the universal Church.

Common cause could now be made with the Colonna. Their help in Italy
was necessary if Boniface were to be arrested and brought to trial. During the
night of 7–8 September 1303, possibly in anticipation of a forthcoming
excommunication of Philip, a force of miscellaneous Colonna allies, led by

119 In addition to Dupuy (1655), see also Picot (1901), pp. 289–480; Dondaine (1952).
Nogaret and Sciarra Colonna, brother of Cardinal Pietro Colonna, broke into the papal residence at Anagni and captured the pope. Boniface resisted with dignity their demands, with threats of death, that he should abdicate. He was eventually liberated and escorted safely back to Rome. His death, no doubt hastened by shock, followed shortly, on 12 October 1303. We may perhaps allow ourselves to see in the contrast between Innocent III in the authoritative splendour of Lateran IV and the bitter humiliation of Boniface VIII, the measure of the decline of the papacy in the thirteenth century: a decline the popes at Avignon did little to halt.

120 Beck (1947); Fawtier (1948); Melville (1950).
By 1200 Catharism was firmly established in many parts of western Europe, particularly in Languedoc, Catalonia, Lombardy and Tuscany. There were several thousand perfected Cathars, which implies that there must have been tens of thousands of people with Cathar sympathies. Statistically they were insignificant even in areas where their support was strongest, but they could not be disregarded by the Catholic authorities because they had an excellent organisation and a coherent system of belief. Wherever their numbers warranted it, they set up territorial bishoprics, subdivided into deaconries, and organised the perfecti in single-sex communities with a variety of pastoral or contemplative functions. They taught that the Catholic Church had been founded by the powers of evil, and that its sacraments could not confer salvation; and this made any kind of compromise impossible.

Innocent III considered them an international threat. In the first year of his reign Cathar supporters were accused of assassinating his podestà of Orvieto in the Papal States, and the pope was informed that the ruler of Christian Bosnia, with many of his subjects, had professed the dualist faith. Although in 1203 Bosnia returned to the Roman obedience in response to Hungarian pressure, Innocent became aware of the true extent of Balkan dualism in 1204 when the Bulgarian Church acknowledged the papal primacy, and the Fourth Crusade set up a Latin patriarch in Constantinople. He may have instigated the repressive measures against Balkan dualism in the Synodikon of Tsar Boril (1211). In the western Church he directed his attention chiefly to the suppression of Catharism in Languedoc.

It was a politically fragmented area. The lands to the east of the Rhone (Provence) were part of the empire, the duchy of Aquitaine was ruled by the

1 A full account of Cathar and Waldensian origins and beliefs is given in volume iv, Part i, of this series, B. Hamilton, ‘Religion and the laity’.
2 ‘Perfecti’ was the name given to fully initiated members of the Cathar Church.
3 Fine (1975), pp. 123–35, does not accept that these Bosnian dissidents were dualists. See n. 28 below.
kings of England, the Aragonese ruled Montpellier and the county of Provence and were suzerains of the Pyrenean lordships of Foix, Comminges, Béarn and Bigorre and of the Trencavel viscounties; and French royal influence was weak, even though the counts of Toulouse were peers of France. Their lands stretched from the foothills of the Pyrenees to the Dordogne, and eastwards to the Rhone valley and the marquisate of Provence, while their chief rivals, the Trencavels, ruled the more compact territories of Albi, Béziers, Carcassonne and the Razès.

But the degree of control which the great lords exercised over those territories was uneven. Many lesser lords, both lay and ecclesiastical, were completely independent, while the cities, of which Toulouse, with a population of 20,000, was the largest, were striving for autonomy, though even in Toulouse the count still retained considerable judicial and fiscal powers. The lesser lords were weakened by the Occitan custom of partible inheritance among all children of both sexes: there were, for example, thirty-five co-lords at Mirepoix in 1207. In this society local warfare was endemic, and most lords used mercenaries or routiers. Many routiers were foreigners: they were hired for a campaign season and turned to brigandage when they were discharged.

The legates whom Innocent sent to Languedoc, led after 1203 by Arnald-Amalric, abbot of Citeaux, met with little success until they were joined in 1206 by Bishop Diego of Osma and Dominic of Guzmán, on whose advice, probably endorsed by the pope, they adopted an ‘apostolic’ life style. By walking the roads simply dressed, sleeping in fields, begging their food and preaching the gospel, they proved that the Cathars were not unique in their ability to imitate the life of Christ. They held public debates on terms of parity with Cathars and Waldensians, but made few converts from Catharism.

On 14 January 1208 Peter of Castelnau, one of the legates, was assassinated and Raymond VI of Toulouse was suspected of his murder. Relations between the two were certainly bad, for Peter had excommunicated the count, but Raymond always protested his innocence, and self-interest would have led him to avoid a confrontation with the papacy. The pope was already convinced that heresy was spreading in Languedoc because the great lords, particularly Raymond VI, refused to co-operate with the Church, for Raymond received Cathar perfecti at his court and had allowed his divorced second wife to become a Cathar perfecta. When he learned of Peter of Castelnau’s murder, Innocent launched a crusade against Toulouse, offering participants the same indulgence as those who went to the Holy Land. Although this war became known as the Albigensian Crusade, because Albi had been the first centre of Catharism in southern France, it was not designed to deal directly with heresy.

4 Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, *Hystoria Albigensis*, i, p. 120 n. 2.  
5 Vicaire (1964), pp. 91–2, 469 n. 79.
Innocent intended to make an example of Toulouse which other rulers sympathetic to heresy would heed, by replacing Raymond VI and those who favoured Catharism by Catholic lords who would co-operate with the Church. It was a war against the *faustores*, those who fostered heresy directly or indirectly: against the lords in the first instance who had tolerated the spread of heresy.

Ever since the papacy had emerged as a political force in the mid-eleventh century it had become involved in wars against Catholic princes, and such wars had sometimes been given crusade status. The crusade against Toulouse was therefore not innovatory, but was the first crusade of that kind to receive wide support.

William of Tudela’s description of the crusade which came down the Rhone valley in June 1209, led by Arnald-Amalric, while not statistically reliable, conveys an impression of the huge numbers of men involved, which the people of Languedoc found so intimidating. One of the attractions of the Albigensian Crusade may have been speed. On conventional crusades participants were required to serve for an unspecified time, until either the Holy Sepulchre was freed or they were dispensed from their vows, whereas those going on the Albigensian Crusade were only required to serve for forty days, at no enormous distance from the Ile-de-France. The desire to acquire land was not central, since most crusaders wished to return home.

Raymond of Toulouse had meanwhile sought a reconciliation with the pope, and undertook to carry out Innocent’s wishes and to make reparations to the Church. He offered seven castles and the county of Melgueil as pledges of his good faith and on 18 June 1209 was publicly flogged by the legate Milo and restored to communion. Four days later he took the cross, thereby automatically placing his lands under the protection of the Church, which caused considerable embarrassment to the crusade leadership. For the main crusade under Arnald-Amalric reached Orange just three days later, while a separate crusade from Gascony had already entered Quercy and burned Villemur. Their depredations had to cease, but it would have been difficult to disband the main crusade, and the legate decided to direct it against the Trencavel viscounties where there were undoubtedly heretics, even though the viscount had not been excommunicated.

6 Housley (1985), pp. 17–36. 7 *La chanson de la croisade albigeoise*, i, p. 36. 8 The Statutes of Pamiers of 1212 make clear that even the few crusaders who accepted fiefs in Languedoc were not prepared to stay there for long, Devic and Vaissète, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, viii, no. 165, xix, p. 629.
From the start military considerations were paramount. When Béziers fell on 22 July 1209 the entire population, Cathar and Catholic alike, was slaughtered in an attempt to frighten the rest of the region into submission. At Carcassonne, which fell to the crusade on 15 August, all the citizens were allowed to leave freely, irrespective of religious confession, in order to bring the siege to a speedy conclusion. Only Viscount Raymond-Roger Trencavel was held prisoner. Arnald-Amalric, advised by a committee of six crusaders, appointed as ruler of the conquered lands Simon de Montfort, a baron from the Ile-de-France and titular earl of Leicester, and having completed their forty days’ service the crusaders dispersed. The campaign had been highly successful: two important cities had been captured, casualties had been slight, booty considerable and opposition negligible. Such seemingly miraculous victories suggested that God approved of this crusade against Catholics, and future recruitment was assured.

De Montfort made no enquiry about the religious affiliations of his Trencavel vassals: those who did homage to him were confirmed in their lands; those who fled were treated as faidits, or outlaws, and their lands were given to his own followers. But many of his vassals revolted after Raymond-Roger Trencavel died in prison in November 1209, for de Montfort was suspected of his murder; Peter II of Aragon refused to receive Simon’s homage; and Raymond-Roger had left an infant son who became a ward of the count of Foix.

Raymond VI, fearing that the crusade might next be turned against him, appealed to Innocent III who instructed his legates to investigate two charges only: whether the count was guilty of heresy or of the murder of Peter of Castelnau. If Raymond were found innocent he should be unconditionally absolved; if he were found guilty the case should be reserved to Rome. The crusaders who came on campaign in 1210 were drawn from the Empire, Flanders, Italy and English Gascony as well as from France, and subdued almost all the remaining Trencavel lands. Peter II of Aragon, who wished to disengage himself from the politics of Languedoc in order to mount a major offensive against the Moors, accepted this fait accompli and in January 1211 invested de Montfort with the Trencavel viscounties.

The independence of Toulouse jeopardised the work of the crusade, for Cathar perfecti and faidit knights from the Trencavel lands sought asylum there and waited for a favourable opportunity to return to their homes. The legates therefore deliberately picked a quarrel with Raymond VI, by refusing to conduct the investigation ordered by the pope until the count had fulfilled a set of extremely harsh conditions to prove that he was acting in good faith. When he refused they excommunicated him. The new crusade arrived in 1211 before the pope had ratified this censure, but attacked Lavaur, a city whose lordship
was disputed between the Trencavels and Raymond VI, and when it fell they summarily burnt about 400 Cathar perfecti. When Innocent III ratified Raymond VI’s excommunication, the Church annexed Melgueil and the seven castles he had pledged in 1209, and the crusade invaded his territory. In mid-June they advanced on Toulouse, defended by Raymond VI and his Pyrenean allies, with the full support of the commune. The city spanned the Garonne, and because the nearest ford was several miles to the north, the siege was ineffective and the crusaders withdrew after two weeks.

In September 1211 de Montfort gained a victory at Saint-Martin-Lalande over numerically superior southern French forces, and thereafter the Languedociens avoided field engagements; but he did not succeed in subduing the lands of Toulouse until the autumn of 1212, by which time Raymond VI only retained Toulouse city and Montaunabon. De Montfort also annexed Comminges and much of Foix, and in November 1212 held a parlement at Pamiers at which he promulgated a law code for the conquered territories.

Peter II of Aragon was alarmed by Simon’s attacks on his Pyrenean vassals. On 16 July he had played a major role in a notable victory over the Moors at Las Navas de Tolosa, and he therefore stood high in the pope’s favour. Thus when he complained to Innocent III that de Montfort was using the crusade to forward his own interests at the expense of the crown of Aragon, the pope suspended recruitment during the winter of 1212–13. Peter also recommended that his son-in-law, the young Raymond VII, who was free from any suspicion of heresy, should be made count of Toulouse, and undertook himself to guarantee the enforcement of orthodoxy in the county. While waiting for the pope’s reply, he took Toulouse and its rulers under his protection.

But Arnald-Amalric and the southern French clergy protested to the pope that heresy was far from dead in Languedoc and persuaded him to reverse his decision. The crusade continued, and later in 1213 Innocent rejected Peter II’s proposed mediation. De Montfort renounced his allegiance to Peter and fought against the combined forces of Aragon and Toulouse at Muret on 13 September 1213. Roquebert estimates that although Simon’s forces were outnumbered thirty to one, his cavalry was probably outnumbered less than four to one. Because Peter was killed near the start of the battle his forces were demoralised and Simon won a notable victory, but he had too few troops to exploit his advantage.

In spring 1214 Innocent III sent Cardinal Peter of Benevento to effect a settlement in Languedoc until the Fourth Lateran Council should meet in November 1215. He recognised de Montfort as provisional ruler of the con-

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9 It had been a Trencavel fee in 1181, Devic and Vaissète, Histoire générale de Languedoc, vi, pp. 91–6, but had moved into the ambience of Toulouse since 1203, Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, Hystoria Albigenos, i, p. 219 n. 1. 10 Roquebert (1970–89), i, pp. 193–5.
quered lands and placed the unconquered lands under the protection of the Church. De Montfort infringed the settlement with the help of new crusaders, brutally suppressing a revolt in the Agenais, and seizing Raymond VI’s lordships in the Rhone valley. In 1215 Innocent III allowed him to administer the ‘unconquered’ lands on behalf of the Church, and when at Easter Prince Louis of France came on a bloodless crusade, he tacitly sanctioned the dismantling by de Montfort of the fortifications of Toulouse.

Raymond VI and Raymond VII were present with a sizeable group of southern French noblemen at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215, but they had few supporters among the clergy, for the bishops of Languedoc, most of whom owed their appointment to the crusade, were solidly in favour of de Montfort. At its third session the Council decreed that de Montfort should receive all the Trencavel lands and all the lands of Toulouse except the marquisate of Provence, which should be reserved for Raymond VII until he came of age. Raymond VI was merely granted an annual pension of 400 marks.

In February 1216 Raymond VI and Raymond VII returned to Provence and were widely acclaimed in the marquisate. They led a revolt against the Lateran settlement with Aragonese help. Raymond VI went to Aragon to recruit an army, and Raymond VII seized Beaucaire from de Montfort’s garrison, the first serious defeat the crusader leader had suffered. Simon was in Paris receiving investiture with his lands when the revolt broke out. He hastened south and sought to dominate Toulouse by abolishing the commune. He also allowed his troops to pillage the city, perhaps because he was too impoverished to pay them, but this alienated the entire community.

Honorius III, who had succeeded Innocent III in July 1216, ordered a new crusade to be preached against Albi. That winter de Montfort annexed Bigorre,11 and in summer 1217 tried to suppress Raymond VII’s revolt in the Rhone valley and Provence. Toulouse, which had no walls, was left with a very small garrison, and on 13 September Raymond VI entered with ease at the head of an Aragonese army. The citizens prepared makeshift fortifications, faidit lords flocked to join him, and he restored the consulate which agreed to pay his knights. During the winter of 1217–18 de Montfort had too few troops to mount an effective siege, but even when a large body of crusaders joined him in the spring, it proved impossible to blockade the city completely because of the Garonne. When de Montfort was killed in the fighting on 25 June, the crusade dispersed.

Simon’s successor, his eldest son Amaury, soon lost control of the lands of Toulouse. The crusade which Prince Louis led in 1219 failed to regain them. It

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11 He secured the annulment of the marriage between Petronilla, hereditary countess of Bigorre, and Nuno Sánchez, son of the regent of Aragon, and arranged her marriage to his own younger son Guy.
besieged Toulouse from 16 June to 1 August but ended when the participants had completed their forty days’ service. Louis’s failure undoubtedly discouraged other crusaders. Amaury de Montfort steadily lost ground, until in 1224 he retired to Paris, and virtually the whole of Languedoc reverted to southern French rule. Raymond VII had succeeded his father as count of Toulouse in 1222; while the four Trencavel viscounties were ruled by Raymond Trencavel, son of the viscount who died as de Montfort’s prisoner in 1209.

In 1223 Prince Louis became Louis VIII on the death of Philip Augustus. Amaury de Montfort ceded his rights in Languedoc to him, and Honorius III, after some hesitation, agreed to this, perhaps influenced by the southern French bishops who were apprehensive about the resurgence of Catharism. In January 1226 the legate, Cardinal Romanus, excommunicated Raymond VII, preached a new crusade against Languedoc and imposed a clerical tenth to pay for it. This crusade, led by Louis VIII, was delayed at the imperial city of Avignon, whose consuls refused to allow the French to use their bridge, from 7 June to 9 September. During that time the legate took over the marquisate of Provence in the pope’s name, while the cities of Arles, Marseilles, Tarascon, Orange, Saint-Gilles, Narbonne, Beaucaire, Termes, Albi and Carcassonne made their voluntary submission to the king, possibly because they were unwilling to fight against their lawful overlord. The crusade which entered Languedoc in September was comparatively small, because some participants had returned home, while others had died in an epidemic. Louis appointed his cousin, Humbert of Beaujeu, his seneschal in Carcassonne, but made no attempt to attack Raymond VII and his allies.

When the king died unexpectedly on 3 November, leaving his widow, Blanche of Castile, regent for their nine-year-old son, Louis IX, there was a resurgence of independence in Languedoc, but Humbert of Beaujeu was opposed to compromise. With the help of southern French churchmen he made war on Toulouse in 1228, which led Raymond VII to open negotiations with the regent. Mundy argues that he was motivated by financial rather than by military considerations. Renewed warfare would have had to be paid for by further concessions to the communes, particularly Toulouse: by 1228 Raymond VII had reached a point where a continuation of the struggle was no longer economically viable, for there was no prospect of a final victory, because the Holy See and the French crown were prepared to continue the war indefinitely.

After initial discussions with the crown at Meaux in December 1228, Raymond made his peace with the pope and the king at Paris in March 1229. He was reconciled to the Church, and agreed to enforce the heresy laws,

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12 Mundy (1954), p. 89.
dismiss routiers, restore to the Church all lands it had held before 1209, pay indemnities to the Church, enforce the payment of tithe, place the marquisate of Provence in Church custody and found a university at Toulouse as a centre of Catholic learning. His canonical penance was to serve as a crusader in the Holy Land for five years. Raymond was also reconciled to the king but was required to surrender all his dominions except for the dioceses of Toulouse, Agen, Rodez, Cahors and the northern Albigeois (with a few minor reservations). In those districts all grants made by Simon de Montfort or Louis VIII should be void, and all southerners driven out since 1209 should be allowed back unless they had been convicted of heresy. But Raymond was required to dismantle the fortifications in a group of key towns and castles, including Toulouse, and to place certain castles, including the citadel of Toulouse, in royal custody for ten years. The succession was settled on his only legitimate child, Jeanne, irrespective of whether he should later beget a male heir. Jeanne should marry one of the king’s brothers and if she died childless Toulouse should revert to the French crown. The settlement was less harsh than that of the Fourth Lateran Council, or than that envisaged by Louis VIII in 1226 which would have led to the count’s losing all his lands to the west of the Rhone.13 All the Trencavel lands continued to be ruled directly by the crown.

Catharism had been little damaged by the crusade. A few mass burnings and individual lynchings of Cathar perfecti had occurred in the early years and driven the Cathar churches underground.14 The perfecti had dressed in ordinary clothes, abandoned their communities and lived dispersed among households of believers; and the hierarchy had devised methods of ministering to the faithful in a hostile environment. As Languedoc was restored to southern French rule after 1218 the Cathars resumed the public practice of their faith and were as strong as before. In 1225 they set up a new diocese for the Razès.

By 1229 comprehensive anti-heretical legislation was in place. Canon 3 of the Fourth Lateran Council enacted that those convicted of heresy should be excommunicated and handed over to the secular authorities, who should confiscate their property and punish them as they thought fit. Rulers who refused to do so should be excommunicated and their lands be seized by Catholic princes, who should receive the same indulgences as crusaders to the Holy Land. Those who abetted heretics in any way, irrespective of whether they shared their beliefs, should be excommunicated and, unless reconciled to the Church within a year, should lose the right to hold public office, to inherit

13 Louis VIII, as designated heir of Amaury de Montfort, intended to enforce the settlement of the Fourth Lateran Council. This would have entailed the transfer of all the lands of Toulouse west of the Rhone to the crown.

14 A single Cathar perfectus was burnt at Castres in 1209, Pierre des Vaux de Cernay, Hystoria Albigensis, 1, p. 117.
property or to make valid wills. Every bishop should, either in person or by proxy, make regular inquisitions for heresy. In lands where Catharism was found the secular authorities had also enacted draconian heresy laws. Frederick II decreed the death penalty for convicted heretics in the empire in 1224 and in Sicily in 1231. Peter II of Aragon had condemned heretics to be burnt alive in 1197. The Capetians had since 1022 customarily executed condemned heretics, and in 1226 Louis VIII decreed that those who abetted heresy should forfeit their lands and be debarred from public office. But all these laws were manifestly ineffective.

Bishops lacked the time and resources to carry out the work of inquisition, while lay attempts to enforce the laws met with only limited success because most officials were not trained to interrogate heretics. Gregory IX, as an experiment, delegated the work of inquisition to Dominican and Franciscan friars. They were professional theologians, qualified to identify heresy; being vowed to poverty they were unlikely to take bribes; and they could devote themselves full time to the work of inquisition. But they were priests not lawyers, who believed in the eternal damnation of unrepentant sinners and considered it part of their priestly duty to convert the heretics, and their procedures reflect this. The Inquisition enjoys an evil reputation which in relation to the thirteenth century is not entirely deserved. Had they wished to carry out indiscriminate massacres of suspects the inquisitors would have met with few obstacles, for that was the tradition which the leaders of the Albigensian Crusade had established. But although on a few occasions they were responsible for mass executions, those were exceptional. Bernard of Caux, inquisitor of Toulouse, for example, sentenced 207 offenders between 12 May and 22 July 1246, yet none of them was burnt and only twenty-three were imprisoned; the rest were sentenced to wear crosses. Those trials are significant because they took place at the height of the Inquisition’s activity.

The first mendicant to act as a papal inquisitor was appointed in Florence in 1226, and from 1233 the papal Inquisition became a regular Church court. There were seldom more than two dozen inquisitors in office at any one time. Each was directly answerable to the pope and there was no central body to coordinate their activities. Initially, they had no procedural guidelines and some of them used crude and violent methods. As Kolmer has shown, this defect was soon remedied: the earliest known manual for inquisitors was in use by 1244 and provided the procedural framework which inquisitors followed throughout the thirteenth century.15

When initiating an enquiry an inquisitor would declare a period of grace during which those who made voluntary confessions would be given light pen-

ances, provided that they made full statements about the involvement of themselves and of others in heresy. With their help the inquisitor compiled a list of suspects who were then summoned to the tribunal. Failure to attend was taken as evidence of guilt and could lead to arrest by the secular authorities. The tribunal consisted of the inquisitor, the notary and two or three sworn Inquisition witnesses. The procedures were weighted against the suspect: his accusers were not named for security reasons; the charges against him were not specified in order to undermine his own sense of security; and no lawyer would defend him for fear of being associated with heresy. The accused could appeal to the pope at the start of the hearing, and the case would then be transferred to the curia, but that was expensive; or he could try to prove that one of his unknown accusers bore him mortal enmity, and, if successful, the charge would be dropped. The inquisitor had the right to imprison suspects who would not co-operate fully with the court and in 1252 Innocent IV in his bull *Ad extirpanda* licensed the use of torture by the Inquisition provided that it did not involve the shedding of blood, mutilation or death. Torture was carried out by laymen and was used to gain more information, never to secure a recantation, since conversion under duress was considered spiritually worthless. Few instances of torture are recorded in the thirteenth century, and it is therefore difficult to determine whether the tribunal seldom used it, or seldom admitted to doing so.16

The inquisitors had no legal training and were required to consult professional lawyers about the punishment of offenders. Some suspects were acquitted, but the majority were given traditional penances, such as prolonged fasts, or pilgrimages. Some able-bodied men were ordered to serve as crusaders; other people were sentenced to wear two large, yellow crosses on their clothing, a punishment which was greatly feared because it often caused social ostracism. The Inquisition also used imprisonment as a penance for serious offences.17 Lesser offenders, or those awaiting sentence, were housed in the *murus largus*, consisting of individual cells round an exercise yard, but serious offenders, like relapsed heretics, were confined to the *murus strictus*, a top security prison, where inmates were chained in unlighted cells. These appalling conditions were partially mitigated because the lay gaolers were sometimes bribable and prepared to relax the rules. The inquisitor had discretion to decide in all cases when sufficient penance had been done, and failure to complete inquisition penances could lead to arrest by the secular authorities. The few Cathar perfecti who recanted were well treated by the Catholic authorities, and

16 Douais (1906), p. 176, claimed that there were only three instances of torture recorded in the thirteenth-century southern French Inquisition records.
17 The inquisitors regarded imprisonment as a penance, not a punishment. The penitent had to report voluntarily to prison and ask to be admitted to do penance on a diet of bread and water.
were sometimes appointed inquisitors because their knowledge of Catharism was immensely valuable to the tribunal. Unrepentant perfecti were handed over to the secular authorities and burnt at the stake. The inquisitors also compiled lists of dead suspects and summoned witnesses to establish whether the accused had died in heresy: if found guilty their bodies were exhumed and publicly burnt.

The expenses of the Inquisition were defrayed by the secular authorities and were at first considerable. Headquarters and prisons had to be built; servants, gaolers and sometimes armed escorts had to be paid, and travelling expenses met. The profits of Inquisition justice accrued to lay rulers but were not great. The Cathar perfecti had no possessions; the debts owed to Catholic creditors had to be discharged on property confiscated from Cathar believers; and after 1243 the dowries of the Catholic wives of heretics were protected. In order to enjoy the co-operation of the secular authorities the Inquisition had to ensure that it did not create a deficit; hence its eagerness to prosecute the dead, whose estates could be confiscated without regard to the rights of Catholic heirs.

The Inquisition set up in Languedoc in 1233 at first met with considerable opposition. There were riots against the Inquisition in Narbonne in 1234; in 1235 the Inquisition of Toulouse was exiled by consular pressure, and though restored in 1236, was suspended by the pope from 1238 to 1241 in response to complaints by Raymond VII. Appeals from the Inquisition courts to the pope increased greatly after Innocent IV settled at Lyons in 1245, and the inquisitors’ authority was further eroded when the pope’s penitentiary commuted the sentences of prisoners willing to enlist on St Louis’s crusade in 1248. The Dominican inquisitors of Toulouse and Carcassonne withdrew their services from 1249 until they were reinstated with greater powers than before by Alexander IV in 1255.

The Cathars were at first resilient in the face of persecution. After the Peace of Paris the perfecti had resumed lay dress and their communities had dispersed. The Cathar bishops of Carcassonne and Albi became itinerant, and ran their churches from refuges provided by a number of patrons, whereas after 1232 the bishops of Toulouse, Agen and the Razès all made their headquarters in the castle of Montségur, whose lord, Raymond of Perelha, was a Cathar believer, while their perfecti lived in cabins on the mountainside. The bishops hired fighting men to garrison the castle and escort the perfecti on missions, and the churches continued to function efficiently. Montségur has been the subject of a vast amount of speculation, much of it by writers who know very

18 The inquisitors were allowed the protection of a small armed escort in some places after c. 1250, Lea (1887), i, pp. 382–3.
little about Catharism, but there is no evidence that the Cathar hierarchy attached any special religious significance to the site: it would have been against their convictions to regard any part of the material creation as hallowed. In 1242 the commander of Montségur, Roger of Mirepoix, murdered the inquisitor of Toulouse and his companions at Avignonet. Montségur was then besieged by the seneschal of Carcassonne, and when it fell in March 1244 the garrison was allowed to leave freely, but about 215 perfecti were summarily burnt, including the three bishops.

Arguably the Cathar churches were more weakened by the death of Raymond VII in 1249 than by the loss of Montségur. He had never been sympathetic to Catharism, but he had tolerated vassals who were. The new count, Raymond’s son-in-law, Alphonse of Poitiers, did not continue this policy. He and his brother St Louis sought to enforce orthodoxy on all their vassals in Languedoc, and at the same time curbed the independence of the cities, thus making it difficult for rich burgesses to protect Cathars. But in time of persecution the Cathars needed patrons who could provide facilities to allow the perfecti to live according to their rule and to train neophytes in their harsh disciplines.

Before 1253, because such patrons could no longer be found in Languedoc, Bishop Vivent of Toulouse and Bishop Aimeri du Collet of Albi went to live in Cremona. Only Pere Pollanh, bishop of Carcassonne, remained in southern France until his death about 1258. The perfecti gradually followed their leaders into exile. This entirely changed the practice of the Cathar religion in Languedoc. A few perfecti were seconded to minister to believers. They were marked men and had constantly to be on the move, and were aided by a network of lay agents who guided them from one safe house to another. Believers who wished to train as perfecti had to go to Italy to do so, which made recruitment difficult and led to a decline in the number of perfecti working in southern France.

There was a revival of Catharism there after 1291 when, in response to a complaint from the cities that the inquisitors were abusing their powers, Philip IV instructed his officials not to co-operate with them on a routine basis, thus making their work impossible. The revival was led by Pere Autier, a notary from Foix, who with his brother Guillem was trained as a perfectus in Lombardy. Between 1298 and 1309 they ministered to believers in 125 places in western Languedoc. But the Inquisition regained its powers in 1307 when

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19 A useful brief summary of the variety of fanciful hypotheses is given by Birks and Gilbert (1987), pp. 13–50.
20 Nevertheless, it may have had a religious significance for believers, some of whom were carried there to die during the time of persecution.
21 For the history of the southern French Cathars in exile see Roach (1990).
Philip IV needed its help in suppressing the Knights Templar. Pere Autier was executed in 1311, saying to those present: ‘If it were lawful for me to preach you would all accept my faith.’ True Catharism in southern France died with him. Bernard Gui, inquisitor of Toulouse (1307–24), tracked down the surviving Cathars; the last known perfectus, Guillaume Bélîbaste, was burned in 1321. Thereafter, although there may have been Cathar believers in southern France, they lacked ministers to transmit the faith or give them the sacrament of liberation.

There is no certain evidence of a Cathar presence in the Rhine valley or Lorraine in the thirteenth century. The heretics convicted by the episcopal inquisitor, Conrad of Marburg, were allegedly Luciferans, or devil-worshippers, a cult for which in that place and at that time there would seem to have been no evidence outside Conrad’s imagination. But organised Catharism was quite vigorous in Flanders, Champagne and Burgundy in the 1220s. It was suppressed through the work of the Dominican chief inquisitor, Robert ‘le bougre’, or ‘the Bulgar’, a converted Cathar perfectus. He stirred up mob violence against Cathar suspects, conducted trials in public, imposed harsh penances on those who recanted, and was responsible for a public burning of 184 convicted Cathars at Mont-Aimé in Champagne in 1239. Though later placed under house arrest for life by his Order because of his intemperate zeal, Robert had effectively rooted out Catharism in northern France. By 1250 the north French Cathar bishop and some 150 perfecti had taken refuge in Verona where their church survived until about 1289. Similarly, after the Inquisition had been established in the crown of Aragon in 1238, Catharism, which had once been present there, declined and had virtually died out by about 1270. Possibly the Catalan perfecti retreated to Lombardy with those of Languedoc.

Rainier Sacconi estimated that in c. 1250 there were some 2,400 perfecti in north and central Italy, organised in six churches, some with competing jurisdictions. Of these, 1,500 belonged to the moderate dualist church of Concorezzo near Milan, 500 to the absolute dualist church of the Albanenses at Desenzano near Brescia, while the rest were divided between the churches of Bagnolo (near Mantua), Vicenza, Florence and the valley of Spoleto. If the letter of Yves of Narbonne is to be credited, the Italian Cathars sent some of

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22 Petrus Auterii hereticus . . . quando debuit comburi, dixit quod si permetteretur loqui et predicare populo, totum populum ad suam fidei converteret’, cited in Vidal (1906), p. 73 n. 2.
23 The heretics tried at Strasbourg in 1211 may have been Cathars, but the evidence is inconclusive, Annales Marbacenses, MGH Scriptores rerum germanicarum in usum scholarum, Hanover (1907), p. 87.
24 Conrad was not a papal inquisitor, but a papally licensed episcopal inquisitor, Kieckhefer (1979), p. 11.
25 The last known Elder Son of the Church of Toulouse in exile in Lombardy was Philip Cathala (the Catalan): Duvernoy (1979), pp. 160–1.  
26 Raynerius Sacconi, Summa de Catharist, p. 50.
their believers to the University of Paris, and Italian Catharism certainly produced speculative theologians in the first half of the thirteenth century. John of Lugio and his pupils, who wrote the *Book of the two principles*, attempted to make a rational defence of absolute dualism, while the treatise about moderate dualism by John’s contemporary Desiderius was read and refuted by St Thomas Aquinas.

There was no systematic persecution of Italian Cathars until Gregory IX tried to introduce the Inquisition at Florence in 1226 and throughout Lombardy in 1232. Even then, Frederick II, although he detested heresy, would not allow the Inquisition to operate in the areas he controlled; while in pro-papal cities it had little support because it was an ecclesiastical tribunal. Some Cathar perfecti were burnt in Milan, Piacenza and Tuscany in Gregory IX’s reign, but believers were seldom attacked. After Frederick’s death his policies were continued by his son Conrad IV, his natural son Manfred, king of Sicily, and his lieutenants, Ezzelino da Romano and Uberto Pallavicini in Lombardy. The Inquisition was sometimes able to operate in new areas which passed under the control of the pope’s allies, but was sometimes driven from cities where it had long been established, as it was from Milan in 1252. Charles of Anjou, who overthrew Manfred and became king of Sicily in 1266, became dominant in northern Italy after the death of Uberto Pallavicini in 1268. He co-operated fully with the Church: the Inquisition was established in the Sicilian kingdom in 1269 and in the northern communes soon afterwards, although Venice only admitted it conditionally in 1289.

When the persecution began the Cathar bishops of Desenzano and Bagnolo, together with the exiled bishops of Toulouse and northern France, withdrew with many of their perfecti to the stronghold of Sirmione on Lake Garda. Their choice of a refuge remote from the main urban areas of Lombardy, yet accessible to them, closely paralleled the choice of Montségur by the southern French Cathars and met the same fate. In 1276 the della Scalas of Verona attacked Sirmione and arrested 174 perfecti, who were burnt with other Cathars in the amphitheatre of Verona in 1278. The church of Concorezzo survived until c. 1289, and there were Cathars in Corsica until c. 1370, while as late as 1388 Cathars were found at Chieri near Turin who claimed to have received their faith from Bosnia, but in most of Italy Catharism had died out by c. 1325.

Western sources, and particularly papal sources, show beyond any reasonable doubt that dualism remained vigorous in Bosnia. Innocent III’s intervention proved ineffective in the long term, while Gregory IX’s launching of a Hungarian-led crusade against Bosnia was cut short by the Mongol invasion of

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Hungary in 1241. When Innocent IV attempted to subordinate the Bosnian Church to the Hungarian hierarchy, it withdrew from papal obedience in 1252. The significance of this development remains a matter of scholarly dispute. J.V.A. Fine takes a reductionist view, arguing that the Bosnian Church remained Catholic, though schismatic, and asserting that there were very few dualists in the principality. The alternative view, developed most fully by Šanjek, is that dualism became the dominant religion in Bosnia after 1252, while Catholicism was marginalised. But all scholars agree that dualism was tolerated in Bosnia in the later Middle Ages. In 1325 Pope John XXII reported that heretics were flocking to Bosnia from many parts of Europe, and if that is true it may explain why Catharism died out so suddenly throughout western Europe at precisely that time.

No other heresy was considered so serious a threat as Catharism by the Catholic authorities, but a number of other dissenting movements did exist. The most flourishing of these were the Waldensians who by 1200 had spread from Languedoc to Lombardy and Lorraine. Innocent III tried to deal with them sensitively, allowing converts to form communities of Poor Catholics which preserved those features of Waldensian spirituality compatible with Catholic norms. But most Waldensians remained separated, and the movement continued to flourish despite the schism of 1218 between French and Lombard members over the issue of absolute poverty. The Waldensians were in substantial agreement with Catholics about central Christian beliefs, but differed from them in forms of worship by subordinating the sacraments to public prayer and preaching, and by holding that at need any Christian man or woman could perform any office in the Church. To avoid persecution by the Inquisition they scattered to remote rural areas in Piedmont, southern Italy and south-east Germany and Austria, and though subject to sporadic and sometimes fierce persecution, have survived until the present day, though their views have changed over the centuries.

Other heresies were more ephemeral: the rebaptisers, a splinter group of Waldensians, unlike the parent body denied the validity of Catholic baptism, and had the endearing belief that a Christian need only keep Lent once in his lifetime. The Speronists of Piacenza taught that the sacraments were unnecessary to salvation, which depended solely on inner purity. The Passagians taught


that Christians were bound by the precepts of the Old Law as well as those of the New. The devotees of Guglielma of Milan (1281) believed that she would return as the incarnation of the Holy Spirit and inaugurate a new dispensation in which there would be a new gospel and a woman pope. All these groups were liable to prosecution, but the Inquisition did not take the Guglielmites at all seriously until on Easter Day 1300 the woman pope-designate celebrated Mass at Guglielma's tomb. Five of the votaries were burned for heresy, but the rest were dismissed with minor penances and the sect collapsed.

‘Academic’ heresies originating in the universities only normally incurred secular penalties if they attracted a popular following. Thus nine clergy who shared the views of Amalric, a teacher of logic in the University of Paris, that a new age was coming into being, in which the Catholic Church would be superceded, were burnt for heresy in 1210. Yet the treatment meted out to the Averroists was very different. They were a group of Masters of Arts at Paris led by Siger of Brabant (c. 1240–c. 1284), who had read the newly translated works of Aristotle and Muslim and Jewish commentaries on them, and were particularly indebted to Averroes (d. 1184), a Muslim philosopher who taught that reason should not automatically be subordinated to revelation if there is a conflict between them. Among the theses propounded by the Averroists of Paris were: that God is not omnipotent; that His Providence does not guide the affairs of men; that matter is not created; that the world has neither beginning nor end; and that ‘the sayings of the theologians are based on myths’.30 Unlike the Amalricians, the Averroists had no popular following, and so the university could treat them as an internal problem. In 1277 many of their propositions were condemned by the university as heretical, and the teaching members were required to subscribe to this decision. Within ten years Averroism had died out. Averroism was potentially a more radical challenge to the Catholic Church than any other thirteenth-century heresy except absolute dualism, yet it caused less trouble to the authorities than all of them. Gordon Leff rightly maintains that the west instinctively drew back from the implications of the Averroists’ central tenet, that there should be no restriction on the use of human reason to speculate about ultimate truths.31

By 1300 dissent, though not eradicated, had been marginalised. New separatist movements like the Fraticelli continued to spring up within Catholicism, while older traditions like Waldensianism persisted, not perhaps reduced in numbers from a century earlier, but with a distinctly lower public profile. But it was now the Catholic Church and not these dissident groups which showed the most signs of religious vigour and social relevance. It would seem logical to

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31 Leff (1958), pp. 258–60.
infer that the eradication of Catharism and the declining fortunes of other dissenting movements by the early fourteenth century were the direct consequence of repression by the Inquisition. But successful religious persecution is very rare: normally the fact that believers are willing to die for their faith gains converts to their cause. The Cathars were certainly prepared to die bravely and in large numbers for their faith, yet their churches declined, whereas the Waldensians, some of whom also died bravely for their beliefs, not only survived but may even have grown in numbers.

Persecution is only part of a more complex process which helped to determine the fortunes of Catharism and the other heresies: they all had to react to changes in western society. During the thirteenth century urbanisation increased as did the concomitant social problems; the intellectual revival of the twelfth century necessitated the rethinking of traditional values in the light of classical Greek and contemporary Islamic and Jewish learning; while in addition, the Mongol empire enabled the west to make contacts with hitherto unknown peoples and civilisations in Asia. All these factors had religious implications for Christian society, and the Catholic Church took the initiative in dealing with them through the work of the Mendicant Orders.

The Dominicans and Franciscans were dedicated to a life of apostolic poverty and public ministry. They attracted some of the most intellectually gifted men of the time and by 1300 there were few towns of any size in western Europe which did not have at least one house of friars. This, of course, immensely increased the Catholic presence in urban areas: by 1295, for example, there were almost 4,000 friars in Languedoc alone, almost all of them priests. Their impact was considerable. They ran urban parishes, and were valued as preachers, confessors and, in their early days, as models of pastoral care for the urban poor. The learned members of both Orders were in the forefront of the intellectual life of Europe. Men like the Franciscan minister general Bonaventura and the Dominican scholar Thomas Aquinas helped to reformulate Christian orthodoxy in the light of the intellectual problems raised by the new learning. The friars also took a lead in exploring the lands of Asia, and in interpreting these new civilisations to their contemporaries. Under the leadership of Ramon de Penyafort, the Dominicans engaged in the close study of Hebrew and Arabic, hoping to acquire the essential tools for disputing with Jews and Muslims.

The friars were able to meet the needs of lay people in a more positive way than the Cathars could do. The Cathars had placed the ideal of Christian per-

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32 There were 2,107 Dominicans in the province in 1295, and although precise figures are lacking for the Franciscans in that region at that time the number of their houses suggests a parallel number of vocations: Ribacourt and Vicaire (1973), pp. 25–77.

33 This began in c. 1259 with Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum maius.
fection within the theoretical reach of all people, irrespective of their social class or even of their marital status, but only if they were prepared to live like monks and renounce the world. Otherwise they had to live without the consolations of religion in the hope that they might die good deaths with the help of the Cathar perfecti. The friars made it possible for lay people to lead the Christian life while remaining in the world: they were encouraged to learn about their faith, to frequent the sacraments and to understand their everyday lives in terms of religious vocations. The very devout among them were even encouraged to join Third Orders in which they practised as much of the Dominican or Franciscan Rule as was compatible with their everyday lives.

Persecution certainly made it impossible for the dissenters to compete on equal terms with the friars. In places where the Inquisition was established they could not preach or bear witness to their faith openly, and since they were barred from attending universities they could not defend themselves adequately against the intellectual objections raised by the friars. It is notable that all the Italian Cathar scholars known to us had been educated before the Inquisition was set up. Yet even when account has been taken of these factors it remains true that Catharism lacked sustained resilience in the face of persecution. The Cathars lost ground to their more dynamic Catholic opponents, and persecution accelerated a decline which seemed inherent in their movement. The Cathars and their ideal of Christian holiness belonged to the monastic centuries, but the friars represented the religious aspirations of a new kind of society. Their relevance to the concerns of their age attracted support, whereas the Cathars could at best hope to continue to minister to the traditionally minded. Persecution made that impossible also.
by the end of the twelfth century, apart from a few peripheral regions such as Finland or Lithuania, the Christianisation of western and northern Europe could be considered complete, if by this one understands that all the inhabitants, except for the Jews, who were very much in the minority, were baptised into the Catholic faith; there were, of course, Muslim populations in some areas, but these were almost without exception lands that had earlier been under Islamic rule. However, at the very moment when Christianity was attaining this territorial extent, the clerics were gradually becoming aware of the superficial nature of this conversion. Until then, the Church had always considered it sufficient for the ruling social classes to be converted, and then for the masses to follow suit; and the method of utilising the elite classes in this way had, on the whole, been successful since the end of the Roman empire. However, throughout the twelfth century, the situation changed: following the Investiture Dispute, the lay aristocracy in several countries became embroiled in conflicts with the ecclesiastical hierarchy and sometimes allowed itself to be influenced by heretical movements, as occurred in the 1170s in both Languedoc and Italy. Even in those areas where the lay aristocracy remained faithful to orthodoxy, it often stood in opposition to the clergy in matters of morality or in those affairs in which the clergy had a vested interest; and the clergy, for its part, could no longer count on unconditional devotion. On the other hand, the masses began to emerge from their passivity, in all aspects of life, aspiring to take control of their own fate, especially in the cities: witness the rapid expansion of the communal movement, which so often stood firm against the ecclesiastical authorities. Yet it was especially the success of the heresies in all the social milieux, from around 1170 onwards, that attracted the attention of the most vigilant clerics towards the lack of profound Christianisation. For if, in the space of a few decades, the population of entire regions had adhered to doctrines which were far removed from the doctrines of the Church, it meant that their faith was not very deeply rooted. Thus, at the
very moment when the crusades were demonstrating the active expansion of Latin Christianity to the outside world, a new frontier was opening up: the frontier of internal renewal. In those areas contaminated by heresy, this renewal was marked by a policy of repression. In the same way, it was a matter of the utmost urgency to regain control in other areas; otherwise there was the threat that opposition to the establishment might gain ground. Hence there was an enormous effort – which began with the Third Lateran Council (1179) and was at its most influential by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) – to make the religious beliefs and practices of the faithful conform more to the demands of Christianity, as Christianity was defined by the Catholic Church.

**THE PASTORAL OFFENSIVE**

*The evolution of the priest's role and the rapid expansion of the parish*

The Church first made an effort to reinforce the prestige of the ordinary priests, who, especially in the countryside, were barely distinguishable from the ordinary faithful, either because of their way of life or even because of their religious knowledge. This was an absolute necessity for the Church, for certain heretics maintained that priestly functions could be undertaken by any Christian who lived free of sin and who encouraged the faithful to refuse to accept the sacraments from any cleric who was deemed morally unworthy. In this respect, the Fourth Lateran Council marked an important stage in the history of the Catholic priesthood by placing the emphasis on the role of the priest in the celebration of the sacrament of the Eucharist, which could only be administered if he had been ordained according to the rites and had been canonically instituted by an appropriate bishop.

On the other hand, canon 21 of the same Lateran Council made it a requirement that all the faithful of both sexes who had reached the ‘age of discretion’ (approximately seven years old) must go to confession and take communion at least once a year in their parish. This decision strengthened the importance of the priest in the community. In fact, from that point on, in theory, the faithful no longer had any choice: they had to rely on their own curate – and on none other – to obtain the absolution which was indispensable to be allowed to take communion and to fulfil their Easter duty.\(^1\) Moreover, it is hardly surprising that it was precisely in the thirteenth century that the title of *curatus* or *rector* became more generalised to designate the local parish priest, whose image was also modified. No longer was the priest merely someone who performed the necessary rites and recited quotations from the holy books: from this point on,

\(^1\) Avril (1980).
it was incumbent upon him to dedicate himself to the salvation of souls (*cura animarum*) and to control the practice of the sacraments as well as the moral life of his parishioners. Even if he did not yet have the power to excommunicate, he at least had the ability to indicate to the episcopal authorities which members of his parish refrained from carrying out their religious duties, and which were considered heretics or guilty of public sin (notorious adulterers, inveterate moneylenders, etc.). And it was also the parish priest who normally passed sentence against them. Thus, as the parish became the necessary framework for religious life – more so than in the past – the powers of the priest also increased proportionately: in the thirteenth century it was the priest who guaranteed the security of the church and enforced a sense of order; he published the banns before marriages and, in particular, he took charge of the wills of those members of the congregation who had anything to bequeath as they neared death (at the very latest), and before that point whenever possible. Even if all the priests were not capable of fulfilling these new responsibilities – witness the bitter criticisms of the authors of the *Fabliaux* of the period towards the priests – it seems that they still enjoyed increased consideration from their *ocks, as is demonstrated by the fact that the curate, especially in the countryside, became the representative of the village community vis-à-vis the external authorities, whether they were bishops or representatives of the crown. 

Thus, from the simple appendage of the local seigniory which it had been up to that point, especially in the rural areas, the parish was gradually becoming a centre of pastoral action for the episcopacy and a framework for the faithful in the religious domain. The faithful, for their part, did not limit themselves to a passive role in the parish but rather took an active part in its management, in particular through the intermediary of the parish councils, which had sprouted up just about everywhere throughout the course of the thirteenth century. These parish councils were administered by an elite of lay parishioners, perhaps the successors of the ‘synodal witnesses’ of the Carolingian era, who were called upon to act as witnesses during pastoral visits with regard to matrimonial matters and/or cases of supposed witchcraft and heresy that cropped up in the village or area. In any case, it was their responsibility to watch over the upkeep of the parish church and the cemetery: as a general rule, the parish council took responsibility for the nave while care of the chancel fell to the clergy, and more precisely to the person who exercised the right of patronage over the ecclesiastical living. This division of labour remained rather theoretical, however, and in practice, one can see the emergence of a kind of

2 Nykrog (1957), i, pp. 575–99.  
3 Clement (1895).  
4 Addleshaw (1936); Godfrey (1969), pp. 70–82.
condominium which linked one or more priests in the parish council, as well as their subordinates, to the tasks of the maintenance and, eventually, the embellishment of the parish church. Of course, this did not mean that the relationship between the two parties was always idyllic. However, they were obliged to collaborate, since the parish council’s funds were usually placed in a purse, or rather a safe (arca) whose key was held by three people: a lay treasurer, the curate and the bishop. Moreover, in certain regions like Normandy, the very existence of the parish council had a positive influence on the cohesion of the parish, for the church-wardens had to present an account of their management three times a year before an assembly of parishioners or elected representatives of the village community.

The increasing importance of the sacraments

Parallel to the strengthening of the parish, at this time we can observe the affirmation of a new conception of the religious life of the laity, founded on the definition of behaviour considered typical of a ‘good Christian’. No longer was this merely someone who had been baptised, obliged to attend Mass on Sunday and to pay the tithe. After the Fourth Lateran Council, he or she was required to show unequivocal outward signs of belonging to the Church, that is to say by going to confession and taking communion at least once a year. This did not actually involve any new practices, but from that point onwards the non-observance of this duty would be punished by being denied access to the Church and Christian burial. There has been much discussion as to whether this measure was intended to help the clergy to identify heretics and non-conformists, those who refrained from these practices standing out ipso facto to the curate, who had to denounce them to the bishop if, after being duly invited by the curate to participate, they had failed to comply. In spite of the enforcement of secrecy of confession by the decrees of 1215, it is difficult to believe that this motive was not present in the mind of both the pope and the Council delegates. But canon 21 of the Fourth Lateran Council in particular constituted the culminating point in a process of internalisation which, since the twelfth century, had emphasised the fundamental role of penitence in Christian life. Of course, penitence was only one of the seven sacraments: the full list had been definitively established by theologians in the years around 1150. But its importance was far greater than the others, with the exception of the Eucharist, and the entire pastoral effort of the Church in the thirteenth century aimed to encourage the laity to have frequent recourse to penitence, in order to force them to become aware of their sins and to take measures to

5 Gy (1986); on the contrary: Little (1981).
better themselves. The clerics, in fact, had been sensitive to the criticisms aimed at the Church by the evangelical movements and by certain heretics, which emphasised the necessity for more cohesion between what they said and how they acted, of practising what they preached. Faith could not remain a formal or implicit adherence: it had to imply knowledge, at least in its broader sense, of a certain number of fundamental truths, as defined in the creed, as well as a minimum of consistency between professed beliefs and the concrete behaviour exhibited in private and in public. The necessity of converting in order to attain salvation was certainly not a new idea. But up to then, in the traditional realm of penitence, the accent had been placed more on atonement for one’s sins, an indispensable condition for obtaining divine forgiveness and reconciliation with one’s fellow man. It was believed that sin was only truly eradicated when the sinner had carried out the penance inflicted by the priest, which most often consisted of the automatic application of a fixed punishment once and for all. In general, these punishments were set during the months or years of fasting and were very harsh and difficult to reconcile with the rigours of life in society. Moreover, an entire system of commutation developed, from the beginning of the tenth century, which allowed these ascetic interdictions to be converted into pilgrimages or the giving of alms. Throughout the course of the twelfth century, the awakening of conscience and the progress of moral theology placed these practices and ideas under scrutiny. Abelard developed a true morality of intention in his works, confirming that ‘the value of our actions and the judgment they call, before God and before man, is determined not by objects, which are either good or bad in themselves, affected by these actions – theft, murder, a carnal act – but rather by the internal consent we give to these actions’. From this perspective, sin is seen as internalised, but in no way diminished. On the contrary, the accent is placed on individual responsibility, which becomes even more serious if an excuse cannot be found for it in the nature of the act, or if it cannot be hidden behind the solidarity of a group. Even if these ideas, which were not accepted without difficulty, only made their way gradually into people’s minds, one sees in both religious and profane literature the confirmation of the importance of repentance, without which even the most demanding rites were of absolutely no use to the sinner.

In this new climate, the emphasis shifted to the centre of the process of repentance. In the 1200s, theologians and canonists agreed to recognise that the essential element of the sacrament was avowal by word of mouth, or by having confession heard, implying repentance and commitment by the person concerned, and not the accomplishment of some punishment as atonement.

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Prayers asking for the grace of God and the saints, making pilgrimages, as well as giving alms to the poor, certainly remained highly appropriate, but no longer had anything more than a subsidiary role. In fact, confession was considered so painful in itself that the shame experienced by the sinner in the act of confessing constituted a punishment in its own right. This new practice was established in the wider context of assigning greater importance to the spoken word, in both its positive and negative aspects: from this point onwards, each person was held responsible for what he said against God or his fellow man. And, in France, the monarchy, after St Louis, severely reprimanded blasphemy. On the other hand, however, from that point onwards, one single word – uttered by the priest – was sufficient to eradicate sin. The priest was bound to interrogate the sinner according to the seriousness of his sins or the commandments of God and the Church, and he had to demand, as in a court proceeding, that he be given the most precise details regarding the circumstances of the sin. But one must not forget that confession could also be a liberation of the soul and the judge par excellence of this period, the king, had the main prerogative of granting pardon. For such reasons, the tracts available to confessors defined them as ‘doctors of the soul’, responsible for facilitating confession, while they were sometimes called to attend a birth, and to diagnose the most appropriate remedies for the situation of the sick person. Rather than an inflexible accuser, the priest was invited to behave more like a merciful arbiter and understanding adviser. It was, in addition, the era which saw certain confessors establish a true relationship with devout members of the laity based on spiritual direction, like the one which existed between St Elisabeth of Hungary and the terrible Conrad of Marburg, stormy as their relationship was.

The Fourth Lateran Council, in 1215, was the first medieval council to formulate a detailed profession of faith (canon 1: On the Catholic faith) in which the strongest affirmation is found regarding Christ, to the effect that ‘His body and His blood, in the sacrament of the altar are contained in the sacred species of the bread and wine, the bread being transubstantiated from the body and the wine from the blood through divine power.’ This marked insistence on the Real Presence evidently constituted a rejection of the heretics – in particular the Cathars – who denied its reality and even the possibility it could be real. But this assertion was also seen in a pastoral perspective, to the extent that the increased devotion towards the sacred species was intended to supplant the devotion towards the relics of the saints, which had always been ambitious and inclined to veer towards the superstitious. After 1203, in effect, the synod of

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12 COD, pp. 206–7.
Paris stipulated that the host be raised after consecration so it might be seen and adored by everyone; the custom soon spread everywhere of kneeling before the Holy Sacrament which was carried in viaticum or in a procession. Finally, Pope Gregory X (1271–6) ordered the faithful to kneel during Mass, from the raising of the sacrament until communion. The sacred wafers were enclosed in a pyx and the statutes passed by the synods contained numerous recommendations to ensure they were kept in a secure place, in special containers or locked away, before the appearance of the first shrines in the next century. All these measures were aimed at increasing the respect which surrounded the sacrament of the Eucharist, which was equally supported by the development of a Eucharistic supernatural, which is found echoed in Caesarius of Heisterbach or in the exempla collections. Throughout the entire thirteenth century, there was a stream of stories of consecrated hosts which miraculously began to bleed (miracles at Bolsena in 1260 – illustrated by the relic of the corporal conserved in the cathedral of Orvieto – and of the cloister of the Billettes in Paris, where blood was said to have flowed from a host which had been stabbed by a Jew who had procured it illegally). This development of Eucharistic piety culminated in the foundation of the liturgical feast of the Holy Sacrament, which was first celebrated in the diocese of Liège, at the instigation of Julienne de Montcornillon, and which then spread throughout the whole of the Church under Pope Urban IV, former archdeacon of Liège, from 1264, soon to be accompanied just about everywhere by processions organised by the brotherhoods of Corpus Christi.

This rapid expansion of devotion, however, was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in receiving the Eucharist. Outside the world of the cloisters, taking communion frequently remained unusual and the most pious members of the congregation barely approached the holy table apart from the three great feasts of Christmas, Easter and Pentecost. On the contrary, a growing emphasis was placed on the respect owed to the Eucharistic sacrament and on the risk of sacrilege by the faithful, in case they were unworthy of receiving communion. Nothing demonstrates better that the purpose of the ecclesiastical hierarchy was not so much to develop the custom of taking communion frequently but, rather, to further the development among the faithful of a heightened sense of the sacred, even though it had a narrow educational base.

The revival of preaching and the restriction of the right of speech in the Church

In a civilisation where access to the written word and to books remained the privilege of a minority, one of the principal instruments of pastoral reform was

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the spoken word and, more precisely, preaching, which, after the end of the twelfth century, experienced a dazzling revival. Maurice de Sully, bishop of Paris from 1160 to 1196, was a great preacher and edited a manual for use by his clergy, which was widely distributed, in which he provided samples of sermons.\textsuperscript{16} But the main turning point came in the years between 1180 and 1200, when a beneficial conjuncture between preaching and university teaching took place, based on the theologian Peter the Chanter (d. 1197). This intellectual of the first order, who counted amongst his students the most prestigious figures of Christianity of the period, from Robert de Courçon to Lotario de’ Segni, the future Innocent III, and whom one could consider the founder of pastoral theology, never left any sermons of his own. However, his efforts to explain the relationship between doctrinal thought and practical life through studying actual situations (such as moneylending, prostitution, war) profoundly influenced his disciples. These included some great orators who encouraged the laity to reform their behaviour to correspond most closely to evangelical requirements. This was the particular case of Fulk of Neullie, a popular, inspiring preacher who, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, did not hesitate to denounce the defects of a society which was Christian in name only; much the same applies to some other intellectuals who were destined to become high ecclesiastical dignitaries, like Stephen Langton (1170–1240) and Jacques de Vitry (1180–1254), who was bishop of Acre, then a cardinal.\textsuperscript{17} Other Parisian masters, like Thomas de Chobham, played a very active role in this consciousness-raising process by reminding the clerics of their moral obligation to preach and to go and seek audiences wherever they were to be found, that is to say, of course, in the churches, but also in public squares and at the workplace, so they might spread the Word of God by adapting it to their specific problems and mentality. This rapprochement between the pulpit and education was not uncommon and it was doubtless the cause of the revival which was seen in the cities of northern France and in England, where masters from the universities did not hesitate to go forth to harangue the faithful. This practice was even institutionalised when Robert de Sorbon founded a college in 1257 intended for theology students of modest backgrounds, who had to go and preach in the Parisian churches. This movement was not limited to university cities, thanks to the graduates who held high ecclesiastical roles in other cities, like Robert de Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln from 1235 to 1253 (though he was also chancellor of Oxford), and especially thanks to the Mendicant Orders, who spread the ‘good word’ everywhere.\textsuperscript{18} Their actions were amplified by collections of model sermons which were composed and placed at the disposal of the priests: most of these sermons especially concerned

\textsuperscript{16} Longère (1983); Robson (1952). \textsuperscript{17} Baldwin (1970). \textsuperscript{18} D’Avray (1985).
Sunday and the obligatory feast days, but, throughout the thirteenth century, one can see the parallel development of preaching on saints’ days, as well as those sermons known as *ad status*, which were adapted to the various circumstances of existence (marriage, death, ordination, etc.) and to different types of audience. Thus the link between the sermon and the liturgy began to slacken, even though it had been very close up to this time, as preaching became a privileged instrument of pastoral action belonging to the clergy, to the point where it could almost be considered as the eighth sacrament. It is not an exaggeration, therefore, to say that the thirteenth century experienced a veritable explosion of preaching, both in the vernacular for the laity and in Latin for the educated clerics, which was accompanied by a systematic effort to spread the Christian message to the greatest number of people, adapting it to their level of understanding.¹⁹

The Church, however, understood very well how to retain control over the Word, and it took all the measures necessary to assure its monopoly in this domain. The new emphasis which was then placed on the role of the priest as minister of the Word in fact went hand in hand with a restriction on the right to preach. Moreover, in the twelfth century, it was accepted that, under certain conditions, the laity and even women could speak in public about religious questions or matters related to the life of the Church. This is what was done in Pisa, between 1153 and 1161, by the lay hermit St Rainier, who, on his return from the Holy Land, committed himself to take up the battle for reform and called upon the clerics and the religious people of his city to lead a better life. In the same way, the nun Hildegard of Bingen left her convent on several occasions between 1160 and 1167 to go and spread the Good Word, in particular in Cologne where she publicly warned the faithful to beware of the temptations of Catharism, which was then in full flood in the Rhine valley. But after the 1170s, a harsher attitude was becoming apparent in this domain, as is witnessed by the poor welcome reserved for Peter Waldo or Vaudès and his first disciples by the Roman curia, in 1179, as well as the condemnation of the Waldensians and the Humiliati of Lombardy by the papacy in 1184, over the issue of the right to preach.²⁰ At the heart of the clergy, however, certain intellectuals, such as the theologian Peter the Chanter in Paris and the canonist Huguccio in Bologna, continued to affirm the legitimacy of certain forms of lay preaching, in the name of freedom of divine inspiration of the prophetic vocation that applied to anyone who was baptised.²¹ A few years later, their former pupil, Pope Innocent III, displayed a certain openness in this sphere, and did not hesitate to grant the right to speak in public to the evangelical movements, like the Friars Minor of Francis of Assisi and the Poor Catholics – the majority of

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whom were lay – by virtue of a distinction between solemn preaching and exhortation or correction, narrowly limited to attempts to gain converts and to the general improvement of habits of life. The pope had no objection to allowing the simple faithful, who were engaged in various ways in religious life, to practise the latter type of preaching, so long as it was limited to dealing with questions of morality or behaviour (the *aperta* but solemn preaching was truly reserved for clerics who dealt with Christian doctrine (the *profunda*). In practice, this dichotomy was very difficult to establish and respect. Moreover, it soon became pointless for two reasons: first, because of the hostility of the secular clergy, who had no intention of giving up their prerogatives in this area, and secondly, because of the process of internal clericalisation which soon transformed movements of lay origin into religious orders, at the heart of which were found a preponderance of people who possessed both a vocation and an education. After 1230, there was no longer any question of allowing anyone apart from the clerics, who had been given that mission from those above them in the hierarchy, to speak in the Church. The beguines, itinerant preachers and other hermits or recluses professing a mystical experience or a particular revelation would be considered with mistrust if they attempted to make their voices heard.22 Women, who were always suspected of getting carried away by the sound of their own voices or by imagined visions, were particularly the target of this interdiction, as well as the words of the humble, discredited in the eyes of the clerics through their lack of education, as is demonstrated by the sarcastic remarks of the Franciscan Salimbene about the Apostolics, which are reminiscent of remarks made by Walter Map, a century earlier, with regard to the first Waldensians.23

**HOW THE LAITY RECEIVED THE MESSAGE FROM THE CLERICS:**

**CONTRASTING EFFECTS**

*The limits of the attempt to teach the catechism*

In the thirteenth century, the Church made a great effort to educate the faithful in their religion, and it is commonly accepted that towards 1270, generally speaking, they had a better knowledge of the fundamental beliefs of Christianity than they did a hundred years earlier. In fact, it is difficult to calculate this accurately, and the efficiency of the clergy in their pastoral efforts was without a doubt less immediate than one might sometimes imagine. Thus the reduction in the number of heresies, which were such a threat towards 1200, can no longer only be explained by the success of orthodox preaching; despite

22 Landini (1968).  
all his passion and eloquence, St Dominic was scarcely more successful than St Bernard, half a century earlier, in his attempts at restoring Catholicism to the population of the Languedoc region, even if he did have some success with the Waldensians and with a certain number of women who had adhered to Catharism. In the majority of regions dominated by Christianity, failure was far less obvious, but the tireless repetition of the same prescriptions by the synodal statutes between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, whether it was a question of the obligation of building a wall around cemeteries or the condemnation of clandestine marriages, is sufficient to demonstrate that a number of ecclesiastical injunctions were rejected by the laity. Even when the laity were docile enough to conform to the orders given them by the clergy, who took more care than in the past to teach the commandments of God and the Church, their success remained limited. Thus, at the end of the thirteenth century, a good number of the laity were capable of reciting the Pater noster, Ave Maria and even the creed, but the use they made of this knowledge in certain cases was not quite what the Church had intended. For example, the creed, whose articles of faith were each said to have been composed by one of the Twelve Apostles, was frequently recited to chase away demons, while the prologue of John’s Gospel was considered capable of purifying the heavens from storms and women from the ritual impurity following childbirth, which explains why it was recited by the priest during the liturgical ceremony following a birth.24 Even the new acts of devotion recommended by the synodal statutes were often given a different meaning by the pervading atmosphere of magic. And so, just when the practice of raising the host was taking hold, there quickly followed the belief that contemplation of the sacred host, both during and outside Mass, constituted a guarantee against sudden death, and there is no end of allusions to the Eucharist or the holy oil being stolen by the peasants to make talismans or to bury in the ground in order to increase fertility and obtain abundant harvests.25 Thus the most orthodox practices became integrated within a folk culture, while the clerics themselves sometimes functioned at this level in order better to spread the Christian message, failing to shrink back from the prophylactic or apotropaic uses of dogma and liturgy. Even a man as cultivated and committed to the pastoral movement as Jacques de Vitry did not hesitate to write, on children’s prayers: ‘Even if they do not understand the full meaning of the words, they are nevertheless useful; just as the serpent does not understand the power of chanting and incantation whose words, nevertheless, do him harm, the virtue [of the words of the prayer] still influences those who do not understand them.’26 We should not, therefore, have too many illusions

concerning the depth of the process of internalisation of faith. This only concerned a very limited elite of priests and laymen.

Some members of religious orders, in particular Cistercians and Mendicants, tried their best to adapt to the ability of their audience and to capture their attention by embellishing their sermons with educational anecdotes or picturesque stories, borrowed from an oral tradition or from sacred and profane literature. These *exempla*, as they were called, enjoyed enormous success throughout the thirteenth century, and there were numerous preachers who referred to them, while various authors made inventories of these little stories for use by the clergy.27 But for them it was a matter of reaching the profane masses, founded, in the last analysis, on a pejorative notion of popular culture, rather than on a genuine attempt at cultural integration, so much so that it would not be an exaggeration to see these ‘winks’ at the public as a simple ‘preacher’s trick’.28 Moreover, even though the clergy preached in the language of the people and tried to place themselves on the level of their audience, the message they were spreading remained an overpowering one. In fact, the laity were totally dependent on their speeches, since, with the exception of a few sovereigns and high dignitaries who were in a position to obtain translations, even if only in the form of anthologies, it was the ecclesiastics alone who had access to the Holy Scriptures and sacred texts, which prevented the faithful from questioning or disputing their statements. Certain among them, aroused by a passionate pastoral zeal, like Honorius Augustodunensis in the twelfth century and especially Jacques de Vitry at the beginning of the thirteenth, really tried to overcome this handicap by endeavouring to adapt preaching to the different *status vitae*, that is to say, the socio-professional situation of their audience and the various stages of their existence. But the efforts made by these authors and preachers to move the faithful through identification with their condition, interesting as they may be, had more to do with strategy than with a concrete, positive appreciation of the realities of everyday life. Thus when Archbishop Federico Visconti proposed that the merchants of Pisa follow the example of St Francis of Assisi by inviting them to establish a brotherhood in his honour, he exclaimed in a sermon in 1261: ‘How pleasant it must be for the merchants to know that their colleague, that is to say, St Francis, was a merchant and that he was sanctified in our era!’ It is impossible not to appreciate the prelate’s skill in taking this approach, at the same time as seeing the incongruity of his remark, once one realises that St Francis early on showed nothing but scorn for this profession which he gave up immediately after his conversion.29 In fact, while half-heartedly praising the work of artisans and

other manual workers, for a long time clerical culture continued to give pride of place to the values of rural civilisation: towards 1260, even a great Dominican preacher like Humbert of Romans still contrasted the peasants – who because of their condition were placed outside the world of violence and money, redeeming their sins through hard labour – with the merchants and the middle-class city dwellers, inclined to sin since their lives did not involve natural work but rather an exchange of goods and riches acquired without effort, under conditions which were often dubious.\textsuperscript{30}

In the final analysis, the pastoral offensive of the thirteenth century enjoyed only limited success with the laity, both because of the often mistrustful attitude of the clergy with regard to their flock and because of its inability to conceive of evangelisation other than as spreading to the faithful the religious practices and models of behaviour adapted to the education and way of life of members of the Church. Moreover, the more enlightened pastors sincerely desired to rescue the faithful from what they called their ‘superstitions’, but they nevertheless did not wish them to become too knowledgeable, for fear that they might slip into heresy and would not claim ‘plus sapere quam sapere oportet’. The cultural level of the parish priests being on the whole rather low, it was not fitting, in fact, that ‘Simple John might teach his curate a thing or two’, that is to say, that the laity might begin discussing religious matters without proper guidance. If at the heart of the Church one wished the \textit{minores} to show respect and submission to the \textit{majores}, it was surely necessary that they be taught the rudiments of the faith, but it was useless and dangerous to initiate them into the ‘subtleties’ which might ruin their simplicity. Moreover, the medieval Church limited the religious knowledge of the faithful to the strict minimum and instead sought to develop devotion within them. For the rest, it was sufficient to follow the words of the priest and to abstain from following the sorcerers, magicians and other old forms of witchcraft which would only lead them to serve the Devil.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Concerns about death and the Christianisation of the after-life}

Even if it seems as though the Church only had limited success in its fight against ‘superstitious’ practices and beliefs and could not always offer the laity models of behaviour adapted to their needs and their unique conditions, its efforts were, on the other hand, rewarded with success in one essential area of religious life: concern about death and representations of the after-life. The thirteenth century, in fact, marks a watershed in this area, the culmination of a long process, begun in the Carolingian era, by virtue of which prayers for the

\textsuperscript{31}Kieckhefer (1992), pp. 56–85.
dead had become a central point of the relationship between the laity and the clerics, in particular the monks, who knew better than the others how to fulfil the expectations of the faithful. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in fact, as the dominance of the feudal aristocracy and awareness of lineage was taking hold at the heart of the upper classes of society, so a convergence was taking place between the profane idea that the living should retain the memory of their ancestors (that is to say, those who were linked to them by flesh and blood) and the practice which was traditionally at the heart of Christianity since Antiquity of the prayer addressed to God by the Church for all the faithful who had died. Thanks to the close links which had become established between the monasteries and the seigneurial world, the great abbeys and the simple collegiate chantries soon became dynastic or ancestral ‘pantheons’ where religious people simultaneously observed the cult of their patron saint, or of the saint whose relics they possessed, and commemorated their founders and lay benefactors.\(^{32}\) The Church tolerated this deviation from its doctrine because of the close links which united it to the high aristocracy and because of the obvious advantages yielded by such a connection. In fact, the nobility, and soon the simple knights, increased their donations to religious establishments in the form of \textit{pro anima} bequests, made before or after their death in the form of irrevocable land, rights or rent concessions, on condition that the clerics who were the beneficiaries would celebrate Mass once a year and pray in perpetuity for the souls of the faithful who had passed on and whose names were from that point on inscribed in the necrologies of the community.\(^{33}\)

This system, which acquired increasing cohesion and efficiency with the passage of time, allowed the Church to spiritualise the cult of the ancestors by integrating it within a Christian perspective, in which prayer, alms and offering the sacrifice of the Eucharist became necessary instruments of intercession for the dead. Through these practices, which gradually spread to all strata of society, the Church could extend its control over death, progressively stripping it of its profane characteristics, whether it was a matter of wakes, burial rites or cemeteries, which for a long time remained the place where people gathered or celebrated festivals.\(^{34}\)

By spreading among the faithful the belief in an after-life conceived as a place where each person would be compensated according to the way in which he had lived in this life, the clerics contributed even more to changing the behaviour of the faithful to conform to a Christian sense of piety and morality. In the thirteenth century, the very close links which had become established between the monastic life and lay society began to slacken, and the monks, without actually disappearing off the horizon of the faithful, never again

regained the influence the reformed abbeys had exercised during the preceding era. However, far from diminishing, the importance of the cult of the dead in the piety and devotion of the laity continued to increase, by virtue of a process of vulgarisation which brought with it a growth in aristocratic types of behaviour within new environments, in particular urban society. During an era when the constraints of lineage were being relaxed and when individuals, without detaching themselves from their family groups, were none the less claiming a certain autonomy, a refinement in sensitivity and in the law brought with it a rediscovery of the testamentary will, a personal and revocable act, unlike the donation or bequest. The increasing practice of this type of legal act was not only an important phenomenon on the cultural level. It constituted an important stage in the evolution of religious attitudes, since it allowed anyone who was of age and who had any possessions to organise his funeral and prepare for his salvation in advance, by simultaneously making amends for wrongdoings towards one’s relatives and also making arrangements to distribute a part of one’s fortune to the poor and to ecclesiastical institutions after death. It certainly was not by chance that in the thirteenth century the Church demanded and obtained that wills come under the jurisdiction of its own tribunals and gradually imposed on all Christians the obligation of making their wills in the presence of a priest. By doing this, the Church was not only taking on the role of guarantor of the freedom of the individual in the face of peer pressure or social custom; it also aimed to lead the faithful to modify their behaviour in relation to the consideration of death, so as to be as irreproachable as possible and to be able to count on the greatest number of ‘votes’ when they stood to be judged by God. At the same time, the increasing value of the Mass as an instrument of intercession in favour of the dead was to bring with it an affirmation of the funerary function of the priesthood; certain parish priests and servers from that point on offered the sacrifice of the Eucharist for the dead and found a means of assuring their livelihood from funeral services and the income given to chaplains.

This change in the attitude towards death can only be understood in light of the transformations then affecting the representations of the after-life. The system inherited from Christian Antiquity was, in effect, based on two central ideas: eternal retribution, which only took place after the Final Judgement, and the division of the after-life where the virtuous could look forward to the joys of Paradise and the damned to the tortures of Hell. However, eschatological perspectives lengthened, and the Final Judgement, despite remaining fearsome, ended up by appearing a long way away. Moreover, the idea, already expounded by Gregory the Great, that the souls of the dead were the object of

unique judgement immediately after their death, continued to gain ground. In the twelfth century, theologians were still hesitant about this idea. Richard of St Victor maintained that if all human beings were judged immediately after their death and if the evil went directly to Hell, the just would have to wait for the Final Judgement before attaining heavenly glory, while those who had only committed venial sins would atone for them by appropriate penances before being granted entrance into Paradise. In any case, this idea assumed not only the existence of Hell (which certain very popular apocalyptic visions of the time placed at the centre of the earth and described in increasing detail; witness the iconographic representations of the era which were inspired by them), it also assumed there was another place where Christians who had committed less serious sins could purge themselves of all their stains, by enduring horrible torments, but with the hope that the living would help them by their prayers.\footnote{Dinzelbacher (1981).}

In this perspective, the affirmation of Purgatory, which gradually took place from the end of the twelfth century, even if the term itself and its use by theologians followed later, constitutes an important element which fits into a perfect, functional system. In fact, the faithful, who knew very well that they were not stainless, could only be asked to carry out penitence, devotions and acts of charity if these acts had repercussions in some way in the other world and if the merit they allowed them to acquire could also benefit their dead. For if there was one doctrine to which the faithful adhered spontaneously, it was the doctrine of the communion of saints, which most exactly conformed to their deepest convictions and their hopes. The Church understood this, and, through a new idea of penitence and Purgatory, offered them, at one and the same time, a more optimistic vision of the beyond and the possibility for each of them to contribute to the salvation of his relatives and other ‘carnal friends’.\footnote{Le Goff (1981); cf., however, the critique by Southern (1982).}

**Voluntary Religion**

**Laity, crusaders and hermits**

Until the last decades of the twelfth century, the laity who aspired to lead a religious life scarcely imagined any possibility other than that of entering into a monastery or in some way becoming connected to a religious community, in order to benefit from the spiritual wealth and merit accumulated in the shelter of the cloisters by the servants of God. The forms this association took were extremely variable: the laity who remained in society were most often happy to make a pact of *fraterinis* with an abbey or collegiate church, by virtue of which...
they became *consortes orationum* with the regular monks or canons. Sometimes, there were family groups or peasant communities who voluntarily placed themselves under the protection of a monastery, without requiring their members to stop attending to their temporal affairs.

Certain amongst the faithful went even further and placed themselves at the service of a religious community as lay brothers, that is to say, manual workers integrated into an abbey or priory, where they shared the life of the monks, to a certain extent, but with their own separate dormitory and refectory and remaining excluded from the choir. Thus, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Jean de Montmirail (d. 1217), a pious knight and follower of Philip Augustus, requested, at the age of forty, to be admitted to the Cistercians of Longpoint as a lay brother, which was considered an act of great humility, since lay members were generally recruited from the lowest sectors of the peasant classes. His case was not, however, an isolated one, since shortly after, the lord Gobert d’Aspremont, after taking part in the crusade against the Albigensians in 1226, entered the *familia* (domestic service) of the Cistercian abbey in Villiers, in the Brabant region, where he acquired a reputation for holiness.

Yet one of the most original phenomena of the thirteenth century, from the point of view of the history of spirituality, consisted in the appearance of an elite of men and women among the laity who sought to lead a genuinely religious life, independent of any formal relationship with monasticism. This phenomenon predominantly involved the aristocracy of the knights, which after about 1130 saw a route to sanctification in the framework of military orders by following St Bernard’s formula for monastic knighthood: these were the Templars and Hospitallers, soon followed by the Teutonic Knights, and numerous orders of the same type which developed in Spain in the framework of the *Reconquista*. But they were still soldier-monks, in general vowed to celibacy, and their way of life was unsuitable to the majority. Married sovereigns, like Louis IV of Thuringia, the husband of St Elisabeth of Hungary, who died en route to the Holy Land in 1229, or even the king St Louis, never belonged to any order of this type. This did not prevent them from leading a very intense religious life, in the framework of the spirituality of the crusades. In fact, there is often a tendency to see the crusades as nothing more than military expeditions guided by religious zeal. This dimension was certainly not absent, but we should not lose sight of the fact that ‘taking up the cross’ was more than a simple rite: for the crusader, this implied adopting an ascetic and pious life style, sometimes for years, which even before departure involved burdensome moral and religious requirements for the crusader and his family;

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a good case is that of the private and public behaviour of St Louis between his crusade of 1248 and his death in Tunis in 1270.41

Another possible choice was to become a hermit. The hermits or recluses were not all drawn from the laity: a certain number of them came from the ranks of the secular clergy; but many recluses, who lived just as often in the cities as in the country, were lay women, in general from the lower classes. The ecclesiastical hierarchy was forced to regroup the hermits into communities and pressured them to adopt the way of life of monks or canons. However, especially in the Mediterranean countries or the mountainous or forest regions of north-western Europe, there still remained, in the thirteenth century, genuine hermits and female recluses who enjoyed great prestige from the population among whom they lived, because of their extreme asceticism and, sometimes, their ability to perform miracles.42

The fraternities

Undoubtedly the most innovative, often quite spontaneous, way of achieving a religious life within society was the fraternity.43 Based on the model of priestly brotherhoods, the laity regrouped on a territorial basis (the village or area), or socio-professional basis (by profession), in order to practise mutual aid and take responsibility for funerals and the posthumous destiny of their dead. The community aspect was, in fact, essential in these groupings, which, in Provence for example, interestingly placed themselves under the protection of the Holy Spirit. The composition of these groups and their objectives varied considerably from region to region: certain brotherhoods remained associated with monasteries or convents; others were even more autonomous and only called upon priests or religious men to say Mass or for occasional preaching. But all of them had in common the fact that they were self-administered and were composed, on the whole – and sometimes even uniquely – of lay members of both sexes who voluntarily adhered to the brother or sisterhood. In the thirteenth century, except in Italy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy often did not look favourably upon these associations over which they had scarcely any control and which were suspected of being breeding grounds of anti-clericalism or subversion, in particular in the cities where temporal power was exercised by a bishop or an abbot. As for the clerics, they sometimes felt themselves to be in competition with these associations, which developed on the fringe of the parish system and competed with them by taking responsibility for the funerals of their members. It is hardly surprising, therefore, to find synodal statutes

43 Le mouvement confraternel (1987); Meersseman (1977); Westlake (1919).
such as existed in Bordeaux in 1255, which severely denounced the fact that the foundation of brotherhoods, established to do pious work, had been ‘abused by the malice of certain members of the laity, who set down illegal statutes by which they attempt to weaken the freedom of the Church and to abolish the good and pious customs of the elders’.44

On the other hand, the ecclesiastical authorities viewed more favourably the lay associations which placed themselves at the service of the ‘Poor of Christ’, endeavouring to alleviate the suffering of the ill and bringing comfort to those who were then beginning to be excluded from society, from prostitutes to lepers. The result of this was an extraordinary flood of initiatives in all the west, which were translated into the foundation of numerous hospitals and charitable establishments. Some of these gave rise to religious orders after varying lengths of time; others retained their structure as brotherhoods or lay groups, such as those in the Rhone valley or northern Italy which endeavoured to build and maintain bridges on the principal rivers, in order to facilitate the journeys made by travellers and pilgrims.45 It is difficult to know the exact number of these Maisons-Dieu, hospices or leper colonies, most often founded by groups of local people or the bourgeoisie, where the poor and ill were welcomed and tended by male and female members of the laity, linked to a few canons or priests. But there is no doubt that their number and importance were considerable in many areas of Christendom during the thirteenth century.

**Penitents and flagellants**

In certain highly urban areas, such as the Netherlands and the Mediterranean countries, there remained, however, a great number of faithful who belonged to devout groups, who above all set themselves the goal of helping one another and progressing spiritually. The main obstacle which prevented the laity from having access to a genuinely religious way of life was marriage: even between legitimate spouses, the sexual act, to the clerics, involved defilement, and virginity was considered the perfect state. After the end of the twelfth century, however, a new development began to take place in this area. Pope Alexander III, in an important papal bull of 1175, intended for the knights of the military Order of Santiago which had just been established in Castile to further the Reconquista, stated that spirituality was not linked to virginity but to obedience to a rule. Married or not, the knights who entered this Order could, therefore, rightly be considered as religious men, since they had taken vows and had placed their lives in danger to defend the Christian faith.46 The importance of

46 PL 200.1024; Gallego Blanco (1971).
this text, which was confirmed by Innocent III in 1209, is considerable, since it is the first instance of an internalised idea of ‘fleeing from the world’, which, in effect, ceases to be necessarily identified with a rejection of carnal life and becomes a struggle against evil in all its forms, in which no category of Christian was disqualified a priori because of his life style. The canonists drew certain conclusions from this turn of events a few decades later, as is confirmed by Hostiensis, who wrote in his *Summa aurea* (1253): ‘In the broad sense, one might call religious those who live a holy and religious life, not because they adhere to a precise rule, but because their life style is harsher and more simple than other members of the laity who live in a purely worldly fashion.’

Between the beginning of the twelfth century and middle of the thirteenth century, there was, in fact, a spontaneous dawning of a whole series of religious styles of life common to the laity of both sexes. This was the case with the penitents in the rural communes of northern Italy, for example, formed around a church or a hospice in order to farm the land, pooling their goods and sharing the work, after having taken a vow of penitence from a bishop or abbot. Even more original was the Third Order of the Humiliati of Lombardy, whose rule was approved by Innocent III in 1201. This group brought together the laity, whether married or not, living in the cities in their own houses according to a *propositum* which allowed them to link work and family life with practising the evangelical ideal. Very similar constitutions were granted between 1208 and 1210 by the same pope to the Poor Catholics – former Waldensians who had returned to orthodoxy – under Durand of Huesca and to the Poor Lombards of Bernard Prim.

During the same period, in regions extending from Flanders to Bavaria, passing through the diocese of Liège and Alsace, there was an increase in the number of lay women known as beguines, who lived alone or in communities they ran themselves and who did not take eternal vows but combined manual work with helping the poor and leading a life of prayer. For some of these women, the regular meditation on the sufferings of Christ led to a voluntary desire for suffering and an aspiration to total deprivation, as is affirmed by the case of Marie d’Oignies (d. 1213), who is well known because of her biography, written in 1215 by her spiritual mentor, Jacques de Vitry, future bishop of Acre and cardinal; he obtained verbal approval from Honorius III concerning the way of life of the beguines, which was never confirmed by a formal document.

In Italy, the most important groups of *laici religiosi* were the brotherhoods of penitents organised in an *Ordo de poenitentia*. Their existence is confirmed for

49 McDonnell (1914).
the first time in a pontifical document in 1221, when Honorius III took the penitents of Faenza, in Romagna, under his protection, but they no doubt appeared before 1215. The *propositum* of the penitents, similar in certain respects to that of the Third Order of the Humiliati, appeared as a public promise to consecrate themselves to God. The voluntary penitents of both sexes committed themselves to wearing modest clothing: a dark woollen habit, undyed, one single garment of one colour. The simple act of wearing this characteristic clothing was indicative of a religious profession. Those who wore it had to abstain from attending banquets, the theatre and dances, and had to observe fasts more frequently and more strictly than the rest of the laity. During these periods, married people were bound to abstain from having sexual relations, which must be interpreted as a periodical abstinence rather than a total restriction of sexual relations between married people. The penitents were committed to reciting the canonical hours every day, while the illiterate had to replace each one of them by seven ‘Our Fathers’ and twelve at midday, to which were added the creed and the Miserere at Prime and at Compline. They had to confess and take communion at least three times a year (Christmas, Easter and Pentecost) and meet once a month in the church appointed by their ‘ministers’, that is to say, the lay representatives of the brotherhood, to attend Mass and hear the exhortation made by a religious man educated in the Word of God. But it was in the realm of their relationship with society at large that the life style of the penitents was most unique: brothers and sisters were only accepted into the community after having returned goods illicitly acquired and renounced dishonest activities, if they engaged in any; moreover, they refused to carry arms and swear oaths, out of loyalty to evangelical precepts, which caused serious difficulties in Italy with the local authorities. These incidents occasioned frequent interventions in their favour by the bishops and the papacy, and in the end a compromise was reached, based on a sort of ‘civil service’: the penitents carried out certain functions for free to serve the community, from visiting prisons to keeping watch over municipal finances.\(^{51}\)

In other contexts, the movement which pushed the laity to form associations in order to save their souls took a different direction, under the influence of the eschatological ideas of Joachim of Fiore, relayed and propagated by the Friars Minor in the Mediterranean regions. This was particularly the case with the Flagellants, who first emerged in Perugia in 1260, when a local penitent, Ranieri Fasani, read the inhabitants of the city a letter he had received from the Virgin Mary, ordering him to carry out his penance in public and inviting his compatriots to do the same in order to appease God’s anger. In anguish over

the imminence of divine punishment, they responded en masse to his call and began to chastise each other during processions of repentance, flagellation permitting those who practised it to identify themselves with Christ by sharing His suffering. By doing this, they merely adopted a ritual of penitence practised by monks and gave it a public and communal dimension. At the same time, the faithful performed rites of conversion, becoming reconciled with their enemies and restoring goods illicitly acquired, in particular through money-lending and charging interest. When the ‘Battuti’ or ‘Disciplinati’, as they were called in Italy, gathered together or marched in a procession from city to city, they sang spiritual praises in honour of God, the Virgin Mary and the saints as they walked and whipped themselves. And it was in the heart of their brotherhoods, when the movement was channelled and institutionalised by the Church, that was to develop in Italy and in Catalonia an unprecedented tradition of religious poetry in the vernacular.52

52 Il movimento dei disciplinati (1962); Dickson (1989).
By the early thirteenth century, the situation of European Jewry had become a precarious one. No longer considered a separate genus with well-defined rights, legally and constitutionally, the Jews had become directly dependent on feudal suzerains and were prey to arbitrary rule. Their mode of earning a living, largely through lending at interest (in northern Europe, at any rate), was viewed with general suspicion and disdain. Their affective nuclear family ideal and structure, wholly sustained by Jewish religious and political leadership alike, often seemed – and was – foreign to that of their Christian neighbours, and certainly to the ideal sustained by Christian clerics. Finally, their image in Christian eyes had universally become that of the nemesis of the Christian polity. They were alternately viewed as the personification – and, by projection, the incarnation – of perverse, unhuman, reason and reasoning; as the object on which to project and transfer irrational doubts and frightening convictions, most notably the conviction of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist; and as the foil for promoting, conjointly with theories of worldwide conspiracies, the Marian cult and other local cults of saints, often in association with libels of ritual murder. Any, or all, of these views was sufficient to generate an image of the Jew as a mythical threat to Christian society. As the source, first, of spiritual pollution, then of the corruption of the Christian body politic, and eventually, in the sixteenth century, if not earlier, of pollution by infection of the physical and individual Christian body itself, occasionally accompanied by charges of magic, although pointedly not of witchcraft, the Jew was deemed capable of subverting a Christian society’s legitimate aims and goals.¹ Since 1096, during the First Crusade, such conclusions increasingly exposed the Jews to libel and physical attack. What role, we can now ask, did the institution of the Catholic Church, its leaders and their ideologies play in either fomenting or moderating this state of affairs?

¹ It is possible in this brief space only to allude to materials recently published by Anna Abulafia, Anna Foa, David Berger, Yisrael Yuval and Gavin Langmuir.
Throughout the Middle Ages, the policies of the Church towards the Jews rested on a set of consistently enunciated principles. These principles referred to Christian salvation, the promotion of the Church as both a spiritual and a worldly institution and to the Jews’ ultimately Christian soteriological role. In each case, the Jews’ continued presence in Christian society was judged necessary, if only for them to personify the absence of belief and its punitive effects. The desire to retain the Jews in order to achieve these ends (as stated by Paul in Romans 9:11) was admittedly balanced by a fear of ‘contamination’ (as stated by Paul in Galatians 4:5). Nevertheless, the tension between these two concerns was decisively resolved in favour of the former with an eye always focused on the latter. At the root of this resolution lay the idea of contingency: Jewish acts – including the very observance of Jewish rites – were at least indirectly to benefit Christianity; otherwise, they were to be forbidden. It was this idea that governed the policies of Gregory I and moderated the wrath (and possibly the designs) of earlier churchmen, such as John Chrysostom (in the fourth century) and Agobard of Lyons (in the ninth century). Eventually, the idea was verbalised by Alexander II who, in letters sent to Spain in 1063, indicated that Jews were to be protected, accepted into Christian society, and guaranteed their rights so long as they did not threaten Christianity (but, by implication, assisted it to achieve its goals). Churchmen throughout the Middle Ages and into the early modern period emphatically and repeatedly reaffirmed this formulation. In about 1140, it was incorporated into Gratian’s normative ‘textbook’ of medieval canon law as the canon Dispar nimirum est (c. 23, q. 8, c. 1).

These theoretical and political continuities have too frequently been ignored. Rather than accepting that ‘What is remarkable in the Middle Ages is not that the doctrine on the Jews was emphasized, but that it underwent so little change’, historians have argued that during the eleventh or twelfth century, the Church set its sights according to an ‘Augustinian vision’ of toleration but then vacated that vision in its attempt to eradicate deviance (especially as represented by heresy and Judaism, which contemporaries are said to have viewed as being in some respects identical). In particular, the thirteenth century is said to have inaugurated a shift towards containment, which radically altered ecclesiastical Jewry policies. In fact, thirteenth-century innovations brought out more than anything else the implications of long-standing policies and heightened their definition, with resulting difficulties for the Jews. The yardstick applied to determine policy remained its congruence with the ‘traditions’ of Christian law, theology and practice. It was not by chance that in 1266 Pope

Clement IV warned the Talmud’s Spanish opponents that their actions must not ‘violate those privileges which the Apostolic See has conferred upon the Jews’. A subtle, if sometimes elusive, balance was going to be maintained.

Indeed, all the elements of canon Jewry law were fully in place by about the year 1012, and most of them were even gathered together and written down, first, in the influential Decretum of Burchard of Worms, and, then, about 1094, in the works of Ivo of Chartres. The twelfth- and thirteenth-century canon lawyers and editors of canon law collections, as well as the theologians, who all perfected Burchard’s and Ivo’s work, did so largely through editorial elaboration. These elaborations sometimes produced programmatic change, yet they did not affect overall goals and strategies. In particular, thirteenth-century canonists emphasised the deep roots of Jews in Christian society, for example, by enhancing the rights of Jewish parents over their children. They also went beyond Alexander II’s Dispar nimirum est and incorporated into Church law the canon Sicut iudaeis non, which unambiguously defined the Jews’ right to live peacefully and securely among Christians. Moreover, Jews and Judaism were identified by neither canonists nor theologians with heresy. Rather, Jews were uniquely ‘Jews’, a distinction that Honorius III explicitly reaffirmed in 1225.

Radicals, too, even Dominicans such as Ramon Martí, still clung to the traditional Pauline formulation reserving the Jews’ conversion for the End of Days. Martí thus acquiesced in the Jews’ presence in Christian society, despite his conviction that contemporary, Talmudic Judaism was a demonic invention and that its observance diverted the Jews from following what he called their authentic, biblical and indeed christologically oriented faith. ‘The Jews’, he said, ‘are like the pomegranate tree, which is spiny and emits a foul odour, but eventually produces sweet fruit.’ Moreover, ecclesiastics who did overstep bounds, especially papal inquisitors, were often summarily restrained by the popes themselves. When churchmen did associate with violence or force, it was nearly always in league with a royal partner, if not a royal initiator. This was true of the forced sermons delivered by the convert, Paul the Christian (Pau Crestiá), and by other preachers in the 1260s, of the disputations held at Paris and at Barcelona in 1240 and 1263, and of the forcible conversion of nearly all of southern Italian Jewry around 1290.

These facts provide the groundwork necessary to understand the doctrine of Perpetual Servitude (Perpetua servitudo), first enunciated in the bull Etsi iudaeos issued in 1205 by an angry Pope Innocent III. Furious that Jews at Eastertime were forcing Christian wet-nurses to express their milk following their reception of the Eucharist, Innocent declared that the Jews must realise

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that their ‘guilt has consigned them to Perpetual Servitude’, 12 and that their actions must accordingly exemplify this state. The Jews’ ‘servitude’, as canonists like Hostiensis stressed, was neither a real one, 13 nor was it a foil with which to parry imperial claims to power. 14 It was rather a concept, a mnemonic device, combining the principle of ‘subservience’ enunciated in 1063 by Alexander II with the exegetical consensus based on Paul in Galatians (4:23) that the Jews were the offspring of Hagar the serving woman. Its purpose was to emblemise correct Jewish behaviour and to remind Christians, as well as Jews, of the rightful parameters limiting Jewish behaviour and of the need to maintain their integrity. Indeed, the specific purpose of Etsi iudaeos was to restore the traditional equilibrium of Jewish ‘subservient’, as opposed to Christian ‘dominant’, behaviour, which Jewish actions had upset.

Just as the concept of ‘Perpetual Servitude’ synthesised previous canonical demands on the Jews, so too did the well-known decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. Their intention, in common with all this Council’s decrees, was to strengthen discipline in Christendom. To be sure, the summary and consolidation of heretofore scattered or local edicts in the format of ecumenical decrees – such as those of Lateran IV – can produce innovation. The fact, however, is that with the exception of the decree that Jews wear a special habit, all the Council’s edicts concerning Jews may be found in the collections of Burchard of Worms and Ivo of Chartres. And the Jewish decrees of the former found their way into at least thirty-four other canonical collections. Gratian’s Decretum contains more than fifty Jewry canons covering the full range of permitted and forbidden Jewish actions, most notably on the subjects of subservience, synagogues, converts, testimony and social segregation. 15 Actual late twelfth- and thirteenth-century innovations, which concern lending, the paying by Jews of tithes and litigating with clerics before courts Christian alone, respond to problems that only then arose. The specific rulings of the Fourth Lateran Council, as well as those of the Third (in 1179), must thus be understood as actions taken to heighten – by a grant of ecumenical status – the observance of select, especially troublesome, rulings that had all too often been flouted. Specifically, the Third Lateran insisted that Christian testimony against Jews always be considered valid. The Fourth Lateran referred to Jewish public appearances during Easter week, denounced Jews holding public office and regulated the interest Jews might accept (it did not forbid the practice entirely) from crusaders. This legislative process culminated in the Decretals of 1234, which streamlined to about thirty the number of Jewry canons and closed existing legislative loopholes. Paradoxically, this

process also had its advantages. The limits of permissible behaviour had now been indisputably clarified – a point on which more than one Jewish writer commented. And, in fact, new documentation confirms that the popes, at least, unfailingly insisted that these limits be observed.16

How does the Fourth Lateran edict directing Jews to wear distinguishing clothing fit into this pattern? To begin with, the concept of special dress was quite likely borrowed from the occasional ancient Islamic practice of making Jews wear honey coloured turbans or sashes. More importantly, historians are becoming increasingly convinced that Innocent III, who presided over the Fourth Lateran Council, must be taken at his word. He was not rationalising when he said that without special clothing ‘it sometimes happens that by mistake Christians have intercourse with Jewish or Saracen women, and Jews or Saracens with Christian women . . . [which is] a grave sin’.17 Indeed, Gregory IX and Innocent IV, in 1233 and 1250, respectively, repeated this reasoning verbatim, citing as authority the Fourth Lateran decree.18 Sexual contact between Christians and non-Christians – whether Jews or Muslims – was a reality, and one that had long been a proverbial thorn in the ecclesiastical side. Hence it would be wrong to say that the ‘original’ purpose of the Fourth Lateran’s directive was visually to exemplify Jewish inferiority. We may also observe that Innocent III spoke in general terms of a ‘distinctive habit’. The pejorative ‘yellow [or otherwise coloured] cloth badge’ came into vogue somewhat later – and the initiators and enforcers of its wearing were often kings, such as England’s Henry III (at least indirectly through the legate Pandulf), in 1218. It was likewise Frederick II who may have been the first to associate this badge with signs such as the prostitute’s special marks of dishonour.

None the less, in both lay and ecclesiastical circles, the badge did come to signify the Jews’ inferior status. It tangibly marked them off as the ‘elder who shall serve the younger’ (Gen. 25:23, cited in Romans 9) and confirmed, as one historian has argued, their social marginality.19 The other medieval group that was commonly forced to wear special clothing was the lepers.20 Yet, by visually indicating the Jews’ status, the badge, somewhat paradoxically, also lessened anxieties and established a modus vivendi. A prime reason why both clerical and lay communities so rapidly adopted the badge was surely the belief that what they saw, they might better know; what they knew, they might less fear; and what they less feared, they might more securely live with, and successfully control. In the thirteenth century, such control was viewed as an urgent

16 Simonsohn (1990), passim.
18 Grayzel (1966), pp. 266–7, 272, 283.
desideratum. Dissatisfied laymen had so mythically inflated the dimensions of ‘Jewish misconduct’ that it was being perceived as an ‘obstacle’ to social and political tranquillity. Uneasy clerics, especially Mendicant Franciscans and Dominicans, doubted that Jews willingly submitted to Christian dominion, and popes, too, occasionally expressed concern. Taking up the cries of their ninth- and tenth-century predecessors, clerical radicals were arguing that Jewish actions contaminated the societas fidei and its members, and that to protect and stabilise this society, greater heed must be given to segregationist warnings, like those in Galatians, saying that ‘a little leaven leavens the entire dough’. More, these warnings ought to be translated into political instruments – one of which was the ‘badge’.

This urge to enhance social stability by visibly segregating the Jews may partly be ascribed to the thirteenth-century Church’s broader predicament. Despite its apparently enormous power and prestige, it had failed to ‘reform’ society into a wholly submissive body; it was challenged by severe waves of heresy; it was forced increasingly to share the total control it claimed over the clergy with lay rulers especially in matters of taxation and justice; and it had to pacify internal dissension, such as that between the Franciscans and the secular clergy at Paris. The unremitting persistence of the seculars, which led to the condemnation of their leader, William of St Amour, might even have been interpreted as criticism of the papacy itself, since the pope supported the Franciscan protagonists.21

To these problems may be added others caused by utopian yearnings, themselves generated by the failure of the Church to create a unified Christian society. But such yearnings automatically implicated the Jews, whose eventual mass conversion was, from the time of Paul, said to prefigure the Second Coming. Thus, the Calabrian radical abbot, Joachim of Fiore, spoke of the Jews’ imminent conversion,22 and the cardinal and papal legate in France, Robert Courson, said that the end of lending at interest – including, of course, that practised by Jews – would herald a utopian era.23 At the very least, therefore, it was necessary to achieve the Jews’ submission, as well as visibly to behold it. Their wearing of the badge, in particular, symbolised a stage in the actual achievement of the Christian order. With this last point, even the popes could concur. The possibility of Jews abusing Christian wet-nurses or the Eucharist (however indirectly) indicated a flaw in the Christian order: no wonder that the popes spoke angrily of Jewish ‘contumely’ and ‘contempt’. Such flaws had to be mended, even at the Jews’ obviously great expense. The badge – its original purpose, too, being that of repairing a breach – symbolised

23 Mundy (1973), p. 175.
the undertaking of this internal healing process. Iconographically, it signified that the Jews’ Perpetual Servitude had been achieved.

II

The achievement of order and equilibrium typified the thirteenth-century Church’s formal stance toward the Jews. It did so even in the face of what came to be viewed as enormous provocations, namely, those associated, first, with the contents of the Talmud, and, second, with the wooing back to Judaism of converts to Christianity.

About 1236, the convert Nicholas Donin composed and sent to Pope Gregory IX a tract listing thirty-five charges against the Talmud. Donin charged that, especially in its aggadic (narrative) material, the Talmud blasphemed, cursed non-Jews, slighted God and alluded to the right of men to emend divine precepts. It was also said to view Jesus as the son of a whore. Worst of all, as Clement IV eventually put it, through the Talmud it could be said that the Jews had ‘set aside the Old Law received from Moses and adopted another in its place’. Going further, Ramon Martí charged that contemporary Judaism was a body of ‘false practices given them [the Jews] by the demonlike Bentalamion’. Not that all of this was a new discovery. In earlier centuries, Agobard of Lyons, Petrus Alfonsi and Peter the Venerable had all alluded to these matters. The Talmud, after all, is an amalgam of diverse legal and midrashic comments made over hundreds of years, with an internal logic far different from that of thirteenth-century Christian scholasticism. Negative interpretations of its meanings are easily obtained.

However, prior to the thirteenth century, Christians had no direct access to the Talmud, unless, like Alfonsi, they were converts. By the thirteenth century, Christians began studying Hebrew, better to know the Bible, often instructed by rabbis. The passage from biblical to rabbinic literature was not a difficult one. The main seat of this study was Spain, where in the 1260s Dominicans like Ramon Martí – whose Pugio fidei in part paradoxically attempts to prove Christianity’s truth through midrashic citations – called for the Talmud to be censored. Separated from the blasphemous chaff, the supposedly pristine and true kernel of Talmudic thought (‘pearls on a great dungheap’) would remain to persuade the Jews to embrace Christianity. The Dominicans thus purposefully incorporated rabbinic texts into sermons, which they forced the Jews to hear, and for which they obtained royal enabling licences in 1245, the 1260s and in 1296. The Talmud’s supposedly Christological texts were also exploited by

the Dominican convert Paul the Christian, in a debate held at Barcelona in 1263. Paul’s Jewish opponent, Rabbi Moses ben Nahman (Nahmanides), was pressured into saying that Jews do not recognise midrashic texts as binding although there is evidence that he did believe they were. Dominican missionary fervour, nevertheless, was neither consistent nor long-lived. By about 1278 the *Pugio fidei* was already finding refuge behind the traditional argument that the Jews would convert in mass only at the End of Days.

Moreover, at the height of these events, in 1266, Pope Clement IV warned that any actions against the Talmud and its supporters (specifically, Moses ben Nahman) must not ‘violate those privileges which the Apostolic See has conferred upon the Jews’. This papal concern for judicial propriety was even more critical a generation earlier at Paris. At first, Gregory IX responded to Donin’s charges (although not before 1239) and ordered Jewish books confiscated and investigated, as they were in a (probably) inquisitorial hearing in 1242, and then burned. The scenario was repeated in 1244. It might have been repeated again, in 1247, were it not for the intervention of a Jewish delegation, to which Innocent IV, himself a canon lawyer of note, responded that the pope is ‘debtor alike of wise and foolish; he must harm no one unjustly, but is in justice bound . . . to render to each his due’. Innocent’s silence following a subsequent condemnation of the Talmud in 1248 by his Parisian legate, Eudes of Châteauroux, may be understood as a confirmation of this position. The Jews, said Innocent in 1247, must be allowed those books ‘without [which] . . . they cannot understand the Bible and their other statutes and laws’. This position was echoed in subsequent papal references to the Talmud. Blameless books, said Clement IV, ordering the Talmud expurgated in 1267, must be ‘restored to the [Jews] . . . as is “just”’. This phrase continued to appear as late as 1553 when Julius III ordered the Talmud burned in Italy.

In the thirteenth century, the real impetus for further action against the Talmud came primarily from Louis IX, king of France. In the early fourteenth century, southern French inquisitors, notably Bernard Gui, took the leading role. Papal involvement after the 1240s was sporadic and unpredictable. Indeed, one may also question the initial papal response. Although papal letters to confiscate the Talmud were sent throughout Europe, they were all ‘mailed’ from Paris through Donin’s intermediacy, with the assistance of the bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne, and the university chancellor, the legate

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Eudes of Châteauroux. From the beginning, that is, the pope was most likely responding to a Parisian initiative. Yet, the pope also had reason to hesitate. The University of Paris had traditionally argued for the supremacy of the Sacred Page as the arbiter of Church doctrine. The popes had argued that they alone were supreme. By the late twelfth century, the popes had bested their opponents, but not by unanimous consent. The thirteenth-century attack on the Talmud as an invalid, extra-scriptural font of Jewish authority, originating as it did at Paris, may hence have been a disguised critique of the papacy itself, and perhaps an indirect challenge. It was best for the popes to proceed cautiously. Such caution may explain why, about 1245, in his ‘Apparatus’ on the Decretals, the canonist Innocent IV first justified the Talmud’s burning in 1244 as due punishment for unchecked blasphemies but after 1247, a wised pope Innocent IV refused to burn the Talmud again. The overwhelming ratification by Parisian university masters, especially the canonists, of Eudes’s 1248 condemnation may have revealed to Innocent hitherto unseen motives: namely, today’s assault on rabbinic halachah law might presage a similar one tomorrow on the now papally and no longer scripturally based body of ecclesiastical canons.

Ironically, therefore, to observe the Talmud’s fate is also to observe how capably the thirteenth-century papacy withstood challenges to its legal and institutional primacy. It was, it appears, no accident that later inquisitorial proceedings against the Talmud charged it only with blasphemy, not with being a ‘new law’. Here, at least, the inquisitors followed the papal lead, despite their zeal for prosecution or censorship. Even the Dominican inquisitor Bernard Gui, adopted this stance. But then had not some Dominicans and even Franciscans generally shown restraint? The Franciscan theologian, Alexander of Hales, for one, reaffirmed in the mid-thirteenth century the doctrines of Pope Alexander II. And he was followed by the former Dominican general, Humbert of Romans, who, in 1274, wrote at the behest of Pope Gregory X, in preparation for the Second Ecumenical Council of Lyons, that Jews ‘are neither capable of harming Christians, nor do they know how to do so’ (nec sciunt nec possunt contra Christianos). Jews, living peacefully in Christendom, that is, were to enjoy their good customs and traditions, as the popes often said. This same motif was stressed by Thomas Aquinas, as well.

Thomas’s discussion of the Jews in his *Summa theologica* is predicated on the idea that Jews are an indispensable block in the seamless scholastic building

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43 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica*, IIa, IIae, Questions 10–12.
fabric of society and its ideals. The Jews’ role is that of the inverse mirrored
reflection. If it is natural to believe, said Thomas, then unbelief is contrary to
nature. Belief resides in one’s intellect; unbelief is the product of the intellect
(inappropriately) moved by the will. The believer is separated from God. The
Jews and their fate, Thomas continued, illustrate these theological verities;
Jewish life in Christian society must be regulated accordingly. Hence, Jews are
not heretics, nor are they to be treated as such, for their sins are certainly much
less grave. Yet, unbelief does lead Jews to sin, especially through false textual
interpretations. Christians therefore must guard lest through these interpreta-
tions, as well as through their other activities, Jews corrupt the faithful. Only
those expertly trained should confront Jews in debate. Likewise, all contacts
with Jews are to be restricted and supervised. This is so even if Jews, as Jews,
are outside the body of the faithful and may not be restrained through spiritual
punishments like excommunication. On the other hand, Jews may enjoy no
dominion over the faithful, whether spiritual or temporal; they may particularly
not employ Christian domestics. At the most, Jews may employ Christian day-
labourers to work outside the home. Jews may observe their rites. For thus
human government imitates that of God by allowing ‘certain evils’ that
portend the good, in this instance, the testimony Jewish rites provide to the
Christian truth which, of old, they foreshadowed. By the same token, none
may force Jews to embrace the faith; although, should they be baptised, they
may be compelled to constancy. Jewish children, too, may not be converted
against their parents’ will. To do so would be to invite apostasy; more impor-
tantly, it would be to defy natural justice, which even the Church may not do.

Thomas’s presentation is, of course, wholly congruent with that of the
canon law of the Decretals. So, too, is his (for us) difficult idea of Jewish justice,
that is justice dispensed to the Jews. For at the root of that justice is not the
modern idea of equality before the law, but the preservation of theological and
canonical principles concerning Jews developed over the course of more than a
thousand years. In this scheme, it was no less just to burn blasphemous books
or to force the Jews to wear a badge than it was to decry charges of ritual
murder, as Popes Innocent IV and Gregory X (among others) resoundingly did.
Contemporaries likewise saw no contradiction between Nicholas IV’s allowing
inquisitors to try Jews accused of aiding heretics and his berating of the Roman
clergy for unjustly oppressing that city’s Jews; 
44 they did not perceive in the
many repetitions of the 1267 bull Turbae corde (mandating the papal Inquisition
to proceed in these matters) that which recently one historian called a denial of
previously more tolerant papal attitudes. 
45 The same applies to our modern
sense of oppression conjured up by the material contained in inquisitorial

manuals, detailing procedures against Jews who aided heretics, as well as ways for dealing with allegedly blasphemous Jewish books. Regrettably, there are too few extant records of inquisitorial trials against Jews, especially north of the Pyrenees, to confirm or deny this impression. The matter is further complicated by the question of whom the inquisition was prosecuting.\textsuperscript{46}

*Turbato corde* specified that the Inquisition might prosecute Christians who had been converted from Judaism and now relapsed, such as those Jews who had been forcibly baptised.\textsuperscript{47} Were they to be considered apostates from Christianity, and even more their children, who may have been baptised at birth and raised in a crypto-Jewish climate? Forced baptism was, after all, illegal – before the fact. Afterwards, as stipulated as early as the year 633, at the Fourth Toledan Council, victims might be forced into Christian observance. This stipulation entered the canonical collection of Burchard of Worms and was incorporated into the official body of canons, in 1298, by Boniface VIII in his *Liber Sextus*. Along the way, fine distinctions between ‘absolute’ and ‘conditional’ compulsion had been drawn.\textsuperscript{48} In theory, a victim of the former could again become a Jew, within three months of the event. In practice, all baptisms were deemed no more than ‘conditionally’ forced. Thus, in 1320, Bishop Jacques Fournier, inquisitor of Pamiers, and the future Benedict XII, forced one Baruch, a victim of the so-called Shepherds’ Crusade, to remain a Christian. This was canonically just. Baruch, as Fournier repeatedly elicited from him at his trial, had never verbally refused to be baptised. That he had held his tongue while being threatened with a sword was irrelevant to the issue.\textsuperscript{49}

Baruch, nevertheless, seems to have been let off lightly. And the truth is that some of those charged by the Inquisition were acquitted.\textsuperscript{50} On the other hand, matters might hinge on an inquisitor’s personal whim or his desire to exploit canonical loopholes. When the number of converts grew large, as it did in southern Italy after about 1290, inquisitors were easily able to accuse of proselytising any Jew who had dealings with converts. Martin IV, in 1281,\textsuperscript{51} had, in fact, already warned inquisitors against prosecuting Jews who may unwittingly have frequented converts (*familiaritas*).\textsuperscript{52} But this warning was insufficient to prevent inquisitors, in 1315, from using such an accusation to persuade King Sancho, himself incensed at possible Jewish support for German proselytes and at attempts to draw converts back to Judaism, to confiscate the bulk of Majorcan Jewry’s wealth.\textsuperscript{53} Inquisitors also tried to sow confusion by changing


venues, an act that aroused papal protests in favour of its Jewish victims.\textsuperscript{54} In this atmosphere, one easily understands why in 1354 a Jewish synod held at Barcelona insisted that Pope Innocent VI publicly restate the limits of inquisitorial juridical competence over Jews.\textsuperscript{55}

Inquisitors had expanded the scope of their actions. Bernard Gui detailed plans to expurgate Jewish books of prayer, intending apparently to supervise the whole of Jewish religious practice; other inquisitors delivered conversionary sermons.\textsuperscript{56} To be sure, inquisitors were sometimes opposed by kings. But, as expressed by Philip IV of France, that opposition was primarily to action taken without first obtaining royal consent. Both Philip III and Philip IV republished \textit{Turbato corde}, just as they, and other kings, supported conversionary sermons.\textsuperscript{57} In the early 1290s, Charles II of Anjou made league with inquisitors to force great numbers of Apulian Jews to convert.\textsuperscript{58} The available evidence does not satisfactorily explain this event. But it is clearly at one with the doings of other rulers who assented to enforced preaching, ordered books indiscriminately confiscated and burned, and generally violated the Jews’ ‘good customs’, quite to the contrary of the papal will. The papal commitment to protect the Jews’ rights, no matter how few these rights had become, was a firm one. This commitment was even partly responsible for the decision to allow Jewish lenders to collect what Innocent III styled as ‘not immoderate usury’ (\textit{non immoderatasve usuras}).\textsuperscript{59} Martin V went so far as to threaten those wrongly accusing the Jews before the Inquisition with severe sanctions.\textsuperscript{60} In apparent response to the petition of Aragonese Jews in 1354, Innocent VI – although otherwise mandating inquisitorial proceedings – issued numerous letters forbidding inquisitors to change venues and withhold knowledge of accusations and evidence.\textsuperscript{61} The popes also refused to sanction forced preaching, no matter how much they may have desired it. In 1245, Innocent IV approved and appended to his papal text an edict issued by James I of Aragon renouncing the normal royal right to confiscate the property of converts; but he omitted all reference to the royal edict’s final paragraph ordering Jews to attend missionary sermons. Thirty years later, in 1278, Nicholas III, in \textit{Vineam sorec}, came even closer to licensing such obligatory sermons, yet, he, too, refrained. Like that of almost every other pope, Nicholas’s involvement in missions to the Jews was a limited, if not an ambivalent, one. A papal policy unrestrainedly pursuing conversion was launched only in the sixteenth century; and even then it


\textsuperscript{56} Grayzel (1989), pp. 149, 141 nn. 1, 2; Yerushalmi (1970), \textit{passim}.


\textsuperscript{58} Roth (1946); Milano (1963), p. 101; Starr (1940); Cohen (1982), pp. 85–8; Abulaafia (1996).

endured for no more than forty years. There was always the fear that a mass Jewish conversion, not followed by the Second Coming, would impeach Christianity’s truth. The question of forced conversion was no less troubling. Still, Nicholas could not wholly refuse a mendicant request to license missionary sermons. At the same time, as he indicated in Vineam sorec, attendance at these sermons could not be made compulsory. At the most, Nicholas nebulously wrote, should the Jews prove stubborn and refuse to hear the preachers, he, the pope, was to be informed, ‘so that he might consider some remedy’. That, but nothing more. Certain limina could not be crossed. The bull, and eventual canon, Sicut indaeis non (x.3,6,9), first issued as early as 1190, and then repeated by nearly every pope thereafter, indicates precisely what these thresholds of restraint were.

Sicut indaeis is actually a contractual text, a fact which well may have ensured its efficacy. Its form is that of the so-called tuitio charters, namely, texts granted originally by early medieval secular rulers to guarantee the rights of Jews who pledged their ‘fidelity’, by which was meant ‘service’. In Sicut indaeis non, this fidelity became synonymous with ‘submission’ to the papally directed Christian order and to the directives of canon law, in return for which the popes guaranteed the Jews’ practice of Judaism and their other traditionally permitted ‘good customs’. To emphasise this mutuality, the text commenced with Gregory the Great’s paraphrase of the Theodosian code (CT 16, 8, 18): ‘Just as the Jews should not have licence to do in their synagogues more than the law permits, so should they suffer no limitations on that which they are allowed.’ So important was Sicut indaeis, that from the time of Innocent III, the popes themselves called it the Constitutio pro iudaeis. The leading fifteenth-century canonist, Panormitanus, said that the prescriptions of Sicut indaeis defined the limits of the Jews’ Perpetual Servitude. Even Eudes of Châteauroux, who so forcefully condemned the Talmud in 1248, was willing to append his signature to reissues of the text in both 1255 and 1262.

Nobody more appreciated the significance of Sicut indaeis non than did the Jews themselves. One thirteenth-century Jewish chronicler, in a deliberate fiction (so well done that it has traditionally been given full credence) wrote that a papal legate was able to halt a royal persecution merely by publicly reading the text. Jews may even have forged the copies of Sicut indaeis attributed to Nicholas III and Martin IV. This is not, however, because the Jews were blind to colours and nuances. They knew well that the popes were not willing
protectors. Rather, they understood that within the framework of the canons and Christian theology, the popes were committed to establishing an equilibrium between Jewish obligation and privilege. The problem, of course – which has raised modern historiographical doubt about just what the popes intended – was that equilibria such as this one fare better in theory than in practice. Clement IV thus ordered restored to her Jewish father, who ‘was being tormented by fatherly emotions’, his dubiously baptised, seven-year-old daughter. But he also said that when the child came of age, she was to be returned to the Church. Was this Jew expected to raise his daughter as a Christian? And why should his ‘natural’ fatherly rights to retain his daughter, as Thomas might have justified it, be eventually subordinated to the ‘divine’ ones of the Church?

This predicament recalls the decision of Gregory the Great, 600 years earlier, monetarily to compensate Palermitan Jews, whose communal buildings the local bishop had forcibly consecrated as churches, rather than to restore the buildings themselves. Consecration, like baptism, could not be undone. Only now, the price was emotional, not solely physical loss. Principles and rules, therefore, had remained essentially constant. The price their application was demanding of the Jews had considerably increased. Moreover, new methods of enforcement created further difficulties. For, in about 1245, Innocent IV argued that the pope ‘may directly judge the Jews’. It was his privilege to do so ‘if they act contrarily to their law in issues of morality,... and if they fall into heresy with respect to their own law’. He was claiming, in other words, the authority to define Judaism’s permissible limits. Not only was this claim threatening in itself, but it also seriously weakened Sicut iudaeis’s guarantees against interference in Jewish religious practice. Its implications were no less perilous than were those of the Theodosian code, which warned (CT 16, 8, 18) that the Jews’ (religious) privileges would be abrogated, should their rites offend Christianity, or should they ignore Justinian’s decree fixing the date on which the Jews were to observe Passover, as well as the translation with which the Hebrew reading of the Torah was to be accompanied.

As Innocent IV himself indicated, the first victim of this new jurisdictional claim was the Talmud. But the real danger was that the right to impugn the Jews as Jewish heretics gave the Inquisition the equivalent of a carte blanche to interfere in strictly internal Jewish affairs. Indeed, the number of restraining orders against inquisitional excess issued by the popes from the later thirteenth century on suggests that this was a card the inquisitors sought to exploit. Yet, in all of this, there was a paradox. By finding ever more direct ways to assert its authority over the Jews, by defining ever more sharply the lines of permissible

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71 Kedar (1979).
Jewish behaviour, and by often succeeding in having its canon law applied, the thirteenth-century papacy was neutralising potentially inflammatory accusations and, possibly, violent behaviour, including its own. And it was doing exactly what both Augustine and Gregory the Great had done in the past, by reaffirming the traditional Pauline myth. Judaism, and Jews, were to be protected, just because they provided an example of improper behaviour and of its recompense. Jews were not to be perceived, as some – in particular, mendicant inquisitors – were beginning to say, as a menace to the ‘Christian polity’s’ health.72

The popes, with perhaps the notable exception of John XXII in the early 1320s, thus followed Innocent IV’s example in asserting judicial power, yet not indiscriminately using it. Their example was also adopted in over twenty-five regional and local Church councils held in the second half of the thirteenth century. No edict issued at any one of them referred to the Talmud, the Inquisition or forced sermons. Papal Jewry policy, as expressed rather in the canons of the Decretals, was time and again overwhelmingly approved.73

The Jews themselves summed up this behaviour best. The popes, wrote Meir ben Simeon, in the letter ‘he would have liked to send to King [Louis IX]’, obey their law. Unlike kings, they do ‘not forbid us to lend at interest, for that would be to forbid us our religion’.74 The anonymous Chronicler who, as noted above, had special faith in the powers of Sicut iudaeis non explained that the popes exercise memsbelet resbut (lawful authority). By contrast, the government of the secular kings was a memsbelet zadon (unjust rule). Nevertheless, to enjoy the papal rule of law, the Jews must also admit the pope’s claim to judge their observances and literature – precisely as Innocent IV had said, and as our chronicler fully knew. That, however, was a prospect so fearful and a behaviour so submissive that even this most politically sage chronicler could describe it only through hints and by implication. It meant bearing up to the often used papal epithet that the Jews were a ‘miserable people’, as well as conceding that, to this day, the dispersed Jews do not want to understand as well as they might that sufficient humaneness is accorded them when they are permitted to dwell among the faithful without ‘burdensome disgrace’.75 It is not surprising that the contrasts of papal behaviour left some Jews, like Natan Official, the probable author of the Debate of Rabbi Yehiel of Paris, mired deep in a quandary.76

Natan may also have doubted papal policy’s efficacy. When all was said and done, that policy’s enforcement was contingent on a not always forthcoming royal assent. And kings themselves were highly inconsistent, undercutting the canons one day, or going far beyond their demands the next. They exempted

74 Meir ben Simeon, ‘Milhemet Mizvah’, MS Parma, 2749, fol. 71v, and cf. fol. 63r, 68r, 70v, 226v.
Jews from Easter Week curfews and from wearing the badge, but they also issued licences forcing Jews to attend missionising sermons. Henry III and Philip IV respectively believed libels of ritual murder and Host desecration. And in the end, it was the kings, not the clergy or the popes, who decreed the expulsions of 1290 and 1306 (among others). Clerical radicals may have continuously carped at the edges of papal and conciliar policies, that is, at those policies established by the central institutions of the Church. But, for reasons that were at once spiritual and political, it was the kings who truly menaced the Jews.

The popes never threatened such extremes. It may be true that the need to shift with the pressures of the Avignonese ‘exile’, the subsequent fifty-year papal schism, the eventual rise of virtually independent regional churches and finally the increasing power of radical Franciscans in fifteenth-century Italy sometimes created instability, with the popes unpredictably alternating strict with loose controls. The popes also remained silent following various thirteenth- and fourteenth-century expulsions, possibly feeling bound not to question the clearly lay prerogative of determining who might reside in a given realm. More problematically, the popes seem sometimes to have accepted that Jews purposefully murdered Christian youths, and in 1295 Boniface VIII authorised the building of a chapel to commemorate a reported Jewish desecration of the Host. Yet Boniface refrained from mentioning the supposed Jewish perpetrators. For Boniface, it seems, the Jews must enjoy the due process of law. It was not deserted even by the octogenarian Benedict XIII. With his (anti-)papacy threatened, in 1415, Benedict attacked the Talmud in the bull, Etsi doctoris, called for missionary sermons, proposed obligatory Jewish residential districts, demanded that the ‘badge’ be always worn and decried Jewish communal self-rule – all for conversionary ends. Nevertheless precisely as had been Innocent IV and Clement IV before him, Benedict set firm limits. ‘Jews’, he said – in an obvious paraphrase of Sicut indaeis – are never to be burdened beyond the limits of the present constitution. [They are not] to be molested, to be offended in their persons, or to have their goods seized . . . [Rather, they are to be treated] humanely and with clemency . . . For the troubled spirit is believed to offer a sacrifice acceptable to God on the altar of the heart when that sacrifice is offered voluntarily, not through coercion.

The limits determining where coercion began and ended were never clearly defined, resulting in perpetual anxiety and no little confusion.

around 1230, one of the greatest figures of the Reformation, the bishop of Acre, Jacques de Vitry, taking stock of the changes that had occurred to Christianity throughout the preceding decades, made the following observation: ‘Three types of religious life already existed: the hermits, the monks and the canons. The Lord wanted to assure beyond doubt the solidity of this foundation. And so, towards the end of this period was added a fourth institution, the beauty of a new religious Order and the sanctity of a new Rule.’ In writing this last sentence, Jacques de Vitry evidently had in mind the first two Mendicant Orders, which were then enjoying great success in all of Christendom: the Friars Minor, stemming from St Francis of Assisi, and the Friars Preacher, founded by St Dominic. The future cardinal seems to have considered them an addition to the structure that contained Christ’s supporters, the last piece (together with the existing Orders) in a perfect square, which made for more stability of the Church’s foundations. However, to some extent, reality contradicted this optimistic view. For if it was true, as Jacques de Vitry had believed, that the great innovation of the thirteenth century in the realm of religious life had been the rise of the Mendicant Orders, then we are also forced to recognise that this phenomenon went hand in hand with a decline and loss of influence by the older Orders, many of which did not – or could not – adapt to the new situation. Therefore, the harmonious vision of Jacques de Vitry, meaningful enough around 1230, rapidly became anachronistic, as some of the foundations on which the stability of the Roman Catholic Church was meant to depend were soon to crumble, becoming more of a problem to the Church than a support to it.

When studying the history of the monastic Orders and groups of canons in the thirteenth century, one cannot help being struck by two facts: on the one hand there is a shortage of studies concerning this period, which contrasts with the abundance of work on the years 1000–1200; and on the other hand, there are frequent allusions to the laxity of the monks and canons, and to crisis, even decadence, in the works of those few historians who have ventured into this domain. In fact, these cursory judgements do not withstand a precise examination of the facts. Monasticism and the canonical movement during the thirteenth century are extremely diverse phenomena, and there is very little in common between a community of nuns, for example, whose existence was rather less harsh than the life led by most lay women, and a Carthusian or Cistercian monastery, where the community continued strictly to observe the religious Rule. Without making gross generalisations, it is appropriate to begin by distinguishing between the different countries. Thus, having come to France in 1247, the Franciscan Salimbene de Adam noted in his *Chronicle* that ‘with the Black Monks of St Benedict, the Rule is much better observed north of the Alps than in Italy’. As much could be said for England and especially for northern and central Europe, where the traditional religious Orders expanded until the beginning of the fourteenth century, while they experienced severe decline in the Mediterranean countries during the last decades of the twelfth century. The great monasteries of the south, like Subiaco, Farfa and Montecassino, faced serious difficulties from 1200 onwards, and these problems persisted throughout the thirteenth century, making necessary continuous intervention by the papacy.

In order fully to appreciate the extent of this regression, it is equally important not to consider all the monks and canons in the same light: the crisis struck first and foremost at the independent monasteries, which were also the most numerous in the western part of Christendom, whereas it was only felt later in congregations like Cluny, La Chaise-Dieu or Saint-Victor, which were not, however, to be spared. The picture – a rather sombre one – which historians traditionally paint of the situation of the monastic and canon Orders of the thirteenth century must be viewed in a rather more subtle light, for it is often treated from what is in effect a moralising perspective; it is all too easy to view the attempts made by certain monasteries or religious congregations to adapt to the new social and economic realities as a betrayal of their original ideal. Finally, we must not fail to recognise certain interesting attempts at reform, which occurred most notably in that region where classical

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Benedictine monasticism was experiencing the most serious of difficulties, that is, in Italy.

Necessary distrust on the part of historians concerning simplistic or excessively pessimistic judgements about the decadence of the monasteries of the thirteenth century should not, however, lead them to negate what the evidence makes all too obvious. It may, indeed, be an exaggeration to speak of a general crisis within monasticism and the canonical movement in the thirteenth century; but it is also undeniable that these movements, especially after 1230, were losing momentum and, in the second half of the thirteenth century, no longer played the fundamental role which had been theirs in the past, either in the Church or in western society. There are numerous causes for this regression: the explanation most frequently put forward is the rivalry between these movements and the Mendicant Orders. However, in numerous countries, the established Orders were in difficulty even before the Friars made their entrance on the scene, and their success seems even more a consequence than a cause of the decline of monastic institutions, although the Friars later helped to emphasise this decline by attracting numerous recruits chosen from the best sources. More important, without a doubt, was the vigorous revival of the secular clergy, initiated during the second half of the twelfth century: the bishops more and more strictly forbade the monks any sort of *cura animarum*, while at the same time working energetically to limit as far as possible the privileges of the exempt abbeys, exercising in addition their right to visit them; this brought about an increase in and sharpening of local conflicts and legal proceedings. But there were genuine social and economic problems which lay at the root of the difficulties which many religious communities found themselves facing at this period: a reduction in revenue, increasing debt, a quantitative and qualitative reduction in the level of recruits. On the whole, the rural world in which the great majority of monasteries were established was left ever further behind by the growth of cities which became the main hubs and decision-making centres of western civilisation in the thirteenth century. Now the monks and regular canons had a strained relationship with urban civilisation: the White Monks had fled the cities to return to ‘the desert’, and even though the Black Monks had often viewed without displeasure the foundation of true townships around their abbeys, as at Saint-Gall or Cluny, they were quick to enter into conflict with their inhabitants when the latter began to claim charters or rights for the community. Finally, certain of the fundamental values of monasticism, in particular asceticism and contempt for society, were broken down by social transformations and the evolution of ideas. All this created a negative atmosphere in which the traditional religious Orders and communities wavered between refusing to evolve, which in the long run was to be fatal, and attempt-
ing to adapt, which put into question their fidelity to customary practices and to the Rule, whether it was the Rule of St Benedict or that of St Augustine.

The crisis in the independent Benedictine monasteries

The isolated religious communities, both masculine and feminine, were the most seriously influenced by the problems we have just described, and often had difficulty coping with the changes. In many regions, financial contributions from the aristocracy, which had been abundant in the preceding centuries and allowed a number of establishments of this type to be founded and maintained, diminished or even ceased altogether. Moreover, their revenue consisted most often in rents or other charges on the land whose total amount was fixed and whose real value continued to diminish, during a period when prices and salaries were rapidly increasing. As a result, the monasteries and priories which did not have the free labour of the lay brothers at their disposal found themselves facing inextricable financial difficulties, especially after 1230/40. Therefore, they fell under the power of their protectors and lay benefactors even more than had been the case before. Now these benefactors were particularly interested in the social function of these religious establishments, where they sent their younger sons who were physically deformed in some way, or had been disinherited, and their daughters whom they did not wish to give in marriage, the monastic dowry being a minor sacrifice compared to the one an earthly husband would have demanded. In addition, these families expected the convents to take on the responsibility of educating the young daughters of the aristocracy and to give them a minimum of education before they were withdrawn at a marriageable age. Dependent upon the castle to which they formed in a sense an annexe, these establishments were not very intensely spiritual centres. For all that, however, one should not imagine, based on a few scandalous cases which made all the headlines, that they had become dens of iniquity: the children of the aristocracy most often led a sheltered life there, which allowed them not to lose their social standing and to experience, within the safety of the cloisters, administrative duties or activities related to running a household, amid a comfortable and easy piety. Rather than calling these communities, both masculine and feminine, decadent, it would be more appropriate to speak of their honest mediocrity.

The popes of the first half of the thirteenth century made great efforts to attempt to remedy the shortcomings of these Benedictine monasteries, which they attributed to their isolation. Thus Innocent III and the Fourth Lateran Council (canon 12, In singulis) imposed on their superiors – abbots or priors –

the obligation of participating every three years in a general chapter, which met at the provincial level, and had the responsibility of examining the situation of various religious communities and organizing visits to them. The autonomy of the monasteries was not questioned, but it was hoped that they could be led to reform through mutual aid and regular control. These measures had a certain effect in countries like England, where general chapters met in Oxford from 1218/19 onwards, or in Aragon-Catalonia where the Benedictines of the Tarragona and Saragossa provinces constituted, after 1233, a truly reformed congregation. However, in many other regions, these measures remained ineffective, since the conciliar decree only gave the general chapter consultative powers, leaving it up to the bishops to enforce its decisions, a situation which led to numerous conflicts. Therefore, from 1235 to 1237, Pope Gregory IX had to issue new, more rigorous statutes, which required the general chapters to meet annually and instituted the ‘superiors’, who were all powerful while the meetings were in session and could appoint ‘visitors’ from amongst the monks who enjoyed a good reputation. The importance of communal life, in particular at refectory and dormitory level, was emphatically stressed, and monks or nuns were forbidden to live isolated in priories or granges which were far away from the monastery. Finally, the abbots were requested to abstain from indulging in any unnecessary luxuries and were required to submit accounts of their finances to the monks on a regular basis, in particular those concerned with their earthly expenditures. But these decrees remained, on the whole, unenforced: the visits to the monasteries, often entrusted to Cistercians or Dominicans, were not acceptable to the Black Monks who often fiercely expressed their opposition to them, while the power of the abbots, who were far from objective in its use, was not really challenged. And even worse, in certain cases the embezzlement of collective assets by the Superiors was so extensive that they had to be split up and apportioned to individual monastic offices – a practice which favoured a tendency towards private appropriation, itself completely contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the Rule of St Benedict. Finally, after Innocent IV came to power, the Roman Catholic Church ended up selling dispensations to the monasteries and made these funds generally available for Church use, an act which marked the abandonment of any attempt at reform. But lay authority also contributed to this failure; thus, in England, the monarchs from Henry III onwards weighed the monasteries down with taxes, and in 1294 Edward I went so far as to demand half of their revenue for the crown. Moreover, since the burden of papal fiscal policy weighed heavily upon the abbeys during this same period, some of the great and prestigious ones like Battle and Bury St Edmunds found themselves on the verge of bankruptcy. The situation was no better in Germany where, in 1250, the monks of Fulda had to sell their most beautiful liturgical ornaments in order to pay off their debts. This does not mean that the long-standing royal
or imperial abbeys had lost all their prestige, as the English historiographers from the thirteenth century onwards were to testify, and as is affirmed by the Benedictine chronicler Matthew Paris, amongst others. But the material difficulties that these abbeys encountered at the time, along with the rigid conservatism which they demonstrated in the liturgical and cultural spheres, in the long run condemned them to decline.

The varied destinies of the great monastic and canonical congregations and the military Orders

The attempts at reform undertaken by the papacy in the thirteenth century did not concern the ‘exempt’ monasteries. On the whole, these were monasteries belonging to congregations some of which had previously played a considerable role in the life of the Church and Christianity. In any case, the Cluniacs, after 1200, used their own initiative to instigate a general chapter which brought together the abbots and priors of the houses belonging to their congregation around the abbot of Cluny. But these measures were not enough to restore the former prestige of the congregation: in the thirteenth century, none of the abbots of Cluny, descended, for the most part, from families belonging to the Burgundian gentry, acquired either the notoriety or the influence of an Odilo or a Peter the Venerable. Several were even forced to resign and, on the whole, the abbatial reigns were quite short, as if the difficulties encountered in the government of the ordo cluniacensis were beyond the powers of even the best intentioned superiors. The geographical spread of the patrimonies, and the problems of administration and management which this implied, together with the reduction of contributions, had already begun to have an impact from the second half of the twelfth century. To this must be added the renewed control, on the part of the secular clergy, over the parishes which in most cases only left the monks a mere advowson and, even more, the flaring of local and national particularism which called into question the unity of the congregation and the power of the abbot of Cluny. In France, a number of Cluniac monasteries demanded the right freely to elect their priors and in various countries, such as England, Spain or Lombardy, the relationship between the main abbey and the various branches became merely symbolic or dissolved altogether around 1300. While it is not possible to speak of a total decline or even of a crisis at the Abbey of Cluny, since it still counted 200 monks amongst its members when Louis IX and Innocent IV met there in 1245, by the end of the thirteenth century, the Cluniac Order was a mere shadow of its former self, and it has been calculated that the number of clergy attached to it had diminished by approximately 25 per cent compared with the

previous century. As much could also be said for most of the great congregations of Black Monks, whether they were La Chaise-Dieu and Saint-Victor of Marseilles in France, or in Italy, at San Michele della Chiusa or Montecassino, with the exception of Cava dei Tirreni, in the kingdom of Sicily, or of San Pietro di Gubbio, in Umbria, founded by the holy Abbot Sperandeo (who died before 1264). In central and eastern Europe, the Benedictine monasteries suffered greatly from the Mongolian invasions and the appropriation of their property by the lay aristocracy, but a recovery was felt, after 1260, under the impetus of the Abbeys of Tyniec in Poland, Brevnov in Bohemia and Pannonhalma in Hungary, which took control of these national congregations, with royal support.6

The case of the Cistercian Order was even more complex, which makes it difficult to examine the situation in the thirteenth century objectively. The White Monks were just as open to criticism as the others and it is easy to demonstrate, simply by looking at the decisions made at their annual general chapter, that in many areas they distanced themselves from the norms set by Robert de Molesme and St Bernard, for example, by obtaining from the papacy the privilege of exemption for their possessions and by obtaining the donation of lands and villages which were obliged to pay them a tithe. Moreover, certain historians have stressed – and rightly so – how passionately, and sometimes obsessively, they sought to constitute a single estate around their monasteries, through exchanges and sales, not hesitating to expel the landowners, nor to raze villages in order to surround themselves by the ‘desert’ dictated by the Rule.7 An even bleaker picture emerges when it is pointed out that certain Cistercian monasteries went as far as giving up home farming on their lands, or that they acquired an income from houses in the city. Others, not knowing what to do with the considerable sums of money brought in by the wool from their sheep, invested it in splendid buildings: witness the grandiose ruins of Fountains in Yorkshire, or San Galgano in Tuscany, which still survive today.8 Add to this the fact that Abbot Stephen of Lexington – who renounced the anti-intellectualism which was the tradition in the Order since St Bernard – created, between 1237 and 1250, a college in Paris where the most gifted Cistercian monks could receive a university education, and that after a violent reaction, this initiative was finally accepted and extended to other university centres (Oxford, Toulouse, Montpellier) by the general assembly in 1287, and then there is no difficulty in demonstrating the deviations – some would say betrayals – which the White Monks allowed to erode their ideals throughout the thirteenth century.

But this point of view only takes into account one aspect of the true situation. Leaving aside Scandinavia and central and eastern Europe, where the Cistercian Order expanded right up to the last decades of the thirteenth century,

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the Cistercians remained one of the most prestigious religious institutions in Christendom at this time: witness the fact that the papacy entrusted certain of its members with many important and delicate missions – beginning with the reform of the Black Monks – and that the Emperor Frederick II, on his death bed, had himself garbed in their robes. Never had the influence of the Cistercians seemed to be so strong in France and the Netherlands as during the first half of the thirteenth century, in particular in aristocratic circles where the call to their order was still potently felt. It is to the White Monks that we owe the works which profoundly influenced the minds of the time, like the anonymous *Queste del Saint Graal*, which gave an intensely mystical interpretation to the Percival cycle, or the *Dialogus miraculorum* of Caesarius of Heisterbach, which equally contributed to breathing new life into the hagiographic genre with his *Life of St Elisabeth*, composed around 1235. In the same way, the Abbey of Villiers, in Belgium, was a very active centre where numerous biographies were written of holy fathers, nuns and lay clergy who were products of the Order, as well as the holy women who had been attracted to their sphere of influence. Finally, recent works have stressed the important role played by the Cistercians, especially in Italy (the Abbeys of Fossanova and Casamari in southern Lazio), in distributing both the texts of Joachim of Fiore (d. 1202) and the Joachite ideas. Even though the Calabrian monk had left the White Monks in 1191/2 to found his own abbey in San Giovanni in Fiore, he can, nevertheless, be rightly considered a representative of the monastic theology inspired by the Cistercians, insofar as a large portion of his thoughts and writings are concerned with symbolic interpretations and images, while radically opposing the spirit of scholastic theology. In a general way, in spite of the lack of success which they experienced in Languedoc in preaching against the Cathars, the Cistercians appeared much less cut off from contemporary society than the other monks, at least during the first half of the thirteenth century; and they seem to have been more eager to communicate what they considered to be the essence of the Christian message, assuming thereby what was in some respects a pastoral role in Christian society.

However, it was in their dealings with women that the followers of St Bernard enjoyed their greatest success in the thirteenth century. The trend within the newly created women’s communities towards the creation of links with Citeaux took place on a massive scale, and is all the more impressive since the White Monks had merely tolerated rather than encouraged this development. In fact, after accepting the incorporation of several women’s convents into the Order between 1213 and 1224, the Cistercian general chapter, fearful of being overwhelmed by the burdens presented by the *cura animarum* of the

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9 Caesarius of Heisterbach, *Dialogus miraculorum*, ed. J. Strange, Cologne (1851); Hilka (1933–7).
10 Roisin (1947), pp. 23–45.
11 Bloomfield and Reeves (1954).
nuns and by visits to their houses, adopted a negative attitude towards new petitions, as the Premonstratensians had recently done. But this did not stop the movement, and, according to Jacques de Vitry who witnessed the phenomenon, ‘the nuns who professed the religion of the Cistercian Order multiplied like the stars of heaven and vastly increased – convents were founded and built, virgins, widows and married women who had gained their husbands’ consent, rushed to fill the cloisters’. In fact, in most cases, these institutions, which sometimes took the place of beguine or other relatively informal communities of *mulieres religiosae*, were content to follow the customs of Citeaux; but some of the women managed to obtain their affiliation to the Order, either due to the influence exercised by the papacy or temporal sovereigns, or thanks to the goodwill of certain male monasteries, such as Villiers, in rejecting the policy endorsed by the general chapter of refusing them admission. Several hundred female convents which adhered to Cistercian observance without legally belonging to the Order were founded in the west throughout the thirteenth century, particularly in the Germanic countries, in France, England and the Netherlands. This flourishing of the Cistercians was not only important in a quantitative sense. These communities, often very fervent and poorer than the masculine monasteries, were also spiritual centres characterised by an intense devotion to the Eucharist and towards various aspects of the humanity of Christ. This devotion was expressed through a collection of hagiographic literature, such as the *Life of St Lutgarde d’Aywières* (died 1246), as well as in narratives recounting visions and revelations. One of the most remarkable representatives of Cistercian feminine mysticism in the thirteenth century was Beatrice of Nazareth (d. 1268), author of an autobiography and an important spiritual treatise in Flemish on ‘The seven degrees of love’ (*De seven manieren van Minne*).

What has just been said of the Cistercians is just as valid, *mutatis mutandis*, for the principal congregations of regular canons, who lived according to the Rule of St Augustine. Even though they stopped founding monasteries in western Europe after the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Premonstratensians continued their expansion on the eastern confines of Germany, between the Elbe and the Oder, in Poland, and especially in Austria and Hungary. In the unexplored regions of the Germanic settlements, from the banks of the Danube to the Baltic, they often played an active pastoral role, founding rural churches and ministering to new parishes. But elsewhere, they seemed especially concerned with properly maintaining their property and resources. Well before the Cistercians, the Premonstratensians refused to turn their attention to the women’s communities which had originally been part of

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their Order. In the thirteenth century, this did not prevent the foundation of new convents of Norbertine nuns. Sometimes called ‘Parthenons’, they had no official links to the masculine counterpart but were generally placed under its spiritual direction. This was still too much: in 1270, the general chapter forbade nuns from being accepted in the future, and gave those who were already in the convents the choice between gradual extinction or entry into other religious establishments.\(^\text{15}\)

The Order of Grandmont, which had enjoyed great prestige in France and England in the twelfth century and whose Rule was monastic in nature but eremitical in spirit, was seriously weakened, from the 1180s onwards, by internal crises which set the lay brothers against the monks. The popes of the first half of the thirteenth century imposed a series of reforms which disposed of its most unusual features: the communities’ possessions were no longer limited to what was strictly necessary, as their founder, St Stephen of Muret, had wished, and the lay brothers, stripped of their power in favour of the prior, particularly in financial matters, were reduced to a minor role. From that point on, this form of religious life lost whatever attractiveness it once had, and the monks who lived in the hundred houses owned by the Order of Grandmont were henceforth barely distinguishable from the Cistercians.

Similar considerations can be applied to the principal military Orders: the Hospitallers, the Templars, the Orders of Calatrava and St James in the Iberian peninsula. Favoured by the princes and the papacy for the eminent role they played in the fight against Islam in the Holy Land, the first two covered Christendom with a very dense network of provinces, priories and commanderies, thanks to which they became very rich and powerful. Alongside the knights were lay brothers, stemming from more modest social circles, responsible for financial activities and domestic chores. But with the loss of the Holy Land by the Christians, caused by the familiar problems of bickering and indiscipline, people began questioning the usefulness of these large organisations which managed immense estates and were at the centre of the European money markets. Only the Teutonic Knights, or Order of St Mary of the Germans, supported by Innocent III in 1199, really flourished in the thirteenth century. But the brutality they used, from 1250 onwards, to attempt to convert the Prussians and the other Baltic pagans to the Christian faith, as well as their exclusively Germanic membership, were obstacles to their expansion.

On the whole, however, the lasting impression which emerges from the study of the principal monastic and canonical congregations in the thirteenth century is less negative than that of the isolated monasteries. In any case, up to about 1250, there is no clear-cut evaluation, and the difficulties that the White Monks, the Black Monks and the Augustinian Monks encountered should not

allow us to forget either their close network of establishments or their profound influence, especially in rural areas. It could even be claimed that the stagnation or the slight decline of the masculine Orders at that time was more than compensated for by the overall increase in feminine convents, which was breaking new ground. Yet it is undeniable that after 1250/60, even the Orders which had most resisted change, like Citeaux, found themselves confronted by more and more serious problems which they themselves did not have the means to solve. As for the others, including the military orders, they behaved more and more like simple administrators or political powers intent on pursuing their own interests. This could only elicit doubts as to the legitimacy of their way of life and incite the lay and even the ecclesiastical powers to expropriate their riches and revenue.

Attempts at revival and their limitations

The difficulties of the great monastic and canonical institutions should not overshadow the appearance of new, often successful, forms of religious life, with ambitions that were both more precise and more concrete. This was particularly the case for a certain number of pious secular associations which sometimes transformed themselves into canonical or monastic congregations. Thus the Antonines or Hospitallers of St Anthony, founded at the end of the eleventh century by a nobleman from the Dauphiné, specialised in caring for people suffering from St Anthony’s fire, caused by consuming rancid grain. They experienced very rapid expansion during the twelfth century and in the first half of the thirteenth century, in particular in the Germanic world, from the banks of the Rhine to the Hanseatic cities.16 The Hospitallers of St Lazarus, as well as the Cellites or Alexians, were more involved with caring for lepers, while the Hospitallers of the Holy Ghost, founded in 1180 by Guy de Montpellier and introduced to Rome in 1204, covered all of Christendom with a network of hospitals.17 Finally, the Order of Trinitarians was created in 1198 by Jean de Matha (d. 1213) with the goal of buying back Christians who had been taken as prisoners or slaves in the Muslim countries. Living by the Rule of St Augustine they practised begging in order to survive. The Order included a large number of houses, especially in France and Spain.18 There was also the Order of the Mercedarians, created in Barcelona in 1203 by Pere Nolasc, which had a similar purpose.19 Finally, several other small canonical congregations, such as Aubrac and Roncevaux on the way to Santiago de Compostela, or the Order of Great St Bernard on the way to Rome, helped the pilgrims make their way across even the most difficult mountains.20 These institutions hardly ever

receive any credit from historians, but they acted efficiently to fulfil the objectives they had set for themselves; their faithful followers seemed to have been very attached to them, as they demonstrated by their generosity towards these monks who took upon themselves the burden of following the example of both Martha and Mary by merging the active life and the contemplative life.

As for monasticism, its revival was due more to small, eremitic congregations which were especially plentiful in Italy, where the great cenobitic abbeys had undergone an early, and very serious, crisis. The term ‘recluse’ in this context does not imply the solitary life of the hermit, which was unusual amongst the monks in the west, but rather a more watered-down form of community life, which valued asceticism as well as individual and collective poverty. Orders of this type appeared after the end of the eleventh century: the most famous was the Order of the Carthusians, which steadily continued to develop, particularly in the Mediterranean countries, and with which some women’s communities became associated. In central and northern Italy, the Orders of Camaldoli and Vallombrosa, first established in Tuscany, enjoyed their golden age during the first half of the thirteenth century and also founded women’s convents, as is illustrated by the life of St Umiltà of Faenza (1126–1316) who was at the head of several. In the kingdom of Naples and in Sicily, the congregation of Montevergine, founded by Guglielmo di Vercelli and recognised by Pope Alexander III in 1181, prospered under the security of royal protection. It was the same for the congregation of Pulsano, near Monte Sant’Angelo, in Gargano, founded by Giovanni di Matera in 1129 and recognised at approximately the same time (1181). The ascetic monks renounced owning any more lands than they required to maintain their livelihood and dedicated themselves to becoming wandering preachers. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the congregation included some thirty-odd monasteries and extended its influence as far as Pisa, where the monastery of San Michele degli Scalzi was an important spiritual centre.

Various new establishments, all eremitical in nature, continued to enrich the already varied palette of Italian monasticism in the thirteenth century: the Order of Fiore, founded by Joachim after his break with the Cistercians, was recognised by the papacy in 1196 and supported by Henry VI and Queen Constance. Introduced especially in Calabria and the south of Campania, it developed to a certain extent until the 1260s. In the Marches, a priest knowledgeable in the law, Silvestro Guzzolini (d. 1267), who wanted to renounce the world, created a group of like-minded ascetics; and then in the Abruzzi a discipline-minded monk, Pietro Morrone, attracted numerous followers through his preaching and miracles, setting up a penitential style of life within his community which won papal approval in 1283. He founded houses in the northern part of the kingdom of Naples. This holy man, elected pope in 1294 (quite by chance), granted many privileges to his Order, which took the name of the Poor Hermits of Pope
Celestine. A certain number of Franciscans were drawn to this Order, as they were being persecuted within their own Order because of their dedication to the principle of absolute poverty. After the death of their founder, the Celestines experienced difficulties under Pope Boniface VIII, but shortly afterwards they profited from the support of the kings of France, in whose land they settled in the fourteenth century. Other areas of Christendom also witnessed the birth of smaller Orders with eremitical leanings, such as the Order of the Hermits of St Paul, or Paulinians, which was created in Hungary around 1250 and spread across central Europe.

The overall picture of western monasticism in the thirteenth century cannot ignore all these initiatives, which illustrate very well the capacity for revival shown by this traditional institution, while diminishing the impression of decline which might be given by a study of the isolated monasteries or even some of the larger congregations. Yet despite the success of these new Orders in certain regions, it is obvious that neither monasticism nor the canonical movement was capable of solving the main religious problem of the thirteenth century, that is the challenge thrown at the Church by the soaring expansion of the cities and of urban civilisation.

The Mendicant Orders and the Religious Reconquest of Urban Society

Recalling in his chronicles the most important religious influences of his day, the German Premonstratensian Burchard of Ursperg (d. 1230) noted the following: 'At that time, the world was growing weary: two Orders emerged within the Church which gave it new life in the most brilliant way, and the Apostolic See supported them: the Friars Minor and the Friars Preacher.' This statement, which is not an isolated remark, demonstrates very well that the members of the traditional Orders quickly became aware of the innovative nature of the first Mendicant Orders and of the parallel ways they were taking. Yet the founders of the two Mendicant Orders were men who were very different from each other, and even if it is likely that they met each other in Rome in 1215, each one matured and developed his experiences independently of the other.

St Francis, St Dominic and the Innovative Nature of the Mendicant Orders

Francis of Assisi and the Origins of the Friars Minor

Born at the end of 1181 or the beginning of 1182, Francis was the son of a rich cloth merchant in the small city of Assisi, in Umbria, and normally would have

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21 Burchard d’Ursperg, Chronicon, in Lemmens (1926), p. 17.
followed in his father’s footsteps by taking up a career in the family business. But from the time he was an adolescent, he seemed to be more interested in the jovial life of the privileged youth of his town than in commercial matters. His wealthy background allowed him to spend his time in the company of the sons of noble families; and, under their influence, he adopted the ideals of courtly culture, which were profoundly to influence both his state of mind and his way of life. Attracted by the life led by the Knights and chivalrous adventures, he joined a military expedition in 1205 to fight in Apulia at the request of Pope Innocent III. But he was taken ill at Spoleto and a vision ordered him to return to Assisi. Driven by the idea of Divine Grace from that moment on, he sought his true path for several years, dedicating himself to solitary meditation and prayer. After breaking off contact with his father, who reproached him for his generosity towards the poor and various churches, Francis renounced his worldly goods and placed himself under the protection of the bishop of Assisi as a penitent. In February 1208, while listening to a priest reading a passage from the Gospel of St Matthew (Matt. 10:7–16) which describes sending apostles out on missions, bare-foot and without any money, he became aware of his true vocation: to live in evangelical poverty.22 From that moment on, he changed his normal clothing, wearing only a simple tunic and replacing his belt with a rope, and began calling on his fellow citizens to convert. He was soon joined by some of the inhabitants of Assisi and its outlying areas, as much by laymen as by clerics, with whom he formed a small itinerant preaching community. In 1209, Francis compiled a kind of manifesto, made up entirely of passages from the Gospel placed end to end, and went to Rome to submit it to Pope Innocent III. The pope gave his verbal approval to Francis’s way of life, but refrained from committing himself further before seeing the outcome of this experiment—which greatly resembled that of the Waldensians.

Comforted by this relatively favourable welcome, the Friars then took the name of ‘Minor’, which meant tiny or humble, and developed their preaching campaigns in central Italy, where they attracted numerous recruits who were fascinated by the personal charisma of Francis. Amongst them were women, the first of whom (in 1212) was Clare, a young noblewoman from Assisi, who was to become the founder of the Order of the ‘Poor Recluses of St Damian’ or Damianites, who were later known as Clares. In 1217, at the general chapter which brought together all the Friars once a year in the small church of the Porziuncula, birthplace of the brotherhood, the decision was made to send the Friars north of the Alps and abroad. Francis himself wanted to go to France, but Cardinal Ugolino stopped him in Florence and persuaded him to remain in Italy to look after the community he headed, which was developing rapidly but which was still in rather a fragile state. In 1219, however, the Poverello left for

22 Hinnebusch (1959/60); Lambert (1961), pp. 35–62.
the Holy Land and joined the Fifth Crusade in Damietta in Egypt, just after the crusaders had occupied the city. During a truce, he left the Christian camp with only one companion and was led before the sultan, whom he tried to convince of the superiority of the Christian faith. But this was in vain; having failed in his attempt, he left on a pilgrimage to the Holy Places, but had to return to Italy in 1220. In his absence, those who had replaced him had taken initiatives which placed the spirit of his Order in danger. Francis restored order, but preferred to give up leading the group, whose rapid growth — the Friars Minor already numbered more than 1,000 in 1221 — was causing institutional and disciplinary problems which he no longer felt strong enough to tackle, in particular the transformation of the Evangelical Brotherhood of the early days into a veritable religious Order complete with a Rule, which Cardinal Ugolino, now their official protector, had continually urged them to adopt. After various fruitless attempts, a text known as the ‘second Rule’ (more precisely, the *regula bullata*) was approved by Pope Honorius III in November, 1223.

Succumbing more and more to illness (he had returned from the east with a serious eye infection and also suffered from problems with his spleen and stomach), uncomfortable with the way his Order was developing and was slipping more and more out of his control, Francis spent long periods of time in hermitages, in particular at La Verna, where he is said to have received the stigmata as sign of the Passion following a vision in September 1224. In 1225, despite being almost completely blind, he composed the *Canticle of the Sun or of Creation*, one of the earliest known religious literary texts in Italian. In 1226, sensing that the end was near, he wrote his *Testament*, in which he passionately evokes his early religious experiences and attempts to bequeath his original ideal of the evangelical life to his fellow Friars. In September of that year, he was brought back to Assisi, where he died at the Porziuncula on 3 October, and was canonised in 1228 by Ugolino, who had become Pope Gregory IX in 1227. Shortly afterwards, with the encouragement of the pope and Brother Elias, construction began on an immense and magnificent basilica in Assisi, where his remains were sent in 1230.

It is obviously impossible fully to convey Francis’s extraordinary success during his lifetime with this bare summary of the principal episodes in his life. A vibrant and charismatic personality, his contemporaries were greatly struck by the absolute harmony which the Poverello demonstrated between what he preached and the way he lived, between the message he delivered and its practical attainment. This message, as we well know, was essentially based on the idea of poverty. Far from being merely a social condition or a virtue, poverty, in his eyes, was the very essence of the evangelical life. The long-standing ascetic adage ‘follow naked the naked Christ’, which was so well known in the west in the twelfth century, to him became a concrete way of life, both on the individual and the collective level. Up to that time, this commitment to living an ideal
had only ever been put forward by dissident groups or heretics. As for monasticism, even under the ascetic form it had taken in the Cistercian Order or with the Carthusians, it had never demanded anything of its followers except personal poverty, which in no way prevented the community from being well endowed with property or from enjoying a good income, and which made it possible for them to practise a cenobitic life. However, Francis’s demand that his followers strip themselves of worldly possessions continued to increase, as he required them not only to renounce their goods and distribute them to the poor, but also to refuse any common property and place themselves in the hands of Providence for their daily survival, through manual labour and begging. For him, living according to the Gospel meant accepting financial insecurity and placing oneself on an equal footing with the poorest people – outcasts, lepers, tramps – who, following the example of Christ, had neither money nor a fixed abode. It was for the same reason that he also placed more emphasis on humility, that is to say, the a priori refusal of any type of power (both the power enjoyed by lords, as well as cultural superiority), which could lead man to oppress others and take pride in owning things which did not really belong to him.

St Dominic and the Order of the Friars Preacher

During those same years, a Castilian cleric, Dominic of Guzmán, had embarked on a path which in certain respects was similar to that of the Poverello, but differed in others. Born in Caleruega around 1175 to a noble family, he was destined to an ecclesiastical career very early on in his life. He studied in Palencia before being elected canon of the cathedral of Osma in 1196. In 1203, his bishop, Diego de Azebo, who seemed to have been inflamed with great apostolic zeal, took him along on a diplomatic mission in northern Germany, on behalf of the king of Castile. Reaching the end of their journey, they were witness to the ravages caused in these regions by the Cumans, the pagan tribes of central Europe whom the princes of the area used as mercenaries. Once back in Spain, they decided to dedicate themselves to the evangelisation of the Cumans and went to Rome to ask Pope Innocent III to support their endeavour. On their return, however, they passed through the county of Toulouse, and after spending some time in the city, they realised exactly how successful the Cathar heresy had been in the region, a situation which grieved them greatly. In August 1206 in Montpellier, the two men encountered Cistercian legates the pope had sent to the region to preach against the heretics, and who were so discouraged by the poor welcome given them by the local population that they were about to abandon their mission. Shocked by the richness of their clothing and their lavish retinue, which was indeed a contrast to the ascetic frugality and simple way of life of the Cathar perfecti, they decided
to remain in Languedoc to try to win back the region’s inhabitants to the Catholic faith through preaching in the apostolic style, proclaiming the Word of God in humility and poverty. Renouncing any pretension to authority, which was inadvisable in a region where the Roman Church could no longer count on the support of the aristocracy, they agreed to face the Cathars and Waldensians in open public debates. In certain cases, as in Montréal in 1207, they succeeded in winning over their opponents through their knowledge of the Scriptures and evangelical testimony. In the same year, Dominic founded a religious community at Prouille intended to receive women he had succeeded in rescuing from Catharism, while Diego, in Pamiers, managed to bring back to the Church an important group of Waldensians led by Durand of Huesca, who subsequently formed a religious congregation, approved by Innocent III in 1208 under the name of the ‘Poor Catholics’.

While all this was taking place, Diego had died, and Dominic pursued his activities with some of the companions who had joined him. In 1214, after the victory won by Simon de Montfort, he settled in Toulouse where he founded a community of clerics who dedicated themselves to the salvation of souls, in collaboration with the local bishop, and strove to redress the inadequacies of the clergy in the parish. This modest congregation of diocesan preachers was approved by Innocent III, after the meeting of the Fourth Lateran Council which Dominic attended, under the title of *ordo praedicatorum*. However, since the Council had just prohibited the creation of new religious Orders the pope commanded them to take up the Rule of St Augustine, which was seen as appropriate for regular clerics. The new establishment would not, however, take on its definitive shape until after it received final approval in 1217, and especially in 1220/1, when Dominic provided it with Constitutions which succeeded in defining its characteristics, emphasising in particular the poverty of the Friars Preacher and their refusal to possess any worldly goods, either individually or as a community, beyond what was absolutely essential for their housing.

The Order thus established would not, perhaps, have enjoyed the success which it ultimately had if its founder had not taken the initiative to uproot it from the region where it originated, due to the violent turn of events in Languedoc. His most brilliant idea was to disperse his companions, even though there were still very few of them, scattering them between a few large urban centres, which were also university cities – Orleans, Paris and Bologna – where they could dedicate themselves to study with the goal of preaching. The austerity of their way of life, as well as their ardent apostolic zeal, did not fail to impress those in the intellectual milieu from which they recruited many valuable members. With the support of the papacy, the Order thus acquired a universal dimension and, on the death of its founder in 1221, it already had several hundred Friars, twenty-five houses and five provinces. Some female communi-
ties had joined them, in Rome as well as in Bologna, and the Dominicans also had great success in the Germanic world shortly afterwards. Benefiting from the trust the papacy placed in them, the Preachers were entrusted with the running of the Inquisition between 1231 and 1233, which was to lead them, though not exclusively, towards the pursuit and repression of heresies.

Diversity and unity of the principal Mendicant Orders

While the Friars Minor placed clerics and the lay brothers on an equal footing and followed a Rule which was completely new, the Order of the Preachers might appear at first glance to be less original, since it brought together religious members, like the regular canons, living under the Rule of St Augustine. However, through its constitutions and structures, the Order of the Preachers found itself in direct contact with the society of its time. Like Francis of Assisi, Dominic had, in effect, understood the fundamental importance of the spoken word in transmitting the faith. The fact that the majority of the Preachers were priests allowed them to go beyond the kind of purely persuasive preaching which the pope had granted to St Francis and his first (predominantly lay) disciples. But while the Poverello maintained a certain amount of distrust of schools and studying, fearing that education might reintroduce new rifts within the bosom of his brotherhood, the Dominicans, on the contrary, wished to depend on education to make their ministry more efficient. This gamble on the value of erudition was to pay off: in a world where theoretical knowledge enjoyed great prestige and where the universities were soon to become breeding grounds which would attract the elite leaders of Christianity, there was most surely a place for an Order of Doctors, whose preaching was rooted in the study of theology and philosophy.

All the same Dominic had spent enough time with the Cathars and the Waldensians to know that the learning of preachers would not be sufficient to ensure that their audiences would convert. He himself seemed to have been more a man of prayer than of education, even if, in his eyes, these two aspects of spiritual life were inextricably linked. Finally, he joined with Francis in his fundamental choice, which consisted of rejecting power over and ownership of land, while at the same time allocating a different place to poverty. To him, in fact, poverty constituted a weapon against heresy; it was a necessary condition, though not in itself sufficient, to make the public accept the apostolic evidence of the Catholic Preachers. But he did not make an absolute virtue of poverty, whereas Francis identified it with the evangelical life. The Dominicans were therefore to behave less rigidly than the Franciscans in this particular field; and they accepted the ownership of the churches given them and that of the property where their houses stood with no qualm of conscience. Besides these differences of opinion, important to be sure but becoming less so, the features

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common to the new orders were basic and contemporaries were correct in seeing in them two aspects of the same phenomenon. Even more than through the begging to which they owe their name, the Mendicant Orders defined themselves above all by their apostolic attitude, that is to say, their desire to dedicate themselves to the salvation of souls in peril, whether they be merely the faithful, heretics or pagans. Thus, unlike previous religious Orders, they proved themselves extremely familiar with the world which they proposed to convert (including, eventually, the worlds of Judaism and Islam as well). Despite living in closed communities, they did not remain within the shelter of the cloisters, but rather ventured out as often as was necessary to maintain relationships with the people. Unlike the monks, the followers of St Francis and St Dominic only renounced the profane life in order better to turn towards those who lived around them, to speak to them of God. The principal vocation of the Mendicant Friar was not to atone for his own sins or his infringements of the Rule, but to lead the faithful to penitence and unbelievers to the true faith.

For this reason, the Mendicants were not constrained by concerns for stability, but were characterised, on the contrary, by their great mobility. Movement was constant from one house to another, and the Friars were often engaged on journeys, travelling in pairs. The pursuit of education, which developed rapidly within both the Orders, led them to travel, if only to reach a studium where their superiors had committed them to study or teach. Meetings of provincial and general chapters, missions to carry out work on behalf of the curia, or diplomatic responsibilities with which they were often entrusted, both within the boundaries of Christendom or further afield, were equally opportunities for stimulating contact, as well as for exchanging new ideas. Relations with the laity were even more important: because begging meant taking up collections, there were already opportunities for the Friars to meet the people upon whom they were dependent for their material subsistence. But it was clearly their preaching which provided the main opportunity for transmitting the good Word to the faithful. Preaching could be done in the context of a parish church where the curate had either invited or allowed them to come, or outdoors, in public places (when the weather and circumstances permitted), or even in the context of meetings of religious fraternities or other devout groups which had chosen them as chaplains or had simply gravitated towards them. Thus by very diverse means, the Mendicants sought profoundly to influence the laity by creating support systems and networks of sympathisers, to assure that their message of penance and the spiritual themes which they carried were widely spread. Thus, since the papacy knew better than anyone else the weaknesses of the secular clergy and how difficult it would be to impose change on this ossified body, it is

easy to understand why the pope greeted the appearance of Francis and Dominic and their spiritual followers as providential, and why the papacy was tempted to use this zealous and ardent militia to meet what it considered the urgent needs of the Church, even at the risk of distorting the intentions of their founders on certain points.

**Expansion and development of the Mendicant Orders in the thirteenth century**

In only a few decades, the two principal Mendicant Orders – the Friars Minor and the Friars Preacher – experienced extremely rapid expansion within all of Christendom and even beyond, since they soon had establishments in the Orient and in certain other countries where the missionaries had travelled, like Persia or certain parts of the Mongol empire. Towards 1300, the Franciscans alone numbered approximately 30,000, spread out over 1,100 houses, which represented 40 per cent of the total number of Mendicant establishments. But this remarkable success did not fail to bring with it repercussions which affected the entire complexion of these new Orders, in particular the Friars Minors who underwent a profound transformation.

**The standardisation of the Franciscan Order**

On the death of their founder, the Friars Minor, whose numbers had continued increasing, found themselves faced with serious problems which touched the very purpose of their vocation: should they at all costs remain faithful to the model of evangelical fraternity set down at their inception, as Francis had so touchingly urged them to do in his Testament? Or should they instead adapt to the changing times and the demands of an apostolic mission whose development was closely linked with ecclesiastical institutions, in particular with the hierarchy? Pope Gregory IX quickly put an end to these perplexing questions, and he – as well as his successors – increased their efforts to remould the Franciscan Order along the lines of the Dominican Order, even if that meant eradicating their most unique characteristics – which were also the most shocking in the eyes of the jurists – that is, the life style and spirituality of the Friars Minor. With the Papal bull *Quo elongati* in 1230, the pope exempted the Friars from observing the Testament of St Francis and stated that to be a good Friar it was only necessary to observe the Rule. Thus there was no longer any question of having to perform manual labour to provide daily sustenance: this was to be acquired uniquely through begging, contrary to Francis’s express wishes. In the following year, the Minors obtained, through the Papal bull *Nimis iniqua*, the privilege of exemption; here again contrary to the exact words of their founder who wanted them to be ‘humble and obedient to everyone’,

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this removed them from the jurisdiction of the bishops, except in matters concerned with preaching and the establishment of their houses. Thus they became totally dependent on the Holy See, which thereafter intervened more actively, to defend them and recommend them to the prelates and princes. These measures did not result from a desire to malign the memory of the Poverello. On the contrary, it was at this very time that the impressive – and expensive – Basilica of Assisi was being constructed in St Francis’s honour, whose religious message was spreading throughout Christendom. But Gregory IX wanted to ensure above all else that the essential holiness and religious enthusiasm which was the legacy of the Poverello be used to serve the Church in what he believed to be the best way.24

The final stage in this process of standardisation was completed at the end of the 1230s, on the occasion of a quarrel between the minister general of the Minors, Elias of Cortona (1231–9) and a certain number of Friars. With the support of Innocent IV, they succeeded in convincing the Holy See to convene a general chapter in 1239, which ousted Elias. This issue was complex in several ways: Elias had governed the Order in an extremely authoritarian manner and, in order to strengthen his influence, he had rashly increased the number of provinces. Moreover, his wish to complete the enormous task of constructing the Basilica of Assisi as quickly as possible drew him into a misguided financial policy, difficult to reconcile with the spirit of poverty; while his sympathy for Emperor Frederick II, to whom he was to ally himself in the end, earned him the hostility of the Roman curia. But the heart of the problem doubtless resided in the fact that Elias was a lay brother and that he had done everything possible to strengthen the position of the lay brothers within the Order, at a time when it was seriously threatened by the growing number of clerics emerging from the schools, and by the influence they had gained. In fact, the coalition which forced Elias to resign in 1239 was led by Friars who belonged to the circle of university theologians, and his successor, the Englishman Aymon of Faversham, favoured the educated clerics and the development of academic study within the Order. By the time this process of clericalisation was coming to an end, in about 1250, the Franciscan Order was hardly distinguishable from the Preachers in this respect, and from that point onwards, the lay brothers were only admitted in small numbers, and even then limited to a secondary role. After the end of the 1230s, certain Friars Minor, like Alexander of Hales or Jean de la Rochelle, held chairs in theology at the University of Paris, in the same capacity as the Dominicans Albertus Magnus and, later on, Thomas Aquinas.25 Apart from the original followers of St Francis, who lived in isolated hermitages in Umbria and the Marches, the

memory of the genuine Poverello and his expression and authentic message of the Poverello became blurred within his Order with remarkable rapidity.

The final point in this evolution was reached under the generalship of St Bonaventura (1257–74), who attempted to settle the controversy which had developed within the Minors on the subject of St Francis. At the general chapter of Narbonne, in 1260, it was decided that from that point on, the *Legenda major* he had written would be the only acceptable official biography of the founder in the Order, and that the existing copies of previous Lives would be destroyed. Moreover, it emphasised the eschatological significance of his supposed stigmatisation, which had identified him with the Angel of the sixth seal, as described in the Apocalypse, and made of him a ‘second Christ’ (*alter Christus*). Through this extraordinary miracle, had not God himself authenticated his message and recognised in advance the providential role of the mission of his spiritual sons?

Finally, Bonaventura, who became a cardinal at the end of his life, emphasised even more the Order’s primary function in the apostolic mission and pastoral activity. To him, the vocation of the Friars Minor was to dedicate themselves to preaching and confession, to join the battle against heresy and to agree to perform the functions of a bishop or inquisitor, in short, to respond to the most pressing needs of the Church. Everything else had to be subordinate to these fundamental requirements. And so it is hardly surprising that under his influence, the Minors had defined a concept of evangelical perfection, which was at the heart of the Franciscan message, as a refusal to own anything, either as individuals or as a community. But in redefining the concept of poverty as a simple renunciation of any legal form of ownership – a definition which was ratified by the papacy in 1279 by the papal bull *Exiit qui seminat* – the Friars turned their back on their heritage once and for all. This situation was to create new tensions within their midst, tensions which, in the long term, were to generate serious crises.

*The growth of the Mendicant Orders*

The rapid expansion that the Franciscans and the Dominicans enjoyed during this period did not prevent new Orders from appearing. These either opted for the Mendicants’ life style or had it imposed on them. Thus in 1244, Pope Innocent IV brought together into a single congregation all the eremetical groups of Tuscany, with the exception of the Guglielmites, and instructed Cardinal Riccardo Annibaldi to unite these clerics, who took on the Rule of St Augustine. In 1255/6, other groups of Italian and Ultramontane hermits joined with them, and from that time on, the group formed a coherent whole, known under the name of the Order of the Hermits of St Augustine, whose
first general chapter was held in Rome in March 1256 and elected a general prior, Lanfranc of Milan. After the 1270s, the Augustinians counted 300 houses distributed throughout all of Christendom. Of course, in a certain number of cases, in particular in Italy, these were not new institutions but rather former eremetical establishments which became monasteries. In France, England and Spain, however, a number of establishments were created ex nihilo and the Order became influential after the end of the thirteenth century, as is demonstrated by the fact that one of its members, the theologian Giles of Rome, was elected archbishop of Bourges in 1295.26

Another Order, the ‘Friars of St Mary of Mount Carmel’, better known as the ‘Carmelites’, also increased the ranks of the Mendicants towards the middle of the thirteenth century. It was initially a community of hermits which had developed during the twelfth century in the Holy Land, at the foot of Mount Carmel, with the purpose of following the example of the prophet Elijah who had lived in solitude, near the source of a river. Between 1206 and 1214, the Latin patriarch of Jerusalem, Albert, ratified their constitutions, which were confirmed by Honorius III in 1226. But the vicissitudes in the Holy Land and its conquest by the Muslims after 1250 obliged them to move to the west, where Gregory IX, then Innocent IV, gave them a new Rule which aimed at making them Mendicant Friars. It was difficult for them to adapt to this new way of life: witness the treatise entitled Ignea sagitta, composed by the general prior of the Carmelites, Nicholas of France, in 1270/1, in which he expresses his profound nostalgia for the ascetic and contemplative life of the past.27 Their right to continue to exist was again questioned at the Second Council of Lyons, in 1274, but they survived thanks to the support of the papacy. At the end of the thirteenth century, the Order of the Carmelites counted 150 houses spread over twelve provinces, and the only major feature which distinguished them from the other Mendicants was their profound devotion to the Virgin Mary.

Alongside the four ‘greats’, place should equally be given to a few small Orders which are differentiated from the others by the fact that they never managed to spread throughout Christendom. However, this did not prevent some of them from having an important influence in certain countries or social circles. For example, this was the case for the Order of the Penitence of Jesus Christ, whose members were commonly known as Friars of the Sack or Sachets, because of the poor, rough cloth they wore. Created in Provence by lay people who had been influenced by the preaching of the Joachite Franciscan Hugues of Digne, in 1248, they experienced rapid expansion in France and England, in particular amongst the common people. Thus they had no less than

five houses in Flanders at the end of the thirteenth century, just one less than the Dominicans; their mission had particular success with the textile workers in the great cloth cities of the region. They also appeared in Majorca in the thirteenth century. In Italy, we must give pride of place to the Servites of St Mary, an Order created towards 1240 by seven Florentine merchants who had decided to give up their professional activities in order to dedicate themselves to the religious life. At first led by the Dominicans, the small religious community became autonomous and soon spread over central and northern Italy where the Servites, who were also very devoted to worshipping the Virgin Mary, took solid root. They were recognised as a Mendicant Order by the papacy in 1259 and succeeded in surviving the threat of suppression which weighed heavily on them in 1274. At the same time, in Parma, the Movement of the Apostles also developed after 1260. It was created by a layman, Gerardo Segarelli, who reproached the great Mendicant Orders for having betrayed their ideal of poverty. Supported by the secular clergy, they were harshly criticised by the Franciscan chronicler Salimbene, who considered them ‘bawdy’, deploiring the fact that these unworthy people dared to imitate the great Orders and to compete with them in begging. This pointed to a worrying problem: that of the proliferation of the Mendicant Orders, which after 1250, began to arouse considerable anxiety in the heart of the Church and of society.

The conflicts between the Mendicant Orders and the secular clergy

Throughout the course of the second half of the thirteenth century, there was in fact a noticeable deterioration in the relationship between the Mendicants and the secular clergy, which was inevitably to lead to violent confrontations, especially in certain countries like France and Germany. Yet initially, most of the bishops had warmly welcomed the newcomers, and some helped them to settle in the cities of their diocese, for example, Walter of Tournai in Flanders, or Federico Visconti in Pisa, who in his Sermons, continuously praised them and proposed that they be taken as models for the clergy in his diocese. But the kindly disposition of the high and even the low clergy towards the Friars disappeared when they began to claim rights and privileges for themselves instead of being content to co-operate humbly with the parish. The first phase of the conflict opened in Paris, and was concerned with the university. Certain Friars who taught there, especially in the Faculty of Theology, came up against a great deal of hostility from their secular colleagues, who reproached them for not showing solidarity with the university, in

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28 Elm (1973); Simon (1992).
particular by refusing to associate themselves with strikes, and of demonstrat-
ing disloyalty towards the other masters by giving free lessons. Moreover, the
Mendicants had obtained various privileges. For example, because of the
education they had already received in their monasteries they were not required
to sit for the Licence-ès-Arts degree, and instead proceeded directly into the
Faculty of Theology. In 1252, the University of Paris therefore declared that no
member of a religious Order could subsequently hold a Chair. The following
year, since they had continued teaching even though the university had
suspended courses in protest against the cruelty inflicted on a student by the
royal police, the Mendicants were excluded from the university and even
excommunicated. Pope Innocent IV rushed to their aid and obliged the uni-
versity to reinstate them. However, as the crisis had revealed the discontent of
a large part of the clergy against the privilege that the Mendicants had obtained
of carrying out pastoral duties in parishes without authorisation from the
priest in charge, the pope abolished this privilege in 1254, through the papal
bull Etsi animarum. But his successor, Alexander IV, repealed this decision in
1255 and the conflict started off again.

The second phase of this quarrel was rooted in the domain of dogma. The
Joachite Franciscan Gerardo di Borgo San Donino in his Introduction to the
eternal Gospel stated that the Mendicants had been called to replace the secular
clergy who were unworthy in the spiritual Church of the future. A master at the
University of Paris, Guillaume de Saint-Amour, used this as a pretext to attack
the new Orders in his De periculis novissimorum temporum, composed in 1255. He
reproached them for supporting heretical ideas, for being hypocrites, eager to
collect legacies which would benefit them under the guise of poverty, and of
usurping the functions of the clergy. At the insistence of the pope, Louis IX
finally proclaimed sanctions against Guillaume who was banished from the
kingdom, but a number of his colleagues united with him and declared their
support. In 1256, the Dominican Thomas Aquinas and the Franciscan
Bonaventura retaliated by writing an apology for the Mendicants’ life style,
declaring it superior to the way of life of the clerics. The controversy became
even fiercer in 1268/70, when Gérard d’Abbeville, Nicolas de Lisieux and
Henry of Ghent supported the idea that the authority of the parish priests –
with whom the Mendicants were in conflict within the parishes – was of divine
origin because it stemmed from the authority of the seventy-two Disciples of
Christ, in the same way that the bishops’ authority derived from the twelve
Apostles. Thomas Aquinas again took up his pen to combat this thesis, main-
taining that, given their dedication to poverty and their vows of chastity and
obedience, the Mendicants had attained a level of perfection which was super-
ior to the level which could derive from any other function or office within the
Church.
After 1270, these quarrels within the university influenced a much wider public, and the episcopacy, at least in France, Germany and England, supported their clergy against the Mendicants. In fact, from 1255 onwards, it was only necessary that the Mendicants be authorised by the bishop of a diocese in order for them to operate freely in all of the churches. In 1281, Martin IV again increased their privileges, through the papal bull *Ad fructus uberes*, by virtue of which the Friars were authorised to carry out their pastoral activities (preaching and taking confession in the parishes, burying the dead in their own churches in the convents, which was an important source of income) without having to ask for any authorisation whatsoever. Following this decision, a true rebellion developed within the heart of the French clergy, led by the archbishop of Rheims and the bishop of Amiens. There followed a legal battle right up to the highest level, and at the lower level, a bitter struggle between the Friars and the parish clergy, which gave rise to numerous incidents, often violent.

Apart from these constant bickerings, it is worth considering what was really at stake within this conflict. The reason it broke out after 1250 was that at this time the status of the secular clergy had noticeably increased, at least in the cities, compared to what it had been at the beginning of the century. Towards 1270, the parish priests of Paris, Cologne or London no longer considered themselves inferior to the Mendicants: some of them had even gone and studied at the universities, and viewed with some bitterness the fact that the people more willingly frequented the Friars’ churches rather than their own parishes, and allowed them to benefit greatly from their donations. But to these circumstantial and sometimes pragmatic considerations were added many others, which were more fundamental and ecclesiological in character. In fact, to the secular clergy, there existed an Ecclesiastical Order of divine origin, founded on a hierarchy with two levels: the bishops and the priests. The Church was structured on the basis of communities, defined spatially in ascending size: the parish, the diocese, the province, the universal Church. A minister presided over each one of these by divine right, possessing the ordinary jurisdiction which accompanied his office. No one could withdraw this jurisdiction from him – unless he showed himself to be unworthy of it – not even the pope, whose supreme authority remained uncontested. But even his supreme authority did not give the pope the right to modify the very constitution of the Church by introducing intruders, however great their merits. The Mendicants replied to these arguments by pointing out the apostolic mission they had received from the pope, whose power was universal. If Thomas Aquinas recognised that the bishops were masters in their own diocese, Bonaventura and certain Augustinian polemicists put forward the idea that the Church constituted in some way a unique diocese over which the pope was the
sole prelate, the bishops only being his ‘lieutenants’ or ‘vicars’. This ecclesiology, which placed the prerogatives of the Roman Church over those of the local churches, was only applied systematically at the beginning of the fourteenth century, but its foundations were already in place in the last decade of the thirteenth century.\textsuperscript{31}

The bitterness and severity of the conflict between these two clergies, which tore each other apart instead of co-operating to reform the Church, was clearly evident at the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. Here the bishops displayed intense dissatisfaction over the growth of the Mendicant Orders and the way they had taken over some of their own prerogatives. They therefore attempted to suppress them. Their offensive failed owing to the strong resistance of Bonaventura, cardinal and minister general of the Friars Minor, and of Giovanni di Vercelli, master general of the Friars Preacher, but especially because of the refusal of Pope Gregory X, who was all too aware of everything the Church owed to the Friars and the fundamental role that they played within the Church. But in order to appease the anger of the episcopate, and with the agreement of the great Mendicant Orders, who viewed the competition among the smaller Orders with distaste, the Council announced, with the constitution \textit{Religionum diversitatem}, that a certain number of these smaller Orders chosen by the Holy See were to be abolished. Shortly afterwards, the Holy See decreed the dissolution of the Friars of the Sack, and of the Pious Friars, who complied, as well as of the Apostolics, who became dissidents. But this partial measure had failed to resolve any of the most basic conflicts, and the problems between the secular clergy and the Mendicants were to recur on many occasions right up to the end of the Middle Ages.

\textit{The Mendicant Orders and the cities}  

During the thirteenth century, the religious influence of the Mendicant Orders was felt above all in the cities; and even in those regions where they had been established for quite a long time, such as in Tuscany, their influence was hardly felt in rural areas before the fourteenth century. There are many reasons which explain the priority they accorded in their mission to the towns. The first is evidently the great rise in population in the west, at least up to about the middle of the thirteenth century, and the increasing role of cities in political, economic and cultural life; far more so than in the past, the cities were now becoming vital centres of Christianity. The Church had been slow to adapt to the situation that had been evolving and remained on the whole attached to the structures and values of rural society, where the majority of religious movements of

\textsuperscript{31} Tierney (1972), pp. 131–70.
the eleventh and twelfth centuries had blossomed, for example the eremitical movements and Citeaux. The city, by contrast, was seen as a den of iniquity, where opportunities to sin lay on every side. In general, it was in the cities that people grew rich more quickly, and there was more money in circulation there, which meant the possibility of considerable financial gain through credit and loans. A significant number of rigorists, or people with high moral standards, within the Church reacted by declaring certain new forms of economic life and urban society to be anathema. In eleventh-century Italy, Peter Damian, who was more truly a hermit than he ever was a cardinal, and in the twelfth century Benedictine monks like Guibert de Nogent in France, or Rupert of Deutz in Germany, could not find harsh enough words to denounce the immorality of life within the city, where robbery and illicit enrichment were the rule for every member of society, regardless of standing or social class (some authors singled out the Jews as particularly active in financial matters). Not only did the rich become more corrupt in the cities; poor people as well, often fugitive peasants drawn to the city by the appeal of financial gain and the desire for freedom, vengefully formed illegal conspiracies with the middle classes, sometimes openly revolting against the power of the bishop, or the ruler of all or part of the city. Later on, the canons of the Second Lateran Council (1123) and the Third Lateran Council (1179) denounced in one fell swoop the role of the moneylenders in economic life and their misdeeds, the scandals provoked by the influx of prostitutes attracted by these great urban centres, as well as the development of heresies in the cities of the Midi region, while St Bernard accused the students – whose numbers had multiplied in the cities – of preferring pointless debates on philosophical themes to serene and respectful meditation on the Word of God. To the sterile flurry of activity at the urban schools, St Bernard opposed the austere joys of contemplation in the ‘desert’, that is at the Cistercian monasteries located deep within the woods, isolated and surrounded by nature.32

This was the situation of the beginning of the thirteenth century, when the first Mendicant Orders appeared. Their founders quickly became aware that the cities had to be reconquered on a religious level. In Umbria, it was necessary to wrench city dwellers away from the fascination that wealth and power had exercised; communal institutions sanctioned their exercise, or abuse, of power, and too often were used to crush the poor and the peasants; in the cities of Languedoc, the major problem was that of heresy, to which a large part of the population had supposedly adhered through their hatred of the Church and the clergy, under the influence of the evangelical preaching of the Cathar perfecti and the Waldensians. It was, therefore, essentially for pastoral reasons,

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and because of their desire to lead the city dwellers to salvation, that Francis, Dominic and their followers gave priority to preaching in the cities, where they believed thousands of souls were threatened by sin.

But other reasons equally attracted the new Orders to the cities. The rapid increase in their numbers and their refusal to own any land forced them, in fact, to settle within urban societies: here money was abundant and they could find the means to support themselves – initially alms, but soon also legacies from wills and pious foundations – which they needed to ensure the survival of their communities. The fact that they were outside both the seigneurial regime and the network of feudal bonds gave them high repute, in particular with the middle classes. Members of the bourgeoisie, who had become wealthy through moneylending, charging interest and other similar activities, seen as illicit by the Church, felt guilty enough to wish to redistribute some of those earnings to the Friars, who had chosen to live in poverty and humility. Moreover, the Friars Preacher, who were from the very beginning an Order of clerics, chose to settle quite close to the schools, at the heart of the great urban centres, and the Friars Minor were quick to follow in their footsteps.33

Thus, towards 1230, the first two Mendicant Orders had taken a decidedly urban orientation which was not to be reversed in the future and which would be imitated by those to come. Initially, however, up to about 1250, they mainly settled in the outlying quarters of the cities, which were generally situated beyond the city walls. Several considerations made this choice imperative: on the one hand, these newcomers were still not very well known in the beginning, and the bishops and the cathedral chapters, to which the popes recommended them, often conceded them only modest churches in the outlying regions or on land situated in areas which were in the process of becoming urbanised. However, these locations corresponded to the wishes of the Friars who, in these suburbs, came into contact with people who had recently arrived from the country and who were not well integrated into the traditional structures of the parishes. Yet, in many cities after 1250, the Mendicants decided to relocate, building monasteries and beautiful churches situated within the city walls, usually at the expense of the commune or paid for by some rich lord or member of the middle classes. By doing this, the Friars were certainly responding to the wishes of a good portion of the population, in particular the ruling classes – the nobility and urban aristocracy – who increasingly valued their way of life and supported them through subsidies. But this complete and definitive urbanisation was not accepted by everyone, in particular members of the Friars Minor, because it was accompanied by an avoidance of the financial precariousness and insecurity which constituted a fundamental aspect of their

vocation. Therefore, certain of their members, in particular the original followers of St Francis who were still alive, preferred to withdraw to hermitages, and did not hide their hostility towards the changes which were taking place. They were called the Spirituals.

But their demands remained unfulfilled at the time, and the hierarchy within the Mendicant Orders as well as the papacy continued to emphasise the pastoral mission of the Friars and the role they had to play in the religious education of the faithful. The fundamental task assigned to them by the hierarchy was preaching, which was intended to lead laymen to penitence and holy confession. Where better, then, than in the urban centres, where great crowds gathered together in the churches or in public places to speak of God and invite them to convert? Moreover, especially in Italy, heresy was essentially an urban phenomenon and, after 1233, the Dominicans and later on the Franciscans were officially given the responsibility of carrying out the Inquisition. In those regions contaminated by heresy, therefore, their houses became tribunals where they would interrogate suspects; sometimes they were even used as prisons. Even though their vocation would seem to exclude them from assuming any authoritarian role, the Friars found themselves becoming the instrument of ecclesiastical power, and even agents of political propaganda serving the Holy See, as was noted in Italy on the occasion of the great conflict between the Emperor Frederick II and Popes Gregory IX and Innocent IV. In Europe during the middle of the thirteenth century, the cities were important political forces and it was essential for the Church to control them.

The foothold held by the Mendicant Orders in the cities was acquired progressively and through different methods in various regions. In northern Italy after 1233, there was an attempt by certain Friars to impose their law on civil society, thanks to the popularity they had acquired in public opinion. Thus the Dominican John of Vicenza was entrusted with full political powers by cities such as Bologna or Vicenza, which allowed him to take measures which would bring peace back to the city by fighting heresy and preventing arguments between the factions. But this success led nowhere: once the enthusiasm aroused by the preaching had tailed off, the communities did not hesitate to return to their internal quarrels and territorial conflicts.34 The Friars, who had learned from previous experience, preferred in future to concentrate on the lay population, who gravitated towards them on the spiritual level, and to organise them into movements. Certain of these had essentially religious goals, but others, like the Society of the Faith, created in Florence and Milan by the Dominican St Peter Martyr, or even the Militia of Jesus Christ, a knightly order

established in an urban environment, aimed at procuring militant support for orthodoxy in its fight against the heretics and their protectors. More widely in Italy, the Mendicants used their status with the laity and the influence they exercised over numerous brotherhoods of penitents (Laudesi) who sang the canticles in the vernacular in honour of the Virgin Mary and the Saints, or the Flagellants (Disciplinati) whose numbers increased after 1260 both belonging to Third Orders with a definite structure from 1280 onwards; these contacts enabled them to win back to the Church that urban society which, around 1200, seemed about to slip through its fingers.35

By the time this process was coming to an end, during the last decades of the thirteenth century, it could be said that the Mendicant Orders were deeply rooted in the cities and influenced them greatly. Their policy of settling in urban areas had borne fruit, and links were established, which were often extremely close, between themselves and the municipal powers, who harboured no mistrust of the Friars, of whom they considered they had nothing to fear on the political level. In Marseilles as in Bruges or Rome, the monastic Church of the Friars Minor served as a meeting place for the leading bodies of the urban community, and it was there that the city officials came to seek an honourable tomb, as well as prayers and offerings in order to face what lies beyond.

This solidarity between the Mendicant Orders and the cities which sheltered them depended on a balanced exchange of services: the municipality granted them regular subsidies in the form of gifts in money and wax candles, but also regular offerings of wood and clothing. In exchange, it often took advantage of their services as messengers, mediators or diplomats. In certain Italian cities, this collaboration was so closely linked that the Dominicans guarded the communal archives in their house, while the Franciscans and the other Mendicants played no less useful a role by returning to the public coffers money taken by thieves which had been returned to them by penitents under the protection of confession.

The most remarkable and lasting illustration of the success of the Mendicant Orders is to be found in their churches. While their founders had wished the Friars to be content with modest buildings, they were quick to launch the construction of monasteries and churches which are still striking, where these buildings have survived, owing to their considerable size. This development was very rapid with the Dominicans, who from the beginning preferred to settle in big cities, building large houses there, while the Friars Minor, on the other hand, preferred more modest surroundings. The Friars Minor allowed themselves to be pressured into constructing sumptuous build-

ings, under the influence of important laity, such as the Countess Jeanne of Hainault in Valenciennes, or Louis IX in Paris. They obliged the Friars to allow professional architects to build them edifices in the best contemporary style, like the house of the Cordeliers (the name given in France to the Friars Minor) in Paris, whose nave, at eighty-three metres long, was the grandest and vastest in the city. Here again, the distortion of the spirit of the Rule could be justified through arguments about usefulness and efficiency: the construction of these great churches in fact allowed the greatest possible number of inhabitants of the city to gather together to hear edifying sermons and, therefore, indirectly raised moral and religious standards.

Research carried out over the last few decades on the relationship between the number of Mendicant monasteries and the importance of the cities which housed them has, moreover, demonstrated that the Mendicants’ establishments were not built haphazardly, but instead through the application of demographic and economic criteria. Towards 1300, a city which had four or five Mendicant convents was considered an important city, while a city which had only one would not have very many inhabitants. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the wave of construction in the thirteenth century began in the large cities (which would subsequently have four or five Mendicant convents), followed by more modest towns, which would end up with only two or three. Finally, it is clear that the most urban regions of the west – in central and northern Italy, the Paris basin, Flanders, the Rhine valley – were the first to be influenced by the Mendicant phenomenon; other parts of Christendom, where urbanisation was late and rather limited, such as Brittany and Poland, were only affected at the very end of the thirteenth century and especially in the fourteenth century.

If these observations alone were taken into account, it would be logical to view the map of the distribution of Mendicant monasteries as a reflection of the map of western cities during the Middle Ages, as well as a reflection of their hierarchy. However, this assumption must be examined more closely, for there are a certain number of exceptions to the rule we have just defined. In several of the most important cities of France, the resolute opposition of the monks of the cathedral chapter was for a long time an obstacle to the installation of the Mendicants who were only allowed to build a single house, while the city, logically, should have had several. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the Mendicants were often travelling a great deal. It was therefore necessary for them to have a guaranteed stopping point every thirty or forty kilometres along the main routes, like the Via Francigena which led from Italy to France, or the road which led from Lombardy to Germany via the

36 Le Goiff (1968).
Brenner pass. Therefore, certain Orders were led to establish houses in smaller locations, but ones which were very well placed once the difficulties of traveling were taken into account. Finally, after 1300, the papacy forbade the creation of new houses without its authorisation, to avoid too much competition between the Orders at a time when the economic situation began to deteriorate and when the secular clergy were less and less willing to accept the proliferation of the Mendicants.

A particularly interesting and well-documented example, the example of Flanders, allows us to have a fairly precise idea of the establishment of the Mendicants in a region characterised by a high degree of urbanisation. At the end of the thirteenth century, the Friars owned no less than twenty-six convents, distributed as follows: seven for the Friars Minor, six for the Preachers, five for the Friars of the Sack, four for the Augustinians, three for the Carmelites and one for the Pious Friars. It is impossible not to be struck by the high number of Dominican convents, which is partly explained by the particular favour which the countesses of Flanders, Jeanne and Marguerite, showed towards this Order, and on the other hand by the relatively small number of Franciscan houses (compared to what was found in other regions), which must, without a doubt, bear some relation to the scarcity in this region of average-sized and small cities, an area the monks took to particularly well. On the whole, these convents were founded very early on; nearly all of them already existed in 1274. If we now consider the distribution of houses by city, we see that it was more or less in proportion to the size of the population, with the exception of Bruges, which had six Mendicant houses, while Ghent, which was more populated, only had five. This demonstrates very well that to the Friars, a city's wealth was even more important than the number of its inhabitants. Ypres comes next with four houses, Douai and Tournai had three, Lille two, and three minor urban centres with one house each. Unfortunately, we do not know the exact number of Friars that these numbers represent in total, but it must have been quite high, especially in the larger cities. In Bruges, towards 1300, the Dominicans had no less than ninety establishments, while the Carmelites had seventy and the Franciscans fifty. On the contrary, there was not much growth in the female sector: in Flanders there existed only four convents of Clares and two of Dominicans, including the one at Lille, which had a very aristocratic membership. In France, this was equally the case in Poissy for the Dominicans, and in Longchamp for the Poor Clares. As for the friars, they seemed more often to be descended from the middle classes and from the Flemish patriciate, at least at the end of the thirteenth century. As elsewhere, they were primarily confessors and preachers. But they also played the role of earthly administrators and spiritual directors of the beguinages as well as of

certain hospitals, and their links with the merchants’ guilds and artisans seemed to have been particularly close. However, it was not until the fourteenth century that these communities, beginning with the Italian merchants, began to establish brotherhoods which had chapels constructed in their churches.

On the whole, we can speak without exaggeration of a massive establishment of the Mendicant Orders in urban society at the end of the thirteenth century: they owed their success to the fact that they could bring to the faithful something which the secular clergy had for a very long time been incapable of providing: the example of a moral way of life which, on the whole, was irrefutable, and sufficient education to provide a better way of presenting and transmitting the Christian message through preaching. The very close relationship that they held with the laity allowed them to understand their problems extremely well, in particular those concerning the economic life of the merchants or bankers. Therefore, it was not merely chance which placed them at the forefront of theological and canonical thought in this area. In fact, these men, who had chosen evangelical poverty, were above all preachers of penitence, eager to win over souls for God and to create faithful followers for the Church. In addition, since they themselves were often descended from the middle classes and came from urban settings, they shared with their lay interlocutors the idea that they would be held accountable for their behaviour on earth. This was demonstrated by their role in propagating the belief in Purgatory, or in buying indulgences which could, without any real exaggeration, be considered paying back debts in the after-life by making payments in hard cash in the here and now.38

Their specific contribution in this area consisted mainly in finding ways to justify the new forms of economic activity, through consideration of their social usefulness, and in putting forward a new concept of the value of time, which was inspired by the thought of Aristotle. After the 1240s, the Dominican Ramon de Penyafort agreed to recognise, in certain cases, the legitimacy of charging interest, not because of the risk run by the lender, but in order to compensate him for the amount he would have gained if the sum loaned had been invested. There were others who later defended the argument of certain contemporary jurists, like Azzo, who emphasised the necessity of evaluating the wrong which might result for the lender from non-payment of his debt by the borrower, and the right of the lender to compensation if the borrower was declared bankrupt at the end of the term of the loan. This meant establishing, at least indirectly, a distinction between the practice of interest and usury, and recognising, at least in certain cases, the legitimacy of charging interest.39

However, the most innovative contribution in the sphere of economic

38 Le Goff (1986), pp. 69–89.
doctrine was undoubtedly introduced by the Languedoc Franciscan Pierre de Jean Olieu, or Peter Olivi (1248–98), who was the first to provide a definition of the notion of capital. He defined as capital any amount of money or merchandise destined for productive economic activity (for example commerce) and which, in this regard, had an innate potential for profit and the expectation of financial gain. Since the value of capital was, in his opinion, more important than the actual quantity of money involved, a ‘fair’ price had to include an additional amount to determine its true value. If someone were to loan this amount, motivated to do so by charity or the consideration of the borrower’s needs, he could legitimately expect to receive interest. Of course, money in itself was not meant to bear fruit, as St Thomas Aquinas pointed out in the wake of Aristotle: money in itself is sterile, but a sum of money becomes capital when its owner decides to invest it. Because of this intention, money changes its nature in some respects when it is being used for a concrete productive project, and anyone who loses such money would be a victim, who therefore deserves compensation. Using the same logic, Olivi considered as normal the fact that a borrower who repaid his debt before the fixed term would obtain a reduction in the interest rate that had initially been agreed, so that, by virtue of the pact agreed with his financier, time had become his personal possession. Since the Dominican Gilles de Lessines reasons in a similar way in his treatise De usuris (1278), one could say that at the end of the thirteenth century, under the influence of the Mendicants, the traditional belief which held that a merchant or lender is guilty of a serious sin by selling Time, which is the sole property of God, was becoming archaic.

It will be seen from other chapters in this volume that the role of the Friars in the evangelisation of the world did not stop by any means at the city walls of Christian towns. The mission to the Jews (stimulated by Ramon de Penyafort and his successors), to the Muslims (again with a notable contribution from the Catalan Dominicans) and to the Mongol lands that lay beyond Islam has received considerable attention from historians, and the view has even been expressed that it was the Friars who spearheaded the new approach to the Jews which aggressively turned their own texts, notably the Talmud, against them and overturned the traditional Augustinian view that they had a right to subsist within Christian society as ‘testimonies to the truth’ of Christianity. Similarly the study of Islamic texts by Ramon Martí and his associates was intended to enable Christian disputants to challenge Islam on the basis of a close reading of the very texts the Muslims utilised; a particularly energetic figure in conversionist campaigns, with close contacts to both major Mendicant Orders, was the prolific polymath Ramon Llull of Majorca (1232–1316).  

41 Cohen (1982); Chazan (1989) and (1992); also Kedar (1984) and Hood (1995). For further discussion, see the previous chapter.
It is arguable that in their attempt to adapt to the realities of urban life, certain Friars went too far. From the middle of the thirteenth century onwards, the Parisian poet Rutebeuf, who had begun by singing the praises of the Franciscans, severely criticised the excessive complacency of the Mendicants with regard to the rich, in particular towards moneylenders and their very close links with those in power. Others were to accuse them of hypocrisy, scorning their advances towards women and people on their death beds, or reproaching them for transgressing their Rule and vow of poverty by accepting rents and income from wills, which was frequently the case after 1250.\textsuperscript{42} However, these weaknesses and shortcomings with regard to their ideals must not allow us to forget that, on the whole, the Mendicant Orders did indeed obtain the objective which the Church had set for them, that is to say a new movement towards the evangelisation and the Christian reconquest of urban society in the west.

\textsuperscript{42} Szitty (1986), pp. 11–61.
During the twelfth century, most countries of the west had experienced a true ‘scholastic revolution’. Cathedral schools of the traditional type and new schools were spreading at that time, attracting an ever increasing number of students. This growth was evidently a response to an increasing social demand for accomplished learned men, but it was also a concrete manifestation of the considerable expansion of the field of erudite culture, and the new curiosities this culture aroused. Even if the global perspectives remained those which had been established in the patristic era (subordination of profane knowledge to the more proper goal of the *sacra pagina*, and rejection of the ‘mechanical arts’), the very great expansion of the stock in trade of the ‘authorities’ which was then accessible (texts translated from Greek and Arabic, Roman law) gave true autonomy to the teaching of certain secular disciplines, such as law or medicine. The revival of grammar and especially the rapid success of dialectics had established a new form of pedagogy in which the compilation of ‘sentences’ and the formulation of ‘theoretical questions’ supplanted traditional exegesis. Even theology, from Anselm of Canterbury and Abelard onwards, had not escaped profound re-examination.

This rapid and spectacular growth hardly ever happened in a controlled manner. Particular historical circumstances or simple chance meant that certain centres – Paris, Bologna, Salerno, Montpellier, Oxford – became exceptionally Xenuential. Around these cities, the first student migrations began to take shape. The Church’s monopoly over teaching, which had been the norm since the early Middle Ages, saw itself challenged once again. In the Mediterranean countries, the mainly lay schools of law (Bologna) or medicine (Salerno and Montpellier) developed outside the Church’s control. Elsewhere, thanks to the system of the *licentia docendi* set out during the rule of Pope Alexander III (1159–81), the ecclesiastical authorities retained the right of controlling the foundation of new schools. But a great sense of freedom, which traditionalists jealously denounced, seemed, nevertheless, to have reigned.
in the teaching establishments devoted to that freedom, as well as in their syllabus.

It is in relationship to what was acquired in the twelfth century in the field of education that the scholarly work produced in the thirteenth century should be judged. In many respects, continuity was the keynote: continuity in the geographical locations of the schools, continuity in the range of disciplines taught, and, up to a certain point, in the teaching methods; continuity, finally, in all probability, in academic attitudes, characterised by an awareness, which became clearer and more defined, of the nature of intellectual work and the social condition of the people who were dedicated to it. But at the same time, in the field of teaching, the early decades of the thirteenth century were marked by serious mutations and ruptures, which must also be considered. Of these, the first and most visible was the appearance of an institutional structure which was completely new, without any real precedent and with an exceptional historical destiny: the university.

THE FIRST UNIVERSITIES

It was around 1200 that the first universities were born in the west. Not all the important academic centres of the twelfth century experienced this transformation. Some of them – Chartres, Rheims, Liège, Northampton come to mind – had already fallen into obscurity, doubtless because they were unable to modernise their teaching and manage their increasing number of students. Only a few schools which were particularly active were transformed into universities. Unfortunately, the surviving documentation does not make it easy to date precisely this transformation, nor to interpret it.

The two most ancient universities were in Bologna and Paris: throughout the course of the Middle Ages, these were to remain the most important, serving as models for all subsequent establishments. It is known that in Bologna the schools of law first appeared around 1100. They continued to develop throughout the twelfth century; there were schools of canon law and especially of civil law where, according to the method set out by Irnerius and his successors, the entire Corpus iuris civilis and the Decretum were expounded. In 1155 or 1158, Emperor Frederick Barbarossa sanctioned this growth by conceding jurisdictional privileges to the students from Bologna (through the constitution Habita). At the end of the century, the influence of Bolognese teaching attracted numbers which continued to grow, consisting not only of Italian students but also of ‘Ultramontanes’ (Germans, French, English). While enjoying this influx, the commune of Bologna was fearful of the disorder which the schools could harbour as well as the competition, in the form of rival teaching establishments, which had appeared in neighbouring cities.
like Modena. For this reason, the commune made the professors vow not to seek to transfer their schools elsewhere (1189). At the same time, it attempted to exercise direct control over the students. But they reacted by grouping together, according to their geographical origins, into ‘nations’ (the initial appearance of which goes back to 1191). After various tentative steps, the nations finally united in the 1230s to form two student ‘universities’, the University of the Italians, or Citramontanes, and the University of the Ultramontanes; at the head of each one was an elected rector who had jurisdiction over the students. Excluded from the official structure, the professors made contracts with the universities; they grouped together to form ‘colleges’ (collegia doctorum), mainly in order to organise examinations.

The commune tried to prevent the foundation of student universities (as is clear from the statutes of 1211 and 1216–17), but the protection afforded them by the papacy obliged the commune to give way. Moreover, in 1219, the papacy took advantage of the situation to introduce the system of the ‘licence’ in Bologna, conferred by the archdeacon. As a result, the papacy manifested its authority over the schools, which had been private and largely lay institutions until then. In the following decades, the communal government, which supported the pope in his dispute with Emperor Frederick II, stopped opposing the autonomy of the universities. However, it was only after 1274 that it officially recognised the powers of jurisdiction of the rectors and the privileges of the scolares (taxation of rent, fiscal exemptions, etc.). By then, the ‘universities of law’ of Bologna had been well established; their oldest surviving statutes concern the curriculum and date back to 1252. Alongside the schools of law in Bologna, there also existed, from the beginning of the century, schools of the arts, where grammar and rhetoric were taught, in a practical form of dictamen or epistolary art; the schools of medicine followed soon after 1260, to form at the beginning of the fourteenth century, a third university ‘of arts and medicine’, organised according to the same system as the schools of law, but which remained independent.

The birth of the University of Paris followed more or less similar chronological lines, but took on institutional forms which were completely different; in contrast to the ‘student university’ in Bologna, it represented the prototype of the ‘university of the masters’. Like the ones in Bologna, the Parisian schools – the Cathedral School of Notre-Dame, and especially the ‘private’ schools’ of the Petit Pont and the Mont Sainte-Geneviève – were ancient, numerous, and already enjoyed a good reputation throughout the west. However, these were essentially schools which had remained ecclesiastical; liberal arts were taught there, especially dialectics, theology and canon law;

and their masters, who were clerics, remained under the power of the chancellor of the cathedral, at least indirectly through the granting of the ‘teaching licence’. It was just before or slightly after 1200 that these masters, who until then had been independent and each the head of his own school, began to form associations. Without a doubt, this movement began with the masters of arts, who were the most numerous, the youngest and the most desirous of autonomy; the canonists and theologians were to follow a little later on, between 1210 and 1220.

The main goal of this movement to form associations was not to remove the ‘licence’ from the jurisdiction of the chancellor and transfer it to a jury of masters, as has sometimes been said. Rather, it was more broadly a movement of fraternal solidarity with the goal of obtaining for the masters and their students freedoms and privileges which would protect them from the judicial and financial demands of the local ecclesiastical and civil authorities. Moreover, it was also doubtless an attempt at self-discipline, with the goal of restoring some sort of order into the management of the institutions, which had become rather anarchical, by imposing on everyone the same syllabus, the same programmes, the same examination procedures.

Development was rapid. Between 1205 and 1208, a primordial association of masters and students seems to have existed in Paris, already eager to pass laws and statutes (none of which have survived) and to exercise a certain internal jurisdiction over its members. The king of France, who after 1200 guaranteed the scolares of Paris the privileges due an ecclesiastic, did not object. As for the pope, in the person of Innocent III, he immediately made known his decided support for the new community. After some resistance, the bishop of Paris and his chancellor had to abdicate a good portion of their former authority over the schools, which from that point onwards were directly responsible, to a large extent, to the Holy See. In 1215, a papal legate solemnly granted its first statutes to the universitas magistrorum et scolarium Parisiensium. More solemn still, in 1231, was the papal bull Parens scientiarum by which Pope Gregory IX confirmed and extended the privileges of the young university, while proclaiming with exceptional emphasis the confidence that he placed in it as the home of truth and the light of the universal Church. However, the papacy had already taken the opportunity of notifying the Parisian masters that although it protected them, they were still expected to remain at its disposal, even if this was at the expense of their autonomy. From 1217 onwards, the papacy required the Parisian masters to receive warmly the new Mendicant Orders in their midst. In 1219, the pope banned the teaching of civil law in Paris, fearing without a doubt that

5 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, 1, no. 8. 6 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, 1, no. 20. 7 Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis, 1, no. 79.
this ‘lucrative’ discipline might be offensive to the study of theology (a point made in the papal bull *Super speculam* of Honorius III).  

Even though they had smaller numbers and less influence, a few other European universities can claim origins which date back nearly as far as Bologna and Paris, yet were independent of them. This is the case of the university of medicine in Montpellier, in Bas-Languedoc. In the twelfth century, Montpellier had been, after Salerno, the principal medical teaching centre in the west. But while Salerno, despite a less rapid decline than was thought, maintained its original private school structure at the beginning of the thirteenth century and did not confer degrees, Montpellier became a true university. This transformation was clearly a result of the statutes it was granted by a papal legate in 1220. These statutes reveal that an association of masters and students had been established with the dual goal of mutual aid and the autonomous organisation of teaching. At the same time, at Montpellier, these statutes introduced the system of the ‘licence’ (here conferred by the local bishop, the bishop of Maguelonne), after examination by a jury of masters. Once this was done, jurisdiction over the schools – which up to that time had been essentially lay institutions – passed over to the Church.

Another example which is even more important is that of Oxford. Certainly, the most ancient English university borrowed many of the characteristics of its institutional organisation from Paris. But its origins are incontestably indigenous. We know that various schools developed in Oxford in the second half of the twelfth century. The causes of this concentration are not very clear. Perhaps the frequent holding of political or judicial assizes in this area brought with it the appearance of schools of law. In any case, at the end of the twelfth century, there were also schools of arts and theology whose masters, like Alexander Neckham, were former students in Paris. In the early years of the thirteenth century, these masters had formed the first association, and a *magister scolarum* is mentioned, instituted by a statute whose origin is uncertain. In 1209, the conflict between the *scolares* and the inhabitants of the city caused the schools to disperse, leading to the establishment of a rival centre of learning at Cambridge. The scholars did not return to Oxford until 1214, after a papal legate intervened on their behalf. It was between this date and the 1230s that the university was truly established. As in Paris, it was a ‘university of masters’, where the essential authority was exercised by the Congregation of Regents. However, certain aspects were original. The masters at Oxford did not have great difficulty in freeing themselves from the authority of the ordinary bishop, who resided in Lincoln, more than 200 kilometres

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away. From 1214 onwards, he agreed to delegate the majority of his powers (the awarding of degrees, his jurisdiction over the students) to a chancellor, who was not the chancellor of the cathedral but a Doctor in Theology or Canon Law of the university, appointed after being nominated by the masters. At the same time, the essential university privileges in Oxford (taxation of rents, financial and legal exemptions) were granted by the king rather than the pope. After 1231, Henry III, inaugurating a policy which all of his successors would continue in the Middle Ages and beyond, guaranteed his personal protection against the middle classes of the city, as well as against any attempt to establish rival schools (in Stamford in 1233–4 and Northampton in 1265) to both Oxford and Cambridge (we will return to the subject of Cambridge). Royal intervention in Oxford was clearly linked to the essentially insular nature of the student body. The papacy, while equally in favour, only gave its approval later on (Oxford never, unlike Cambridge in 1318, received a formal papal grant of the *ius ubique docendi*). For the University of Oxford, despite the reputation quickly acquired by its schools of theology, did not enjoy the role of a privileged auxiliary of the Roman Magisterium which had evolved in Paris under the patronage of, and in the service of, the universal Church.

**The University: Community, Profession, Power**

Despite their diversity, the four cases we have just described in some detail provide an understanding of the newness and originality of the university phenomenon at the beginning of the thirteenth century.

The first universities initially appeared as communities, as is clearly indicated by the terms used to distinguish them from the outset: universitas (scolarium for the ‘student universities’, magistrorum et scolarium for the ‘universities of masters’; Cambridge University to this day is constituted by ‘The Chancellor, Masters and Scholars of the University of Cambridge’). The university was therefore a community of men organised to undertake, in a given place, the activities of teaching, the *studium: universitas studii*, as it was also called. Naturally, especially in the beginning, there were very few universities: everywhere else, the schools – mainly elementary grammar schools but also the more advanced *studia* in law or medicine – retained their previous ecclesiastical or purely private structure, even if the professors, notably in the Mediterranean countries, were sometimes subsidised by the commune. Nevertheless, in the very places where universities existed, all the people associated with teaching were not necessarily full members of the universities. In the universities of the Bolognese type, the professors remained outside the official organisation. In the Parisian system, only the masters participated in the management of the university, though it is true that the students in law, medicine or theology were
often already masters in liberal arts. The ordinary students studying the arts, or other categories of ‘henchmen’ (vergers, booksellers, servants), were also subject to the authority of the university, enjoying its benefits but not allowed to participate in its councils.

The existing documentation hardly enlightens us on the conditions under which these initial associations were formed. We do know that to a large extent the masters or students themselves had taken the initiative. Very little is also known about the primitive organisation of the universities. The visible signs of their autonomy (written statutes, official seal, permanent officers) would only appear gradually, throughout the course of the century. In the beginning, what mainly counted was first, their vow of allegiance, and secondly, the deliberative assemblies consisting of members of the university which met periodically to make the necessary collective decisions. It is also important to note that the universities themselves were made up of smaller communities. In Bologna, the various ‘nations’ of students appeared even before they united to form the universities. In Paris or Oxford, the birth of the university seems to have been rapidly followed first by the formation of nations (four in Paris: French, Norman, Picards, English – two in Oxford: Northerners and Southerners), then by the establishment of the faculties (arts, law, medicine, theology), which amalgamated the masters teaching within the same discipline. Given these diverse internal processes, relationships among groups were far from always perfectly cordial.

The goals the universities set for themselves were at first very concrete, deriving from the increasing number of students and their unique conditions of existence. It was a male population: young, active, consisting on the whole of immigrants from nearby or distant areas, billeted in the ‘quarter of the schools’. These masters and students were largely foreigners in the city which provided their food and shelter. Their intellectual prestige prevented neither prejudices nor discourteous behaviour. The local authorities were happy to share the hostility of the bourgeoisie. At first, therefore, the universities were associations of fraternal mutual aid, brotherhoods, assuring acceptance, a religious framework, assistance in times of illness or death, legal and material protection. Initially, the universities were established to obtain from the local authorities – and have ratified by the superior authorities – rent privileges, financial exemptions, judicial guarantees; more or less completely outside the jurisdiction of local tribunals, the *scolares* were only accountable to the internal jurisdiction of the university or the Church.

The universities were also corporative institutions, as were all of the professions established at the time, whose purpose was to regulate professional activity and conditions of work for their members. In this regard, their role was ambiguous. On the one hand, they wished to remove the schools from the arbi-
trary control and traditionalism of the bishops and their chancellors, so the masters could freely introduce texts and new methods into their teaching which were available thanks to the translations that continued to flow in from Spain and Sicily. But in reality, there is nothing which leads us to think that the schools in the twelfth century were really reactionary or repressed. The authors of the time complained more of the anarchy which reigned, the uncontrolled innovations, the triumph of the dialecticians and philosophers, and the irresistible success of the ‘lucrative sciences’ (medicine and civil law). One might conclude, therefore, that the universities were founded as much as a means of restoring order and regaining control as for the dissemination of knowledge, for both the authorities and the masters who were in situ.

It is significant that the most ancient statutes which have survived accord an important place to teaching and examinations. From that point onwards, it was no longer possible to teach or study in a personal way. Even if each professor retained authority in his school, the official syllabus, a long and obligatory cursus, examinations (which were organised down to the very last detail) were imposed on everyone, guaranteeing both the seriousness and orthodoxy of the teaching which took place and the diplomas conferred. In the same way, the universities exercised total control over recruitment of both their teachers and their students. (No one was considered a student if he had not been matriculated from a ‘nation’ or from a practising master.) The ‘licence’ continued to be conferred by the chancellor, of course, that is by the representative of ecclesiastical authority, but only after examination by a jury of masters; and, in any case, in order to teach at a university, anyone with a degree had to be solemnly received as a master or doctor within the university. The proliferation of new schools, which might have been a threat to both the desired standardisation of teaching and the income of the existing masters, was no longer to be feared.

Another characteristic of the phenomenon of the university must be emphasised. Unlike both the other urban professions and the schools of the preceding century, the universities were not institutions which were purely local. They may have been located in a given city, but they were simultaneously institutions belonging to all of Christendom. Their range of recruitment was not limited by administrative or ecclesiastical boundaries but extended as far as their power of attraction, which in itself was solely determined by the influence of their teaching. Their freedoms and privileges, whose main purpose was to remove them from the control of the local authorities, were confirmed by the papacy, the universal power par excellence. The knowledge conveyed by the universities was itself conceived as universal knowledge, exempt from any particular locality, unique and valid in all of Christendom (which was demonstrated by the exclusive use of Latin). Consequently, the degree confirmed by the universities was valid everywhere (licentia ubique docendi),
unlike the former episcopal ‘licence’ which was only recognised within the diocesan framework.

This dimension of universality was well demonstrated by the idea of the studium generale which, emerging from the practical experience of the first universities, became commonly accepted, notably in pontifical documents, in the middle of the thirteenth century;\(^{11}\) as a studium generale, the university was from that point onwards defined as an institution of superior teaching of pontifical foundation (or imperial foundation, as the case may be), whose members enjoyed privileges and titles which were valid in all of Christendom precisely because of the support of the papacy. Consequently, the university represented, in the manner of the papacy itself, a kind of power at the heart of Christian society, an intellectual authority of a superior nature. Naturally, outside Paris and Bologna, this pretension to universalism was often rather theoretical. Nevertheless, it was an expression of the essential spectrum of high culture during the Middle Ages, which the universities, with the support of the Church, took over during the thirteenth century.

The Universities in the Context of the Thirteenth Century

It remains to attempt to explain why the universities appeared, in the original form that we have tried to define, precisely in the first half of the thirteenth century. Two sets of factors are classically invoked.

First, there are the factors which have sociological significance. It is clear that the universities were born in a global context of expansion, of urban expansion in particular. The effects of economic growth, the proliferation of money exchanges and social diversification had resulted in an increasing demand for competent men of letters. The princes and cities had more and more need for secretaries, jurists and doctors to help the administrative organs function better, as these were becoming increasingly more complex and dependent on using the written word. As for the Church, it equally had a growing need of canonists, to reinforce its institutional apparatus, and educated preachers, to address the new urban social classes and counteract the threat of heresy. To reply to these new needs, traditional academic structures proved to be insufficient and unsuitable. Their facilities were limited and the spirit which permeated these institutions could not properly accommodate the new aspirations of the urban centres: solidarity between peers, the exchange of ideas, open discussion, the value attributed to work, including intellectual work, and personal effort. In short, the creation of the institutional form of the

\(^{11}\) Weijers (1987), pp. 34–45.
university would have been seen as a way of adapting academic structures to changing social requirements and attitudes.

These considerations are incontestable, but they mainly provide a global overview and do not take into account the geographical locations of the first universities: Paris was without a doubt the greatest city of the west, but why Bologna, Montpellier or Oxford, from among so many cities of superior or equal importance? Neither do they take into account the precise chronology of events: the economic expansion mentioned earlier had begun well before 1200, yet it is questionable whether social pressure was quite so strong at the beginning of the thirteenth century. In France, for example, the *magistri* made up only a handful of King Philip Augustus’s entourage, and they only represented 10–20% of the high clergy (bishops and canons). In England, it is true, these percentages rose to more than double that figure.12 And even if we assume that the principal motivation for academic advancement was the will of the princes and the Church, was the institutional form of the autonomous university best suited to this purpose? Would not the schools which had been directly founded and controlled by these authorities have been more suitable?

Given this paradox, certain historians have preferred to emphasise those factors which could properly be considered intellectual.13 The birth of the university would first and foremost be linked to progress in science and the intellectual enthusiasm of the *scolares*. Autonomy in the universities would have been indispensable to anyone who wished to escape from the finicky control of the ecclesiastical authorities and dedicate themselves freely to the quest for truth. Of all the intellectual innovations which might have triggered changes at the end of the twelfth and beginning of the thirteenth century, the most influential would have been the influx of translations of philosophical works by Aristotle (*Physics*, *Metaphysics*, *Ethics*), along with texts by their Arab commentators (first Avicenna or Ibn Sina, then Averroes or Ibn Rushd). The schools of the twelfth century had used the logic of Aristotle without difficulty. But for Christian culture, the assimilation of Aristotle’s philosophy raised problems which were formidable in other ways. The condemnations launched in Paris in 1210 and 1215 against the teaching of the natural philosophy of Aristotle and against the first masters of the west, such as David of Dinant, who dared to comment upon it, illustrate the bitterness of the debate. The foundation of the university allowed the masters to escape from the censure meted out by the local authorities, simultaneously providing protection against nonconformity through collective discipline.

This perspective is doubtless too idealistic, but it is interesting because it highlights the awareness of both the masters and the students. Whether they

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were prompted by a love of knowledge or through a desire to have a career, they created the institution of the university out of self-awareness, their concept of work, and the specific demands of teaching.\textsuperscript{14} Nevertheless, it is clear that the \textit{scolares’} initiative alone would not have been sufficient to give birth to the universities. Favourable political circumstances and the intervention of external authorities were also necessary.\textsuperscript{15} The birth of the university as an institution was part of the general restructuring of power which was seen in the west in the thirteenth century. Once ancient feudal constraints and responsibilities began to dwindle, there was a clear field for both the movement towards forming associations (on the local level) and for a trend towards the assertion of superior (if not universal) powers, whether those of the national monarchies, or those of the papacy (within the framework of Christendom).

The university became involved in both areas. The terminology used reveals what it had in common with all the other types of \textit{universitates} (brotherhoods, guilds, trades, communes) which multiplied in the west. What they all had in common was the fact that they were voluntary associations in the pursuit of communal ends. But at the same time, the universities could only emerge because they received, at a crucial moment in their formation, the determined support of a superior power which allowed them to triumph over the local resistance of the traditional authorities who were not at all receptive to their independence. This support was discreetly given in Paris, by the king of France, or in Montpellier, by the king of Aragon, much more openly in Oxford, by the English king, and in all of the cases mentioned here, by the pope. It could be said that the first universities were, to a large extent, the creation of a triumphant papacy at the beginning of the thirteenth century: Popes Innocent III, Honorius III and Gregory IX.

Naturally, this support was not disinterested. By granting the young universities statutes and privileges, the popes kept them under the control of the Church and cut short any inclination towards secularisation; the masters and students remained clerics, submissive to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and it was through a pontifical delegation that the chancellor conferred their degrees. The papacy expected the universities to serve it directly by guaranteeing orthodox teaching and by furnishing the jurists and theologians needed for the pope to pursue – in keeping with Gregorian tradition – his policy of making reforms and centralising power. At the same time, however, the pontiffs demonstrated remarkable awareness of the new conditions created by the great explosion of knowledge and the revival of their influence. Despite the predictable risks, the popes steadfastly took the part of cultural modernity. By supporting the emergence of the universities, they endorsed the social and political promotion of

\textsuperscript{14} Ferruolo (1985). \textsuperscript{15} Verger (1982).
knowledge and legitimised the vocation of those men who chose studying and teaching as their profession, recognising these as requirements that lay at the heart of Christian society.

**The consolidation of the universities: successes and initial crises**

The universities which emerged at the beginning of the thirteenth century continued to consolidate further in the following decades. Even if it is impossible to put forward real hypotheses supported by actual figures for this period, it seems none the less certain that numbers regularly increased, reaching a new high at the beginning of the fourteenth century which would not be surpassed until the modern period. At this time, Bologna, Paris and probably Oxford were to attract several thousands of students. The university institutions, which were initially very simple, grew stronger and more definitive in character, so they could better manage a population which was constantly growing and privileges which were becoming more and more extensive. This continual development was an indication of their new social and political status, which was acknowledged from that point onwards.

At this time, the strengthening of the institutions was a result of trial and error, and broadly based sets of general statutes only appeared in the fourteenth century. In Paris, the thirteenth century was especially influenced by the formation of the ‘nations’ (first mentioned in 1222), which united the Masters of Arts (who were often simultaneously students in the higher faculties). Despite their geographical heterogeneity, especially in the cases of the nations of ‘France’ and ‘England’, the nations, with their general assemblies, elected officers and communal coffer, soon could offer the main facilities and intellectual societies around which university life was focused. The end of the 1240s brought the appearance of the rector, a figure who emerged from the four nations. Despite the briefness of his term (one, then three months), the rector would soon be a leading figure who enjoyed exceptional prestige, not only within the faculty of arts but throughout the entire university. In the following years, perhaps as a reaction to this, the higher faculties (theology, canon law, medicine) were established with their own Congregation of Regents, dean and official seal.

An analogous evolution was observed in Oxford, where the thirteenth century saw the progressive strengthening of the powers of the chancellor, notably in matters of jurisdiction, as well as an increase in the powers of the

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16 At Paris, if the ‘nations’ of Normandy and Picardy had a strict geographical definition, the definition of ‘England’ covered all of northern Europe, and the definition of ‘France’ included all the kingdom of France (except Normandy and Picardy) as well as the Mediterranean countries – cf. Kibre (1948).
‘proctors’ in dealing with day-to-day management. Here as well, however, all of the important decisions were taken by the Congregation of Regents (congregation), where the Masters in Arts held the majority.

The institutional strengthening of the Universities of Paris and Oxford was also a result of the appearance of the first colleges, which were seen in Paris towards the end of the twelfth century (Collège des Dix-Huit, Saint-Thomas du Louvre). At the time, these were nothing more than houses with a small income, donated by pious founders to assure the lodging and maintenance of a few poor scholars. It was towards the middle of the thirteenth century that the colleges became institutions which were relatively important and autonomous, with a certain amount of influence over university life. This was perhaps due to the example of the Mendicant Orders’ convent schools, which we will discuss later on. The colleges were not yet teaching establishments – they would only become so at the end of the Middle Ages – but already they were true communities. They initiated a communal life style which had strict rules of residency for small groups of socii, chosen using criteria which were not only economic (i.e. poverty) but which also took into account their parentage, geographical origin and intelligence. The colleges offered their members a comfortable life style and access to a library (the universities did not have libraries at this time). On the other hand, the socii managed their colleges themselves, under the control of external superiors or ‘visitors’. This meant that the college communities tended to become small elites, apart from, yet within, the student population. The first true college was in Paris: the College of the Sorbonne, founded in 1257 for about twenty secular students in theology. Its founder, Robert de Sorbon, was both a regent master in theology and a chaplain of the king; he took charge of the material endowment of the college, the formation of its library and the publication of its statutes; before 1300, the Sorbonne was followed by seven other similar institutions in Paris, even though they were less important. Shortly afterwards, Oxford began founding its own colleges; the oldest Oxford colleges – Merton (1264), University College (c. 1280, with antecedents as far back as 1249), Balliol (1282), plus four monastic colleges – were conceived as autonomous communities of fellows, united by their communal life style and shared intellectual interests. In Cambridge, Peterhouse was founded as early as 1284.

In Bologna, on the other hand, there were no colleges as in the universities of the north. However, as we have seen, by 1220 two student universities with elected rectors who held great powers of jurisdiction were in place. The doctors, who were excluded from the universities and strictly controlled by the commune, nevertheless succeeded in acquiring their own corporative organ-

17 Glorieux (1965–6).
isation towards 1280: the two ‘Colleges of Doctors’ (civil law and canon law), comprising a fixed number of co-opted regents, with the principal function of supervising the organisation of examinations and conferring titles. In addition, it was at about the same time that the first salaries were paid by the commune of Bologna to professors of law, in order to complete the *collecta* paid by the students (in line with a system which was already in use in certain non-university urban *studia*), and a new type of relationship emerged between the political powers and the universities.

All of these factors guaranteed the success of the institution of the university in thirteenth-century society. The documentation from this period does not allow us to reconstruct systematically the careers of the graduates, but it is clear that in England, Italy and France, a multi-secular movement was emerging, a movement to promote holders of university titles into the ecclesiastical and civil administrations, as well as into the legal and medical professions. In societies which were becoming more and more complex, where everywhere the use of the written word was becoming essential, individuals, cities, princes and the Church had a growing need for secretaries, jurists and educated preachers. For example, it has been calculated that one quarter of the Masters in Theology educated in Paris in the thirteenth century went on to become bishops or cardinals.

The ecclesiastical and civil authorities could not remain indifferent to the new role of academic study in the education of the elites. We have seen how, after having applauded the birth of the universities, the upper classes supported their subsequent development. The princes and popes continued confirming and extending the ‘liberties and privileges’ of the universities, defending them against the ill-will of the urban population and the abuse of the local authorities. They soon undertook to found new universities, using the ones which already existed as models.

In fact, the movement to establish the universities remained limited in the thirteenth century. In 1300, there were certainly only twelve *studia generalia* which were truly active in the west; eight others had quite quickly collapsed. However, certain of them were not originally pontifical or princely foundations, but resulted from the process of ‘hiving off’ from a more ancient university, often following a conflict which had prompted the dispersion of all or a portion of its masters and students. These migrations sometimes only gave

birth to establishments which were not to last (Vicenza, Arezzo, Vercelli), but others produced institutions which took root: Cambridge originated as a result of the migration from Oxford in 1209, Padua from a portion of the University of Bologna which seceded (1222). Despite its limited range of recruitment and an initial reputation inferior to that of Oxford, Cambridge steadily developed throughout the course of the thirteenth century. Statutes in twelve chapters have recently been uncovered, which date from approximately 1250. They are the oldest and most complete corpus of statutes preserved for a medieval university and paint a picture of a university which was already active and well organised: Cambridge’s institutions paralleled those of Oxford, its students led the life of a coherent community;21 in 1284, the creation of the first college, Peterhouse, confirmed the growing success of the second English university. The establishment of Padua was much more difficult, since it began at the time of the wars between Emperor Frederick II and the cities in northern Italy. Modelled on the University of Bologna, but with an important place accorded to the school of arts and medicine from its inception, this university only really began to develop after 1260.

As for the French situation, even if the law schools of Orleans and Angers were only to become a studium generale in the fourteenth century, their initial expansion certainly dates back to the dispersion of the Parisian schools during the great crisis of 1229–31, which set the scholars against the royal government and the bishop of Paris. At the end of the century, despite remaining under the direct control of the bishop and the cleric in charge of the cathedral school, they were already the main centres of teaching of law in northern France, especially in Orleans where extremely capable masters like Jacques de Révigny and Pierre de Belleperche were teaching in the 1280s. Alongside the establishments founded through this process of “hiving off”, other universities were undeniably created intentionally during the thirteenth century. Leaving aside the very unique case of the studium of Naples, founded in 1224 by Emperor Frederick II, which had so little autonomy that it does not in some senses qualify as a university,22 the favoured location of the princely foundations of the thirteenth century was the Iberian peninsula. This is explained by the tradition of close co-operation in these kingdoms between the king, the cities and the Church as a result of the Reconquista. Even if Palencia, Seville and Alcalá were failures, Salamanca (1218–19), Lisbon (1290) and Lleidà or Lérida (1300) rapidly became true universities, ratified by the papacy. As for the pope, he took the initiative by founding the University of Toulouse (imposed in 1229 on the count of Toulouse who was defeated by the Albigensian Crusade), and, in Rome itself, the studium curiae, the University of the Pontifical Court.23

Endowed with the right to confer degrees and other privileges, these ‘implanted’ universities had not always been conceived as autonomous institutions by their founders. Yet all those that survived, fairly quickly – and more or less faithfully – adopted one of the types of corporative organisation born in Paris and Bologna. Ceasing to be purely political creations, they therefore succeeded in anchoring themselves in local society.

Even if general expansion seems to be the keynote in the history of the universities in the thirteenth century (apart from a few aborted attempts), in both the number of students and the growth of cultural and social influence, this does not necessarily mean that they experienced no difficulties whatsoever. We will not dwell here on the violence endemic to student life, marked by classical confrontations between ‘town and gown’ or the clashes between nations (Australes against the Boreales in Oxford); the privileges and immunities granted to the universities allowed them to be regulated at the least possible cost, due to the goodwill of the prince and the Church.

The principal challenge of the thirteenth century, at least in Paris, was the infiltration of the new Mendicant Orders into the university. From the beginning of the establishment of the Friars Preacher, St Dominic had made study an essential aspect of their spirituality: study in order better to seek truth, refute the heretics and teach the faithful. The Franciscans were quick to imitate them, followed soon after 1250 by the Carmelites and the Augustinians. Towards the middle of the century, the monks of the ancient orders – Cluny and Citeaux – also recognised the value of a university education. Naturally, all these religious men studied within their own Orders, in the studia of convents. At the same time, however, they wanted certain of these studia, intended for the better students, to be situated in the university cities, and eventually integrated with the existing faculties of theology, so that their students could obtain university Bachelors’ and Masters’ degrees. Such degrees, whose value was guaranteed by the papacy itself, were in fact synonymous with excellence and modernity, aims which were especially desirable to the Mendicants. By 1250, the Dominicans and Franciscans had already established their convents and schools in Bologna, Paris, Oxford and Cambridge.

In Bologna, and afterwards in other southern universities, the establishment of these Orders presented no difficulties. These universities did not have a faculty of theology; strictly speaking, therefore, they did not have to integrate the Mendicants’ studia, but willingly granted them the monopoly of theological teaching and adept preaching. In Paris, on the other hand, the secular professors at first welcomed the Mendicants – at the express invitation of the pope – but they were soon worried by the behaviour of the newcomers. Indifferent to the university’s autonomy and privileges, obeying only their superiors and the pope, the Mendicants seemed to be pressing an intrusive
proselyte creed upon the students. However, by the time certain secular theologians from the camp of Guillaume de Saint-Amour wanted to have them expelled from the university, it was too late. The confrontation was violent (1250–6), but the Mendicants were eloquently defended by Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura and firmly supported by the papacy (papal bull *Quasi lignum vitae* of Pope Alexander IV, 14 April 1255), so all of them retained their chairs. Under various pretexts, the conflict resurfaced on several occasions right up to the end of the Middle Ages and, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, extended to Oxford and Cambridge. Never, however, was the important, even dominant, place of the Mendicants in the teaching of theology at the universities truly questioned.

It is possible to believe that the seriousness of these events has sometimes been exaggerated. On the contrary: these crises were caused by expansion. Even if the new Orders retained their individuality, they did not really threaten the autonomy of the university. The secular masters, in any case, did not have the means to resist the papacy, by whom they were granted their essential liberties and privileges. Moreover, the quality of the Mendicants’ teaching in the 1250s, symbolised by names such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura and Roger Bacon, was so high that to exclude the Mendicants would have meant a catastrophic drop in teaching standards, which would have been difficult to imagine, both for the members of the universities themselves (amongst whom the Mendicants certainly counted many friends, alongside their more noisy opponents) as well as for the civil and ecclesiastical authorities dedicated to the proper management of the institution.

**Scholasticism: Risks and Rewards**

The social and political success of the universities in the thirteenth century cannot be separated from their exceptional intellectual success. Not that everything was new in university teaching. The main texts used had been accessible in Latin since the twelfth century and were introduced into the schools in the thirteenth century (in particular all of the natural philosophy of Aristotle, plus his *Ethics* and *Politics*). At about the same time, several later translations completed the collection, mainly Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle (after 1220). In the same way, the pedagogical method remained the same as in the pre-university schools: *lectio* and *quaestio*, which both depended, in all of the disciplines, on the systematic use of dialectics. Through the rigour of its logical reasoning, dialectics alone was capable of deducing the truth hidden in the texts, and confidently revealing solutions to the problems posed. The uni-

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The universities and scholasticism

The university evidently allowed teaching methods and exercises to be systematised and diversified. The ‘question’ gave birth to various types of arguments (‘argued questions’ and de quolibet debates); in the faculties of arts and law, private lessons and checking procedures were instituted to facilitate the memorisation of fundamental texts. The practical stages in medicine and university sermons in theology were introduced to structure teaching theory and clinical and pastoral activities.

As in institutional matters, the contribution of the thirteenth century was first and foremost an immense effort at establishing order. In all the faculties, precise programmes were drawn up and a timetable and calendar defined. A strict division of labour assigned the ‘ordinary’ lectures – the more difficult ones – to the Doctors, who also presided over debates. The simple Bachelors of Arts, while participating in the debates as respondens or opponens, took responsibility for ‘cursory’ or ‘extraordinary’ lectures. The writing down of numerous lectures and debates, as well as the regulation of transcripts and the circulation of manuscripts, simultaneously increased the amount of accessible knowledge (at the least possible cost to everyone) and ensured the orthodoxy of their content. Finally, the meticulous regulation of examination procedures clearly set the standard required of the Doctors: they were expected to be graduates who had perfect mastery of their discipline.26

It is evident that the establishment of scholasticism made no contribution to extending the boundaries of scientific knowledge, which was inherited from Antiquity and the High Middle Ages. The primacy of reliance on written authorities generally forbade venturing into ‘the mechanical arts’ or disciplines which relied on observation or experimentation. The triumph of dialectics and Aristotle’s philosophy relegated the study of the Classics to second place and forced the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy and music) to take a back seat, except perhaps in Oxford where Robert Grosseteste inaugurated a lasting tradition of scientific teaching.27 The system of the faculties, which was a concrete reflection of a taxonomic concept of knowledge, perpetuated a hierarchical relationship in which the profane disciplines found themselves subordinated to theology. On the other hand, it is impossible to neglect the fact that many students were not to reach the superior levels and attain higher degrees; and amongst those who did, many were mainly concerned with social success and only viewed their studies from a utilitarian point of view.

In spite of all of this, the principal universities of the thirteenth century were centres of debates of exceptional scope and extremely fruitful intellectual activity, practically without precedents in the west since Antiquity. It is

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not possible to enumerate here the hundreds of written works, which are but a partial reflection of their oral teaching, which the professors of the thirteenth century have bequeathed to us. Some of them have enriched the very foundation of knowledge: think of the *glossa ordinaria* of civil and canon law composed in Bologna by Accursius and Johannes Teutonicus. Others involved the expression of original doctrines: consider the outlines and treatises of the great theologians from Paris and Oxford, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventura, Grosseteste, Bacon and many more.

This burgeoning activity gave rise to many debates which impassioned the *scolares* of the time and sometimes reverberated beyond the world of scholasticism. The essential contribution of these debates, at least in the fields of arts and theology, was a massive distribution of all the Greco-Arab knowledge in Latin into the schools of the west, thirstily absorbing everything that was available by 1255. This knowledge was simultaneously extraordinarily rich, in philosophical and scientific subjects, and, by definition, foreign to the Christian faith and the message it spread. In facing this challenge, various attitudes were possible. Some attempted to take the brilliant, yet fragile, path of synthesis, in the hope of constituting a truly Christian philosophy, in which theology appeared as the crowning glory of a science of man and of the world based on Ancient sources; this was the choice of the Parisian Dominicans, in particular with Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologica*. Others wished to explore the even more perilous path of a philosophy which was somehow secularised, whose study did not immediately relate to theological ends: not the ‘double truth’ for which these scholars have been reproached, but rather an autonomous thought process based on reason, and an attempt to achieve the justification of both philosophy and of the philosopher from within this process. This endeavour, which remains associated with the names of the Masters of Arts of Paris, Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, known as the ‘Latin Averroists’, was thwarted (in 1277) by the condemnation launched against this movement – detailed in 219 articles – by the bishop of Paris, who was himself influenced by the Franciscans and several secular masters in theology.

The most convenient way of handling such problems, and one which naturally gained the support of both the civil and ecclesiastical authorities, was rejection and censure. It was possible to use traditional Augustinian thought, which emphasised the debasement of profane knowledge, scorn for the world, the ethical and religious dimension of ‘wisdom’, the primacy of divine

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28 According to van Steenberghen (1997), it would be preferable to speak of ‘integral’ or ‘heterodox Aristotelians’. 29 Hissette (1977); Bianchi (1990).
illumination over the discursive thought process of reason, against such foes; and several theologians, especially among the Franciscans, followed Bonaventura and John Pecham, in rejecting the dangerous ideas to which Aristotelianism could lead regarding the creation of the world and the immortality of the soul, as well as resisting any attempt to establish philosophy as an autonomous science. The bishop of Paris’s condemnation of 7 March 1277, which was followed up a few weeks later in Oxford, did not finally reduce the philosophers to silence. The conflict continued to arise in diverse shapes and forms and in various places right up to the Renaissance. In any case, only the faculties of arts and theology in Paris and Oxford were involved; the expansion of law and medicine, in particular in the southern schools, remained unaffected.  

The debates we have just described were initially internal debates, at the very heart of the universities, between the supporters of opposing doctrines. This very fact is evidence of a form of freedom which was previously unknown. In other words, thanks to the universities, a new social figure emerged in the west: the intellectual.  

Neither truly secular – for the Church kept the academic institutions under its authority – nor simply a cleric, the medieval intellectual, after his conception during the twelfth century, appears in full blossom in the thirteenth. He is a new creature, characterised above all by his self-awareness, his attachment to specific working methods, his confidence in the true value of his studies, his conviction that these studies could greatly influence how society evolves.

This change did not escape the notice of the ecclesiastical authorities, in particular the papacy, or the civil authorities of the time. Control of the universities was not only a social goal for them – control over the education of the administrative elites – but also an ideological risk. As the German political author Alexander of Roes remarked around 1280, with the university, the studium had become one of the ‘powers’ of Christianity, in competition with the regnum (political power) and the sacerdotium (religious power). In matters concerning faith and wisdom, the University of Paris had come to represent a ‘new source of authority’. The king of France, Philip the Fair (1285–1314), recognised this fact when soliciting the university’s support during his conflict with the pope and his fight against the Templars. In the southern countries, the opinions of the Doctors from Bologna, who soon found themselves engaged in some kind of rivalry with the Doctors from Toulouse, Montpellier or Orleans, were considered a living source of law, a regulating element for all political and social life.

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31 Le Goff (1985).  
32 Cited in Rashdall (1936), I, p. 23.  
33 Menache (1982).
The thirteenth century, therefore, inaugurated an extraordinary advance in knowledge and an extraordinary advancement for men of learning. The great universities were major centres of this movement. The secondary centres, on the other hand, did not fare as well during this period. It was to be during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that they too gained a major place in society.
PART III

THE WESTERN KINGDOMS
When he came to the throne in 1223 Louis VIII was confronted immediately with the need to secure the western territories which his father Philip Augustus had conquered from the English and to decide on a course of action with regard to the failing Albigensian Crusade. The first necessitated that he renew truces with barons who possessed fiefs on the March between French- and English-dominated territories in the south-west, including the count of La Marche, Hugues de Lusignan, and his wife Isabelle, the countess of Angoulême. Isabelle was also the widow of King John of England and the mother of the reigning king, Henry III. An alliance between Hugues, the most powerful baron in Poitou, and King Henry might have been expected except that the new French king tempted the count’s wife with the possibility of compensation for the valuable lands once promised to her as her marriage gift by John, but conquered by Philip Augustus. Although Louis VIII’s successful appeal to the self-interest of Hugues and Isabelle only briefly and tentatively secured their support, it deprived England of needed backing when the truce between the two kingdoms broke down and war resumed on 5 May 1224.

Louis pursued the war vigorously. By 15 July French troops under his command were besieging La Rochelle, although a quarrel with the count palatine of Champagne, Thibaut IV, over the wisdom of the siege threatened to undermine the French effort. The dispute between Louis and Thibaut was the latest of a series. Earlier differences about Jewish policy had already soured relations. On 1 November 1223 as his first major act of state Louis had issued an ordinance that prohibited his officials from recording debts owed to Jews and from allowing royal offices to be used for striking deals between potential debtors (Christians) and potential creditors (Jewish). Simultaneously he imposed a sweeping confiscation of Jews’ outstanding bonds. In doing away

1 Veterum scriptorum... Amplissima collectio, 1, pp. 1182–3.
with royal registering of Jewish loans, Louis VIII rejected the legacy of his father, the architect of the old system. On 8 November 1223 he requested his barons to apply the same policy to the Jews of their lands.²

Twenty-six barons acquiesced, but Thibaut refused. In June 1222, only a month after coming into his majority, the count had negotiated an agreement with the Jews in Champagne according to which they would submit to regular taxation in return for enforcement of their credit transactions.³ With a far larger population of Jews in his lands than in the royal domain, Thibaut’s policy was in his long-term financial interest. Refusal to modify it was a rebuff to the crown.

Personal factors aggravated differences in policy between Thibaut IV and Louis VIII. Both were in the prime of life (Thibaut was twenty-two, Louis thirty-six in 1223) and considered themselves natural leaders. Thibaut’s posturing owes much to the fact that he had spent his minority (May 1201–May 1222) under the domination of Philip Augustus whose favour he and his mother had to curry in order to prevent the old king from supporting rival claimants to the county. Louis VIII, too, had chafed under the strong hand of Philip Augustus. When he became king, he distanced himself from certain of his father’s policies, like that toward the Jews; but he did not govern with any less expectation of obedience than Philip Augustus.

The count of Champagne’s lack of enthusiasm and the simmering animosity between the two rulers notwithstanding, the siege of La Rochelle was a success, and Louis VIII’s armies continued to do well thereafter. By the end of the campaign in the late summer of 1224 all of southern Poitou as well as Périgord, Quercy and the Limousin were brought under Capetian domination. At this point, however, problems further south in Languedoc began to trouble the crown’s relations with the pope, and a decision was made to break off the war. Stiff resistance near the great port of Bordeaux also argued in favour of the decision, although it was greeted with anger by Hugues de Lusignan who had been promised Bordeaux in return for his aid. Fighting continued intermittently with the English managing to consolidate their hold on lands from Bordeaux to the Pyrenean foothills. This region, Gascony, would remain in their hands for more than a century to come.

After returning north and perhaps in anticipation of a new campaign, Louis VIII made provision, in the event of his death, for the financial welfare of his family.⁴ In dispositions dated June 1225, he directed that his eldest son, Louis, succeed to the crown and command the revenues of the old domain and Normandy. Younger sons were to receive portions or apanages: Robert, the

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² Layettes, II, no. 1610. ³ Church and the Jews, I, pp. 353–4 no. IX. ⁴ Petit-Dutaillis (1894), Appendix VI, no. 25 3.
county of Artois; Jean, Maine and Anjou; Alphonse, Poitou and Auvergne. Any remaining or future sons were to find preferment in the Church. As it turned out, only one other son, Charles, lived to adulthood; and, because of the death of his brother Jean, Charles received Anjou and Maine as his apanage. To the women of the family – wife and daughter – he assigned substantial legacies of 30,000 and 20,000 livres parisis respectively.

Meanwhile the situation in Languedoc which had induced the king to break off the war in Poitou demanded attention. Although the Albigensian Crusade had ravaged large parts of the region, southerners had managed to unite with sufficient effect to expel most of the crusaders by the end of 1223. In February of the following year Amaury de Montfort, the nominal head of the army, ceded to the crown the rights he had inherited from his father Simon de Montfort, the original commander of the crusade. These included a claim to the county of Toulouse which in theory gave the king authority throughout Languedoc and in parts of Provence. In fact, the native count of Toulouse and most powerful southerner, Raymond VII, was in control of the south; so, it appeared that military force would be required to give substance to the royal claim.

In 1223 and 1224 Pope Honorius III, facing up to the reality of the crusaders’ reversals and the preoccupation of the crown with its war in Poitou, pursued negotiations with Raymond VII. The rapprochement (more apparent than real) between the papacy and the house of Toulouse necessarily threatened the legitimacy of the claims of the crown and spoiled relations between Honorius III and Louis VIII. In the end, however, what Raymond VII demanded of the pope – the recognition of his right to rule and the return of rights and lands seized by orthodox churchmen in Languedoc or granted to them by de Montfort and his allies – was too great, at least as long as there were lingering doubts as to the count’s determination or capacity to extirpate heresy. Consequently, the pope’s representatives resumed serious talks with Louis VIII in late 1225. Much bickering ensued, but the king took the cross on 30 January 1226.

By June 1226 a royal army, including a contingent under Thibaut IV of Champagne, was in the field in Languedoc under the personal command of the king. By the eighth of the month this force reached Avignon where the town council had agreed to allow Louis, the religious leaders of the crusade, their entourages and 100 knights to pass through the town and use the great bridge to traverse the Rhone. When the time came for the agreement to be put into effect, however, the Avignonese, fearing the possible pillage of their town, balked. The turnabout provoked violence, during which the temporary wooden causeway built over the river and outside the town for the bulk of the army was demolished with only part of the army as yet on the other side.
Furious, Louis VIII laid siege to Avignon on 10 June. In this he was opposed by Count Thibaut IV, who, performing the minimum service of forty days, left for home amid charges of treachery. Allegedly Louis intended to deprive him of his fief when the campaign was over. The difficult siege lasted until 9 September when the great town surrendered.

There were few other encounters after Avignon. Town after town capitulated, and the might of the royal army grew in the retelling. But in late October while bringing the campaign to an end the king fell ill. He made provisions in council on 3 November at Montpensier in Auvergne for the appointment of his wife, Blanche of Castile, as regent, obtaining promises from the barons in attendance that they would see to the coronation and orderly transfer of power to his eldest son in case of his death. He further authorised letters to barons not in attendance informing them of his instructions and commands. He died on the eighth.

THE REGENCY OF BLANCHE OF CASTILE

The coronation took place on 29 November 1226 at Rheims following the hasty knighting of the young Louis at Soissons. The absence of Thibaut IV of Champagne from the ceremony was significant. The regent at first invited him, but many loyal barons from the old domain and Normandy could not forgive the count’s behaviour on campaigns with the king. Many suspected him of poisoning Louis VIII. Under pressure, Blanche of Castile withdrew the invitation (proffering it to his mother instead).

Another baron absent from the coronation, evidently by choice, was Hugues de Lusignan, the count of La Marche, who was conspiring with Pierre Mauclerc titular count of Brittany with the intent of bringing the two houses to dominance in the west. Thibaut IV of Champagne was an early partner in these plans, but for reasons still obscure (perhaps his love for Blanche of Castile was a factor) he deserted the conspiracy just as it made its move. Blanche reacted to the threat from Hugues and Pierre by promising to ally the royal house to their houses through marriages of her children to theirs and to make monetary concessions to Hugues in recognition of his undercompensated good service to her husband in the campaign in Poitou. She was prepared to put a royal army in the field if they persisted in rebellion.

Without the support of Thibaut, neither Pierre nor Hugues could effectively match the military power of the crown. The English and Count Raymond VII of Toulouse who might have been expected to intervene on their behalf were in fact uncertain allies. The English were again put off by Isabelle d’Angoulême’s

5 Petit-Dutaillis (1894), Appendix vi, nos. 435–7.
attraction to the French offer. Raymond VII of Toulouse was deeply involved in negotiations with Cardinal Romano Frangipani in an attempt to extricate himself honourably from the Albigensian Crusade. Constrained by these facts the coalition made its peace with Blanche.

The legate realised that unless the major native house in the south, that of Toulouse, was mollified, the likelihood of any permanent solution of the heresy problem was very small. A royal army, the remnant of Louis VIII’s invasion force, was tenaciously trying to maintain the integrity of the conquest, but the cost of supporting it, let alone replenishing it while meeting aristocratic challenges in the north, was telling on the crown. The result was a settlement reached at Meaux (and ratified at Paris, hence called the Treaty of Paris) of 1229. On the one hand, it acknowledged the uncertainty of the crown’s position in that it preserved a large part of the patrimony of the count of Toulouse for Raymond. On the other hand, large parts of Raymond’s lands (like the Comtat-Venaissin on the eastern bank of the Rhone) and the territories of seigneurs who had allied with Raymond VII but refused to make their peace were ceded either to the crown or to the papacy. Most importantly, Raymond VII’s daughter and heir, Jeanne, was affianced to Blanche’s son, Alphonse, an act that promised a Capetian succession in the south.  

Just at the time the crown deflected the coalition of western barons and the situation in the south was heading toward resolution, a new hostile coalition took shape. The raising of revenues necessary to overcome the recent challenges and meet this new one was itself a considerable undertaking. The cardinal-legate Romano Frangipani endeared himself to Blanche (some critics hinted at a romance) even before his astute negotiations with Raymond VII of Toulouse, because he had used his considerable influence to obtain from the French Church the payment of 100,000 livres to the crown. This payment was in lieu of a three-year tax of 10 per cent on the income from ecclesiastical benefices originally promised to Louis VIII for his campaign in Languedoc which, owing to his death, the clergy were reluctant to pay. This windfall plus the regular income of the crown (even in this difficult period) gave it a material advantage over its opponents. The crown compounded the advantage by means of a confiscatory taxing of the Jews in 1227. 

The new coalition, following soon after an abortive attempt by a few barons to kidnap the young king, was more dangerous than the earlier, for rumour had it that it aimed not only at the overthrow of the regent but at the seizure of the crown. The extent of the coalition was extraordinary, drawing in half a dozen important northern nobles. They claimed that Thibaut IV of Champagne, whom Blanche had supported in a violent dispute with eastern barons in 1229,

had become overly influential at court. They resented the regent and some of her advisers whom they associated with the strong-arm policies of Philip Augustus. They accused the queen of preserving her authority over her young son by keeping him unmarried.

Certain actions of Pierre Mauclerc, however, deflected the coalition. Chafing at the indecisive nature of the outcome of his first rebellion, he moved more and more toward the English camp. This in turn put the barons of the second coalition in a quandary. Their opposition to the crown did not imply friendship with the English. Thus, they responded obediently to the regent’s summoning of the host, when the treachery of Pierre became manifest. They did not do so with the greatest enthusiasm—they would have preferred to fight Thibaut IV of Champagne in the name of the crown—but they did so. The young Louis rode at the head of the army in 1230 as the rebellion grew in scope in Brittany. There was a series of campaigns in that year and the next. A definitive truce was established in 1231, which contained the rebellion, although it did not vanquish Pierre. Again, Hugues de Lusignan and his wife Isabelle’s refusal to support Pierre and the English, after considering the possibility, contributed significantly to the rebellion’s failure.

By 1231, in other words, Blanche and Louis had blocked a rapprochement between the Lusignan family and the English (and thereby temporarily secured the south-west), stabilised the situation in Languedoc with the help of the cardinal-legate, deflected two major baronial coalitions bent on changing the nature of the regency and put down a Breton rebellion that had English support. It was an extraordinary record, but it came at a cost. Buying the Lusignans’ support meant a potential loss of influence in Poitou. Accepting the Treaty of Paris meant recognising the continuation of Raymond VII’s authority in a large part of Languedoc. The decision not to obliterate Pierre Mauclerc’s forces left an opening for still further rebellion. And remaining faithful to Thibaut IV antagonised barons who otherwise felt some loyalty to the crown. None the less, the monarch and his mother grew in the eyes of the nobility. They were tough; and they talked the language of toughness. An example is the Ordinance of Melun in 1230, the first serious piece of legislation of the reign, which addressed technical questions of Jewish policy and insisted that the barons follow the royal solutions to these questions. Those who would not were deemed ‘rebels’ and liable to the sanction of military force. A degree of confidence had returned to the monarchy.

The decade 1231–41 saw recurring resistance to the crown, but at least until the very end of the decade nothing comparable to the strife of the opening years of the reign. For example, ecclesiastics frequently entered into jurisdic-

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7 Layettes, II, no. 2083.
tional squabbles with the crown. The bishop of Beauvais, beginning in the 1230s, desperately tried to retain his jurisdictional authority in Beauvais (where he had failed to keep order) in the face of the crown’s determination to fill that role. Lay aristocrats could be equally disagreeable. They occasionally made marriage alliances (implying political alliances) that were not to the crown’s liking. A few great lords at times directly confronted the crown in ways similar to the challenges of the early days of the reign. Pierre Mauclerc, Hugues de Lusignan and his wife Isabelle d’Angoulême, and Thibaut IV of Champagne were among those who did so, but the regent and her son managed by astute diplomacy to prevent effective coalitions and face their opponents down, so that no sense of precariousness shrouded the monarchy. Finally, in the south there were occasional émeutes, local uprisings against the Capetian presence, but these, like one in Narbonne in 1237, were repressed quickly and efficiently.

The system of administration hinted at in Louis VIII’s conventions of 1225 assigning apanages to his younger sons could have been the cause of similar political struggles, for, to a certain extent, it cut the direct link between the crown and key provinces (Artois in 1237, Poitou and Auvergne in 1241, Anjou and Maine in 1246), since not only income but governance was given over to the cadet princes. There was always the danger that these princes would make accommodations with local nobles which might not be in the crown’s interest, but the resentment of native barons at the intrusion of these Capetian princes generally stimulated the latter to emphasise their solidarity with the crown.

While the direct authority of the crown receded by the creation of apanages, it was augmented by the purchase of the county of Mâcon for 10,000 livres tournois in cash and 1,000 livres tournois in rents drawn from Normandy. Count Jean de Braine of Mâcon (the brother of Pierre Mauclerc of Brittany) together with his wife used much of the cash to mount a crusade expedition. The county became a separate administrative district under a bailli.

The crown augmented its authority also with the gradual incorporation into the domain of the land confiscated in the Albigensian Crusade. These regions were administered as the sénéchaussées of Beaucaire-Nîmes and Carcassonne-Béziers. Organised in ways that were similar to the northern bailliages, the sénéchaussées did possess notable differences. First, although it is difficult to be precise about ‘boundaries’ (the very concept seems somewhat forced with regard to regions where the rights of various lords overlapped), each sénéchaussée, covering at least 10,000 square kilometres, was geographically much larger, perhaps four times larger than an average bailliage in the north. Second, the military component of administration was more prominent in the south than in Normandy and the western provinces, and far more prominent.

8 Layettes, II, no. 2776.
than in the bailliages of the old domain. Languedoc, in other words, remained for long an occupied province. As in Normandy and the western provinces, the most powerful posts were given to appointees whose geographical origin was the Ile-de-France, but in order to govern with any success these administrators surrounded themselves with natives who knew the language and the local customs (which had been confirmed) and were willing to work for the new regime. Last, the sénéchaux who administered the southern districts were chosen from higher ranks of the nobility than were the baillis of the north.

The central problem facing the crown in the south was perceived to be support for the Cathar heresy. The vehicle to confront the problem was a new creation, the Inquisition. Founded in the early 1230s, the Inquisition was more like a series of investigatory commissions than an institution properly so-called. It did ferret out heretics and protectors of heretics and brought villages back to Catholicism, but it also kept the south in a ferment by its intrusiveness, its confiscations of property and its condemnation of a few unrepentant heretics to the flames. At the same time, though wholly dependent on secular authorities to carry out its confiscations and condemnations, it trod on other jurisdictions (including the crown’s) in its obsessive hunt for Cathars.

Heretics were not perceived as a particular problem in the north, but the Jews were. Traditionally the crown had exploited the Jews to its financial benefit, although it had tried to avoid benefiting directly from interest that Jews charged Christians. This policy continued. The crown had also tried to regulate and limit social relations between Christians and Jews and to deny the claims of lords to exercise jurisdiction over Jews who fled to their lands from other lordships. The Ordinance of Melun of 1230 addressed these matters in strong language. But a new dimension of royal policy began in 1240 when the crown, responding to a papal enquiry on the content and nature of Jews’ use of the Talmud, held a ‘trial’ in Paris where rabbis were forced to defend the book against the charge that it contained insults to the Christian faith. Twenty-four cartloads of the books were solemnly burned at Paris in 1242.

The Talmud trial was scarcely over when baronial issues reoccupied the centre stage of politics. Despite the repeated successes of the monarchy in containing violence, the forcible attempt of a dispossessed southern baron, Raymond Trencavel, to recover the viscounty of Béziers in 1240, though unsuccessful, showed that the spectre of rebellion had not been laid to rest. A more serious manifestation of baronial discontent occurred soon after on the occasion in 1241 of the investiture of the king’s brother Alphonse with the appanage of Poitou in accordance with the instructions of Louis VIII. The investiture required the swearing of fealty to Alphonse by Poitevin barons including Hugues de Lusignan. Prodded by his wife, Hugues defied Louis and Alphonse. At first, his defiance succeeded. Not expecting hostility, the king had
come to Poitou without the kind of military force that could overawe potential opponents. But when the defiance of Hugues infected other barons, like Count Raymond VII of Toulouse, and stimulated the English to intervene in 1242, Louis put together an army ‘that covered the earth like locusts’. Raymond, to protect his patrimony, backed out of the rebellion. Hugues and his remaining allies were soundly beaten in July 1242. After this the English never again made a serious attempt to undo the disasters of John’s reign. Hugues, his family and his lesser baronial allies were stripped of a number of their possessions.9 A few minor émeutes aside, there were no rebellions against the crown in the remainder of the century.

The Personal Rule of Louis IX

In December 1244 the king, ill and in fear of death, vowed to go on crusade if he recovered, a decision that had far-reaching implications for the political and administrative system in France. After designating the recently established port of Aigues-Mortes in Languedoc as the chief embarkation point for the crusaders under his command, a decision that required further extensive construction, he selected Cyprus as a supply depot for food and other resources needed for the army. He seems to have made it known to recently rebellious barons that joining him on crusade would bring them back into his good graces; a number of them took the cross. Negotiations for support with other Christian princes – Henry III of England, Håkon IV of Norway, Emperor Frederick II, James I of Aragon and rival baronial claimants to the counties of Flanders and Hainault – were less successful. Henry III, for example, continued to covet his continental patrimony, though he was in no position to recover it after his recent defeat. He agreed to a continuation of the truce between the two kingdoms, but made no coherent effort to lead his own contingent to the Holy Land.

Most important was the effect of the struggle between Frederick II and Pope Innocent IV on Louis’s venture. The pope had come to depend on the French king as an ally against Frederick. Louis IX profited from this dependency by obtaining a promise from the pope, who had taken up residence in Lyons on the thirteenth-century borders of the kingdom, to persuade the Church in France to contribute a tax of 10 per cent of its income to the king’s crusade for three years (later prolonged to five). The promise was translated into policy at the First Council of Lyons in 1245, the occasion also of the deposition of Frederick II, an act which Louis IX did not endorse and which,

in any case, was unenforceable without an aggressive war against the emperor to which the French king would not commit himself. Consequently, Innocent IV, behind the scenes, worked out with other princes a set of arrangements that were not compatible with Louis IX's plans. He directed his representatives in Germany who were ostensibly there to preach Louis’s crusade to preach against Frederick II. After the death of Frederick II in 1250 the pope also felt confident narrowly to construe concessions that he had made to the French king before the crusade, in 1246, when a league of French barons intimated that they would boycott the crusade unless various ecclesiastical abuses and jurisdictional encroachments were corrected.10 The king had intervened to obtain promises of correction from the pope.

To finance the crusade the king had access to the tax on the Church (roughly calculable at 900,000 livres). He (and his mother later on) negotiated a series of gifts from the domain towns; this amounted, again roughly, to 270,000 livres. He levied a confiscatory tax on Jewish moneylenders. He or, perhaps more accurately, fiscal officials in the bailliages and sénéchaussées cut regular expenses, including wages to subordinate administrators, wherever possible. He or they prolonged and exploited vacancies in the bishoprics and abbeys where the king had the right, called temporal regalia, to collect the income during the vacancy. And wherever possible his men secured higher bids for revenue farms than had been customary. Later governmental estimates of the cost of the crusade suggest that Louis IX expended one and a half million livres on the war, the equivalent of six years’ annual revenue. The army that was raised with this money was between 15,000 and 25,000 strong, of which 1,500 to 2,000 were fully armed knights. Approximately half of the knights and the rank and file – mounted sergeants, foot sergeants and less well-arrayed troops – were directly in the pay of the king. Independently raised contingents constituted the remainder, but the king offered loans to and arranged credit for the captains of many of these units.

Even though raising money for an army of this size necessarily opened the door to criticism, the king managed to enhance his reputation by a series of investigations into abuses of power by local officials. These may have begun on an ad hoc basis – sending a troubleshooter into a district where collection of revenue for the crusade was stalled or the sums collected suspiciously low. In 1247, animated by the desire for moral purity in the kingdom, Louis made the investigation more systematic. Carried out largely but not exclusively by Dominicans and Franciscans reluctantly given permission by their Orders to work for the government in this task, this investigation or enquête uncovered widespread local corruption (including toleration of Jewish ‘usury’) and

10 The constitution of the league is printed in Layettes, ii, no. 3569.
intimidation of the populace by baillis, sénéchaux and their subordinates (viguiers, prévôts, bayles and sergeants). Besides encouraging admiration for his reforming zeal (since large numbers of petitioners received compensation for their injuries), the king improved the administration over the long term by firing and fining a number of corrupt officials, retiring a number of incompetent ones and transferring a great many others.11

The king departed France in August 1248, and after wintering and additional preparations in Cyprus led the attack on Damietta at the mouth of the Nile on 5 June 1249. The capture of the port by the morning of the sixth raised hopes. The disaster inland in early 1250 at al-Mansura where the king’s army was beaten, he and his brothers Charles and Alphonse captured and held to ransom, and his brother Robert killed dashed all these hopes. The news of the defeat and captivity reached France but had less severe consequences for governance than might be expected. Except for a series of émeutes in Languedoc in mid-1250 and a brief uprising of ‘Shepherds’ in Flanders and northern France in the next year (whose ostensible purpose was to help Louis IX, a fact which explains the regent Blanche of Castile’s initial favour to the movement), a tight lid was maintained on opposition. Meanwhile, Blanche recruited military aid and money for the crusaders who resumed a much reduced war in Palestine after their ransom.

To say that Blanche kept a tight lid on opposition is not to say that it did not try to manifest itself. One such occasion had already occurred in 1249 following the death of Count Raymond VII of Toulouse. The provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1229 gave the inheritance to his daughter Jeanne, the wife of Alphonse of Poitiers, Louis IX’s brother. Alphonse being abroad on crusade with his brother at the time of Raymond’s death, it was up to Blanche to see to the orderly transfer of the county to representatives of the Capetians. A few gestures which gave the appearance of resistance were quickly countered. Another occasion where there was potential cause for alarm involved disputes at the University of Paris, for whose well-being the crown traditionally felt responsible. Here again, however, she intervened successfully and prevented the disturbances from getting out of hand.

Blanche’s death in November 1252 was an acid test of the strength of the monarchy and loyalty to it. The king had selected a council of bishops to advise his mother during his absence, and this group continued to act in the name of the king’s ten-year-old son Louis (d. 1260) who became the formal regent in 1252. At the same time the king’s two surviving brothers, Alphonse and Charles, who returned to France in 1250 after their ransom, used their

11 The writ of commission is printed in Layettes, V, no. 490; the bulk of the records of the investigations are published in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, XXIV.
influence to maintain order. It was their voices presumably that were raised against the wish of one faction of barons to bring in Simon de Montfort, the son of Louis VIII’s friend, Amaury de Montfort, as regent for the young Prince Louis until the king’s return.

But even if there was no power vacuum, there was a multiplicity of discordant voices vying to be heard. Charles and Alphonse differed on important policy matters. Alphonse was intent upon outfitting a new expedition to the crusader states, whereas Charles was eager to exploit the deteriorating situation in Hainault and Flanders, where the agreement arbitrated by Louis IX and the papal legate in 1246 assigning the succession to the counties had come apart. The count of Flanders, recently returned from the crusade, was killed in a tournament, and members of the family of the count of Hainaut were accused of engineering the mishap. Charles supported the Flemings in their private war in return for their promise to support his bid for the countship of Hainaut. With large amounts of monetary aid from the northern French communes, he invaded Hainaut in 1253. When the king returned from crusade, he persuaded his brother to withdraw and reimposed the judgement of the original arbitration.

The council of bishops, prodded by the pope, constituted an especially strident ecclesiastical voice (though always expressed in the prince regent’s name) after Blanche’s death and before Louis’s return. In Beauvais, Albi and elsewhere disputes with churchmen in which the crown had a vested interest were resolved or appeared to be heading for resolution to the clergy’s benefit. Disputes between lay aristocrats and prelates no longer found a neutral forum for resolution at the summit of royal government. This in turn led lay barons to take the law – as they saw it – into their own hands; and it induced a number of baillis to defy the council or leave administrative service. The council, in these circumstances, found it difficult to hire replacements who did not look like ecclesiastical lackeys. Only the king’s return in July 1254 brought this situation to an end.

The period from 1254 to 1266 saw the passage of legislation and the issuance of royal orders intended to overcome systemic weaknesses in governance. The problem of the ecclesiastical tilt in royal policies in the year and a half between Blanche’s death and Louis IX’s return was resolved in part through the death of Pope Innocent IV who bore the major responsibility for influencing the council of bishops. But the king was not content to leave the matter alone. He insisted in the 1250s and 1260s on a strict division between the competence of the Church and the crown; and he showed himself reluctant to

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12 Records of the aid are published in several municipal fiscal accounts; e.g., Layettes, iii, nos. 4583, 4192, 4194, 4195, etc.
13 Jean de Joinville, Histoire de saint Louis, ch. cxl; Ordonnances, i, pp. 67, 76, 77–81.
enhance the disciplinary powers of the Church (outside the special crime of heresy) through the apparatus of state power.\textsuperscript{14} His refusal in the 1260s to enforce by civil sanctions ecclesiastical decrees of excommunication is a powerful indicator of this view. His decision in 1269, on the eve of his second crusade, to arrange a council of regency with both lay and ecclesiastical members reflects this perception as well.\textsuperscript{15}

Another aspect of governance where the king introduced significant changes was coinage policy. In the late 1250s and early 1260s he put the royal coinage on a firm footing, regulating exchange rates and eventually introducing gold. No less importantly, he put pressure on the issuers of baronial coinages to keep them sound. Failure on the barons’ part to do so could lead to forfeiture (or, in another evaluation, usurpation) of the privilege of minting. The count of Nevers learned as much in 1262.\textsuperscript{16}

Such confrontations and punishments were, however, rare. In general, the king was willing to compromise. He even respected charters of questionable authenticity if custom supported the right or the privilege alleged in the charters, and he repeatedly intervened, occasionally over the mild remonstrances of the judges, in the decisions of his high court of parlement on the side of equity when doing so was consonant with his views of the dignity of the crown. More specifically, he decreased the legitimate charges of hospitality levied against bishoprics, abbey and the royal communes (self-governing towns in the north) where there was evidence that this burden struck too hard at their financial well-being. At the same time, in the case of the communes, ordinances of 1262 brought about a significant loss of independence in fiscal administration because of a perceived incompetence and corruption in their internal governance.\textsuperscript{17}

Underpinning the legislation on the communes was a moral vision of the kingdom. Treatises inspired or commissioned by the king on the ruler’s craft, from the pen of Vincent of Beauvais, Gilbert de Tournai and others, imagine a ruler whose every waking thought is about the Christian character of his principality. Royal legislation against blasphemy and usury, in support of the Inquisition, articulating a programme to inspire Jews to convert, and a general governmental responsiveness to the petitions and needs of the poor, the sick and those vowed to a religious life speak to this image. In the case of the Jews, for example, while increasingly restrictive legislation about contact between Christians and Jews made social life difficult for large numbers of the latter, the crown tempted many to convert with promises of financial well-being through

\textsuperscript{14} Jean de Joinville, \textit{Histoire de saint Louis}, chs. cxxv, cxxxvi.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Documents sur les relations}, pp. 85–8; \textit{Ordonnances}, 1, pp. 82–3.
pensions and the probability of finding a godparent in an influential protector, perhaps the king himself. With regard to the Christian poor and sick, for another example, hospitals were founded, endowed or given grants from the royal fisc in Beauvais, Bellême, Compiègne, Lorris, Paris, Pontoise, Saint-Cloud, Verneuil and Vernon. Leprosariums – quasi-monastic hospices – were founded, endowed or given royal grants in Boigny, Fontenay-sous-Bois, Paris and Pontfraud. And charity in general was channelled to and through Dominican Friars and nuns, Franciscan Friars and Poor Clares, Sack Friars, Pied Friars, Crutched Friars, Carmelites and other religious who succeeded in obtaining the land and money for their mission throughout the realm. Lay women living religious lives in common, the so-called beguines, drew repeatedly on the seemingly inexhaustible largesse of the crown; and reformed prostitutes received the king’s blessing and endowments of their monastic foundation in Paris.

From 1254 to 1256 a series of ordinances spelled out a code of ethics for the baillis and sénéchaux who arranged for all these initiatives and most other matters of governance. It was enforced through periodic enquiries into performance timed to coincide with the regular transfers of officials (approximately every five years) from one district to another. A special aspect of this administrative regimen was designed for Paris where jurisdictional conflicts had been common between the mercantile elite (in essence the municipal government) and the royal administration for a hundred years. The crown simplified the scheme of governance considerably, making all lines of command culminate in a single prévôt of Paris. It strengthened and reorganised the royal police force and the small merchant watch patrols (guéret). Although recording the statutes of the guilds in the famous Livre des métiers (c. 1260), it left the adjudication of mercantile disputes in the hands of the merchants and craftsmen themselves, whose head was officially to be referred to by the already traditional title, prévôt des marchands.

Criticism of the government’s policies was muted but not absent. Certain churchmen had considerable misgivings about the long-term threat posed by the king’s clear association with the mendicant Friars. They were apprehensive about the mendicant ‘theologies’, associated with the prophetic writings of Joachim of Fiore, and their challenge to the traditional structure and theology of the Church. Guillaume de Saint-Amour, a doctor of the University of Paris, who expressed many of these misgivings on parchment and emphasised the king’s friar-like personal devotions as a central embarrassment, lost his position, had his work condemned in 1256 and went into exile.

This did not inhibit principled criticism in such areas as the crown’s foreign

18 Jean de Joinville, Histoire de saint Louis, ch. cxl.
policy. In general the king desired to end lingering disputes over borders and earlier conquests. On 11 May 1258 he concluded the Treaty of Corbeil with the king of Aragon by which he laid aside claims to territories on the Spanish side of the Pyrenees dating from Charlemagne’s time, and James I of Aragon laid aside his territorial claims on the French side (with the exception notably of Roussillon and Montpellier). Although this could not have been to everyone’s liking, it was the agreement with England, the Treaty of Paris of 28 May 1258 followed by the homage of Henry to Louis in Paris on 4 December of the next year, that was most controversial. The treaty was a recognition on Henry’s part both that loyalty to his house had withered in the lost territories and that any effort to gain them by force would be too costly; but Louis promised Henry more than 100,000 livres for this acknowledgement and also ceded him territories on the March between Poitou and Gascony in return for the homage that Henry did for Gascony. In the context of his generosity in the Treaty of Paris, it is not surprising that Henry III and his barons turned to Louis a few years later to arbitrate a dispute that threatened to tear the English kingdom apart. The arbitration, however, failed when Louis’s general sentence (the so-called Mise of Amiens, 23 January 1264) supporting Henry was rejected by the barons as exceeding his mandate to arbitrate specific technical questions.

The issue that preoccupied the crown in the 1250s and 1260s even more than relations with England was the drawn-out struggle between the papacy and the heirs of Frederick II (d. 1250). The popes had long looked to other Christian princes to counter the threat that it perceived from the Hohenstaufen. Its policy was two-pronged: find a prince, perhaps a native German prince, to assume the imperial crown; find a different prince to invade and seize the crown of Sicily which was also in Hohenstaufen hands. Louis IX had been and continued to be reluctant to intervene as late as the mid-1250s. When a papal agreement with Henry III of England also came to nought, the pope offered the Sicilian crown to Louis IX’s brother, Charles of Anjou. Charles accepted, and Louis permitted him to use the revenues of those of his lands that were French apanages to supplement his other resources for raising an army necessary to the task. The explanation for this turnabout is usually laid to the king’s conviction that an essential precondition for mounting a successful crusade to the east was peace in Christendom or at least peace among the men who wore the Sicilian and imperial crowns and the papal tiara. By 1268 Charles of Anjou (Charles I of Sicily) had displaced the Hohenstaufen in Italy.

It was in the context of Charles’s successes in the 1260s and of reports around the same time from the Holy Land of the escalating precariousness of

21 Documents of the baronial movement, pp. 280–91. See also Layettes, IV, nos. 4884–6, 4888, 4898.
the crusaders’ position that Louis IX took the cross again on the feast of the Annunciation, 1267. He negotiated a three-year tax of 10 per cent on ecclesiastical income to help finance the war and converted to the use of the crusade the aid collected from the towns for the knighting of his son, the future Philip III, which took place on 5 June 1267. A reduction in ordinary expenses also generated a surplus that was directed to the crusade. Serious measures were instituted to seize usury, hear complaints about bad government and punish blasphemy in an effort to make the kingdom morally worthy of victory. The king made a last progress through his northern lands on the eve of his departure. Two regents were appointed, one lay, one ecclesiastical, each with a designated replacement from the same estate, in case of death.22

The army, if the number of knights in Louis’s pay can be taken as a key, was probably half the size of the army of 1248–9. Many other princes, such as Charles of Anjou and Edward, the heir of Henry III of England, joined the crusade, although their efforts were not always logistically co-ordinated with Louis’s. Louis, as in the 1240s and 1250s, frequently underwrote these expeditions financially. He lent Edward, for example, 75,000 livres.23 The rendezvous for the various contingents of the army was Sardinia, since the attack as envisaged by Louis (who kept the destination secret until the last possible moment) was planned for Tunis. The army, or that part of it under Louis’s direct command, reached Tunisia in mid-July 1270, but the Tunisian ruler neither capitulated nor made overtures to convert as seems to have been expected. Meanwhile, disease spread through the Christian camp claiming the life of one of the king’s younger sons, Jean Tristan, and his own (25 August). The eldest son, Prince Philip, although sick, took command. But it was given to the more experienced Charles of Anjou, who soon arrived with reinforcements, to negotiate a favourable end to the engagement. When the English under Prince Edward later made their appearance, there was nothing to do but re-embark for the Holy Land.

PHILIP III

Although Philip’s coronation at Rheims did not take place until 15 August 1271, he was officially recognised as king on crusade. Advised by Charles of Anjou Philip did a commendable job, acting courageously, audaciter, according to one writer, behaviour that might explain the epithet Hardi, ‘the Bold’, given him by contemporaries.24 Also advising Philip was an ambitious and clever man who would rise to dominate his inner councils, Pierre de la Broce. A scion of a

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22 Layettes, iv, nos. 5662–4; Ordonnances, xi, p. 346.
23 Foedera, conventiones, literae, i, pt 2, pp. 113–15.
24 Cited in Langlois (1887), p. 2 n. 4.
modest administrative family from Touraine, Pierre entered Louis IX’s service some time before 1264. By the end of Louis’s reign he was one of several chamberlains concerned with the receipt and expenses of the royal household and government. His brother, Guillaume, was *panetier* (provisioner of supplies) in Prince Philip’s retinue in 1270. After the king’s return to France Pierre’s influence and wealth grew, and he himself became more overbearing. But eventually he antagonised the king’s second wife, and his devious efforts to impugn her reputation were discovered after a protracted investigation. On 30 June 1278, under considerable baronial pressure, Philip sent Pierre to the gallows.

Despite the scandals and machinations at court a number of political and administrative problems demanded attention. In most cases, especially domestic affairs, Philip was content to follow the policies of his father, whose canonisation he was encouraging from at least 1273. On the whole the king lived off his ordinary revenues, but when demands were acute he turned to ‘taxation’. This followed earlier patterns. There were grants from seigneurs and ecclesiastics for the great ceremonies like the coronation of the king (1271) and new queen (1275), tallages of the Jews (1281–2) when additional money was needed, an aid for the celebration of the knighting of his eldest son (1284) and papally approved levies on and voluntary contributions from the Church for the crusade (1284). With respect to the Jews, the anti-usury and segregative policies of Louis IX were also confirmed at various times in Philip’s reign.

Most disputes over the extent of seigneurial rights or breaches of order were resolved judicially in *parlement*. This institution undoubtedly acted less informally than under his father; certain procedures, for example, were defined carefully by ordinance in 1278.25 But the competence of *parlement* saw no changes.

Some disputes required special action. The most pressing of these were the succession to the county of Toulouse and the resolution of the status of the Comtat-Venaissin. On 21 August 1271 Alphonse of Poitiers, Louis IX’s brother and then, a few days later, his wife died on the route back from crusade. The childless Alphonse intended that his lands as count of Poitou and Toulouse, lord of Auvergne, and (disputed) lord of the Comtat-Venaissin go to the crown. Charles of Anjou argued that the apanage of Poitou and Auvergne remained within the system of apanages and, therefore, should pass to Alphonse’s nearest relative, namely Charles himself, just as Artois on the death of Robert had passed to Robert’s nearest relation, his son and namesake Robert II.26 The dispute was a long time in being settled; *parlement* did not rule definitively against Charles until March 1284.

Another controversial dimension of the crown’s efforts to annex Alphonse’s lands was the assertion that since his wife had died after him, she had the right

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to bequeath the lands acquired in her own name as she saw fit. Before she passed away she made separate provisions for this property. The crown cannot be said to have ignored these provisions, but it took a narrow view of the extent of the territories and in the end asserted control over the vast majority of both Alphonse’s and Jeanne’s holdings. The king himself made an armed progress through these lands, encouraging support for his regime by the confirmation of liberties and franchises and securing the annexation in the military sense by authorising the founding of royal bastides, fortified towns, as symbols of the new order.

With the royal annexation of Toulouse, the French came to control certain borderlands of the county which the English claimed were part of the bloc of territory ceded to them by the Treaty of Paris of 1258. Such lands, they argued, being now in the royal gift should be transferred to their dominion. Negotiation over the legitimacy of the claim and the precise boundaries of the disputed lands dragged on for years. At the same time, English efforts, led by Prince Edward, the heir to the throne, to exploit disorder in Limoges in this border region to their benefit caused resentment among the French and did not speed up the process. It was not until 1278 and the so-called Treaty of Amiens that the apportionment of the disputed lands was accomplished with the appearance of amity. Other shows of resistance to Capetian hegemony in the south-west, like that of the count of Foix who violated the sanctuary offered by the crown to one of his enemies, the latter having requested royal adjudication of his dispute with the count, met equally forceful and sometimes unnecessarily imperious reactions from the crown. These and similar manifestations of royal authority in the south-west left a bitter legacy among native barons.

The disputed claim of Alphonse to the Comtat-Venaissin, the second of the major administrative and diplomatic conundrums facing Philip in the early days of his kingship, put the crown in conflict with the papacy. The Treaty of Paris of 1229 ending the Albigensian Crusade had granted the county to the pope. Neither Louis IX (perhaps it would be fairer to lay the responsibility on Blanche of Castile) nor Count Raymond VII of Toulouse, to whose patrimony the Comtat had pertained, relished this aspect of the settlement which created a dangerous precedent in sanctioning deposition of lords and ecclesiastical succession to fiefs. There must have been an oral agreement that the papacy would resign its claim when Alphonse of Poitiers and Jeanne of Toulouse fulfilled the terms of the Treaty of Paris and married. Until then the crown administered the Comtat in the pope’s name. In 1234, on the occasion of the marriage, Louis (or Blanche), therefore, withdrew the royal administration, and

\[27\] Foedera, conventiones, litterae, i, pt 2, p. 179.
Raymond VII resumed control. Pope Gregory IX protested but to no avail. Pope Innocent IV protested again in 1249 when, on the occasion of Raymond’s death, the county passed smoothly to Alphonse and his wife. It fell to another pope, Gregory X, to renew the struggle; and, from September 1271, that is, immediately upon his elevation, he found that he had considerable leverage with the French king, for Philip III, at his uncle Charles of Anjou’s urging, was putting himself forward as a candidate for the imperial throne and needed papal endorsement.

Philip already had ‘imperial’ interests: at the request of influential Lyonnais in May 1271 during his sojourn in the region on his return from crusade, he took the imperial city of Lyons under his protection because it was suffering baronial depredations that imperial forces were unable to check. His agents, although their actions were contested, began from that time on to behave as though the king’s gesture was tantamount to annexation. His men continued to exploit ties with imperial territories, acting similarly in Viviers (1271) and Montfaucon-en-Argonne (1273). These ‘interventions’ gave Philip no claim to the imperial crown, nor was papal support for his candidacy sufficient for election, but both could be helpful. In the end, Philip’s candidacy only received the tentative support of Gregory X and did not succeed, but the Comtat-Venaissin had been promised and was transferred to papal governance in 1274.

The situation in the Comtat had scarcely been resolved before another serious issue occupied the government’s attention. In the summer of 1274, King Henry I of Navarre, who was also count of Champagne and the husband of Philip III’s niece, Blanche of Artois, died, leaving, in addition to his widow, an infant daughter, Jeanne. To safeguard her daughter’s inheritance in Navarre, the queen-mother appointed a native governor, but took herself and her three-year-old daughter to France for additional security. The work of the governor was difficult from the start, the young child’s hand being sought with different degrees of intensity by scions of the royal families of England, Castile and Aragon. Promises had been made and broken; other promises were asserted to have been made and broken. And the various parties had conflicting explanations for the ill-will that arose.

Both Aragon and Castile intervened with armed force. Certain native lords of Navarre appealed to the French king. In May 1275 Blanche went so far as to cede her rights to the governance of Navarre to Philip III and to agree to her infant daughter Jeanne’s eventual marriage to his son and putative heir, the future Philip IV. Eustache de Beaumarchais, one of the most gifted of the sénéchaux, was authorised to lead a force to Navarre and restore order. Aragon and Castile were simultaneously warned off but continued to threaten the borders.

Navarre, however, did not remain stable for long, for French rule was soon resented, and the country erupted into civil war in 1276 which only large numbers of reinforcements from France managed to contain. Castile was active in helping the rebels partly because the death of the heir to the Castilian throne in 1275 created tensions with France. The reigning king, Alfonso X, probably under pressure, looked to his mature second son as his successor, an act that disinhernited the infant children of his deceased elder son. Unfortunately, these were the children of Philip III’s sister, Blanche of France. To overthrow their rights was an obvious provocation.

The combination of Castilian interference in Navarre and the disinherniting of Philip’s sister’s children in Castile brought war. Castile looked for allies unsuccessfully. England refused to send troops. In Aragon the king had recently abdicated (July 1276), and his son and successor, Peter III, suspicious though he may have been of the French, abandoned his claims in Navarre. To be sure, the new king’s wife had claims in Sicily against Charles of Anjou who was supported by the French crown, and Peter himself by 1277 got into nasty disputes with vassals of the French king, including the count of Foix, who had lands on his border and whom Philip did not effectively bridle. But this was all in the future. In 1276 the Aragonese stance meant that no principality would come to the aid of Castile.30

On the other hand, with the weather uncooperative, the French army was stalled before crossing the Pyrenees and ran out of supplies. The situation was an embarrassment, but preparations had been shoddily largely because the administration was overburdened in 1276. The credibility of the charge soon to be made, however, that Pierre de la Broce had undermined or sabotaged preparations for the invasion for his own purposes fits the mood of the French. The accusation shifted the blame for poor preparations away from the king; and the importunities of the pope and the English king to arbitrate the dispute with Castile gave Philip the opportunity to abandon the war honourably before a battle was ever fought. On the one hand, the formal truce (November 1276) that ended the confrontation could not disguise the fact that the two kings continued to despise each other, made military displays from time to time, and encouraged treachery in each other’s domains for several years to come. On the other hand, freed from having to carry out a sustained campaign in Castile, the French were able to impose peace on Navarre in 1277.31 Blanche and her second husband, Edmund, the English king’s brother, would later confirm the arrangement for the future Philip IV to wed her daughter Jeanne of Navarre. They became husband and wife in 1284; the

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30 These and related matters are addressed with full documentation in Langlois (1887), pp. 99–102.
young Philip commenced to style himself king of Navarre and count palatine of Champagne from that time forward.

The south was in Philip III’s thoughts also because of the desire of his mother, Margaret of Provence, to wrest Provence (or her share of the county) away from Charles of Anjou. The origins of the dispute went back to the 1240s and the marriage of Béatrice, the youngest of the four children, all daughters, of the count of Provence. The count had arranged extremely prestigious marriages for his other three daughters: Margaret married Louis IX; Eleanor, Henry III; and Sancia, Richard of Cornwall (Henry III’s brother and later king of the Romans). By the old count’s will, Béatrice (or effectively her husband when she married) was to possess the county of Provence, with reversion to Sancia if Béatrice died without heirs, and with reversion to James of Aragon if Sancia died without heirs as well. It was arguable whether this arrangement could annihilate the rights of the other daughters as co-heiresses, even if James had not resigned his claims late in Louis IX’s reign. In any case, in 1246, soon after the count’s death, Blanche of Castile and Louis IX arranged a marriage between Béatrice of Provence and Charles of Anjou, the aim being to prevent Béatrice from marrying any lord hostile to the crown or soft on heresy.

Charles had his own opinion about what the old count’s instructions for the succession meant: he simply continued to rule Provence after his wife died in 1267. Margaret and Eleanor (Sancia died in 1261) were of a different mind. After Louis IX’s death Margaret began to lobby for her fair share of the Provençal inheritance. On several occasions her machinations threatened to erupt in war, for the imperiousness of Charles of Anjou in any number of environments had made him innumerable enemies who were prepared to join her if she made a concerted effort. Here, however, Philip III was decisive. Determined that peace would reign within his immediate family, he succeeded in negotiating a settlement that left Provence in Charles’s possession but assigned a very substantial portion, 2,000 livres, of the income of the county of Anjou to his mother.32

The affairs of Charles of Anjou occupied Philip III in other ways. After conquering the kingdom of Sicily, Charles had imposed an authoritarian regime. It may not have been noticeably worse than the government of other territories under his control (his brutal suppression of the autonomy of Marseilles in 1261–3 is a case in point), but the burdensome taxation and the heavy-handed repression carried out by some Angevin administrators repelled the native population. In 1282 their resentment erupted in the rebellion known as the Sicilian Vespers. The king of Aragon, Peter III, who had claims on Sicily through his wife, intervened on the rebels’ behalf. His intervention in turn led

32 Langlois (1887), p. 128.
the pope to condemn the crown of Aragon and to authorise a ‘crusade’ against it. Philip III supported Charles of Anjou and by late 1284 was actively preparing to invade Aragon. Victory would not only re-establish Angevin dominance in Sicily, but, with papal approval, it would bestow another prize, Aragon itself, on Philip’s younger son, Charles of Valois.

The invasion, in May 1285, was a costly disaster. Except for the ephemeral taking of Girona, the French found themselves stymied on all sides. They were embarrassingly outclassed at sea by the Aragonese admiral Roger de Loria. Thinking better of continuing to fight, Philip ordered a retreat even as disease spread through the undersupplied army. The Aragonese followed at a respectful distance until the French army passed the borders. Soon after, at Perpignan on 5 October 1285, Philip died. He left his kingdom to his son, Philip IV, who had accompanied him during the invasion.

Philip IV

The young man of sixteen or seventeen years of age, Philip the Fair (Bel or Handsome), continued the retreat. He had probably loathed going south in the first place. That he compromised his loyalty by communicating with the Aragonese king after his father had decided upon war is an intriguing but unproven allegation. It is true, however, that he had little or no love for his stepmother Marie of Brabant who was strongly committed to the anti-Aragonese policy. That he rejected the policy is evident from the substance of the settlement negotiated by the arbitrator, Edward I. In 1290 Charles of Valois surrendered his claim to Aragon. Only the lordship of the Val d’Aran, a small area on the French side of the Pyrenees seized from Aragon in 1283, remained in dispute, but even it was restored to Aragon in 1313.33 James, the second son of Peter III (d. 1285), was permitted to hold the island of Sicily. As a sort of compensation, Charles of Valois married the grand-daughter of Charles of Anjou and received Anjou and Maine as an endowment. Charles of Anjou’s son, Charles II (a hostage until 1289), retained mainland southern Italy. Certain of these arrangements were obviously inconsistent with the goals of the papacy and caused a brief, but long remembered, estrangement between the French crown and the Holy See.

Even while the negotiations with Aragon were going on, Philip turned his attention to the royal administration. The first two years or so of his reign saw the transformation of administrative personnel. At every opportunity he picked men who were personally congenial, seemed in agreement with his views of governance and were eager to serve him. One source that became
prominent somewhat later and long served as a locus of recruitment was the legal community in the south: it provided the king with Pierre Flotte, Guillaume de Plaisians and Guillaume de Nogaret, all of whom at one time or another appear to have played the role of chief minister or principal troubleshooter for the king.  

The country over which Philip and his officials ruled was entering a period of economic difficulties, exacerbated if not necessarily caused by the steady growth of population over the last two centuries. Signs of sluggishness in certain sectors of the economy had appeared as early as the 1250s and evidence of recession is clear in the 1270s. In part what was occurring was a major transformation in the patterns of trade in France. The fairs of Champagne were being displaced in favour of new routes; and traditionally important commercial enterprises, like the wide marketing of wine from the Auxerrois, went into decline. At the same time, typical of an economically transitional period, other sectors of the economy grew in sophistication and volume. To stay with the example of wine, merchants operating out of Bordeaux (under Plantagenet control) developed increasingly complex credit instruments in this period and marketed their product along the entire Atlantic coast of continental Europe and in England.

None the less, the pressure of population which for centuries had been a positive push by increasing demand in the economy became a drag by the end of the thirteenth century. New arable continued to be created, but in nothing like the quantities associated with the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Lands of low natural fertility (‘marginal lands’) were brought into cultivation because prices of grain and meat were reasonably high and justified the expansion of grain growing or herding into these lands. Although justified by price levels, the stress on the lands and the likelihood of erosion after over-grazing put long-term productive capacity at considerable risk.

Over-grazing of lands of relatively high natural fertility was also a danger near towns, where demand for meat and dairy products, wool and leather were high. Paris, which probably grew from about 60,000 in the days of Philip Augustus to as many as 150,000–200,000 in the days of Philip the Fair, had such an effect. No other town in France grew quite so spectacularly in absolute numbers, but the doubling of the populations of major towns occurred frequently over the same period. This enormous increase – and with it the increase of middle-class demands for the non-grain products they wanted either for consumption or for marketing – sometimes reduced grain production in the immediate hinterlands of the great towns, further exacerbating the price rise and putting the whole economy at risk.

34 Pegues (1962).
Disturbing the delicate political and economic equilibrium that had emerged in the course of the century was almost unavoidable when government officials were obliged to raise money to fight wars. The year 1294 saw the opening salvos in the first of these wars, the Gascon or Aquitanian war. Philip the Fair used acts of piracy in the Bay of Biscay and jurisdictional disputes with local English authorities in Gascony as excuses to demand a humiliating gesture of obeisance from Edward I of England, as duke of Aquitaine. Edward accepted the demand, which included permission for Philip to occupy parts of Aquitaine with a token force. But Philip, even after Edward’s acceptance of this and other terms, invaded Aquitaine with a sizeable army and denied Edward the right, to which he was entitled as a vassal of the king of France, of protesting in the French _parlement_. The war that erupted was an expensive affair, although actual fighting was intermittent and not very savage. By 1297 Philip’s and Edward’s forces had fought or rather manoeuvred to a standoff with large parts of the duchy, including Bordeaux, still in French hands. Negotiations to end the war would drag on until 1303.

Financing this war required the same sort of clever methods of raising revenue as had occurred throughout the thirteenth century. Townsmen in France were cajoled through local assemblies; the Jews were subjected to a confiscatory levy of more than 200,000 _livres_. The vast wealth in the control of the Church was traditionally more difficult to get at. Under the governments of his predecessors, churchmen, even those exempted from crusade taxes, were often persuaded to give grants to the crown. So frequently had these grants been given that they became a customary aspect of revenue enhancement whenever a French king declared his intention to go on crusade. It was possible also to argue that the Church ought to help pay for the defensive wars which assured it of its prosperity. What was not clear was on what authority to rely in judging whether a war was defensive or not and what obligations the Church had until the decision was made.

To leave the matter in the hands of the papacy was to allow intolerably long delays when an enemy was at or already across one’s borders. To leave the matter to the princes was to invite extortion, for no prince was prepared to acknowledge at the beginning of a conflict that he was the aggressor and deserved no support from the Church whose temporal protector he claimed to be. In the event, princes had the stronger hand and, when they needed to do so, they used it. Both Edward and Philip, claiming urgent necessity for the defence of their patrimonies, negotiated directly with their Churches who agreed to render up taxes without the prior approval of Pope Boniface VIII for the war.

Both kings were vehemently censured in the papal bull *Clerici laicos* of 1296. Posturing on each side (papal and royal), including the embargo of goods headed toward Italy from France, worsened the situation, and a bitter propaganda war erupted between spokesmen for the princes and those for the papacy. The changing fortunes of the pope in Italy induced him to compromise and, by the bull *Etsi de statu* of 1297, he acquiesced in the doctrine of ‘urgent necessity’, reserving only the right of confirmation to himself. The reconciliation of Philip and the pontiff was symbolised in the canonisation of the king’s grandfather Louis IX in the same year.

If financing the Gascon war had major consequences, the long negotiations to bring it to an end had equally significant results. Here the complications were other foreign policy and financial initiatives that put such a burden on the resources of the crown that it consented in 1303 to a peace treaty with England which involved French withdrawal from the duchy of Aquitaine, and the establishment of a set of commissions to resolve the jurisdictional issues and the charges of piracy that had been invoked to justify the war in the first place. The foreign policy and financial initiatives to which reference has been made concerned Flanders.

The count of Flanders suffered the same sort of pressures for submission that Philip had brought to bear on Edward of England with regard to Aquitaine. The submission Philip envisaged antagonised the count and many Flemish aristocrats. It also led to bitter disputes among various groups in Flanders – churchmen, urban oligarchies, guildsmen and the labouring classes. Any disorder that resulted was usually interpreted by the French as a sign that the count was incapable of effective governance and thus provoked disciplinary action, usually in the form of citing the count before the *parlement* of Paris or, more ominously, military intervention.

The war in Flanders took place in two phases. The first began in the 1290s and culminated in 1305. Count Guy de Dampierre was already at war with the counts of Holland and Hainault in the mid 1290s when the French crown commanded a subsidy of one fiftieth of income for its own war in Aquitaine. An agreement was worked out which would have shared the bounty of the subsidy between the king and the count. With the power of the crown behind him, Guy began collecting the subsidy. Bruges, Douai, Lille and Ypres, however, tried to escape the tax by offering the king lump sums. The size of the lump sums was probably inferior to what the subsidy was intended to bring in, but they had the advantage of offering the king immediate payment. Philip, perhaps at the behest of Pierre Flotte but to the bitter disappointment of Guy de Dampierre,

37 For the place of the bull in the intricate financial history of this period and the problem of the date of issuance and publication, see Denton (1991), p. 21.
38 *Registres de Boniface VIII*, 1, cc. 941–2: 31 July 1297.
was sympathetic to the towns, including their protests about the count’s over‐
ardent attempts to collect the subsidy.39

Guy immediately turned to the English crown for support, as he had threat‐
etened to do in earlier crises. But in 1296 it was manifest treason to do so, since
France and England were at war. The French replied by invading Flanders. Ed‐
ward I of England did ultimately send support, but too little and too late. It
was sufficient, none the less, to persuade the French to negotiate the truce of
Vyve-Saint-Bavon (9 October 1297). This ended hostilities while ratifying,
temporarily at least, the occupation of most of the county by the French
crown’s forces.40

A sorry train of negotiations that were intended to bring about a permanent
resolution of the disputes ensued. Pope Boniface VIII, Edward I, Guy and
Philip were involved in a very complex game of international politics. No love
was lost between Philip and Edward. As Edward was supporting the Flemings
in their ‘revolt’ against Philip, so Philip was supporting the Scots in their resis‐
tance to Edward. They bought off each other by abandoning their allies.
Edward obtained a free hand in his north while Philip obtained a free hand in
his. Boniface VIII acquired a reputation as an insincere and bumbling peace‐
maker. The Flemings felt sold down the river.41

At the expiration of the truce in 1300 the French occupied all of Flanders
(with the exception of that small part, imperial Flanders, held of the German
crown). The Flemings resisted fiercely but with indifferent success over the
next two years, until risking everything in a pitched battle at Courtrai, on 11 July
1302. Outmanned and at a considerable topographical disadvantage, their
hopes seemed about to be dashed, when the French committed their cavalry in
a senseless charge. Pierre Flotte and many other principal advisers of Philip the
Fair who were present were hacked to pieces in the fury of Flemish revenge.

Despite the crisis the crown made elaborate plans to mount a counter‐
offensive. In 1304 Philip imposed a huge war tax to underwrite this effort. A
naval battle (Zierikzee, 10–11 August) and another pitched battle on land, this
time at Mons-en-Pévèle (18 August) in which Philip almost met his end,
redeemed French arms, but were not decisive enough to secure the county. On
the other hand, the victories made further negotiations tolerable for both sides.
The Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge (1305), which can be said to have closed the first
phase of the war, imposed harsh conditions and reparations on the Flemings.42

Contemporary with the events in Flanders was a struggle between the crown
and the papacy which began when the bishop of Pamiers, Bernard Saisset,
probably in his cups, allegedly slandered the king: Philip was like an owl, stately,

40 The events summarised here are addressed more fully with complete documentation in Strayer
handsome, but he just stared. The French, said this southerner, were a bother; and their policies – Philip’s policies – were witless. When these words were reported, the reaction was swift. Royal officials collected evidence and prepared a dossier. The bishop himself decided to go to Rome, a gesture interpreted as flight, an admission of guilt. The crown arrested the bishop on a charge of treason. He was escorted north and incarcerated while awaiting trial before a session of the royal council that was to meet at Senlis.

The pope was furious. Philip did recognise the procedural errors and ultimately (February 1302) permitted Saisset to go to Rome unjudged. But he did so too late to forestall the publication of papal letters against him in December 1301. Boniface suspended the crown’s privileges, including the right to collect taxes from the Church without prior papal approval, and summoned the French bishops to a council to consider the behaviour of the king. *Ausculta fili* (‘Listen son’), a condescending personal letter to the king from the pope, was an imperious assertion of papal authority and a long-winded criticism in detail of the policies of Philip the Fair.43

Pierre Flotte, the king’s chief minister, published a misleading paraphrase of the letter which made it appear as though the pope claimed dominion in France even over temporal affairs. (When Boniface VIII learned of the paraphrase, he denounced it as a forgery.) Meanwhile, Flotte called a meeting of clergy, nobles and bourgeois. On 10 April 1302 the assembly (formerly regarded as the first meeting of the estates general) listened as the king’s men harangued them and attacked the usurpations of the pope. Apparently convinced, nobles and burghers addressed angry letters to the cardinals (not the pope, whom they referred to disrespectfully anyway), insisting upon the king’s rights and condemning the summoning of a council. The clergy wrote to the pope, cautioning him on the situation, but were steadfast in their loyalty to their spiritual lord.

Boniface insisted on calling the council and prayed for the deaths of his enemies, the king’s advisers. Within a few months his prayer seemed to be answered when Pierre Flotte and other royal councillors died at Courtrai. The king opened negotiations, but still forbade his bishops to attend the council. Thirty-three (of seventy-nine) defied him, but most of these were from the periphery of the kingdom. In retaliation Boniface issued the bull *Unam sanctam* on 18 November 1302. It asserted in powerful language that there is one holy, Catholic and apostolic Church, outside of which there is no salvation. It is one body and has one head. The head is the vicar of Christ, the successor of St Peter, Boniface VIII. In his own words, ‘we declare, state, define and pronounce

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43 The material on the quarrel and its culmination in the titanic confrontation between Pope Boniface VIII and Philip IV (which is summarised in the next several paragraphs) is collected in Dupuy (1655).
that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff. The bull was obviously a step toward the deposition of the king. Philip decided in March on desperate measures.

One of Philip’s councillors, Guillaume de Nogaret, wanted to convene an ecclesiastical council to depose the pope who, after all, had plenty of enemies. But to do so obviously meant seizing power from the pope, since the pontiff was not likely to call a council to depose himself. A royal assembly in June heard Guillaume de Plaisians, another adviser, bring charges against the legitimacy of Boniface’s election. He was also accused of heresy and of entertaining perverse ideas on sexuality. The nobles at the assembly immediately endorsed the call for a council. After much cajoling the clergy did so as well, but were careful to explain that they did so in order that the pope could clear himself of the charges. A few clerics refused to knuckle under. One of these, the abbot of Citeaux, was arrested, a gesture that quelled most further opposition. Regional meetings in France, attended by clergy, nobles and municipal officials ‘adhered’ to the call for a council by affixing their seals to letters in support of the crown.44

Meanwhile in Italy, Nogaret was securing the allegiance of the pope’s enemies to his plan to cite Boniface as a heretic. Word reached him, however, that the pontiff was at Anagni, near Rome, preparing the bull of deposition. Acting with a small and divided group of men, Nogaret went to Anagni. There is some doubt as to whether the Italian co-conspirators (Boniface’s old enemies, the Colonna) or the French were in control. In any case, Boniface was taken prisoner and berated, if not physically assaulted. But no one was quite sure what to do after this. To take Boniface 1,000 kilometres to Paris from the heart of Italy would have been folly. There was not much love of French hubris in the peninsula. To kill the pope as some of his personal enemies wanted to do would have fatally tarnished the image of Philip the Fair and made Boniface a martyr in the tradition of Thomas Becket. Nogaret could not have wanted that.

Time ran out. After two days the people of Anagni took courage, rose up and expelled the would-be kidnappers. Boniface’s friends escorted him to Rome. It is speculation, of course, but the pontiff’s inactivity in the next three weeks, followed by his death, suggests that he suffered a stroke at Anagni. Had he died immediately at Anagni, it would have been a master stroke indeed. His death could have been laid at the feet of Nogaret and, ultimately, of the king of France. As it was, he lasted a bit too long. The pope’s successors (Benedict XI, briefly, and after a long caucus, Clement V) were eager to bring the dispute to a close. Eventually Clement would consent to praise the zeal of Philip and his

44 The documents arising out of the series of royal assemblies (sometimes inaccurately referred to as estates general) in which so many of the discussions about Philip and Boniface’s quarrel took place and in which the matter of adhesions was addressed were collected and published by Documents relatifs aux États Généraux.
advisers in return for dropping the demand to exhume the late pope and to put his corpse on trial.

The victory over Boniface VIII had wide-ranging implications. For the rest of the reign of Philip (certainly after the election of Pope Clement V in 1305), the crown could count on the papacy to be extremely correct in its behaviour towards France. Requests made of the pontiff by the king and his advisers were not routinely endorsed, but more often than not they received a favourable hearing. Moreover, the victory over Boniface gave strength to the argument, in France at least, that the crown had a special role in religious life or to confront religious enemies. That role was not entirely new. The French crown had long been the mainstay of the crusades and the principal military supporter of the papacy. The sacred or semi-sacred character of kingship – the king’s ability to heal scrofula by touch, for example – had long been alleged and had practical consequences in the pilgrims who came to be touched after the coronation.45 But the assertion of authority that was implicit in Philip’s attempt to charge a pope with heresy and depose him (even though frustrated by Boniface’s untimely death) underscored the remarkable religious claims the French crown was making.

This religious *auctoritas* helped justify policies that might otherwise seem purely fiscal in purpose, such as the expulsion of the Jews (1306), the arrest of the Templars (1307) and confiscation of Lombard profits (intermittent from the 1290s but with particular intensity thereafter). The fiscal justification for these acts hardly needs a word. The war in Aquitaine and the war in Flanders (soon to be resumed) plus the regular expenditures of the crown forced policy makers to seek new ways of raising money. Increasing the rate and frequency of taxation was always dangerous, for it antagonised politically powerful groups in the country. None the less, as we have seen, the year 1304 saw a very heavy tax to deal with the crisis in Flanders; and traditional levies (like the aid for the marrying of the king’s daughter, 1308) were also exploited with intensity. In the 1290s the government had begun to debase and grossly overvalue the coinage and reaped immense profits from doing so. By 1305 each coin (‘weak money’) had a nominal value of three times its worth before debasement and overvaluation (‘good money’). These manoeuvres temporarily increased the crown’s purchasing power, but the eventual result was runaway inflation and extreme distress among those, like many nobles, living largely from the income of fixed rents. (Revaluation in 1306 caused dismay among groups that had profited from the inflation.) Forced loans were another expedient repeatedly used by the crown. When these were not repaid promptly, they too provoked great distress and anger.

If Philip and his advisers could not avoid antagonising the privileged classes in necessity, they still tried hard to devise ways of raising money that avoided serious confrontations with nobles and bourgeois. Here is where religious sensibilities became a handmaiden to fiscal policy. The Jews were, in traditional rhetoric, enemies of Christ, crucifiers of Christian children, desecrators of the host and manifest usurers. Not every Christian in authority subscribed to every one of these allegations, but those who actively opposed the putting of restrictions on the Jewish community were few and far between. The decision to expel the Jews therefore was congenial or, at least, not uncongenial to the political nation at large. On a single summer’s day (22 July 1306), 100,000 Jews were arrested after a carefully planned campaign. All were expelled; their property, including records of debts payable to them, was confiscated. The property in cash, jewels, the profits from the auction of their houses and shops, and the return from their debts which the crown collected probably brought in close to 1 million livres (reckoned in terms of good money).46

In 1307 came the turn of the Templars. Again, there was some discernible hostility already, this time to an order that was no longer defending the Holy Land (Acre, the last stronghold, had fallen in 1291). There was probably some resentment that warrior monks had become something akin to bankers. Maybe, too, there were popular stories about fornication. But from these bits and pieces (and eventually from evidence given under torture), a dossier was assembled that constructed an utterly perverse picture of Templar sodomy and heresy. Philip moved as he had against the Jews: 13 October 1307 saw, after intensive preliminary secret planning, the attempted and almost completely successful arrest on that one day of every Templar in the kingdom. The financial take was probably less great than in the expulsion of the Jews, since much Templar property was later conveyed to the Order of the Hospital. But although no firm figure has been established on the take, it was undoubtedly significant. The pope did little; the Order was formally suppressed at the Council of Vienne in 1312. Princes elsewhere in Europe, troubled or not in their consciences, despoiled the order in their countries as well.47

The Lombards were treated somewhat differently. The Lombards, really a congeries of Italian bankers and merchants operating in France, had an extraordinary amount of control over foreign trade.48 They were intermittently tal-laged in the 1290s. And the death of this or that financier among them also usually afforded the crown the opportunity of seizing assets. The Lombards had also coughed up very large loans on a number of occasions. But in the wake of the expulsion of the Jews and the attack on the Templars, and

confident of French antipathy to foreigners and ‘usurers’, the crown pursued
two complementary policies. It continued to exploit the Lombards, as for
example with a heavy levy in 1309–10, but it also increasingly distanced itself
from them. They were weaned from positions in royal service in a xenophobic
and moralistic attempt to purify (of Italians and usurers) the French
administration.

All of these innovations probably brought Philip and his government to the
pinnacle of their power and authority by 1312. The resumption of the Flemish
war revealed how fragile this achievement really was. The first phase of the
Flemish war which had ended with the Treaty of Athis-sur-Orge in 1305 had
been followed by a long series of disputes over the schedules for paying the
huge punitive fines it called for. As these schedules were worked out, resistance
in the towns grew. The king put pressure on Clement V to excommunicate
those who forswore themselves by having promised to comply, but continued
to oppose him. In June 1310 Clement capitulated to the king’s entreaties.

Philip continued the pressure through the medium of his specialist in
financial affairs, Enguerran de Marigny. Marigny attempted to purchase the
rights to Flanders from Count Robert de Béthune’s son and heir, Louis of
Nevers, who would be allowed to keep Rethel and Nevers (lordships he already
possessed in France), but who with the money from the sale of his rights in
Flanders would become one the wealthiest men in the kingdom. His refusal of
this and similar proposals provoked Marigny to denounce his family. The king
supporting Marigny ordered Robert and Louis and representatives of the
Flemish towns to meet with him on 14 October 1311 at Tournai. When the two
lords did not come, a strong declaration of royal sovereignty in Flanders was
made to the townsmen who did.49

An effort was made to persuade Louis of Nevers by force. He was arrested
but escaped. On 11 June 1312, however, his father agreed to the cession of
French Flanders (Béthune, Douai, Lille) to the crown in exchange for the
suppression of the financial clauses of the Treaty of Athis. Louis of Nevers
denounced the cession, a position that led to the seizure of his fiefs (Rethel and
Nevers) in France. In the event it looked as though war would resume in 1313.
Philip summoned an army for August and began to collect taxes, but both sides
(probably through Marigny’s mediation) compromised; and in July, before the
army assembled, the king even returned the taxes, respecting the principle that
the cause having ceased (cessante causa) the tax should also. None the less, in the
summer of 1314 a new royal army was assembled and skirmishes took place.
Marigny, trying to save the situation before it became a general war, managed to
persuade the two sides to agree to a cease-fire.

At the town of Marquette the basis of the cease-fire was made known: Robert de Béthune and Louis of Nevers were, upon their request, to receive a royal pardon; French Flanders was to remain in Philip’s hands; Rethel and Nevers were returned to Louis of Nevers; and a very modest indemnity – a realistic 20,000 livres tournois – was to be paid to the crown. Aristocrats like Philip’s brother, Charles of Valois, and many of the flower of French chivalry who wanted a decisive war to teach traitors a lesson, found the agreement at Marquette distasteful.50

Philip’s annexation of French Flanders has sometimes been considered part of a wider effort to expand the kingdom. In the south in 1293 he purchased Montpellier, a district of Montpellier, from the bishop of Maguelonne, and he also secured the bishop’s rights over the king of Majorca’s holdings in the town. For the east officials made claims based on the four-river theory, which asserted that the kingdom extended to the Rhone, Saône, Meuse and Scheldt. But the four-river theory did not preclude attempts at expansion beyond the rivers. In the county of Burgundy (the Franche-Comté), for example, the king arranged the marriage of one of his younger sons to the heiress. The county would remain a fief of the empire, but the heiress agreed to seek a waiver of the homage her husband would normally have been obliged to do. The marriage, these agreements and a further concession, the vesting of administration of the county in the hands of the crown until the heiress succeeded (in exchange for a life rent for the count of 10,000 livres tournois and a lump sum of 100,000 livres tournois up front), were ratified in a series of treaties: Ervennes (1291), Evreux (1294) and Vincennes (1295). Adolf of Nassau (the uncrowned emperor) declared the confiscation of the county as a result, and resentment among the local nobles who were anti-French led to war (1296–1301). But the opposition to Philip was outmatched, and from 1301 until after Philip’s death the county was held by a cadet branch of the royal family.51

Lyons was also an anomaly. Most of the city was east of the Saône. At first Philip took small steps to solidify claims that went back to his father’s time. In 1292, for example, he took the city under his special protection during a dispute between the citizens and the archbishop, and soon afterwards a royal official took up permanent residence in the city to protect royal rights. French legists, responding especially to the protests of Lyonnais clergy with their own claims of authority, tried to make a coherent case in favour of royal lordship, based on antique legends and precedents, and constantly lobbied the clergy and other important groups to accept the case. In 1307 nobles, peasants and clergy in the Lyonnais approved a draft treaty that recognised French suzerainty, but to obtain approval promises had been made that necessarily upset the delicate

balance of power within the Lyonnais. Although many groups had second thoughts, the archbishop who had first favoured the treaty became its most consistent critic. Rebuked at Paris by Guillaume de Nogaret in January 1310 for his foot-dragging, he returned to the Lyonnais and raised an army, an act that provoked the French to seize the region in July. Less than two years later a face-saving agreement was worked out that allowed the archbishop and the cathedral chapter to sell their jurisdiction.52

The last act in the long reign of Philip the Fair opened inauspiciously in 1314. The king’s three daughters-in-law were accused of adultery with household knights. Ultimately, one was exonerated, but all were tarnished by the charges. The knights were executed after excruciating tortures. The adultery put in doubt the legitimacy of the women’s children, and the whole affair came as a terrible shock to Philip, a man for whom the dignity of his family was obsessively important. Rebellion added to his problems.53 Marigny’s negotiation of the cease-fire with Flanders was expected to bring an end to the war tax, but the crown rejected the application of cessante causa, since an army had assembled, not just been summoned. To many this made Philip look like a transgressor of good law.

Provincial leagues of nobles appeared and the pent-up frustrations of thirty years of authoritarian rule exploded. Perhaps most unsettling were the recollections of manipulation of the coinage (the king had briefly tried this expedient again in 1311). Neither new taxes nor manipulation could be justified in the absence of war. And war to be worth fighting had to be honourable. Compromise with traitorous enemies and the retention of war taxes after the compromise seemed particularly repugnant. Philip the Fair began to deal with this opposition, but it was not for him to bring it to an end. He died on 29 November 1314, concerned, if we are to believe the reports of his last days, that he may have failed to live up to the model of St Louis.54 Many of his subjects would have agreed, for the rallying cry of the rebels was the exhortation to the crown to return to the good old days of the saintly king.

King Richard I died outside the castle of Chalus-Chabrol in the Limousin on 7 April 1199. There were two candidates for the succession: his younger brother, John, and his nephew Arthur of Brittany. Arthur, however, was only twelve years old and was the protégé of Philip Augustus, the Capetian king of France. John, on the other hand, was in his early thirties, had played a fractious part in Angevin politics since the 1180s and was thus, for the English and Norman barons, a known if questionable quantity. On 25 April he was invested as duke of Normandy; on 27 May he was crowned King of England. A year later King Philip himself, under the Treaty of Le Goulet, accepted his succession to Normandy, Anjou and Aquitaine, the dominions which the Plantagenets held as fiefs from the crown of France.

John was proud of his power and showed it. Richard I had styled himself 'king of England, duke of Normandy and Aquitaine and count of Anjou'. John added *dominus Hiberniae* to these titles, having been given the lordship of Ireland by his father, Henry II. He thus proclaimed himself mightier than all his forebears. Indeed, with a realm stretching from Dublin to the Pyrenees, he might seem the mightiest ruler in the known world. Yet, within a few years, the Capetians had brought this whole edifice crashing to the ground, thus transforming both the political structure of western Europe and the nature of England's polity.

John's trail of defeat began with his quarrel with the Lusignans, one of the great noble families of Poitou. They appealed for justice to Philip Augustus and in April 1202 John was sentenced to forfeit all his French fiefs as a contumacious vassal. Initially the sentence seemed purely nominal. At Mirebeau (July 1202) John captured the Lusignans and Arthur as well. But he then alienated his Angevin supporters and by April 1203 had lost virtually the whole of Anjou. Ugly rumours about Arthur's fate likewise made him enemies in Brittany. Meanwhile King Philip had invaded Normandy. In December 1203
John left the duchy never to return. The surrender of Rouen in June 1204 completed King Philip’s conquest. Of his great continental empire John was left with but a tenuous hold on Poitou and Gascony, the constituent parts of the duchy of Aquitaine.

John deserves some sympathy. Normandy was both the most valuable part of the Plantagenet continental empire (its revenues not far short of England’s) and the most vulnerable; hence the absolute priority Philip Augustus attached to its conquest. Normandy’s eastern frontiers were contiguous with those of the French royal demesne; its capital, Rouen, is only sixty miles from Paris. During Richard’s captivity, moreover, King Philip had over-run the frontier along the river Epte and seized its great guardian castle of Gisors. Richard built Château Gaillard to plug the gap but the defences of Normandy remained gravely weakened. In this situation considerable importance attached to the question of resources and it has been vigorously argued by modern historians that by 1200 those of the Capetians, thanks to recent acquisitions of territory and administrative reforms, considerably outstripped those of the Plantagenets, or at least those which the Plantagenets could bring to bear for the defence of Normandy: hence, essentially, the loss of the duchy. A contrary view, however, has also been advanced, namely that the Plantagenets remained richer than the Capetians and that if John failed to make his superiority tell, then that was due to his own incompetence. A rigorous comparison between the surviving Capetian and Plantagenet financial records will be necessary to resolve this debate, but in the meantime the case for Capetian superiority seems compelling.¹ Capetian revenues, coming from a compact demesne adjoining the Norman frontier rather than from a far-flung empire, were clearly much easier to mobilise in the war zone. They also appear around 1200 to have been larger than those of the Plantagenets, or at least those which the Plantagenets derived from England and Normandy, and it is doubtful if the dominions further south produced much to alter that balance. John cannot be convicted of lack of effort. In 1202–3 he transported vast sums across the Channel, but by this time the revenue from Normandy itself was disintegrating as a result of the fighting. In the end John’s flight to England in December 1203 was due to more than a failure of nerve. He had quite simply run out of money.

There were other factors. King Philip, with offers they could not refuse, had prised away the allies on whom Richard had depended. The count of Boulogne now fought strenuously on his side, not John’s; the count of Flanders opted out and left for the crusade. Meanwhile John’s greatest remaining potential ally, his nephew Otto of Brunswick, had his hands full securing the German

¹ For the debate see Holt (1984); Gillingham (1984), pp. 71–4; Barratt (forthcoming), and for the loss of Normandy in general Power (forthcoming).
throne. None of this made the loss of Normandy inevitable. John did have substantial resources. He also had the potential support of the Anglo-Norman nobility. At the beginning of the thirteenth century there were still more than a hundred barons with significant lands in both the duchy and the kingdom and thus a good deal to lose from their separation. But in Normandy, as the chronicler Ralph of Coggeshall put it, John ‘always feared betrayal by his own men’. It was for that reason, as well as shortage of funds, that he simply failed to fight. Nor was John far wrong in his assessment. In 1203 Robert count of Alençon entertained John to breakfast in the morning and defected to King Philip in the afternoon. In part, especially when such barons held land along Normandy’s vulnerable borders (like Hugh de Gournay on the Epte), treason was the condition of survival. But it was also provoked by John’s own character and mistakes. John was an alarming mixture. He was quite capable of acting with sensitivity and judgement. At the start of his reign he was widely praised for settling a quarrel with the Cistercians and indeed for making peace with France at Le Goulet. Yet there was also in him a devil, perhaps the product of his tortuous past as a younger son plotting against his father and brothers. Very soon his cruelty to those taken at Mirebeau, his breach of the promises made to William des Roches, the greatest baron in Anjou, and his murder of Arthur branded him a king both dangerous and dishonest. Richard too, of course, had been stern and intimidating, but he also possessed an open, self-confident inspiring chivalry, as well as a military genius, which John totally lacked. The final straw was John’s reliance on low-born administrators and his stationing of mercenary troops not on the frontiers but in central Normandy, where they engaged in a riot of pillage and extortion. ‘And for such things’, concluded a shrewd observer, ‘he was hated by the barons of the land.’

In 1203–4 John had been knocked out of the ring with amazing speed. He spent the next ten years trying to climb back into it. Using the treasure produced by his intensive government of England he secured the support of Otto and restored his alliances with the counts of Flanders and Boulogne. In 1214 he at last launched the great campaign which would, he hoped, recover all he had lost. It ended in disaster. While John himself was outfaced in Anjou, his northern allies were decisively defeated on 27 July at Bouvines, near Valenciennes. John had no alternative but to agree to a six-year truce. His efforts to recover Normandy and Anjou were over.

The loss of Normandy did not mean that thirteenth-century England ceased to be part of ‘the community of Europe’. A mason from Rheims designed Henry III’s Westminster Abbey, and one from Savoy Edward I’s

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2 Radulphi de Coggeshall chronicon anglicanum, ed. Stevenson, p. 144.
3 Diplomatic documents, ed. Chaplais, p. 140.
castles. There was nothing the least bit ‘Euro-sceptic’ about Henry and Edward themselves. Henry III left his heart to Fontevrault Abbey where Henry II and Richard I were buried. He was determined to recover the Plantagenet cross-Channel empire, as was Edward to defend what was left of it. English nobles were equally cosmopolitan. They joined the European tournament and pilgrimage circuits and visited the major courts on diplomatic missions. Churchmen shuttled to and forth from Rome, and academies established large English contingents at the Universities of Paris and Bologna. Merchants from Italy, France and the Low Countries took up residence in London, and, with cloth and furs from the north and silks and spices from the south, attended the great international fairs at Boston, Stamford and St Ives. The Gascon wine trade depended on the English market; the Flemish cloth industry depended on English wool; and the finances of Edward I depended for many years on Italian bankers. Throughout the century, moreover, the business of the crusade continued to grip the hearts and minds of Englishmen. Chroniclers recorded events in the east at length. Both Henry III’s brother, Richard earl of Cornwall, and Edward, his son and heir, went to the Holy Land, as did many English nobles, one of whom, William Longespee, gained international fame through his heroic death there in 1250.4

Yet, for all that, the changes wrought by the loss of Normandy were momentous. The duchy’s revenues now flowed to the Capetians rather than the Plantagenets, thus tipping the balance of power decisively in favour of the former. The Anglo-Norman elite which had dominated both the kingdom and the duchy since 1066 ceased to exist. John insisted that his subjects could owe but one allegiance. Those who did homage to King Philip for lands in Normandy thus forfeited their possessions in England and vice versa. However much it might visit the continent, the upper nobility, now bereft of lands overseas, essentially lived in England and became English rather than Anglo-Norman. The change was equally profound for the dynasty. The days of the absentee kings were over. The Plantagenets down to 1204, like their Norman predecessors, had spent at least half their time across the Channel. After 1224, only Gascony remained of their continental empire. Lacking revenues and palace-castles, it had never attracted regular visits from the king-dukes before 1204, nor did it afterwards, even when those revenues began to increase. Thus Henry III spent only four and a half years of his fifty-six-year reign across the Channel, and Edward I five and half years out of his thirty-five. The Plantagenets, for practical purposes, had become an English dynasty. Ultimately that fact had consequences for the whole political shape of Britain.

4 For this perspective see Matthew (1997) and for the crusade Lloyd (1988).
While John, on the continent, succumbed to a monarch of his own size, in Britain he triumphed over inferior kings and princes. In 1209 he marched to the Tweed and imposed an exigent peace on King William of Scotland, who had contemplated an alliance with Philip Augustus. In 1210 he took an army to Ireland, received the homage of the native princes and drove out the Lacy's, who had harboured the rebel baron William de Braose. In 1211 he invaded Gwynedd, penetrated as far west as Bangor and forced Llywelyn prince of North Wales to cede the lands between the Conwy and the Dee. ‘Thus’, commented the Barnwell annalist, ‘in Ireland, Scotland and Wales there was no one who did not bow to the nod of the king of England, which as is well known was the case with none of his predecessors.’ Indeed, John might well have responded to the Welsh revolt of 1212 with the total seizure of Gwynedd envisaged in the 1211 treaty, had he not been distracted by his troubles in England and by his ambitions across the sea.

One of those troubles was John’s bitter contest with Pope Innocent III. At the end of 1206 the monks of Canterbury, at Innocent’s behest, had elected the famous academic, Stephen Langton, as the new archbishop. John was understandably furious and refused to accept him. Like his predecessors he hoped to have a trusted curialis at Canterbury, not some independent professor. But John lacked freedom of action. The medieval papacy was at the height of its power. The quarrel with the Capetians was reaching its climax. In 1208 England was placed under an interdict; next year John was excommunicated, and finally the papacy encouraged or at least permitted plans for a Capetian invasion. So, in May 1213, John came to terms. He accepted Langton as archbishop and made England a papal fief. This astonished monkish chroniclers but was the wisest move of his life. If Langton remained unreliable, from the papacy John received unstinting support. Without it, his dynasty would not have survived.

Papal support, however, could not help John when he returned to England in October 1214 after the failure of his continental campaign, humiliated, penniless and at the mercy of his domestic enemies. Already in 1212 there had been a baronial plot against his life, which had forced him to call off his Welsh expedition. Now, as J.C. Holt has remarked, ‘the road from Bouvines to Runnymede was direct, short and unavoidable’. John retained until his death the loyalty of some important barons (notably the earls of Pembroke, Chester and Derby), but the great majority sided against him. Hostilities opened in the spring of 1215 and culminated in the surrender of London to the barons. After that John saw no immediate prospect of victory and so came to terms. On

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15 June 1215 he sealed Magna Carta at Runnymede, an island in the Thames near Windsor.

The Charter had sixty-one clauses and their main thrust was clear: to limit the ‘money-getting’ activities of the king and his government; to make royal justice more equitable and available; to correct the abuses of the king’s local agents and, in general, to assert a fundamental principle: that the king could not act against individuals in an arbitrary fashion ‘by will’ (per voluntatem). He was subject to the law. That principle was encapsulated in what was to become the Charter’s most famous chapter (39), the only one still on the Statute Book at the end of the twentieth century: no freeman, John promised, was to be deprived of his property, outlawed, imprisoned, exiled or in any way proceeded against save by lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land. The Charter met both baronial grievances and those of other sections of society. The early chapters benefited the barons first and foremost since they regulated the king’s so-called feudal rights and revenues, those that derived from the tenurial relationship between the king and his tenants-in-chief: thus the inheritance tax (relief) paid by a baron was limited to £100, the king’s exploitation of wardships was restricted, widows were not to be forced to remarry, and scutage was to be levied only with consent. However, the Charter’s first chapter promised freedom to the Church, another safeguarded the liberties of London, while others assigned an important role to knights in dispensing justice in the localities and reforming local administration. The beneficiaries of chapter 39 were conspicuously all freemen, not simply all bishops and barons. All sections of society, even the unfree peasants, benefited from the clauses which limited the size of judicial fines.

In essence the Charter was a response to a system of royal government which had developed in the twelfth century, on strong Anglo-Saxon foundations, and had become the most formidable in north-western Europe. The king’s ordinary revenues derived from his feudal rights (which also gave him large windfalls from ecclesiastical vacancies), from the profits of justice, from the royal forest and from the king’s own lands, ‘the royal demesne’. Substantial revenue could also be derived from the Jews. The number of Jews in England was small. In the early thirteenth century less than 5,000, including women and children, were gathered in about twenty towns, with the communities in York and London the most important. A high proportion of Jewish wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few plutocrats; wealth was derived largely from moneylending. Indeed the Jews were probably the main source of credit both for knights and freemen in the shires and also (here much larger sums were involved) for great magnates and ecclesiastical institutions. Since in law the

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7 Holt (1961), (1985) and (1992) are absolutely fundamental to an understanding of Magna Carta.
Jews were the king’s own property, he could tax them at will just like the peasants on the royal demesne. He could also seize the assets of individual Jews on their death, or if they could not pay their taxes; this meant that many Christians ended up owing their Jewish debts to the crown.  

The great institution responsible for exacting the king’s revenue and auditing the accounts was the exchequer, based at Westminster. (There was a separate exchequer dealing with Jewish affairs.) In the localities the chief administrative division was the county, each divided into hundreds, and the chief administrative officer the sheriff. He executed all manner of royal orders, collected the king’s revenues and presided over minor pleas in the county and hundred courts. More important judicial business was the concern of the justices of the general eyre, justices sent on circuit around the country to try cases of serious crime and share with the justices of ‘the bench’ at Westminster the hearing of the civil actions introduced by Henry II. The eyres also investigated royal rights and through their pleas, particularly their criminal pleas, generated substantial revenues for the crown.

When the king was out of the country, this system was controlled by the chief justiciar. When he was in England, the centre was the royal household. There the clerks of the king’s wardrobe received money both from the exchequer and from local revenue, and spent it on the household’s food, drink and clothes and on an assortment of gifts, wages and salaries. Alongside the wardrobe was the chancery, whose clerks wrote and sealed the king’s letters, writs and charters and, from John’s reign, recorded them, according to type, on a whole series of chancery rolls. It was through letters sent out from the chancery and the exchequer (which had its own seal) that the government of England was directed. To run the system there was a staff of royal clerks, the most successful of whom were often rewarded with bishoprics. There was also a long tradition of employing laymen, ‘raised from the dust’, or at least from the ranks of the knightly class, who owed everything to the king and thus would be the more loyal and ruthless in his service. One particular group of men had especial importance, namely the knights of the royal household. John at any one time had over fifty of them. They could ‘trouble-shoot’ on special missions, stiffen local government as sheriffs and castellans, and, with their own followers, form the core of royal armies.

The Plantagenet kings, at their coronation, swore to dispense justice and maintain the rights of the crown. The two essentials of kingship were inseparable; how could the kings do justice if they were weak? But whereas the dispensation of justice, notably through the legal procedures introduced by

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Henry II, was potentially popular (and expanded in the Charter), the maintenance of royal rights and power created deep resentments. Henry II had hugely expanded the area of the royal forest and exploited it ruthlessly for money. Richard I had demanded fines rather than reasonable reliefs from his barons for succession to their inheritances. The fact was that the Plantagenet kings, like their Norman predecessors, had all exploited England to sustain their continental possessions, and all, faced with the steady erosion of easy income as the wide lands acquired by the Conquest were given away to reward servants and supporters, relied increasingly on money extracted if not extorted from individuals by the exchequer. The pace of exploitation quickened as the threat to Normandy increased. By 1199, so the chronicler Abbot Ralph of Coggeshall believed, it had already reached unprecedented levels.

Equally resented might be the way that kings gave patronage to their friends and punished their enemies. They had much to give: land, money, wardships and marriages. But if they bestowed these on too narrow a group and raised too many men from the dust, they were bound to antagonise old-established families. Punishment took the form not of execution but of money fines (exorbitant under Richard) and confiscation of land. Magna Carta was concerned with those who had been dispossessed ‘without lawful judgement of their peers’ by Henry II and Richard I. Not surprisingly, as soon as John came to the throne he was faced by groups of barons demanding the restoration of their ‘rights’. The rebellion of 1215, according to Ralph of Coggeshall, was thus to secure the abolition of the evil customs ‘which both the father and brother of the king had raised up to the detriment of the Church and kingdom, together with the abuses which [King John] had added’.10

The Great Charter was also then, as Coggeshall recognised, a more particular attack on the policies of King John, for John took the weapons of his predecessors and wielded them with a new vigour. He had good reason to do so. First, his real income was eroded by a period of rapid inflation in the early 1200s which left many prices at double their old levels.11 Secondly, his necessities were multiplied many times over by the loss of Normandy. John was thrown back on his English resources and needed to exploit them as never before. Personally present in the country to a degree unknown under Henry and Richard, he closed down the loopholes and, with remarkable energy, began a steady, long-term exploitation of the kingdom. At the start of the reign his ordinary annual revenue from the counties, as recorded in the pipe rolls, was some £22,000. After 1204 it steadily increased, until between 1208 and 1212 it averaged some £39,000. If we add in the revenue from escheats (land which

10 Radulphi de Coggeshall chronicon anglicanum, ed. Stevenson, p. 170.
11 Latimer (forthcoming) casts new light on the chronology of the inflation. See also Bolton (1992).
had come into the king’s hands), the rise is from £23,000 to £45,000; while if we look at total pipe roll income, swollen as it was by revenue from ecclesiastical vacancies and estates seized from the Church during the Interdict, then the increase is from £23,000 to £52,500. Of course, allowance in all this must be made for the rapid inflation of John’s early years, but even in real terms John’s ordinary annual revenue from the counties alone was over a third larger between 1208 and 1212 than it had been at the start of the reign. His total pipe roll revenue was 60 per cent larger. The pipe rolls far from recorded John’s total resources, however. If we add in £60,000 certainly raised by a great tax in 1207, an estimated £45,000 for further Interdict revenues, and assume (as may well be the case) that the £40,000 demanded from the Jews in 1210 was largely paid, then John’s income between 1207 and 1212 averaged over £70,000 a year. Probably this represented the greatest level of financial exploitation seen in England since the Norman Conquest. As a result by 1214 John had amassed a treasure of £130,000. The expedition of that year did not fail for lack of money. The victims of all this were partly great barons like Gilbert de Gant and William de Mowbray who were made to pay off vast individual debts derived from reliefs, proffers for justice and debts owed to the Jews. They were also knights, freemen and peasants in the shires, the ‘miserable provincials’ (as the Barnwell chronicler described them) who were oppressed both by the sheriffs (made to raise additional revenues above the ancient farms of their shires) and by the extortionate forest eyres of 1207-8 and 1212. 1215 was indeed a ‘rebellion of the king’s debtors’ in Holt’s words. And it was a rebellion particularly strong in the north, which had under John for the first time felt the full weight of royal government.

In an earlier generation John might have got away more easily with his oppressive policies, but standards were changing. Old ideas that kings should rule justly were gaining increasing bite and definition. The great political thinker, John of Salisbury, in his Polieraticus (c. 1160) publicised the distinction between the true ruler and the tyrant: the former respected the law and governed in the interests of his people; the latter ruled according to his will (voluntas) and consulted only his private interests. Such ideas became common currency and were powerfully expressed in an apocryphal collection of ‘The Laws of Edward the Confessor’ made in London in the 1200s. The Plantagenets themselves played a part in their transmission. Henry II’s new legal procedures turned on the principle that no freeman should be deprived of his property save lawfully and after judgement. It was natural to think that the same rule should apply equally to the kings. John himself would have argued

12 For these financial figures see Barratt (1996).
13 Holt (1961), p. 34, and see pp. 143–74 for an essential account of John’s oppressive financial policies.
that much of this was unfair. He frequently stressed his desire to follow the law and custom of the realm and in any case, in many areas (like the size of relief) there was no precise law and custom for him to break. In that sense Magna Carta, although it pretended to be restoring old law, was in fact imposing new. Yet what was important in all this was not the technical arguments but the general perception. Some of John’s acts on any reckoning were lawless (notably his murders) and the general nature of his rule went far beyond what seemed customary and acceptable.

John’s situation was also more complex than that faced by kings earlier in the century, for he had to control a political community not merely more vocal than before but also expanding in size.15 At the top of the heap, alongside the bishops and greater abbots, there were 150 to 200 lay barons with median annual incomes of about £115. The wealthiest barons (including around a dozen earls) enjoyed £300 to £1,000 a year. The bulk of this income, coming from rents and the sale of large grain surpluses, was derived from the labour of the free and unfree peasants who formed 85 per cent of the population. Money and authority also came from rights of jurisdiction. A great baron had tenants, holding land from him by knight service, over whom he had his own rights or relief and wardship. The honour (as this structure of baron and tenants was called) had its own court which tenants were bound to attend and where civil disputes over land and services might be settled. Lords also derived power from a share in royal jurisdiction in the localities. Half the hundreds of England in the thirteenth century were in private hands, with the official of the lord rather than the sheriff presiding over the hundred court and taking some or all of the resulting revenues. Lords might also have other liberties attached to their manorial, private hundred or honorial courts (and the distinction between the three was sometimes blurred), for example ‘infangthief’, which was the right to hang a thief taken red-handed on one’s property. Throughout the century lords struggled to maintain and expand the authority of their local courts and jurisdictions, thus coming into conflict with their tenants, their neighbours and the sheriff. How far the honour in the early thirteenth century was still a focus of loyalty between the lord and his knightly tenants (as opposed to simply a source of rights and revenues) is debated by historians. What is clear is that those tenants were becoming an increasingly independent force in politics for whose support both king and magnates might contend.

There were in the 1200s over 4,000 county knights. Some were as wealthy as small barons, but the great majority had one or two manors and incomes of between £15 and £30 a year. There were also knights who were considerably

15 For the next two paragraphs see Painter (1943); Holt (1961), pp. 17–60; Coss (1973); Waugh (1986); Carpenter (1996b), pp. 349–80; Coss (1991); Crouch, Carpenter and Coss (1991); Thomas (1993); Coss (1995); Faulkner (1996).
poorer than that and were not lords of manors at all. (Even they, however, were far better off than the most substantial unfree peasants whose income after rent might be around £2 a year). During the course of the century the number of knights declined dramatically; by 1300 there were perhaps 1,200 of them, the rank having become confined to those with two or three manors and above. According to one hypothesis this change was related to a social and economic crisis which engulfed the early thirteenth-century knights and their descendants, radicalising them politically and forcing many families, heavily in debt (often to the Jews), to sell up. A different hypothesis (which seems more convincing), while acknowledging many individual difficulties, would see the long-term material position of the the early thirteenth-century knightly families (if they were manorial lords) as fundamentally sound, and explain the decline in the number of knights in terms of all but the wealthiest families safeguarding their positions by refusing to assume an increasingly expensive honour. These changes produced a prestigious and influential knightly elite in each county (around 1270 there were about sixty knights in a medium sized shire). But this elite was still intertwined (hence much of its influence) with the one and two manored lords who had sensibly ceased to take up knighthood (an increasingly onerous honour) and who in the next century were to adopt the title of esquire. Ultimately the power of this wider class, which one may reasonably call the gentry, derived from the amount of land it held and from its increasing domination of local government office. Its members also gained independence through frequently holding from more than one lord, and were protected from arbitrary dispossession by the new legal procedures of Henry II. Barons were perfectly able to adapt to this situation. From at least the mid-twelfth century they were thus retaining followers with whom they had no tenurial connection. Indeed, competing for good service, they were eager to do so. But in this more fluid society they were less able than before to answer for and control a defined body of knightly tenants. Hence the gentry gained its own voice with which it complained about the running of local government and called for its control to be vested in their own hands. Ultimately this was a voice which was to be represented by knights in parliament.

It was not merely the knights who came to be represented in parliament, of course: burgesses also came from the towns. By the end of the century there were around fifteen towns boasting populations of over 10,000, with Bristol and Norwich among the most important. Some during the century may have

16 All the estimates of income given here are very approximate. For attempts to reconstruct peasant budgets see Dyer (1989), pp. 109–18, and see pp. 29–30 for (much larger) magnate and gentry incomes around 1300.

17 In this debate a good deal turns on how far knightly families had demesnes large enough to take advantage of rising prices by producing grain for the market.
grown faster than London itself. In terms of size and political importance, however, London remained dominant. In 1141 its defection had been decisive in preventing the empress Matilda gaining the throne. Around 1200 it had perhaps 40,000 inhabitants, numbers having doubled during the twelfth century. By 1300 its population may have approached 80,000.18

Given John's urgent need for money after 1204, it was inevitable that he would give offence to this widening political society, but his problems with the magnates were compounded by his handling of patronage and punishment. He concentrated power and favour on a narrow circle of ministers, including parvenus like Philip Oldcoates and Brian de Lisle, who were ruthless local agents in the north, and foreigners like Philip Mark, a notorious sheriff of Nottingham, who was dismissed from office under Magna Carta. For barons litigating against each other, the 'justice' John provided was venal, arbitrary and essentially designed to reward friends and chastise enemies. At least one cause célèbre ended (or so it seemed) in a lawless act of dispossession 'by the king's will' when Trowbridge was taken from the earl of Hereford and given to William Longespee. Yet John later drove William (his half-brother) into rebellion by seducing his wife. John's feud with another great baron, William de Braose, was concluded by murder: William's wife Matilda (a celebrated Amazonian woman) and his eldest son were starved to death in Windsor castle.

John also failed to reach out to the knights so that, as Ralph of Coggeshall noted, even those of his few baronial supporters went over to the rebels. Here John had shown himself particularly blind, for in the legal procedures of Henry II, he had a means to conciliate knights and others below them in local society. These procedures offered all (save unfree peasants) trial by jury before royal justices in cases of lawless dispossession by barons or anyone else. The procedures also took business away from the barons' honorial courts. Yet here too John's paranoia let him down. Far from playing his strongest card, he threw it away. Rather than make royal justice easier to obtain, he made it more difficult. Between 1209 and 1212, suspicious of rival centres of authority, John closed down the bench of justices at Westminster, virtually suspended the eyres in the counties and insisted that all pleas should follow his own hectic itinerations round the country: impossibly inconvenient for litigants. The Great Charter therefore reversed all this and insisted that Henry II's procedures and other common pleas were to be held at a fixed place, either the bench at Westminster or before judges in the county court where they were to sit with four locally elected knights.19

The great barons, therefore, were able to mobilise a broad coalition against

18 Keene (1989); Nightingale (1996).
the king, a coalition which was reflected in the Charter itself. In Stephen’s reign the barons had fought for themselves and extracted concessions in individual charters. Under John they co-operated together to force a general charter of liberties on the king, even though it extended royal justice at the expense of their honorial courts. Underlying baronial co-operation were ties of faction which often derived from long-standing connections of family and neighbourhood. They derived too from a strong sense of a common problem — that produced by the aggressive activities of the crown. When a baron owed money to the king, his fellows frequently rallied round to act as pledges for the payments. Thus, as Holt has remarked, the very evidence which touches most closely on the financial exploitation of families by the crown is also that which touches most closely on the incipient community of action of those families. In widening the scope of the Charter to include grievances other than their own, the great baronial leaders may have been influenced by the idealism of Stephen Langton, who was closely involved in the negotiations in 1215. But essentially they were gaining support by responding to the balance of power in English society. It was not till the reign of Edward I that the king was able to turn the tables and do the same.

In the short term Magna Carta failed utterly. Probably John always saw it as a temporary expedient to secure time until his position improved. Almost at once he asked the pope to quash the document, and Innocent III duly obliged on 25 August. The country was once again in a state of civil war. Fundamentally, John’s opponents had made the mistake of coming to terms without winning the war. The Charter was a negotiated document, not one dictated when John was on his knees. It required John to dismiss his foreign mercenaries and certain named castellans, but allowed him to keep the bulk of his army and all his castles. This made the task of the twenty-five barons who were empowered to enforce the Charter impossible.

Starting the war, John took Rochester castle and then, early in 1216, led a great marauding expedition to the north. The rebels countered by offering the throne to Louis, eldest son of King Philip Augustus of France, who landed in May 1216 and soon controlled over half the kingdom. John died in Newark castle, during the night of 17–18 October 1216, as a great storm blew the roofs off the surrounding houses. At the start of the reign, with boastful confidence, he had added the lordship of Ireland to his titles. Now Ireland appeared the only place where Henry, his nine-year-old son, might find safe refuge.

No king of England came to the throne in a more desperate situation than Henry III. Yet, within a year, Louis had left the country, peace had been proclaimed and
Henry was universally acknowledged as king. Hubert de Burgh’s gallant defence of Dover castle, the triumph of the aged William Marshal earl of Pembroke at the battle of Lincoln (20 May 1217), and finally Hubert’s naval victory off Sandwich, had secured his succession.

Once the war was won, William Marshal, as regent, and after his death in 1219, Hubert de Burgh, as chief justiciar, ably assisted by two remarkable papal legates, Guala and Pandulf, grappled with appalling problems. With the royal government penniless and powerless, they had to appease former rebels, assert authority over freewheeling loyalists, slowly rebuild the apparatus of the crown and somehow retain what was left of the cross-Channel possessions. In the event Henry’s governors were unable to save Poitou from conquest by Louis VIII in 1224, but, by a vast effort, they did preserve Gascony. The Capetian tide which had swept the Plantagenets out of much of France and shaken their position in England had at last been stemmed. Gascony was to remain in English hands till 1453. The minority government made no similar effort to reverse the advances made by Llywelyn after the abandonment of John’s expedition in 1212. In 1218 the Treaty of Worcester accepted Llywelyn’s possession of southern Powys as well as Cardigan and Carmarthen. The campaigns against him in 1223, like those in 1228 and 1231, were essentially holding operations. In 1223 it was the second William Marshal earl of Pembroke, not the king, who did the real damage to Llywelyn’s hegemony in South Wales. Within England, however, by the time that Henry III entered full power in 1227, he controlled a government restored in many ways to its appearance before the war. Yet it was also a government decisively different. Magna Carta took root in the minority of Henry III. In order to win the war, secure the peace and obtain the great tax which saved Gascony in 1225, Henry’s ministers, acting in his name, performed an astonishing volte face. They accepted what John had rejected and in November 1216, November 1217 and finally in February 1225 issued new versions of the Great Charter. In 1217 and 1225, moreover, they combined it with an entirely new Charter regulating the size and administration of the royal forest. The 1225 versions became definitive. When Henry III and his successors confirmed the Charters they always confirmed those of 1225.

The Charters were no panacea. Even where relevant they had no constitutional means of enforcement since the twenty-five barons set up in 1215 to remedy violations were not mentioned in any of the later versions. The Charters also said virtually nothing about how the king’s ministers were to be chosen and patronage distributed. They were thus irrelevant to key issues under Henry III and had to be supplemented by more radical schemes of reform. Although it has been argued that after the Charter great magnates, litigating against each other, enjoyed for the first time the routine legal procedures
introduced by Henry II, in practice (while justice was no longer sold) such high cases were just as subject to royal interference as before.  

If the defects of the Charters were already apparent in the minority, so were potential remedies. The period saw large responsibilities being shoul-dered by great councils, assemblies (later called parliaments) of the chief lay and ecclesiastical magnates of the realm. Such assemblies sanctioned taxa-tion, settled law cases and selected the king’s ministers. In 1218–19 great councils placed Ralph de Neville, later bishop of Chichester, in charge of the king’s seal, and Hubert de Burgh in day-to-day charge of government. Both, over a long period, discharged their responsibilities in an open, even-handed fashion. The merits of ministers chosen by great councils were clearly demonstrated. The demand for appointments to be made in that way became the programme round which Henry III’s critics rallied during the period of his personal rule.  

It would be quite wrong, however, to think that the Charters were failures. Quite the reverse. They constituted a watershed in English politics. During the minority they were not merely issued by the king. They were also taken to heart by his subjects. Copies of each version were sent to the counties, proclaimed in the county courts, preserved in accessible places and copied into numerous private cartularies and notebooks. From 1218 the gentry struggled to exploit the clauses dealing with the county and hundred courts and the illicit afforestations of Henry II. Important clauses like those which limited the relief of a baron to £100, protected widows and forbade the selling of justice were largely obeyed, thus reducing the king’s revenue and his political power. The general force of the Charters was amply confirmed by the events which closed the first phase of Henry’s reign. Although Henry assumed full power in 1227 he retained Hubert de Burgh as his justiciar down to 1232 and then for two turbulent years lay in thrall to Hubert’s arch-rival, the Touraingeau Bishop Peter des Roches of Winchester. Bishop Peter had been at the heart of John’s abrasive rule and now aspired to turn back the clock. He boasted about the king’s ‘plenitude of power’, ridiculed chapter 39 of the Charter, and encouraged Henry in a series of lawless dispossessions. The result was a political explosion which left Henry humbly apologising for his tyrannical rule.  

The fundamental principle of the Charter – that the king was subject to the law – could not have been more powerfully reinforced.
IV

It was only when Hubert de Burgh and Peter des Roches, two former chief justiciars of King John, quit the political stage in 1234 that Henry's personal rule really began. It ended in 1258 with a great political revolution, followed by a radical reform of the realm and a vicious civil war. But this turbulent conclusion should not obscure the fact that Henry’s rule, indeed the reign in general down to 1263, saw a long period of domestic peace, little foreign war and (for the laity at least) limited financial pressure from the crown. All this enabled the economy and society to recover from John’s extortionate kingship and the destruction of the Magna Carta civil war. Henry’s peace had a variety of causes and one certainly lay in his own temperament. He was the very opposite of his father. He was pious, chaste, trusting and rather lazy. In contrast to John’s hectic itinerary, Henry sojourned lengthily at his favourite palaces and palace castles: Winchester, Clarendon, Marlborough, Windsor, above all Westminster, none of them further north than Woodstock. He delighted in the daily ceremonial of the Mass and issued streams of orders to make all his homes more beautiful and luxurious.22 Henry’s ‘simplicity’, which so exasperated his subjects, the product perhaps of the minority in which ministers shielded him from unpleasant realities, was essentially a naiveté which made it hard for him to judge the results of his actions and gauge what was possible and what was not. His able and loyal councillors (notably John Mansel) saved him from many blunders but they could not save him from everything.

This was partly because Henry was not without ambition, if in an arm chair sort of way. Indeed he wanted passionately to recover the lost cross-Channel empire. That, however, was no easy task. Even when Henry's income had climbed back to over £20,000 a year (as it had by 1230), it was still three or four times smaller than that of the Capetians. The Capetian conquest of Anjou and Poitou meant that Normandy itself could not be attacked directly. Unless Henry secured allies the nearest port for an army was as far south as Bordeaux in Gascony. In practice Henry saw little alternative but to begin by reconquering Poitou, but since the English baronage had no lands to recover there, it had limited interest in the enterprise. Enthusiasm for the reconquest of Normandy was itself diminished by the way the English barons who had lost lands in the duchy had been compensated, and other royal servants rewarded, out of the ‘lands of the Normans’, the English lands confiscated from those who had chosen the French allegiance in 1204. This did not mean that the Plantagenet empire was irrecoverable. Louis IX’s minority and the tensions between the French monarchy and the lords of the great fiefs gave plenty of room for

22 Colvin (1963), I, pp. 94–5.
exploitation. Henry spent large sums on pensions for the major Poitevin magnates and his diplomacy was not unsuccessful. His first expedition in 1230 hinged on an alliance with Peter duke of Brittany, his second in 1242 on one with Hugues, lord of Lusignan and count of La Marche, whom Henry’s own mother, having returned home to Angoulême, had married in 1220. Both in 1230 and 1242 a single great battle—a Crécy, Poitiers or Agincourt—might have reversed the verdict of Bouvines. Yet battle was the one thing Henry did everything to avoid. In 1242 when Louis IX bravely led his forces across the river Charente to confront the English in the fields at Taillebourg, Henry turned tail and fled back to Saintes. The fact was that Henry was the last person to lead a successful military expedition. His ambitions were totally unsupported by martial interests and expertise. In that respect as in others he was truly a rex pacificus.

The failure of the 1242 expedition marked the end of Henry’s attempts to recover his lost possessions. His final expedition in 1253–4 had more limited objectives and was by far his most successful. Gascony, inflamed by Simon de Montfort’s harsh seneschalship, and threatened with invasion by Alfonso king of Castile, was set in order by a judicious mixture of force, conciliation and diplomacy, Edward, Henry’s eldest son, being married to Eleanor of Castile, Alfonso’s sister. Shortly afterwards Henry accepted a papal offer of the throne of Sicily for his second son, Edmund. This was a disastrous scheme, as will be seen, but at least in clearing the decks to promote it, Henry reached a settlement with the king of France.

Under the Treaty of Paris (December 1259) Henry surrendered his claims to Normandy, Anjou and Poitou. In return Louis IX accepted Henry’s tenure of Gascony and promised him eventual possession of the Saintonge and the Agenais, the second, in particular, a valuable territory. Henry was later criticised for accepting that Gascony, hitherto, so it was said, an allod possessed in full sovereignty, was now a fief held from the king of France. But this allodial theory was largely a creation of fourteenth-century lawyers. At the time Henry was rightly concerned to secure Louis IX’s recognition of his title to Gascony and thus remove the threat of French invasion. Henry and Louis shared a common piety (though Louis’s was far more austere) and their courts embraced a common code of conduct with its stress on courtesy, generosity and good nature—débonereté.23 The two kings had married sisters and wished for harmony between their families. The theory was laudable; the practice sufficient to keep the peace for thirty-five years.

The family peace which Henry achieved with the Capetians had been foreshadowed within Britain by Henry’s relations with Scotland. In 1237 he

23 Vale (1990), pp. 21–47.
reached a statesmanlike settlement with King Alexander II which removed all causes of friction between the two kingdoms and good relations were cemented by Alexander III’s marriage to Henry’s daughter Margaret, splendidly and joyfully celebrated at York in 1251. Henry fuzzed over Scottish affairs during Alexander’s minority, which lasted until 1260, but he conspicuously refused to advance ancient claims to overlordship over the kingdom. Henry had no comparable interest in Ireland, although its politics in times of crisis (notably in 1224 and 1233–4) were inextricably linked with those of England. He was content to draw several thousand pounds a year from the lordship without ever fulfilling promises to go there.²⁴ It was Wales which eventually felt the oppressive side of Henry’s kingship. Henry had strengthened his position on the frontiers of Gwynedd by securing Chester for the crown on the death of the last earl in 1237.²⁵ Thus after Llywelyn the Great passed away in 1240 he was in a position to abandon the holding policies which had prevailed since the Treaty of Worcester in 1218. Two campaigns against David, Llywelyn’s son, in 1241 and 1245, put Gwynedd back to where it had been after John’s campaign of 1211. Henry took the homage of all the native Welsh princes (thus making clear that David enjoyed no such general hegemony) and secured his conquest of the cantrefs between the Conwy and the Dee by building castles at Deganwy and Diserth. Yet even here the more benign side of Henrician policy was still apparent. On David’s death in 1246, without heirs and in rebellion, Henry, under previous agreements, was perfectly entitled to annex Gwynedd (now reduced to Anglesey and the lands west of the Conwy) to the crown. Yet instead, under the Treaty of Woodstock in 1247, he permitted the succession of David’s nephews Owain and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, the latter the future prince of Wales.

Within England Henry ruled in peace from 1234 down to the revolution of 1258, a peace for which he justifiably claimed much credit. Later, Henry’s critics implied that he was influenced by two of the most famous and notorious Roman law tags: that the prince was ‘free from the law’ (*legibus solutus*) and that ‘the word of the prince has the force of law’. Perhaps such absolutist sentiments were bandied about Henry’s court by Peter des Roches between 1232 and 1234. Henry himself sometimes wistfully compared his power to the pope’s and pondered what special authority he might enjoy as a result of anointing at the coronation. Yet, *Bracton*, the great book on the laws of England, compiled by the legal circle around the judge, William Ralegh, Henry’s chief minister for a time in the 1230s, stressed that the king was subject to the law, and Henry himself acknowledged as much both in 1237 and 1253 when he confirmed the Charters with every appearance of sincerity. Although

he also claimed the absolute right to choose his own ministers, that was, as he said, in accordance with English law and custom, not in contravention of it. Calculation as well as temperament meant Henry had no wish to return to the policies of his father. Had they not nearly destroyed the dynasty and brought low Henry himself when repeated between 1232 and 1234? Henry’s model of kingship was thus not King John (quite probably in Hell) but the king/saint, who was buried at Westminster Abbey, and now sat at God’s right hand: Edward the Confessor. The Confessor, as Henry knew him from legends and hagiographies, had been the very reverse of the autocratic, energetic, warlike monarch. Rather, he had been calm and wise, just and pious, generous and peaceable. During the 1230s Henry’s devotion to the Confessor grew apace. In 1245 he started to rebuild the abbey as a fitting home for the saint’s new shrine.26

To some extent, Henry’s practice accorded with his theory. He based his peace perfectly reasonably on appeasing the great magnates. He avoided challenging their local jurisdictions, took a lenient attitude to their debts, tried to draw them into a family circle at court and never repeated the arbitrary seizures of property of the years 1232 to 1234. 1258, unlike 1215, was not a rebellion of ‘outs’, debtors and dispossessed. For the laity more generally, Henry’s rule was also less oppressive than John’s, partly because the Charters limited his revenues, partly because he drove his government less hard. Henry obtained no grants of general taxation after 1237, and between 1241 and 1245, when his ordinary revenues were at their height, they averaged £31,500 a year from the counties and escheats, approaching £14,000 a year less than those of John between 1208 and 1212. His total known revenue in the same period averaged £36,500, quite possibly £35,000 a year smaller than John’s between 1207 and 1212.27 By 1253, after a long period of saving, Henry had accumulated a treasure (saved in gold for a crusade which never took place) of some £20,000. It was this treasure which funded the successful Gascon campaign of 1253–4, but it was still a paltry sum compared with the £133,000 John enjoyed in 1212. By 1258 Henry’s total revenues (thanks in part to the apanage created for the Lord Edward together with other patronage) had fallen back to under £30,000 a year.28 Henry could live within his means and generate a small surplus provided he lived quietly and avoided war. The peace of his personal rule was thus due to lack of resources as well as to lack of martial spirit. Equally the revolution of 1258 was possible because Henry had no reserve of treasure with which to resist it.

Against this background one might wonder why there was a revolution in

26 For Henry, the Confessor and the abbey see Binski (1995) and Carpenter (1996b), pp. 428–59.
1258 at all, but it was easy to see another side to Henry’s rule. In the localities there was widespread discontent. Henry III had conspicuously failed to reform the realm after the fashion of Louis IX in France. While Louis promulgated ordinances and sent enquêteurs round his kingdom, Henry gave occasional lectures to his barons and made a solitary speech at the exchequer enjoining virtue on his sheriffs. Essentially, Henry lacked what Louis possessed: the drive and determination to push through reform in the teeth of opposition from both ministers and magnates. After 1236–7 there was little legislation and no mass dismissal of sheriffs. On the contrary, faced with the denial of parliamentary taxation, Henry resorted to some of the financial expedients which had been so unpopular under his father. He made the sheriffs raise money above the ancient county farms (the increments demanded stood at £1,500 in 1241 and £2,500 in 1247), pressurised the justices in eyre for revenue, and between 1244 and 1252 staged forest eyres which imposed fines totalling some £18,200. If things had been worse under King John that was a fast-fading perspective. In one area Henry may have gone beyond his father. Between 1241 and 1256 taxation worth some £73,000 was demanded from the Jews, much of it being paid. Since this was to demand roughly half the total wealth of the Jews the effect on the community was devastating. It was equally so for the Christian debtors, many of them gentry, from whom the Jews had to get the money. Meanwhile Henry’s leniency towards the greatest nobles gave their officials virtual immunity from prosecution. ‘If I do you wrong, who is there to do you right?’, boasted one notorious steward. An important change aided this process. After 1241 sheriffs were increasingly minor professional administrators rather than either curiales close to the king or the county knights coveted by the counties. Such administrators were expected to collect revenue efficiently from the general run of the population (hence their appointment) but they lacked the power and prestige which had enabled curial sheriffs to stand up to the great men in the shires. As a result seigneurial officials had a freer rein in forcing tenants to attend their master’s private courts and withdrawing them from attending the hundred courts held by the sheriffs. Henry, it seemed, had placated the great magnates at the cost of injustice to everyone else.

There was also an institutional change at the centre. After 1234 Henry III dispensed with the office of chief justiciar and from 1238 he no longer had a great man as chancellor in day-to-day charge of his seal. He feared the independence of such offices and considered the justiciarship anyway redundant now that the king was confined to England. As a result Henry’s government became increasingly remote, and the channels through which complaints and petitions could pass from the localities to the centre became increasingly

murky. The real sufferers were those outside the circle of the court, most notably the ecclesiastics, minor magnates, gentry and freemen in the shires who wished to complain about shrieval or seigneurial abuse.

Henry, therefore, had offended local society. He had also, despite his personal piety, completely alienated the Church. This was partly because of the way his officials had exploited vacancies and trampled upon the Church’s jurisdictional liberties. A list of over fifty complaints was drawn up after a great ecclesiastical council in August 1257 (the first Convocation?) and another great council presided over by Archbishop Boniface promulgated a set of reforming ordinances in June 1258. 31 Even more provocative was the extraordinary affair over Sicily. In 1255 Henry had accepted a papal offer of the Sicilian throne on behalf of his second son Edmund. He was able thereby to ward off any rival Capetian candidature, and envisage his dynasty established in a Mediterranean kingdom: a kingdom so wealthy that it would provide both ample compensation for the loss of Normandy and a splendid base from which to launch a crusade to the Holy Land – just as Richard I had conquered Cyprus before mounting his own crusade. Indeed, with Henry’s brother, Richard, earl of Cornwall, securing election as king of Germany in 1257, the Plantagenets seemed about to become the dominant dynasty in Europe. True, Sicily was actually ruled by Manfred, an illegitimate son of the Emperor Frederick II, and Henry was expected to lead or send an army to expel him. But Henry already had a foot in the Italian door thanks to his wife’s uncle Thomas of Savoy, lord of Piedmont, and might not that wily operator arrange some compromise, perhaps through Edmund’s marriage to Manfred’s daughter? Such were Henry’s hopes, and they were utterly illusory. 32 Manfred spurned any compromise (why should he be interested when he was firmly in the saddle?); Thomas of Savoy, captured by his enemies, was soon languishing in a Turin prison, and Richard of Cornwall was preoccupied with securing his precarious position in Germany. What gave all this serious domestic repercussions were the demands of the pope, for the pope was far more interested in Henry’s money than in any invading army. Accordingly he insisted on first and foremost receiving the £90,000 he had been promised under the agreement. It was, of course, the English Church which paid the price, raising over £40,000 in taxation for the papacy between 1254 and 1259. Not surprisingly, the bishops and abbots left Henry to his fate during the crisis of 1258, and later many openly sided with his enemies.

The Sicilian affair did more than damage Henry’s relations with the Church, however. In 1258 a papal agent, with threats of general Interdict, demanded that the laity too pay a heavy tax to meet papal demands. The whole affair

seemed to demonstrate only too amply Henry’s ‘insufficiency’ and what the barons called the ‘imbecillic state’ of the kingdom. That was also made plain by the abject failure of Henry’s 1257 expedition to Wales designed to repress the growing power of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd. It was made even plainer still by the fact Henry had completely lost control of factional struggles at his court. It was these which really set off the revolution. This brings us to arguably the most important political figure in the later years of Henry’s reign, his queen Eleanor of Provence.

Medieval queens lived in an environment which militated against any major political role. If they gained status through being anointed and crowned at their coronation, they took no oath defining their duties. If the coronation prayers stressed that like the biblical Queen Esther, they should intercede with their husbands and beg them to be just and merciful, the very role as an intercessor indicated that they were in no sense joint rulers of the kingdom. While the growing cult of the Virgin Mary gave some added gloss to earthly queens, historians have also argued that they lost real power in the twelfth century through ceasing to be managers of the king’s household and treasure without gaining any independent sources of revenue of their own. However that may be, it is certainly true that in 1236, when Henry married Eleanor, it was some seventy years since a queen had played a part in English politics and government. John’s queen, Isabella of Angoulême, though she grew up to be a passionate and strong-willed woman, had no discernible political role until after John’s death, and when that was immediately repressed, she left her children and went home to Angoulême. Eleanor of Provence (like all the thirteenth-century queens) was likewise a foreigner, and like Isabella still a girl when she married. Yet her fate was very different. One factor was that Henry came to give her, largely through wardships, considerable revenues, and thus independent sources of patronage; another was that quite uniquely she had her own family party in England. For Henry in 1240–1 had made one of her uncles, Peter of Savoy, lord of Richmond and another, Boniface, archbishop of Canterbury. Prosecuting the interests of her kin became one of Eleanor’s major concerns and many Savoyards were married into English noble families. Eleanor’s other major concern (alongside increasing her own revenues) was to safeguard and promote the interests of her children, and above all those of her eldest son, Edward, born in 1239, the heir to the throne. She proved a doughty

33 Matthaei Parisiensis Chronica majora, ed. Luard, vi, p. 401. The chronicler Wykes states that the magnates in 1258 regarded Henry as ‘insufficient’ for ruling the kingdom. He also points to the absence of the steadying hand of Richard of Cornwall who was in Germany during the crisis: Annales monastici, ed. Luard, iv, pp. 118–19.

34 For what follows see Howell (1998).

35 For Isabella see Vincent (forthcoming).
faction fighter and a courageous champion of the English crown in one of its
darkest hours, striding into the space opened both by her husband’s
‘insufficiency’ and his genuine respect for her abilities.

The establishment of the Savoyards was less controversial than the marriage
which Henry arranged in 1237, without consultation, of his widowed sister,
Eleanor, to a young French noble, Simon de Montfort. The third son of a
famous father (about whose heroic death leading the Albigensian Crusade he
often spoke), Simon was eloquent and charismatic. He made good a claim to
the earldom of Leicester and was soon accepted in England. But he proved
very demanding, and was less useful to the king than the queen and the
Savoyards. With the queen’s eldest sister married to Louis IX and with another
Savoyard uncle, Thomas, as we have seen, lord of Piedmont and for a time
count of Flanders, it gained Henry an international profile he would otherwise
have lacked. The real trouble came not with the Savoyards, but with a second
group of foreigners whom Henry brought to England. These were his half-
brothers, the children of his mother’s second marriage with Hugues, the lord
of Lusignan in Poitou. The Lusignans (William de Valence became lord of
Pembroke through marriage in 1247 and Aymer bishop-elect of Winchester
three years later) helped defend the English position in Gascony, but they chal-
lenged the influence of the queen and created factional strife at court. This
reached a climax in 1258 when the brothers struck up an alliance with Edward,
the heir to the throne, thus threatening the queen at the very citadel of her
power.36 Meanwhile the Lusignans had also quarrelled with Simon de Montfort
and with several of the great English magnates around the court. This was
partly because of competition over patronage, for though there were fewer
Lusignans than Savoyards, they were established at a time when Henry had far
less to give.37 It was also because of the way Henry protected the Lusignans in
their quarrels with other magnates, and seemed to place them above the law.
Henry’s denial of justice to the great magnaite and courtier, John fitzGeoffrey,
when he complained of an assault on his men by those of Aymer bishop-elect
of Winchester, was the immediate catalyst behind the revolution of 1258.

The setting for the revolution of 1258 was the parliament which met at
Westminster in April 1258. This was the first parliamentary crisis in English
history, a fact which reflects the central constitutional development of
Henry’s reign. It was in the 1230s and 1240s that the name parliament first
appears to describe meetings between the king and the great men of the
realm. In one sense it was simply a new name for an old institution, one which

36 This important element in the crisis was first revealed in Ridgeway (1986). For the aliens more gener-
dated back to Anglo-Saxon times. But two things were different. First, the meetings gained a more formal institutional core by the creation in the 1230s of a sworn inner council of the king; second, they gained an entirely novel political power, both from their role in the minority and, more importantly, because of the king’s increasing dependence on extraordinary taxation. Extraordinary taxation had always in practice required the common consent of the realm to be effectively levied. That had not bothered the twelfth-century kings since they had not needed such taxes. Henry, by contrast, came again and again to parliament to beg taxation and, again and again, was refused it unless parliament could choose his chief ministers. These novel demands were urged less perhaps by great barons than by the ecclesiastics, lesser magnates and gentry who had suffered most from the malpractices of local officials and the disappearance of the justiciarship and chancellorship. Within parliament, the minor tenants-in-chief (many of knightly status) were no doubt particularly vocal. Having appeased his great courtier barons, Henry was able to resist such demands. When they too had had enough and his court cracked open, the game was up.

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At the April parliament of 1258 the crisis in Wales, the papal threats over Sicily, the rapprochement of Edward and the Lusignans, and the denial of justice to John fitzGeoffrey all demonstrated the bankruptcy of Henry’s rule. Quite probably with the queen’s support, the earls of Norfolk and Gloucester, Simon de Montfort, Peter of Savoy and fitzGeoffrey allied together. On 30 April they marched into the king’s hall in full armour and demanded reform of the realm. The first instalment of those reforms came at the Oxford parliament in June. In a way never attempted by Magna Carta, control over policy, appointments and patronage was vested in the hands of a council of fifteen, a council itself responsible to three annual parliaments. In practice, as Henry later complained, he was reduced to a cipher and the council, or members of it, ruled the country. When the Lusignans refused to accept this new regime, they were expelled from England. Having taken control at the centre, the magnates proceeded to deal with local grievances. The 1225 Charter had been silent about the sheriff. Now it was laid down that he should be a major local knight, hold office for a year and receive a salary, all this bowing to the traditional demand that local government should be in local hands. At the same time the office of justiciar was revived and he was sent round the country to hear complaints

38 For these parliaments and in particular for the importance of the lesser tenants-in-chief, who were summoned en masse by the sheriffs, see Maddicott (1998).
against both royal and seigneurial officials, complaints collected by four knights in each county. Next year, in October 1259, the Provisions of Westminster restricted the obligation to attend the barons’ private courts and limited the exactions of the justices in eyre.

As in 1215, therefore, the reforming magnates met the grievances of the counties, although that involved specifically acknowledging the malpractices of their own officials. They did so because, having coerced the king and his son, they needed support; indeed, probably as never before they were actually under pressure from below. They were also influenced, as in 1215, by political ideas. The commonplaces of medieval political thought were now articulated from a specific base in England, from the University of Oxford, and were broadcast through the preaching of the new Mendicant Orders. The Franciscan lectors at Oxford in the 1250s and 1260s condemned ‘modern princes who oppress poor country folk’ and like John of Salisbury pictured the realm as a human body whose welfare was dependent on the health of all its parts. Precisely this image was adopted by the council of fifteen in its letter of explanation to the pope.39

It followed that everyone should be embraced by the movement of reform, and this was indeed the case. In 1258 a sworn association was formed called the ‘community of England’ or ‘community of the realm’. It was not confined to the barons. It included everyone in the realm down to the humblest peasant. In the short term the revolution of 1258 was far more successful than that of 1215, and for a simple reason. Its leaders took control of the royal castles and thus stripped the king of physical power. Whereas John reneged on Magna Carta almost at once, it was not till the end of 1261 that Henry III, urged on by the queen (worried by increasing attacks on the Savoyards) was able to overthrow the Provisions of Oxford, as the reforms of 1258–9 were loosely known. The key to his escape lay in divisions amongst the leaders of 1258. Hugh Bigod, the 1258 justiciar, and the great earl of Gloucester, Richard de Clare, were repelled by Simon de Montfort’s arrogance and ambition; great barons, like Richard, also resented the way the reforms trespassed on their own courts and officials. In the end, only Simon de Montfort refused to accept the king’s recovery of power. Instead he retired to France declaring that he would rather die landless than depart from the truth.40

Had Henry III played his cards right, he might have lived out the rest of his reign in relative quietude. This was to reckon without the queen. Having welcomed the revolution of 1258 because it separated Edward from the Lusignans, she now moved to rid her son (perhaps with his agreement) of further undesirable company. The result was that those ejected from Edward’s


40 For this and what follows see Maddicott (1994) which supersedes all previous biographies of Simon.
service, led by Roger of Leybourne, formed the nucleus of a new party of dis-sidents who summoned Simon de Montfort back to England and, under his leadership, subjected Henry III once more to the Provisions of Oxford and conciliar control (July 1263). Simon's triumph, however, was short-lived. By the autumn Edward had recovered the allegiance of the Leybourne party, Henry had escaped from Simon's control and the country stood on the verge of civil war. In the end the two sides submitted their differences to the arbitration of Louis IX. His verdict in the Mise of Amiens (January 1264) condemned the Provisions of Oxford and restored the king to the fullness of his power. This total rejection of all they stood for, the Montfortians refused to accept. They defied the king and defeated him comprehensively at the battle of Lewes (14 May 1264). Conciliar control was restored with Montfort as the de facto ruler of the country. Once again, however, he was unable to place his regime on a stable footing. The defection of Gilbert de Clare, the new earl of Gloucester, and the escape of Edward from captivity, signalled the end. They defeated and killed Montfort at the battle of Evesham (4 August 1265) and restored the king to power. Unfortunately, the wise conciliation which had closed the 1215–17 civil war was then neglected. The Montfortians were disinherited and it was not till 1267 that a measure of peace returned to England.

Simon de Montfort was the first leader of a political movement in English history to seize power and govern the country in the king's name. He owed his extraordinary prominence to two characteristics which made him unique. One was his unwavering adherence to the Provisions of Oxford. The other was his genius as a general. He had both a cause and the cutting-edge to sustain it. Montfort proclaimed that he had taken an oath to support the Provisions and would not break it. But enemies suspected that he was driven on by contempt for the king (whom he compared to the Carolingian Charles the Simple), a need to provide for five sons, and a bitterness over the £1,066 a year by which his wife's dower fell short as the widow of the earl of Pembroke. The extent and the basis of his appeal have long been debated. He relied a great deal on a small but devoted affinity of personal followers. His power was underpinned by the resources of London where a revolution ousted the ruling oligarchy, broadly favourable to the king, and installed the middle and lower orders in power. He had the fervent support of many bishops and ecclesiastics, repelled by Henry's mistreatment of the Church and attracted by Simon's fabled hair-shirt religiosity. (Many of the Montfortian ecclesiastics had been members with Simon of the circle around Robert Grosseteste (d. 1255), the greatest thinker and reforming bishop of the age.)

Simon also had a significant degree of sympathy and support from the gentry. Indeed the period 1258 to 1265 sees that class plays a part in politics merely foreshadowed under John and during the minority of Henry III. In October 1259 'the community of the bachelery of England', a body broadly
representing the gentry in the shires, protested at the Westminster parliament that the barons had so far merely looked after their own interests and had done nothing ‘for the utility of the republic’. This led directly to the promulgation of the Provisions of Westminster with their restrictions on the authority of private courts. Then in 1261 it was in the counties that the most formidable resistance to Henry III’s recovery of power took place. The knights, as leaders of local society, also strengthened their position on the stage of parliament. Many of the minor tenants-in-chief summoned to the parliaments before 1258 may well have been of knightly status, but there was already a feeling that more formal representation was required. Accordingly in 1254 two knights had been elected in each county to come to parliament to say what kind of tax the counties would grant. (The answer was none at all.) This precedent was not repeated in the parliaments envisaged by the Provisions of Oxford in 1258, but Montfort seized upon it. He ordered each county to elect two knights to represent ‘all of the county’ at the parliament of June 1264. Next year Montfort summoned knights again, this time with burgesses from the towns – the first meeting of the embryo House of Commons.

Montfortian enthusiasts, however, would have viewed his cause not in constitutional but in national terms: above all he had come to rescue the English from extirpation by foreigners. This period was central to the development of English national feeling. Since the loss of Normandy in 1204 all the great barons had been native-born and land-holders only in England. They had thus come to share with other sections of society a sense of Englishness. In part this sense was quite innocuous. It celebrated the Anglo-Saxon past and boasted of England’s physical beauties – its rivers, castles and cathedrals. But there was also a darker side, for national feeling was sharpened by a growing fear and resentment of foreigners. Had not the English race been threatened by the aliens imported by King John, by the invasion of Louis and his Frenchmen, by the Italian clerics granted livings by the pope and by Italian merchants engaged in moneylending? On the face of it, Henry III was well placed to quiet or exploit such fears. He was native-born; indeed, he was sometimes called ‘Henry of Winchester’ after his birthplace. He regarded England as his homeland. He named his sons after Anglo-Saxon saints. And yet the favour he gave to his foreign relatives severed him from the Englishness of his subjects. In 1258 hostility to foreigners played a limited part in the palace revolution with which everything began: although the Lusignans were expelled from England, the Savoyards, as well as Simon de Montfort, were among those doing the expelling. Outside the court, however, there was already a more general antipathy to foreigners, and the demand was voiced that marriages in the king’s gift and the custody of important castles should be the preserve of Englishmen. After 1258 xenophobia grew apace. The queen and her party of Savoyards were blamed for overthrowing the Provisions of Oxford in 1261.
and alienating Edward from his native followers. The use of foreign mercenaries by both Henry and Edward showed their distrust (so Montfort said) for the men of their own land. Such sentiments were paradoxical and irrational given England’s fruitful place in the community of Europe and the small number of natives who had actually suffered at foreign hands. Yet they were shared by Oxford academics (like Thomas Docking) and great barons (like Gilbert de Clare) as well as knights and peasants. Simon de Montfort was a foreigner himself but in a way an honorary Englishman. In 1263 he channelled the xenophobic tide and forced Henry III not merely to confirm the Provisions of Oxford but to agree to a remarkable new “statute” which banned foreigners absolutely from office and expelled them, with certain reservations, from England. More than anything else, hostility to foreigners cemented Montfort’s movement and broadened its appeal.

Simon de Montfort passed in and out of history like a comet, trailing admiration and debris in his wake. After his death he was revered by some as a saint, and hated by others as the Devil incarnate. While he retained the support of his personal entourage to the last, he lost that of the great magnates both in 1261 and again between 1263 and 1265. That was the ultimate reason why his regime proved unsustainable. The period from 1258 to 1265 showed the impossibility of keeping power from the king unless the magnates were united in the task, which was never likely to be the case for long. But it also taught more positive lessons both about how the realm might be reformed and how it might be represented in parliament.

Henry, therefore, had survived the most radical constitutional reforms seen in England before the 1640s. He owed much to the papacy, to the king of France and to Edward. He owed much too to himself. There was no attempt to depose King Henry as there had been King John. He might be an incompetent politician but he was a decent, pious man. On 13 October 1269 he achieved his greatest ambition. He translated the body of Edward the Confessor to its golden shrine within the glorious new church at Westminster.

Henry III died in November 1272. Edward, absent on crusade, did not return to England until August 1274. He had to pacify a kingdom where discontent still simmered, and he had to rebuild royal resources which had collapsed in the civil war and been inadequate long before that. Edward did both, thereby laying the foundations for late medieval monarchy. The power Edward thus generated enabled him to transform the political structure of Britain. Victory in war

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41 Prestwich (1988) is fundamental for all aspects of Edward’s reign.
and organisation in peace secured the conquest and settlement of Wales and very nearly that of Scotland. In early 1305 Edward I's great parliament at Westminster heard petitions from his subjects in Wales and Scotland, as well as from those in England, Ireland and Gascony. Around the same time Edward's exchequer inspected accounts from subordinate exchequers at Caernarvon and Berwick, as well as Dublin and Bordeaux. 'The British isles seemed to lie within the grip of an irresistible organizing force', as Robin Frame says. Edward had fashioned a new Plantagenet empire to replace the old.

Henry III had received no training in politics before becoming king; Edward's was immense. He had struggled to free himself from restrictions imposed in 1258 and then from the Montfortian regime. He had learned about the interest groups in society, and grasped above all the importance of the knightly class. In 1259 it was to Edward that the 'community of the bachelory of England' had made its protest, and he had promised to stand by them to the death. Edward had also seen how the regime of 1258 had reformed the whole realm through nationwide enquiries, legislation and complaints heard by justices in eyre. He would follow the same path himself. There was also another crucial difference between father and son. Henry was of middle height and a rex pacius; Edward was six foot two inches tall and a great warrior. He combined the exploits of the knight with the judgement of the general: hence his victory in the Montfortian civil war; hence his later wars of conquest.

Edward's overwhelming competence had repercussions for one person in particular, his queen Eleanor of Castile. There was no vacancy for a part anything like that played by Eleanor of Provence. Reactions to the latter's political activity, at least when (a virago potentissima) she had tried to raise an army to invade England and rescue Henry and Edward in 1264, were remarkably positive even among male chroniclers; yet the conclusion was that this boded well for the character of her son (as indeed it did), not that it opened a path for her daughter-in-law. Cultivated and acquisitive, sometimes sensitive and sometimes vindictive, the second Eleanor was no pale shadow of the first. She too had her own resources, though in the form not of wardships but of a carefully planned landed estate which she incurred much odium in putting together, in part through trafficking in Jewish debts. Unlike Eleanor of Provence, however, she had no family party in England and, dying too soon (in 1290), no political activity through her son. She was even criticised for not acting as an intercessor with her husband, thus failing to fill even her allotted queenly space. In her own household records Eleanor appears as a caring parent and an amiable wife; and it was this private woman as much as any vision of queenly authority that Edward strove to convey in her magnificent tomb, and in the Eleanor

crosses which marked the resting places of her body on the way to Westminster.

On his return to England in 1274, Edward moved at once to secure the peace of his country with a series of reforms: reforms which, as the chronicler Thomas Wykes put it, ‘joined the hearts of the multitude of the people to him in the sincerity of inestimable love’. In October 1274 a great enquiry investigated the malpractices of local officials, both royal and seigneurial. An attempt to remedy the grievances thus revealed, as well as many other problems, was made in the legislation promulgated at Westminster in April 1275. This was the first of the great Edwardian Statutes. It was followed by the Statutes of Gloucester (1278); of Mortmain (1279); of Acton Buranel (1283); and of Merchants, Westminster II and Winchester (all 1285). In its frequency and scope this legislation was unprecedented. It represented a serious and determined attempt ‘to redress the state of the realm in such things as require amendment’, as the first Statute of Westminster put it, a statute which runs to thirteen pages of modern print. In the field of law and local government, the statutes did not create new procedures, but extended and improved those which existed. The general aim was clear: to maintain peace and order, to secure speedy and equitable justice, stamp out the abuses of both royal and seigneurial officials and act ‘for the common good and the relief of those who are oppressed’ (Statute of Westminster I).

Other reforms too showed concern for local grievances. The appointment in 1278 and thereafter of substantial local knights as sheriffs met a long-standing demand of the counties; the use of general eyres to hear complaints, brought verbally or by written bill (plaint), meant that lesser men could ventilate grievances without the expense of obtaining writs. Such grievances frequently concerned trespass, a misdemeanour less than felony which involved breach of the king’s peace. The rapidly growing number of trespass actions under Edward I, by plaint and by writ, brought a great range of lesser crimes into the king’s courts and marked a new stage in the development of the crown’s jurisdiction. At the same time throughout Edward’s reign, as indeed throughout most of the century, the number of civil actions (mostly brought by smaller men) coming into the king’s courts continued to mount. According to one calculation, the number of cases coming in one year before the justices of the bench more than tripled between the 1220s and 1330s. Meanwhile, the forms of civil actions multiplied. There were nineteen writs for the initiation of actions in the king’s courts in 1236 and well over a hundred by the end of Edward’s reign in 1307. A legal profession centred on a body of narratores grew

up both to steer litigants through these procedures and to argue their cases in court. By the 1320s the chancery was producing nearly 30,000 writs a year, most of them connected with legislation. Such labours and the convenience of litigants were a major reason why the chancery late in Edward’s reign increasingly ceased to follow the king (especially when he was on campaign), and took up residence in a fixed place. In all these ways, thirteenth-century kings in general, and Edward in particular, met the demands of local society, powerfully expressed in the Great Charter, for more royal justice.

In appointing knights as sheriffs and opening the eyres to complaints, Edward was imitating the reforms of 1258–9; in expanding the judicial system he was likewise treading a long familiar path. In his use of parliament he was more original. From 1275 onwards, he encouraged his subjects to bring before it petitions for justice and favour, which would then be dealt with by the king’s council or by specially appointed committees. Since parliaments, between 1275 and 1286, were held on a regular bi-annual basis, a clearly defined channel of communication was opened up between the localities and the centre, making it much easier for ‘the people’ to complain of abuse and injustice. This was indeed a ‘momentous innovation’ in J.R. Maddicott’s words, for the reformers of 1258, aware of the same problem, had tried to solve it merely by the revival of the justiciarship. Edward had in effect his own justiciar in Robert Burnel who for eighteen years as chancellor, down to his death in 1292, dealt conscientiously with a mass of requests and complaints. But the task was far beyond the strength of a single man. Under Edward the hearing of petitions bulked larger and larger in parliament’s business. For the people it was its most important function.

A sense of the duties of the ‘kingly office’ drove Edward to provide for ‘the betterment of his kingdom’ as the Statute of Gloucester put it. But there was also an element of calculation. After his coronation, Edward declared that he would not wear the crown again until he had recovered all the lands and rights lost by his father. His ability to challenge the usurpations of great magnates and later to tax the realm to the hilt depended crucially on the popularity he had won by the reform of the realm.

The enquiry of October 1274 was about royal rights as well as local oppression. Henry III’s lax rule and the anarchy which succeeded it had enabled lay and ecclesiastical magnates to encroach on the authority of the sheriff, for example by setting up private gallows and withdrawing their tenants from the jurisdiction of the hundred court. In 1278, therefore, Edward ordered all those claiming local liberties to come before the justices in eyre to prove their title.

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47 Brand (1992b) is central for the development of the legal profession. The figures for forms of action are between pp. 32 and 33. For the growth of a professional judiciary see Turner (1985).

These *quo warranto* enquiries, continuing until 1294, recovered some losses, stemmed further encroachments and generally enforced the lesson that all jurisdiction stemmed from the crown.

Such enquiries were not the only area where Edward put great magnates under pressure. Although he was careful to avoid outright acts of lawless dispossession, through a combination of persuasion, purchase and sharp practice, he put several of the great comital families through a course of slimming, acquiring in the process the Isle of Wight and the earldoms of Derby and Norfolk (the first during the lifetime of Henry III). Edward used such acquisitions to endow his closest family, but otherwise, apart from generous gifts from his Welsh conquests, his approach to patronage was tight-fisted. As contemporaries pointed out, this made it difficult for him to pose as the ideal chivalric king, despite his other abundant qualifications. And K.B. McFarlane contrasted Edward’s ‘masterfulness’ with the ‘political management’ of his grandson, Edward III, who won the regard of his magnates rather than simply their grudging respect. Edward I’s perspective was different. By replacing his father’s lopsided generosity with an even-handed meanness, he husbanded his resources and avoided court factions and struggles of ‘ins’ and ‘outs’.

Underlying Edward’s approach to right and patronage lay his determination to reform the finances of the crown. Both Edward’s need and his ability to do so needs to be put in a wider context. Although historians differ over the extent and the chronology, they are agreed that the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in England saw significant economic growth, much of it taking place during the long years of Henrician and Edwardian peace. The population between 1086 and 1300 increased from perhaps 2 million to 5 million. By 1300 according to one hypothesis it may have been outstripping the ability of the land to support it, so that there was a proliferation of peasant small-holders living on the verge of subsistence and starving in years of bad harvest. On the other hand, historians have also argued that shortage of land was to some extent offset by the development of the commercial sector which grew at a faster rate than the population and thus came to form a larger element in the whole economy. This ‘commercialising economy’ was reflected in the proliferation of markets which may have tripled between 1200 and 1349 (even if not all survived or were significant), in the development of towns so that by 1300 England was as urbanised as it was in 1600, and in the growth of the money supply: according to one estimate £250,000 was in circulation in 1205 and £900,000 in 1300. Gross domestic product, after allowance for inflation, was

49 McFarlane (1965).
50 For what follows see the essays in Britnell and Campbell (1995) and also Bolton (1992).
thus very much larger in 1300 than in 1086; it was significantly larger even on a per capita basis.

The problem for the king was how to secure his share of this increasing wealth: no easy task. Henry III’s ordinary peace-time revenues either side of their peak in the 1240s probably averaged around £25,000 a year. That was the figure in the pipe roll of 1230, and it was almost exactly the same as the revenue in Henry I’s pipe roll of 1130 a hundred years before. Henry I’s wealth had been legendary. That was hardly, as we have seen, the case with Henry III. The fact was, of course, that the real value of the income in 1230 was perhaps only half that of 1130, given the rapid inflation in the early thirteenth century. Also, of course, Henry III had no revenues from Normandy to draw on, while by the end of the reign heavy taxation had almost destroyed the flow of cash from the Jews. Another longer-term problem was the diminishing proportion of revenue from the king’s own demesne. Lands valued at nearly £5,000 (and probably in fact worth much more than that) had been given away to provide patronage in the hundred years since 1130. This made it more difficult for the king to take advantage of the inflation, in the fashion of great lords who concentrated increasingly on demesne farming to produce surpluses to sell on the rising market. It correspondingly threw him back on exploiting his feudal and judicial sources of revenue which were far more politically sensitive. John had reacted to these financial problems with amazing vigour and raised his revenues even in real terms above those enjoyed by Henry I. The result had been Magna Carta. Henry III, aware of the political consequences, never rivalled John’s revenues and his consequent poverty and impotence left a deep mark on his son.

Edward made no attempt to put back the clock. The revenues he demanded above the ancient farms of the counties were, for example, lower than under his father. Instead, Edward innovated. The Italian bankers, the Ricciardi of Lucca, had already lent money for his crusade. Now they took over the funding of Edward’s household and a wide range of other activities, most notably the wars in Wales. Ultimately, in the 1290s, the firm went bankrupt, but until then Edward’s finances were far less hand to mouth than those of Henry III. Foreign bankers were again to play a central part in royal finance in the next century. The second innovation supported the first. In April 1275 parliament granted Edward a customs duty of 6s 8d on every exported sack of wool, thus increasing royal income by some £10,000 a year (equivalent to 30,000 sacks). It was from the customs above all that the Ricciardi recouped their loans. Since customs duties were essentially paid by the foreign merchants buying the wool they had no adverse political repercussions, or at least not at the rate of 6s 8d a

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51 Kaeuper (1973).
sack. This was the moment when the customs became a regular and permanent feature of royal revenue.

Edward, therefore, enjoyed sources of income only dreamed of by his father. But they were completely inadequate to meet the huge costs of the wars in France and Scotland after 1294. To fund these Edward tripled his revenue from the customs by increasing the levy on exported wool sixfold from 6s 8d to £2 a sack (the maltote), used prises (his rights of compulsory purchase) to supply armies, not just the royal household, and raised vast sums from extraordinary taxation granted by parliament. The regularity of extraordinary taxation was the third financial innovation of the reign. The form of such taxes (essentially a percentage levy on everyone’s corn and cattle) dated back to John’s great levy in 1207, but Henry III had secured them rarely and usually in return for major concessions. The last tax for secular purposes had been in 1237, its price a confirmation of the Charters. Edward changed all that. He was granted lay taxation in 1275, 1283 and 1290. Then, in the years of war between 1294 and 1307, he levied six taxes with a yield of £270,000, £191,200 coming between 1294 and 1297. Meanwhile clerical taxation after 1294 brought in approximately £24,600.52

The gigantic difference in power between Edward and his father is suggested by recorded wardrobe receipts: these averaged, roughly, £12,000 a year between 1234 and 1258; £38,000 between 1274 and 1293; and a colossal £75,000 between 1293 and 1303.53 These increasing sums of money reflected Edward’s burgeoning expenditure on war, for it was the wardrobe which was the nerve centre of Edward’s war effort, as it was more generally of his personal rule. Its small but immensely able staff of clerks paid the armies, purchased the munitions and often in later years sought out the money to do so. The wardrobe could act for itself because it controlled the king’s privy seal, and thus could issue letters independently of the chancery, something which became more and more necessary as wardrobe responsibilities increased and the chancery ceased to follow the court. Edward’s household as a whole was large and immensely impressive, although he travelled far more than his father, in particular around his favourite hunting lodges. In the mid 1280s there were nearly eighty household knights (many from families with long traditions of service), a hundred squires and around thirty-five sergeants at arms. The total establishment of the household (in large part supported by wages) was about 600 while the court around it was larger, of course, swollen by the attendance of local worthies when Edward was out around the country and by the great lay and ecclesiastical magnates during time of parliament. The court and household formed the social and political centre of the realm. During the

approaching £12,000 a year might be spent on its food, drink and stables, perhaps £4,000–£5,000 more than under Henry III in the 1250s.

How far Edward’s resources were greater than those of King John is debatable. After 1290 his revenues were certainly larger in cash terms; but in real terms, given the course of inflation during the century, the picture may be different. One pioneering study has suggested that revenue between 1291 and 1307 was about equal to that between 1199 and 1216 when measured against general consumables (whose prices had roughly doubled), but was significantly larger when measured against wages, including those of soldiers which had remained broadly static. However, these conclusions may need modification in the light of new work on inflation and the size of John’s revenues.54 The real point is this: Edward’s revenues at least rivalled those of John, but they came from very different sources; in particular, after 1291 between 125 and 200 per cent more in real terms was derived from taxation.55 As a result the political and constitutional consequences were very different. Edward’s state, as we shall see, was much more soundly based than that of his grandfather.

Edward had thus created a state possessed of formidable resources. Was it inevitable that he would use them to march beyond his frontiers? In respect of any plans to recover the cross-Channel empire the answer to that question was an emphatic no. Edward’s machine was used to conquer Wales and Scotland, not to recover the territories overseas lost by his father and grandfather. Part of the explanation lay in the facts of power. Even in the years of most lucrative extraordinary taxation, Edward’s income, from all his territories, fell short of that of the Capetians, which, according to surviving accounts, averaged some £240,000 a year between 1286 and 1292. Thus Edward, instead of overthrowing the Treaty of Paris, sought to capitalise on its benefits and limit its disadvantages, while all the time improving his position in Gascony.

Until the 1290s Edward had considerable success.56 He side-stepped the military service owed as a vassal of the king of France, thus avoiding awkward conflicts of interest and loyalty; he secured possession of the Agenais in 1279 and the Saintonge in 1286, thus realising at last the territorial promises made in the Treaty of Paris; and he limited the number of judicial appeals from Gascony to the parlement of Paris, thus rendering more tolerable the Treaty’s most vexatious consequence. Edward visited Gascony twice, in 1273–4 and in 1286–9. On the first occasion he launched a massive enquiry into ducal rights;

56 For Anglo-French relations and the war of 1294 see Vale (1990).
on the second he issued Ordinances which systematised and improved the duchy’s government. Throughout his reign he profited from the foundation of large numbers of new towns.

An abrupt change of approach at the Capetian court brought this difficult but workable relationship to an end. In 1294, what Edward imagined would be a purely formal surrender of the duchy as a stage in a judicial dispute turned out to be a full-scale Capetian invasion, 1204 all over again.57 In response, Edward taxed England to the limit, made alliances in the Low Countries and Germany, and left for Flanders in August 1297 to take personal command of the northern campaign. In the south, Edward’s armies recovered Bayonne, Bourg and Blaye, but left the French in control of Bordeaux. A truce in October 1297 was followed by a peace in May 1303, under which King Philip vacated Gascony completely. Edward had won. He was indebted to the Flemings who had inflicted a catastrophic defeat on the French at Courtrai in 1302. But his own armies had fought the Capetians to a draw in Gascony and shown it was no easy picking. He had also demonstrated that he could intervene in Flanders; the fear that he would do so again after Courtrai made Philip all the keener to make peace. Edward’s victory was due to the expenditure of large sums of money. The Gascons themselves had provided substantial loans (Bayonne’s totalled £45,763) and had formed by far the largest element in the southern armies. Their enthusiasm for the English connection rested on solid economic foundations. Since the French conquest of La Rochelle and Poitou in 1224, Gascony had supplied almost all England’s wine. Both the speed with which English administration was restored and the validity of the struggle are reflected in the Gascon revenues for the year 1306–7: nearly £17,000, of which £6,000 came from the Agenais and £6,250 from the customs on wines exported from Bordeaux.58 Gascony was now a valuable jewel in the Plantagenet crown.

If Edward did not wage aggressive war in France, he certainly did in Britain. In Wales the collapse of Henry III’s power in the 1250s and 1260s had cleared the way for the revival of Gwynedd under Llywelyn the Great’s grandson, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd. In 1267 under the Treaty of Montgomery Henry had recognised his possession of the cantrefs between the Conwy and the Dee as well as Builth and Brecon in the south. He had also acknowledged Llywelyn’s overlordship of all the native Welsh princes and conferred on him the title

prince of Wales. Within little more than fifteen years Edward had completely destroyed this infant Welsh principality. In his first Welsh war in 1277 he reduced Llywelyn once more to Gwynedd west of Conwy and destroyed his hegemony over the other princes. In the war of 1282–3 Llywelyn was killed and Gwynedd and native Wales as a whole ‘annexed and united to the crown of England’. Welsh independence was at an end. Scotland very nearly went the same way. The death of Alexander III in 1286 and then of his grand-daughter, his only direct descendant, four years later enabled Edward to sit in judgement on the rival claimants to the throne. When the victorious candidate, John Balliol, proved disobedient Edward invaded Scotland in 1296, won the battle of Dunbar, and simply brought the Scottish kingdom to an end. Henceforth Wales like Scotland would be a ‘land’ annexed to the English crown. When the Scots rebelled, Edward mounted more invasions, won a second victory at Falkirk (1298) and finally in 1305 issued a great ordinance for the government of Scotland. It looked like total victory. Had Edward I not been followed by a son who proved the most incompetent ruler in English history, it might well have been just that.

These cataclysmic events cry out for explanation, and it has been eloquently argued that they were the result less of chance and individual decision than of a long and inexorable process in which Britain was increasingly dominated by the growing power and demands of the English state. This hypothesis cannot be accepted (nor indeed is it advanced) without qualification. There was nothing in the polity Edward had refashioned which necessitated external war. It was a well-balanced entity perfectly able to exist in a steady state. The circumstances in which Edward did decide on conquest, moreover, were very much the product of contingent events. In the case of Scotland these were surprising and unforeseeable, the product of the extinction of the native dynasty. In the case of Wales conflict was always more likely but might still have been avoided had not Llywelyn through a series of miscalculations ‘just fumbled his way to disaster’. The kings of Scotland in the thirteenth century, and more novelly and dangerously Llywelyn in native Wales, were, of course, involved in their own processes of state building but how far these were incompatible with the nature of the English state is debatable. After all, there was little that was monolithic about the latter. Its power collapsed dramatically in the Magna Carta and Montfortian civil wars. Even when it was ‘up and running’ it is hard to detect a consistent drive to dominate the whole of Britain. The twenty-five years of Llywelyn the Great’s own domination of Wales after 1215 are as much a reflection on the English state in the thirteenth century as a result of English policy.

59 Davies (1990). What follows is not a precise exposition or critique of the Davies hypothesis but rather some reflections prompted by it. 60 Edwards (1940), p. lxi.
century as the ten years of English domination (though conspicuously not of conquest) which followed it. Edward himself did not begin his reign with plans to conquer Wales and the quarrels which provoked the decisive war of 1277 did not arise from his challenging the fundamentals of Llywelyn’s new principality. Relations with Scotland down to 1290 were remarkably harmonious and were facilitated by intermarriage between the royal houses, the common culture of the courts and a substantial cross-border aristocracy ‘undivided by any genuine opposition of nationalities, and neither wholly English nor wholly Scottish’. (Of the twenty-seven baronies in the far north of England, fourteen were held at some time in the thirteenth century by lords who held land in Scotland.)\(^{61}\) It is natural perhaps to think that the growth of English national feeling in the thirteenth century, with its hatred at times of foreigners from across the Channel, would be accompanied by hostile and domineering attitudes towards the Welsh and the Scots. Yet in the years before the conquests this was far from the case. Indeed the imperialistic attitudes towards the Celtic races which are certainly found in mid-twelfth-century English chroniclers had largely vanished a hundred years later. Scotland was spoken of with respect and the Welsh cheered on in their rebellion against the English crown in the \(1250\)s. That was not simply because there was common cause to be made against an unpopular monarchy. It was also due to broader social and cultural changes in which the perceived differences between the English and the Welsh and the Scots had lessened. The Welsh armies in the \(1250\)s and \(1260\)s seemed as well equipped and their leaders just as chivalric (or unchivalric) as their English counterparts. The eventual conquests were not preceded by deep-rooted and intensifying English hostility towards the Scots and the Welsh.

And yet the domination and conquest paradigm still has compelling features. If the demise of the Scottish dynasty and (on one view) the blunders of Llywelyn put Edward into the saddle, he then brutally cracked the whip. The fashion in which he did so moreover certainly owed much to developments in the English state over the previous hundred years. In Wales after 1277 and Scotland after 1291 there was no question of the kind of loose hegemony which Henry II had exercised over Wales and Scotland a hundred years before. Instead the Welsh revolt of \(1282\) and the Scottish in \(1294\) were provoked by a far more intensive and intrusive form of lordship, one which owed a great deal to the growth of English law and bureaucracy in the intervening period. Those developments were equally reflected in the forms of government set up in Wales and Scotland after the conquest, both absolutely breathtaking in their ruthless mastery and precision.

Behind all this, moreover, lay the power of the state which Edward had created. It was that which underpinned and indeed inspired his unprecedented decisions simply to bring Welsh and Scottish independence to an end. These required no new theory: both Llywelyn’s principality and Balliol’s kingdom were forfeit through the treasonable conduct of their rulers, much as John had forfeited Normandy to King Philip in 1204. What was new was the power within Britain to make such decisions a reality and thus to conceive of them in the first place. Edward’s conception of his power was well justified. He spent £80,000 on the great ring of castles, new in their site, scale and sophistication, which secured the conquest of Wales. Both to deal with the Welsh revolt of 1294 and to conquer Scotland once and for all in 1298 he mobilised armies of up to 30,000 men, probably the largest ever seen in Britain.62 Given the huge discrepancies in resources it might be thought that the English conquest of Wales, and to a lesser extent that of Scotland, would have been perfectly possible long before Edward I. Yet the Edwardian state was different in important respects. One reason for that was the loss of Normandy in 1204, which made it much more possible to concentrate resources in Britain. Edward’s campaigns in Scotland were hampered by the French invasion of Gascony, but those in Wales faced no similar distractions. In 1174 a Welsh seer rightly prophesied that Henry II’s invasion of Wales would be prevented by a French attack on Rouen. There was no possibility of that happening a hundred years later. Whether Edward’s purely financial resources in 1277 or 1294 were greater than John’s in 1212 is a moot point, but he was able to mobilise them at far less political cost. There was no possibility of Edward’s conquest of Wales being stopped in its tracks, like John’s in 1212, by a baronial plot against his life. This reflected more than the very different characters of the monarchs. It was also the product of very different types of rule.

In the last phase of Edward’s reign after 1294 the kingdom was placed under enormous strain. The king was struggling to conquer Scotland, save Gascony and suppress a revolt in Wales. He raised massive sums of money and between 1294 and 1298 alone spent £750,000 on war.63 The state which Edward had created withstood the pressure, yet was modified significantly in the process.

Edward left behind chaos in the accounts at the exchequer and a wardrobe debt of £200,000. The exchequer, however, continued to collect lay taxation with remarkable efficiency while the wardrobe, in running up the debt, had essentially found a way (later formalised) of replacing the activities of the now

bankrupt Ricciardi.\textsuperscript{64} The financial pressures on the realm none the less caused widespread discontent.\textsuperscript{65} The situation was not unlike that experienced during John’s great mulct of the kingdom ninety years before. Yet the outcome was different. Sequestration and outlawry crushed the clerical protest, led by Archbishop Winchelsea, but Edward also made concessions.\textsuperscript{66} Both in 1297 and 1300 he confirmed the Charters and accepted additional clauses dealing with his new forms of exploitation: prise was limited, the additional customs duty on wool (the maltote) was abolished, and Edward promised that taxation should only be levied ‘with the common assent of all the realm’, thus responding to the belief that in 1297 he had tried to side-step proper parliamentary assent. Edward, however, unlike his father and grandfather, never faced armed rebellion and his concessions were small beer compared with those of 1215 and 1258. In 1215 the Charter had been a revolutionary document; by 1297 even with the additional clauses it hardly struck at the heart of royal power. There was no attempt to revive the reforms of 1258 which sought to do just that by taking control of central government out of the hands of the king.

One other concession had arguably more significance for late medieval monarchy. In 1294 Edward suspended the judicial eyres and the quo warranto inquiries which went with them. Neither were ever properly revived. Up to a point the end of eyres had limited importance.\textsuperscript{67} Much of their judicial work, both criminal and civil, could be hived off to the existing justices of gaol delivery and assize, while the inquests of the escheators to some extent substituted for the \textit{quo warranto} enquiries and the eyres’ more general investigation of royal rights. The justices of trailbaston introduced in 1304 were a vigorous response to an apparent increase in local disorder. This increase, if it took place, was probably the result of the war economy and overpopulation, yet by the 1320s contemporaries were blaming it on the end of the eyre. Certainly the newer types of commission, though more flexible and expeditious, seemed less impressive manifestations of royal power in the localities than the great omni-competent supervisory visitations of old, the more so since they were often staffed by local knights and esquires. This process of local government office passing into the hands of the gentry was consummated in the fourteenth century with the emergence of the justices of the peace. It had begun earlier in the thirteenth century with the disappearance of the great multi-purpose curial sheriffs and their replacement after 1258 with county knights, a change which

\textsuperscript{64} Ormrod (1991) offers a more critical view of Edward’s last years, stressing the chaos and failed expe-dients. He suggests that it was reforms later in the century which really established the late medieval state.\textsuperscript{65} The ultimate sufferers were the peasantry, see Maddicott (1975).\textsuperscript{66} For Winchelsea and clerical protest see Denton (1980).\textsuperscript{67} For this very debatable subject see Harding (1973), pp. 86–92; Crook (1982); Powell (1989), pp. 9–20; Waugh (1995).
Edward himself (as we have seen) had endorsed. Edward’s acceptance of knightly sheriffs and his suspension of the eyres were both concessions to the localities. They meant giving way to the demand, apparent since the reign of John, for local self-rule, a rule exercised in patterns of kaleidoscopic variety by the knights and esquires, who held the local offices, and the great magnates who retained the knights and esquires. Yet for the king, although he might regret the threats to peace and justice, these developments had clear logic. With Magna Carta restricting the revenue which could be exacted from magnates (for example through reliefs and proffers for justice) there was less need for great local officials to force them to pay their debts. Correspondingly there was all the more need to conciliate the localities so as to secure general taxation from parliament.

This brings us to by far the most important consequence of the years of emergency in the 1290s, one which completed the thirteenth-century refashioning of the English state, namely the establishment of the Commons in parliament. The parliaments of Edward’s last years served to bring together in a single assembly both the disparate organs of government and the major interest groups in the country. The institutions with the king (the household, the justices of king’s bench, and the chancery insofar as it was still itinerating) met with the justices of the bench and the officials of the exchequer based at Westminster. The heads of these departments and selected magnates formed the king’s council, the essential core of parliament. Around the council gathered the other great lay and ecclesiastical magnates and also increasingly (in a way which ceased to be the case later with the development of Convocation) the representatives of the lower clergy. The main reason for summoning the latter was almost certainly to gain their consent to taxation. The same motive operated to secure the regular attendance of the Commons. As with so much thirteenth-century politics, there was an element of ideology here. The Roman law maxim ‘what touches all shall be approved by all’ was frequently cited in connection with taxation, especially by churchmen. Yet more fundamental was simply the increasing importance and independence of the gentry, the result of social changes sketched at the start of this chapter. In 1225, 1232 and 1237 parliaments, composed simply of the great barons and with the knights and shires represented merely through the haphazard attendance of the lesser tenants-in-chief, still felt able to concede taxation on behalf of the whole realm. From 1254, when knights representing the shires were summoned for the first time, that ceased to be the case. The linkage thus established between the knights and taxation, however, only secured their intermittent attendance at parliament. Between 1275 and 1293 they were present at all the parliaments

68 For clerical representation see Denton (1981).
which granted taxes and one more besides; but that amounted to four parlia-
ments out of twenty-five. The wider political considerations which had driven
Montfort to summon knights to his parliaments had ceased to operate. The key
point of change came when Edward needed regular taxation after 1294.
Knights alone or knights and burgesses together were summoned to four of
the eight Edwardian parliaments between 1294 and 1298, precisely the ones
which conceded taxation. Thereafter the pattern was set and, even though
taxation was not granted, knights and burgesses attended seven of the nine
parliaments held between 1300 and 1307. The House of Commons had
 arrived.

What had equally arrived, or was equally required, was a new form of king-
ship. For parliament was not simply prepared to grant taxation on the nod. It
had met Henry III’s requests with demands for radical reform, and had refused
supply when he would not grant them. At least Henry had been faced with
parliaments where the counties were only represented informally by the minor
tenants-in-chief. Edward had to deal with a body of formally empowered
knights, elected in the shires, and pushing their demands with all the more
force. Yet Edward proved himself a master at managing this new type of
assembly.69 In 1290, in order to secure the greatest tax of the reign (worth
£115,000) he suppressed his temper and impatience, stage managed sessions to
coincide with royal weddings and burials, put on trial unpopular judges, concili-
ated the magnates by issuing the statute of Quia Emptores and finally won the
consent of the knights by expelling the Jews from England. By an awful but
telling paradox this most fearful of Edward’s acts was actually the one which
showed him at his most flexible and conciliatory.

As late as 1286 Christians joined in the celebrations of a Jewish wedding in
Hereford, but such harmony was untypical. The Jews were widely hated both
for their religion and for their usurious moneylending. Those in London were
massacred in 1264 by the Montfortians. Nine years earlier in 1255 nineteen
Jews from Lincoln had likewise been put to death, this time executed by the
king on the fantastic charge that they had kidnapped and crucified a Christian
boy: the first official sanction for the delusion that the Jews insulted Christ by
practising such ritual murders. The expulsion of 1290 was demanded by the lay
and ecclesiastical magnates as well as by the parliamentary knights, but it
appealed especially to the latter. Indeed the statute (never entirely effective)
prohibiting lending at interest by the Jews was their price for consent to taxa-
tion at the parliament of 1275. The fact was that the destruction of Jewish
wealth by Henry III’s fines and taxes left lesser men as their main clients. The
latter had also suffered from the way magnates, courtiers and indeed the queen

69 For what follows see Stacey (1997) and Langmuir (1972).
had bought up Jewish debts so as to obtain the property on which those debts were secured. In the past kings had the strongest motives for protecting the Jews since they were assets of the greatest value. But with the decline in their wealth (and by the 1280s numbers had probably fallen to under 2,000), that was no longer the case. By volunteering the expulsion Edward gratified religious prejudices and visibly established himself as a Christian ruler over Christian subjects in the same way as Charles II of Anjou and Naples. (He expelled the Jews from Anjou and Maine in 1289 before unleashing persecution in southern Italy). But Edward’s main immediate aim was simply to secure parliamentary assent to taxation.

The expulsion of the Jews thus showed the Edwardian regime both at its most oppressive and its most consensual, or, to put it another way, it showed how its power had to be based on consent. The Magna Carta revolution had demonstrated that the traditional revenues of the crown could only be expanded at unacceptable political cost. Edward appreciated that truth as much as Henry III. He found the answer in the use of credit, the inauguration of the customs and the resort to parliamentary taxation. His ability to get that taxation both before and after 1290 depended not merely on his skills as a parliamentary manager, but on the more general way he had met the aspirations of the gentry. All of this created the framework out of which under pressure of war in the 1290s there emerged the parliamentary tax based state of the later Middle Ages. In the idealistic rhetoric of the thirteenth century, this was a state in which the peasantry, free and unfree, should certainly have had a valued place. Some peasants believed they did. In 1265 those of the Leicestershire village of Peatling Magna attacked a party of royalists because it was acting ‘against the community of the realm and the barons’. Clearly they thought of themselves as part of that community and believed the barons were promoting its interests. Yet there was also another side. Throughout the century, peasants employed both violence and litigation to resist the demands of their lords. They probably gained little from the reforms of Edward I, however much these spoke of helping ‘the people’. One peasant from Westerham in Kent (Nicholas French) doubtless spoke for many when he declared that the king’s bailiffs deserved to be hung because they never did good when they could do ill. Edward’s later exactions fell with disproportionate heaviness on the peasantry; and by the early fourteenth century there were fears of a popular revolt. The parliamentary state did not merely exclude the Jews. It was also based on the exploitation and the repression of the great bulk of the population.
Chapter 13

The Kingdom of Burgundy, The Lands of the House of Savoy and Adjacent Territories

Eugene Cox

The ‘middle kingdom’ created by the Treaty of Verdun in 843 for Charlemagne’s eldest grandson, Lothar, underwent many transformations in the course of the centuries, and by the thirteenth century it was known by many names, none of which made entirely clear what territories were included. Geographically, the region in question is bounded on the west by the valleys of the Rhone and Saône rivers, on the north and north-east by Lorraine and Switzerland, on the east by Lombardy and the Maritime Alps, and on the south by the Mediterranean sea. This part of the medieval Holy Roman Empire had traditionally been known as the ‘kingdom of Burgundy’, but by the thirteenth century it had become increasingly common to apply the term ‘Burgundy’ only to the northern part, and to refer to the regions from the Viennois southward as the ‘kingdom of Arles’, the ‘kingdom of Arles and Vienne’, or even as the ‘kingdom of Provence’. In 1193, for example, Emperor Henry VI sought to soften the impact of the ransom imposed upon Richard Lionheart by proposing to crown him ‘king of Provence’ after his release from prison. According to Roger of Howden, this kingdom was to consist of ‘Provence, Vienne and the Viennois, Marseilles, Narbonne, Arles and Lyons to the Alps, and whatever the emperor possessed in Burgundy . . . [a kingdom containing] five archbishoprics and thirty-three bishoprics’. Apart from the inclusion of Narbonne, this description is a reasonably accurate one of what in the thirteenth century was usually called the ‘kingdom of Arles’, although, as Howden also quite correctly noted, ‘the emperor was never able to establish his dominion over the said territories and subjects, nor would they, upon the nomination of the emperor, accept any superior lord’.

Frederick Barbarossa had shown considerable interest in making imperial authority a reality in this part of his empire, however, as his marriage to Beatrice of Burgundy in 1156 and his coronation at Arles in 1178 made clear; and after his death the Hohenstaufen continued to do so. Frederick’s son Otto was made his successor as count-palatine of Burgundy (or the ‘Franches-
Comté’, as it was later called), but he was at once challenged by Stephen II, count of Auxonne and Chalon, a member of his mother’s family, which had resisted the expansion of Germanic power in the Franche-Comté from the first. Otto steadily lost ground to the Chalon during the 1190s, but Philip of Swabia, Otto’s elder brother, was able to recoup some of those losses after his election as king of Germany in 1198. After Otto’s death in 1201, Philip went to Besançon in person to confirm the allegiance of the Francomtois magnates, and he married Otto’s daughter and heir, Beatrice, to Otto von Andechs, duke of Meran, in order to sustain Hohenstaufen penetration of the region. With the duke of Burgundy, Odo III, giving assistance to Stephen of Chalon, however, the struggle for control resumed and began to take on the character of a war between French and German contenders, with the native magnates increasingly joining the Chalon to oppose the establishment of an outsider as count-palatine. The death of Philip of Swabia in 1208 deprived Count Otto II of valuable support, and in 1211 he was badly defeated by Stephen. Only the intervention of Duke Odo III of Burgundy, who had designs of his own on the county, prevented Otto II from being driven out altogether.

Frederick II, however, whose Italian perspective on the Holy Roman Empire enabled him to view the Burgundy-Arles region as an important connecting link between his northern and southern dominions, revived imperial interest in its affairs. Soon after his position as emperor-elect was consolidated by the defeat of Otto IV at Bouvines in 1214, Frederick arrived in Basle and summoned the magnates of the middle kingdom to do homage and recognise their new suzerain. They did so in large numbers, from the archbishops of Vienne and Arles in the south to the duke of Zähringen, imperial rector of Transjurane Burgundy (western Switzerland) in the north. But Frederick from the first treated Burgundy rather as a part of his German dominions than as a separate kingdom. In 1215 he designated his son Henry, future king of the Romans, as imperial rector to succeed the duke of Zähringen, whereas at the same time he offered to William des Baux, prince of Orange, the ‘kingdom which is called of Arles and Vienne’ (regnum Viennense quod et Arelatense dicitur), the first time that expression is known to have been used. Nothing seems to have come of this offer, since Frederick subsequently appointed a series of imperial vicars to represent his authority there, and in 1231 he referred to himself as ‘king of Arles’ in the Constitutions of Melfi. In 1247, however, when he had been formally deposed and excommunicated by Pope Innocent IV, and the heiress to the county of Provence, to whom he had hoped to marry his own son, was wed instead to Charles of Anjou, Frederick revived the idea of using the kingdom of Arles as a means of attaching allies, notably the house of Savoy, to his cause. The Savoyards were indispensable if Frederick was serious about marching upon the papal court at Lyons across the Mont Cenis,
so he now proposed that the daughter of Count Amadeus IV of Savoy be married to his son Manfred, and that the newly-weds be endowed with a kingdom of Arles enlarged to include all the territories between the Rhone and the Alps, and from Savoy to the sea, as well as western Lombardy from the Alps to Pavia.

The plan to reconstitute a kingdom of Arles on behalf of the house of Savoy vanished with the death of Frederick II in 1250, and during the next thirty years the various contenders for the imperial crown granted regalian rights to a variety of regional magnates. Duke Hugh IV of Burgundy, John the Wise (or ‘l’Antique’) of Chalon, and Peter of Savoy competed with one another for the right to exercise imperial authority in the Burgundies, while Albert III de la Tour-du-Pin, a leading magnate in the Viennois, and Charles of Anjou, the new count of Provence, obtained vice-regal powers in the kingdom of Arles. Before the end of the century, however, one more serious effort was made to revive the kingdom of Burgundy-Arles as a political entity. The moving spirit behind this effort was the dowager-queen of France, Margaret of Provence, eldest daughter of Count Ramon-Berenguer V, who had never accepted her exclusion from any part of her father’s inheritance, all of which he had bequeathed to his youngest daughter, Beatrice, wife of Charles of Anjou. Margaret was determined to make good her claims, and when Charles of Anjou refused to pay them any heed, she enlisted the support of her sister Eleanor, dowager-queen of England, who had also been disinherited by their father, and approached Rudolf of Habsburg, since 1273 the new king of the Romans. The moment (1278) was well chosen because Rudolf was then in conflict with Charles of Anjou, who in 1266 had become king of Sicily, over their respective rights in Italy. Margaret’s plan was a marriage between Rudolf’s son Hartmann and Joanna, a daughter of Edward I of England, in return for enforcement of the dowager-queen’s claims upon the county of Provence. The kings of England and France would then support Rudolf’s speedy coronation as emperor and Hartmann’s as king of the Romans – or, if the pope would not accept the latter, Hartmann’s coronation as ‘king of Arles’ instead.

Unfortunately for Margaret, the pope, Nicholas III, had plans of his own which consisted of subdividing Frederick II’s former empire into four hereditary kingdoms: the kingdom of Germany for the Habsburgs, the kingdom of Sicily for the Angevins, the kingdom of Arles for Charles of Anjou’s grandson Charles Martel, and a new kingdom to be created from papal and imperial territories in north-western and central Italy for the pope’s own family, the Orsini. With this scheme in view Nicholas persuaded Rudolf to withdraw his support of Margaret of Provence in return for the marriage of his daughter Clementia to Charles Martel, future king of Arles, which took place in Naples in 1281. Nicholas III died in 1280, but his successor, Martin IV, was an enthusiastic sup-
porter of the plan for a revived kingdom of Arles-Vienne under an Angevin dynasty, and Charles of Salerno, Charles Martel’s father, began assembling an army at Tarascon in 1281 with the intention of establishing the new kingdom by force. Queen Margaret, for her part, was assembling at Mâcon an equally formidable military coalition in the determination to prevent realisation of the Angevin project, but the grand confrontation that appeared so imminent between Burgundians and Arlesians in 1281 never took place. Before the end of the year various of Margaret’s allies were either backing away from their commitments or involved in other military confrontations of their own; and in March 1282 the Sicilian Vespers resulted in the expulsion of the Angevins from Sicily. Angevin resources had now to be mustered in a great effort to reconquer the island kingdom, and all plans for a new Angevin kingdom of Arles-Vienne had to be abandoned. From then on, as indeed had already long been the case in reality, the future of the kingdom of Burgundy-Arles would be the future of the major principalities of which it was composed.

There were four major principalities and several important independent baronies in the Burgundy-Arles region, but they differed greatly both in extent and in character; and during the thirteenth century they often evolved along quite different lines owing to internal peculiarities and to the nature of the external influences to which they were subject. The independent baronies included the county of Geneva and the barony of Faucigny in the Alps, the county of Valentinois-Diois and the baronies of Montauban and Mévouillon in the Dauphiné, and the Comtat-Venaissin and the principality of Orange in the south – not to mention the ecclesiastical baronies possessed by the bishops and archbishops of the region – all of which successfully resisted absorption by their more powerful neighbours during this period. The more powerful neighbours in question were the counts of Burgundy, the princes of the house of Savoy, the dauphins of Viennois, and the counts of Provence; and the real political history of the kingdom of Burgundy-Arles is best told by tracing out the history of these four principalities. Provence was the earliest to develop centralised administrative institutions, and while the counts of Savoy also made notable progress in that direction, both they and the dauphins were primarily concerned with the task of bringing unusually widespread and heterogeneous territories under their dominion. In the Franche-Comté, on the other hand, both administrative centralisation and political unification was made impossible by recurring warfare among competing claimants to the countship, struggles that were further complicated by the powerful external forces at play in the region.

The county of Burgundy in the thirteenth century consisted essentially of the territory bounded by the Saône on the west, the Juras on the east, Lorraine to the north and the land of Bresse to the south. Political life was dominated by
the activities of three major contenders for control of the county: the German counts-palatine, issue of the marriage of Beatrice of Hohenstaufen, granddaughter of Frederick Barbarossa, to Otto (II) of Meran (1208–34); the French dukes of Burgundy Odo III (1193–1218) and Hugh IV (1218–72), who exercised suzerainty over large parts of the county; and the house of Chalon, the cadet line of Burgundian counts who had never accepted their exclusion from comital authority in favour of the Hohenstaufen when Frederick Barbarossa married the heiress of the senior line in 1156. The Hohenstaufen-Meran counts managed more or less to hold their own against the Chalon, at least in the eastern half of the county, but only by allying with the count of Champagne (1227), intermarrying with the Chalon (1231), and placing their possessions under the protection of the duke of Burgundy (1242–9). In 1216 Duke Odo III formed an alliance with the count of Champagne, apparently with a view to partitioning the county between them, but other concerns intervened, and the duke died soon after leaving a six-year-old successor. During the minority of Hugh IV his mother, the regent, acquired the important barony of Salins with all of its dependencies, which included the castle of Les Clées on the route through the Juras from the Pays de Vaud and could have served very effectively as a power base from which to extend ducal authority in the county. In 1237, however, after lengthy negotiations with John l’Antique de Chalon (1233–68), Hugh agreed to exchange the barony of Salins for the counties of Chalon and Auxonne on the Saône. This exchange consolidated ducal holdings on the south-eastern boundaries of the duchy and left Hugh with important rights of suzerainty over Franconnaiss nobles, but it shifted the balance of power in the county very markedly in favour of the house of Chalon. John l’Antique was both intelligent and energetic in profiting from his good fortune. He established strongholds along the major routes between France and Switzerland, and he granted privileges to the towns through which they passed in order to expand commercial activity, particularly the trade in salt from the famous salt-works at Salins, which supplied much of Burgundy on both sides of the Jura mountains. John and his successors pursued an enlightened policy of clearing forests and founding new settlements, both religious and secular; and in 1288, when John de Chalon-Arlay obtained permission from Rudolf of Habsburg to establish a toll at Jougné, where the principal trade route passed from Italy via Lausanne, the Chalon were in a position both to control and to profit from the economic expansion that characterised the thirteenth century everywhere in the Burgundies.

The house of Chalon, which thus seemed on the way towards establishing its dominion over the Franche-Comté by mid-century, soon lost its advantages owing to bitter divisions which arose within the family itself. John l’Antique had fathered at least sixteen legitimate children by his three successive wives,
and he had married his eldest son by the first marriage, Hugh, to Alice of Meran, sister and universal legatee of Otto III, who died without heirs of his own in 1248. This had the important effect of fusing the Hohenstaufen-Meran line of counts with the Chalon line, thus putting an end to a rivalry that had been a cause of warfare in the county for almost a century. However, when John l’Antique decided to revise his will so as to provide for the children of his second wife, Isabelle de Courtenay, his eldest son, Hugh, took up arms to prevent it. In order to secure the neutrality of the duke of Burgundy during the struggle against his son, John was forced to recognise ducal suzerainty over a whole array of fiefs in the Franche-Comté; and in 1256 John was also forced to accept the mediation of Louis IX of France. In the peace treaty that ensued, the principle of partition prevailed over that of primogeniture, with the establishment of three branches of family hereafter in competition with one another in the Franche-Comté: the Chalon-Arlay and the Chalon-Rochefort in rivalry with the senior line, represented by the offspring of Hugh de Chalon and Alice of Meran.

The dissensions within the house of Chalon during and after the 1250s furnished new opportunities for neighbouring princes with designs of their own on the county. Foremost among them was Duke Hugh IV, who in 1264 obtained a fifteen-year protectorate over Besançon from its citizens and who then purchased the claims of Beatrice of Orlamunde, eldest sister of Otto III, on the county itself. John de Chalon-Rochefort, already attached to the Capetian interests by marriage to the heiress of the county of Tonnerre, joined forces with Duke Hugh while Otto’s youngest sister, Alice, now widowed, to whom he had bequeathed all of his rights, married Philip of Savoy in 1267 in an effort to protect her children’s inheritance. Philip met the ducal invaders with an army of his own and in the negotiations that followed, the duke agreed to surrender his claims on the county in return for payment of £11,000 viennois, recognition of Rochefort, Dôle and Neublans as ducal fiefs, and an annual pension from the revenues of the salt-works at Salins. The rights of Alice’s eldest son, Otto IV, as count-palatine of Burgundy were reconfirmed, and ducal troops withdrew from the county.

The alliance between the house of Savoy and the Chalon-Meran served to defend the Franche-Comté from the power of the dukes of Burgundy during the 1270s and 1280s, but a new threat from the German side appeared after Rudolf of Habsburg became emperor-elect in 1273. Rudolf was by no means disposed to accept continued French intervention in imperial Burgundy, but he was no friend to either the Chalon-Meran or the house of Savoy. The Habsburgs and Savoys had long been rivals for power in Transjurane Burgundy, and in 1282 Otto IV’s younger brother Renaud became count of Montbéliard and was at war with the bishop of Basle, Rudolf’s staunchest ally,
over possession of Porrentruy. In 1287 Renaud of Montbéliard inflicted a severe defeat upon the bishop and his allies, while Count Amadeus V of Savoy was inducing Berne and Fribourg to renounce their allegiance to the Habsburgs. In 1288 Otto IV went so far as to declare that the county of Burgundy was not a fief of the Holy Roman Empire at all, but a true ‘Franche Comté’ – a declaration that harked back to the early twelfth century when Count Renaud III of Burgundy had refused to do homage to Emperor Lothar of Supplinburg on similar grounds. These events required a vigorous response, which Rudolf was prepared to deliver with the assistance of John de Chalon-Arlay and the archbishop of Besançon. Although he was unable to defeat the Bernese, he easily defeated Renaud of Montbéliard; and although the emperor’s siege of Besançon also failed, the city did surrender in 1290 to his ally John de Chalon-Arlay, and Otto IV was compelled to recognise that all of his family holdings in the Franche-Comté were indeed fiefs of the Holy Roman Empire.

The result of these developments was that Chalon-Arlay now became the champion of imperial overlordship in the county of Burgundy and the leader of the anti-French nobility, whereas Otto IV, the last representative of what had once been imperial interests in the county, now went entirely over to the French, as his cousins the Chalon-Rochefort had already done. In June 1291 Otto secretly promised to marry his daughter Jeanne to a son of King Philip IV, and he promised as well to detach the county of Burgundy from all feudal ties to the empire. For many years Otto IV had in effect been serving almost as a mercenary captain for French royal princes, warring in Italy on behalf of Charles of Anjou and in Aragon on behalf of Philip III, for which he was rewarded in 1284 with the hand of the king’s cousin Matilda, daughter of the count of Artois. Otto and his brothers now undertook to oppose the pro-imperial magnates in the Franche-Comté, including their Chalon-Arlay cousins. Rudolf of Habsburg died in 1291, but his successor, Adolf of Nassau, gave every indication of an intention to resist French penetration in the county. In 1293 he arrived in Colmar with a large army and forced Otto IV and his brother Hugh to abandon their efforts to undermine Chalon-Arlay’s power in Besançon and the Juras. Early in 1294 John de Chalon-Arlay responded by assembling twenty-eight Francomtois nobles who formed a league to oppose Otto IV and his pro-French allies, but Adolf was soon drawn away from the Burgundies and into conflicts elsewhere. Philip IV was also preoccupied at the time by an outbreak of warfare with the king of England, which induced both kings to recruit supporters among the Burgundian nobility. To make sure of Otto IV’s continued loyalty, Philip in effect bought out all of his possessions and pretensions in the Franche-Comté, a purchase disguised as the dowry of Otto’s daughter Jeanne on her marriage to one of Philip’s sons. In return, Otto
received a payment of 100,000 livres tournois and an annual pension of 10,000 livres tournois for life.

In the county the reaction to this development (2 March 1295) was mixed. Most of the towns responded favourably, but much of the nobility was still opposed. On 29 March 1295 sixteen of the most powerful barons of the county, including Otto’s brothers John and Renaud, assembled and solemnly swore that they would never become vassals of the king of France. Philip IV reacted by appointing his cousin Robert II, duke of Burgundy, to act as his administrator for the territories ceded by Otto IV, and he delegated to Otto’s brother Hugh the task of forming a coalition of pro-French magnates. In 1297 a truce in the war with the king of England enabled Philip to focus his attention upon winning over the recalcitrants; and when John de Chalon-Arlay at last gave in and accepted the role of protector of the county on behalf of the king of France, all opposition to French dominion over the region effectively ceased.

A second major principality in the former kingdom of Burgundy was that under the dominion of the house of Savoy, whose destiny in the thirteenth century was very different from that of the house of Chalon. Although nearly as numerous as the Chalon, the house of Savoy in this period did not suffer from the kind of internal dissensions that opened the way for outsiders to intervene in their affairs. On the contrary, good fortune, family solidarity and an enterprising spirit enabled the Savoys to experience a century of unprecedented prosperity and influence both in their Alpine homeland and abroad. The county of Savoy itself was geographically and politically insignificant (its rulers continued to call themselves counts of Maurienne until well into the thirteenth century), and the importance of the house of Savoy lay not in possession of the county of that name, but rather in their possession of a whole array of territories in the western Alps stretching from the Juras and the Viennois in the west to the Piedmont in Italy. These possessions enabled the counts of Savoy to dominate the three most important transalpine routes between France and northern Italy in the thirteenth century, the Great Saint-Bernard route through western Switzerland, the Little Saint-Bernard route into the upper Isère valley, and the Mont Cenis route to Lyons. Throughout the Middle Ages the Savoys laboured ceaselessly to extend and consolidate their control over these routes, and therein lay their chief importance both politically and economically.

The fortunes of the house of Savoy at this time were in the hands of Count Thomas I (1189–1233) and his nine children, seven sons and two daughters, whose careers above all explain the family’s rise to international prominence. Margaret, the younger daughter, married the count of Kyburg, which furnished
new opportunities for Savoyard enterprise in western Switzerland; but it was the
marriage of the elder daughter, Beatrice, to Count Ramon-Berenguer V of
Provence, that gave the family a new prominence, first in the kingdom of Arles
and then in western Europe generally when her four daughters all became
queens (Margaret married Louis IX of France; Eleanor, Henry III of England;
Sancia, Richard of Cornwall, elected king of Germany in 1257; and Beatrice,
Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily after 1266). The favourable notice which the
uncles of these young women were able to acquire in royal and papal courts as a
result of these marriages enabled Boniface to become archbishop of
Canterbury, Peter to become earl of Richmond, and William, briefly, to become
the head of the king’s privy council in England; Thomas to become count of
Flanders between 1237 and 1244, then nephew of Pope Innocent IV; and Philip
to become both bishop-elect of Valence and archbishop-elect of Lyons
simultaneously. These widespread international connections not only helped to
protect the counts of Savoy from the designs of aggressive neighbours, but also
contributed substantially to the achievement of many of their domestic polit-
ical objectives.

At the outset of the century Count Thomas defined the basic political objec-
tives that would dominate the careers of his successors well into the next
century: to supplant the dukes of Zähringen, the counts of Geneva, and the
barons of Faucigny in Transjurane Burgundy; to attach the ancient family
holdings in the Viennois to the county of Savoy-Maurienne; and to recover for
the house of Savoy the March of Turin, which had once embraced the whole
of the Piedmont in Italy. During the thirteenth century very considerable
progress was made towards the fulfilment of all three of these objectives. In
Transjurane Burgundy the Savoys were able to overcome all of their major
rivals and secure dominion over the Pays de Vaud, the towns of Morat and
Berne, and the Valais almost as far as the Simplon pass into Italy. During the
struggle against Rudolf of Habsburg, who had also inherited part of the
Kyburg territories, the Savoys temporarily lost ground, notably the chief towns
on the northern edges of the Pays de Vaud. But after Rudolf’s death in 1291 a
cadet line of the house of Savoy known as the barons of Vaud succeeded in
recovering all but the city of Berne. In the effort to absorb the Viennois more
fully into the family holdings, the Savoys met with determined opposition from
the dauphins, already in possession of the southern part of that region. Count
Thomas had greatly increased his control over Bugey, however, which con-
ected the Viennois to Savoy geographically, and he established his son
William as dean of Vienne and bishop-elect of Valence. Philip, who succeeded
his brother in the see of Valence and in 1245 became archbishop-elect of
Lyons as well, greatly strengthened the family position in the Viennois, buying
up towns and territory there as well as acquiring the province of Bresse, which
bordered Bugey on the north-west and brought Savoyard dominions to the banks of the Saône opposite Mâcon for the first time. All this made the Viennois a more integral part of the county of Savoy than it had been in the past, but in 1268 Beatrice, wife of Dauphin Guigues VII, inherited the barony of Faucigny in the Alps. This situation – a Savoyard enclave embedded in the northern Dauphiné and a delphinal enclave embedded in the mountains of Savoy – was an unfortunate setback that would be a cause of warfare for almost a century to come. Finally, on the Italian side of the Alps the Piedmont principality which Count Thomas had laboured to create beyond the edges of the Valle d’Aosta and the March of Susa began to take shape between 1245 and 1259, thanks to the exertions of his son Thomas, formerly count of Flanders. These exertions led to sharp confrontations with the commune of Asti, however, and soon afterwards, with the Angevins engaged in expansion into Piedmont from Provence. Conflict with such formidable opponents resulted in several setbacks, but by the end of the century a small but compact principality had been created with another cadet line of the house of Savoy, the princes of Savoy-Achaea, established there to rule it.

Much more than in either the Franche-Comté or the Dauphiné, comital revenues in Savoy came from the exercise of regalian rights over the transalpine trade: minting money, collecting tolls, granting enfranchisements and safeconducts, policing the districta passagia. Removable castellans were early on installed in strategically located castles, and robber-barons were bought out or expropriated by force. Hospices located on or near the major mountain passes were usually placed under the counts’ special protection, and charters of privileges were conceded with increasing frequency, particularly to communities on or near the transalpine thoroughfares, or in territories which the Savoys were trying to annex. Between 1195 and 1282 the house of Savoy alone was responsible for at least twenty-three new charters for towns in their dominions, and for more than a half-dozen enlargements of franchises already in existence; and two new towns were founded, at Villeneuve on Lake Geneva and at Villafranca on the Po, both with a view to attracting merchants. The acquisition of Bresse in the 1270s meant that Savoyard territory stretched uninterruptedly from the plains of the Po to the French county of Mâcon on the Saône; and at least as early as 1302 Count Amadeus V was trying to persuade Italian merchants crossing the Mont Cenis to avoid Lyons altogether by taking the more direct route to France via Chambéry and Pont-d’Ain.

In addition to pursuing a vigorous policy of territorial expansion, the rulers of Savoy in the thirteenth century also began the task of organising administrative institutions that would ultimately create a centralised state out of such a disparate collection of dominions. Here the principal innovator was Peter II (1263–8), who had been earl of Richmond and lord of the Pays de Vaud for
more than twenty years prior to becoming count of Savoy, and who had clearly been influenced by his familiarity with English royal government. It was Peter II who first organised Savoyard holdings into bailliages under salaried, transferrable baillis with extensive military, judicial and fiscal responsibilities and supervisory authority over the count’s castellans. A chambre des comptes was now also created, rather like the English exchequer, where comital officers audited the accounts of income and expenditure which the castellans were obliged to present each year. Finally, Peter also issued statutes setting forth the principle that the count alone was entitled to supreme judicial authority in his dominions, and he instituted itinerant justices called juges-mages to preside over regular hearings in the castellanies located within each judicatura. These measures, together with the replication of urban franchises of a similar type, gradually began to create a body of common law for the count’s territories despite the fact that large geographical areas still escaped comital jurisdiction altogether. Unlike the dauphins of Viennois, the counts of Savoy rarely entered into power-sharing arrangements (pariages) with the bishops in their dominions, so until the early fourteenth century much of the dioceses of Maurienne, Tarentaise and Sion lay outside the counts’ authority, as did the alodial holdings of abbeys like Aulps and Abondance. The bishops of Maurienne and Aosta (and of Belley in fact, if not in theory) were direct vassals of the counts, however, and most of the other bishops (Geneva, Lausanne, Sion, Turin and Tarentaise) were situated on the periphery of Savoyard territories. Thus the principality of Savoy, unlike the Franche-Comté, emerged from the thirteenth century with its sovereignty intact, its territories unthreatened by dismemberment at the hands of French, German or Italian neighbours, and a solid foundation in governing institutions.

The Dauphiné (a term first used in 1293 to designate the territories ruled by the counts of Viennois and Albon) originated in the early eleventh century when the count-archbishop of Vienne ceded the southern half of the Viennois (except for the city of Vienne) to the lord of Vion, count of Albon, and the northern half to the count of Maurienne, founder of the house of Savoy. The original ruling family of the Dauphiné came to an end in the male line in 1162 with the death of Guigues V, whose father, Guigues IV, had been the first to use ‘dauphin’ as a surname. His daughter, Beatrice, after the death of her first husband, married Duke Hugh III of Burgundy in 1184, and the offspring of this marriage (a second marriage for the duke as well) constituted the so-called ‘Burgundian’ dynasty which ruled in the Dauphiné for most of the thirteenth century. At the outset of the century the dauphin’s holdings included the Grésivaudan (the valley of the Isère from the Savoyard frontier to the Valennois and the valley of the Romanche) and the Briançonnais (which borders the Grésivaudan on the south-east and centres upon the upper
valley of the Durance with the Montgenèvre pass into Piedmont), as well as the southern Viennois. These possessions were very notably increased in 1202 when Guiges VI (1192–1236) married Beatrice de Claustral, grand-daughter of the count of Forcalquier, whose dowry consisted of the counties of Gap and Embrun, mountainous regions that bordered the Grésivaudan and Briançonnais on the south and brought the Dauphiné to the Durance river boundary with Provence. When Humbert de la Tour-du-Pin became dauphin in 1282, his ancestral barony in the north-eastern Viennois became part of the delphinal domain, and at the beginning of the fourteenth century the baronies of Montauban (1300) and Mévouillon (1317) in the south brought the dauphin’s possessions to the borders of the Comtat-Venaissin. Only the county of Valentinois-Diois prevented the dauphins from suzerainty over the entire region between Savoy and Provence.

The counts of Valentinois-Diois were a very serious obstacle to the political and territorial cohesion of the Dauphiné, however, and so were the counts of Toulouse, who held the so-called ‘marquisate of Provence’, the region bounded by the Isère, the Rhone, the Durance, and the mountains on the east. The counts of Valentinois-Diois were thus vassals of Toulouse and of the Holy Roman Empire, not of the Dauphiné, and by the end of the thirteenth century they had acquired the important barony of Saint-Vallier on the Rhone, in the south-west Viennois. The invasive presence of the house of Savoy in the Viennois was another obstacle, as were the barons of la Tour-du-Pin until the 1270s. In 1245 Albert de la Tour-du-Pin received imperial confirmation of his right to collect tolls on the transalpine route that crossed his territory, and in 1257 he was named seneschal of the kingdom of Arles by emperor-elect Alfonso of Castile, an appointment that was renewed in favour of Humbert de la Tour-du-Pin by Rudolf of Habsburg at Lausanne in 1275. The seneschals presumably placed the barons of la Tour-du-Pin on a legal footing equal to that of the dauphin himself, a situation that was resolved only when, following his marriage to the sister of Dauphin John I, Humbert himself became dauphin.

In addition to powerful lay rivals, the dauphins also had to contend with ecclesiastical baronies considerably more powerful than those with which the counts of Savoy had to deal. All of them (Vienne, Embrun, Grenoble, Gap, Valence and Die) possessed imperial charters according them regalian rights in their dioceses, and many of them enjoyed the status of sovereign princes of the Holy Roman Empire. For the county of Viennois the dauphin himself was a vassal of the archbishop of Vienne, who traditionally held the honorary title of archchancellor of the kingdom of Burgundy, just as the archbishop of Embrun held that of imperial chamberlain. By the thirteenth century the dauphins had succeeded in forcing pariages upon the bishops of Vienne, Embrun, Grenoble and Gap by which judicial authority was exercised jointly
by episcopal and delphinal officials in the dioceses (something the counts of Valentinois-Diois were never able to achieve in the dioceses of Vienne and Die, which in 1276 were merged in order to provide the bishop with greater resources in the struggle to preserve his independence).

Like the Franche-Comté, the Dauphiné was also subject to constant outside interference during the thirteenth century. The empire–papacy struggle and the existence of rival contenders for the imperial crown after 1250 provided endless opportunities for political manoeuvring among the magnates of the region, and the Albigensian Crusade brought the French monarchy ever closer. Aymar of Valentinois-Diois at first joined the crusaders, but his long-standing loyalty to the house of Toulouse led him soon to turn against them. After Simon de Montfort’s victory at Muret in 1213, he marched into the Valentinois and forced Aymar to surrender several of his castles. In 1217 Simon was again victorious over Aymar, but after Montfort’s death in 1218, Raymond of Toulouse began to recover his possessions in the marquisate, including the city of Avignon, which Innocent III had awarded him at the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. In the course of the fighting, however, the citizens had rebelled against the crusaders and murdered William des Baux, who had been holding Avignon on behalf of the Church. Louis VIII was induced to punish so outrageous a deed, and in 1226 he arrived with an army and laid siege to the city. This was a flagrant violation of imperial sovereignty and Louis sent an embassy to Frederick II to apologise for his actions, and to explain that the presence of numberless heretics and hostile acts by the citizens had left him no choice. Avignon surrendered after a long siege, during which the papal legate took control of the marquisate of Provence. In the peace treaty of 1229 Count Raymond was forced to cede to the papacy all of his possessions on the left bank of the Rhone, which the legate then entrusted to the king of France’s officers at Beaucaire. The French were not disposed to accept this arrangement permanently, however, and during the next two decades Raymond recovered his marquisate. It was only after his death in 1249 that the papacy in fact acquired the Comtat-Venaissin portion of the marquisate, although without the city of Avignon, which, as in the past, remained the joint property of the counts of Toulouse and Provence.

From this point forward French influence only continued to increase in the Dauphiné, the Lyonnais, the Vivarais and the Valentinois. When the new count of Provence tried to recover the county of Gap from the dauphin, it was Louis IX who forced his brother to let the latter hold it as a fief. Louis IX also mediated in disputes between the dauphin and the count of Savoy in 1269, and between the citizens and the canons of the church of Lyons. In 1271 Philip III, stopping at Lyons on his return from the crusade, accepted the citizens’ request that he place their city under his protection, for which they agreed to
make annual payments to the royal bailli at Mâcon. This was the first major step toward annexation of the Lyonnais, which, although lying west of the Rhone, had always been part of the Holy Roman Empire; and in 1292 the city of Lyons was declared to be part of the kingdom of France. Similar encroachments by French royal officials were occurring during the same period in the Vivarais, also west of the Rhone, despite repeated protests from the bishop of Viviers, who was often seconded by the pope; and in 1286 the bishop was finally forced to recognise the king of France as his overlord.

A final French intervention in the affairs of the Dauphiné occurred on the death of John I without heirs in 1282. Beatrice de Faucigny, who had been acting as her son’s regent since the death of Guigues VII in 1270, at once recognised Humbert de la Tour-du-Pin, husband of her elder daughter, Anne, as the new dauphin; but Duke Robert II of Burgundy, like Anne a great-grandchild of Duke Hugh III, claimed the Dauphiné on the grounds that an imperial fief could not pass to a woman. Robert was supported by the house of Savoy and most of the Chalons, while Humbert had the backing of Faucigny, the count of Geneva and the count of Valentinois-Diois. In 1284 Rudolf of Habsburg invested Robert with the disputed territory and warfare ensued; but in January 1286 Philip IV of France induced Robert to renounce his claims on the Dauphiné in return for 20,000 livres tournois and all of Humbert’s holdings in the valley of the Ain. These holdings were a group of castellanies north of the Viennois known as the ‘manche de Cologny’, and by 1289 they had been ceded to the count of Savoy, Robert’s chief ally, in exchange for Savoyard possessions in northern Bresse. It was therefore the king of France, not the emperor, who settled the succession crisis in the Dauphiné; and in 1294 Philip IV acquired the liege-homage of Dauphin Humbert I by means of a £500 annual pension, thus foreshadowing the acquisition of the entire Dauphiné by the French monarchy a half-century later.

The administrative organisation of the Dauphiné in the thirteenth century resembled that in Savoy, except that there were no centralised institutions other than the itinerant court of the dauphin. An important step in the establishment of the dauphin’s authority over his dominions was Frederick II’s confirmation in 1249 of Guigues VII’s acquisitions in the counties of Gap and Embrun, and the grant of sovereign rights over all allodial proprietors both there and in the counties of Viennois, Albon and Grenoble. But Frederick was a dethroned and excommunicated emperor at the time, and the dauphins were never able to make use of these grants to obtain recognition of their claims to supreme authority as Counts Peter II and Philip I were doing in Savoy. As in Savoy and the Franche-Comté, the thirteenth century was a great era for town enfranchisements (fifty-nine in the Dauphiné), and some of them, for example Grenoble, permitted the modest beginnings of self-government for the citizens, in addition to regulating
dues and taxes, furnishing a penal code and freeing the inhabitants from most manorial obligations. But the dauphins seem to have been almost a century behind the Savoys and Chalons in making a policy of using enfranchisements to establish trade routes or to strengthen their annexation of newly acquired territories. Delphinal government on the local level was in the hands of castellans, and when the dauphin acquired the counties of Gap and Embrun, he found that the castellans there (called *bailes*, as in Provence) were under the supervision of a *baile-général* answerable directly to the count. This may have inspired the introduction of *bailliages* in the rest of the Dauphiné (by 1300 there were seven of them), and by the end of the century judicial administration was mainly the duty of *juges-mages* or *vi-bailes*, who held assizes once or twice a year in the castellanies.

The Dauphiné in the thirteenth century thus managed to preserve its independence despite the increasing presence of the French monarchy, which had extended its borders to the right bank of the Rhone. The dauphins had also made considerable progress in expanding and unifying their various territories, although the Savoyard enclave in the Viennois and the possessions of the counts of Valentinois-Diois seriously disrupted their lines of communication in the Rhone valley. The legal bases for a sovereign state had been laid, and the foundations for a centralised administration, but their realisation would be the achievement of subsequent centuries.

The county of Provence was the earliest of the four major principalities composing the kingdom of Burgundy-Arles in the thirteenth century to achieve both territorial integrity and centralised governing institutions. The territorial integrity resulted from an early twelfth-century peace treaty between competing claimants that gave to Count Alfonse-Jordan of Toulouse the marquisate of Provence (including the castles of Beaucaire, Valabrègue and l’Argence on the right bank of the Rhone), while Ramon-Berenguer, count of Barcelona, received the region bounded by the Rhone, the Durance, the Alps and the sea, with Avignon, Pont-de-Sorgues, Caumont and Le Thor held jointly. At the outset of the century the count of Provence was Alphonse II (1193–1209), second son of King Alfonso I of Aragon, whose marriage to the only child of William IV of Forcalquier brought that important county on the borders of the Venaissin and Gapençais into the dynastic holdings. Ramon-Berenguer V (1209–45) did have to contend with powerful lords like the barons of Castellane and Les Baux, with autonomous cities like Arles, Nice and Marseilles, and with the rival ambitions of the counts of Toulouse, but not with rivals for the countship itself. When Ramon-Berenguer V died without sons, bequeathing his county to his youngest daughter, Beatrice, there was an international rush to obtain the hand of the heiress. The result was her marriage to Louis IX’s youngest brother, Charles of Anjou (d. 1285), the first of a long line of Angevin counts. Since Charles’s brother Alphonse became count
of Toulouse at almost the same time (1249–70), interference in Provence from that quarter ceased, and Charles embarked upon a vigorous policy of expansion across the Maritime Alps into Italy. In 1258 he acquired the county of Vintimille (Ventimiglia) on the coast, and by 1260 he had established his dominion over most of southern Piedmont, as far north as Turin and as far east as Asti and Alessandria. These holdings were lost after the battle of Roccavione in 1275, but in 1266 Charles had become king of Naples-Sicily, and Provence was drawn more forcefully than ever into the world of Italian politics and Mediterranean commerce.

Probably the most striking political feature of Provence in the early thirteenth century was the number of populous self-governing cities it contained. They were ruled by consuls, usually chosen annually, and were often supported by the local viscounts in competition with episcopal officers. Some of them, like Arles, Avignon and Marseilles, had had their consulates confirmed by the counts and were close to enjoying complete independence. Ramon-Berenguer V set out to reverse this trend, assisted by an unusually talented group of Catalan ministers inherited from his predecessors. Among the first steps was to organise the entire county into bailliages, with bailes who were representatives of full comital sovereignty, not merely overseers of the comital demesne, assisted by judges and clavaires, who collected comital revenues. The fiscal administration was particularly well organised, and the salt trade, carefully exploited as a government monopoly, soon became the most important single source of revenue for the comital treasury. After 1235 the bailes in the east and north were grouped into large administrative districts under grand-bailes responsible directly to the count, at whose court was a special judge to handle appeals from the baillage courts. The count of Provence enjoyed superior jurisdiction everywhere in the county except within the fiefs of a few great vassals, and he could enact statutes providing for general peace and order, setting forth comital prerogatives, and defining the specific obligations of each locality. Charles of Anjou created the office of seneschal to provide a lieutenant-governor for administrative affairs, employing Angevins and Frenchmen rather than Provençaux in that post and changing them almost annually, as he did the members of a council created to supervise the seneschal. Charles retained his predecessor’s appellate judge for the county and added a treasurer-general to centralise and co-ordinate the collection of revenues.

In this movement towards centralisation the towns were not spared, and through a policy of force combined with concessions Ramon-Berenguer persuaded most of them to abandon their consulates in favour of a comital viguier. Marseilles, however, refused, and in 1230 gave itself to Raymond of Toulouse as a means of preserving its independence. Although the Marseillais did recognise Ramon-Berenguer’s suzerainty in 1243, on his death they formed a mutual
defensive league with Avignon and Arles under the captaincy of Barral des Baux. Charles of Anjou gradually forced all towns to accept his officers (a viguier assisted by a judge and a clavaire) in place of their consuls, however, and although Marseilles rebelled against this regime in 1262, it was subdued once and for all in 1263. Probably the major factor in reconciling the Provençal towns to the loss of their independence was their general economic prosperity during this period. The expansion of commercial activity between France and the Mediterranean world, fostered by the crusades, greatly benefited this region, and the establishment of Angevin dominion in much of Italy after 1266 created many new opportunities for Provençal merchants and shippers. After the conquest of Naples-Sicily, Charles named two overseers for Provence, which was increasingly subordinated to the royal government in Naples; but when Charles died in 1285, his successor was a prisoner of the Aragonese. One result was the first meeting of an estates general of Provence, an assembly of nobles, clergy and town representatives at Sisteron to arrange for his ransom; and the seneschal of Provence in 1288 established a resident chambre des comptes at Aix. After his release from captivity in 1289, Charles II was disposed to allow the county to retain these elements of autonomy, and in the 1290s he created an admiralty and a naval arsenal for Provence at Marseilles; this accentuated a trend away from trade and towards shipbuilding and naval services in Marseilles. In 1291 at Tarascon he gave his daughter Margaret in marriage to Charles de Valois, younger brother of Philip IV, with the counties of Maine and Anjou as her dowry, receiving in return Philip’s half of the city of Avignon.

Thus the accession of a French prince to the county of Provence in the mid-thirteenth century, which is often described as a victory for France over the empire in the competition to dominate this region, did not move Provence closer to France. Instead, it became part of a new Provençal–Sicilian state with increasingly close ties to Italy; and like the dominions of the house of Savoy, it offered rather a barrier than an open door to the further expansion of the French monarchy in the kingdom of Arles.
The following account is an attempt to grasp the essentials of the history of Germany as a whole during the thirteenth century. Unlike other political histories which derive their focus from the rule of a single dynasty, this chapter has to deal with the demise of the Hohenstaufen, the so-called ‘interregnum’, and the following attempts at reconstruction. It has also to render intelligible the complex impact on kingship of the territorial principalities of Germany. Writing Landesgeschichte, the history of the many and different princely territories, is of course impossible and the reader must be referred to the works of the specialists. What will be attempted is Reichsgeschichte in its own right, the charting, within the framework of the history of the kings of Germany, of the interplay between kingship, aristocratic power and the new social classes developing in the period under consideration. Social history thus has an important part, but it should be borne in mind that major themes (the aristocracy, the urban phenomenon, the peasantry, trade and communications, and German expansion into the Slavonic north-east) are treated in chapters of their own within this volume.

Philip of Swabia (1198–1208) and Otto IV (1198–1218)

The death of Emperor Henry VI (Messina, 28 September 1197) could hardly have occurred at a worse time. His three-year-old son Frederick, already elected king of Germany and on his way to be crowned in Aachen, was instead taken to Sicily where he consequently became a pawn in the Italian struggles of Pope Innocent III. Despite the initial intentions of some of the political actors who favoured Frederick’s succession, circumstances in Germany made

1 A convenient overview including the newer literature is Uhlhorn and Schlesinger (1974). For a more recent bibliography of the major Landesgeschichten see Moraw (1989), p. 427.
Map 5  Germany and the western empire
for a disputed election and a renewed struggle between the Hohenstaufen and Welf dynasties. Both contenders were more or less evenly balanced in their resources, a basic fact which made for a long-drawn-out struggle. The Hohenstaufen had at their disposal the duchy of Swabia, widely dispersed crown lands and the important force of the imperial ministeriales, as well as the endorsement of a majority of the German princes and prelates. The Welf was supported by the north-west and the lower Rhine region, then politically and economically the most developed parts of Germany. These parts were dominated by the archbishopric and city of Cologne, both of which for different reasons and despite sharp internal dissensions were following a consistent policy, orientated towards Cologne’s trading partner, England. Probably the most important single driving force at the outbreak of the throne struggle was Adolf of Altena, archbishop of Cologne, old opponent of Henry VI and friend of the English king Richard I. Heading a coalition of princes and nobles from his Westphalian duchy and the lower Rhine, Adolf was seeking a new king very soon after the emperor’s death. One of his chief concerns was to safeguard, in the face of a possible Hohenstaufen succession, the princely prerogative of royal election, so hard fought for in the earlier twelfth century and almost lost under Frederick Barbarossa. But Adolf’s candidates, first Duke Bernhard IV of Saxony and later Duke Berthold V of Zähringen, withdrew because of the exorbitant payments expected of them. Despite his own see’s and his family’s territorial interests which had greatly profited from Henry the Lion’s downfall in 1180, Adolf was compelled to come to terms with a Welf nominee pressed on him by the English king, as well as by the trade and finance interests of Cologne’s merchants to whom the archbishop was heavily indebted. This candidate was Otto, third son of Duke Henry the Lion. He was English by education and a favourite of his uncle King Richard I, but lacked a power base in Germany, except for his possession of the third part of the much diminished Welf estates. Otto IV was elected by Adolf of Cologne, who also cast the votes of his colleagues of Mainz and Trier, and by north-western prelates (Cologne, 9 June 1198). He then occupied Aachen and was crowned by Adolf in Charlemagne’s church (12 July 1198), yet not before he had renounced all claims to the duchy of Westphalia. The opposing Hohenstaufen faction came into being during Christmas 1197, not least under the influence of Duke Bernhard of Saxony, who had much to fear from a Welf king undoubtedly intent on recovering his patrimony. Philip of Swabia, elected in March 1198, was unable to enter Aachen and had to wait until

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2 The proper name of the dynasty is actually the Staufer of German usage, but for nostalgia’s sake the older English Hohenstaufen is used. 3 On finances see Hucker (1990), pp. 25–35. 4 For a rehabilitation of Otto, who for centuries has had the worst possible press, see now Hucker (1990).
September to be crowned at Mainz, with the right crown but by the wrong man, the Burgundian archbishop of Tarentaise. As was to be the case more than once during the thirteenth century, constitutional law was as yet too feeble to decide such issues, the solution to which was then perforce sought on the battlefield. Both sides set about strengthening their position, but the half-hearted military moves of the later part of the year made little impact. Only during 1199 did the Hohenstaufen make some headway, when Philip countered the Welf–Plantagenet coalition by a renewal of the Capetian alliance. The crisis of German kingship thus merged with the English–French war which had just erupted anew. But none of these moves proved decisive and the scene was set for papal intervention.

Initially the new Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) had kept aloof from the contest. Both antagonists notified the papacy of their election and both had their allies lobby the papal curia. Otto’s partisans directly asked for papal confirmation of their choice, while Philip’s supporters warned the pope against infringing the empire’s prerogatives. The attempt of Conrad of Wittelsbach, archbishop of Mainz, to bring about a withdrawal of the contenders and to revive the candidacy of Frederick of Hohenstaufen fell through with Conrad’s death. In secret negotiations with the curia Philip seems to have rejected Innocent’s heavy demands, but Otto, badly pressed by his English patron’s inability tofinance the war in Germany, gave in to the papal dictate. Thus at the turn of the years 1200/1 Innocent made his decision known and had the Welf once more solemnly proclaimed king (Cologne, 3 July 1201). Otto in turn agreed to renounce his rights over the German Church, to recognise papal claims in Italy and to follow the pope’s guidance in his political dealings (Neuß, 8 June 1201). Philip and his followers were put under the ban, but to no real avail. There were some defections from his faction, most notably Ottokar I of Bohemia, won over by papal recognition of the kingship previously granted to him by Philip, and the ever bribable Landgrave Hermann of Thuringia. In Mainz a Welf partisan was installed as archbishop. Otto also recognised the Danish conquest of Holstein including the important towns of Lübeck and Hamburg. Still, a majority of ecclesiastical and lay princes backed Philip and thirty-two of them sent a sharp letter to Innocent, protesting against the interference of the papal legate in their electoral prerogative (Halle, January 1202). This letter occasioned the papal bull Venerabilem, expounding the legal ground on which Innocent stood (26 March 1202).

Despite these limited successes, the balance of power was again to tilt against the Welf. Edged on by the failure of the English in France, some military counter-pressure applied by Philip, and the obscure dynamics of regional rivalries, a number of important princes came over into the Hohenstaufen camp. Otto’s own brother, Heinrich, count-palatine of the Rhine, defected in
spring 1204, followed by the duke of Brabant and a majority of the counts from the lower Rhine and Westphalia. Most spectacular was the reversal of Adolf of Cologne, fearful for his Westphalian duchy and apprehensive of a strengthening of the burghers of his city under Welf protection, but also concerned as before to safeguard the princely right of election in the eyes of the likely winner. Adolf came over in November 1204, richly rewarded by Philip with money and privileges. The Hohenstaufen was re-elected and crowned the same day (Aachen, 6 January 1205). The Thuringian landgrave and the king of Bohemia too submitted to Philip. The honourable capitulation of Cologne, the Welf’s last major prop, was presumably prepared by a financial deal with the Münzerhausgenossen (the patrician society of minters), but was effected only after Philip’s military victory over Otto (Wassenberg, 27 July 1206). 5 By now Innocent III was ready to negotiate. The ban was lifted and a one-year truce established in Germany. The terms reached by spring 1208 were never published, but appear to have included a marital pact between the pope’s nephew and the king’s daughter, Philip’s imperial coronation, and the by now obligatory renunciation of royal rights over the German Church. All this came to nought when Philip was murdered as a result of a private grudge by the Bavarian count-palatine Otto of Wittelsbach (Bamberg, 21 June 1208).

By now the German princes had their fill of the struggle and quickly settled on Otto. The Hohenstaufen party was reconciled by the betrothal of Philip’s eldest daughter to Otto, who also announced his willingness to avenge the murder of his former rival. The princes’ prerogative was given expression through a renewed election carried out twice, by the Saxons at Halberstadt and then by an unusually large gathering of fifty-five princes at Frankfurt (11 November 1208). There they swore to uphold the general peace of the land (Landfriede) promulgated by the king. Philip’s assassin was put to death by Heinrich of Kalden, leader of the Hohenstaufen ministeriales. Working towards the next step, the imperial coronation, Otto IV renewed and amplified his promises to the pope, but kept a loophole open by failing to commit the princes. Despite misgivings about the king’s true intentions Innocent III effected the imperial coronation (Rome, 4 October 1209) and almost immediately Otto IV executed an about-turn. Rather than return to Germany he stayed with his army in Italy, mingling in the affairs of Lombardy and Tuscany and preparing for the conquest of Sicily. By November 1210 he was operating in Apulia and by mid-1211 he controlled the greater part of southern Italy. Far from being a servile tool of the papacy, Otto had thus quickly developed a forceful Italian policy along traditional Hohenstaufen lines, to the point of using the German ministeriales stranded in Italy after Henry VI’s death. He also

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5 Hucker (1990), pp. 80–8.
seems to have devised a number of plans deeply disturbing to the German princes. Innocent’s warning against the Welf inclination to treat them like Norman barons must have rung true, especially as a scheme to raise a general tax and plans for the secularisation of ecclesiastical property became public.6

*Frederick II (1212–20)*

The ban pronounced by Innocent against the emperor (18 November 1210) made little impression on Otto. Definite measures were first taken by King Philip II Augustus of France, who set about convincing the pope of the need to revive Frederick’s candidacy. He was also the first to stir up the German princes against Otto, although some of them needed little prodding. The initial German opposition, constituted as early as September 1210, included the archbishops of Mainz and Magdeburg, the king of Bohemia, the landgrave of Thuringia, the duke of Meran and, from the same Andechs family, the bishop of Bamberg. It took another half-year of pressure both from France and Germany, as well as the final failure of parallel negotiations with Otto (21 February 1211), to overcome Innocent’s qualms about yet another Sicilian-German king. On 31 March 1211 he freed the emperor’s vassals from their oath of allegiance. The princely opposition secretly elected Frederick as king of the Romans, possibly at Naumburg (April or June 1211) and informed the pope of their choice.7 Augmented by further princes, they then publicly re-elected Frederick and invited him to Germany (Nuremberg, early September 1211). Otto was forced to break off his Sicilian operations and hurry home, where he managed in some measure to check the revolt. After arrangements with the papacy, Frederick accepted the invitation in March 1212, let his infant son Henry be crowned king of Sicily, and departed for the north. In Rome he met Pope Innocent III (for the first and last time) and pledged himself to observe the conditions already accepted by Philip and Otto. After a delay in Genoa he then made his way through a hostile Lombardy and slipped with a small following over the Alps. In the meantime Otto was busy mopping up the resistance in the south-west. But the sudden death of his Hohenstaufen spouse, to whom he had only been wedded a few weeks, led to his desertion by the imperial ministeriales. Frederick managed in the nick of time to find shelter behind the walls of Constance (September 1212). From there he recovered the allegiance of the Hohenstaufen partisans in Swabia and the upper Rhine, not least by his personal appeal. He also renewed the Capetian alliance (Vaucouleurs, 19 November 1212), for which he received much money to buy the princes’ adherence. Otto IV had to withdraw to Cologne, and Frederick was formally

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re-elected and crowned in the presence of the papal legate and French ambassadors (Frankfurt and Mainz, 5 and 9 December 1212). He sealed the papal alliance by the formal undertaking, endorsed by a large number of princes, to abide by the concessions previously wrung from Otto (Golden Bull of Eger, 12 July 1213). Indecisive manoeuvres in Germany continued for some time, but Otto sought a military decision where it mattered, that is against the French King Philip II. At Bouvines, where Frederick was not even present, Otto was decisively beaten (27 July 1214). The French king is said to have sent Frederick the imperial eagle left lying on the battlefield. The Welf’s remaining strongholds of Aachen and Cologne fell during the following summer. At Aachen, where Frederick had himself crowned once more according to form (23 July 1215), he performed two further acts heavy with significance: the reburial of Charlemagne’s body and the taking of the cross preparatory to going on crusade. Soon afterwards Innocent ratified Frederick’s kingship at the Fourth Lateran Council.

Frederick had arrived in Germany in September 1212. His effective rule began in summer 1215, yet the threat of the Welf, contained in his Brunswick estates but still functioning, endured until Otto’s death in 1218. Frederick remained in the country until August 1220, to return only fifteen years later for a much shorter span. Clearly his energies and efforts were directed much more towards his Sicilian kingdom, imperial Italy and the crusade. Even if (as has traditionally been supposed) he had intended to rule Germany forcefully along the lines later developed in Sicily, the circumstances of the long throne struggle in Germany and the resulting power relations prevented such an attempt. Modern studies by Arnold, Abula and others are in any case sceptical of the traditional argument. The Golden Bull of Eger of 1213 not only recognised the papal acquisitions in central Italy but also renounced the vestiges of the old ‘imperial Church system’, mainly the claim to ecclesiastical revenues during vacancies and to participation in the election of prelates. It also permitted free appeals by the clergy to the papal curia. This primarily benefited the German prelates, for instance the bishop of Strasbourg who had provided Frederick with his first fighting force. One should be careful, however, about construing Frederick’s decisions of the period of the throne struggle as a coherent policy of state building. The clause of the Würzburg diet of 1216 opposing the alienation of principalities from the empire, sometimes interpreted as possessing the power of imperial law, was but the favourable response of Frederick to the complaint of two abbesses of Regensburg over an exchange of landed property.\(^8\) While granting privileges to imperial cities, Frederick also took steps

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\(^8\) The editors of the *Monumenta Germaniae historica* saw fit to include the piece in the *Constitutiones* (ii. 57); see also Poole (1956b), pp. 80–1.
against other towns which had trespassed on the rights of their episcopal lords. Thus a decision favouring the burghers of Cambrai (July 1214) was revoked when their bishop joined Frederick’s cause a year later. The king was favouring adherents and penalising dissenters, playing the traditional role of arbitrator and keeper of the peace, deciding, when asked to, on local issues and conflicts. By 1219/20 Frederick was granting this ‘beneficent patronage’ to cities outside the traditional Hohenstaufen pale, such as Goslar and Dortmund. But such favours should also be viewed within the framework of itinerant kingship, which during these years was extended eastwards of the traditional Hohenstaufen power base (the upper Rhine region, Worms, Speyer, Hagenau). Places like Ulm, Augsburg and Nuremberg now emerged as favoured points of sojourn.

For systematic policies we should then look at a different level. A recent school of *Landesgeschichte* has stressed the reconstruction and enlargement of the Hohenstaufen power base in Alsace, the Egerland and Pleifenland as well as in other regions, employing the still loyal ministeriales, reviving royal advocacy over monasteries, settling peasants, building castles and palatinates, favouring existing royal towns and raising as many as twenty castles and smaller places to town status. The acquisition of part of the inheritance of the dukes of Zähringen with the towns of Zurich and Berne in February 1218 was a major boost to this territorial effort. Thus the traditional view accusing Frederick of dissipation of crown lands is no longer tenable. After the substantial losses during the double kingship there was a period of recuperation lasting up to 1235/6, followed by new losses during Frederick’s final struggle against the papacy. In both phases, the actual direction of such policies was not in the emperor’s hands anymore. They were initiated and executed by his sons and their officials, mainly those belonging to the ministerialis class. Like his grandfather in 1180, Frederick in 1218 had good reasons not to use the Welf’s demise to occupy the loser’s lands. In return for the royal insignia, Frederick acknowledged Otto’s brother and heir, the previous count-palatine Henry, as rightful holder of the Welf patrimony and imperial vicar between Elbe and Weser. To do otherwise would have meant disregarding regional princely interests in an area almost totally lacking Hohenstaufen strongpoints. The royal attempt at territorial reconstruction and consolidation was thus geographically confined,

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11 Bosl (1930–1) and (1973), pp. 168–78.
12 The classical statement is Frey (1881), with strong echoes in Poole (1936b) and Barraclough (1946). For the scholarship following Frey and differing views see Schlunk (1988), pp. 3–6.
while in other regions princes undertook by the same means similar, and in the long run more successful, efforts.

Frederick’s two great political concerns, imperial matters and the crusade, both hinged on securing the Hohenstaufen succession, for which preparations were begun immediately after Innocent III’s death. He sent for his son Henry and made him duke of Swabia and then, after the extinction of the Zähringer in 1218, rector of Burgundy. Following lengthy negotiations with the princes Henry was elected king of Germany (Frankfurt, mid-April 1220). A few days later Frederick granted the prelates the famous *Confoederatio cum principibus ecclesiasticis*, which is now seen as a recapitulation of practices by then mostly common rather than the formulation of a new policy. ¹⁴ For the sovereign rights resigned here to the ecclesiastical princes, of building castles, holding markets, keeping mints and tolls, and dispensing justice in their territories, had not for a long time been in royal hands. The expected row with Pope Honorius III over the renewed personal union of the kingdom of Sicily and the empire in Frederick’s hands duly followed. But, with the accord with the German princes sealed by the *Confoederatio* and the bogged-down crusade of Damietta weighing heavily on the pope’s mind, the king had his way. In August Frederick left for Italy and the imperial coronation (Rome, 22 November 1220). By then the conservative quality of his German government was fully developed, primarily intent on keeping together, above the level of local and regional rivalries, the princely consensus that secured the imperial title. This quality could not but be strengthened after 1220, when Frederick’s kingship became an absentee one.

Princely regency, Henry (VII) (1220–35), Conrad IV (1237–54) and William of Holland (1247–56)

In 1220 Henry was nine years old, king-elect but not yet crowned. An arrangement delegating matters of state to the powerful princes in each region was soon found unsatisfactory. Prior to leaving for Sicily Frederick thus appointed as governor and guardian of his son Archbishop Engelbert of Cologne, of the comital house of Berg and kin to four previous archbishops. Like his uncle and predecessor Adolf, Engelbert was much concerned with the affairs of his Westphalian duchy, as well as with the re-establishment of his rule within the city of Cologne. In the regency he was assisted by a few bishops and a council mainly made up of Swabian nobles and ministeriales of the emperor’s choosing. This was a caretaker office instituted mainly for routine matters, rather than an independent government with full powers. With additional princes (mostly ecclesiastical ones) occasionally in attendance, the royal court both before and

after Henry’s coronation in 1222 acted on questions brought up by one of its members. It dealt mainly with problems of feudal law, monopoly of coinage and the unrest of knights and burghers which was increasingly leading to sworn associations and uprisings directed against the ecclesiastical lords. To brook the spate of feuds peace agreements (Landfrieden) were instituted, in 1221 a regional one for Saxony and in 1223/4 a general one probably promulgated at Würzburg.15 But central to the period was Engelbert’s attempt to pursue an independent policy along the old Welf lines. When war threatened again between England and France, he defied the emperor’s renewal of the Capetian alliance by carrying on earlier negotiations for an English marriage of the young king. A group of princes tried, unsuccessfully, to promote the daughter of the Bohemian king Ottokar I as Henry’s bride. Eventually Frederick wedded his son to the daughter of Duke Leopold VI of Austria, foreshadowing the role later given to Austria in his imperial designs. The contentious issue of Danish expansion in Nordalbingia was raised again when the Danish King Valdemar was kidnapped by the court of Schwerin (Lyô, 6 May 1223). The wrangle over the king’s release revealed the different approaches of the regent, who intended to free the captive, and of the emperor. Negotiations were taken out of Engelbert’s hands when Frederick despatched his trusted friend Hermann von Salza, grand master of the Teutonic Knights, to work out a new agreement designed to regain the lands previously abandoned, as well as to enforce his suzerainty over Denmark. Eventually Valdemar repudiated his concessions by appealing to the pope and was later defeated in the battle of Bornhøved (22 July 1227) by a coalition of north-east German towns, counts and princes. Frederick’s part in these proceedings was a purely passive one. But he did map out, by charters granted from Italy in spring and summer 1226, the legal basis for the Teutonic Order and the town of Lübeck, granting the Knights freedom of action in Prussia and guaranteeing Lübeck’s status as a free imperial city.

By then Engelbert of Cologne was dead, murdered (on 7 November 1225) by a disgruntled kinsman presumably acting his part in a wider conspiracy directed against the archbishop’s energetic territorial consolidation in Westphalia. The choice of his successor as regent and guardian caused some irritation, as both the Bohemian king and the Bavarian duke resented the rise of the Austrian Duke Leopold VI, who was now allied to the Hohenstaufen by marriage. On the other hand it took almost a year for the office to be filled, finally, by the Wittelsbach Duke Ludwig I of Bavaria. Of larger politics few issues stand out during this second period of regency. At a Würzburg diet (November 1226) attended mostly by ecclesiastical princes, new measures were

15 Their dating is disputed: Gernhuber (1952), p. 88 n. 87.
enacted against the restive towns. One of them aimed to abolish the first town-
league of Germany established earlier against the archbishop of Mainz by
episcopal and imperial cities. In concert with the new archbishop of Cologne
and further princes Duke Ludwig devised yet another English marriage, this
time of the daughter of Ottokar of Bohemia or of some other German prince
to King Henry III. There was also the question of the Welf possessions, soon
to be vacated by the anticipated death of the childless Henry of Brunswick.
Ludwig and the king co-operated to occupy his lands, but were forced into
retreat by the citizens of Brunswick (August 1227). The half-measures of the
regency government were unsuccessful in bridging the gaps increasingly
apparent between the two main interest groups concerned with imperial poli-
tics, namely the princes and counts of the lower Rhine and the lords of the
south-east. To the latter also belonged the count of the Rhine Palatinate, which
in 1214 had been granted by Frederick II to the Wittelsbach dukes of Bavaria.
There was a last show of unanimity when King Henry and many princes
attended the knighting of the regent’s son Otto (Straubing, May 1228). By then
the whole international political framework was being overturned by the
excommunication of the emperor (29 September 1227) and his later departure
for the crusade (28 June 1228). During a final row King Henry, by now long
eager for independence, accused his guardian of complicity with the pope
(Hagenau, Christmas 1228). When war broke out between the two in the fol-
lowing year, Henry prevailed and forced Ludwig to swear allegiance. He was
aided by the Andechs clan, old rivals of the Wittelsbach, who were reinstated in
some of their possessions earlier confiscated for their presumed complicity in
the murder of King Philip. The Andechs were also strengthened by a marital
alliance with the Austrian duke. This affair thus turned into a power struggle
between the south-eastern German princes, short-lived like so many other
conflicts, and by 1230 Henry and Ludwig were reconciled again. Ludwig’s
murder at the bridge of Kelheim (September 1231), held by many to have been
instigated by the king or his father, was probably not of their doing. 16

None of the German princes but one – the bishop of Strasbourg – had
cared to support the papal ban against Frederick. The pope’s legate had no
more success when he attempted in 1229 to raise Otto of Lüneburg, nephew
of Otto IV, as anti-king. Nevertheless, Henry’s kingship seemed unable to gain
strength. He was helpless to stem the numerous feuds that had erupted in
Alsace, Westphalia, Lotharingia and Austria. He had to contend with a papal
legate whose activities were again legitimate after peace had been made at San
Germano (1230). But most of all he managed to raise the enmity of both eccle-
siastical and lay princes. One major bone of contention was the king’s close

16 Spindler (1977), p. 36.
relationship with the towns and the ministeriales. Both had much in common, a fact recognised and utilised by Henry when he authorised intermarriage between patricians of imperial cities and his ministeriales. Some historians have credited Henry with a consistent policy, or at least a tendency in favour of these emergent forces.\textsuperscript{17} To others he only followed the traditional line of favouring the enemies of his enemies.\textsuperscript{18} His recognition of a town-league directed in 1230 against the bishop of Liège can be viewed in both ways: the citizens of that town had expelled both their bishop and the papal legate. But there seems to have been something in Henry’s personal temper which prompted him to take up positions bound to antagonise almost everyone. Thus, for instance, his abortive scheme to divorce his Austrian wife aroused the anger both of his father and of his Babenberg brother-in-law. Altogether Henry had very little time to develop any stable policy, for he was thwarted very soon after the princes returned from Italy, where they had again proven their value to the emperor at the negotiations of San Germano. At a diet at Worms (January 1231) the ecclesiastical princes forced Henry to outlaw town-leagues, sworn associations and independent legislation by town-burghers. He had to admit that his previous recognitions of such confederations had been unlawful. During a second diet at Worms (April/May 1231) Frederick’s Confoederatio of 1220 and later anti-town legislation was repeated and extended for the benefit of all princes in the famous Statutum in favorem principum. At the request of the bishop of Worms, the prohibition of leagues was reiterated a year later by Frederick at the Christmas diet of Ravenna, attendance at which Henry had managed to avoid. The emperor, by now impatient with such irritations to his greater designs, made his son appear at yet another princely gathering at Cividale (May 1232) and re-enacted the Statutum under the imperial seal. Henry was compelled to swear that he would follow his father’s instructions and favour the princes, on pain of excommunication and removal of their fealty should he act otherwise. Like the Confoederatio of which it was a continuation, the Statutum is now perceived as a codification of the earlier development of princely power.\textsuperscript{19} King and emperor renounced the right to erect new towns, castles and mints in princely territories. Yet both acts are also definitive evidence for other, contradictory, strains: the strength of the urban communal movement and the continuing thrust of the royal recuperation of lost lands and rights, against both of which the princes had to seek the emperor’s help.

Henry could not or would not abide by these rules for long, as witnessed by his espousal of an uprising of the burghers of Metz against their bishop at the

\textsuperscript{18} Grundmann (1973), p. 50; Stoob (1978), pp. 384 n. 9, 396.
\textsuperscript{19} Grundmann (1973), pp. 51–2 and n. 6; Beumann (1987), p. 376 and n. 7; Engels (1987), col. 831; the earlier view is forcefully stated by van Cleve (1972), pp. 359, 363–4.
end of 1232. There followed military measures in southern Germany, against Duke Otto II of Bavaria, whose young son he took hostage in 1233, and a year later under cover of a Landfriede sworn at Frankfurt (11 February 1234) against the counts of Hohenlohe and the margrave of Baden. Again Henry was stalled when his adversaries called upon the friendship of the emperor, who ordered him to release the prisoner and repair the demolished castles. The most famous episode concerns the ruthless hunt for heretics organised for two years by the papal inquisitor Conrad of Marburg, until his murder at the hands of irate nobles in 1233. For once, Henry was backed by the nobility and the bishops when he attempted to stem the excessive zeal of these proscriptions. He had the most celebrated case, against the count of Sayn, transferred to the royal court and then adjourned and dismissed, and inserted in the 1234 Peace of Frankfurt a clause insisting on due process of law. By doing so he raised the ire of both pope and emperor, whose co-operation against heretics had for long been an established feature. Thus the rupture between father and son, previously averted at Cividale by the intervention of the princes, appeared imminent and unavoidable. On Henry’s side there was also envy of his younger half-brother Conrad, heir to the kingdom of Jerusalem and potential successor to the empire. It was Conrad whom Frederick took to meet the pope in Rieti, where he persuaded Gregory IX to issue the eventual ban against his elder son. In a letter of July 1234 the emperor announced to the princes his intention of coming to Germany the following summer. Henry answered in September by circulating a manifesto of self-defence, but also openly asserted his defiance the same month at a meeting of his supporters at Boppard. In addition to a group of Swabian ministeriales and nobles there were some unenthusiastic prelates, among them the bishop of Worms whom he now supported militarily against the burghers, his Austrian brother-in-law Duke Frederick II, and the towns of the Rhineland and Alsace, some of which had been coerced by the taking of hostages. None of these supporters eventually stood up for him. Henry allied himself with his father’s arch-enemies, Milan and the Lombard League, hoping they would bar the emperor’s way across the Alps. His attempt to detach the French king from his alliance with Frederick by playing upon the emperor’s plan to wed the sister of Henry III of England was foiled by papal intervention.

After preparing his entry by diplomatic advances to the princes, Frederick reached Germany in the spring of 1235. He was accompanied by his son Conrad, his friend Hermann von Salza and an exotic court that aroused great marvel wherever it moved; yet he had brought no army. Indeed, the German princes, nobles and towns quickly made their way to assure the emperor of their loyalty. Henry withdrew to the castle of Trifels, indicating too late his willingness for reconciliation. He was conducted to Wimpfen where he made his
submission, prostrating himself at Frederick’s feet and waiting in vain to be raised again (2 July 1235). At Worms (mid-July 1235) the emperor sat in judgement on his wayward son, deprived him of his kingship and put him in prison, first in Germany and then in Apulia; he was to meet his death in southern Italy in 1242. At Worms Frederick also celebrated his wedding to Isabella, sister of Henry III of England. At the Diet of Mainz held a month later, Frederick raised the last Welf, Otto of Lüneburg, to the estate of the imperial princes. By these two acts the age-old strife between the two dynasties was finally put to rest, acknowledging at the same time the legitimacy of the traditional English orientation of the German north-west. It seems fitting that the first Hohenstaufen emperor able to overcome the regional confines of his dynastic interests was to be the last of his line, and also the one least concerned with German affairs. At Mainz Frederick declared, for the first time using the German vernacular, a new imperial peace unlimited in time (Mainzer Reichslandfrieden, 15 August 1235). Besides numerous clauses for suppressing feuds, the peace reiterated some of the princely privileges. But it also dwelt on the royal prerogatives of justice, coinage, customs and escort, and instituted the new office of an imperial justiciar (justiciarius curiae), complete with notary and chancery, to deal with all cases except the ones concerning princes. This is sometimes argued to have been modelled on Sicilian precedents; but despite many later confirmations little of this reform was actually implemented. Politically, however, this was a mature affirmation both of the alliance with the princes entered into long ago, and of the basic stance taken by the emperor as superior arbitrator, lord of justice and ultimate fount of the regalian rights delegated to the princes. On a more practical level Frederick had the princes commit themselves to a Lombard expedition planned for the coming spring. Yet because of Austrian matters very little of the promised help eventually materialised.

The Austrian scheme, the emperor’s last German venture before his departure for Italy in July 1236, has been credited by some historians with the significance of a new master-plan, in which the duchies of Austria and Styria were to be part of a reorganised central axis of Swabian–Alpine–Lombard crown possessions, not to be enfeoffed but administered by accountable procurators. More in keeping with previous steps taken by Frederick in Germany, the Austrian design can also be viewed as a response to opportunities too rare not to be taken advantage of. The Babenberger Duke Frederick II (the Bellicose) of Austria and Styria, brother-in-law of the emperor’s son Henry and enemy of the rulers of Bavaria, Bohemia and Hungary, had been outlawed in June 1236 for his repeated refusal to appear at court. The

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confiscation of his fiefs held from the emperor was, however, left to his princely opponents, who failed militarily. Thus Frederick was forced in late 1236 to interrupt operations in Lombardy and bring troops north to occupy Vienna, which he raised to the rank of imperial city. After his departure the deposed duke managed to regain his position and, under the changed circumstances of Frederick’s renewed excommunication, was again recognised in his possessions in 1239. At the height of the final struggle against the papacy Frederick even thought it wise to promise him a hereditary kingship. Only after the Babenberger’s death in 1246 were Austria and Styria for a short time to become imperial lands. Still, at Vienna Frederick had his nine-year-old son Conrad elected king and imperial heir (February 1237).

When Frederick quit Germany for the third and last time in August 1237, he once again left behind a minor son as king and a regent, this time the archbishop of Mainz, Siegfried III of Eppenstein. As had happened before, Frederick II was excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX (20 March 1239), whose legate Albert Behaim again tried to stir up the princes. In March 1238 the rulers of Austria, Bavaria and Bohemia had united against Frederick’s expansionist plans in the south-east of Germany. In concert with the papal legate they later attempted to raise an anti-king, but to no avail. Despite the massive use of the interdict (at some point half the bishops of Germany were excommunicated) Behaim found it hard even to publish the ban in Germany. Under the threat of Mongol invasion both Frederick of Austria and Otto II of Bavaria returned to the imperial camp and the latter’s daughter was betrothed to King Conrad IV. The first prelate to yield to the pope, possibly because of his fights with the lower Rhenish nobility, had been Conrad of Hochstaden, archbishop of Cologne. He was followed by the archbishop of Mainz, Frederick’s regent for Germany until his turn-about in 1241. Siegfried was in feud with Otto of Bavaria, by now a loyal follower of the emperor, over the possession of the imperial abbey of Lorsch. The imperial cities remained steadfast in their allegiance to the Hohenstaufen, as witnessed by an extant tax-list of 1241/2. Incidentally, the rebates granted there for the building of walls speak of the very practice of fortifying cities that had been outlawed in the earlier charters of privileges conceded to the princes. Conrad’s military successes in 1241/2 were in fact mostly due to the efforts of the burghers of Cologne and Worms, who had grudges of their own against their ecclesiastical lords.

After the election of Pope Innocent IV in 1243 the Hohenstaufen fortunes in Germany slowly ebbed. Many of the clergy were won to the papal cause, by methods which have aroused the indignation of some historians.21 The new

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regent appointed by Frederick, the Thuringian Landgrave Henry Raspe, defected too in 1244, and consented after Frederick’s deposition at the Council of Lyons to be elected king by the Rhenish archbishops and some bishops (22 May 1246). Most of his further actions were to be financed by the papal curia. The lay princes throughout remained aloof, except for the duke of Bavaria, who wed his daughter to Conrad IV in September 1246. The south-east thus remained a Hohenstaufen bastion, including the duchy of Austria, which had finally escheated to the emperor after the death of Duke Frederick II in the same year. Despite the great noise created by imperial and papal propagandists their secondary theatre of war in Germany saw no quick decision. Henry Raspe succeeded in beating Conrad IV near Frankfurt (5 August 1246) and with the help of some Swabian nobles confiscated Conrad’s duchy, but failed at the siege of Ulm and died in February 1247. Six months later the Rhenish archbishops, in concert with Duke Henry II of Brabant, elected as king the latter’s young nephew William of Holland, the first in a series of counts to accede to the German throne. Even more than his predecessor this anti-king appeared, initially at least, as a creature of the clerics, without a power base of his own. But he did force entry into Aachen for his coronation, and after hard fighting gained the acceptance of most of the lower Rhine region, including the city of Cologne which had to be bought by great concessions. Yet other cities on the middle Rhine resisted much longer. Boppard, for instance, eventually surrendered in 1251 after repeated sieges.

In Germany the death of Emperor Frederick II (13 December 1250) does not appear to have been the decisive event in the slow dismantling of Hohenstaufen rule, as often claimed. More important was the disintegration of the Hohenstaufen party of princes and towns, which saw no further advantage in their ties to the dynasty. When Conrad IV departed in October 1251 for Sicily, never to return, he appointed his father-in-law Otto II of Bavaria as caretaker of the kingdom. Otto and his son Ludwig II, who in 1253 had inherited Bavaria as well as the guardianship over the king’s son Conradin, were unable even to safeguard the Hohenstaufen possessions in Swabia, which rapidly fell into the hands of the local nobility. By then William of Holland had done much to strengthen his position. He married the daughter of Otto, duke of Brunswick, and gained the recognition of the north-eastern princes, headed by the duke of Saxony and the margrave of Brandenburg. His re-election by them accorded with notions current in the north-east and recently stated in the Sachsenspiegel law book, and made possible William’s acknowledgement by the Saxon towns. Other imperial cities previously adhering to the Hohenstaufen cause followed suit after Conrad IV’s death in 1254. In the meantime William’s coalition with the Rhenish electors had broken up, and the king allied himself with the powerful Rhenish town league. Answering to the widespread need for
secure traffic routes and the reduction of toll-stations, this confederation not only agitated for but also militarily enforced the *Landfrieden*. It had rapidly developed under the leadership of Arnold Walpolt of Mainz, the first German burgher to appear as an independent political actor. Out of an alliance with Worms this federation grew to encompass over seventy towns mainly up and down the Rhine, but also reaching as far as Lübeck in the north, Zurich in the south and Regensburg in the east. Constituted on 13 July 1254 for ten years, it was equipped with a river-fleet of armed ships and appeared so formidable that the Rhenish archbishops and bishops, the Rhenish count-palatine and other nobles thought it wise to join in. Royal recognition of the league was made public at the Diet of Worms in February 1255. Yet the strength of such an attempt at ‘reform from below’ should not be overstated. This was no new constitutional departure. Town associations, although eventually outlawed, had developed even earlier, and the notion of *Landfrieden* was the common vehicle for any attempt at public order, be it by decree of the king or by the initiative of the parties concerned. The efficacy of such peace arrangements was not very impressive: when William and the papal legate barely escaped from an attempt at their lives instigated by the archbishop of Cologne (Neuß, January 1255), the culprits remained free. As usual, such enmities were part of wider issues, in this case the struggle for the inheritance of Flanders-Hainault, in which the archbishop played along with Charles of Anjou against William of Holland, attempting amongst other moves to raise Ottokar of Bohemia as anti-king. King William was killed in late January 1256 while attempting to force the Frisians into submission. By then his erstwhile Hohenstaufen rival of almost the same age, Conrad IV, had already been dead for two years. Conrad’s half-brother Manfred and Conrad’s son Conradin were to die in Italy in 1266 and 1268 respectively, without leaving any imprint on Germany, besides romantic memories.

**Richard of Cornwall (1257–72) and Alfonso of Castile (1257–75)**

The period following the extinction of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, often mis-named the ‘interregnum’, was to lack emperors, but not kings, a fact that did not make it any more dreadful than others. As candidate for the throne there was again the king of Bohemia, sponsored for some time by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne, whereas the northern princes were contemplating the

22 For a map of the league’s members see Moraw (1989), p. 207.
25 The direct progenitor of this influential view was Friedrich Schiller in his poem ‘Der Graf von Habsburg’ of 1803: ‘die kaiserlose, die schreckliche Zeit’.

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candidacy of one of their own. The Rhenish town-league, without its princely members, once more undertook to safeguard the crown possessions and acknowledge only a unanimously elected king. But while the Germans pondered, others acted. Henry III of England advanced his brother Richard of Cornwall, whose case was taken up in Germany by Archbishop Conrad of Cologne and the Rhenish count-palatine Ludwig of Bavaria. The two elected Richard (13 January 1257), with the archbishop casting also the vote of his imprisoned colleague of Mainz as well as receiving the subsequent assent of the Bohemian king. In opposition to the English scheme Pope Alexander IV and Louis IX of France supported King Alfonso X of Castile, whose candidacy was launched by Pisa and fostered in Germany by Archbishop Arnold of Trier, a determined enemy of his colleague of Cologne. After a delay of eleven weeks Arnold staged a new election, adding to his own vote those of Saxony and Brandenburg cast by proxy. The king of Bohemia reneged on his previous choice and proffered his vote, thus creating a legal deadlock which was to last until 1273. Alfonso contented himself with diplomatic action which, together with Richard’s counter-steps, occasioned a law suit, never to be decided, at the papal curia. Despite the fact that other princes too had been invited to take part in the double election of 1257, the right to choose the king was henceforth by precedent confined to seven alone. The archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, the king of Bohemia, the Rhenish count-palatine, the duke of Saxony and the margrave of Brandenburg had even before possessed, by virtue of their functions at the election, crowning and enthronement of the king, the privilege of casting the first votes. The lack of constitutional safeguards for a smooth devolution of power, one of the major stumbling-blocks of thirteenth-century German politics, was thus slowly amended, but the formal development of the college of electors (Kurfürsten) was to take yet another hundred years.

Alfonso never set foot in Germany. In contrast Richard, equipped with great sums of money, quickly made his way to Aachen, where he was crowned by the archbishop of Cologne. He was recognised by the towns of the lower Rhine, oriented as always towards England and the north-western trade and duly rewarded by trade privileges in London. But those of the middle and upper Rhine were more difficult to persuade, and some made their recognition conditional upon the pope’s consent to Richard’s kingship. The most prominent victim of the double election was the Rhenish town-league, which fell apart under the strains of conflicting loyalties and interests. Richard left Germany for England at the end of 1258 and returned three more times for short spans, to prepare for the imperial coronation, never to materialise, or to avert a danger to his kingship. Such was the case in 1262, when the archbishop of Mainz and Ludwig of Bavaria considered the last
Hohenstaufen, ten-year-old Conradin, as candidate for the throne. At his last visit (1268/9) Richard held a diet at Worms where he renewed the general peace and was attended for the first time by a sizeable number of princes, albeit only Rhenish ones. He also married a daughter of the noble family of Falkenstein, members of which had already been in his service. Altogether Richard had few dealings with the German princes, except for the king of Bohemia. To him the king granted in the crisis of 1262 confirmation of his seizure of Austria and Styria, and in 1266 the title of vicar of imperial lands east of the Rhine. Richard spent a little less than four years in the country, almost never venturing eastwards of the Rhine. He was ‘treated apparently as a harmless, decorative and magnificent person who could be relied upon to confirm charters, pardon debts and spend an infinity of time in settling disputes without knocking together the heads of the disputants’. Yet both Richard and Alfonso were mature and able statesmen of European stature, both dynastically connected to the Hohenstaufen. However, their interest in the German crown was limited to its imperial–Italian nexus. In fact, their policies were similar to those of Frederick II, who nevertheless has been spared some of the censure directed against the Englishman and the Castilian by modern historians.

What mattered then in this period were not general politics – Reichsgeschichte – but the developments in the different territories of Germany – Landesgeschichte. The most conspicuous feature was the great number and high intensity of feuds, usually judged by historians in moral terms or as a breakdown of law and order. Yet this was a feature of growth only to be expected when the weight of kingship was lifted from a fragmented political system pushing towards territorial reintegration. In the south-west masterless ministeriales with the imperial assets entrusted to them were taken into service by competing princes, while others – in Thuringia – developed their own lordships on royal land. The south-west saw extreme political fragmentation, prompted by the dismemberment of the Hohenstaufen duchy of Swabia and the extinction of noble families, but there was also the rise to prominence of dynasties such as the counts of Württemberg and, most notably, of Habsburg. Central and northern Germany were similarly troubled by processes of political realignment, exhibiting a much confused picture of ferocious struggles between lay princes, prelates and nobility. The more developed ecclesiastical territories in the Rhine–Main region grappled towards regulation of conflict by means of

Landfrieden enforced independently of the king. There as well as in the south-east, by the late thirteenth century the struggle for supremacy had already been decided against the nobility and in favour of the dukes and princes. Only in the south-east, however, was there a prospect for the development of an overall hegemony, by King Ottokar II of Bohemia, who used the extinction of the ducal line of Babenberg to seize Austria and Styria, and in 1269 also Carinthia. Processes of political agglomeration went on everywhere, but their foci were to be located for the period under consideration mainly in the west and the south-east.

Rudolf I of Habsburg (1273–91)

After Richard’s death on 2 April 1272 the new king’s election was delayed for a year and a half, mainly because of the great number of candidates: there was still Alfonso of Castile, demanding a re-election; Philip III of France, promoted by his uncle Charles of Anjou, king of Sicily; Ottokar II of Bohemia, at the height of his might; some counts, amongst them the very last Hohenstaufen, a young namesake and grandson of Emperor Frederick II. Pope Gregory X of course proscribed the latter, but favoured none of the others. Once again a league of prominent episcopal and imperial towns wished to acknowledge only a unanimously chosen king, and sent delegates to the electors’ meeting in Frankfurt. On 1 October 1273 all the electors except the absent Ottokar of Bohemia voted for Rudolf, count of Habsburg. His reign has been greeted by most historians as a hopeful new beginning.29 A recent and less enthusiastic approach sees Rudolf not so much as the earliest of the proud Habsburg dynasty but rather as the first of a line of ‘small’ kings (reges Allamanniae) running to Henry VII.30 According to this view, Germany was politically dominated by the victors of the previous struggle – the papacy and the ecclesiastical electors. Compared to the papal curia and the French king, the German kings had at their disposal only little-developed administrations. They were not princes of the empire, but came from the class of counts that had already been among the props of the Hohenstaufen regime, whose political concepts they perpetuated. They were dependent on what little had been preserved or could be recouped of the crown lands, much of which, however, they were forced to pawn away. Of this Reichsgut the towns had been a major element, but their political, military and financial usefulness was being eroded

29 The most detailed accounts are Redlich (1903) and Martin (1976). Töpfer and Engel (1976) and Grundmann (1973) devote to Rudolf little less space than to Frederick II’s and Henry (VII’s) rule put together.
by their rapid development into ‘free imperial cities’ (*freie Reichsstädte*). With the old quasi-feudal rules of the earlier part of the Hohenstaufen era gone, these kings were too underequipped, too short-lived and sometimes just not lucky enough to make use of the yet unformed environment of their own period. This ‘open constitution’ of the German Reich, itself the heritage of the later part of the Hohenstaufen period, was characterised by a minimum of institutionalisation, the participation of very few persons in the political give and take, and the low level of commitment of the political elites.31

Despite these general circumstances there were significant differences between the three kings of the late thirteenth century. Rudolf’s popularity was not merely a figment of nineteenth-century historians affectionately creating a ‘bourgeois king’ in the image of their own period. Amongst his first acts were charters for the cities that had agitated for his election, and throughout he supported the towns’ need for freedom of traffic and trade. He possessed a real rapport with the towns; and more than any other king before he liked to take residence in towns, lodging sometimes with rich burghers and leaving behind unpaid debts.32 For the first time ecclesiastics of urban origin were amongst the king’s closest advisers, most prominently Heinrich of Isny, a Franciscan also called Knoderer or Kugullin (one wearing a rope or a cowl), who became bishop of Basle and then archbishop of Mainz. Yet Rudolf from the outset also demanded from the towns regular and special taxes, in some places even a direct levy on property which unlike other lump demands hurt the town elites directly. Already in 1275/6 there was resistance against such extortions, as well as to the troops stationed in royal towns. In 1284 there was talk of a general property tax and in the Wetterau and the Rhine valley the challenge became even more threatening with the appearance of a number of pseudo-emperors claiming the names of Frederick II or Conrad. In the face of this mixture of popular agitation and defiance by the urban elites Rudolf changed his policy. There were to be no more direct levies, the towns were left to apportion taxes themselves, and in 1290 their representatives were called to participate in deliberations about imperial finances.

Closely connected to Rudolf’s measures in the towns were his efforts, much applauded by modern historians, to regain the crown lands lost since 1245. In line with Hohenstaufen traditions such assets were reorganised in *Landvogteien* under bailiffs based on the towns of Basle, Mainz, Erfurt and Nuremberg. Still, Rudolf had to tread carefully, especially with regard to the princes, with whom he attempted to build a more durable rapport by means of marital alliances. In 1273 he wed two of his daughters to sons of the Rheinfalz Wittelsbachs and

the Saxon Wittenbergs, and in 1279 two more to the Wittelsbachs of lower Bavaria and Brandenburg. His main fight, joined soon after the election and maintained with force and political acumen, was against Ottokar II of Bohemia. It concerned the duchies of Austria, Carinthia and Styria, once again the lynchpin of greater designs. Ottokar had refused to do homage for the duchies to the new king and was duly indicted (November 1274) and outlawed (June 1275). Rudolf had the assistance of the high Austrian nobility (Landesherren) chafing under Ottokar’s hard rule, the duke of lower Bavaria, the count of Tyrol and the Bavarian prelates. With the help of local nobles Rudolf took Vienna and the count of Tyrol occupied the Alpine territories of Carinthia, Krain and Styria. Ottokar was forced to yield in a poignant scene of submission, kneeling in kingly splendour before Rudolf, who was clad in a simple leather jerkin. The accord, sealed by a new round of betrothals, soon broke down and the king lost some of his princely allies now apprehensive of his growing power. At the battle of Dürnkrut (26 August 1278) Rudolf with Hungarian assistance and somewhat un-knightly tactics overpowered the Bohemian army augmented by units from Brandenburg, Silesia and Saxony. Ottokar was killed by an Austrian knight. This was indeed the breakthrough for Rudolf, who was now able to lay the foundations for the long-lived Habsburg predominance in the south-east. Bohemia was given to Ottokar’s son Vaclav, Carinthia to Count Meinhard of Tyrol and Austria and Styria to the king’s sons. Despite outright misgivings and possibly also a Rhenish conspiracy against the king, the electors agreed to this arrangement in 1282 by signing letters of consent (Willebriefe). This was to become a constitutional precedent, for later dispositions of imperial fiefs needed to be endorsed by the electors. Despite his considerable achievements, Rudolf thus could not go beyond the inherent constraints of the political system. He also failed to achieve the imperial election that could have guaranteed or at least eased a Habsburg succession. His recurring preparations for an Italian expedition never bore fruit, despite an understanding with the papacy which entailed a renunciation of the imperial claim to the Romagna. Rudolf’s death (15 July 1291) vividly expressed the duality between the old political legacy and the novel circumstances: feeling his end near, the old man mounted his horse to ride from Frankfurt to Speyer, there to be buried amongst the Salian and Hohenstaufen emperors of earlier times. The effigy upon his tomb is the first one in Germany to show a king’s portrait in a naturalistic manner.

Adolf of Nassau (1292–8)

Albrecht of Habsburg, the only surviving heir of King Rudolf, had none of his father’s popularity but instead a reputation for ruthlessness and want of
moderation. His claim to succession was supported only by Ludwig II, Rhenish count-palatine and duke of upper Bavaria. King Vaclav II of Bohemia secured for himself the votes of Saxony and Brandenburg, allies of his father in the struggle against the Habsburg. But the archbishop of Cologne, Siegfried of Westerburg, intent on recovering from his defeat at the battle of Worringen (fought on 5 June 1288 over the duchy of Limburg against the burghers of Cologne, the count of Berg and the duke of Brabant), succeeded once again in pulling off a Rhenish election. He promoted his brother-in-law and former military ally Adolf, lord of one half of the smallish county of Nassau, who was unanimously elected on 6 May 1292. His was a really impossible kingship, shackled by the promises exacted by his sponsor, among others, to pay 25,000 marks of silver, cede the towns of Dortmund and Duisburg, and promise not to dispose of Limburg and Austria without the archbishop’s consent. True to Rhenish traditions he entered in 1294 into a well-paid alliance with King Edward I of England. This was countered, one might assume almost automatically, by a coalition between Albrecht of Habsburg, now the upholder of the Hohenstaufen tradition, and King Philip IV of France. Adolf did send a declaration of war to France, but never came to grips with the enemy, having been bribed, as rumour had it, by the French. Whatever the case, the English payments were used by Adolf to acquire the lands of Landgrave Albrecht ‘the Degenerate’ of Thuringia. He joined them to the recently escheated margravate of Meißen, thus creating a substantial territorial base in the middle of Germany, administered by an imperial vicar and systematically enlarged by the purchase of support in Thuringia. He also secured some room for political manoeuvre by a marital alliance with the new Rhenish count-palatine Rudolf, traditional rival of the elector of Mainz, and by an accord with the duke of Brabant, arch-enemy of the elector of Cologne. But all these clever moves rebounded on Adolf. They stirred up archbishop Gerhard of Mainz, who feared for his Thuringian lands, and King Vaclav II of Bohemia, who saw himself blocked towards the north. At Vaclav’s coronation in Prague (June 1297) and at a further meeting in Vienna (February 1298) a coalition of former enemies, Mainz, Austria, Bohemia, Brandenburg and Saxony, was formed against Adolf. In March 1298 Albrecht led his forces to the Rhine. On 23 June 1298 Gerhard of Mainz and the electors, except for the Rhenish count-palatine, deposed Adolf and elected Albrecht. The old king was vanquished by the new one and died in the battle of Göllheim (2 July 1298).

33 For this moot point and the older literature see Grundmann (1973), pp. 125–6 and n. 1. Moraw (1987), col. 840, does not believe the rumour, unlike Töpfer and Engel (1976), p. 325. The otherwise quite detailed Patze (1980) does not mention it at all.
Albrecht I of Habsburg (1298–1308)

The deposition and killing of a king were not auspicious signs for a new reign and Albrecht had himself quickly elected anew (Frankfurt, 27 July 1298). He too was forced to bestow considerable concessions upon the ecclesiastical electors, granting them tolls, towns and castles on the Rhine. The Bohemian king received the administration of imperial Meißen, Osterland, Pleißnerland and Eger, as well as recognition of his Polish claims. Public expression of this accord was given at Albrecht’s first Reichstag at Nuremberg (November 1298), where all the electors attended and renewed the imperial peace of Frederick II, including some new clauses directed against the towns. But this initial co-operation was soon to be broken. Relations with the king of France, Philip IV, established since 1295, were enhanced by a marital pact and a personal meeting at Quatrevoux near Toul (December 1299). The terms concluded were kept secret but appear to have provided for French freedom of action in some border regions. Albrecht’s indecisive measures in Holland-Zeeland, where after initial warlike noises and attempts to secure the county for himself he left John of Hainault in power, further heightened the apprehension of the Rhenish princes. To them Albrecht seemed lacking in any concern for the German west, parts of which he was assumed to have sold to the French in return for support of a hereditary Habsburg monarchy. Pope Boniface VIII, dissatisfied with Albrecht’s reluctance to surrender imperial rights in Tuscany, now also turned against him, withholding the recognition that might have absolved Albrecht of the blame of regicide. With papal encouragement, and augmented by the Rhenish count-palatine and the heirs of Adolf of Nassau, the electors began preparations for the king’s deposition. Albrecht reacted forcefully. He drew the Rhenish towns to his side by demanding the abolition of tolls erected since Frederick II’s time, and through a mixture of military and diplomatic means succeeded in subduing all four Rhenish electors within a year and a half. By then Boniface VIII, seriously threatened by France, was forced to reconsider his stance towards Albrecht, who now was ready to sign almost any concession for the sake of the imperial coronation. Thus the pope publicly approved Albrecht’s election (30 April 1303). Boniface’s death only five months later freed Albrecht from his concessions of imperial rights in Italy. The following years saw intense struggle in central-eastern Germany, where Albrecht with changing luck fought the Wettiner dynasty for supremacy in Thuringia, Meißen and Eger. He also interfered in Hungary and Bohemia, where after the extinction of the Prˇemyslid dynasty he installed his son Rudolf as king, but lost the country after the latter’s death in July 1307. While recruiting

34 The only detailed account of his reign is still Hessel (1931).
troops for a renewed Bohemian expedition, Albrecht was killed by his nephew Johann, probably because of his refusal to grant compensation for the Habsburg lands from which Johann’s father had been excluded. The emerging principle of consolidated dynastic power, Hausmacht, had guided both Habsburg kings in their attempts to emancipate themselves from the constraints of electoral tutelage and territorial limitation. At the end of the period under consideration this principle was still to be foiled by a family feud of the most basic kind.

MAJOR TENDENCIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

The German thirteenth century was an age of rapid political and social change, a true period of transition. Some of the pertinent features have already been singled out in the exposition of political history. Most prominent amongst them, to contemporaries as well as to modern historians, were the decisive changes in the nature of German kingship, some of which only very recently have been perceived as not necessarily altogether negative:35 the attrition and extinction of the Hohenstaufen dynasty; the definitive move from hereditary to elective monarchy; the underequipped and overtasked ‘small kings’ of comital rank; and the spectacle of a foreign king putting in a single appearance every now and then. For this demise of royal power some blame must surely be placed on the imperial entanglement that had been part of the German political system for centuries, resulting in almost constant conflict with the papacy and its Italian allies. The traditional Hohenstaufen system of rule, combining feudal elements with a strong territorial base and the use of Italian resources, was not applicable any more in conditions of dynastic struggle and absentee kingship. More importantly, during our period the tendency towards princely aggrandisement, another feature almost as old as the imperial–Italian nexus, accelerated considerably and became the second moving force impinging on the powers and possibilities of kingship. It is true that much was achieved in the sense of transfer of constitutional rights and prerogatives from royalty to territorial princes, as witnessed by the grand charters of Frederick II, by the formation of the college of electors, and by the development of institutions designed to guarantee a permanent influence on a once-elected king, such as Willebriefe. However, the internal make-up of the German states, the institutions of fiscality, taxation, justice and peace-keeping, as well as the arrangements by which aristocracy and towns were integrated into the political structure (estates – Stände), took much longer to develop, in most cases right into the later Middle Ages and beyond.36 The means employed by the

principalities were the same as those used by the Hohenstaufen and later kings in the reconstruction of their own territorial power base: advocacy over ecclesiastical institutions, the founding of new towns, the fortification of existing towns and castle building, the take-over of the Landfrieden, the reorganisation of landed property in Landvogteien under replaceable officials. It appears that under the conditions of the thirteenth century new political resources could only be created on the local and regional level, as attempted by both the monarchy and the princes but successfully carried out only by the latter. The second part of the century thus exhibits a learning process being experienced by the ‘small kings’, which led to a new departure that would fully come into its own only during the fourteenth century: namely, a Hausmacht kingship based on well-defined blocks of territorial might strong enough to tip the balance of power, not in the whole of Germany, but rather in one of its major political regions. At the same time, and accompanying this process, there were definite shifts in the geography of political power. As a centre of political gravity, the old Hohenstaufen territorial base (the vis maxima regni of Otto of Freising) of the upper Rhenish plain gave way to the middle and lower Rhine, whose ecclesiastical powers dominated German politics up to about 1270. The last two decades of the century experienced a renewed shift, to the former border regions of the south-east (Bavaria, Austria and Bohemia). At the same time the Ostsiedlung (treated more extensively in the chapter on the military Orders in the Baltic) was adding considerable territory to the east of the Reich. The full impact of this new colonial Germany on the general balance of power was only to be felt after the close of the thirteenth century, but an important forerunner was Brandenburg, which after mid-century became prominent in imperial matters and whose rulers attained the rank of elector.

After kingship and imperial politics, the second major feature to be considered is social change. As over most of western and central Europe, there was demographic growth, raising the population of the German Reich by the end of the century to approximately 15 to 20 million inhabitants. As in the rest of Europe, there was considerable extension of human habitation within the old settlement area west of the Elbe, starting in some regions already towards the end of the eleventh century and almost everywhere by the mid-twelfth century. This movement, under the direction and for the profit of the landowning ecclesiastical and lay lords, would invest tremendous energies during the thirteenth century in the opening of additional land for cultivation, and reached areas previously considered unfit for human life, for instance the high-altitude slopes of the Alpine valleys. With growing population pressure on the resources of the old pale of settlement, there was much geographical mobility,
most of it on a small scale, within the countryside and towards the towns, yet also along considerable distances towards the newly opened east, although in smaller numbers than was previously thought. There was a rising curve of friction between lords and peasants, which led to new forms of co-operation and conflict resolution, but also to the full development of peasant communities increasingly insistent upon their rights.\(^{38}\) Most regions of old Germany also saw the dismantling of the manor and the allocation, by sale, of landed resources amongst the village population – the birth of a peasant society increasingly connected to the market mechanisms of regional trade circuits. As for the German colonisation in Slavonic lands, apart from some regional variations such as the preservation of old oppressive forms of serfdom in Silesia, its main social effect was consistent with the general tendency toward an improved legal standing of, and a lighter economic burden on, the peasantry. These developments were secured by way of the *ius teutonicum*, granted by conquering or indigenous lords to settlers in the east. This body of custom included personal freedom of movement, unhindered rights of inheritance, standardised holdings considerably larger than the ones of the old-settled west, planned villages and institutionalised access to urban markets.

The main expression and impact of the proliferation and loosening of the social body are to be found at the level of towns. Much of this is treated in earlier chapters, but the tremendous importance of the process of urbanisation for Germany needs stressing.\(^{39}\) The number of towns in central Europe has been estimated in the year 1250 as 1,500, three times as much as a hundred years earlier. By 1300 their number doubled again. The large towns of Germany, those that had developed organically as centres of trade, were all creations of previous periods. The thirteenth century still witnessed the foundation of a sizeable number of new towns (*Gründungsstadt*), but these tended to remain small, sometimes even dwarf-like (*Minderstadt*). Many of them, mainly in the old west, owed their existence not to the pursuit of trade but to a territorial ruler in need of a fortress, with the burghers serving as an unpaid garrison. In the east, however, the towns founded after 1250, many of them according to a standardised grid design, were still medium sized. These towns also enjoyed German law, which was sometimes granted to older Slavonic settlements too; they would perform, with regard to the villages built around them, clear functions as regional centres. In the east only a few towns ever reached the size and functional diversity attained much earlier by the old trade and industry towns of the west. Such towns did so by connecting with, or creating from scratch, networks of commerce, communication and power that

\(^{38}\) Toch (1986a) and (1986b).

\(^{39}\) For the following see Moraw (1989), pp. 100–1, and his map ‘German law in the towns of eastern central Europe’, on p. 112.
The Hansa, originating from the merchant guilds of the Rhineland and Westphalia towns on one hand, and from the trade emporium created in Lübeck for North Sea and Baltic trade on the other, was by about 1230 entering a new stage of development. Until the end of the century the merchants of these towns obtained their most important privileges abroad, particularly in Flanders and England, and formed a single guild possessing great economic might. In the thirteenth century the tremendous social and economic growth that created the Hansa had not yet found political expression. The further development of this system into a political Hansa of towns was to take place during the fourteenth century. The case was different with the older towns of the west, especially the great ones of the Rhineland. We have frequently seen them acting on their own or in league, in peace and more typically in war, taking advantage of their strategic position, mobilising their wealth and multitude of inhabitants, mostly in opposition to their lords but also for a general cause. Sometimes a medium-sized town was strong enough to impede the progress of a king for a considerable time, for instance Boppard, which impeded William of Holland from 1249 until 1251. During the earlier part of the thirteenth century a number of kings had attempted to use the concentrated potential of the towns for their own purposes. By mid-century the Rhenish town-league, the greatest of the town-associations till then outlawed, was sufficiently mighty to attract princes and kings into its ranks. Acceptance of the urban phenomenon seems to have crossed a critical threshold towards the end of the century, under Rudolf of Habsburg who moved in a burgher milieu and began the integration of the towns in the newly developing institutional framework of the empire. By then most of the towns of the former, disintegrated, royal domain were quickly moving towards the status of free imperial cities.

The aristocracy too underwent important changes, to which the concept of social growth might be applied. The reshuffling of the German aristocratic order, begun prior to our period during the time of Frederick Barbarossa, had led to attempts to curb social mobility by creating a legal order based on feudal principles (Heerschild, Reichsfürstenstand and Leihzwang). The thirteenth century saw two main developments: the growth of some princely lordships into territories (Landesherrschaft) and the transformation of the originally unfree ministeriales into a lower nobility. The former process has been an integral part of the political history recounted earlier; the fate of the latter is extensively treated in ch. 1 (a) in this volume. There remains the intermediate rank of counts and other dynasts descending from the old high nobility, the third and fourth rank of the Heerschild. Some comital families such as the Habsburg and later the Luxembourg attempted successfully to rise into the first rank, and their history is part of Reichsgeschichte. Other counts such as Adolf of Nassau failed in their
bid to do so. The social history of the greater part of this group, who for various reasons were unable to share in the possession of imperial fiefs and the movement towards territorial concentration, must necessarily be a regional one and is as yet little researched. Thus, for instance, a sharp drop in the number of families of the high nobility in eastern Switzerland occurred between 1260 and 1300, for which both biological attrition and the loss of wealth have been made responsible. In yet other regions, such as lower Austria, there was the early development of *Landesherren*, barons possessing great self-confidence and armed power, who formed an organised body that foreshadowed the order of estates of the later Middle Ages.

Compared to the still archaic *Reich* of the early thirteenth century, the Germany emerging at the end of the century was one we would recognise much more easily. It was a social body more open and fluid than ever before, and probably than later too. It was an entity characterised by multiple forms of regionalism and evolving under the strain of numerous contrasting pressures and forces. Seen from the perspective of western Europe, the Germans were receding from their former position of overbearing might, yet seen from the perspective of eastern Europe they were even more strongly identified with the role of colonising overlords. As a culture Germany was beginning to find its own voice, yet this voice was for a long time destined to be a double one, of the ruling lords and of the burghers.
CHAPTER 14(b)

FLANDERS

Wim Blockmans

DYNASTY AND TERRITORY

under Count Philip of Alsace (1157–91), Flanders had become one of the mightiest and most progressive principalities of western Europe. Although a vassal of the king of France, Philip could compete with him, especially since the succession of his wife Elisabeth of Vermandois in 1163 had extended his territories from the mouth of the Scheldt to only twenty-five kilometres north of Paris. In fact, he held a patrimony larger and probably richer than the royal domains of France. Only the Angevin kings of England and dukes of Normandy were even more powerful vassals of the French crown. However, in 1185 Philip had to give up Vermandois after his wife’s death; he remained childless and his two brothers died before him. He sought his destiny in personal glory, taking part in the Third Crusade, and died before Acre in 1191. He had secured his succession by Baldwin V, count of Hainault, who was the consort of his sister. In order to obtain his suzerain’s approval, Philip had arranged Philip Augustus’s marriage with his niece Isabel of Hainault in 1180, for which he offered as a dowry a great number of his cities and castellanies which in 1237 were to be formed into the county of Artois.

So, in 1191, the power relations between Flanders and France had radically been reversed: the king now constantly undermined the counts’ power. Flanders lost the southern and perhaps most developed part of its territory, with such large and rich cities as Arras and Hesdin, while the final agreement in 1212 tore off Flanders the equally important cities and castellanies of Saint-Omer and Aire. Exactly one century later, Flanders would again lose to France three of its southern cities with their territories, namely Lille, Douai and Orchies. These substantial losses clearly demonstrate the constant and successful pressure the crown exerted on its peripheral fief during the whole of the thirteenth century. On the other hand, they equally show that Flanders could not entirely be incorporated in crown lands, as occurred for example with Champagne, although the territory had twice been entirely occupied by
French armies. Lille, Douai and Orchies were even returned to Flanders later in the fourteenth century. In all probability, the high level of urbanisation is the main explanatory factor for this partial royal failure. Another factor may have been that since 1191, the neighbouring counties of Flanders and Hainault had become a personal union, which compensated for at least part of the count of Flanders’s power losses. The two territories kept their own institutions and were separated again in 1278.

Thus Flanders initially still comprised the cities of Saint-Omer and Aire, which were definitively lost to Artois in 1212. Apart from the brief occupation in 1213, the territory was invaded by a French army again in 1297, when the western half of the county was subdued; from 1300 till 1302, the rest was taken as well. A Flemish invasion of Zeeland in 1253 turned into a complete failure. Except for these short periods, Flemish territory remained undiminished during the century. It has to be noted that some of its eastern and northern parts were held in fief from the empire and were unsuccessfully disputed by the rival Hainault dynasty of Avesnes. Three small peripheral seigneuries were also acquired: Béthune and Dendermonde as a dowry in 1246 and Bornem by means of a bargain. Moreover, the rights over the county of Namur were bought off by Count Guy de Dampierre who married the heiress in 1265; their younger son was to succeed there in 1298.

Count Baldwin IX, who had succeeded his father in 1196, participated in the Fourth Crusade and left at Easter 1202. In May 1204, he was elected emperor of Constantinople, a dignity which brought him into Bulgar captivity at the end of 1205, when he died. He left two very young daughters, Joan and Margaret, whose uncle Philip of Namur was in charge of the regency but who felt unable to withstand Philip Augustus’s request to send the girls off to Paris. He agreed to Joan’s marriage in 1212 with Ferrand of Portugal, in return for the huge relief of 50,000 livres parisis and the castellanies of Saint-Omer and Aire, as already mentioned.

The conditions to the marriage, imposed by the king, provoked a revolt from two important Flemish noblemen and the city of Ghent, which closed its gates instead of doing homage to the new lord. So Ferrand was soon driven into the anti-French, pro-English and Welf party, sponsored by the Flemish cities, which led him to the losers’ side in the great battle at Bouvines in 1214. King Philip Augustus held the young count prisoner until 1227, when his spouse Joan was allowed to buy him off for the same amount as the relief, 50,000 livres parisis. In the meantime, he imposed his control on the county’s affairs through his loyal vassals the viscounts of Bruges and Ghent. This leads us to the observation that the position of the count of Flanders was weak during most of the thirteenth century: by absence in 1202–5, minority in 1205–12, a female heir from 1214 to 1278, captivity of the count in 1214–27.
and 1300. During the sixty-six years of female government, the countesses always had male executives at their side. The consorts normally took over the government in such a way that even when Countess Joan acted in his absence, she explicitly mentioned his delegation or made reservations for his approval. After Bouvines, King Philip Augustus imposed a *ballivus comitissa* in the person of the vicount of Bruges John of Nesle who had been dismissed by the countess only two years earlier. Just after the king's death in 1223, she took the opportunity to get rid of him again. Nevertheless, she left the institution of the countess's bailiff intact, appointing to it a nobleman loyal to her, for the further duration of her consort's captivity and during her widowship (1224–7 and 1233–7). Joan of Constantinople remained childless even after her second marriage to Thomas of Savoy (1237–44). Thus her sister Margaret took up the succession. At that time, she was a widow of the Champagne nobleman William of Dampierre. She soon shared the title of count with her sons William (1246–51) and after his death with Guy (1252–78) who eventually succeeded her. Margaret's first marriage with the cleric Bouchard of Avesnes was declared invalid, which was at the origin of a century-long feud with her first-born. Arbitration in 1246 by King Louis IX assigned the succession in Hainault to the Avesnes, that in Flanders to the Dampierre. A ten-year conflict about rights over imperial Flanders would only reconfirm that division. Both dynasties successfully expanded their positions. The Avesnes effected a coalition with the counties of Holland and Zeeland which in 1299 resulted in a personal union with Hainault. Guy de Dampierre managed to place his sixteen children in several strategic positions: as bishop of Liège, as count of Namur and as spouses of the duke of Brabant and the count of Guelders. King Philip IV cynically played off the dynastic rivalries of the Avesnes and Dampierre to strengthen his grasp on Flanders.

To sum up: during the whole thirteenth century the comital dynasty was a weakening factor, especially in its lasting antagonism to the crown. Dynastic manoeuvres caused the loss of Artois as well as the temporary union with Hainault, along with the related feudal disputes. Discontinuity and the limitations felt about female government considerably reduced the impact of the counts on Flemish history in the thirteenth century, especially if it is compared to the twelfth.

**Institutions of the County**

The highest governmental organ, the count's *curia*, showed a clear tendency towards professionalisation. The originally dominating group of great vassals kept their function in the field of feudal justice, but lost their concern with the routine of administration. In their place came, especially in the second half of
the century, officers, clerics, bailiffs and, under Count Guy, university-trained lawyers. The highest officer was the chancellor, heading the count’s administration and a member of the curia comitis. Since 1087 and still during the first half of the century, the office was traditionally linked with that of the provost of the chapter of St Donatian at Bruges. It was held by younger members of the dynasty; their main ambitions being purely feudal, they often came into conflict with Countess Joan. After Count Thomas of Savoy’s brother’s appointment as the archbishop of Lyons in 1240, the office of chancellor was kept vacant. Its competences had been shifting over several years to a keeper of the seal, a prothonotarius and a clericus comitis or a notarius clericus, all humbler officers with a bureaucratic training, living off a salary and thus well controlled by the count.

Similarly, the traditional court offices of constable, butler, steward and chamberlain, which had become hereditary possessions of high noble families, lost their political content.

Since the first half of the eleventh century, the county of Flanders had been subdivided into castellanies, châtellenies, districts under the control of the viscounts residing in a central borough or castle. Count Philip of Alsace is known to have introduced into Flanders a system of public officers, the bailiffs. From the thirteenth century onwards, the bailiffs tended to replace the hereditary viscounts, expressing the modern notion of office instead of the feudal power links. From about 1210 onwards, feudal courts were created in the castellanies, presided over by the bailiffs. In the eastern rural circumscriptions of the county, namely the castellanies of Douai, Oudenaarde, Ghent and Aalst, these feudal courts took up all jurisdictional matters including those for non-noble inhabitants. In the central areas, however, rural courts of schepenen, échevins, scabini (aldermen) were created for allodial and lower justice, as well as the feudal courts which maintained high justice. Finally, in those coastal areas which had been taken into exploitation more recently and therefore were free of feudal structures, the schepenen obtained full jurisdiction.

Bailiffs were recruited among the lower nobility; if they were vassals to the count, it certainly was not their office they held in fief, since their removability was a key element in their status. As a rule, a bailiff was not a burgher in the city of his office, so as to guarantee his independence. The number of offices expanded as they were split, and reached seventeen castellanies in the middle of the thirteenth century. The bailiffs’ competence was mainly that of public prosecutors in criminal affairs, capable of suing as of right. They were accountable to the count for the fines they collected and from which they were entitled to hold a share for themselves. In the larger offices, fixed wages were defined, such as £200 per year in Ghent and Bruges, and £140 in Ypres and Cassel.1 It is

clear that this system helped to impose law and order while it contributed to the count’s income. In 1286, the receipts of the bailiffs’ accounts can be estimated at some £10,800, nearly the total income of the county of Namur in 1265, while Guy de Dampierre’s global net receipts amounted to more than £28,000. We can conclude that the consolidation of the judicial offices not only reduced the influence of the feudal nobility, but contributed a substantial portion to the count’s income.

Since the twelfth century, the count’s financial administration was organised primarily on the local level in officia, ministeria, run by more than forty receivers of circumscriptions comprising the comital domain. An audit of the old domainal income had been institutionalised in the redeninghe (Fl.), renenghe (Fr.). A general account has been preserved from 1187, in which these regional receivers rendered their account on the feast of St John the Baptist, 24 June, originally before the comital curia presided over by the provost-chancellor. During the thirteenth century, he lost this function to a clerk-notary, while the regional offices of receiver became feudalised. The structure and amounts of most receipts and expenditures remained remarkably constant until the next extant grote brief from 1255, which shows that the receipts were fixed farms and the expenditures fixed rents granted by the count on certain revenues. Casual income increased considerably during the thirteenth century, especially from other sources like newly exploited domains, tolls, mints and bailiwicks. New methods of accounting were being developed in juxtaposition to the domainal resources and the extra-domainal income such as the judicial fines, aids granted by cities and churches and loans. This leads to the following estimate of the count’s ordinary revenue around 1280, in livres parisiis:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Net</th>
<th>Gross</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>old domain</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>new domain</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>farms and tolls</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bailiffs</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>totals</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
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</table>

These sums can be compared with the yearly revenue of the duchy of Normandy, amounting to £56,000–£60,000 in the years 1286–96, and with those of the county of Namur which were £11,000 in 1265. In Flanders, however, the extraordinary income from gifts from the church and the cities and loans substantially augmented the ordinary. The city of Douai alone paid from 1244 to 1268 a yearly average of more than £1,200, which allows one to

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2 Luykx (1961), pp. 202, 298–9; £13,804 turn. were equivalent to £11,043 par.
estimate the total for the aids from cities and castellanies as more than £7,000 from the traditional domainal income. The growing complexity of the financial administration required more elaborate institutional devices. The level of centralisation remained low, even when, at least since 1267 and perhaps as early as 1262, a petty nobleman was mentioned as the count’s general receiver. He was the first of a series of officers originally appointed ad hoc from other offices like that of bailiff, from whom gradually emerged, at least by 1291, the office of the receiver of Flanders, heading a central treasury. Thus in 1296 the receiver general audited the first general and complete account of the renenghe, while he heard the accounts of all other officials as well. His gage or salary of £50 was to be taken from the receipts of the domainal circumscription of which he happened to be the particular receiver. An abstract notion of the circumscription of the general receiver had not emerged yet. An important step forward in this evolution had been made by an Italian banker residing with some of his family in Flanders, Gerard Lupichimi, who bore the title of general receiver from 1289 to 1292. Count Guy had been indebted to him for £9,000. His financial expertise was urgently needed to handle the repayment of the huge loans contracted by the count with financiers from Arras, from Flemish cities and from Italian merchant-bankers. He developed the count’s household treasury into the central treasury under the general receiver’s control. During the last decade of the century, the number of accounts and other financial surveys increased considerably, which points to enhanced bureaucratic activity.

The Flemish nobility was primarily determined by birth; free status, vassalage, the ownership of allodia and the possession of seigneurial rights were further but not essential characteristics. Although all Flemish nobles esteemed military skills, knights in Flanders did not necessarily belong to the nobility. During the thirteenth century, important shifts tended to erode the nobility’s status. The spread of free status made noble freedom less distinctive. The income of landed estates diminished as a consequence of the monetarisation of the economy which led to the inflation of the fixed money rents. Since the nobles were unable to adapt their life style to the professionalisation of government, their share of offices fell. The four heritable court offices were still held by noble families, but their importance derived more from the incumbent than from the office itself. Finally, the rule that nobility could only be transmitted by two noble parents necessarily reduced their numbers.

All these tendencies prompted the nobility to open their ranks. During the thirteenth century, the principle that a noble mother and a non-noble father could have a noble child was accepted. In the second half of the century, noble status was transmitted through a noble father only. It was clear that the sale of allodia and feudal rights, and finally intermarriage with rich burghers, had become unavoidable means of survival for the nobility. At the very end of the century, the king even granted patents of nobility in return for good money, to those who considered their inherited status insufficient. The last remnant of the nobility’s supremacy, its military superiority, was given a heavy blow by the astonishing victory of urban and rural footsoldiers in the battle of Courtrai (Kortrijk) in 1302. New weapons, new social relations and new values had definitively eroded the hegemony of the nobles.

THE ECONOMY

The continuous population growth increased pressure on the land as a response to the high demand for agrarian products. In the coastal area, the count commercialised his regalian rights over the wilderness, farming or selling out the dunes for profitable use. The intensified use of the natural dunes for grazing, not only of sheep but even of horses and cattle, eroded the natural vegetation and resulted in shifting of the sand. The new private owners did not care much about the landscape, either. In this way, the natural protective function of the dunes against the sea was undermined for the short-term profit of the count, the landowning abbeys, noblemen and propertied burghers. In a similar way, the creation, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, of new harbours, especially that of Ostend in 1267, also interrupted the dams along the shore line formed by the dunes. The long-term effects came in later centuries in the form of floodings. The thoughtless profit-seeking of the thirteenth century had, however, already revealed the first symptoms of the limits to economic expansion as they were reached in the Flemish coastal area.7

The intensive use of the land is only one aspect of the highly developed Flemish economy. Its population could only survive thanks to intensive commercial relations with neighbouring regions, especially with Artois. The excellent quality of the lime soils there enabled much higher agricultural yields than on the Flemish sandy soils. Agriculture in southern Flanders and Artois combined cattle holding in stables with two crops, wheat and animal fodder, high in yield thanks to the manure. This system of intensive husbandry created large surpluses that could be marketed downstream in the great Flemish cities. Here was to be found the purchasing power for grain, dairy produce and meat. In

their own close environment, the burghers equally invested in the commercialisation of agriculture, orienting the production to labour-intensive vegetables and crops needed for the textile industry, such as the colouring plants madder and woad. In large areas peat was extracted for fuel.

In the large cities, figures for the fourteenth century show that up to 60 per cent of the workers lived off the textile industry. This was the case of typical industrial cities like Douai, Ypres and Ghent. It is well known that Flemish cloth was exported throughout Europe since at least the eleventh century. Its early development had opened markets everywhere and secured a solid reputation for quality. Thanks to this continent-wide distribution, we have at our disposal price lists in various Iberian, Italian, French and German centres, both courts and merchant houses. From these documents, we know that the most expensive cloths were always the coloured ones and especially the scarlets, made of the finest wools in Douai, Ghent, Cambrai, Ypres and Lille. In each of these centres, other and cheaper types of cloth were produced and exported as well. These were differentiated as a variety of special products, such as stanfort, biffe, rays, and the plain ones, such as the whites from Diksmuiide. The cheapest coloured cloth cost double the price of the best stanforts. This second category of specialised products constituted the main articles of the export of other important cities: Arras, Saint-Omer, Valenciennes, Tournai and Bruges. The great variety in qualities, types and prices reflects the far-reaching specialisation and division of labour within the textile industry. The differences in quality depended mostly on the raw material and the differentiation and sophistication of the product. The cheaper products were made of cheaper wool, which might well be of English origin, taking into account the important differences in the prices paid for English wools. The highest quality cloth from Douai was always woven from the finest wools for warp and weft. In Ypres, the use of domestic or Irish wools was forbidden for the most expensive cloths. On the other hand, cheaper cloth was coarser, and used more wool from various origins, prepared in a less refined way. By the end of the century, some centres turned to mechanisation by the use of the spinning wheel and the fulling mill. At that time, other regions emerged with competitive prices, creating serious problems for the Flemish producers. Brabant, Tuscany and Languedoc developed their own textile production and went to buy their wool in England directly. The price advantage the Flemish had so far enjoyed dwindled, partly also as a consequence of political disputes with both England and France, and social conflicts at home.8

From this survey it clearly appears that the political borders played only a subordinate role in the production and merchandising of textiles. Cities from

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Flanders, Artois, Normandy and Champagne were organised in the so-called ‘Hansa of the seventeen cities’ which all concentrated their trade on the fairs of Champagne. These were the most prominent meeting places for merchants from all parts of Europe, especially the Mediterranean and the north-west. There, the counts of Flanders contracted or repaid their loans with merchant financiers from Arras, Siena and Florence. Until around 1300, the cycle of six fairs through the whole year connected well with the cycle of six Flemish fairs, held in five places on the route from Lille to Bruges and thus linking with England and its fairs system. Between the two cycles, a regular exchange of credit notes facilitated international payments. Copies of some 5,500 contracts, drawn up at the Ypres fairs from 1241 to 1291, show that 13.5 per cent of these concerned a foreign party, of which the French were mentioned in 559 (10 per cent) of the cases, Italians in 122 (2 per cent). Textile products were the most frequently mentioned, but articles of current utility were just as often dealt with. From these contracts, the function of international fairs seems to have been not only that of a meeting place for long-distance trade but even more to link this stream of business with local and regional ones.

The Cities

After northern Italy, Flanders was the earliest and most densely urbanised area of medieval Europe. The urban growth had started from the tenth century onwards, and the earliest city privileges must date back to the late eleventh, even if they are not preserved in a written form. Around 1170, Count Philip of Alsace had granted similar privileges called the great keure to all seven major cities of his county (still including Arras and Saint-Omer), which showed the strength of comital power. Moreover, he introduced modern legislation by limiting the death penalty to homicide and violation, and by converting other corporal punishments into monetary fines. Later, this law was extended to smaller cities like Aardenburg, Dendermonde, Hulst and Oudenaarde, which had to appeal to their ‘capitals’ for difficulties of interpretation. Each of the seven cities could ask the other to arbitrate in conflicts with the count or with one of the other six. From this consultative practice grew the institution of the hoofdvaart, recours au chef-de-sens, which provided a legal basis for the predominance of the major cities over the rest of the county. As the college of the scabini Flandriae, they concluded a treaty with the king of England in 1208 and subscribed to several treaties with the king of France as well. At least in the second half of the century, they controlled the counts’ monetary policy, gave advice

11 Verhulst (1989), p. 34.
concerning technical points and checked the quality of the circulating coins. In this way, the merchants, who were the most closely interested in monetary affairs, secured the stability of the currency in the county.\footnote{Wyffels (1967), pp. 1133–5.}

After Count Philip’s death, the cities obtained new charters which generally allowed them more autonomy vis-à-vis the count, especially concerning the free choice of the city government. In 1209, regent Philip of Namur granted such a privilege to Ypres, requiring only the yearly mutation of the aldermen and an oath of loyalty from them after their election. Similar acts were granted to Ghent in 1212, Douai in 1228, Lille in 1235, Bruges and its dependent towns in 1241–2. In Ghent, \textit{schepenen} were not allowed to be relatives in the first or second degree; elsewhere, the third degree was excluded as well. In practice, the annual election did not prevent the governments from being strongly exclusive and plutocratic. In Ghent, a rotation system was introduced in which the thirteen \textit{schepenen} after one year of office collectively turned into the second bench of \textit{schepenen} with competence mainly in civil procedure; in the third year, they remained out of office, only to return to the first place in the fourth year. So, with formal respect for the annual mutation rule, a closed group of thirty-nine \textit{schepenen} occupied political power for a lifetime, which furthered corruption of all kinds.\footnote{Blockmans (1938), pp. 329–41.} In Ypres, sixty-five persons occupied the 338 posts of provost or alderman during the twenty-six years from 1265 to 1290, which provides an average of 5.2. Taking into account the fact that careers in fact covered far longer periods for which the data are lacking or incomplete, these achievements must have been considerably greater. Some managed to occupy eighteen posts in twenty-nine years, sixteen in twenty-six and sixteen in twenty-three. Fathers and sons not only alternated with each other, but could act simultaneously when one or other was the provost, as did Jehan and Pierre de Lo.\footnote{Wyffels (1967), pp. 1133–5.} In the 1241 charter for Bruges, Countess Joan even tolerated the non-observance of the annual turnover and restricted the eligibility to members of the Flemish Hansa of London, an association of wealthy merchants.

All these concessions of the counts strengthened the autonomy of the major cities and the hegemony of their ruling class, commonly called the patriciate. The relatively weak position of the Flemish counts from 1191 to the beginning of the fourteenth century helps to explain why they granted such far-reaching privileges to the cities. They needed the cities’ support, not in the last place their financial aid, in their struggles against the still active nobility, the king of France and the dynasty of Avesnes.

Overall, the Flemish towns must have grown considerably during the thirteenth century. Parishes were erected, feudal and allodial lands were incorporated in the urban \textit{ban} or jurisdiction. Examples of this can be given for Ghent,
Bruges, Douai and many other instances. The newly built city walls offer one criterion to evaluate the magnitude of this expansion. In Ypres, a suburban area, mostly inhabited by textile workers, was fortified in 1214. In Ghent, gradual territorial extensions were walled in during 1213, 1254, around 1300 and so on. Douai had a large wall built on the right bank of the Scarpe by 1200 and constructed a new one on the left bank from 1310 onwards. In the twelfth century, the Ghent city walls included some 80 hectares, in the fourteenth 644; in Bruges the territorial growth was from 70 to 430 hectares.\textsuperscript{15}

The population of the Flemish cities must have reached a peak around 1300 since famines, plagues, economic and social degradation led to depopulation afterwards. Around the middle of the fourteenth century, the earliest estimate for Ghent indicates about 64,000 inhabitants in 1356, after the Black Death and a series of other crises. If we assume that this figure may have been higher at the end of the thirteenth century, it is obvious that Ghent was one of the very few large cities in northern Europe at that time, preceded only by Paris. The Bruges population can be estimated at 46,000 in 1340, before the Black Death but after at least one serious famine in 1315–16. Lille, Douai and Ypres must have counted around 30,000 inhabitants around 1300, which brings the total population of the five major cities up to some 200,000. Given the small distances between them, and the fact that dozens of smaller but still sizeable cities had developed as well, the huge impact of the cities in the county became very obvious towards the end of the thirteenth century. Within the cities, social tensions grew between the economically and politically dominating patricians and the exploited masses of textile workers, the great industry of the region.

The first symptoms of social protest from the textile workers date from a strike in Douai in 1245 and Ghent in 1252. It was the English blockade from 1270 which provoked the collective exodus of the Ghent weavers and fullers in 1274. The magistrates of a series of Flemish and Brabantine cities reacted by agreeing mutually to exclude unruly artisans who had been banished from one of their cities. In 1275 Countess Margaret dismissed the whole oligarchy of the thirty-nine Ghent schepenen and imposed a set of measures to restrict economic abuses practised by the patricians.\textsuperscript{16} Nothing changed for the better, and revolts broke out in 1279–81 in Ghent, Ypres, Bruges and Damme. The gemeente, the ‘common man’, appealed to the count to redress all kinds of abuses of power by the patricians, asked for self-government of the crafts and an equal say in all political decisions.\textsuperscript{17} The main result was the prescription, by king and count in 1279, that all Flemish cities had to render yearly accounts, with which they complied only with the greatest reluctance. Crafts had been

created by the patricians and placed under their leadership, primarily with the task of controlling production; later on they took up charitable and military functions. Douai was the city where craftsmen penetrated the earliest into the inspection committee: in 1229 for the clippers, around 1250 also for other crafts. Some consultation in the preparation of regulations was mentioned as well. Generally, however, the patricians fiercely opposed any meetings and political claims by the craftsmen. When the antagonism between King Philip IV and Count Guy came to a climax with the imprisonment at Paris of the latter, a process of polarisation drove the patricians into a coalition with the king, while the count and his family badly needed the support of the craftsmen whose cause they had not favoured at all until then. In this process, grievances were listed against the patricians’ arbitrary and selfish rule. So, even after his complete occupation of the county, King Philip ordered in 1301 the election of the schepenen to be made by four men designated by him and four by the commune, which made some opening of the ranks possible. This system held for 240 years, albeit with some modification. Nevertheless, the French occupation awakened a fervent Flemish resistance, which might be labelled national. The French language of the occupants and the patricians facilitated a negative identification among the Flemish-speaking artisans and peasants; these nevertheless easily sympathised with their French-speaking companions in Douai and Lille. The resistance resulted in a strike of all ‘mechanical’ workers on 2 April 1302 in Ghent and an uprising in Bruges on 18 May, in which at least 120, mostly noble, French occupants and dozens of patricians were slaughtered by Flemish craftsmen. When the royal army came to punish the rebels, it was dramatically defeated by the Flemings near Courtrai on 11 July, although these were mostly occasional footsoldiers, while the French had mobilised up to 2,500 of their best trained knights. The marshy ground explains a good deal about this astonishing event in military history, but it also signals the emergence of the massive armies of artisans and peasants as occasional fighters, expressing a new social order.

The Courtrai victory had two lasting effects: first, it secured the continuity of the county of Flanders as a largely independent fief under the crown; secondly, it radically ended the predominance of the patricians who had sided with the king; this brought about a far-reaching breakthrough in the artisans’ claims for autonomous organisation and political participation. The conjuncture of strong class antagonism, built up during decades, with a political struggle between patricians, count and king, made a revolutionary social and political transformation possible which gave Flanders by 1302/3 arguably the most open and broadly based political system of Europe.

Chapter 15(a)

The Maritime Republics

John H. Pryor

At the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the economies of the three major Italian maritime republics were flourishing. Their maritime commerce brought in wealth which enriched those engaged in trade, filtered through to the rest of the populace and funded the physical embellishment of their cities. Genoa and Venice also had transalpine trade by land with France and southern Germany which made significant contributions to their prosperity. This foreign trade was secured by the republics by means of political and economic treaties and agreements with their trading partners. After the massacre of the Latins in Constantinople in 1182, Pisa and Genoa negotiated renewal of their privileges and re-establishment of their quarters in 1192. In 1198, Venice finally reached agreement with the Byzantines on her claims for compensation for losses incurred in 1171 and for re-establishment of her quarter. In the Holy Land, in return for their participation in the Third Crusade, the republics received confirmation of their earlier privileges in the crusader states and grants of new ones: the most important being those of Conrad of Montferrat to the Venetians in 1192, in Tyre; and of Guy of Lusignan to the Pisans in 1189 and the Genoese in 1190, in Acre. In Egypt the aftermath of the Third Crusade did not lend itself to renegotiation of the earlier commercial treaties of the republics with the Ayyubid sultans. But while formal treaties were not renegotiated until 1205 (with Venice), the ships of the republics nevertheless crowded Alexandria in the decades of relative peace between 1191 and 1217.

In the east the three republics competed on a relatively even footing; however, the Pisan presence in Byzantium was more restricted than that of Genoa and Venice. By contrast, in the Maghrib Venetian involvement was limited; even though she had made a treaty with the Almohad sultan Abu-Ya’qub Yusuf in 1175, Pisa and Genoa negotiated treaties with his successor Abu-Yusuf Ya’qub in 1186 and 1191 respectively. The Genoese notarial cartularies show extensive trading by the Genoese in Maghribi cities from Tripoli to Ceuta and Saleh. Although comparable archives have not survived in Pisa, the
Map 6 Genoa, Venice and the Mediterranean
evidence of her commercial treaties and of chronicle records, reporting clashes between Pisan and Genoese ships in North African waters, suggests that her commerce there rivalled that of Genoa. Letters to a Pisan merchant, Pace di Corso, from his Muslim partners in Tunis survive from 1201;¹ and the father of the famous Pisan mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci had been resident in Tunis and had held the lease of the Pisan customs there.

The confusion which followed the extinction of the line of Norman kings in Sicily in 1189 made the trading positions of the republics in the Regno less secure. Both Genoa and Pisa allied with Emperor Henry VI in his invasion of Sicily in 1194. Venice remained neutral but did not suffer for that.² Henry confirmed Venice's limited rights in Palermo in 1195 but prevaricated over the more extensive privileges claimed by Genoa and Pisa. Merchants from the three republics continued to trade in the Regno but Genoa and Pisa became embroiled in incessant conflict at sea, notably over their rights and possessions in Corsica and Sardinia, as well as in Sicily. As the following chapter reveals Sardinia was parcelled into judicatures under hereditary native families, some intermarried with Pisan and Genoese noble families. Genoa gained the upper hand in Corsica in 1195, when she finally seized possession of the great fortress at Bonifacio. But in Sardinia Pisa held the upper hand; even so Genoa hotly disputed influence over parts of the island.

In the western Mediterranean, Genoa in 1181 and Pisa in 1184 renewed treaties with Ishaq Ibn Muhammad, the emir of the Balearics, in order to secure access for their ships to the strategic islands which he controlled. In Provence, Languedoc and Catalonia the situation was confused and constantly shifting. The two republics jockeyed for position both with particular towns and also with the counts of Provence and Barcelona and the counts of Toulouse. Marseilles and Montpellier in particular were gateways to the Rhone valley and major conduits to the Mediterranean for the northern cloth which both cities traded around the sea; and at the start of the thirteenth century Aragonese lordship over Montpellier became more firmly established.

Across the Mediterranean the three republics competed for shares of the wealth that maritime commerce could provide. In the west competition for market share had already brought Pisa and Genoa to war. In the east the situation had not yet degenerated so far, although they had attacked each other's quarters in Constantinople earlier in the twelfth century, engaged in a corsair war at sea whenever the opportunity presented itself, and were at loggerheads in the Holy Land. As an anonymous treatise on the Holy Land written shortly after the Third Crusade said of the Pisans, Genoese and Venetians: 'They are

as jealous of each other as they are hostile to each other, which gives greater security to the Saracens.” 3

At home the constitutional evolution of the republics diverged. Venice had already begun a process of political consolidation which would contain the power of the doges and bring political authority into the hands of the patriciate. Although the solidity of the Venetian ruling class was less monolithic than has often been claimed, nevertheless, in the first half of the thirteenth century Venice managed to create a political system in which checks and balances between the doge and the patriciate created a relatively stable political order. From the accession of Doge Giacomo Tiepolo in 1229, successive doges were required to take oaths (promissioni) on their accession which addressed concerns exhibited during the dogeships of their predecessors and which progressively circumscribed their freedom of action. By contrast, both Pisa and Genoa began a desperate search for political stability that neither would ultimately attain. In efforts to overcome the effects of political brawling between their aristocratic factions for control of the communes, both cities followed the example of other north Italian towns and appointed their first foreign podestà in 1191. The podestat then alternated intermittently with native consuls in both republics until foreign podestà became regular in Genoa from 1217 and in Pisa from 1218. However, even this measure did not resolve the internecine political strife in the two republics and their future history would be punctuated by civil unrest, violence and experiments with alternative forms of rule.

With Genoa and Pisa locked in struggle in the western Mediterranean, the French crusaders of 1201 turned to Venice for transportation. Doge Enrico Dandolo miscalculated badly, placing far too much credence in the ability of the French to raise the army they expected and to pay for its transport. Not only did Venice raise a transport fleet of more than 200 ships; she also furnished at her own expense a battle fleet of fifty galleys. Half the city’s adult male population was involved; maritime commerce was suspended in order to assemble the fleet; and a new coin, the silver grosso, was minted to pay for it. French failure to pay the 94,000 silver marks owed for the transport fleet would bankrupt the city. Only Venice’s enormous investment and the subsequent failure of sufficient crusaders to arrive and pay for more than a part of the costs explains the diversion of the Fourth Crusade to Zadar (Zara) and Constantinople.

As a result of her participation in the crusade, the conquest of Constantinople on 12 April 1204 gave Venice lordship over three-eighths of Romania; but she soon abandoned her claims to large swaths of mainland territory and remained content with island bases and strategic ports of call. With a group of companions, Marco Sanudo conquered on his own account most of the Cyclades and Dodecanese islands. The aftermath of the crusade gave Venice a great coup over her rivals in the east. Henceforth, for the life of the Latin empire of Constantinople, Romania would be a sphere of Venetian economic predominance. Although both Pisa and Genoa regained access to Romania by treaty with the Latin emperors and Venice, neither city in fact developed an active commerce in the Aegean or Black Seas until after 1261. Their attentions were deflected to the south, to the crusader states, Egypt and the Maghrib. Venice monopolised the trade of Romania with the west and began the creation of a colonial empire.

The first major hostilities between Genoa and Venice were opened in 1205 by the Genoese corsair Enrico Pescatore, count of Malta, who sent a squadron to the Levant and tried to take possession of Crete. By 1211 he had lost his struggle with Venice for the island but the war was continued until 1218 by other Genoese corsairs, particularly by Alamanno da Costa, count of Syracuse. Syracuse had been promised to Genoa by Henry VI in 1194; however, the Pisan Count Ranieri Manente di Segalari managed to occupy the city in 1202 as a by-product of Pisa’s support for Markward von Anweiler, the imperial vicar in Sicily. Alamanno da Costa succeeded in ousting him from the city in August 1204 and hostilities between Pisa and Genoa in the western Mediterranean then dragged on until 1217. At sea corsairs waged war against shipping while by land hostilities continued in Sicily and Sardinia. Pisa attempted to secure assistance against Genoa by making alliances with Venice in 1206 and 1214 but Venice was too preoccupied in the east to be able to divert resources to the Tyrrhenian.

As a preliminary to the Fifth Crusade, Pope Honorius III engineered treaties of peace between Pisa and Genoa in 1217 and Genoa and Venice in 1218. In fact, Genoa did not participate in the crusade but both Pisa and Venice did. Forty Pisan galleys sent to Damietta under Sigerio Visconti played an important role in the siege of the city. Venice placed an embargo on trade with Egypt during the crusade and Doge Pietro Ziani sent fourteen galleys to Damietta in August 1220.

The crusade brought an end to hostilities between the republics for some two decades and gave them the opportunity to devote their attentions to developing their economies. Earlier expansion of European maritime commerce

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4 Abulafia (1971).
and its penetration of the economies of the Byzantine and Muslim worlds was consolidated and enhanced. Both Genoa and Venice also developed further their trade with northern Europe. However, it is impossible to quantify the nature and dimensions of this commercial expansion in the cases of Pisa and Venice, and difficult even in that of Genoa. No complete notarial cartularies survive from either Pisa or Venice for the thirteenth century; and the numbers of fragmentary documents upon which analysis of economic activity can be based run to only a few hundred for Venice and a few dozen for Pisa. From Genoa and its satellites, such as Ventimiglia, Portovenere and Savona, numerous cartularies have survived but only seven have been published in full, although extracts from others have been published in many places. The late thirteenth-century cartularies of Genoese and Venetian notaries working abroad have also been published. But the important cartularies of Genoese notaries redacted at home by Bartolomeo di Fornari and others remain unedited. Moreover, no scholar has dared to use the unpublished cartularies and other sources to construct a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of Genoese commerce in the thirteenth century; perhaps this is too massive and daunting a project. Pisa and Venice also lack overall surveys of their trade in this period.

The commerce of the republics was founded upon dual bases. On the one hand, although none of them could be regarded as a major industrial power in the same league as the Flemish cities, Milan or Florence, their own industries provided a limited degree of commodity export basis for foreign trade, especially in the case of Pisa. A large range of crafts and trades was practised in all three republics on a small scale, as in other medieval towns. However, the only industries of the republics sufficiently large in scale to form a basis for extensive commodity export were the extractive salt works of Venice, which by the thirteenth century had become centred upon Chioggia, the iron industry of Pisa founded upon her possession of Elba and its iron mines, the glass industry of Venice centred upon Murano, and the leather industry of Pisa, which by the thirteenth century was importing skins on a large scale from the Maghrib and Sardinia. Both Pisa and Genoa also had significant woollen cloth industries, especially in the dyeing and cloth-finishing trades. On the other hand, and to a far greater degree, the republics’ economic prosperity was founded upon extensive shipbuilding industries and merchant marines operating throughout the Mediterranean as carriers and entrepreneurs dealing in the commodities and maritime traffic of other regions. Venice drew on the timber of Istria, Dalmatia and the Trentino. Genoa had access to that of the Ligurian

Apennines and the maritime Alps, while Pisa acquired hers from the Tuscan Apennines, the Maremma, the Regno and Sardinia. Analysis of the twelfth-century Genoese sources has identified 291 ships of various kinds in port at Genoa between 1179 and 1200, most of them owned by Genoese or men from Genoese territories. This must have been only a fraction of the actual Genoese merchant marine, and we may assume confidently that Pisa and Venice had merchant marines at least roughly comparable in size. By the mid-thirteenth century the republics could put war fleets of dozens of galleys to sea and could replace them at short notice. Although they cannot be quantified, their merchant marines must have run to hundreds of vessels of various types.

Of the 328 Venetian documents in the collections of Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo dated between 1217 and 1261, forty-four were concerned with Crete, Greece, the Aegean islands, the Black Sea and Constantinople. However, from 1223 it became rare to specify a particular destination for voyages and of a further 130 contracts which refer to voyages per terram et per aquam ubicumque many more would have been to Romania. Venice made commercial agreements not only continuously with the Latin emperors of Constantinople but also with Michael I Angelos Komnenos of Epiros in 1210, with the Seljuq sultans of Konya in 1211 and 1220, with the Ayyubids of Aleppo in 1225, 1229 and 1264, with the kingdom of Cilician Armenia in 1246, with Emperor Theodore I Laskaris of Nicaea in 1219 and with Leo Gabalas of Rhodes in 1234. The Aegean basin and Black Sea became rich sources of commodities for Venice and her colonies, ranging from slaves to grain, ceramics, glassware, drugs and spices reaching the area from further east, and the alum of Aleppo and Phocaea. In 1255 Bonifacio da Molendino of Venice held the monopoly on alum from the Seljuq sultanate together with a Genoese partner. Export of Venetian silver grossi to pay for purchases caused the coin to circulate freely in Romania. As early as 1206 Pietro da Ferragudo made a voyage from Constantinople to Soldaia in the Crimea. He was followed to the Black Sea in 1212 by Giovanni Blanco da Cannaregio and in 1232 by Marco Romano.

Pisa had been granted entry to the Latin empire in 1206, confirmed by treaty with Venice in 1214. Although there are only indirect references to Pisans in Romania before 1261 and no actual contract for a voyage from Pisa to the region survives before 1269, Pisans were to be found in the empire of Nicaea and the Seljuq sultanate. By 1247 a Pisan merchant was in Kiev, together with

7 Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo (eds.), Documenti, nos. 561–865; Lombardo and Morozzo della Rocca (eds.), Nuovi documenti, nos. 77–104.
8 Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo (eds.), Documenti, nos. 478, 541, 662.
Genoese and Venetian merchants who had reached the Ukraine. The Genoese–Nicaean Treaty of Nymphaion of 1261 proclaimed that the Pisans were *fideles nostri imperii* of the Nicaeans and protected Pisan access to the Black Sea. Genoa also regained access to Romania by treaty with Venice in 1218, but few Genoese sailed there before 1261, except in 1251 when renewal of the treaty with Venice saw a brief flurry of activity. In a futile attempt to counter Venetian hegemony in Romania, Genoa tried unsuccessfully to negotiate treaties with John III Doukas Vatatzes of Nicaea and also with Michael II Angelos Komnenos of Epiros in 1251. However, she did succeed in concluding a commercial agreement with Guy I de la Roche, duke of Athens, in 1240. In the same vein, she attempted to seize Rhodes from Leo Gabalas in 1248 but was expelled after a few months by the Nicaeans.

In the Holy Land, the three republics shared the commerce of the Levant on a more equal footing. All had quarters in the ports of the crusader states. In Acre their privileges were well established; however, elsewhere they were subject to continual renegotiation. Genoa renewed treaties with Tripoli in 1205 and Antioch in 1216 and made new ones with Beirut in 1221 and 1223 and with Haifa in 1234. Venice gained new privileges in Jubail in 1217 and Beirut in 1221. Pisa profited greatly from her support of Frederick II in the years leading up to his crusade and received renewal of her privileges in Acre, Tyre and Jaffa in 1229. Confirmation of her privileges in Antioch and Tripoli was also granted in 1216 and 1233 respectively.

By around 1230, the Venetian system of annual caravans or *mude* to Constantinople, Cyprus–Armenia–Syria and Alexandria had become well established. Surviving Venetian contracts include the wills of Venetians in Acre, Venetian contracts made in Acre and records of Venetian voyages in Acre and Syria. An inquest into Venetian properties in the Holy Land conducted by the *bailli* of Tyre, Marsiglio Zorzì, in 1243–4 shows extensive holdings in Tyre and Acre. Venice held a third of the city of Tyre and its countryside, including whole villages, fields, orchards, sugar plantations and olive groves.

The Pisan quarter in Acre occupied a prime position close to the inner harbour. Although no document recording Pisan commerce with the Holy Land survives before 1252, and although there is no specific record of a voyage from Pisa to the Holy Land before 1263, Pisan commerce in the first half of the century was clearly significant. The commune had three consuls in charge of its quarter in Acre until 1248, after which one sufficed, and the Pisan presence was adequate for them to engage in a battle with the Genoese in Acre in

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10 Balard (1966) and (1987).  
12 Otten-Froux (1983), docs. ii, iii.
1222 and to destroy a Genoese tower. However, in spite of the fact that after Genoa’s defeat in the War of St Sabas Pisa took over part of the Genoese quarter in Acre, Pisa’s position in the east declined steadily in the face of Genoese and Venetian competition and she gradually shifted her focus back again to Sardinia, the Regno, and the Maghrib. By the second half of the century all her colonies in the Levant seem to have disappeared, with the exception of Acre, Armenia, Cyprus and Egypt.

From Genoa, sufficient notarial documentation survives to permit reliable statistical analysis of Genoese commerce with the Levant. The value of Genoese overseas investments in *ultramare*, the coast of Syria-Palestine, from 1222 to 1262 is as follows: 1222–6 = £2,836 (19 per cent of total recorded trade), 1233 = £12,074 (71 per cent), 1239 = £6,697 (47 per cent), 1248 = £9,668 (41 per cent), 1251 = £11,351 (41 per cent), 1252 = £17,356 (67 per cent), 1253 = £50,660 (53 per cent), 1254 = £13,378 (51 per cent), 1255 = £9,104 (65 per cent), 1256 = £594 (11 per cent), 1257 = £7,228 (28 per cent), 1258 = £4,333 (54 per cent), 1259 = £4,827 (40 per cent), 1261 = £55 (1.6 per cent), 1262 = £39 (0.3 per cent).13 Merchants took more trouble to record contracts for the most remote destinations, in view of the enhanced risks; and too much should not be made of these totals. Still, the reduction in investment after 1256 reflects the deterioration of conditions for Genoese commerce in the Holy Land after her initial failures in the War of St Sabas against Venice and Pisa. Before that, although the figures oscillate somewhat, they show an average investment in the Holy Land of 50.5 per cent of the total. This represents a massive concentration in this sector of the Mediterranean, a concentration almost certainly greater than that of either Pisa or Venice. Not surprisingly, Genoa’s quarter in Acre was the largest until 1256 and she also possessed agricultural estates in the countryside around the city.

Commercial relations with Egypt were troubled by political unease in the aftermath of the Fifth Crusade, by the crusade of Frederick II in 1228–9, and by the crusade of Louis IX in 1248–54. But in spite of this the republics maintained a presence in Egypt throughout, except in time of war. All had *fondachi*, or warehouses, in Alexandria. Venice had two there and Pisa had another at Damietta. Venice negotiated six treaties with the sultans between 1205 and 1229 and renewed them in 1244 and 1254. Pisa negotiated treaties in 1207 and 1215. But strangely, although Genoa sent missions to Egypt in 1200, 1231–3, 1263 and 1273, the outcome of these negotiations is unknown and no actual treaty survives before 1290.

Attempts by popes such as Innocent III and Gregory IX to suppress trade

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13 Baletto (1978), p. 98; Balard (1966), between pp. 488 and 489. Values are in Genoese pounds. Figures given in parentheses are percentages of the total.
with Egypt, as well as the prohibition of it by Doge Pietro Ziani between 1224 and 1228, are sufficient proof that in fact it was maintained virtually continuously. A Venetian manual of merchant practice compiled at Acre around 1270 and another compiled in Pisa in 1278 both have their first and largest sections on Alexandria and Egypt. As was the case with other manuals of commercial practice, these two not only reflected conditions at the time when they were compiled but were also retrospective. Yet there is little real documentation for the commerce of the republics in Egypt. Probably because of its sensitive nature, voyages to Egypt were frequently hidden in the notarial contracts by not specifying the destination of the voyages. Egypt is not mentioned as a destination in Venetian documents from 1209 to 1271, when a Venetian woman in Crete invested twenty-five hyperpers in a voyage to Alexandria. For Pisa, there is a letter of 1245 from the Consuls of the Sea to all Pisans in Alexandria announcing the election of a new consul, followed by a contract for a voyage from Alexandria to Acre in 1252. For Genoa, the annals and the notarial cartularies contain references to voyages to Egypt in 1205–31, 1258, 1259 and ten more until the end of the century. There are also records in the unpublished cartularies of a receipt for £5 from a commenda to Damietta in 1224, a maritime loan of £5 12s 0d for an embassy to Egypt in 1231, three receipts for commende to Alexandria in 1253, three commende totalling £86 15s 0d and a procuration in 1256, three commende totalling £35 7s 0d in 1257, twenty-two commende and a receipt in 1258, eight commende and three receipts in 1259 and a procuration in 1262. There are more records up to the end of the century. Of course, the increase in volume of traffic to Egypt after 1258 reflects a deflection of Genoese commerce away from the Holy Land following her initial losses in the War of St Sabas. But this large number of references to Genoese commerce with Egypt, by comparison with Pisa and Venice, simply reflects the volume of documentation which survives from Genoa. Whether any of the republics had a dominant position in Egypt in the first half of the century it is impossible to say.

In the Maghrib Venice had only a minor interest, in spite of the fact that she negotiated treaties with the Hafsids of Tunis in 1231, 1251 and 1271. The Venetian documents contain only one commercial transaction between Venice and Tunis, in 1245. For Pisa and Genoa, on the other hand, the situation was quite different. Developing her twelfth-century relations with Tunis, Pisa negotiated treaties with the Hafsids in 1229 or 1234 and 1264. Genoa did the same in 1236, 1250 and 1272. From 1240 there is a record of three Pisans

18 I am indebted to M. Balard for this information, which is the production of extensive research in the Genoese archives.
claiming ownership of a shop in, or near, the Pisan *fondaco* in Tunis. From 1261 a contract for a voyage from Pisa to Bougie survives. If the numbers of brokers attached to the Pisan *Curia maris* in the *Breve curie maris* of about 1215–20 are any guide, Pisan commerce with the Maghrib amounted to a third of her total; three brokers each were assigned to Romania and the Levant, to the Regno plus Corsica and Sardinia, and to the Maghrib. The value of Genoa’s investment in the Maghrib (Tunis, Bougie and Ceuta) between 1222 and 1262 was as follows: 1222–6 – £6,872 (47 per cent of the total), 1233 – £4,530 (26 per cent), 1239 – £6,400 (45 per cent), 1248 – £8,375 (35 per cent), 1251 – £9,013 (32 per cent), 1252 – £5,474 (21 per cent), 1253 – £27,165 (29 per cent), 1254 – £7,764 (29 per cent), 1255 – £3,046 (21 per cent), 1256 – £3,805 (68 per cent), 1257 – £8,993 (36 per cent), 1262 – £6,628 (59 per cent). The increase in importance of the Maghrib after 1256 again reflects a deflection of Genoese trade from the Levant after the outbreak of the War of St Sabas; but even before that the Maghrib took an impressive average of 31.5 per cent of recorded Genoese overseas investment.

In 1229 the Muslim Balearics fell to an Aragonese–Catalan fleet under James I of Aragon. Both Pisa and Genoa moved quickly to secure the position of their merchants in the islands because of the importance to them of the salt of Ibiza, and because of the role of Majorca as a staging post on the routes to Valencia, Granada and the Maghrib. In 1225 a Genoese merchant had taken three commende worth £105 Genoese in total to Ibiza. In 1230 both republics concluded treaties with James I. By 1232 the Genoese had a *fondaco* and a consul in Majorca and eight Genoese figured in a list of persons receiving land grants following the Catalan conquest. By 1245 there is a reference to a group of fourteen Pisan merchants operating in Majorca. The treaties with James I also confirmed Genoese and Pisan access to Catalonia. The republics then extended their reach to Castile by treaties with Ferdinand III in 1251 and with Alfonso X in 1256. They thus gained entrance to the increasingly important market of newly conquered Andalusia, particularly Cádiz and Seville, with the latter of which they had already become familiar a century or so earlier. However, Spain remained a minor sphere of interest for Pisa and Genoa in the first half of the century. Data from the Genoese cartularies show Spain becoming a regular focus of investment only from the 1250s, and even then it attracted only a few per cent of Genoese overseas investment except in occasional years. The major advantage of access to the Spanish ports was that they lay on the routes towards the Maghribi markets.

Provence and the Languedoc, by contrast, were extremely important to both Genoa and Pisa both for themselves and for the access which they provided to northern France. Recorded Genoese investments in Provence ranged from 3.3 per cent of the total in 1222–6 down to a low of 1 per cent of the total in 1233.
and 1251, and up to highs of 23 per cent in 1248 and 25 per cent in 1258, an average of around 8.0 per cent before 1256 and rising to 15 per cent after that. The importance of the region was reflected in the large number of treaties made by the republics with local powers. Pisa and Marseilles struck an alliance against Genoa in 1209. Pisa concluded pacts with Fos in 1208, Hyères in 1222, Narbonne in 1224, Montpellier in 1225 and Marseilles in 1229 and 1234. Genoa made peace with Marseilles in 1211 and signed commercial treaties with her in 1229 and 1231, with Narbonne and Montpellier in 1224, Hyères and Fos in 1229, Saint-Gilles in 1232 and Toulon in 1229 and 1242. Behind all this activity lay the need of their merchants for freedom of access to the fairs of Champagne and to the northern cloth which came south to these towns. In the notarial cartulary of Giraud Amalric of Marseilles of 1248, three Genoese and seven Pisans can be identified. In the course of the months March to July 1248 ten ships left Marseilles for Pisa and six for Genoa. Thirteen commenda contracts were sent to Genoa and fourteen to Pisa.19 By mid-century Provence and Languedoc were incorporated into the republics’ commercial systems. They had their own independent interests and capabilities, but were nevertheless overshadowed by Pisa and Genoa.

At home all three republics engaged in extensive building programmes which both enhanced their physical aspects and improved their public infrastructures. Although public financial difficulties caused the deferment of construction projects at various times, private wealth from commerce and industry played an important role in both private and public construction and in new ecclesiastical buildings. Pisa undertook a broad programme of drainage works, dyke construction and road building. Construction commenced in 1262 on a third bridge over the Arno, the Ponte della Spina, and in 1278 on the great Campo Santo. A number of new churches, including both Franciscan and Dominican ones, were built in all three cities. Profits from economic expansion were diverted to the glory of God. Venice added external cupolas to the domes of S. Marco and embellished the interior with many new mosaics. Genoa extended the mole of her harbour in 1260 and 1283, built an aqueduct along the quays, constructed the great Palazzo del Mare of the commune in 1260 at the instigation of Guglielmo Boccanegra, and built a wet dock and arsenal between 1283 and 1285. Venice began planning, and commenced preliminary work on, her great new arsenal at Castello in the 1220s, although it was not to be completed until 1325. Venetians also poured wealth into prestigious private palaces such as the Ca’ da Mosto, the Palazzo Loredan and the Casa dei Querini. The republic also spent on public works. The Rialto bridge was rebuilt in 1254 and 1265, streets on the islands were paved in brick,

and the Fondaco dei Tedeschi was properly established in 1228, though its roots lay further back.

Together with their buildings, the most outstanding monuments to the economic and civil life of the republics was their legislative achievement. Venice promulgated its oldest surviving law code, the *Usus Venetorum*, during the doganate of Enrico Dandolo (1192–1205). This was followed in 1204 or 1205 by a code revised by Ranieri Dandolo, his son, during Enrico’s absence on the Fourth Crusade. The statutes were then revised again by Doge Pietro Ziani between 1213 and 1229 and yet again by Giacomo Tiepolo between 1229 and 1233. The statutes relating to maritime traffic were finally revised in a definitive version by Doge Ranieri Zeno in 1235. Pisa had by far and away the most extensive body of written statutory law. Building on the monumental *Constitutum usus* and *Constitutum legis* of 1156–60 and other twelfth-century compilations, Pisa enacted the *Breve curie maris*, probably around 1215–20. In 1286 a *Breve Pisani communis* and a *Breve Pisani populi* were added to the Pisan corpus. The earliest surviving fragment of Genoese legislation is part of a *Breve consulum placitorum* dated to 1196–1216. It was followed by a complete revision of the Genoese statutes by the podestà Jacopo di Balduino in 1229. This text does not survive but it was incorporated into the so-called Statutes of Pera of 1304–6, which are in fact a revision of the statutes of the home city. Building on foundations of Roman and canon law, and incorporating their own customs and traditions, which also embodied elements of other legal systems from as far afield as Byzantium and Islam, the republics erected systems of municipal law each of which had its peculiarities but which, taken together, form a remarkably homogeneous body of law. Together with the statutory legislation of other medieval Mediterranean cities such as Marseilles, Barcelona, Amalfi and Trani, the statutory law of the republics laid much of the foundation of private international law.

While their economies flourished on the foundations of commerce abroad, both Pisa and Genoa experienced political turmoil at home. Whereas Genoa adopted an independent, almost isolationist, position in the struggle between Frederick II and the Church which embroiled Italy from the 1220s, Pisa remained consistently pro-imperialist. As a consequence, in 1222 she was drawn into war with the Guelf Tuscan cities led by Florence and was defeated at Castel del Bosco and compelled to sue for peace. The defeat induced civil strife between her noble clans, aligned around the Visconti and Gherardesca

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21 The *Breve curie maris* survives only in a manuscript of 1305, which declares that it is a reworking of a text of 1298. Beyond that its original date of compilation is unknown. However, certain indications suggest that it dates to the period c. 1215–20.
22 Bonaini (ed.), *Statuti inediti*.
23 Promis (ed.), ‘Statuti della colonia genovese’.

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families. The parties became identified as Visconti ‘Guelf’ and Gherardesca ‘Ghibelline’; but these were merely overt tags and the factions really formed according to personal and group interests. Visconti success in this struggle led to reinstatement of a citizen podestà in the person of Ubaldo Visconti in 1226. The formation of the Second Lombard League against Frederick II in 1226 drew the city once again into conflict on the mainland with Florence and other Guelf cities. In Sardinia, the death of Ubaldo Visconti in 1230, and the succession of his nephew Ubaldo II, who had married Adelasia, the heiress to the judicature of Torres, led to a conflict in the island between the Visconti and Gherardesca. The crisis was only resolved in 1236 when Adelasia donated her lands to the Church and Pope Gregory IX then transferred them to her husband and his heirs. In 1237 the Gherardesca were forced to accept the situation and a conclusive peace between the warring factions was concluded.

In Genoa, factions similar to those in Pisa emerged, again identified with the wider Guelf and Ghibelline struggle but in fact formed around groupings of noble families known as the Rampini and Mascherati respectively. The Rampini dominated the government but civil strife with the Mascherati was endemic. It induced a popular uprising in 1227 led by Guglielmo de’ Mari and gave an opportunity to some of Genoa’s subject towns, such as Alessandria, Tortona, Savona and Albenga, to attempt to shake off the Genoese yoke. Genoa survived the crisis only to fall into conflict with Frederick II in 1233 when she rejected his demand that she abandon her neutrality and alter her choice of podestà for the following year because he was a Milanese Guelf. Frederick retaliated by arresting the Genoese and confiscating their property throughout his domains. Genoa then responded with naval expeditions against the Regno. Meanwhile, Frederick had neutralised Venice by concluding a pact which gave her privileges in Sicily. However, she gradually grew dissatisfied with the imperial alliance, and in 1236 joined the Second Lombard League in its campaign against Frederick’s lieutenant in Lombardy, Ezzelino da Romano. After Frederick defeated the Lombard League at Cortenuova in 1237, his envoys demanded Genoa’s fealty and homage but were rejected. While her subject towns seized the chance to revolt yet again, Genoa finally allied with the Lombard League, and at Rome on 30 November 1238 made a treaty with Venice which contained a clause that neither city would make any peace or agreement with the emperor without papal permission. Some noble families with imperial sympathies, such as the Doria and Spinola, refused to accept Genoa’s new alignment and from exile joined in the war against their home city. The papal–imperial conflict had the effect of forcing the republics and the factions within them into more clearly defined and monolithic blocs.

Frederick seized the occasion of the death of Ubaldo Visconti II in Sardinia in 1238 to marry his son Enzo to the much married Adelasia and to enfeoff him
as king of Sardinia, at the same time respecting Pisa’s protectorate over the island. His action was viewed as an infringement of the rights of the Church by Gregory IX, who excommunicated him. Pisa was drawn into the quarrel in 1239 when Frederick visited the city and was welcomed by the Gherardesca faction. She enacted a statute barring Guelfs from holding any office in the commune and betrothed a son of Count Ugolino della Gherardesca to the daughter of Enzo and Adelasia. In the following year Gregory IX convened a general council in Rome to pronounce on the conflict and depose the emperor. Because of the difficulties of travel by land through northern Italy, Genoa undertook to transport prelates from northern Europe to Ostia by sea. In riposte, Enzo persuaded Pisa to arm a fleet of forty galleys to intercept them. Joined by a further twenty-seven imperial galleys, the Pisans met the Genoese fleet of only thirty galleys near Giglio on 3 May 1241 and overwhelmed it. Only five Genoese ships escaped. The prelates were taken off to Pisa and then consigned to Frederick, who imprisoned them in Apulia.

As always when Genoa found herself in dire straits, her subject towns seized the moment. Albenga and Savona rebelled and Genoa herself was attacked by a coalition of the imperial vicars of the Lunigiana and Lombardy, the marquis of Montferrat and other feudal lords, some Ghibelline towns and the fleet of the Genoese exile Anselmo de Mari. However, in extremis, Genoa displayed the tenacity for which she was renowned. She grouped her forces by land, managed to secure the defection from the alliance of the Marquis of Montferrat and the towns of Novara and Vercelli, and built a fleet of eighty-three galleys which drove off Anselmo de’ Mari. The war then focused around the siege of Savona by the Genoese. In 1243 the Savonesi called on Pisa for help and a fleet of eighty Pisan galleys, joined by another sixty imperial ones at Portovenere, forced the Genoese fleet to lift the siege. From then on, the war degenerated into one of raiding and skirmishing by land and a corsair war at sea, in which, by and large, Pisa and the rebels had the better of it. Savona and Albenga maintained their revolt until Frederick’s death in 1250 and Pisan and imperial naval forces held the upper hand in the Tyrrhenian, even enabling Pisa to re-establish herself in Corsica to some degree.

In these circumstances, it was remarkable that Genoese seamen found the resources between 1246 and 1248 to furnish the crusade of Louis IX with at least sixteen, more probably thirty, two-decked sailing ships, three three-deckers, twenty taride or transport galleys and an unspecified number of war galleys. Even though Genoa faced enemies on all sides, her resources were such that she could play a role in the Sixth Crusade almost comparable to that of Venice in the Fourth Crusade, with the exception that she provided no battle fleet of her own. As a consequence, her businessmen and bankers played a major role, and no doubt made major profits, in the financial transactions
between France and the Holy Land which provided Louis’s forces with the funds they needed in the east between 1249 and 1254.24

Frederick’s death gave Genoa the opportunity to reassert her authority. Albenga and Savona made their submissions. Peace was made between the factions and the Mascherati exiles were allowed to return home. But when Frederick’s son Conrad IV made his descent into Italy in 1252, Pisa saw an opportunity to re-establish the fortunes of the Ghibelline cause and joined in a successful assault on the rebel city of Naples. The renewed imperial threat gave birth to a reorganised league of Tuscan Guelf cities and by 1254 Pisa was isolated and forced to sue for peace. However, the terms imposed by the allies were harsh. Her predicament then became so disturbed and disruptive that an uprising succeeded in replacing the podestà government with a Captain of the People and Council of Elders. But in spite of this, by 1256 the forces opposed to her had become so irresistible that Pisa was forced to submit and to accept the terms of 1254. Venice had also become involved in the Guelf offensive, allowing a crusade to be preached in Venice against Ezzelino da Romano. Marco Badoer of Venice was elected commander of the Guelf army. Pisa’s decision to submit was also prompted by the action of her own judge in Cagliari, the marquis Chianni, who had rebelled and called in the Genoese. Always ready to take advantage of her rival’s misfortune, Genoa sent an expeditionary force to Sardinia in 1256 but in the fighting that resulted the Pisans had the better of it and Genoa was left with only a toehold on the island. Prompted by this setback and also by a crisis in the cloth trade, a popular uprising in Genoa succeeded in throwing up a rich merchant from a popular family, Guglielmo Boccanegra, as Captain of the People.

By 1257 Genoa had good reason to accept her failure in Sardinia and agree to peace with Pisa engineered by Pope Alexander IV. During all the years of conflict between Pisa and Genoa in the west, Venice had been building her strength in the east. The outposts she had established after the fourth Crusade had grown into an embryonic colonial empire. She had had little need to expend her resources, except on occasion in support of her colonies and of the Latin empire of Constantinople, in suppressing a revolt by Zara in 1242, and in campaigns by land in Lombardy. In 1256 tensions between Venice and Genoa in Acre erupted into conflict over possession of St Sabas monastery on the border between the Venetian and Genoese quarters. In a dawn attack, the Genoese seized the monastery, precipitating a conflict in which all the factions in the kingdom of Jerusalem took sides. In 1257 Venice sent a fleet to the east under Lorenzo Tiepolo, who broke through the chain of Acre harbour, drove the Genoese back into their quarter, and reoccupied St Sabas. In a secret

24 Belgrano (ed.), Documenti inediti.
agreement made at Modena in the same year, Pisa joined Venice in an alliance against Genoa which ran counter to her own peace treaty with her. Venice then completed Genoa's isolation by making a treaty with Manfred of Hohenstaufen. Genoa responded by sending a fleet to the east under Rosso della Turca, who was reinforced by other Genoese squadrons in the Levant. In the first of the classic naval battles which Venice and Genoa would fight over the next 150 years, a combined Venetian and Pisan fleet of some thirty-nine galleys under Lorenzo Tiepolo confronted della Turca's fleet of fifty galleys off Acre on 25 June 1258 and won a decisive victory. Genoa lost her quarter in Acre to Pisa and Venice. A savage corsair war in the Levant continued until 1263, during which the commerce of all three republics and the economic vitality of the crusader states suffered badly.

In the meantime Genoa achieved a remarkable coup in Romania. Whether by prescience or good luck, in 1261 Guglielmo Boccanegra sent envoys to Michael VIII Palaiologos, emperor of Nicaea, to conclude a treaty against Venice. His timing was perfect. The treaty was signed at Nymphaion on 13 March 1261 and on 25 July Nicaean forces entered Constantinople by ruse. Venice responded by outfitting two expeditions and trying to raise a crusade in the west against Michael VIII, but to no avail. The Latin empire was finished and Venetian dominance in Romania was at an end. Overnight the upper hand in the Black Sea and those areas of Romania not controlled directly by Venice and her colonies passed to Genoa. Boccanegra himself paid a heavy price because the pope excommunicated Genoa and the noble families then overthrew him. Domestically, Genoa entered a new period of civil strife between factions grouped around the Doria and Spinola families on the one hand and the Fieschi and Grimaldi on the other. But Boccanegra's misfortune was Genoa's fortune. His action laid the grounds for a new expansion of Genoese commerce in the east. His work was almost undone in 1264 when the Genoese podestà in Constantinople was foolish enough to make a pact with Manfred of Hohenstaufen to restore the Latin empire. Although the home government disowned the pact, Michael VIII was incensed and expelled the Genoese, who in any case seemed likely to become as troublesome to him as the Venetians had been in past times. However, they were readmitted in 1267 and granted the colony of Pera at Galata, across the Golden Horn from the Byzantine capital.

But at sea the war continued. In major naval engagements, Venice had all the success. At Settepozzi, off the Peloponnesos, thirty-eight Genoese galleys were roundly defeated by thirty-two Venetian ones in 1263. In the following two years Genoese fleets avoided engagement but in 1266 twenty-seven Genoese galleys under Lanfranco Balbuino were caught at Trapani by twenty-four Venetian ones and annihilated. Venetian formal naval forces had proved themselves clearly superior to the Genoese and Venice had extended her range into
the western Mediterranean. However, Genoa balanced her losses by overwhelming success in the corsair war. Her corsairs preyed at will on Venetian shipping. In the most spectacular exploit of the war, Simone Grillo caught an undefended Venetian caravan off the Albanian island of Saseno (Sazan) in the Adriatic and captured all of its ships except for a large sailing ship, the Roccafortis, on which the crews from the other Venetian ships took refuge. In 1265 there was a riot in Venice precipitated by a decision to double the tax on grinding grain in order to pay for the war. In the same year, Oberto Spinola led a popular uprising in Genoa but then surrendered power to a new regime of two podestà, Guido Spinola and Niccolò Doria. Both republics were nearing exhaustion but they fought on until 1269, when Louis IX persuaded them to agree to a truce for five years in order to provide the necessary infrastructure for his proposed crusade to Tunis.

While Genoa and Venice fought themselves to a standstill in the east, Pisa had her own problems at home. The death of Conrad IV in 1254 left only his infant son Conradin in Germany to claim the imperial throne. In 1256 Pisa took it upon herself to resurrect the ancient right to elect an emperor in the name of the Italians and offered the crown to Alfonso X of Castile. Richard of Cornwall became another claimant. However, Pope Alexander IV would have neither, thereby unwittingly leaving the way open for Frederick’s bastard son Manfred to have himself crowned as king of Sicily at Palermo in 1258. His coronation awakened high hopes for the Ghibelline cause in Pisa, which pledged its support to Manfred. The Guelf towns of Tuscany, led by Florence, responded and the resulting confrontation culminated at the battle of Montaperti on 4 September 1260, where Pisa and her Ghibelline allies were victorious. But the war continued against Lucca, the last of the Guelf towns to hold out, until a kind of peace was patched up in 1265, leaving Pisa and the Ghibellines in the ascendancy.

All that changed when Pope Urban IV offered the Sicilian crown to Charles of Anjou, count of Provence and younger brother of Louis IX. At Benevento on 26 February 1266, and at Tagliacozzo on 23 August 1268, Charles defeated Manfred and Conradin respectively in two closely run battles. Pisa had supported the Hohenstaufen against Charles; and her innate antagonism towards the Guelf Angevin was reinforced by his expulsion of her citizens from Sicily once he had gained possession of it. The fortunes of the Guelfs were in the ascendancy. Fortunately for Pisa, Charles came under pressure from his brother to bring the discord to an end in order to prepare for his crusade and he reached an accord with Pisa in 1270 which conceded her independence and gave the Pisans freedom of movement and commerce in the Regno, subject to an annual tribute of 120,000 ounces of gold. It led to general truces between the Guelfs and Ghibellines in Tuscany, but in Pisa the terms of the capitulation to
Charles were so unpopular that an uprising expelled the aristocratic Guelf families.

Genoa also, amidst the trials of war with Venice, attempted to steer a course of advantage between Guelf and Ghibelline, Angevin and Hohenstaufen. Genoa found the additional problem that her lands in Liguria bordered on those of the Angevins in Provence, notably at Ventimiglia; this meant Charles was too close a neighbour for comfort. She made an alliance with Manfred in 1217 but came to terms with Charles of Anjou in 1269 on the condition that she elect only Guelf podestà. She participated in the Tunis Crusade and, according to the Genoese annals, more than 10,000 Genoese sailed on the fleet with fifty-five two-decked sailing ships and other vessels and galleys. In fact there were some very large three-decked ships as well, but the number of Genoese involved was certainly fewer than claimed. While the fleet was away, an uprising led to the overthrow of the Guelf podestà and the election of Oberto Doria and Oberto Spinola as Captains of the People. The Doria–Spinola dyarchy would give Genoa its strongest and most stable government of the century for the next fifteen years, but it also led to war with Charles of Anjou. In 1272 he imprisoned the Genoese merchants in the Regno, and Genoa replied by loosing her corsairs against his coasts. The registers of the Angevin chancery for the years 1272–6 contained many references to Genoese pirati and to measures taken to defend the coasts against them. A system of beacons was established to warn of the approach of Genoese galleys, with the number of fires indicating the numbers of galleys. Genoa was placed under papal interdict and the war was eventually brought to an end through the mediation of Pope Innocent V. A treaty of peace was signed in 1276 and the Guelf exiles from Genoa were allowed to return home.

Tensions and rivalry between Pisa and Genoa came to a boil in 1282. The Corsican judge of Cinarca, Sinucello, rebelled against Genoese rule and called on Pisa for help. Both republics mobilised all the forces at their disposal; and on 6 August 1284 near the shoals of Meloria off Porto Pisano ninety-eight Genoese galleys encountered seventy-four Pisan ones in what proved to be the final disaster for Pisa. The battle was a triumph for the tactics of the Genoese admirals Oberto Doria and Benedetto Zaccaria. Less than twenty Pisan galleys escaped back into Porto Pisano. Her captain general was killed and one of her podestà captured. Thousands of Pisan men were taken off to dungeons in Genoa, where they languished for years and from which few returned home. The Genoese chose not to ransom their prisoners and thus to deprive Pisa of her most valuable asset: her manpower. Rustichello of Pisa, to whom Marco

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Polo dictated his travels in prison in Genoa after having been taken prisoner himself at Curzola in 1298, had been taken prisoner at Meloria and had already been in prison for fourteen years when Marco Polo joined him. It was the ruin of the old aristocratic Pisan families. In extremis, the Pisans chose Ugolino della Gherardesca as podestà with virtually unlimited powers. He maintained the struggle against the Guelf alliance which closed in on Pisa with great success but was nevertheless forced to sue for peace with Genoa in 1288. The terms imposed were so harsh that in the end they could not be met. Pisa stood to lose Sardinia, Corsica and the part of the Genoese quarter in Acre which she had seized after 1257, and had an enormous indemnity of 20,000 marks sterling imposed on her, secured against Elba’s iron mines, which were eventually forfeited. Even though he had had no choice but to capitulate, della Gherardesca was overthrown. Failure to meet Genoa’s demands resulted in a second attack by the Genoese fleet in 1290 which destroyed the towers of Porto Pisano and carried off its chain. Under a new Captain General, Guido da Montefeltro, Pisa manfully fought off the Guelf attacks on her until peace was finally concluded at Fucecchio in 1293. However, by then the losses which she had sustained as a consequence of Meloria were irreversible. Even though Pisans continued to trade across the Mediterranean, their presence at Ayas in Armenia and Famagusta in Cyprus being well attested into the fourteenth century, the battle was both a symptom of Pisa’s gradual decline as a first-rate power in the second half of the century and also the critical point at which that decline became undeniably manifest. Pisans were frequently forced to use the ships of others: Catalans, Venetians and even Genoese; and it was the Catalans who now emerged as the second major Latin trading force in the western Mediterranean.

In the second half of the century, traditional patterns of commerce established by the republics since the twelfth century changed perceptibly as events far from the Mediterranean acted on them. The Mongol empire in Asia opened up access to the Far East via the Black Sea and Cilician Armenia. Replacement of the Ayyubid sultans in Egypt by the more aggressive Mamluks made conditions for trade in Egypt more difficult. The collapse of the Almohad caliphate led to the foundation of less powerful successor states in Tunis and Morocco which allowed Europeans greater access to the trade of the Maghrib and the Sahara. Decline in the importance of the fairs of Champagne as trade fairs *per se*, the growth of southern German towns, and an influx of silver from new deposits in Bohemia, altered the traditional relations of the republics with northern Europe.

From 1266 the Genoese established a colony at Caffa in the Crimea, not far distant from the main Venetian entrepot at Soldaia. With her colony at Pera growing rapidly into an important city in its own right, Genoa established
extensive commercial networks around the Aegean and the Black Sea. From the 1260s the Venetians also established themselves at Tana, where the Don flows into the Sea of Azov. With establishments in other Black Sea ports such as Trebizond, both Venice and Genoa developed their trade in grain and other agricultural products, furs, timber and slaves from the Black Sea to Constantinople, Egypt and the west. On the other hand, the Pisan presence in Romania contracted in the late thirteenth century. Silver which originated in new mines in east-central Europe financed the expansion of western trade in the Black Sea, being melted down into silver bars, sonmi, which had currency throughout the region. Mongol, Turkish and Greek slaves were bought and sold on a large scale for the Mamluk armies and harims in Egypt as well as for plantations in the Genoese and Venetian colonies, and for domestic service throughout Romania and in Italy. From Tana the merchants found their way overland to the headquarters of the Golden Horde at Sarai, where the Volga flows into the Caspian. From there they would find their way to Persia, India and the Far East.

Acre remained an important market until 1291; but as the Mamluks gradually overran the crusader states, both Cyprus and Armenia became more important to western commerce. In the last quarter of the century, Ayas became a major point of access to Armenia and the trade of Syria and Anatolia. The Genoese cartularies of Pietro di Bargone and Federico di Piazzalunga redacted at Ayas from 1274 to 1279 show the Genoese well established there by that time, with a church, a loggia and a consul in charge of the colony. Genoa renegotiated an earlier treaty of 1215 with Armenia in 1288. Pisa also had a colony headed by a viscount in Ayas from 1263 and the Genoese cartularies from Ayas reveal the presence in the port in those years of fifty-seven Pisans, indicating that the prominent place given to Armenia in the Pisan commercial manual of 1278 reflects accurately Armenia’s importance to Pisa also. It is probable, however, that Venetians had not yet become attracted to Armenia in large numbers, in spite of the fact that Venice renewed her earlier treaty with Armenia in 1271. Only six Venetians appear in the Genoese cartularies from Ayas, and Armenia does not figure at all in the Venetian merchant manual of about 1270 compiled in Acre. There is also no mention of Armenia in surviving documents from Venice nor in Venetian cartularies from Crete in 1271 and 1278–81.

Yet it was from Ayas that Marco Polo set out on his journey to China in 1271. His father and uncle had begun their first journey in 1260 from Soldaia and Sarai. By this time, the accounts of missionaries and envoys to the Mongols reveal the presence of Genoese, Venetian and other western merchants in the

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27 Balletto (ed.), Notai Genovesi.
Ukraine, Anatolia and Syria. By the age of Marco Polo, Genoese and Venetian merchants had reached Persia and, in all probability, India and China. In 1263 a Venetian merchant called Piero Veglione (Pietro Vigione) redacted his will at Tabriz in the presence of other westerners, including two Pisans, and between 1288 and 1301 a Pisan adventurer by the name of Zolo di Anastasio was in the service of the Il-khans of Persia. Pietro di Lucalongo, an Italian merchant, accompanied Giovanni di Montecorvino to China in 1291; and in the same year the Vivaldi brothers of Genoa attempted to reach India by sailing out of the Straits of Gibraltar and down the African coast. By the 1290s, the routes to India and China were well enough known to persuade the Vivaldi to try to find an alternative route by sea.

In Cyprus, Genoa had made treaties in 1218 and 1233 and Venice had had establishments there and claimed to have been granted privileges, although no treaty survives. Pisans were settled in Nicosia and Limassol and the republic itself appears to have had some sort of establishment there. As refugees from the mainland increasingly settled in Cyprus, the size of the republic’s communities on the island increased, and first Limassol and later Famagusta became important ports of call. However, the real rise to prominence of Famagusta dated from after the fall of Acre in 1291, when the republics relocated their colonies to the island. By the end of the century the Genoese, and the Venetian and the Pisan colonies were headed by a podesta and consuls respectively. The colonies of all three republics in Famagusta flourished. Cyprus became an entrepot of major importance on the changing routes of the Levant and also a significant supplier to the west of commodities such as wine and sugar in her own right.

In Egypt, Pisa continued to maintain a presence but the scale of her commerce shrank to that of a second-rate power. Even the Catalans, moving into the Levant from the 1280s, had a more prominent position by the end of the century. Venice also maintained her position in Egypt and concluded a new commercial treaty with Sultan Qalawun in 1289. By that time her annual caravans to Egypt had assumed a highly regulated character. Because of the lack of statistical data from Venice as a result of the failure of notarial cartularies from the thirteenth century to survive, it is impossible to quantify the scope of Venetian commerce with Egypt towards the end of the century. None the less, the impression remains that in Egypt, as in the Holy Land and Romania, the second half of the century was Genoa’s rather than Venice’s. Genoa concluded treaties with the Mamluks in 1275 and 1290 and certainly dominated the trade between Romania, the Black Sea and Egypt.

In the west, the rise to economic and political prominence of Catalonia and Aragon had a major effect on Pisa and Genoa. From mid-century Catalan merchants, with the aggressive support of the kings of Aragon, made major
inroads into Pisan and Genoese trade with the Maghrib. Although Genoa sustained the competition and remained entrenched in the region, and also reached out of the Straits of Gibraltar and down the Moroccan coast to Safi, by the end of the century Pisa had largely been driven from the Maghrib by her competitors. Her trade contracted to Sicily, Sardinia and the Tyrrhenian.

Western merchants were drawn to the Maghrib to trade Oriental commodities which they had acquired in the Levant, the industrial products and silver of Europe, and Sicilian grain for the leather and wool which European industries needed and especially for gold. West African gold from Takrur and Wangara on the Senegal and upper Niger rivers found its way to Ceuta, Safi and Tunis, from where, as a result of a favourable balance of trade and because of varying gold to silver ratios in Europe and the Maghrib, western merchants carried it back to Europe either in the form of gold dust (paiola gold) or as minted Muslim dinars. Accumulation of gold stocks in Europe induced the minting of gold coins in the Regno and Spain from the twelfth century. However, by 1252, the amount of gold reaching Genoa and Florence was sufficient to permit the minting of gold, twenty-solidi coins of a new type: the genovino and the florin. Venice, less involved with Maghribi trade, followed with the ducat only in 1284.

In the Regno the fortunes of the republics had fluctuated throughout the century according to their involvement in the struggles between the Church and the Hohenstaufen. With the advent of the Angevins Florence also became heavily involved in the Regno and both competitor and collaborator alongside the maritime republics. But the latter retained their connections also. Genoa obtained licences to export grain in 1284 in return for the loan of galleys during the War of the Sicilian Vespers and members of families such as the Spinola, Doria, Fieschi and Grimaldi settled in the Regno and rose to high office. Pisa’s relations with the Angevins were troubled by her Ghibelline affinities, but Pisans also traded and settled in the Regno, especially from the peace of 1272 to the end of the century. They had a Loggia in Naples and consuls in charge of their establishment. Venice remained entrenched on the east coast, particularly in Apulia, whose grain she needed. Because of her hostility to Michael VIII Palaiologos, under whose rule Genoa had stolen the march on her in Romania, as well as because of her interests in the Regno, Venice was persuaded to make a treaty with Charles I in 1281 which envisaged a Venetian–Angevin attempt to conquer Byzantium and restore the Latin empire. The plans came to nothing when Charles was forced to redirect his energies to his own realms by the outbreak of the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers at Easter 1282. Until the end of the century and beyond, Venetians remained heavily engaged in the Regno, both in Apulia and the Abruzzi and also at Naples.

In Sardinia Pisa and Genoa waged a virtual war for control of its economy, with Pisa holding the upper hand until Meloria but gradually losing out there-
after. In the 1250s, important new silver mines were discovered in the southwest of the island at Iglesias (Villa di Chiesa) in the lordship of Sigerro, which was in the hands of the Pisan Donoratico family. Huge amounts of silver flowed to Pisa from her one twelfth tax on production and from supplying the mining community. The mines remained in Pisan hands even after 1284 and large numbers of Pisans settled in the area.

The incorporation into the crown of Aragon of Valencia and the Balearics, and from 1282 of the island of Sicily, as well as the rapid growth of the Catalan economy, caused the relations of Pisa and Genoa with Aragon to become more important. By 1275 there were Catalan consuls and rectors at Pisa and in 1288 the republic made a treaty with Alfonso III. Pisans became active in the Balearics, Valencia and Catalonia, especially after Meloria when new merchant houses came to prominence in Pisa and developed new spheres of interest in Catalonia and Provence. By the 1280s Majorca and Catalonia had also become important elements in Genoa’s commercial networks. In 1282 a ship one third owned by the famous Genoese merchant and admiral Benedetto Zaccaria made a round trip voyage to Alexandria, Majorca and mainland Spain and again in 1286 another of his ships made a voyage to Majorca, Almeria, Ceuta and Cádiz.

From the long-term perspective, perhaps the most important innovation in Mediterranean maritime traffic in the latter part of the century occurred around 1277–81 when Genoese and Majorcan galleys first made the voyage out of the Straits of Gibraltar and across the Bay of Biscay to Flanders and England, thus opening up a sea route to the north which in time would erode the predominance of the land routes across the Alps and up the Rhone valley. The galleys traded in ports along the way, particularly in Barcelona, Majorca, Almeria, and at Cádiz and Seville as Castile opened up to Genoese commerce in the last quarter of the century; Lisbon too became a port of call. By the last years of the century Venetians were also making the voyage to Flanders and England. The demands of cargo capacity and seaworthiness imposed by the Atlantic voyage led gradually to the development of larger trireme merchant galleys with much wider beam and higher freeboard.

Although the Champagne fairs were declining as trade fairs in the latter part of the century and becoming more exclusively financial clearing centres, they nevertheless remained important to both Genoa and Venice, which both maintained their consuls at the fairs. Genoa in particular played a major role in the functioning of the fairs. By means of letters of exchange raised in Genoa, merchants from other Italian towns raised the credit they needed to operate at the fairs. In 1253 the Genoese merchant Symon de Gualterio, who was resident in Genoa and represented by procurators in Champagne, invested over £4,220 Provins and £770 Genoese in exchange of contracts to the fairs and France.
He shipped spices to Champagne and northern cloth to the Levant. Because of their favourable balance of trade at the fairs, Genoa and Venice tapped the supplies of central European silver which found their way there. It was carried south by the Italians either as ingots or plates or else in the form of the silver currency of Champagne.

Pisa apparently came late to the fairs. There is no reference to Pisans there until 1273 and the city does not appear amongst the lists of Italian towns with consuls there or in other documents recording Italians at the fairs. However, in the Pisan merchant manual of 1278 a whole section is devoted to the fairs of Champagne, suggesting that the lack of references to Pisans at the fairs in other sources may be misleading. Certainly, in this period Pisans were obtaining large amounts of northern cloth somehow. We have what amounts to the cargo manifest of a Pisan galley wrecked on the island of Othonoi near Corfu shortly before 1273. The cargo was salvaged by Angevin officials and forwarded to Melfi for the king. Judging from the nature of the cargo, almost entirely western cloth, the galley was en route to Romania or the Levant and crossing the Straits of Otranto when wrecked. The most valuable cloths are listed first and described in detail, beginning with thirty-three whole pieces of striped cloth of Ypres with fields of green, brown, perse blue and bleveto, and with lists in many colours. For the rest, there were thirty-four plain cloths of Ypres and thirty-one of Provins, five of Sarlat, three of Cammuri, four de Combitis, fifteen of Châlons and two of Cambrai. From Italy there were 193 plain cloths of Florence, seventy-five of Milan, seven of Pisa and three of Lombardy, as well as one striped cloth of Florence, one of Lombardy and an odd length of striped Milanese cloth. One striped and two plain cloths have no provenance assigned to them. Then there were 177 cloths of Bergamo (burgumasci seu grisi), a coarse woollen cloth, thirty-four cloths of nesarum, and twenty-six of say. Finally, there were twenty-six cameline cloths of Florence, three of Châlons and two of unknown provenance. In all there were 678 complete cloths of various kinds plus a variety of smaller pieces. This was an extremely valuable cargo, well worth the expense of salvaging it, and an index of the extent of Pisan commerce in the cloth of Champagne, Flanders and northern France, as well as of Italy.

In central Europe the second half of the century saw the trade of Venice with the growth areas of southern Germany and Bohemia across the Alps expand dramatically. The increasing importance of towns such as Ravensburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg and Regensburg, the development of fairs at Geneva, Nördlingen and Zurzach, and the movement of silver to Germany from new deposits in Bohemia at Freiburg, Jihlava and Kutna Hora (Kuttenberg), as well

29 Filangieri, Mazzoleni, et al. (eds.), I registri, xxv, pp. 35–9.
as in Styria, gave great impetus to the economic development of the region. Venice welcomed German merchants to the Fondaco dei Tedeschi for the silver they brought with them and her own merchants made the journeys across the Alps to the German towns and fairs, particularly using the Brenner pass to Augsburg and Regensburg. In 1286 the doge sent ambassadors to the duke of Carinthia with a view to securing the routes across the eastern Alps to Austria via the Semmering pass. With respect to Germany, Venice had a unique advantage amongst the maritime republics. Venetian state policy ensured that Venice remained a terminus for the trade of the east, through which it was not easy for non-Venetian merchants to pass. As a middleman between the Levant and Germany, Venice enjoyed the same favourable position that Alexandria held further east and which Constantinople had enjoyed until 1204.

Venice and Genoa had been nominally at peace since 1270 when, at the instigation of Louis IX of France, they had ended their first great war. However, their mutual hostility and rivalry had remained as strong as ever, and numerous corsair actions had created grievances on both sides. Tensions increased after 1291 when Acre was lost to the Mamluks and the trade of the Black Sea became even more important to both cities. In 1293 a clash off Coron in the Peloponnese between Genoese galleys returning from Romania and four Venetian galleys bound for Crete precipitated open war. At Ayas in the following year, a Genoese fleet under Niccolò Spinola caught a Venetian fleet under Marco Basegio which had escorted the Cyprus–Armenia caravan to the east and had plundered Genoese possessions in Cyprus. Even though they had the advantage of numbers, the Venetians’ tactics were so incompetent that they handed the victory to the Genoese. Thereafter, the war settled down into a murderous corsair war at sea coupled with raids on coasts and colonies by large squadrons. Oberto Doria took an enormous fleet of 165 ships to sea in 1295 but the Venetians refused combat. On their side, Ruggiero Morosini destroyed Pera and burnt Genoese shipping in the Golden Horn in the same year, while Giovanni Soranzo sailed to Caffa and destroyed the Genoese ships and colony there; he was foolish enough to allow himself to be trapped in the ice by the onset of winter and limped home the following year with the loss of seven of his galleys. Animosities were exacerbated in 1296 by the murder of Marco Bembo, the Venetian baili in Constantinople, and the slaughter of the Venetians in the city by the Genoese. In 1297 squadrons under Matteo Quirini and Eufrosio Morosini scoured the waters off Sicily and Cyprus–Armenia respectively. The war climaxed in 1298 when Lamba Doria led the Genoese fleet into the Adriatic and, by ravaging the coast of Dalmatia, forced the main Venetian fleet to give battle. Off Curzola island (Korcula) on 8 September 1298, ninety-eight Venetian galleys under Andrea Dandolo met Doria’s fleet of seventy-five galleys in a fight to the finish. But, as at Ayas, even though they had
the advantage of numbers, the Venetians fought the battle poorly. Their command was divided and Dandolo showed lack of decisiveness. Although the Venetians fought well and inflicted such heavy losses on the Genoese that they were unable to follow up their victory, they were destroyed. Only twelve galleys escaped the rout.

Curzola was different from Meloria. It did not alter the balance of power and had no strategic consequences. Venice immediately constructed a new fleet of 100 galleys and in the following year her most intrepid corsair, Domenico Schiavo, raided the port of Genoa itself, hoisted the flag of St Mark and struck a Venetian ducat on the mole of Genoa’s harbour. Genoa had suffered heavy losses to her manpower, shipping and colonies in the course of the war, and even though she had won its two major battles, she was in fact more eager to make peace than Venice, who, because her pride had been injured, proved more recalcitrant than Genoa in the negotiations which finally led to peace. Pope Boniface VIII finally forced the two republics to sign a peace at Milan on 25 May 1299. Although the peace really amounted to no more than a truce preserving the status quo, in which both sides agreed to end the corsair war and to stay neutral in any conflicts between either of them and third parties, especially Byzantium and Pisa, the remarkable outcome was that even though the Peace of Milan did nothing to remove the fundamental causes of tension between the two republics, it did ensure at least formal peace between them for fifty years.
Chapte 15 (b)

Sardinia and Corsica from the Mid-Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Century

Marco Tangheroni

Internal Strife and External Pressures

Around the middle of the twelfth century Sardinia was still divided, politically, into four small kingdoms, also known as judgeships (from the title of iudike held by their rulers). This system dated back to the ninth and tenth centuries, and to the breaking of the bonds between Sardinia and the eastern empire. There was the judgeship of Gallura in the north-east, of Cagliari in the south, of Arborea in the west, and of Torres or Logudoro in north-central Sardinia. All these statelets were characterised by several common features: the absence of feudal bonds; chronic underpopulation; the servile condition of the majority of the population (a servitude linked not to the soil but to labour obligations); the survival of a public judicial system; a well-ordered administrative division into curatorie, within which were the ville, with at their head the curatori as representatives of the judges. But all were subject from the mid-eleventh century to a variety of powerful external pressures consequent upon the ending of the isolation which had characterised the island in the early Middle Ages.

In the religious sphere the papacy, as is clear from the intervention of Pope Gregory VII, was anxious to bring the island into line with the institutions and customs of western Christianity, challenging the strong local tradition of Greek Orthodoxy and creating more than nine new dioceses, as well as favouring the influx of Benedictine monks from Montecassino, Vallombrosa, Camaldoli and St Victor’s, Marseilles. They contributed significantly to the Latinisation of the Sardinian Church, including the introduction of writing styles from the mainland and the spread of Romanesque architecture, and they also initiated agricultural improvement schemes. They were sometimes supported, sometimes challenged, by Pisa and Genoa as they all began to penetrate politically, culturally and economically into the island. Above all, however, the papacy relied on the Pisan Church for the work of Latinising the Sardinian
Church and of introducing ecclesiastical reforms into the island; Pisa, which would become by the 1160s firmly imperialist, and later on fiercely Ghibelline, was before then closely tied to the popes who even turned to the city when in need of a provisional seat of government, after being forced out of Rome. Thus the archbishop of Pisa was first of all conceded legatine authority in Sardinia and then primacy over the Sardinian dioceses. On the occasion of the Pisan expedition to Majorca in 1113–15 important contingents from Cagliari and Torres participated, as allies but not as subjects of Pisa. However, Pisa and Genoa were able to take advantage both of intestinal strife within the Sardinian statelets and of conflict between the statelets, so that they built upon the gifts received by their cathedrals, acquiring influence over the political life of the judgeships. Nor were Sardinian issues alone at issue: the strife in Sardinia must be understood in the context of a wider and almost reckless rivalry for supremacy in the western Mediterranean. For this reason no number of pacts and truces concluded in the twelfth century could assure the end of strife either in Sardinia or in Corsica. Papal intervention hardly helped either, since the main aim was to bring the islands under the authority of the papacy on the basis of the theory, attributed to the Donation of Constantine, that papal authority extended over islands. Thus in 1131 Genoa concluded a treaty with the judge of Arborea, Comita, which brought the judgeship into the Genoese sphere of influence, openly and explicitly in opposition to Pisa. What was in fact being planned was a war of conquest in Logudoro, whose judge, Gonnario, had been brought up in Pisa and had been placed back on his throne with the help of Pisan arms. At the same time Pisa affirmed that it exercised the predominant influence in the judgeships of Cagliari and of Gallura. In 1146 Villano, archbishop of Pisa, in his capacity as papal legate, held a meeting of all four judges at Arborea.

However, from the middle of the twelfth century the history of Sardinia was disturbed by the ambitious policies of the new judge of Arborea, Barisone, who attempted to set up a Pisan–Catalan alliance in the hope of acquiring the Balearic islands and who married a Catalan wife; he then moved into the Genoese camp, gaining Genoese support at the court of Frederick Barbarossa. Frederick realised that his own ambition to acquire direct control over Sardinia was a vain one; and, accepting the proposal of the Genoese consuls, he crowned Barisone king of all Sardinia at Pavia in August 1164. In reality Barisone had to contract considerable debts with the leading Genoese families in order to achieve this result, as well as promising further sums to meet Genoa’s military expenses. After becoming king of Sardinia he was to remain tied to Genoa by several firm links, notably an annual tribute of 400 silver marks. Since he was unable to meet these obligations, in the end he had to renounce his elaborate plans. Indeed, less than a year later, in April 1165,
Frederick I, renewing his favours to Pisa, granted the entire island to Pisa as an imperial fief. These developments are none the less suggestive of the economic resources of the Arborean state; in addition, they pointed the way towards the idea of a united Sardinian kingdom, an idea which was to remain alive in later centuries.

In subsequent years Genoa was able to take advantage of its acquisition of the strongpoint of Bonifacio on the southern tip of Corsica (1195); this enabled Genoa to gain control of movements from Porto Torres to Pisa, and the Genoese were able to build up their influence in Torres, obtaining considerable commercial and military concessions.

**THE AGE OF THE CONTINENTAL DYNASTIES**

In 1187 the marquis of Massa, Guglielmo, burst on the scene in Sardinia; he was the head of one of the four branches of the Obertenghi clan and was supported by the commune of Pisa. Having, by marriage, acquired the judgeship of Cagliari, he attacked Arborea, occupying the kingdom, and then moving on to attack Torres. Although the judge of Torres, Costantino, had been his ally in the struggle against Arborea, he now seized Costantino’s wife as a hostage. The archbishop of Pisa excommunicated Costantino, made the new judge, Comita, swear the oath of fidelity, and acquired a similar oath from Guglielmo. Pope Innocent III reaffirmed the dependence of Sardinia on the Holy See, but was unable to do much more than vaunt his claims to authority.

At the start of the thirteenth century the initiative on the island was seized by the Pisan noble house of the Visconti, who were already locked in a long-term struggle with the Gherardeschi for control of the commune of Pisa. Success within Pisa would have brought the chance to mobilise a Pisan citizen army in Sardinia to serve their own ends. The financial resources to be drawn from Sardinia, together with the influence that could be gained from patronage over Sardinian lands, meant that events in Pisa and in Sardinia were closely intertwined. This was even truer as Pisa declined from its status as a Mediterranean power into that of a Tyrrhenian power. Naturally, Sardinia was also important for Genoa, which, all the same, continued to pay attention to wider Mediterranean issues as well. The influence of Sardinia on the internal politics of Genoa was less marked than in the case of Pisa, despite the importance within both Genoa and Sardinia of the Doria and Spinola clans, who, with the Malaspina of Lunigiana (a branch of the Obertenghi), sought to establish lordships in northern Sardinia.

At the start of the thirteenth century, Lamberto Visconti succeeded in the face of competition, including the pope’s nephew, in taking as wife Elena, the heiress to Gallura (1207). Soon after, once Guglielmo had died in 1214,
Lamberto and his brother Ubaldo extracted from Guglielmo’s daughter Benedetta the grant of a hill where they intended to found a large fortified city, Castel di Castro (in Latin, Castrum Kalaris), the future Cagliari. The new city, inhabited by merchants and by Pisan artisans, was surrounded by imposing walls and grew rapidly; it enjoyed a degree of autonomy, even though it remained subject to the authority of two castellans sent out from Pisa. The Visconti benefited from the support given them by the leading citizens of the new town.

In the north of the island, the Visconti, who had tightened their family bonds with the judges of Arborea, tried to conquer Logudoro. The war for Logudoro came to an end in 1219 when Ubaldo Visconti, Lamberto’s son, married Adelasia, the daughter of Mariano, the judge of Torres. This was seen as a necessary first step before the acquisition of the throne of Logudoro. In fact Lamberto was already married to Benedetta of Cagliari, but the pope obligingly annulled this marriage. Even so, the political situation in Sardinia remained extremely complicated as a result of constant dynastic problems, the conflict between the various states, the repercussions of the struggles among the leading Pisan families and the permanent enmity between Pisa and Genoa. In the judgeship of Cagliari, the Visconti were challenged by the rivalry of a branch of the Gherardesca clan, the counts of Donoratico, while in the judgeship of Torres there existed at Sassari a pro-Genoese and a pro-Pisan faction. Events came to a head between 1233 and 1238. A leading group of citizens, new men who included merchants living in Genoa in exile, with Doria support, asserted itself in the city, brutally killing the young judge Barisone, in the hope of creating an autonomous commune. The throne passed now to Adelasia, the wife of Ubaldo Visconti, who was supported by the old landed aristocracy. But those in control of Sassari prevented them from entering the city, with the help of the Genoese and also of those Pisans who opposed the Visconti, as can be seen from Pope Gregory IX’s correspondence. Once Ubaldo was dead, Adelasia married Enzo, the illegitimate son of Frederick II, in 1238, who, in the light of his grandfather’s actions and in the name of the universal rights of the emperor, created him king of Torres and Gallura, and then of all Sardinia. The Visconti could do little about this, whether because the heir to Gallura, Giovanni, was a minor, or because of the agreement that existed between the emperor and Pisa. Frederick had it in mind to put an end to conflict arising from the discordia sarda which had torn apart his close ally Pisa itself. In fact Enzo spent very little time in Sardinia with his wife, who was some years older than he; he soon left for the mainland where he ended his days as a prisoner of the Bolognese. His inheritance was claimed by Count Ugolino, in a setting ever ripe for renewed conflict. However, while Sassari was governed henceforth as a free commune, the judgeship of Torres was now at an end, torn apart by the
conflicts among Doria, Malaspina and Sassari itself which gained control of the lands in its vicinity.

**MEDIEVAL CORSICA BETWEEN PISA AND GENOA**

Corsica, unlike Sardinia, had maintained since the Lombard and Carolingian eras fairly close and constant contact with the Ligurian and Tyrrenian cities. In 1077 Gregory VII, in the hope of bringing the Corsican Church into a greater degree of dependency on the papacy, admitted that his predecessors had for long ignored the island, but he added that the marquises of Tuscany, even if they alone had made plain their legitimate rights in the island, could do so only in the name of the Church of Rome. In order to achieve the reform of the Corsican Church, the papacy here as in Sardinia relied upon the work of the Benedictine monks and of the Pisan Church. Gregory VII announced that he was sending bishop Landulf as his representative; Urban II conceded to the archdiocese of Pisa authority over the Corsican Church at the same time as he elevated Pisa to archiepiscopal status (1092). This right, the significance of which was not simply religious, was contested by Genoa, which sought to challenge Pisa for political and economic mastery of the island after the eclipse of the marquisate of Tuscany. The first half of the twelfth century was characterised by changing policies on the part of the papacy: Calixtus II gave the archbishop of Pisa the right to consecrate the Corsican bishops (1123), then Innocent II reached a compromise by which three dioceses (Accia, Nebbio and Mariana) were placed under the authority of the archbishop of Genoa, and three (Ajaccio, Aleria and Sagona) under the authority of the archbishop of Pisa (1133).

In the second half of the twelfth century Corsica was one of the central issues in the rivalry between the two western Italian maritime cities, which was expressed at sea in an almost constant sequence of pirate raids, and on the island itself took the form of attempts to exploit local forces which were already locked in conflict among themselves. The period of Pisan ascendancy, later recalled in a somewhat mythical fashion as the age of the *pax pisana*, left important traces in the ecclesiastical buildings still surviving on Corsica, though later the Genoese became more influential. Genoa scored a major advance in Corsica, and indeed in northern Sardinia, with the capture of Bonifacio in 1195; this well-fortified stronghold, settled exclusively by Ligurian immigrants, controlled movements through the narrow stretch of water between Corsica and Sardinia. In 1217 Pope Honorius III confirmed Genoese rights there by conferring privileges upon the archbishop of Genoa. Genoa itself conferred on Bonifacio limited rights of self-government and special privileges for those who settled there. A similar policy was adopted in 1278 at
Calvi, a Genoese foundation established ten years previously on the west coast of Corsica.

In the second half of the thirteenth century Pisa sought to strengthen its hand against Genoa by lending its support to Sinucello della Rocca, the son of the lord of Cinarca; once he had achieved the upper hand, Sinucello made an agreement with Genoa, only to rebel and take up arms again. After the Pisan defeat at Meloria in 1284, he gravitated once again towards Genoa, before abandoning his patrons yet again and gaining control of a good part of Corsica. Genoa sent Luchetto Doria to the island as vicar general, and then it sent Niccolò Boccaneegra who tried to build a power base among the other local lords, but suffered defeat at Sinucello’s hands. Sinucello took advantage of the occasion to style himself ‘judge of Cinarca’. For several years he managed to govern the island, reorganising its judicial and fiscal system and challenging the power of local lords. In 1299 he was betrayed by a bastard son and handed over to the Genoese, ending his life, aged nearly a hundred, at Genoa as a prisoner.

Genoese domination was by now fixed definitively, and, in view of the failure in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries of the Aragonese monarch to make good his claims to Corsica, conferred by Boniface VIII in 1297, Genoese rule was to last for nearly five centuries. These events are known to us by and large from external, particularly Genoese, documentation, but the social and economic developments taking place on the island are extremely obscure, since there is virtually no local documentation for the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and archaeological research has not, so far, brought much new information to light. More recently, however, some historians have tried to fill this gap by making use of the fifteenth-century chronicle of Giovanni della Grossa, in which it is possible to trace the survival of an oral tradition, to which the author often appeals. This approach, characterised as it is by an interest in long-term developments and by its use of the insights of anthropology and sociology, lays an emphasis on the permanent, indeed timeless, basis of social organisation in Corsica: the role of the clan, and of the vendetta. These are seen as the real foundations of Corsican medieval society, in relation with which a ‘feudal form of production’ is said to have emerged from the eleventh century onwards. Other historians, however, take the view that this approach is dangerously anachronistic, since it arbitrarily extends to earlier centuries the realities of the fourteenth and later centuries, rather in the manner of Giovanni della Grossa’s chronicle. It fails to take into account the ways in which the memory of the noble elite was formed. Such an approach fails, too, to take into account the dynamic elements which were able to transform Corsican society, notably the external stimulus provided by monastic movements, from the early Middle Ages onwards, and that provided by the
commercial presence of the Genoese and the Pisans. Even so, it is possible to identify in the documentation the distinctive features of some ecclesiastical institutions, and the development of a local notariate with its own characteristics. So, allowing for the bias that exists within documentation produced almost invariably within the major centres of power (Pisa and Genoa), it is still possible to identify changes taking place in island society, such as the strengthening of religious, political and economic bonds between Corsica and the mainland. Here, the papacy, the archbishops and merchants of Pisa and Genoa and the Benedictine monastics all played their role. They stimulated production of a range of products which were in demand in the region, notably oil, wine, skins, cheese, honey, wood; they worked to incorporate Corsica in the network of Mediterranean trade.

One can also see new families rising upwards, to replace the old lords of the Corsican valleys, as these external influences took hold. The new families often acquired fertile estates as early as the time of Pisan overlordship, paying fairly modest rents; this was particularly the case in Cap Corse and the Balagne, where they were able to maximise their revenues from these lands. Thus Corsican society underwent changes and a new local leadership emerged; the attempts by Genoa to challenge the local leaders at the start of their bid for power further stimulated social change of this sort. At the same time, there was a constant stream of Corsican migrants towards Sardinia, Liguria and Pisa, mainly consisting of a poor underclass.

Looking at the forms of settlement, it appears that the old parish organisation did not disappear, though rural communes tended to come into being alongside or instead of the parishes; but urban development was very modest, with the partial exceptions of Calvi and Bonifacio. These in any case were really Genoese centres on the soil of Corsica.

**The Social and Economic Evolution of Sardinia**

The reconstruction of the social and economic evolution of Sardinia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is difficult, in view of the scarcity of sources: we have a few donations made by the judges and other eminent Sards, the *condaghi* (monastic registers written in Sardinian), the Genoese and Pisan notarial acts, a few papal documents, a brief chronicle from Logudoro, the *Libellus iudicum turritanorum*. One can still make sense of the basic developments and try to assess the impact of the growing power of Pisa and Genoa on the society and economy of Sardinia. It is also, however, important to bear in mind the different forms that Pisan and Genoese penetration took: great families aspiring to the creation of lordships or even the acquisition of a judge’s throne; families of lower rank tied to these leaders; merchants of some standing who
saw Sardinia in the context of wider Mediterranean concerns; other merchants and artisans who settled in Sardinia definitively.

While on the one hand Sardinia was clearly characterised by severe under-population, on the other there took place a massive rural colonisation movement, occupying vast empty spaces; this was already visible in the eleventh century, and thus seems to be in part at least an outcome of internal demographic developments within the island. The judges and other major landholders took important initiatives, and the arrival of the monks from the mainland stimulated it still further, as demand for agricultural goods increased and the island took its place in the trading networks of the western Mediterranean. Rural settlement had its economic and administrative base in the numerous ville and was characterised, in contrast to the position visible after the crisis of the fourteenth century, by a dispersed habitat. Alongside lands set aside for vineyards or orchards, the majority of land was given over to cereal cultivation. In the mountainous areas of the interior, and in the less fertile lands, the major activity was, rather, pastoral, above all the raising of sheep. Cereals, wheat and barley, had a particularly important role in the export trade. Up to the middle of the fourteenth century, Sardinia would be an important granary for the Mediterranean not far behind Sicily and Apulia in the quantity of its exports. Salt too was of considerable importance; the saltworks of Cagliari were among the finest in the Mediterranean, and were exploited first by the monks of St Victor of Marseilles and then by the Pisans. Though a modest substance in itself, salt, as an essential additive to other foodstuffs, helped feed a wider network of traffic in foodstuffs in the region.

Alongside agricultural products the most important export from Sardinia was pastoral goods. While Sardinian wool always retained its modest quality and was best suited to low-quality cloths, skins from Sardinia were another matter; they were prized in the market of Genoa from the middle of the twelfth century, as well as playing the essential role in the leather industry of Pisa, which was the city’s most important industry. There was also considerable demand for the cheeses produced on the island, which passed through Genoa and Pisa to reach even more remote markets. Notwithstanding the reputation of Sardinia in the classical sources for its silver resources, and the signs, up to the start of the twelfth century, of some interest in the island’s mineral reserves, a systematic policy of exploiting the richest seams, those in the southwest of the island, only really came into being around the middle of the thirteenth century, with the foundation of Iglesias (Villa di Chiesa) and the decision by Ugolino della Gherardesca to develop these possibilities, at the end of our period.

As far as products exported to the island from the mainland are concerned, they were extremely varied and consisted for the greater part of manufactured
goods, from woollen cloths to cooking pots, from arms to maritime equipment; this resulted in an unfavourable balance of payments for Sardinia. Historians have therefore described the Sardinian economy in terms of ‘unequal exchange’ or ‘a colonial regime’, language which runs the risk of underestimating the dynamic role of Pisan and Genoese penetration into the island, stimulating further economic development. The merchants of the two maritime cities in fact stimulated agricultural production before they managed in large measure to control it. They brought into being at a limited level a money economy and they gave a significant push towards the disappearance of rural serfdom, a change which resulted in greater population mobility. But above all Pisan and in lesser measure Genoese influence was decisive in the evolution of the towns, which was so characteristic of the first half of the thirteenth century; this occurred later than elsewhere in western Europe, but it was all the more concentrated and rapid. The many cities of ancient Sardinia had not survived the early Middle Ages; Karalis, Nora, Sulcis, Tharros, Olbia all disappeared between the eighth and the tenth century. The judicial centres which had managed to subsist during the period of Muslim raids included Santa Gilla in the Cagliaritano, Oristano in Arborea and Porto Torres, the successor to the Roman centre at Turris, in Logudoro. But only Oristano retained its urban character in the thirteenth century, undergoing significant development soon after 1200. Santa Gilla was destroyed by the Pisans in 1258 and Porto Torres was overtaken by Sassari, which transformed it into its outlet on the sea. Sassari, which had been no more than a curtis dependent on the monastery of San Pietro di Silki in the early twelfth century, and had become a villa by the end of that century, in a few decades became a major urban centre, with a large merchant and artisan population, including a significant Sard element, though the main impetus to development came from the settlers of mainland origin. As has been seen, Castel di Castro or Cagliari was founded by the Pisans in 1217, with imposing fortifications; and, even though settlement by Sards was prohibited, it rapidly grew to contain a population of several thousand (between 7,000 and 10,000 at the end of the thirteenth century); a key factor was the development of its port, which benefited from its proximity to Sicily, the Maghrib and Majorca. Cagliari became one of the main centres of maritime traffic in the western Mediterranean, notable for its role in the redistribution of goods. Suburbs at Villanova and Stampace, outside the walls, testified to its rapid growth. In the same judgeship, in the south-west of Sardinia, Count Ugolino founded around 1250 the city of Iglesias, which was to grow within a couple of generations to a population not far below 10,000. The secret behind this development was the count’s encouragement of the exploitation of the silver resources of the region and of the metal industry needed to extract the silver from the lead seams in which it was found. Though
the majority of the inhabitants hailed from Pisa itself, there were also very many Sard and Corsican settlers, who were attracted by the generous privileges conferred on its inhabitants. Another town which experienced growth was the reborn centre at Olbia, on the north-east coast of Sardinia; Civita or Terranova was described in a Pisan document as a quasi civitas. Its expansion was the result of its relative proximity to the coast of Tuscany. Another centre on the eastern side of Sardinia which had a brief period of success for similar reasons was the port at Orosei. The Genoese area of influence in the judgeship of Torres saw some small but quite well-populated centres develop, too: Castelgenovese (now known as Casteldoria) and perhaps Alghero were founded by the Doria, and Bosa and Osilo were founded by the Malaspina.

Even though the surviving sources do not permit a serious calculation of the Sardinian population at the end of the thirteenth century, it is possible to argue that the level of urbanisation was in reality quite high. This urbanisation was rendered possible by the emigration from the mainland, especially from Pisa and its contado; however, the Sard contribution should not be ignored either, with the exception of the citadel at Cagliari. Some have argued therefore that there took place a drainage away from the countryside, but there is no real proof of this, and rural settlement remained firm, with increasing production of agrarian goods. The urban Sards must represent a surplus labour force which was not needed in the countryside.

FROM THE SARDINIA OF THE JUDGES TO PISAN SARDINIA

Immediately after the middle of the thirteenth century major events took place in Sardinia. The judge of Cagliari, Chiano di Massa, hoping to extract himself from Pisan control, came to an agreement with Genoa, bringing his lands within the Genoese sphere. He was to become a citizen of Genoa and it was agreed that once Cagliari had been conquered, it would fall under direct Genoese control. Such agreements show clearly how limited was the freedom of action of the judgesthips and how economically and strategically important Cagliari had become. In the face of the danger of losing the city, the Pisans gained renewed energy; the same years saw the Pisans, in alliance with Venice, confront the Genoese in Acre (1256–8). In Sardinia, the Donoratico della Gherardesca, the counts of Capraia (judges of Arborea) and the Visconti (judges of Gallura) were all entwined in a bitter struggle for Sardinia. Chiano was killed in battle, but his successor, Guglielmo Cepolla, found himself constrained by even more demanding terms imposed by the Genoese, including the cession to Genoa of his capital, Santa Gilla, and the feudal submission to Genoa of the entire judgeship. But Pisan forces gained the upper hand and Santa Gilla was razed to the ground; the judgeship of Cagliari was dis-
membered. Castel di Castro, its suburbs and the immediately surrounding lands were taken over by Pisa, which every year sent out two castellani but permitted the city itself (whose population was in any case almost entirely of Pisan origin) a certain degree of administrative autonomy. The remainder of the judgeship was divided among the three leading houses which had participated in the conflict: the west went to the Donoratico, the centre to the Capraia and the east to the Visconti. A few years later the Donoratico third was itself divided between the two branches of the family, that of Ugolino and that of Gherardo, the former leaning to the Guelphs, the latter to the Ghibellines. In 1259 Adelasia, mistress of Torres, died without heirs; her judgeship ceased to exist, with the majority falling under the lordship of the Genoese signori on the island, while Sassari remained independent and moved in the orbit of Pisa, which sent it a podestà each year. The Pisan sources refer to this period in the island’s history as the era of the Domini Sardinie. However, it was really changes in Pisa that determined, within thirty years, further radical shifts. Hoping to put to an end Genoese control of the sea routes, Pisa challenged Genoa to a decisive duel, but, in the waters off Porto Pisano, its fleet was annihilated by that of Genoa, with the loss of 3,000 dead and 9,000 prisoners (the battle of Meloria, 1284). This led in Pisa to the brief period of a Guelf signoria under Ugolino di Donoratico and Nino Visconti, which gave way in 1284 after a coup d'état led by the archbishop and the city aristocracy. While the Visconti continued their struggle in exile, Count Ugolino was shut in a tower and condemned to death by starvation, an episode commemorated in Dante’s Commedia. The Pisan commune managed to retain control of the island, losing only Sassari. The Visconti and the sons of Ugolino were defeated in Sardinia and their lands fell directly into Pisan hands. Logudoro remained within the Genoese sphere, but Gallura and the Cagliaritano had now become, to all intents, part of the Pisan contado. Only Arborea retained its independence, though for the moment it remained loyal to Pisa. While all this was happening, Pope Boniface VIII sought to resolve the difficulties created by the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers by creating in 1297 a Regnum Sardinie et Corsice which he granted to the king of Aragon, James II, in the hope that the island of Sicily could be returned to the house of Anjou. Lengthy attempts to acquire recognition in Sardinia by diplomatic means failed, and James II proceeded, in 1323–4, to the armed invasion of the island; but, from 1297, Pisan dominion in Sardinia was already under severe threat.
chapter 15 (c)
THE RISE OF THE SIGNORI

Trevor Dean

During the thirteenth century, political life in the city-states of northern Italy began to be dominated by a new breed of political and military leaders, often described as tyrants or despots. In an accelerating development, as Frederick II’s efforts to reimpose imperial authority failed, monarchical power was recreated at the local level, in the persons first of Frederick’s former political and military lieutenants, then of local faction chiefs (Azzo d’Este in Ferrara, Martino della Torre in Milan, Mastino della Scala in Verona). Though their power often remained informal, for they were masters, not lords of their cities, they passed that power to their heirs, who sometimes formalised their position through popular ‘elections’ and technical transfers of arbitrary power (Ferrara, 1264; Mantua, 1299, etc.). In the course of time some of these lordships developed into the principalities and regional states of Renaissance Italy (the Visconti, Este, Gonzaga, Montefeltro). By 1300 most cities of northern Italy were under signorial rule; nearly all of those that were not (Padua, Parma, Vicenza) soon followed.

How should these important changes be described and explained? Let us start with the word ‘despot’. How is it that this word has become attached to late medieval Italy? Its usage seems to be an English peculiarity. Other languages use other terms (signori, seigneurs, Tirannen). With its one-time connotations of ferocity and caprice, of indiscriminate butchery, of eastern domination over slaves, the word is really displaced. The concept of the signori as tyrannical despots seems to have become current among English historians during the nineteenth century when the historian Hallam, writing of the Italian signori, commented: ‘I know not of any English word that characterises them, except tyrant in its primitive sense.’ And among nineteenth-century histories before Symonds, the word, and its cognate ‘despotism’, though occasionally used, was mixed with other words of different import: ‘sovereign power’,

1 Hallam (1818), 1, p. 287.
‘absolute masters’, ‘the rule of some distinguished military family’, ‘hereditary principalities’. It was Symonds’s prodigal use of the word (‘The age of the despots’) that seems to have set the dominant tone for succeeding generations. But the ‘despots’ called themselves ‘lords’, ‘governors’, ‘rectors’ and ‘captains’; it was their critics (mainly later) who called them ‘tyrants’. In an age when most government in Europe was monarchical and when monarchy was thought to be the best form of government, why should the Italian signori alone be singled out for ‘tyranny’?

‘Tyranny’ of course has a pedigree as a concept of political analysis that ‘despot’ lacks. Aristotle’s influential definition – which we shall find behind contemporary condemnations of signori – centred on the distinction between just rulers, who govern in the interest of all, and the unjust, who govern in their own interest alone; and on the basis of this distinction, Aristotle elaborated a wide range of tyrannical political actions and strategies. In like manner, the famous fourteenth-century jurist Bartolus of Sassoferrato, in a treatise on tyranny (De tyranno), identified ten key features of tyrannical rule; yet he subsequently admitted that most of these could also be the justified actions of legitimate lords, and by the end of his treatise he had softened almost to invisibility the dividing line between a just ruler and a tyrant: ‘rarely may any government be found in which the public good alone is looked to and in which there is not something of tyranny. For it would be more divine than human if those who ruled attended only to the common welfare and in no way to their own profit.’ Forms of tyranny are present in all types of government, Bartolus concludes, and the only distinction is one of degree. Bartolus thus provides us with a helpful reminder that the political transformation of the Italian communes should not be seen as a degradation from an ideal, free and democratic past to a period of dark and bloody oppression. The fact is that most communes in northern Italy in the first half of the thirteenth century were weak, divided and unable to command adequate political consent. The power of private associations (clans, factions, guilds, neighbourhoods), the persistence of private attitudes to justice, the expression of political rivalry in street-fighting and violent clashes, the uneven, patchy subordination of the contado, the military might of the rural aristocrats who had taken citizenship and now resided in the cities: all combined to render the commune’s political and territorial structures ‘rudimentary, semi-private and provisional’, in the words of Chittolini.

The most notorious of the early ‘tyrants’, whom later lords were often alleged to imitate, was Ezzelino da Romano. The da Romano were one of the four pre-eminently lordly families of the Marca Trevigiana: with a rural base at

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2 Quaglioni, *Politica e diritto nel trecento italiano*, p. 212.
Bassano, between Treviso and Vicenza, they had power and influence in both cities in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Already in the 1200s, rivalry among the great families of the region had drawn in the Sambonifacio, counts of Verona (who made an alliance with the Este family), and the Torelli of Ferrara (who allied with the da Romano). The scale of the da Romano sway over the Marca Trevigiana can be gauged by the remarkable longevity of these alignments: only after the overthrow and death of Ezzelino III da Romano in 1259 did the alliance of Este and Sambonifacio fall apart. According to the chronicler Rolandino, the Marca was dominated for fifty years by the ‘capital enmity’ that grew between Estensi and da Romano and that originated in a dispute over marriage to an heiress between the da Romano and the Campo San Piero, another family allied to the Estensi. This legendary origin of a long-lasting political division may be discounted as literary invention; more certain sources of conflict lay in the relations between these aristocratic families and the cities that they sought to control. Thus, when Azzo d’Este became podestà of Verona in 1207, Ezzelino II assembled a force to expel him; when Aldrovandino d’Este resisted Paduan claims to jurisdiction over his castles and estates in the southern Padovano, Ezzelino joined the Paduan army that raided his lands. Then, between 1228 and 1236, Ezzelino III established dominion over the cities of Verona, Padua and Vicenza: he took control in Verona at the request of the Monticoli faction and expelled their rivals; with Frederick II and his imperial envoys, he occupied Vicenza in 1236 and Padua in 1237. Ezzelino then controlled these cities until 1259. According to Rolandino, the arrests, imprisonments and expulsions began almost immediately in Padua and those who were left all began to call Ezzelino ‘lord’. In the 1240s, Ezzelino’s rule became a wearying succession of battles for control of the countryside and executions of war-captives and of unmasked plotters. After Frederick II’s death, he turned on former supporters such as the Dalesmanini and their allies and discovered plots even within his own household. As a former supporter of Frederick II, and a continuing supporter of his heir, Manfred, Ezzelino became a prime target of the papal campaign in northern Italy and in 1256 a crusade was proclaimed against him. However, Ezzelino’s power to strike back was still awesome: he captured the papal legate in 1258 and occupied Brescia; and it took the defection of his former ally and counterpart in Lombardy, Uberto da Pallavicino, to make possible his defeat and capture.

It is difficult now to disentangle history from fiction in the career of Ezzelino. He was subject to an intense campaign of denigration and demonisation by the papal crusade and this has left its mark on the historiography, which lacks any compensating public documentation for his rule. The contemporary and later chronicles are almost uniformly hostile. No other tyrant was mythologised in the same way: legends were told of his birth and of his death; his life
formed the theme of an early Latin verse drama written by Albertino Mussato; cities liberated from his sway commemorated this fact in anniversary celebrations. Whether the stories of his ghastly atrocities are true or are lies invented by his enemies, it is impossible to ascertain. Some at least are quite clearly versions of biblical horrors, such as the massacre of the innocents. According to the Franciscan friar Salimbene, ‘to record all his cruelties would require a large book. He was as much the devil’s special friend as St Francis was Christ’s.’

Salimbene’s account stresses fear and butchery as the twin bases of Ezzelino’s power. For Rolandino, writing immediately after Ezzelino’s downfall, the main characteristics of his rule were the ruthless hunting out of subversives, traitors and the lukewarm, as well as the number and brutality of tortures, mutilations and executions. In the fourteenth century, Ezzelino still represented (to the Church) the model *par excellence* of the worst type of secular ruler: among the charges that the papacy brought against Matteo Visconti was that of worshipping the bones of Ezzelino as the relics of a saint.

There is, however, some more sober evidence of the nature of Ezzelino’s rule. A small group of documents shows him respecting the constitutional legalities of the communes. The growth in size of the councils of Padua and Verona during the 1250s, and the increased artisan representation, suggest that he had substantial popular support. Even Rolandino gives evidence of his chivalric and courtly behaviour, and records his speech made in Monselice in 1237 against bad government in the Marca, which was well received by the local population. Hostile chroniclers admit that Ezzelino was suitably harsh against murderers, rapists and thieves. Not all observers were as shocked by the necessary removal of proud aristocrats: the chronicler Maurisio, in a complicated exposition of the meaning of Ezzelino’s name, saw him as a ‘corrector of the proud’ who would ‘put down the mighty from their seats and exalt them of low degree’.

The suggestion of popular support for Ezzelino, as also for his ally Salinguerra Torelli, who dominated Ferrara until 1240, raises an important historiographic debate: was the rise of the *signori* linked to a ‘class struggle’ between the *popolo* and the aristocrats, which split asunder the communes from the early thirteenth century onwards? It is suggested that the communes had been created in order to maintain and extend the privileged interests in the countryside of the political elite (the consular aristocracy), but demographic and economic expansion then generated new, more purely urban social groups which not only demanded participation in urban government, but also attacked the landed interests, the judicial and fiscal privileges of the old ruling class. Under this pressure, the nobility turned to their defences in the *contado*.

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3 Salimbene de Adam, *Cronica fratris*, p. 195.
while intensifying their sense of lineage and exclusive rank (visible in the growth of family surnames and of knightly societies). The artisans and traders, banding together as the popolo, but excluded from communal government, established their own ‘commune within the commune’, with its own podestà, its own assemblies and statutes, its own buildings, churches, banners and militias. The popolo has been seen as representing the ‘real’ interests of the city-state, its markets, food supplies, justice and tax revenues, against the claims of nobles to dominate office, to hold fiscal exemptions for themselves and their tenants and to export crops from their estates (so as to enjoy the high prices in areas of shortage). Thus, in Milan in 1240, the popolo complained of nobles being lightly punished for violence against popolani, of nobles in their castles who did not obey the commune and of the many burdens that the nobles imposed, ‘such that the popolo carries the whole weight of expenses’.  

The popolo has also been seen as embodying more ‘modern’ principles of organisation: the collectivity of neighbourhood associations and guilds, as against the clans and factions of the nobility. The popolo represented solidarity as opposed to division, civil concord as opposed to aristocratic riotousness. Popular statutes sought to disarm and disband local and regional factions, to halt faction-fighting, to disable magnates and feudatories and to prevent the embroilment of popolani in their disorderly affairs. It has also been argued that the presence of the popolo contributed to the emergence of the signori, who were either generated from within the popolo as an instrument in the struggle against the aristocracy (thus Martino della Torre, Mastino della Scala and Alberto Scotti, all of whom based their rise to power on popular organisations), or spearheaded an aristocratic reaction to overcome the popolo (thus, at Modena, popular institutions were suppressed with the advent of the Este signoria in 1291).

It is certainly the case that class tensions existed: Salimbene, with his aristocratic sympathies and friendships, declared that ‘populares and peasants are those by whom the world is destroyed; by knights and nobles is it conserved’; he also gives the example of a nobleman from Parma who abandoned the city out of disgust that any ‘popular’ man, of town or country, could summon him to the communal palace in a legal action. Some aristocratic poets (anticipating Dante’s distaste for ‘fast profits’) railed against the destruction of their cities by ‘merchant-robbers’. Conversely, a Florentine writer in Modena, recalling to mind the devastation of Modena and Milan, asserted that, in contrast, ‘nothing has defended Bologna or Lucca . . . except the great strength and constancy of the popolo, since, whenever a disturbance has arisen, immediately the popolo has arrived, such that, by actively proceeding against the malefactors, all disorder

The rise of the signori

6 Nevertheless, the popolo was not a united, progressive force, nor did it give rise to the signorie in the way suggested. Almost everywhere, in fact, the popolo was divided, almost everywhere led by aristocrats. Indeed, as Daniel Waley has observed in the case of Siena, it can be argued that the term popolo was generally understood to mean all people, noble and non-noble, who demanded a right to participate in city government. Nobles who adhered to the popolo are found in Piacenza as early as 1218; soon after there is reference too to popolani who adhered to the nobles. In Verona it was noted that in 1227 not only the knights (milites), but also the populares et mercatores were divided into two factions. In Milan, the choice of Martino della Torre as leader split the popolo in two, and many populares later adhered to Archbishop Ottone Visconti, leader of the nobles. The Manfredi faction in Faenza comprised both populares and milites. When the popolo first appeared in Brescia in 1200, it chose as its podestà a local count, Narisio di Montichiaro. The first captain of the popolo in Reggio in 1278 was Ugolino Rossi, whose grandfather had impressed Salimbene as an ideal prince, whom he likened to Charlemagne. At Mantua the first captains of the popolo were the regional faction-leaders, Azzo d’Este and Lodovico da Sambonifacio; and the popolo’s bell was housed above the battlemented house in which Lodovico resided. The early rectors of the popolo of Piacenza were members of the local aristocracy (Guglielmo Landi, Uberto Iniquitate), who both rapidly turned this elective office into a hereditary one. In Treviso a contemporary observed that ‘there is faction when the populares, or other persons, adhere to and look to one magnate or another’.7

Leadership by nobles was not so much an attempt to take control of an organisation that challenged aristocratic interests, as an attempt to mobilise the popolo against one or other faction. One aristocratic faction would look to the popular classes for the support with which to claim direction of the commune from its rivals, to impose itself at the head of the government. In this sense, the organisation of the popolo by guild and neighbourhood was not a collective reaction against the clan and the faction, but corresponded to aristocratic domination of their residential districts and to magnate membership and leadership of guilds. Both were merely vehicles for aristocratic power. Magnates were members, as well as leaders, of the popolo (as revealed in statutes and ordinances at Padua, 1270 and Modena, 1306). Anti-magnate legislation, while sounding drastic and radical, was often the work of magnate partisans and was directed against their rivals. Some signori originated as leaders of the popolo only because of the configuration of local power. In Ferrara there was no organised popolo, nor a conspicuously active merchant class and even the nobility appears weak: as a result, the Este took over by the power of faction alone. In Piacenza

the great aristocratic families based their growth on commercial success on a European scale: this ensured that, however strong the rural nobility remained, landed power alone was insufficient to bring control over the city, and it was the greatest of the merchant aristocrats, Alberto Scotti, from a traditionally ‘popular’ family, who seized power. In Milan, which was a much greater centre of industrial production, aristocratic involvement in trade appears much less prominent, and it was by detaching himself from the nobles that Martino della Torre came to lead the popolo. In Verona, Ezzelino’s decimation of the local aristocracy, by expulsion and execution, together with an absence of rural noble clans, allowed power to be claimed by the della Scala, a family of second rank, without castles, jurisdiction or significant feudal ties: Mastino della Scala was podestà of the popolo in 1239, then podestà of the merchants in the 1260s.

It is usually claimed that there was a clear difference between Ezzelino and later signori. Ezzelino’s position was a personal one, not incorporated within the legal framework of either empire or commune: he rarely held the position of podestà, received no grant of special power from the communal councils, he acted as the emperor’s ally, not his lieutenant or delegate. But the early years of other signori were also marked by personal power such as this; nor should we overlook the common features that united Ezzelino and the succeeding generations of signori. Ezzelino’s supremacy was certainly distinct from that of his contemporary, Uberto, marquis of Pallavicino. Like the da Romano, the Pallavicino were a typical baronial family, established in the region between Parma and Piacenza, where they held vast territories. Like the da Romano, they were drawn, by the growing wealth and pretensions of the communes, to deploy that power in the cities. Unlike Ezzelino, Uberto inserted himself into the civic and imperial structures of authority: he received imperial vicariates, his position within cities was often that of podestà or captain. The fulcrum of his power was his lordship of Cremona (1250–67), to which he added, for varying periods, control of Piacenza, Crema, Brescia, Alessandria, Pavia and Milan. Again unlike Ezzelino, Uberto relied heavily on local lieutenants, who themselves sought power in their own right (thus Martino della Torre in Milan, Ubertino Landi in Piacenza, Buoso da Dovara in Cremona). In essence, his power appears more military than political. Salimbene noted as a feature of his rule that he could draw military contingents from wherever he wanted (though ‘more from fear than love’) and it was as a military saviour that he was granted temporary supremacy in Milan. Uberto thus came from outside the communes he dominated, and exercised combined civil and imperial functions; later lords came from within communal society and created new functions for themselves and their heirs. Yet in some of his (rarely surviving) individual decrees, Uberto did exercise authority like later signori: as captain-general of Milan, he issued in 1262 a typical lordly grant, which claimed to reward merit, dispensed from the
communal statutes and threatened lordly anger against any who did not respect the grant; as ‘perpetual lord’ of Cremona, he issued in 1264 orders that dispensed from the statutes and restricted papal jurisdiction.

Whether tyrants or not, most signori were clearly barons. In modern historians’ accounts of this period, the word ‘baron’ is rarely used, yet it was in common usage among thirteenth-century chroniclers, poets and writers, denoting both aristocratic rank and the aristocratic companions of greater rulers. The term was used both generally (Frederick II’s barons, the barons of the Marca Trevigiana) and specifically (as applied to Alberico da Romano, Azzo d’Este or the Sambonifacio, for example). To see these lords as barons, rather than tyrants, is to restore something of the aristocratic, hereditary nature of their power, which was legitimised not so much by delegation or constitutional transfer, but by possession and long use. Noble power rested on a conjunction of illustrious past and present might, as was made clear in the answer provided by the nobles of Milan when Pope Innocent IV, after a dinner in that city, asked them which was the noblest family there: they replied that the da Soresina were, because they had given birth to two emperors and a beato, but that the Crivelli were the most powerful ‘in persons and wealth’. In the same way, the origins of many signorial families combined antiquity, hereditary rank, eminent deeds and command of persons and property. The da Camino, lords of Treviso (1283–1312), were probably descended from the counts of Treviso; their first known ancestor appears in the early twelfth century already in possession of a castle; by marriage to an heiress the family became counts of Ceneda. The della Torre, lords of Milan (1259–77 and again briefly in the early fourteenth century) vaunted descent from the exiled sons of a French royal prince; they were formerly counts of Valassina; Martino della Torre died on crusade; Francesco was knighted and made count of Benasi by Charles of Anjou. The Visconti, according to the chronicler Galvano Flamma, ‘among the other nobles of Milan . . . were always extremely noble and old’, with rights to a county and prerogatives for their banner in the Milanese army. The Estensi, who had held vast lands and public office in north and central Italy for centuries, were ‘the marquises par excellence, on account of their nobility and ancient title’, they married the daughters of kings and had had German dukes among their widespread kin. Nor were the rivals of these families any the less noble. Lodovico da Sambonifacio, ‘who should have had the lordship of Verona’ (Salimbene), came from a family which had been counts of Verona since the eleventh century and held important castles along the river Adige. Ubertino Landi, with lands and castles that dominated sections of the Piacenzan contado, was created count of Venafro by Frederick II.

8 Lacaita (ed.), Benvenuti de Rambaldis de Imola comentum super Comœdiam, ii, p. 12.
Those signori who were definitely not barons in the thirteenth century – notably Alberto Scotti, lord of Piacenza, and the della Scala lords of Verona – slowly adopted baronial habits: acquiring castles and jurisdictions, which they ordered their heirs never to alienate; obtaining large feudal investitures from local bishops and monasteries; participating in the chivalric culture of courts, knighthood and liberality. Thus, Alberto Scotti acquired ‘castles, possessions, lands, rents, jurisdictions, tithes and vassals’ at Zavattarello, Castelverde and Ruino, in the Val Tidone, declaring in his will that ‘those can be of great honour and profit to my sons and heirs and their friends’; and he ordered, ‘so that my memory be preserved forever’, that they never be sold or parted with. Note the important connection made here between the acquisition of castles and the aristocratic family’s sense of its own past. Alberto della Scala exhibited similar concerns in his will, providing for masses and prayers to be said not only for his own soul, but also for those of his ancestors and successors, while also prohibiting his sons from selling or alienating his ‘castles and jurisdictions’ (a reference to Illasi, Ostiglia, Villimpenta and Peschiera). Alberto had been invested with Peschiera, with all its vassals and the toll levied there, by the bishop of Verona in 1277. Alberto also came to share in the wider aristocratic world by holding a ‘great court’ on the feast day of a significant chivalric saint, St Martin, in 1294, at which he knighted his own sons and nephews and other members of the Veronese ruling elite, in obvious imitation of the grander, more cosmopolitan court held by the Estensi earlier in the year. Within another generation, the then lord of Verona, Cangrande della Scala, would be described as a ‘noble baron of great gentility’.

Such men were united by a common chivalric culture that was characterised by courts, tournaments, liberality, martial valour and magnificence. Obizzo d’Este lost an eye in an accident while tourneying for a lady’s love. Earlier in the century, the Estensi had frequently received troubadours at their court, and their virtues were praised, and their deaths lamented, in troubadour poetry. The Bonacolsi built up a collection of French chivalric romances. Paolo Malatesta was led into adultery by reading the story of Tristan and Isolde. Gherardo da Camino was Dante’s buon Gherardo, singled out as a model of true nobility, ‘a totally benign, humane, courtly and liberal man, a friend of the good’. Large curial spending was noted by Salimbene as a feature of Uberto da Pallavicino’s lordship and Riccobaldo records Azzo d’Este’s claim that ‘the sum of my revenues does not meet the burden of the expenses which I cannot refuse if I stay in Ferrara’. Knightly conduct in war, especially the treatment of captured aristocrats, though lamented as something of the past by

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Rolandino (‘then wars were good wars’), undoubtedly continued to flourish. Even the atrocities of Ezzelino did not exclude him from ‘courtly’ treatment at the hands of his captors in 1259: the ‘barons’ of the crusading army would not allow ‘such a man’ to be jostled by the crowd that pressed in to look at him, but provided him with the best medical attention and, when he died, ‘honoured’ him in his burial.

The reverse of such chivalric conduct was, of course, vendetta. Technically, according to social scientists, vendetta is a particular type of blood-feud (characteristic of Corsica), but here, as generally among historians of Italy, the term is a synonym for blood-feud. The quest for revenge played a major part in the aristocratic feuds from which many signorie emerged. At the battle of Desio in 1277, which won Milan for the Visconti, the archbishop of Milan had to restrain Riccardo count of Lomello from taking revenge on the captured Napo della Torre for the dishonourable execution of his brother who, having been captured during a fight, should have been accorded chivalric respect. Curiality could thus stifle vendetta; but usually vendetta was stronger. During Azzo d’Este’s incursion into the Ferrarese against Salinguerra Torelli in 1222, Tisolino di Campo San Piero had died fighting because there was no one of ‘chivalric blood’ to take his surrender. Two years later his son Jacopo took ‘delighted’ revenge in a massacre at Fratta, whose inhabitants were Salinguerra’s ‘special and most trusted men’. Excessive revenge of this sort tended to have escalating consequences. Salinguerra complained of this enormity to Ezzelino who declared that men should attend to two things in life, observing faith to friends and living with honour, and undertook to avenge the massacre. Rolandino presents Ezzelino’s assumption of his ally’s vendetta as the major motive in his seizure of power in Verona in 1227. Another episode from Milan further demonstrates the politically destabilising effects of the pursuit of vendetta. In 1266 Napo della Torre installed his brother Paganino as podestà of Vercelli, but he was attacked and killed by Milanese exiles. In revenge, other members of the della Torre publicly killed ‘with their own hands’ over fifty relatives of the exiles. Napo was shocked and predicted that ‘their blood will be on the heads of my sons’; and it was the publicity given in Rome to this atrocity by Napo’s enemies that stiffened the pope into unrelenting opposition to the della Torre (he declared that he would revoke his condemnation of the della Torre only ‘when the sea lacks fish, the air wind and the flame heat’). More wisely, Napo’s father, Martino della Torre, had refused to kill his enemies; likewise Matteo Visconti never spilled anyone’s blood (according to Flamma). Other lords avoided doing their own killing. But it was better for lords to appear to be above vendetta: when Obizzo d’Este was assaulted and wounded by Lamberto Bazaleri in 1288, it was the ‘people’ who demanded vengeance, and while Obizzo insisted on due judicial process, it was the ‘people’ who killed Lamberto’s servant on the piazza.
The position and attitudes of the noblemen who became signori may be gathered from their wills, several of which survive. The two wills of Ubertino Landi from 1277 and 1297 serve as good illustrations. They reveal his enormous and widespread landed property; his attachment to a favoured rural monastery (Chiaravalle della Colomba), where he wished to be buried; his piety in the provisions for bequests to a large group of monasteries, nunneries, friaries and hospitals, for distributions of alms to the poor and for the singing of masses for his soul; remorse in the provision for extortions (male ablata) and repayment of long-standing debts; his sense of lineage in his injunction against the sale or alienation of important family properties; and his munificence towards his relatives and clients in rewards, in cash, land, fiefs or food and clothing, to servants and agents (a marshall, a judge, a counsellor, a notary, unnamed donzelli), to his own bastard sons, to a daughter in a Pavian nunnery, to a scatter of Landi kin (though with the strict instruction that nothing should go to Alberico Landi, ‘because he is my mortal enemy’), and to his vassals, whose fiefs he ordered his heirs to respect and whom he ordered them to aid, defend and maintain ‘as I have always done in my lifetime’. Several features of Ubertino’s wills are found more generally: the concern to set right wrongs; burial in a rural monastery which housed the tombs of family ancestors; the desire to perpetuate mortal enmities; the anxiety to prevent disintegration of properties or the decay of feudo-vassalic bonds with clients.

The identity of Ubertino Landi’s vassals draws into focus the role of feudalism in the rise of the signori, for they were his associates and lieutenants, the supporters of his faction in the Val Taro and Val Ceno, who waged a long contado war in his interest against Piacenza in the 1270s. Elsewhere too vassals were mobilised by lords seeking to conquer or keep power in the city, and fiefs were used to reward the service of partisans. At Ferrara, most clearly of all, the Estensi distributed exiles’ lands and other properties in fief among their own supporters, held feudal ‘courts’ in town to overawe their opponents, required military support from their vassals in times of disorder and issued laws forbidding other nobles from granting fiefs to Este vassals. No other signoria has the extensive records of feudal investitures that exist for Ferrara; and it is possible that in no other city was the connection of lordship and feudalism so close. In some cities, most notably Verona, fiefs and vassals played little or no part in the establishment of the signoria. And elsewhere the evidence is fragmentary: fiefs of tower-houses in Mantua and Verona attest to the role of feudo-vassalic relations in faction fighting; in 1292 Passerino Bonacolsi gave armour and weapons to a group of brothers who swore fealty to him as vassals; the Scotti family acquired a castle with vassals and linked themselves by feudal ties to

their allies; when Ivrea submitted to Guglielmo di Monferrato in 1266, all the citizens surrendered their property to him and received it back in fief; Flamma records as one feature of Visconti nobility the fact that ‘they had vassals and granted fiefs’.

Feudalism could thus play a role in the transition to signoria, but many other factors were involved. This process may best be illustrated by reference to a would-be lord who failed to complete that transition, Giberto da Gente in Parma. With Parma under pressure from Uberto da Pallavicino, Giberto was made lord of the city in 1253. He held his position until 1259, during which time, according to Salimbene, he did two good things (returning the citizens to peace and walling some of the city gates), but many more bad, on account of which the city eventually rose against him, deposed him, destroyed his houses and exiled him to Ancona, where he died in 1270. Salimbene then provides a list of Giberto’s failings (his ‘mala et stultitia’), which contributed to his downfall, but which we can see as his efforts to make permanent a temporary position. First, he gave wholehearted support to neither of the organised regional powers (Pallavicino and the pars ecclesiae); then, he was greedy without being liberal; his poor knightly background led to envy among his co-citizens when he began to build ‘great, tall palaces’; both in Parma and in the contado at Campeggine; he condemned some unjustly to death or money-fine, while sparing others in return for money; he took a large salary, much larger than Parma was used to giving to its podestà; he had himself made hereditary lord in a popular assembly on the piazza; he devalued the local coinage, causing great losses to the people, but bringing great profits to himself; he sought to enlarge his ‘magnificence and dominion’ by creating ‘out of pomp and ambition’ a permanent escort of 500 armed men, by procuring the bishopric for his brother and by seeking to add Mantua and Reggio to his lordship.

This is a model analysis of the problems that attended lords as they handled the demands, opportunities and temptations of power. Each of Giberto’s ‘failings’ can be paralleled elsewhere. The vital importance of a regional alliance, in both creating and destroying signorie, was shown in the Guelf coalition’s installation and support of Obizzo d’Este in Ferrara, by the mutual support of Bonacolsi and della Scala in advancing their power, and by the collapse of Matteo Visconti’s position in Milan in 1302. The need for liberality was usually well recognised by signori, in contrast to Giberto da Gente, who in response to courtiers’ requests would send them away with an insulting shilling to buy figs. Azzo d’Este was recalled as ‘a liberal man whom it greatly shamed not to offer whatever was asked for’, while Gerardo da Camino’s liberality too was legendary.13 Giberto’s desire for new palaces in city and contado mirrored that of

13 Riccobaldus, Historia imperatorum, col. 135.
most lords: Napo della Torre, newly made ‘podestà and lord’ of Lodi, had a
castle built there at the commune’s expense (1270); in 1308 Guido Bonacolsi
admitted to the general council of Mantua that he had used public funds to
build his private palace; Alberto Scotti built a castle at Olubra in the Piacentino.
Similarly, complaint of lords’ abuse of justice was frequent, though always
couched in the same cliché of convicting the innocent, while sparing the guilty.
Alberto Scotti was accused by one chronicler of executing three brothers for a
murder that only one had committed, of consigning two captives from Lodi to
their enemies who strangled them out of personal revenge, of hanging a friar
for betraying a castle, and of executing another man for a crime he could not
have committed. However, to set against partisan complaint of this sort, we
should note that ensuring justice became an essential claim of signorial rule:
when Bardellone Bonacolsi seized power from his father in 1291, he had ‘a
banner of justice’ made, white with an image of St Peter, with which he was
invested in the general council, ‘so that he could securely maintain every citizen
in good justice’; a novella preserves the image of Guido Bonacolsi being merci-
ful to a pair of criminals. Like Giberto da Gente, other lords also took fat
salaries as podestà or captain: according to the Chronicon parmense, Giberto’s was
four times the usual £500; Martino della Torre took £4,600 as podestà of Como
in 1269, in place of his predecessor’s £1,000; Guglielmo di Monferrato’s salary
as ‘lord’ of Milan in 1278–83 was £10,000 a year; Guido Bonacolsi received
£4,000 as captain of Mantua. Sometimes salaries were even continued after
the attached office had expired: both Azzo and Obizzo II d’Este received a
salary of £3,000, which was originally Azzo’s salary as podestà. Few lords,
however, followed Giberto da Gente’s example in being so soon elected hered-
itary lord. More usually the achievement of heritability was slow and piece-
meal, following periods when sons or brothers were associated in power with
the lord. Local elites could resist the hereditary transmission of power by the
signori: when Matteo Visconti appointed his son as captain of the popolo in 1298,
he was deserted by all his friends and four years later was forced to resign
power. Even in Ferrara it was only in 1292 that the Este lord took the right to
designate his successor. Likewise, Giberto’s manipulation of the coinage
seems to be unparalleled elsewhere; however, destructive economic policies
have also been alleged against other signori, especially Azzo d’Este, who allowed
Venice to stifle Ferrara’s two annual fairs in return for Venetian military and
political aid in 1240; but this is an area where hard evidence is difficult to come
by, and we should note that lords also acted to relieve poverty and hardship:
ensuring grain supplies at times of shortage, mounting public works – for
example, water supplies – giving privileges to monasteries specifically in
recognition of their alms-giving. Giberto was, on the contrary, typical of other
lords in his armed guard, his acquisition of important benefices for kinsmen
and his designs on other cities. In Mantua, Pinamonte Bonacolsi created the *signori di notte* in 1274 to secure the city, while following Bardellone’s seizure of power in 1291 a corps of 2,000 was immediately formed under the insignia of St Peter; one of Alberto della Scala’s early acts was the creation of an armed guard (though with reason, as his brother had just been assassinated); in Ferrara, a special force of 100 knights and 800 foot was created and all were to wear the Este emblem of a white eagle. The exclusive function of such forces was to suppress any disorders which threatened the new regime. Finally, as for territorial ambitions, Giberto was not the only lord to pursue these too soon, with an insufficient base of local support. Azzo VIII d’Este’s belligerent impulse to dominate Lombardy only united all Lombardy against him and cut away the gains of earlier expansion; Alberto Scotti’s triumphal intervention in Milan in 1302 provoked a reaction which turned him out of the lordship of Piacenza.

Only one feature of Giberto da Gente’s brief tenure of power remains to be discussed. It was not mentioned by Salimbene, who presents Giberto as inspiring only envy or hatred, but it was noted by the anonymous *Chronicon parmense*. This additional feature was fear: ‘the *pars ecclesiae* feared him to death and no more than two or three dared speak together at the same time’. The necessary ability to inspire fear links all the *signori* from Ezzelino on. Pinamonte Bonacolsi was said to be ‘feared like the devil’; Taddeo di Pietrarubbia, one of the Montefeltro, reduced all to silence by his presence. Whereas the art of public speaking was the quality most prized in communal *podestà*, the advent of *signoria* was marked by silence. Fear was inspired by silencing enemies and malcontents by whatever means necessary. Martino della Torre’s rival as lord of the Milanese *popolo* was stabbed fatally in a tumult; Jacopo da Fano, who had slighted Obizzo d’Este’s parentage, was quietly done away with by an assassin on the road to Padua; Guglielmo da Monferrato’s agents killed the bishop of Tortona when he refused to surrender his castles. The force of such examples was strengthened by measures banning public or private assemblies, any form of contact with political exiles, criticism of the regime, even the mention of faction-names.

But, in addition to fear, lords needed the ‘love’ of partisans, the reputation for liberality and justice, the assurance of armed guards, the revenues of office or conquest. Many of these elements can be found in the della Torre lordship of Milan and its neighbouring cities. When Martino della Torre was appointed *podestà* of Como for five years in 1259, the ‘partisan’ judgements of the previous *podestà* were reversed, while Martino’s own repressive powers were strengthened: he was to have twice the number of constables as his predecessor; he was

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14 *Chronicon parmense*, p. 20.
to have the *arbitrium* to take hostages and was not to have his term of office subjected to the usual review. Here, of course, lay the seeds of future claims of injustice. In Milan, the brief della Torre *signoria* (1259–77) collapsed, like that of Giberto da Gente, because the civic tensions and discontents excited by their internal policies weakened their ability to resist a coalition of exiles and hostile powers. Their preference for hiring mercenaries had increased the tax burden (a tax riot was bloodily put down); the della Torre and their friends extracted lands for themselves and benefices for their creatures from Milanese churches; territory was lost (Brescia, Lodi, Como), as were important noble supporters (the da Castiglione: their similar defection from Matteo Visconti presaged his downfall in 1302). Meanwhile, military and political pressure from the exiled archbishop, Ottone Visconti, who had papal support, forced the della Torre into the pro-imperial camp and out of their leadership of the Guelph alliance in north Italy. Surrounded by enemies and forced to make expulsions, the della Torre lost support: betrayed by the inhabitants of Desio, they were defeated in battle and found the gates of the city closed against them.

The Visconti who replaced the della Torre, first Archbishop Ottone, then Matteo, succeeded until the turn of the century in avoiding the conjuncture that had brought down the della Torre. Galvano Flamma's description of Matteo’s rule is worth examining:

> He behaved very virtuously, for he was of such chasteness and honesty that his whole court seemed to be composed of religious men. He most devotedly heard masses, dressed the priest with his own hands, made his *domicelli* and other members of his household (*familia*) confess every Lent; otherwise he would punish them heavily. He gladly listened to the nobles of Milan, whose advice he did not contradict. He preserved the properties of the commune, keeping nothing for himself. He never spilled anyone's blood. He distributed the lordships of towns and villages among the nobles, changing them every year. At length, he incited all the nobles in his love.¹⁵

The description is, of course, eulogistic and didactic, as full of good examples to follow as descriptions of Ezzelino were of bad examples to shun, and it stands in many ways in opposition to Salimbene’s depiction of Giberto da Gente. The stress is on love, not fear or hatred, on respect and concern for the spiritual welfare and temporal interests of others, not on self-advancement. As such, it is a reminder, as Machiavelli later stressed, that fear was not enough to command prolonged authority.

Flamma also usefully focuses on three other aspects: the Church, the nobility and the court. *Signori*, great and small, exploited the resources of the Church in lands, jurisdictions, offices and authority. In this, of course, they were only following an established aristocratic pattern. Cathedral chapters were com-

monly dominated by canons from the local ruling class; tithes were held by aristocrats; monasteries were subject to secular threats and violence at times of abbatial elections. When fra Filippo Boschetti, from one of the leading families of Modena, was elected bishop there, Salimbene commented that many friars became bishop ‘more thanks to their relatives by blood and marriage, than to their order’. Nor were clerics passive recipients of such help, for they joined their relatives in their faction fights: one of the factions in Reggio in the 1280s included three aristocratic clerics, one of whom was attacked in his monastery by his secular enemies in 1286; and Bishop Ugolino di Montefeltro stood solidly with his kin against papal attack in the 1240s. It is also Salimbene who gives us a memorable portrait of a secular, aristocratic bishop, Guglielmo Fogliani, from one of Reggio’s most powerful families:

He was a greedy man, unlettered and almost a layman . . . He wanted to live and eat splendidly every day . . . he often held great banquets for the rich and for his relatives, but to the poor he closed off his piety . . . He was a fat man, dull and rough; he had few who spoke well of him. Wherever he could plunder, he plundered. He assembled a great treasure, which near to death he dispersed and gave to his nephews. It would have been better for him had he been a swineherd or a leper.17

Signori continued to act in much the same way; the only difference was in the scale and continuity of the profits taken, more or less forcibly, from the Church. Alberto della Scala appointed his illegitimate son, Giuseppe (‘deformed in his whole body and worse in mind’, according to Dante), to the abbacy of San Zeno. This followed Alberto’s use of threats against the former abbot to obtain a grant of lands to Alberto’s ally, Pinamonte Bonacolsi. The della Scala also extracted huge lands for themselves from Veronese churches: in 1290, for example, Alberto was invested with all of San Zeno’s property at Ostiglia. At Ravenna Lamberto da Polenta held a lease of a monastery’s property for only 1d per year. The great monasteries of Pomposa and Vangadizza transferred large parts of their estates into the protection of the Estensi, who also profited from a stream of papal appointments to benefices at their request. According to Ottone Visconti’s vicar in the archbishopric of Milan, the della Torre were trying to install their creatures in every benefice and their fixers were at work in the chapter; but once in power in Milan, the Visconti pursued the same policy, acquiring canonries, bishoprics and Church administrative posts throughout their territories.

However, the Church, though vulnerable in its individual parts, was too powerful as an enemy. Ezzelino feared the friars more than any others, according to Rolandino, ‘because they come and go freely on their business on account of their poverty’; their mobility and the non-local nature of their

organisation presented insuperable problems of control. Uberto Pallavicino was similarly hostile to such vehicles of Guelf subversion: against the tide of flagellant processions that arose in northern Italy in 1260, he raised gallows along the Po as a warning; as lord of Milan he expelled the inquisitor; as lord of Piacenza he was soon in conflict with the local church and, when the bishop abandoned the city, Uberto installed his own vicar in the episcopal palace. ‘Ghibelline’ regimes such as his were fatally weakened by the decisive victory of Charles of Anjou over Manfred in 1266 and by militant preaching campaigns mounted against them. In 1267 papal envoys, under the guise of negotiating ‘peace’, forced him out of his lordships: according to Salimbene, Uberto ‘marvelled at how a priest could expel him with bland words’. Other lords were more careful to accord honour and respect to the Church, more wary of the power of its words; though this attitude too could help strengthen signorial power. Lords were alive to new devotions and foci of worship: it was under Gerardo da Camino that formal veneration began in Treviso of the ‘popular saint’, fra Parisio; the Bonacolsi attributed victory over their enemies in 1309 to the Blood of Christ, which had begun performing miracles in the church of S. Andrea ten years earlier. Lords also attached themselves to the new Mendicant Orders (again following good aristocratic precedent earlier in the century). Members of signorial families rose to prominent positions within the orders, for example, fra Filippo Bonacolsi, who became inquisitor for Lombardy and was elected bishop of Trent. Lords transferred their burial places from rural monasteries to urban friaries. They would sponsor provincial chapters (Obizzo d’Este, 1287), grant central sites for new mendicant churches (Ubertino Landi, 1278), surround themselves with friars at their deathbeds (Alberto della Scala, 1301) and provide in their wills the funds for the construction of new houses. The motive for such attention was, of course, to appear (or to become) patrons of the local mendicants, who had acquired impressive resources, through their amassed properties, through their role as trustees and ‘guardians of the poor’ and through preaching, confession and the Inquisition. The new concentration of power in the hands of signori also gave the Church a surer instrument in the fight against heresy, especially in cities which had failed to support repression in the past: it was to the della Scala that Veronese chronicles gave the credit for the arrest and execution of 166 heretics from Sirmione in 1277–8; in Ferrara it was Azzo VIII d’Este who in 1301 dispersed a popular disturbance that followed the Inquisition’s exhumation and burning of the body of Armanno Pungilupi, held by many citizens to be a saint and not a heretic.

Flamma’s description of the rule of Matteo Visconti in Milan also draws attention to the nobility and the court. Most lordships were created by noble

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factions and had an early history that was overtly partisan. Where lords came as arbiters, rivals might be allowed to remain: when Martino della Torre was created podestà of Como in 1259, the power of the Vittani family was bolstered, while that of their rivals was pruned. But usually the victory of one faction meant the removal of their rivals – either into custody (Salinguerra Torelli, 1240), or to hostile presence in contado castles (Ubertino Landi in the Piacentino, the conti di Casaloldo in the Mantovano) or to exiled dependency on great lords (the Gaffari of Mantua stayed with the Estensi, Buoso da Dovara with the della Scala). Often the losers were never able to return to their cities of origin: Lodovico da Sambonifacio died in a borrowed house in Reggio in 1283, Galvano Gaffari died fighting for the Estensi in 1309, Giberto da Gente died in far-away Ancona in 1270. Many families from the losing side simply disappear from the historical record. Signori issued long streams of prohibitions on any form of contact with exiles and only slowly removed penalties against them. Along with the removal of one faction went alliance with another. At Modena, the Rangoni, who remained the city’s first family for centuries to come, gave the lordship to Obizzo d’Este in return for an Este bride for Tobia Rangoni and a confirmation of all expulsions. When an impediment was discovered to the marriage, the Pope acceded to suggestions that serious disorders would result if the marriage were dissolved because the Rangoni were so powerful in Modena and had so many friends and supporters. Allies as powerful as this were, of course, liable to be thrown over, as Obizzo d’Este had earlier expelled his original sponsors and patrons in Ferrara, the da Fontana family.

But the advent of lordship transformed the structure of the ruling class not just by expulsions and dispossession, nor just by the redistribution of confiscated property to supporters and associates, but also by the gradual construction of a court, drawing its personnel more widely from the aristocracy of the region, and of an administrative staff or salariat, composed of specialists (lawyers, judges, military captains, financiers). Much of this development lies outside our period, but the lines of evolution can be seen already in, for example, the numbers of lawyers to be found in attendance on signori and the growing frequency of special ‘courts’ (i.e. festivities) to celebrate marriages, peace treaties or the visit of foreign dignitaries. The eye of contemporary chroniclers was caught by the scale and colour of these occasions: the lavish receptions, the display of precious objects and clothes, the jousting and touring, the gift-giving and dancing, the creation of knights. Though there are imperial and communal examples from the first half of the thirteenth century, one of the earliest of these signorial courts was that held by Francesco della Torre in 1266 on his return from Apulia, where he had been knighted by Charles of Anjou, at which Francesco in turn ‘girded with the chivalric belt
many knights of Lombardy’. A court held in Parma in 1282, on the feast of the Assumption of the Virgin, lasted almost two months and witnessed the knighting of members of the Rossi family. In a court held on All Saints’ Day, 1294, Azzo VIII d’Este knighted fifty-two nobles from across northern Italy, giving two garments to each. When Matteo Visconti married Azzo’s sister, another court was held outside Modena, with tents along the river and a wooden dancehall. The significant association of important religious festivals or occasions with the regeneration of the corps of knights, often by a lord himself newly knighted, shows the vitality of the knightly ideals among the signorial aristocracy.

Lords, then, had many sources of power and authority to draw on and exploit: they were pacifiers; they organised civic defences; they held communal office; they had the wider support of regional factions; they built castles and palaces on a grand scale; they had armed escorts who displayed their insignia; they associated with powerful and popular religious orders and trends; they used their revenues and confiscated exiles’ estates to reward supporters and to project an image of liberality; they tried to identify with justice and to act as if above vendetta; they kept their own hands free of the stain of bloodshed; they were knights or counts, with sufficient chivalric standing to create knights. But the titles they adopted – ‘captain’, ‘lord’, ‘governor’, ‘rector’ – expressed only a general idea of authority to command. They contrast with the precise definition of the powers and responsibilities of officials to be found in communal statutes. So what was understood by the term ‘captain’ or ‘lord’? Insight is provided in the records of an early fourteenth-century legal action in Treviso. The case concerned the right of the Avogari family to levy tolls at one of the city gates, and in the course of the trial light was trained on the nature of the power of Gerardo da Camino, ‘captain’ of Treviso from 1283 to 1306, by whose grant, it was alleged, the Avogari held their toll. When asked what was understood by the office of captain, witnesses replied: ‘to be a lord in acting and doing, and administering the city . . . according to his will’; ‘he is said to be captain who has [the power] to command his subjects’; ‘to be captain is to do and act, regarding the city and its district, according to the pleasure of his will’.19 Asked about the specific content of such power, witnesses mentioned interpreting the statutes according to the lord’s will; the expulsion of the rival faction (variously numbered fifty or one hundred); using arbitrium to absolve those convicted of serious crime and to convict innocents against the law; imposing direct taxes (collectas); taking the goods of subjects, whether justly or unjustly; issuing orders to whomever he liked. ‘He ruled as a man who could do what he wanted.’ We must be careful with such evidence: the statements are ex

19 Picotti (1905), pp. 307–12.
parte, calculated to prove a point in a legal contest, and we should note that the defendants objected to these witnesses. Nevertheless, their testimony does provide evidence for what was thought to be the content of ‘captaincy’: essentially, *arbitrium* in applying statute law, in administering justice, in issuing orders. That the essence of city-lordship was the power to give orders, to whomever the lord wished, is well illustrated at Verona, where the only surviving letter of Mastino della Scala is one of command to a local official. Similarly, when Obizzo d’Este was created lord of Ferrara and granted *arbitrium* by a public assembly, the chronicler Riccobaldo commented that more power was given to the new lord than everlasting God possessed, for God can do no wrong. The creation of such arbitrary power of course undid the constitution of the commune, but it was not only in *signorie* that this happened: republics too made use of extraordinary powers, created emergency commissions to deal with threats to the regime or to public order. The difference was that in republics such powers were temporary and oligarchic, in lordships permanent and dynastic.

Further evidence of the extent of lordly *arbitrium* is provided by the document recording the creation of Guido Bonacolsi as ‘captain-general of the city and commune of Mantua’, and by the subsequent Bonacolsi statutes of 1303. The former gave Guido free and undiluted *imperium*, jurisdiction, dominion, power, signory and free *arbitrium* . . . such that he can impose bans, absolve and convict . . ., make war, enter truces, concords and peace, acquire friends, contract alliances, receive and rehabilitate exiles, appoint, install, dismiss, acquit and convict the *podestà*, rectors, judges, assessors and all other officials and administrators, grant or remove their salaries, convene councils and assemblies (such that no councils, assemblies or meetings may be held without his special licence . . .), issue, interpret and clarify statutes, and do all other things that pertain to the utility of the commune and men of Mantua.20

The statutes add extensive details to such powers: the *signori* had the *arbitrium* to decide penalties for specific crimes (especially for political crimes such as having contact with exiles, defaming the Bonacolsi by word or deed, brawling near their house); the Bonacolsi family, household, counsellors and officials were allowed to carry weapons, which was denied to all others without licence; the *signori di notte*, whose office was ‘to maintain and preserve’ the Bonacolsi, were to arrest all those whom they found abroad at night ‘who seem to them, at their *arbitrium*, should be detained’; the properties of all political exiles were devolved to the Bonacolsi; although all the usual public offices were to be filled by election by lot, the Bonacolsi were to appoint a committee of ‘friends’ to vet those elected for suspects and enemies, with the power to remove them. In

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reserving specifically to their own discretion the key matters of judicial penalties, political offences and office holding, while also swelling their own resources with the inflow of exiles’ properties, the Bonacolsi, like all other lords, grasped the twin levers of reward and punishment.

But the exercise of such power weighed heavily on lords’ consciences. The death-bed memory of seizures, confiscations and extortions demanded recompense and lords often made lavish provision in their wills for the restitution of *male ablata* (extortions). Sometimes lords sought blanket forgiveness for such sins by making gifts to the mendicants, as symbols and relievers of poverty: thus, Giberto da Gente assigned revenues from some of his lands to the friars of Parma; Alberto della Scala distributed £10,000 to various convents; Obizzo II d’Este ordered the construction of a religious house for fifty Franciscan friars outside Rovigo, on the road ‘on the other side of which is our demesne vineyard’. But lords could also be very specific: in 1278 Mastino della Scala’s widow gave £100 to the friars of S. Eufemia, Verona, to distribute to Ferraresi injured by Mastino; Pinamonte Bonacolsi’s son, Corrado, in 1281 listed in detail thefts and acts of violence that he had committed – stealing oxen, cattle, grapes and millet from fields, burning a shed, taking money given by the commune of Mantua to the men of a village, receiving money from the commune to guard the walls but failing to do so, exploiting his position by exercising undue pressure on communal officials from whom he extracted money.

And the scale of some restitutions proves the depth of remorse: in 1301 the executors of Obizzo d’Este’s will paid part of the huge sum of £100,000 (about 10,000 florins) due to the Turchi family as *male ablata*.

And after death, what could these lords expect? Salimbene presents some *signori* as proudly resisting to the last the urgings from friars to repent. Dante put the most prominent lords in Hell: Ezzelino da Romano and Obizzo d’Este together as examples of modern tyranny, Buoso da Dovara among the traitors to their country, Guido da Montefeltro among the counsellors of evil and Guglielmo di Monferrato among the negligent princes. And, despite the best efforts of the *signori* themselves, they have been remembered, not for their illustrious achievements, but for their cruelties. In a historiographic tradition dominated by their critics, they have been collectively vilified as ‘despots’. But given the disordered state of the Italian communes for most of the thirteenth century, one might agree with the later Italian proverb, regarding the need for sharp instruments to remove pests: *Gatta inguantata mal piglia sorci* (a cat with gloves on can hardly catch mice).21

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IN the thirteenth century, Florence emerged as the leading commercial and banking centre of western Europe. At the same time, there evolved in it — under the impact of factional conflict and attempts to restrain the violence this unleashed — a distinctive political system which enabled a dominant mercantile aristocracy to exercise power with the collaboration of artisans, shopkeepers and less distinguished merchant families. In the closing decades of this period, out of the vitality and intensity of the city’s economic and political life, a culture grew which was not to attain full expression till the opening years of the following century, but which nevertheless reflected the social and ideological climate that had come to prevail there by 1300.

The ascendancy which Florence established in finance, trade and manufacture was closely linked with the pursuit of policies that opened to its merchants the lucrative fields of papal banking and of tax collecting and moneylending in the Neapolitan and English monarchies, as well as of commerce in France and Flanders, in conditions made more favourable by the political orientation of its government. There were therefore connections between economic developments, internal factional conflicts, the wider Italian confrontation between popes and emperors and more immediate relations with neighbouring communes. Issues of domestic and foreign policy were intertwined, the pursuit of wealth bringing with it power, and political success in turn yielding financial benefits.

By the beginning of the thirteenth century, Florence was about to displace Pisa as the leading city in Tuscany. Between 1172 and 1175, a new circuit of walls had been built¹ and soon, beyond these, new borghi were rising to accommodate a rapidly increasing population.² Political authority still lay, however, in the hands of a restricted urban aristocracy, the members of which served as

'consuls' in the civic administration and formed 'tower societies', joining families to each other in sworn associations and providing for the erection of commonly owned defensive towers that dominated the town's skyline. In 1177, the group of clans then in power had been challenged by the Uberti and their allies in civic disturbances that foreshadowed the feuds of the following century. From about 1200 onwards, the efforts made to integrate the Florentine _contado_ brought it into conflict not merely with rural nobles, such as the Alberti, but also with Siena and Pistoia. As its zone of influence extended into the Val d'Elsa with the taking and demolition of Semifonte (1202), friction arose between the Florentines and the Sienese over the claims each made for a dominant position in this valley. The acquisition of Capraia on the Arno (1204), and the seizure of Montemurlo by Florence's ally, Count Guido Guerra (1207), also provoked hostilities with Pistoia.

These boundary disputes, occasioned by the encroachment of Florentine power into areas which other cities considered their preserves, did not, however, give rise to a wider confrontation between opposing coalitions at this stage. The imperial throne was now occupied by Otto of Brunswick, a Welf (or, as the Italians were later to corrupt it, a Guelph) and the papal one by Innocent III who was supporting Frederick, the infant son of the late Henry VI of the Hohenstaufen or Waibling (that is, Ghibelline) party. It was not until Innocent had died that the conflict between his successors and his former _protégé_ who had come of age and assumed the title of Frederick II came to divide the communes of northern and central Italy and the factions within them into broadly pro-papal Guelph and broadly pro-imperial Ghibelline blocs. But before this had happened, the dissensions which had emerged in 1177 between the Uberti and their enemies had erupted again in Florence and, by hardening the divisions between the two groups of noble families engaged in this conflict, paved the way for the extension into the city of the struggle between the two dominant parties in the Italian peninsula. The chroniclers attributed the recurrence of this feud to an episode which soon assumed legendary significance: a quarrel which had arisen at an aristocratic banquet at Campi near Florence was resolved by a proposed marriage alliance between the Buondelmonti and the Amidei. The subsequent decision of the prospective bridegroom, Buondelmonte dei Buondelmonti, to break his promise to wed the daughter of Lambertuccio Amidei and instead to choose as his wife a more attractive woman from the Donati family led (it is said) to his murder on Easter Sunday 1216 by the outraged kinsmen of the repudiated girl and their support-

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3 Davidsohn (1956–68), 1, pp. 822–4, 996–8. 4 Santini (1887); Niccolai (1940).
6 The pseudo-Brunetto Latini chronicle (Villari (1893), pp. 549–51) is the source for this, but it is elaborated by later writers, particularly Villani, _Cronica_, ed. Dragomanni, Book v, chs. 38–9.
ers. This killing unleashed a cycle of violence between the two groups, later to be known as the Guelf and Ghibelline factions. Because of their earlier loyalty to the Hohenstaufen dynasty, the Uberti and their allies – the Lamberti, Fifanti, Amidei and Gangalandi – adhered to the latter, while the Buondelmonti, Donati and their close associates came to be identified with the former.\footnote{Davidsohn (1956–68), i, pp. 822, 888–9.}

The incident which provoked the civic disturbances of 1216, though later seen as the initial act of the internecine conflict that was to plague Florence for the ensuing half-century, was in fact no more than a manifestation of a pre-existing rivalry between two close-knit combinations of families. The hostility between these was the natural outgrowth of an ethos in which the need for mutual protection led to alliances between aristocratic consorzerie (or ‘tower societies’) and in which the application of the vendetta principle produced outbursts of fighting whenever any member of such coalitions of noble houses was offended or injured. (For the use of the term vendetta as a synonym for the blood-feud, see the previous chapter, p. 467.) The climate of violence engendered by the resulting feuds was further intensified by the persistence of wars against neighbouring communes, in which citizen levies were used as troops, those from leading families usually making up the city’s cavalry. In 1222, there were hostilities with Pisa, in 1228 with Pistoia and between 1229 and 1235 with Siena.\footnote{Davidsohn (1956–68), ii, pp. 122–31, 213–18, 234–52, 261–77, 287–93, 300–5.} Collaboration with Lucca and Genoa in campaigns against Pisa and the tendency for Florence’s enemies in Tuscany also to help each other against their common foe produced a pattern of alliances between two groups of powers which later came to be aligned with internal factions, as those who had lost out in domestic feuds sought refuge and support in communes opposed to the dominant regime in their own cities.

But this extension of civic discord into a general confrontation between parties, affecting whole regions of Italy, can be said to have occurred only when the antagonism between pope and emperor provided a focus and context for it. Originally, Frederick II had enjoyed reasonably good relations with the Church, during the pontificates of Innocent III and Honorius III. It was only after Gregory IX took over the Roman see that the opposition between the Hohenstaufen dynasty and the papacy once again came to dominate the politics of the peninsula. For a time, Florence remained relatively uninvolved, but after the victory of Frederick II over the Milanese at Cortenuova in 1237, the increasing interference of the imperial administration in Tuscan affairs drew the city into the conflict between it and the partisans of the Church. In 1238, after the Guelf podestà of Florence, Rubaconte di Mandello of Milan, was forced to surrender his position as a result of the acceptance by the commune...
of a more pro-Ghibelline stance, civic disturbances broke out in which the Giandonati and Donati who were opposed to the prevailing regime attacked the houses and towers of their enemies. In 1242, the Guelf Adimari clashed with the Ghibelline Bonfanti. The election of Innocent IV in 1243 and his condemnation of Frederick II at the Council of Lyons in 1245 encouraged the faction allied with the papacy to challenge the pro-imperial policy of the city’s government. The emperor’s reaction to this was to appoint his illegitimate son, Frederick of Antioch, as vicar-general of Tuscany and podestà of Florence. From 1246 when the latter took office, Florence passed securely into the Ghibelline fold and the Uberti family, under its head, Farinata, acquired a dominant position in it. A rising by the Guelfs against the party in power at the end of 1247 was unsuccessful and, at the beginning of the following year, the majority of the pro-papal nobility went into exile. After its departure, its enemies wreaked their revenge on its property, demolishing the houses and towers and confiscating the goods of those who had been declared rebels. This instituted a practice which was to be a feature of civic feuds for some time to come, creating a situation in which the victorious faction attempted to destroy the capacity of their opponents to recover their position, and the defeated one sought assistance from outside to regain its previous influence and authority.

While the polarisation of the Florentine aristocracy into two groups contending against each other for supremacy, with the support either of the pope or the emperor, had become the salient feature of the city’s politics by the end of the first half of the thirteenth century, other less well-documented developments were transforming the economic basis of its society. There was a rapid growth in population, fuelled by the expansion of commerce and industry and fed by immigration from the contado. As Plesner has shown, those who moved from the country to the town were not the poorest peasants, but no less often well-to-do proprietors who could continue to draw an income from land they owned in their original villages while setting themselves up as craftsmen or traders in their new urban community. Their influx into Florence therefore had the effect, later intensified by purchases of rural property by successful merchants, of making surplus wealth from the countryside available, in the form of rents, as capital for commercial enterprises. The need for larger sup-

plies of grain to feed the increasing population also strengthened the interest of the commune’s government and entrepreneurial class in the exploitation and extension of the contado, the resources of which came to form part of the underlying basis of the city’s wealth. It was, however, the expansion of trade, particularly that in woollen cloth, which was responsible for the remarkable economic growth in this period. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, Florence appears to have had only one merchant guild, the Arte della Calimala, made up of those who dealt in this commodity, though there were also some craft corporations. But, at least by 1212, a separate wool guild (Arte della Lana) and one of judges and notaries had been formed, while the Arte di Por Santa Maria, embracing the silk merchants, mercers and goldsmiths, emerged shortly afterwards in 1218. About the same time, the money-changers who had been active before this in transactions carried out by Florentines in foreign currencies also grouped themselves together in what was to become the Arte del Cambio. The establishment of these guilds reflected the growth and diversification of the city’s trade and manufacture. The concomitant rise in population, evidenced in the expansion of the borghi and the building of three new bridges over the Arno in addition to the pre-existing Ponte Vecchio, namely the Ponte alla Carraia in 1220, the Ponte Rubaconte in 1237 and the Ponte Santa Trinita in 1252, contributed to the transformation of the character of the civic community which the expansion of commerce and manufacture had set in train. From being a small town, dominated by an exclusive, clannish and combative aristocracy, Florence was turning into a city, considerable numbers of whose inhabitants, represented in the artisan and merchant corporations, were gaining in wealth and aspiring to a share of political power.

The framework within which these groups achieved political influence was that of the popolo, a term which included the master-craftsmen, shopkeepers and those members of the merchant class who did not belong to previously prominent families; the popolo owed its emergence as a significant force at this time partly to its growing importance in the urban economy and partly to the military organisation it acquired through its participation as infantry in the civic armies employed in the wars of the period. The Florentine sources, unlike those of Bologna, unfortunately throw little light on the formative stages of its development as a political entity. On the basis, however, of indications furnished by the history of the latter city and of other places such as Lucca, it

13 In the course of the thirteenth century, Florentine need for grain came to exceed what was available from the contado, and, at least from 1274, the commune appointed officials to arrange importation of it from Sicily, Provence, Naples, the Romagna, as well as from elsewhere in Tuscany (de la Roncière (1982), pp. 556, 571–2).
14 Santini (1903) pp. 57–8.
would appear likely that, in Florence as in comparable communes, there was a close link between the growth of the arti or guilds and of the armed companies within which members of the popolo were mustered when called to perform military service. In Bologna, which probably provided the model for the form of organisation of the popolo adopted elsewhere, the establishment of the società delle armi can be traced back at least to 1228. In Florence, however, it was not until 1244 that a clearly constituted popolo appears although the earlier emergence of the guilds and inclusion of the non-noble infantry in the civic army made it likely that a basis for it existed well before this.

What enabled this previously quiescent element in the city’s political life to begin to play a key role in it was the weakening of the Ghibelline ascendancy after the defeat of Frederick II in Parma in 1248. This provided the opportunity for an alliance between the recently exiled Guelfs and those parts of the population which had formerly been overawed by the nobility and kept in check by imperial officials distrustful of any movement towards greater popular participation in government. By 1250, opposition to the prevailing regime was building up from various quarters. The pope was attempting to set against it a clergy which, particularly since the Dominicans and Franciscans had gained a position of influence in Florence, had become an important force in shaping public opinion. The Guelfs, encouraged by the emperor’s reverses in northern Italy, rebelled in the Val d’Arno and the contado of Arezzo and, when Frederick of Antioch’s troops attempted to move against them, defeated them in a surprise attack at Figline. News of this setback precipitated a rising in Florence in September of that year, led by the armed formations of the popolo which saw in the destruction of the power of the Ghibelline aristocracy a means of curbing its intimidation of the rest of the citizenry and of bringing to an end the high taxes imposed by the imperial administration to finance Frederick II’s military campaigns.

As a result of the success of this revolt, the Guelfs were readmitted and a new constitution, generally known as that of the primo popolo, enacted the following October. This provided for the institution of the anziani, a committee of twelve which was to exercise executive authority, while the Council of Three Hundred and that of Ninety were created to approve legislation. The popolo was to be separately organised under its own captain, with twenty companies, known as gonfaloni (later reduced in number to nineteen and, in 1343, to sixteen) each from a different district of the city, acting as watch-dogs of the regime by protecting it and those of non-noble status from the violence of the feuding

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17 Fasoli (1933), pp. 3–26, and (1936), pp. 6–7; De Vergottini (1943), pp. 16–65, 78–95.
aristocracy. It was from this point forward that this now legally constituted body, excluding the ‘knights’ (or ‘magnates’ as they later came to be called) from membership in it, acquired increasing importance as an organ of the Florentine state, representing the merchant and artisan communities. As yet, however, it did not dominate the communal government as it was subsequently to do and, in the decade from 1250 to 1260, the returning Guelf faction was at least as significant a determinant of civil policy as the humbler elements within the popolo. The death of Frederick II at the end of 1250, and the revival of the league between Florence, Lucca and Genoa in 1252, following the conclusion of an alliance between Siena, Pistoia and Pisa, set the scene for a renewed struggle between the Guelfs and Ghibellines of Tuscany, fought now less as a conflict between the pope and the emperor and more as a contest between two opposed coalitions of cities. The renewal of internal tensions led to the withdrawal of some Ghibellines from Florence in 1251, and the expulsion of many more in 1258. From the restoration of a strong monarchical power in southern Italy under Frederick II’s illegitimate son Manfred in 1254, these exiles and the communes, such as Siena, in which they took refuge, looked increasingly to him as their defender. Their hopes were, in some measure, justified, for it was in part his intervention, in the form of the despatch of 800 cavalry under Count Giordano, which was to play a critical part in the victory by the Sienese over the Florentines at Montaperti in 1260. Following this rout, the Guelfs fled from Florence and the Ghibellines returned in triumph to it.

Under Guido Novello of the comital family of the Guidi and Farinata degli Uberti (the latter of whom is said to have dissuaded his partisans from destroying their city as Manfred had suggested), those who had lost power in 1250 now regained it. Banishing their enemies whose property was seized and whose houses were demolished, they re-established the authority of the old pro-imperial aristocracy and pursued a policy favourable to Siena, Pisa and the kingdom of Sicily. The expelled Guelfs who, 1264, were driven from their last Tuscan foothold in Lucca, could appeal for assistance only to the papacy. Clement IV, elected pope the following year, welcomed the adherence to his cause of a faction which, during the continued expansion of the Florentine economy in the 1250s, had come to include many banking families who were now given a privileged position as collectors of papal taxes and asked to put their resources at the service of those who, at Clement’s urging, could challenge the position of

21 Villari (1893), pp. 184–9; Davidsohn (1896–1908), iv, pp. 100–6.
24 For houses of Guelfs destroyed between 1260 and 1267, see Ildefonso di San Luigi (1770–89), vii, pp. 203–86, and on Ghibellines in power and Guelfs in exile at this time, Raveggi et al. (1978), pp. 3–72.
Manfred and the Hohenstaufen dynasty in southern Italy. It was in this way that close links were forged, that were to endure and become fundamental to the prevailing order in Florence after 1267, between the papacy, the house of Anjou, the city’s Guelf party and its merchant companies. Whilst the political situation between 1265 and 1267 provided the catalyst for the creation of this community of interest, the basis on which it rested was the outgrowth of earlier developments. The accumulation of capital by Florentine commercial enterprises and the establishment of a viable currency for international trade through the minting of the silver grosso in 1236 and of the gold florin in 1252 had opened up new opportunities for gain through moneylending. In the 1250s when Pope Alexander IV had encouraged the candidature for the imperial throne of Richard of Cornwall, the brother of Henry III of England, Florentine bankers had made loans to facilitate his election and the attempt to secure for Henry’s son, Edmund, the throne of Sicily, thereby obtaining access to financial markets in the English dominions in Britain and France. Later, after the return of the Ghibellines to Florence in 1260, Urban IV had put pressure on its merchant companies, such as those of the Spini, Scala and the Spigliati branch of the Mozzi, which had earlier been involved in these transactions, to repudiate their allegiance to Manfred and instead swear loyalty to the Church in formal acts of submission in August and December 1263. These precedents prepared the way – in 1265 when Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX of France, had been induced to lead an army into Italy as the pope’s champion who was to dislodge the Hohenstaufen from the southern half of the peninsula – for a close co-operation between him, the exiled Guelf faction from Florence and those of the city’s merchant-financiers who, on the strength of guarantees of repayment of their loans from papal revenues, advanced money to pay for this expedition.

Charles’s victory over Manfred the following year at Benevento, which delivered the kingdom of Sicily to him, also enabled the Florentine bankers who had helped to underwrite the cost of his conquest to receive favoured treatment in access to monopolies and tax collection in his newly acquired dominions. The Guelf knights from Tuscany who had fought for him in this battle were likewise assured of his support in their efforts to regain power in the commune from which they had been exiled. The Ghibelline regime in Florence tried to minimise the effects of Manfred’s defeat and death by seeking a reconciliation with the pope and, under popular pressure, created a new magistracy of the thirty-six which included some former Guelfs who had not been banished. Friction between this council and those who had until then controlled

the government then provoked a rising that led Guido Novello and his partisans imprudently to withdraw from the city. After the return of the Guelfs to it, a tentative attempt was made to reconcile the factions, but it was frustrated when Clement IV appointed Charles of Anjou as *pacificus generalis* or ‘general peace-maker’ in Tuscany and when this ruler sent a detachment of French cavalry to Florence. As it approached, the remaining Ghibellines fled.

Following the entry of the Angevin troops at Easter 1267, the Guelfs re-established the predominance they had enjoyed before 1260. Charles of Anjou became, in effect, overlord of Florence, nominally holding the office of *podestà* and delegating his powers to his vicars. In the form of government established by this secondo popolo, the institutions created in 1250 were revived and a special council of one hundred Guelf *popolani* added to them. The officials of the major guilds which, by this time, included those of the physicians and apothecaries (*medici e speziali*) and of the furriers and leather merchants (*pellicciai*), as well as the five which had emerged by the early thirteenth century, were also conceded a part in the legislative process. Owing to the influence of Charles of Anjou, the tendency towards popular rule which these constitutional provisions might otherwise have favoured was checked and the *parte guelfa*, made up of the *grandi* and *popolani grassi* among the former exiles, became a significant force in Florentine politics. A third of the property confiscated from those Ghibellines who were condemned and banished in 1268 was allocated to this society which rapidly established itself as the guardian of the interests of the Guelf aristocracy and the Angevin dynasty. The captain of the ‘Mass of the Guelf Party’ for a time took over the functions of the earlier captain of the *popolo*, an office that was temporarily suspended. An analysis of the most prominent political families of this period suggests that those in power during it were drawn partly from the old, pro-papal nobility and partly from elements of the newly enriched merchant class.

The unity of purpose between the Church, Charles of Anjou and the Florentine Guelfs – fundamental though it had been to the establishment of the new regime – did not long endure. From the election of Gregory X in 1271, it became an object of papal policy for a decade to contain Angevin influence in Italy by encouraging reconciliation between the opposed factions in its communes. In 1273, during the pope’s visit to Florence, peace was ceremonially made between the city’s Guelfs and Ghibellines in accordance with this planned pacification. But the veiled opposition to it of Charles of Anjou and his supporters and the limited nature of the concessions extended to those

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30 Davidsohn (1916–68), 11, pp. 806–84. 31 Villani, *Cronica*, ed. Dragomanni, Book vii, chs. 13, 16. 32 On the *parte guelfa*, see Dorini (1902); Caggese (1903); Bonaini (1878–80); Raveggi et al. (1978), pp. 91–6. 33 For a list of these, see Idefonso di San Luigi (1770–89), viii, pp. 221–81. 34 Raveggi et al. (1978), pp. 97–164.
until then in exile (who were to be readmitted only with that king’s consent) rendered this settlement largely inoperative. Despite this, Nicholas III, a member of the Orsini family who ascended the papal throne in 1277 and who was even more eager to bring to an end the ascendancy which Charles had acquired in Tuscany, continued with efforts to heal the rift between the two rival Florentine parties. In 1278, he induced the German king, Rudolf of Habsburg, to terminate the Angevin monarch’s tenure of the imperial vicariate in Tuscany (an extension of his previous office as ‘peace-maker’ there) and, in the following year, he sent Cardinal Latino to Florence to attempt to effect a reintegration of the Ghibellines in the political life of the city. This emissary’s task was made easier by the tensions which had appeared shortly before between the more extreme Guelfs such as the Donati and Adimari, who remained loyal to Charles of Anjou, and more moderate ones, including the della Tosa and Pazzi, who saw in the healing of earlier feuds a means of reducing their commune’s dependence on that ruler. In November 1279, he succeeded in persuading a parlamento, or public meeting of the citizens, to agree in principle to the conclusion of an agreement between the two factions and to allow him to act as an arbiter between them, in order to lay down the terms each should be asked to observe. On 18 January 1280, after a formal reconciliation between the Buondelmonti and Uberti, the families originally responsible for the conflict between the parties, Cardinal Latino stipulated the conditions for restoration of peace in the city. These included the provisions that, with the exception of fifty-five of their more prominent leaders, such as Guido Novello and some of the Uberti, Lamberti, Bologesi, Gangalandi, Amidei, Fifanti, Scolari, Caponsacchi and Uberti, the Ghibellines would be allowed to return to Florence, that a new executive committee of fourteen, representing both factions, be formed to exercise authority together with the Twelve Good Men (as the former anziani were now called) and that measures enacted by past regimes against their enemies be waived. On 18 February, fifty members of each of the previously opposed parties, acting on behalf of these, swore to accept the terms Cardinal Latino had proposed and symbolically healed the rift between them with a kiss of peace.

This solution to the city’s political problems, imposed on it by the pope and his legate for motives of their own, did not provide a lasting answer. The attempt to place the Guelfs and Ghibellines on an equal footing was not, in the long run, acceptable in a commune in which the former had enjoyed, and wanted to go on holding, a major share of power. In the immediate aftermath

of the settlement of 1280, members of the old Guelf aristocracy appear to have been well represented among the Fourteen. Later, however, popolani came to exercise more influence and the implementation of statutory provisions (according to Rubinstein, probably dating from 1280), requiring ‘magnates’ to post a surety of £2,000 as an earnest of good behaviour, was discussed in the consulte or council meetings. Subsequently, it was also decreed that the podestà be empowered to establish a militia of 1,000 men to preserve public order.

These developments, in 1281, foreshadowed the major reform of the following year, the creation of the priorate which was to become the principal executive committee of the Florentine state and which would endure till 1494. Its fundamental feature was that it represented the guilds which, with its establishment, acquired a central role in government. Its establishment can be seen to reflect the growing importance to the city’s economy and society of the commerce and industry in which those who belonged to these corporations engaged. But it is also explicable in terms of the need to find a substitute for the magistracy of the Fourteen, which would enable the Guelf predominance to be preserved and the essentially artificial efforts of 1280 to restore the Ghibellines to a minor share of power to be circumvented. In 1281, Nicholas III, the inspirer of the compromise of the previous year, had been replaced as pope by the pro-Angevin Frenchman Martin IV. In 1282, the rebellion of the Sicilian Vespers, by depriving Charles of Anjou of part of his kingdom, had produced alarm among his followers and reignited for them the threat of a possible Ghibelline revival. What had appeared in 1280 as an innocuous concession to a defeated faction therefore came to seem once again a potential danger to the prevailing regime. Recourse to the device of a civic council drawn from the guilds could allow those already in a politically dominant position to exercise their authority with less obstruction and, at the same time, by conferring on the merchants and craftsmen constituting the arti rights of election to it, make it possible both for men of leading families to attain office and for less eminent members of these associations to influence their selection.

That the priorate was initially a short-term expedient to meet a special contingency which rapidly acquired the status of a durable institution is evident from the first year of its history; such a transition from the temporary to the permanent was not unusual in the history of the Italian commune. To begin with, it was made up of merely three members from the Calimala, money-changers and wool guilds and held office simultaneously with the Fourteen. It

41 Davidsohn (1916–68), iii, pp. 237–8, 279–84; Compagni, Cronica, ed. del Lungo, Book 1, ch. 4; Salvemini (1899/1966), pp. 78–9; Ottokar (1926), pp. 12–16.
was only gradually that it replaced the latter committee (which was last elected in 1283). Its numbers, after its first two-month term, were increased to six, so as to enable it to represent the six wards (setti) of the city. Made up usually of members of the seven major guilds, it was chosen at this stage by officials from these and five artisan corporations, as well as by its previous incumbents, the special council of the captain of the popolo and co-opted representatives of the citizenry. The composition of the priorate in the first decade of its existence indicates that it was dominated by the five arti maggiori which had emerged early in the century and which, between them, accounted for an estimated 316 of 381 positions filled over this period. The families which most frequently occupied places in it were grandi, such as the Bardi, and popolani grassi, such as the Girolami, Altoviti and Acciaiuoli.

The order thus established confirmed the Guelf orientation of the commune at a time when the pope and the Angevin monarchy in Naples were once again working in consort. Because of its guild base, it also enabled economic wealth to be more readily translated into political power. The closing decades of the thirteenth century witnessed the displacement by the Florentine merchant companies of their main rivals in the field of international banking. The collapse of the Sienese Buonsignori and the Lucchese Ricciardi in the early 1290s enabled the Mozzi and Spini to become the principal moneylenders to the pope. At the same time, other Florentine families, such as the Scala, Frescobaldi, Peruzzi, Bardi, Cerchi and Franzesi, became prominent in trade and public finance in the kingdoms of England, France and Naples. The continuing growth of the city’s commercial economy increased the prestige and political influence of those most actively engaged in advancing it, to the point where they acquired a pre-eminent position in its society, often enhanced by their close contacts with the papacy and the Angevin monarchy which remained the main supports of its government.

The growth in power and population which this expansion brought also encouraged a policy aimed at the consolidation of Florentine hegemony in Tuscany. Following the Angevin conquest of southern Italy, the Sienese had, after their loss of the battle of Colle di Val d’Elsa in 1269, been forced to abandon their previous opposition to the Guelfs and, under the regime of the Nine, became firm allies of Florence. Only Arezzo and Pisa therefore stood in the way of the dominance over their region by the Florentines who, between

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1288 and 1293, fought wars against both these communes. After defeating the Aretines in 1289 at Campaldino, they initiated hostilities against the Pisans who, however, thanks to the able generalship of Guido da Montefeltro, successfully defended themselves and were able to make peace, without significant concessions, in 1293.\footnote{Davidsohn (1956–68), iii, pp. 452–535; Villani, Cronica, ed. Dragomann, Book vii, chs. 124, 127–8, 131–2, 138, 140, 148, 154, Book viii, ch. 2; Oerter (1968).}

As had happened previously in Florentine history, external armed conflict acted as a stimulant to internal dissensions, though now these took the form not of factional feuds but of clashes between unruly elements of the old aristocracy and the mass of the guild community. Already in 1286, the tendency to lawlessness on the part of some of the great families had led to a reassertion of the statutory requirement by which ‘magnates’ had to pay a surety, and to a renewal of attempts to enforce it.\footnote{Pampaloni (1971), pp. 410–12; Ottokar (1926), pp. 104–6; Salvemini (1899/1966), pp. 111–17; Lansing (1991), pp. 196–201.} These efforts to curb their resort to violence appear, however, to have been no more effective than earlier ones. Indeed, the fillip given to the ‘knights’ who fought in the civic army by the crucial part they had played in victories, such as that of Campaldino, encouraged some of them to try to use force to overawe the rest of the population. But while their overbearing attitude was, in all likelihood, one of the causes of the rise of a ‘popular’ movement at this time, the nature and extent of the unrest which manifested itself in 1292–3 indicate that it was also inspired by the need felt by previously subordinate sections of Florentine society, particularly those represented in the so-called ‘lesser’ or artisan and shopkeeper guilds, to acquire greater political influence. There has been considerable debate between historians as to the significance of the developments that culminated in the Ordinances of Justice of 1293. Salvemini saw them as the outgrowth of a conflict between a rising middle and lower middle class and an old, mainly landed, aristocracy of grandi.\footnote{Salvemini (1899/1966), particularly pp. 160–71.} Ottokar, on the other hand, explained them as a transient explosion of popular feeling which did not, in the long run, disturb the pre-eminence of a homogeneous ceto dirigente or ruling group.\footnote{Ottokar (1926), particularly pp. 90–128, 199–215.} More recently, Patrizia Parenti has argued that there was some broadening of participation in government and reaction to previous oligarchic tendencies as a result of the changes of 1293, although elements of the old elite retained some power after them.\footnote{In Raveggi et al. (1978), pp. 241–75; see also Lansing (1991).} It is common ground between these interpretations that there had been, from the late 1280s onwards, a growing prominence and militancy of those in the five ‘middle’ and nine ‘lesser’ guilds, due partly to dissatisfaction at the cost and lack of success of the war against Pisa, but that it
needed the leadership of the patrician, Giano della Bella, and the collaboration of some *popolani grassi* to secure sufficient support for the acceptance of the Ordinances of Justice.

These were enacted in January 1293 and the provisions contained in them extended by further decrees in the following April. In their initial form, they prescribed severe penalties against ‘magnates’ who assaulted or harmed *popolani*, stipulating that, if death resulted in such cases, the offender should be executed, his property confiscated and his house demolished. A militia of 1,000 men (later increased to 2,000), under the Gonfaloniere of Justice, the newly created president of the college of Priors, was to enable such sentences to be immediately carried out. By an amendment to the Ordinances of April 1293, *grandi* were to be excluded from the priorate and other important civic offices. All kinsmen of those required since 1287 to pay the surety demanded of ‘magnates’ were to be subject to this disqualification, as well as to the other provisions against the *grandi*. The number of guilds, from the members of which the Priors, Gonfaloniere of Justice and other councils of the *popolo* were to be chosen, was increased to twenty-one, with the inclusion of the nine ‘lesser’ guilds, and only those who were actively engaged in the professions or trades covered by the *arti* were granted eligibility for the exercise of these political rights.51

The rigorous form which the Ordinances assumed as a result of the provisions passed between January and April 1293 reflected the predominance at this period of a coalition of interests determined to remove from power the previously influential *grandi* whose ability to impose their will by the use of violence was also to be restricted. Underlying the shift in the political balance that allowed measures as radical as these to be enacted was the combination of the resolve of Giano della Bella and of the capacity of the *arti minori* and of the armed force of the *popolo* to exert pressure to extend the principle, which had applied to the priorate when it was created in 1282, that guild membership should be a pre-requisite for office bearing. The survival through 1293 and 1294 of the regime responsible for these changes led to some broadening of participation in government, so that even some of the nine ‘lesser’ guilds came to be represented among the Priors. Despite this, the majority of this college continued as a rule to be drawn from the *arti maggiori* and families which had previously been politically active.52 The long-term effects of the promulgation of the Ordinances were further modified by amendments made to them in 1295 after the recurrence of popular disturbances had resulted in the disgrace and departure from Florence of Giano della Bella. By provisions passed in July

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of that year, the designation of ‘magnate’ was restricted to those specifically listed as *grandi* in the statute of the *podestà* and the qualification of guild membership required for the exercise of full political rights extended to all those admitted to the *arti*, including those not practising the professions they covered. These changes in the Ordinances reflected yet another shift in the balance of power in the city, with many of the *popolani grassi* moving away from their previous alliance with the lesser guildsmen who lost much of their political influence when their principal supporter in the ruling class, Giano della Bella, was discredited because of his inability to handle a riot set off by a protest at an unpopular legal decision. That this decision had exonerated Corso Donati, the most turbulent of the ‘magnates’ who had assaulted his kinsman, Simone, and that such a clear violation of the spirit of the Ordinances should have remained unpunished, was itself an indication of the weakening of the position of those transiently in the ascendant since 1293, as was the fact that their attempt to have the verdict in this case reversed had resulted only in the fall of their leader.

Henceforth, a compromise came to prevail under which the Ordinances were retained but applied in practice in such a way that they did not disturb the pre-eminence of wealthy merchant families. The exclusion of the ‘magnates’ from the priorate created opportunities for the entry of the newly rich into the political class; but the tendency for the proportion of lesser guildsmen in it to increase was arrested after 1295. The tensions created by the events of 1293–4 remained, however, and were to resurface in the last of the Florentine feuds of the thirteenth century, that between the so-called ‘Blacks’ and ‘Whites’.

This has attracted considerable scholarly attention because of the involvement in it of the poet, Dante. Because it resulted in his exile, it has tended to be seen from his viewpoint and that of chroniclers sympathetic to his cause, such as Dino Compagni. Considered historically, however, its main consequence, by bringing into power many of those who might otherwise have tried to upset the political order created by the Ordinances of Justice, was to allow that order to survive in a modified form, thus stabilising Florentine politics in the early decades of the following century. Arising out of a conflict between a group of more moderate *grandi* and *popolani grassi* (which emerged as the ruling party in the city towards the end of the 1290s under the leadership of the ‘magnate’ banking family of the Cerchi) and the more intransigent faction under the Donati, it issued initially from one of those divisions in the governing elite inspired by personal antagonisms which had been responsible for earlier rifts in

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Florentine society.\textsuperscript{56} What complicated this feud was the support of the pope, Boniface VIII, for the Donati party. When, in the aftermath of a brawl between the young men of the two factions on 1 May 1300, leading protagonists of both sides were sent into exile, the Cerchi-dominated regime soon allowed its partisans to return to the city while continuing to keep its enemies outside it. At the same time, it intervened in the affairs of Pistoia where the Cancellieri family had split into ‘White’ and ‘Black’ branches, ferociously hostile to each other and, supporting the former, it drove the latter and its allies into banishment in 1301. The expelled members of the Donati party who came to be known as ‘Black’ Guelfs because they joined these Pistoian exiles in opposition to the Cerchi faction (who, also by association, were dubbed ‘Whites’) sought to recoup their fortunes through papal intervention. Led by Corso Donati, Pazzino dei Pazzi, Rosso della Tosa and by Boniface VIII’s banker, Geri Spini, they induced the pope first to offer to mediate to settle differences in the city and then, when the Florentine commune proved unresponsive to his pleas, to engineer their return to it. The instrument of their restoration to their previous position in Florence was to be a member of the French royal family, Charles of Valois, who had come to Italy with a detachment of troops intended to reinforce the army with which Charles II (who had succeeded Charles of Anjou as king of Naples in 1285) proposed to attack Sicily. After visiting the pope in Rome and making solemn assurances to the city’s government that he would not interfere in its internal affairs, this prince entered Florence on 1 November 1301, nominally as a peace-maker. Once it was militarily under control, however, he permitted Corso Donati and his partisans to break into it, open the prisons and seize power by force of arms. A new regime was rapidly established which, from then until early in the following year, condemned to death or exiled the members of the ‘White’ faction, including Dante Alighieri.\textsuperscript{57}

Despite the leading role among the ‘Black’ Guelfs of ‘magnates’ opposed to the Ordinances of Justice, the acceptance of these by the bulk of their supporters ensured that they were not repealed. Corso Donati, the central figure in his party, himself fell victim, in 1308, to his continued intrigues and he and his closest associates eventually lost the dominant position they had held in it.\textsuperscript{58} The political settlement which emerged in the wake of the events of 1301 came to reflect the ascendancy of the \textit{popolo grasso} rather than the \textit{grandi}. As oligarchic tendencies asserted themselves and the influence of the guilds in elec-

\textsuperscript{56} Raveggi \textit{et al.} (1978), pp. 307–9; Masi (1927) and (1930); Arias (1902), pp. 123–37; Davidsohn (1956–68), iv, pp. 31–144.


tions declined, an elite of leading families found itself able to maintain its position by means of the existing constitution and did not seek to change it. Because of the exclusion of Ghibellines, exiles, ‘magnates’ and those condemned for political or other offences, the regime remained, in effect, a factional one, but was not in itself rent by the kind of divisions which had reappeared regularly in the city from 1216 to 1301.

In Florence, as in other places in Italy at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the commune was beginning to assert its authority over the smaller, self-protective associations of consorzerie or of armed companies of the popolo which, based in particular neighbourhoods within the walls, had been sources of security and objects of loyalty in an earlier age. The sense of the unity of the city, as represented in the institutions that gave it a collective identity, was increasingly reflected, from the 1250s onwards, in a spate of public building. Some of this was in the form of palaces to house the new offices of the state, such as that of the popolo, later that of the podestà and now the Bargello, initiated in 1255, and that of the Priors, now the Palazzo Vecchio, projected in 1283 and begun in 1299. The decision, in 1284, to construct a new circuit of walls, enclosing a vastly increased area to accommodate the expected growth of Florence, was further testimony to civic pride and confidence in the future greatness of the city. The loggia of the grain market at Or San Michele of the same year and prisons, such as that of the Stinche, were other examples of communally funded structures that revealed the acceptance by the government of the need to provide facilities for the exercise of its functions or for other public purposes, as did new streets and the extension and opening out of piazzas. Religious institutions, as well as secular ones, benefited from the policy of endowing the city with buildings appropriate to its dignity. The Baptistery was faced with marble on the outside in the 1290s and its decoration with mosaics within continued from the 1270s onwards, while the replacement of the adjoining church of Santa Reparata by a new cathedral was approved in 1296. The erection for the Dominicans of a rebuilt Santa Maria Novella (from 1279 on) and for the Franciscans of a larger Santa Croce (from 1295) was supported financially by the commune, as was that of Santo Spirito (begun in 1267) for the Augustinians.

The provision of monumental structures such as these on a scale previously unknown in Florence represented one aspect of the burgeoning culture of the city. Another was the emergence of an intellectual tradition that was to shape a rich literature and later influence art of great vitality. The composition by the

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59 Najemy (1982), pp. 68–79.
notary Brunetto Latini of his *Trésor* (written in France in the language of that country during his exile there in the 1260s) set the tone for this by assimilating medieval scholastic and rhetorical ideas to the civic environment. Preachers, such as the Dominicans Remigio dei Girolami and, a little later, Giordano da Rivalto were subsequently also to try to make relevant to political and commercial experience the verities of theology and moral philosophy. But the main application to life in its most personal form of ideal conceptions of reality was made by the Florentine poets inspired by the *dolce stil nuovo*, in particular Guido Cavalcanti and Dante Alighieri. In their belief in natural nobility and virtue and in their view of love as a means to spiritual refinement and self-realisation, they appeared both to reflect and to react against the mercantile world which had produced them by making everything depend on the quality of soul of the individual, yet rejecting the value of mercenary pursuits. In their writings up to the 1290s and particularly in Dante’s *Vita nuova*, there is as yet no sense, as there was to be in his later *Divine Comedy*, of the strife and tragedy of recent Florentine history. Only in the opening decades of the fourteenth century, in that latter work, as in the chronicles of Dino Compagni and Giovanni Villani and in the dramatically conceived fresco cycles of Giotto, does the prevailing tension between a yearning for justice and order, and self-destructive violence, attain artistic expression. Yet, for all that, the tentative literary culture of the 1290s does set the terms for that which flourished after 1300, by deriving an understanding of the higher purpose of things from the experience of the real.

Around the year 1300, Florence can be said to have reached the end of a significant stage of its development. Its citizens, by their exploitation of the resources of its territory and of opportunities for commerce, created by enterprise and sometimes by shrewdly chosen alliances, had achieved pre-eminence in western Europe as merchants and financiers. In the evolution of its institutions, the convergence between economic and political power had enabled previously divisive tendencies to be held, for a time, in check. Moreover, as a result of the application of some of the energy, which had contributed to its success, to the justification and edification of the city and the great causes espoused by those in it, the foundations were being laid for a culture which was both rational and practical, impressive in its concrete monumentality, yet also subtle, critical and, if didactic, bold in the range and power of its ideas.

61 The literature on Florentine intellectual and literary culture in the late thirteenth century is too extensive for full coverage of it to be attempted here; but Holmes (1986), pp. 73–87, 103–27, and Davis (1984) may be cited as excellent recent studies in this field. On Brunetto Latini, see Ceva (1965) and Sundby (1884).
THE KINGDOM OF SICILY UNDER THE HOHENSTAUFEN AND ANGEVINS

David Abulafia

The Sicilian kingdom, encompassing also the south of Italy, contained a great variety of lands, with distinctive economic, ethnic, religious and political characters. It was not as heavily urbanised as parts of the Po valley or northern Tuscany, though it contained two of Europe’s largest cities, Palermo and Naples, the former of which had become the capital under the Norman kings (1130–94), while Naples increasingly acquired the role of capital in the course of the thirteenth century, and stood close by the once vibrant commercial centres of the Amalfi coast. Apulia, facing the Balkans, contained a line of cities which were not permitted by the Normans to achieve true autonomy, but which could trade the wine, grain and olive oil of the Apulian plains for produce of the east. Further inland cities such as Lucera performed valuable roles as centres of administration, and L’Aquila emerged in the Abruzzi as a major border town, linking the economy and religious life of the northernmost parts of the Regno (as it is generally called: the kingdom) to the Umbrian world of Franciscan spirituality. In Sicily, there existed extensive grain-producing areas, which grew in importance during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, as traditional Muslim agricultural skills were lost, and land which had been given over to specialised crops such as indigo and henna was converted into wheat land. Pastoral activities are also clearly documented, with Frederick II in 1231 legislating to ensure that the regular transhumance of sheep in Apulia did not give rise to strife. The emphasis was on the production of primary goods such as raw wool, hard wheat and olive oil; therefore, some historians have seen in this a sign that the Regno was in some sense underdeveloped.¹ In the thirteenth century, the ready availability of staple goods was, rather, seen as a source of wealth to whichever would-be conqueror acquired control of the kingdom. Taxes on trade, and direct control of royal lands, made

¹ For a discussion of views on this expressed by Bresc, Epstein and others, see Abulafia (1993), ch. 1.
Map 7  The kingdom of Sicily
the Regno an attractive prize; on the other hand, the reputation of the kingdom for great wealth may have become enlarged beyond reality, attracting adventurers who throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were keen to gain its crown.

A consistent difficulty was that of knowing who had the right to grant the kingdom’s crown. The assemblies of barons and leading townspeople who acclaimed Tancred in 1191 or Peter of Aragon in 1282 were arrogating to themselves rights which the papacy regarded as its own; it was essential to the popes that they should be able to regulate effectively their relationship with their southern neighbours. One factor was the existence within the Regno of a papal enclave at Benevento, which was easily occupied by the kings of Sicily when they were at odds with the pope, as experiences under Roger II in the twelfth century and Frederick II in the thirteenth revealed. Another factor was the consolidation of papal authority over Lazio, Umbria and parts of the Marches, a gradual and uneven process which was placed in jeopardy when the kings of Sicily tried to reach beyond their agreed northernmost frontiers. A third, crucial, factor was the recognition by the Norman kings of papal overlordship, which was reactivated in the late thirteenth century under Charles I and II of Anjou, a tie which was confirmed by the occasional payment of the census or tribute. However, this was itself placed at risk when the king of Sicily was also German emperor, as occurred under Henry VI of Hohenstaufen and under Frederick II. The fall of Sicily to Henry VI threatened directly the authority of the papacy in central Italy, and brought into question papal claims to suzerainty over the Sicilian king. It is thus not surprising that Pope Celestine gave his support to Henry’s rival Tancred, an illegitimate grandson of Roger II who had shown his mettle as admiral of the Sicilian fleet during the wars against Byzantium. The defences of the kingdom were less strong than its tradition of government. Though Tancred died still in harness, in 1194, after seeing Henry off the premises, Henry returned again shortly after Tancred had been succeeded by a minor, William III, and this time, with the help of the Genoese and Pisan fleet, all fell before him.

Henry thus became king, but not simply by right of conquest. His wife Constance, who appears to have had little love for him, was the posthumous daughter of Roger II; nor was it clear that she would secure the succession for his heirs: her one child, Frederick II, was only born the day after Henry was crowned king of Sicily at Palermo (Christmas Day 1194). Despite tension with the Sicilian nobility, Henry and Constance retained much of the elaborate administrative structure that they found, though there were changes in the management of the coinage under Henry VI which reveal the influence of

2 Palumbo (1955).
policies he was more familiar with in Germany and northern Italy. In particular, it is hard to show that Henry saw the Regno as a limb of the western Roman empire; everything suggests that he wanted to keep it as a private domain, a source of wealth which he could then use for more grandiose schemes such as the conquest of all or part of the Byzantine empire and a major crusade to recover Jerusalem. These plans were themselves largely frustrated by Henry’s early death, in 1197, leaving his wife in charge of the kingdom’s affairs. Yet during his brief reign over Sicily he had still managed to bully the Byzantines into tribute payments, based on the demand for the return of territories briefly occupied by the armies of William II on the abortive Greek campaign of 1185.

II

It is not really surprising that Henry’s widow led the reaction after Henry’s death; his cruelty to rebels against his authority in Sicily confirmed that he was an outsider who held power by brute force. Constance could at least be seen as a legitimate heiress to Roger II, and her willingness to bind the monarchy once again to the papacy revealed her determination to cater for the Sicilian interests of her young son Frederick, and her lack of interest in any claim that the boy might have to the imperial throne. She was not even interested in perpetuating the tight control over church offices which had its origins in the grant of legitimate authority by Pope Urban II to Count Roger I of Sicily in 1098. Pope Innocent III thus took on the functions of guardian of the boy king after Constance herself died in 1198; this was the proper function of the pope as overlord of the Sicilian king, and yet it was an almost impossible task to perform from the pope’s power bases in Rome and Umbria. The result was that central power withered, though it did not become totally ineffective; it was worth the while of competing warlords to acquire control over the young king’s person and over the royal seal. Some warlords appear to have claimed their lands without even asking the crown first, and the powerful alliance between the Genoese pirate captains Alamanno da Costa and Henry ‘the Fisherman’, count of Malta, brought the Genoese republic enormous influence in the central Mediterranean. More serious was the threat from Markward von Anweiler, one of a group of German war captains who had arrived in the entourage of Henry VI; Markward even claimed to have in his possession the only valid version of Henry’s will. But in a sense Henry’s will was immaterial: if the kingdom was a papal fief, then not Henry but Innocent had the right to dispose of its government. Innocent attempted to tame Markward, and even threatened a crusade against Markward in 1198–9; had

3 Clementi (1955).
this occurred it would have been the first ‘political crusade’ launched against the Christian enemies of the Church (though in fact Innocent painted Markward in lurid colours as a worse Saracen than Saladin, whose obstruction was preventing the much-needed crusade from departing in aid of the Holy Land). Early attempts to restore authority in the Regno created a backlash, as Frederick found in 1209, when Sicilian barons who had acquired part of the royal demesne were only quelled after Frederick called out his troops and marched at their head against the rebels. Characteristic of these years, however, was his reluctance to punish his opponents; it was sufficient simply to win back what had been lost, for it was essential to recreate the financial base without which a strong monarchy could not flourish. Nor was the ability of the crown to respond made easier by the growing distraction of German and northern Italian affairs, as the rivals of the Hohenstaufen, the Welfs, gained the imperial crown in 1209, only to destroy their chances of an accommodation with Innocent III when Emperor Otto IV launched his own invasion of southern Italy in 1211–12, confining Frederick to Palermo and its environs, and raising the possibility that Frederick would have to flee across to Tunis. Yet the very fact that Otto was far away in southern Italy gave an opportunity for the supporters of the Hohenstaufen to assert themselves in Germany, Lombardy and Tuscany, creating enough turmoil for Otto to withdraw from the Regno, discomfited, and for Frederick himself to receive, and respond positively to, appeals for aid from his German adherents.

It was precisely the personal union of the Regno and the German empire that the pope was most firmly resolved to resist, and his abandonment of Otto for Frederick II may in this respect seem surprising, for he seems on the surface to have gained nothing. However, it opened up the possibility that in future different branches of the house of Hohenstaufen might rule in the different Hohenstaufen kingdoms; it also delayed significantly the reconstruction of royal power in Sicily while Frederick was immersed in his own victorious campaign in Germany. Frederick’s occupation of Constance in 1212, followed by his triumphant coronation at Mainz on 9 December, meant that for eight years he was engaged in the suppression of the Welfs and the bringing of order to Germany, showing great sensitivity to the interests of the provincial nobles and prelates, and no particular interest in the assertion of strong monarchic power. This revealed a good sense of the mood among the political elite in Germany. Frederick’s commitment to the crusade, after he took the cross at his coronation, also suggested that Sicilian affairs were no longer a high priority. It was not until 1220 that he felt able to come south and to reassert decisively the traditional authority of the Norman kings in the Regno, following his imperial coronation on 22 November.

The ideal was, of course, one of harmony between pope and emperor, and
the generous outlook of Pope Honorius III towards Frederick was calculated to usher in an age of imperial–papal co-operation on a scale that had not been achieved since the days of Henry III.\textsuperscript{4} If Frederick could be persuaded to make real his crusade vows, then the danger that he would meddle in Italian affairs and obstruct attempts to extend papal authority over central Italy would be removed. Moreover, Frederick would be able to mobilise the resources of his Sicilian kingdom in horses, ships’ biscuit, sailors and much else so that the first complete crusade by a western Roman emperor would also be properly funded and able to achieve its holy objectives.

The early years of Frederick II thus reveal a familiar tension between a baronage, including many foreign elements, that was actively challenging the traditionally highly centralised government of the kingdom, and a monarchy which was increasingly anxious to recover rights which had been stolen from it when it was at its weakest. Frederick was increasingly insistent upon the need to rein in the provincial nobility, and this was to be achieved not simply by a show of force but also by emphatically proclaiming the nature and powers of the monarchy. His Capua assizes of 1220, followed by legislation in 1221 at Messina, made plain the crown’s right to control the succession to fiefs just as the Normans had attempted to do; a theme of moral reform also entered into legislation requiring Jews and prostitutes to wear distinctive clothing. Frederick was to be the Christian king of a Christian society.\textsuperscript{5} The Muslims of Sicily were crushed by Frederick’s armies; their rebellion had in effect been under way since the end of the twelfth century, and the Muslim ‘capital’ at Iato appears even to have minted its own coins. The Sicilian Muslims found themselves faced with deportation to far-off Lucera in southern Italy, where Frederick initially hoped they would be so isolated from contact with the Muslim world that they would gradually convert to Christianity. Though Lucera became a favourite palace of Frederick, his establishment of a Saracen colony there was hardly the act of a ‘baptised sultan’; it was a repressive act, part of a long tradition of population transfers in the Mediterranean world.

Fiscal issues attracted his attention, and the removal of the Genoese from their strongholds at Syracuse and Malta was emblematic of his desire to gain full control of the commercial life of the Regno, as was the creation of a network of state warehouses which promised to provide valuable tax revenues. A particular problem which long rankled in papal circles was the recovery from the Church of alienated royal demesne lands; easily enough seen as despoliation of the Church, such a policy was consistent with Frederick’s wider attempt at the restoration of royal authority as it had been under the Norman kings. Frederick also took care to protect those of the Church’s interests which were

\textsuperscript{4} Pressutti, \textit{Regesta Honorii papae III}.  \textsuperscript{5} Abulafia (1994a).
demonstrably sound in law, though like many contemporaries he was happy to enjoy the revenues of empty sees; far from being a religious sceptic, he was a patron of the local Cistercians and had intimate links to the Franciscan Elias of Cortona. On the other hand, it is clear that, as in Norman times, the barons of such areas as Molise and other relatively remote areas often remained masters of themselves and felt fairly lightly the hand of royal authority. Authority had to be proclaimed in the authentic spirit of the Roman law codes: in 1231 the Constitutions of Melfi invoked the image of the king as the scourge of man’s sinfulness appointed by God, and emphasised (reusing earlier Norman legislation) the terrible punishment that awaited traitors, heretics, false moneyers and others who undermined the sanctity of the kingdom.6 Interesting too, as in Frederick’s earlier legislation against the Jews, is the influence of thinking at the papal curia on the decrees against Christian usury contained in the same law book. Despite his later quarrels with the papacy, Frederick’s court was heavily exposed to current legal thinking in Rome, which shared an interest in the issues raised by the key texts of Roman law. Piero della Vigna and Taddeo da Suessa were well-trained lawyers and rhetoricians who had a major role in drafting the laws and maintaining a well-oiled propaganda machine.

Frederick saw all the economic activities of his subjects as potential sources of income, extending the rights exercised by his Norman predecessors over several commodities, notably salt production and the manufacture and dyeing of fine cloths, especially silks. The improvement of port facilities in the Regno was a high priority, and the crown made use of a ‘grain weapon’, exploiting grain shortages in Africa in 1239–40 by forbidding the private sale of wheat to Tunis, where the crown sold Sicilian grain at a staggering profit.7 It is now doubted whether the silver coinage was improved; however, the crown attempted to collect all gold coin coming into the kingdom, a policy which recalls some aspects of Norman policy. The gold accumulated in Frederick’s treasury, enhanced by substantial tribute payments from Tunis, was released as coin in 1231, with the issue of the 20½ carat augustalis, in 1231, carrying a striking neo-classical portrait of Frederick as Roman emperor, even though issued solely in his Sicilian kingdom. There were two messages, one about the wealth of the kingdom, the other about the untrammelled authority of its king.8

Frederick’s career between his first attempt to establish order in the kingdom in 1220–1 and his second in 1231 revealed, however, that his many commitments were becoming hard to reconcile with one another. He had capped his crusading vows by marrying Isabella, daughter of John of Brienne, and heiress

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7 Maschke (1966); Abulafia (1994d).
8 Abulafia (1983a); Grierson and Travaini (1998).
to the throne of Jerusalem, though he was soon accused of maltreating her and preferring the company of his Saracen slaves, an accusation, true, or false, which seemed to enlarge his reputation for faithlessness. She did, at any rate, produce an heir to Jerusalem, the future Conrad IV of Hohenstaufen. The promise to go on crusade led him to call a diet at Cremona in 1226, which, perhaps unjustifiably, created alarm among the cities led by Milan which traditionally resisted imperial pretensions in Lombardy.9 Far from facilitating the crusade, the diet generated a new Lombard League, though a good many Lombard cities, including Cremona itself as well as Parma and Modena, stood aloof from the rebellion. Thus the crusade was further delayed while Frederick insisted that Milan must submit and accept imperial punishment; there were increasing signs that the situation in Germany was becoming unstable, as Frederick's son Henry (VII), king of the Romans, made himself unpopular by trying to extend royal authority, a policy which his father had deliberately avoided. Papal mediation produced a Lombard settlement after a year; but Frederick had become sucked into the Lombard whirlpool, and it was his good fortune that Pope Honorius persisted with a conciliatory line, urging the Lombards to lay down arms so Frederick could pursue the greater cause of the crusade. This was not the case with his successor Gregory IX, who excommunicated Frederick for his constant failure to depart on crusade, which culminated in a false start when he and several companions fell ill on leaving port. The crusade itself brought Jerusalem back into Latin hands in 1229, on what were arguably unsatisfactory terms; but the pope launched his own war in defence of the faith while Frederick was in the east, sending Christian armies under Frederick's quarrelsome father-in-law John of Brienne south to conquer what the papacy still regarded as the subject kingdom of Sicily. The returning crusaders managed easily enough to defeat the 'soldiers of the keys' and Frederick forced Gregory to accept peace in 1230–1, at San Germano. Pope and emperor dined together; but the atmosphere of suspicion remained.

The rumbling Lombard problem seemed for a time solved when Frederick scored a crushing military victory, in conjunction with his Lombard allies, over Milan at Cortenuova in 1237. But this only accentuated the conviction in papal circles that he was far too powerful for the good of the papacy, and Gregory IX's true feelings emerged more and more clearly. Conciliation was no longer the policy, but confrontation. Frederick's enemies could exploit his alliances with local warlords, such as the terrifying Ezzelino da Romano, who controlled Verona, and who was friendly to heretics, even though Frederick remained very hostile to heresy in his own lands. Frederick had in fact been sucked into a destructive Lombard civil war, fought out by opposing armies who looked for

support and salvation to the pope, emperor or (very dangerously) Henry (VII) in Germany.

Unable to tolerate Frederick’s success at Cortenuova, in 1239 Gregory IX declared that the struggle to defend Rome against the Hohenstaufen was itself a crusade in defence of Sts Peter and Paul, whose skulls he theatrically displayed to the assembled throng. After this the conflict was continuous, accentuated by Frederick’s seizure of a group of churchmen travelling by sea to a council where his case was to be discussed. In 1243, Pope Innocent IV ascended the papal throne, a Genoese who had an established dislike for the emperor; he took the conflict to an even more bitter level by fleeing to Lyons and excommunicating the emperor, declaring him deposed from his thrones. He was accused of despoiling the Sicilian Church, consorting with Saracens and abandoning Christian belief; it is interesting to see that the Lombard issue was not pushed to the front, though it is impossible to escape the conclusion that it lay at the very heart of the conflict. Beyond Lombardy was the even more vexed issue of the separation of the empire from the Sicilian kingdom. This was something Frederick was prepared to countenance, though not, as the pope would have wished, in his own lifetime. The rebellion of Henry (VII) in Germany in 1235 robbed Frederick of the chance to offer part of the patrimony to Henry and the other part to Conrad of Jerusalem. In the event, Conrad would inherit both, for his other half-brothers were either illegitimate (like Enzo of Sardinia and Manfred) or too young (like Henry son of Empress Isabella II).

Frederick enjoyed a degree of support in Germany and southern Italy that was sufficient to hold off those who challenged his authority: not merely the anti-kings Henry Raspe and William of Holland in Germany but a serious conspiracy in the Regno in 1246; tough government, including a very tight fiscal policy, not surprisingly created some opposition, which was apparently joined even by his long-time associate Piero della Vigna, but there was no large-scale rebellion, and the violent reaction against stern royal autocracy would have to wait until 1282. Even the south Italian conspiracy was partly fuelled by the papacy, which appears to have contemplated Frederick’s assassination without demur. The papacy also hoped to revive memories of long-lost liberties, by dangling in front of the Campanian towns promises of urban freedom comparable to what was available in other parts of Italy, if only they would rise up against the despot who held them in his thrall. When Frederick died in 1250, his power was far from broken, and the fall of the house of Hohenstaufen was not, it must be stressed, the result of his unexpected death that year but of the

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10 The apocalyptic tone of the papal attacks on Frederick II may have been exaggerated by historians who have placed too much trust in bogus texts: Herde (1994).
crises that emerged under his successors Conrad and Manfred. In 1250 Frederick seemed to be standing up well against many of his enemies, despite the ignominious failure of the siege of Parma in 1247–8.

On that occasion Frederick’s camp was raided, and among the booty carried off was a magnificent manuscript of a hunting book. Frederick II has long retained an exaggerated reputation for his cultural activities. He wrote to the leading Jewish and Muslim scholars of his day, including, Judah ha-Cohen in Castile and Ibn Sab’in in Ceuta, but his court was not the home of Muslim or Jewish scholars; indeed, it was increasingly an itinerant court, moving from camp to camp, and his contact with non-Christian authorities was maintained by mail. He offered a post at court to the astrologer and physician Michael Scot, who had earlier been in the entourage of his foe Gregory IX. The most important monument to his cultural interests is his book on *The art of hunting with birds*, revealing good knowledge of Aristotle and of Islamic authors; and he clearly had some basic knowledge of Greek and Arabic. However, there is some uncertainty whether the surviving versions of the hunting book owe a great deal to the revisions of his son Manfred. The writing of rather derivative courtly love lyrics, similar to those of the southern French troubadours but expressed in Italian, was another product of Frederick’s cultural patronage, particularly the sonnet, which appears to have originated at his court. However, spending on the fine arts had a strongly propagandist aspect, as can be seen in the surviving neo-classical sculptures of the Capua gateway, which proclaimed to those travelling into the Regno the pervasiveness of royal justice. But it was on the restoration of Norman castles such as Lagopesole or the building of palaces and hunting boxes in Lucera, Castel del Monte and elsewhere that funds were most often disbursed; little was built at royal expense for the Church, a point which perhaps unfairly reinforced the image of the emperor as its opponent.

III

The papacy was aware that the death of Frederick did not mean the end of the ‘brood of vipers’; Conrad IV (1250–4) had, however, to face an uprising in Naples and continued pressure from papal armies, so that he depended heavily on the energetic abilities of his half-brother Manfred to scatter his foes. He himself visited the Regno in 1252, but it was still not quiet; however, he was prompted by renewed success to invite Innocent IV to come to terms and recognise him as Sicilian king. It was hard to see how Innocent could agree to

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11 Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, *De arte venandi cum avibus*; Frederick II of Hohenstaufen *The art of falconry*. 12 Shearer (1955); Willemsen (1953).
sanction the perpetuation of a personal union of Germany and Sicily, still more when northern Italy also became a theatre for Conrad’s operations. It thus seemed obvious in the papal curia that a candidate for the Sicilian throne must be found who would be a known partisan of papal interests and who would accept the suzerainty of the Holy See without question; but the problem was that of where to find such a person, particularly someone who could pay his way in the war of conquest that would be needed. Henry III of England offered his son Edmund as candidate, a move that reflects Henry’s grandiose ambitions which were just as visible in his patronage of Italian artists; but the English barons saw no advantage, and the ‘Sicilian Question’ continued to rankle for several years. In fact, Conrad’s early death seemed to suggest that the time had come for more radical measures still, and Manfred was able briefly to gain appointment as papal ‘vicar’ in southern Italy, for he posed no apparent danger north of the Alps, nor, for the moment, in central Italy. Perhaps through him the separation of the German and Sicilian inheritances of the Hohenstaufen could be achieved; but Innocent did not see him as a future king of Sicily either. The question of who should be king could perhaps be deferred while the cities were granted their rights of autonomy and a general reorganisation of the kingdom was initiated. Innocent and Manfred proved quite unable to work together, with the result that Manfred took refuge in Muslim Lucera at the end of 1254, and began to aspire to the crown which by rights should have devolved on Conrad’s own young son, ConRADin (‘little Conrad’). His position was strengthened when Innocent died very soon after, and when the Sicilian barons, acting within an established tradition, elected Manfred in lieu of either Edmund of England or ConRADin of Germany; the new pope, Alexander IV, continued to pursue plans for a papal champion, but all the while Manfred was left free to consolidate his own power.\textsuperscript{13}

The basis on which he operated was the Norman–Hohenstaufen system of government, so that urban liberties were cancelled and new initiatives were set in train to stimulate the economy and royal fiscal returns. A good example is the foundation of the port of Manfredonia, long an important centre of the grain trade. The Adriatic was a major area of interest, as befitted a prince of Taranto; a marriage between his daughter Helena and Michael II, despot of Epiros, brought the island of Corfu, as well as Durazzo, Avlona and Butrint on the Albanian coast, to the Hohenstaufen as dowry. But he looked west as well, renewing traditional ties between Sicily and the Catalans when the heir to Aragon-Catalonia, Peter, married Manfred’s daughter Constance in 1260. Thus despite strong papal reservations, there were Mediterranean neighbours who accepted Manfred’s title to the Sicilian throne.

\textsuperscript{13} Pispisa (1991).
Northwards, Manfred became the focus of Ghibelline hopes, much to the
alarm of the papacy, and by 1260 he was already able to help the Ghibellines of
Siena, who defeated a league of Guelfs at the battle of Montaperti. Manfred
began to develop wider ambitions of lordship in northern Italy, even in
Piedmont in the far north-west; in this sense the papacy was not deluding itself
when it concluded that he was no better for the interests of the Church and its
Guelf allies than Frederick and Conrad had been.

IV

Charles, count of Anjou, the brother of King Louis IX of France, had
appeared on the papal shortlist as a possible leader of an invasion of southern
Italy as far back as 1252; his reputation as a tough count of Provence, with the
financial backing of an efficient \textit{chambre des comptes}, made him appear very suit-
able, and he was also ambitious for a crown. He was known for his piety, but he
expressed it in a more pragmatic way than his brother, whose obsessive
demonstrations of devotion often shocked contemporaries; he acquired many
admirers, among the ranks of poets as well as soldiers, and among the citizens
of Rome who expressed their gratitude for his constitutional reforms as
senator of the city by erecting a magnificent statue of him which is still pre-
served on the Capitol. His cruelty in executing his Hohenstaufen rivals in 1268
reveals a less commendable side to him.\footnote{Amari (1850); a more favourable view is in Cadier (1891).} But the essential point from a papal
perspective was that he was keen to launch a Sicilian war, and for a time seemed
to be able to pay for one; and the same could not be said for Edmund of
England. On the other hand, his brother the French king had long shown
himself reluctant to become embroiled in a conflict in which he evidently
thought that the papacy had over-reached itself. Moreover, it took some years
to establish his authority securely in Provence, particularly in the inde-
pendently minded city of Marseilles, where Charles hanged the ringleaders of a
rebellion in 1263. From Provence, however, his influence spread eastwards into
Piedmont, where, as has been seen, Manfred was already becoming a source of
worry to the papacy.

The papacy sought not merely a victor but a source of regular income:
Charles’s promise of annual tribute amounting to 10,000 Sicilian ounces of
gold reveals how readily the Holy See allowed itself to be influenced by
financial as well as political temptations. He agreed too not to claim any of the
imperial or papal lands in Italy, for his brief was the conquest of the Regno, and
the papacy remained insistent upon the separation of north and south Italy. In
return, because the campaign was actually beyond his means, the papacy
agreed to declare his campaign a crusade, so that he could benefit from payments of crusade tithes, and draw in volunteers who were taking the cross to fight both the Saracen infidels of Lucera and the virtual infidel Manfred.\textsuperscript{15} Thus by 1265 Charles had committed himself to the enterprise and was negotiating with the north Italian cities and lords through whose territories his crusaders would have to pass; it was thus evident that, even after promises to keep out of north Italian affairs, he would be unable to fulfil his objectives in the south without gaining allies in the north. As serious a difficulty was the failure of the preaching campaign to produce the financial support Charles needed, so that the pope had to bail him out; the conquest of southern Italy drained the papal coffers almost to the bottom. Easier to provide, on the other hand, was the army he required, since French, Provençal, Italian and other volunteers flocked to his flag, apparently in the hope of material rewards when the Regno was conquered.

The defeat of Manfred's army, and the death in battle of King Manfred, at Benevento on 26 February 1266, brought Charles his prize within a few weeks of his entry into the kingdom. Opposition was at this stage quite limited, and Charles was aware that he could quell resentment by not punishing those who had in the past supported Manfred. This applied as much to the government officials as to the barons, and he rapidly benefited from the desertion to his cause of such bureaucrats as Joscelinus de Marra. Without their aid he could not hope to transform his military victory into effective control over the fiscal resources of the Regno. Radical changes in methods of government were few, and the emphasis remained the reconstruction of the old Norman–Hohenstaufen administrative regime, though some room was found for French and Provençal advisers. French was used in government, but primarily for the purpose of maintaining contact with Anjou, and in order to keep a French-speaking king adequately informed. Charles's conquest did not constitute an administrative revolution. Clear testimony to his local heritage in methods of government is provided by the king's decision to summon an assembly of justiciars and fiscal officials in 1267, to check their accountability, which derived from the judicial provisions of Frederick II over thirty years earlier.

The papacy cannot have deluded itself that victory in the south would leave the north of Italy untouched; his own representatives were present at a major Guelf conference in Milan in 1266, and the Angevin seneschal in Provence and Piedmont was given a brief to address Lombard affairs also. The impossibility of respecting papal wishes to the letter and avoiding northern entanglements was made clear when the north Italian Ghibellines began to look towards Germany and the fourteen-year-old Conradin for inspiration; such appeals

\textsuperscript{15} Housley (1982), pp. 18–19, 33–4, 68–9, 98–9, 166; Maier (1995), with a text edition.
easily turned his head, and Pope Clement IV realised that he would have to use Charles as his agent in the north to keep the Guelf flag flying. Thus Clement allowed him to hold office in Tuscany for up to three years, and Charles received approaches from Prato and Pistoia offering him the post of podestà or governor. In another respect, though, this sowed the seeds of new difficulties, since Charles’s northern interests distracted him from the south, where baronial rebellions, uprisings in Sicily and Lucera, and a Muslim invasion of Sicily from Tunis threatened to tear his kingdom apart. His old ally Henry, prince of Castile, disgruntled at the lack of rewards he had received from Charles, joined forces with the rebels in southern Italy, gaining power briefly at Rome and even becoming captain-general of the Ghibellines in central Italy. Charles had reason to reflect on the fickleness of those who had sworn to support him. When Conradin set foot in Italy he gained significant support from Pisa and other allies, and seemed poised to recover the Regno for the Hohenstaufen. The project was not a hopeless one, and Conradin’s defeat at Tagliacozzo in 1268 was what the duke of Wellington might have described as ‘a damned close run thing’. It was not simply a victory over the Hohenstaufen; throughout southern Italy opposition crumbled, while in northern Italy the Guelfs began to enjoy an ascendancy which in many areas lasted until 1282. Key cities in Lombardy and Piedmont accepted his lordship. In Rome, which had been so friendly to Henry of Castile and to Conradin, Charles was elected senator; Ghibelline Siena fell under the shadow of Guelf Florence, and Charles henceforth chose the name of its podestà from a shortlist of four candidates presented to him by the Sienese. He had evidently observed the extreme peril of interfering directly in the government of the autonomous communes, and his financial demands on the north Italian cities were relatively modest by comparison with those of the Hohenstaufen. Of course, all this left the papacy in a difficult position, and a papal vacancy from 1268 to 1271 was artfully prolonged by Charles so that he would retain freedom of action; the five-year interregnum in Germany also meant that the Ghibellines lacked a serious champion capable of challenging his authority. Charles’s Italian ascendancy was exactly what kings of Sicily were not supposed to achieve. Nor did his ambitions stop here. He claimed Sardinia for his younger son Philip in 1267, though the pope, faced with similar demands from the king of Aragon and from Henry of Castile, demurred; even so, Philip was declared king by Guelf loyalists in Sassari (1269). Charles seemed unstoppable.

It is a moot point how far Charles’s growing interest in Balkan affairs should be seen as part and parcel of the traditional concerns of the Norman and
Hohenstaufen kings of Sicily, and how far it was guided by his own wish to solve the ‘eastern question’ in several of its facets. Manfred’s alliance with the ruler of Epiros had left Charles with a dubious claim to lands in southern Albania; in 1271 he grabbed Durazzo on the coast facing Apulia; a year later he appears with the title ‘king of Albania’, reflecting his alliance with the Albanian population of the interior around Elbasan. In some respects he seems to have been pursuing the classic policy of attempting to create a cordon sanitaire around southern Italy and Sicily, comprising a ring of lands in Albania, Tunisia and Sardinia.16 Charles took his Albanian policy seriously, attempting to garrison and supply Durazzo and to extend his authority into the hinterland as far as Berat and Kruja, though a major earthquake shattered his hold on the region. Albania served not merely his interests in the Adriatic region: Charles regarded it as a back door into what remained of the Byzantine empire, recently recovered for the Greeks by Michael VIII Palaiologos. For Charles early made plain his wish to establish his influence east of Italy, plans which were more satisfactory to the papal curia than involvement in Italy itself. Soon after gaining the Regno, Charles was negotiating with the deposed Latin emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin II de Courtenay, in the hope of gaining lands in Achaea and the Aegean, as well as a marriage tie between his own daughter and Baldwin’s heir Philip. Charles’s family were to succeed to the Latin throne should Philip have no heirs of his own. The idea of obtaining for his descendants in the female line an imperial crown clearly excited Charles.

The 1270s saw a series of small-scale campaigns in the Balkans against the armies of Michael VIII; the Angevins had to withstand a siege of Durazzo in 1274, but were unable to avoid humiliation in battle at Berat in 1281. That Charles had Constantinople in his sights by 1281 is clear, and his inability to draw closer to its walls was the result not merely of checks in the western Balkans. Papal insistence on the need to pursue a negotiated settlement was furthered by Michael Palaiologos, who began serious negotiations for the reunion of the eastern and western Churches, in the awareness that success here would do much to secure his throne in the face of western competitors; on the other hand, he would also need to reconcile the Greeks themselves to some sort of recognition of papal authority, and an agreement on these issues was hampered by established theological differences. In 1274, Pope Gregory X scored an apparent triumph at the Council of Lyons, which accepted the profession of faith of Michael VIII and of the Greek Church. While Charles saw the submission of the Greeks to armed force as the best guarantee for the eventual success of a crusade to the Holy Land, Gregory aimed to ensure that Greeks and Latins would fight a crusade side by side.

That Charles’s interest extended further east still, to Jerusalem, also became plain. His record as a crusader included participation in the disastrous crusade of 1248 and he helped steer the Tunis crusade of 1270, in which Louis IX died, to North Africa, though there is some debate how far his role was decisive; Louis may have been deluded by reports that the Maghrib was poised to convert to Christianity. On that occasion Charles was the gainer, since he was able to enforce the restoration of Tunisian tribute to the kings of Sicily, a major source of gold to the crown, and to avenge the Berber invasion of Sicily in 1267. The Tunis crusade risked antagonising the Catalans, who were actively building up their business interests in Tunis, and must be seen as another in a series of clashes between Angevin and Aragonese ambitions in the Mediterranean.17

Charles’s interest in the Holy Land was revealed when he bought the crown of Jerusalem from Maria of Antioch in 1274, even though Hugh of Cyprus had been more widely recognised as king in 1269. Charles seems to have assumed that he could legitimate himself by showing a capacity to act decisively in the kingdom’s interests; by sending Roger of Sanseverino from southern Italy to Acre with an Angevin fleet and supplying the city with grain from the Regno, he was able to make Acre into an Angevin stronghold; but in essence Charles was another in a long line of absentee kings of Jerusalem who was able to deliver rather less than the nearby king of Cyprus. What Charles did gain was prestige, and Neapolitan royal documents would continue under his successors to use the title Rex Hierusalem et Sicilie, while the cross of Jerusalem found its way on to the royal coat of arms.

VI

Charles showed a readiness to engage in Balkan politics that was belied by the continuing presence in northern Italy of Ghibelline factions (for example in Genoa after 1270); playing politics on so many fronts at once, he risked losing control of affairs. Indeed, the more successful he seemed to be, the more the diehard Ghibellines reacted against his power. Even in Piedmont his authority was called into question, and Asti secretly entered a regional alliance against the Guelfs; the pope, too, felt concern at Charles’s activities in northern Italy, and wanted to see in the new king of the Romans, Rudolf of Habsburg, a make-weight who would exercise influence in the north, while Charles was confined to the south: this was a return to the well-established principle of a separation of functions. Gregory’s efforts at peace-making included the suggestion to Rudolf that he formally grant Charles of Anjou the county of Piedmont as a

17 See ch. 20 in this volume for further analysis of this clash of interests.
The grant would actually give the house of Anjou solid rights in northern Italy despite the terms of Charles’s promise to the papacy in 1263. In any case, the pope sent Rudolf a secret message in which he whispered that it was at Charles’s prompting that he had suggested the grant of Piedmont. Moreover, Charles’s position in Piedmont was growing more and more tenuous, and it is doubtful whether the grant would have been any help to him, even had Rudolf been disposed to make it.

Even so, it was not in the north of Italy that Charles of Anjou faced the greatest risk to his power. Sicily, after stern repression, remained quiescent, but the volcano was all the more powerful when it exploded. The French pope, Martin IV (1281–5), was an old associate of Charles, who had helped preach Charles’s crusade against Manfred, and he proved keener than his predecessors to accept an Angevin alliance. Nicholas III (1277–80) insisted that Charles resign as senator of Rome; but Martin supported his re-election. Nicholas had pursued a path of compromise in Tuscany, whereas Martin encouraged the Guelfs. Martin showed none of the reservations Gregory X had revealed about the Byzantine wars of the king of Sicily: by July 1281 the pope, Charles and Venice had reached an accord for the armed conquest of Constantinople, arguing that the Greeks had been faithless and had not brought their Church into line with the requirements of Rome. Therefore a negotiated settlement had been proved impractical, and it was time to turn to coercion.

The fleet which was expected to sail in April 1282 never did so. Small incidents can release the pent-up fury of the repressed; when on the evening of 30 March 1282 a French trooper was thought to have molested a young married Sicilian woman at the church of Santo Spirito on the edge of Palermo, a riot erupted. The news of trouble in the suburbs of Palermo spread like wildfire, so that the French garrison in Palermo was massacred and within a few days much of Sicily had risen against the house of Anjou; within a month even Messina, the home of the fleet which was due to be sent against the Greeks, was in the hands of the rebels. And yet the motives and intentions of the insurgents remain a puzzle. As in any violent revolution, events moved so fast that the leading rebels found it well-nigh impossible to keep them under control; and in many ways this proved paradoxically to their advantage, for the Angevins were in no position to restrain uprisings right across the island, in town and country, in which even one or two French landlords were active. At the peak of the uprising the representatives of the Sicilian towns and nobility appealed to the papacy, hoping that Martin IV would accept the failure of the Angevin regime and recognise the right of the Sicilians to self-government, under papal suzerainty, on the model of the central Italian towns; but Martin was of course a close ally of Charles, and condemned the rebels outright. It is clear that the long tradition of tight-fisted government, dedicated to the maximisation of
royal revenue to pay for foreign wars, whether of Frederick II in northern Italy or of Charles of Anjou in Italy and the Balkans, generated intense ill-feeling among the Sicilian elites; this was accentuated by the reliance, again since Frederick’s time, upon non-Sicilian bureaucrats, not just from Provence and northern Italy, but most noticeably the group of ‘Amalfitans’, including Joscelinus de Marra and the Rufolo family, who had in several cases accepted the coming of the Angevins with equanimity, and continued to exercise great influence over the secrezia in Sicily.\(^{18}\) Tensions within the secrezia between rival factions, some more pro-Angevin than others, resulted by 1282 in dangerous political rivalries which the central government in Naples was barely in a position to control. The Sicilian nobles and bureaucrats apparently felt that they had been pushed to the edge by 1282. Some of the rebels had, by contrast, lost lands and power earlier on, when the revolt of 1267–8 was suppressed; and those who fled to foreign courts, in particular Giovanni da Procida, were evidently anxious to see Charles’s government overthrown, even if Giovanni hardly qualifies as the secret architect of what became known as the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers. As a functionary of King Peter of Aragon, he urged the case for Peter’s wife, Constance of Hohenstaufen, the daughter of King Manfred and virtually the last survivor of Frederick II’s dynasty, but events in Sicily itself revealed that the preference of the Sicilian rebels was, as has been seen, for a federation of free communes not subject to any king.\(^{19}\)

As important as the heavy hand of government in explaining the Vespers are the structural changes taking place within Sicilian society during the thirteenth century. The old Muslim and Greek population had gone into steep decline, as new waves of Latin migrants filled their place in the thirteenth century. An Arabic- and Greek-speaking island now became predominantly Italian speaking, settled by migrants from the Italian mainland (both north and south) and from Provence or further afield. The island still remained lightly populated, and as a result it continued to enjoy the profit from the sale of its bumper harvests to foreign purchasers in the Christian and Muslim ports of the Mediterranean; it has, however, been argued that the expectations of the Latin farmers who came to settle were the traditional ones in a frontier society: low taxes, exemptions from feudal obligations including (in the case of Randazzo) service in the king’s ships, and so on.\(^{20}\) The more persistent the government, based far away in Naples, was upon the extraction of income from Sicily, and the longer Charles absented himself from the island, with the exception of a brief incursion during the 1270 crusade, the more fragile the hold of that government on the loyalty of those with influence in the island became: the richer merchants and


lawyers of Palermo, Messina and other key towns; the landlords in the interior. Charles had clearly not learned the lesson of the revolt of 1267–8.

Still less had he learned that a long sequence of clashes with the king of Aragon over such issues as Tunis, Sardinia, eastern crusades and above all Provence and Sicily had left the Aragonese embittered at the sight of his power building. Peter III of Aragon was not, perhaps, party to a grand conspiracy that had caused the revolt in the first place; but with his navy at the ready he was clearly toying with the idea of a Sicilian invasion, to coincide with Charles’s eastward crusade. His own crusade to Collo or Alcoll in North Africa met with papal suspicion and disapproval; it left him waiting in the wings while Sicily rose in revolt, and he was ready to accept the invitation to take the throne that came from the Sicilian parliament, which met at Palermo, and agreed to his envoys’ suggestion that the king of Aragon be summoned to Sicily to take the crown in right of his Hohenstaufen wife; in September he entered Sicily, proceeding from Trapani to Palermo amid acclaim, in order to receive the crown and to defend his new kingdom, not just the island of Sicily but the mainland territories as well, which he seriously hoped to seize from the Angevins with the support of the Ghibelline factions in central Italy, who responded to the invasion of Sicily by expelling their Angevin governors (even papal Perugia turned against Martin IV). His armies swept into Calabria once the Angevins had been defeated at sea; the ability of the Catalan fleet, small but efficient, to hold the seas around Sicily was long to prove crucial. The most frightening problem for Peter was the awareness that Catalonia and Aragon lay open to French attack while he was busy in Sicily, and that some of his own Spanish subjects would relish his humiliation at home. Peter therefore proposed an ingenious way to avoid further bloodshed and to end the rivalry of Anjou and Aragon: he would fight a duel with Charles in single combat; a meeting was arranged at Bordeaux in 1283, but both sides managed deftly to avoid one another, each accusing the other of bad faith. Not even a French crusade, with papal blessing, against the kingdom of Aragon managed to dislodge Peter III. Aragon had in the past recognised papal suzerainty, though the position was less clear than in Sicily; in any case, the pope had no qualms about conferring Aragon on Philip III’s son Charles of Valois, in 1284; but both in Spain and in Italy Peter managed by a combination of luck and determination to hold and strengthen his position. His victories culminated in the capture of Charles’s son, Charles prince of Salerno, by the Catalan navy, resulting in riots at Naples which amply proved that on the mainland too Angevin power was far from firm. The revolt of Sicily was a financial as well as a political and military disaster, since the island was such an important source of revenue to the crown;

21 See on the social structure of Sicily at this time Catalioto (1995).
all plans to capture Constantinople had to be frozen, and in January, 1285, he died in his one great stronghold, the plains of Apulia, leaving his heir still captive; the auguries for the house of Anjou appeared extremely unfavourable.

VII

It was not Charles II but the pope who really initiated the recovery of what can now be termed the kingdom of Naples, that is, the Angevin mainland. Martin IV and his successors Honorius IV (1285–8) and Nicholas IV (1288–92) exercised their rights as suzerains of the kingdom, despatching their own representative to work alongside the regent nominated by the crown, Robert of Artois. Honorius IV attempted to correct past abuses in the kingdom of Sicily, recognising that Angevin overgovernment lay behind the rebellion of 1282; his willingness to seek compromise between Guelfs and Ghibellines in the northern towns earned him a reputation as a lukewarm defender of Angevin interests, though it may be more correct to see him as a realist who knew the limits of the possible. His ‘Constitution concerning the government of the kingdom of Sicily’ (Constitutio super ordinatione regni Sicilie, 1285) sought to remove the ‘abuses’ attributed to Frederick II and Charles I and to return to the good old days of William II the Norman, setting out with considerable precision what these abuses had been. It is thus a precious document which helps reveal contemporary assessments of the root causes of the Vespers revolt, forbidding excessive financial demands by the crown: the *collecta*, first levied by Frederick II, were to be reduced and controlled; limitations on inheritance to fiefs were in some cases lifted; the tax burden of the towns, and demands for military service, were also modified. The alienation of royal demesne land was forbidden, though the loss of Sicily had itself entailed the loss of the most precious part of the royal demesne. The dilemma was how to find the funds to prosecute a successful war when it was obvious that heavy tax demands undermined the loyalty of the barons and towns. A similar problem, it should be stressed, existed in Sicily proper, where tax collection by Peter of Aragon at first met with relatively enthusiastic responses from those anxious to pay their way out of Angevin rule; but in the longer term there were fears that Peter would not be able to maintain the light tax regime he had promised, with the result that several of his leading Sicilian supporters even reverted to pro-Angevin loyalties.

The leading participants in the events of 1282 died in the same year, 1285: Charles I, Martin IV and Peter III. Peter’s lands were divided after his death: the ancient patrimony of Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia went to his eldest son Alfonso III (1285–91); the newly acquired kingdom in Sicily to his second son James (d. 1327). This division was deliberate, and reflects the aims of Peter in launching his Sicilian war; his aim had been to defend his wife’s inheritance, and...
he did not invade Sicily to ‘catalanise’ it by settling the island with his Spanish vassals or by issuing massive franchises to the merchants of Barcelona. Only after he died were they given special tax exemptions in Sicilian trade; and even then they received the same rights as the better-established Genoese. His aim was to ensure that once again a Hohenstaufen should sit on the throne of Sicily; when he returned to Catalonia in 1283 to defend his patrimony against the French crusaders, he left his wife behind as his regent, indicating with clarity that Sicily had now been returned to its rightful owner.

The division of Sicily from Aragon in 1285 helped the papacy negotiate a truce between Alfonso, James of Sicily and their Angevin captive Charles II, who in his despair at his imprisonment was even willing to abandon his claim to the island of Sicily, a concession the pope could not countenance. Acting as impartial arbiter, King Edward I of England drew up a plan whereby Charles would be exchanged for three of his sons, and would agree to implement a final peace accord within three years. In 1288, despite hostility at the papal curia, this approach was finally adopted, but this did not bring peace any nearer, particularly in view of the bellicose attitude of the French king, Philip IV, who had yet to learn what a morass the Sicilian Question had become, and who still had expectations that Charles of Valois, his brother, might gain the Aragonese throne.

After his release Charles II travelled by way of Anjou and the French court to Italy and his coronation at Rieti, just outside his kingdom, in May 1289. A theme of moral reform entered at once into his government: he expelled the Jews, Lombards and Cahorsins, all accused of moneylending, from Anjou and Maine shortly before renouncing the counties in favour of Charles of Valois, who was thought to deserve a consolation prize. Tough measures were also introduced against the Jews in southern Italy, this time accused of putting children to death in mockery of the crucifixion, an old canard already denounced by Frederick II and Innocent IV. Mass conversions took place, notably at Trani, and Dominican inquisitors were introduced into southern Italy. Drawing on French concepts, Charles and his leading advisers, such as Bartolomeo da Capua, appear to have reasoned that it was their duty to establish a Christian kingdom in the Mezzogiorno; as well as the political battle for control, a moral battle, which might even determine that political one, needed to be fought. A further reflection of this can be seen in the sudden arrest of the Muslim inhabitants of Lucera, whose goods and persons were confiscated in 1300; as well as bringing much-needed funds to the king, the sale of the Lucerans into slavery was the fulfilment of old Angevin promises to purify the kingdom of its heathen inhabitants.  

Charles’s return to Naples coincided with a restoration of Guelf fortunes in central Italy and was soon followed by changes in the crown of Aragon which opened up new opportunities. James succeeded his childless brother Alfonso as king of Aragon in 1291, but he did not maintain the separation of the kingdoms of Aragon and of Sicily; his brother Frederick was appointed royal lieutenant in Sicily but was denied the crown. James increasingly saw Aragon-Catalonia as his base; thus by 1295 James of Aragon was willing to renounce control of Sicily in exchange for a dynastic alliance with the Angevins and the suppression of French claims to his own crown in Spain. He valued the chance to return to the obedience of the Church. He was attracted, too, by a counter-offer of Sardinia and Corsica in lieu of Sicily, a less troublesome prospect than Sicily since power was fragmented in Sardinia and there was no single rival king. The error was to assume an agreement between James, Philip, Charles and Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) would be respected by the Sicilians themselves.

Frederick, James’s younger brother, became the voice of Sicilian opposition; in 1296 he rebelled against his brother James II of Aragon, and was acclaimed by the Sicilian parliament of barons and townsmen as the independent king of Sicily, as the true heir to his Hohenstaufen namesake; and his court rapidly became the focus for anti-Angevin agitation in Italy, attracting also the Ghibelline exiles of northern Italy. Sicily proper was placed under strict interdict by the pope, and Frederick, though a pious man, had to endure several years of excommunication. The Aragonese in Spain began to offer military support to the Angevins against the inhabitants of the island James himself had so recently defended. The next five years thus saw a bitter renewal of the conflict between the Angevins and the Sicilians, at sea and on land; unable to make headway against him, the Treaty of Caltabellotta (1302) brought final peace to the exhausted combatants. Frederick agreed to withdraw his armies from the Italian mainland. He was to remain as king of the island of Sicily, which was to be known as ‘Trinacia’, an antiquarian name for the island unearthed to distinguish the two kingdoms of Sicily; the Angevin ‘king of Jerusalem and Sicily’ was supposed then to inherit the island of Sicily after Frederick’s death. Frederick was thus accepted as king of Sicily for a single creation, and his heirs would be offered Cyprus, Sardinia or another suitable land in due course.

The Sicilian war took place at a time when Christian navies were urgently needed in another of Charles II’s kingdoms: that of Jerusalem, which, after all,
took precedence in his formal royal title. Charles was aware of his obligations in the east, even though the fall of Acre in 1291 rendered him incapable of exercising any authority there, while the continuing claim of the king of Cyprus to the throne of Jerusalem further underlined the failure of the Angevins to make real their aspirations in the Holy Land. As the author of several elaborate plans to reconquer Palestine with the help of the military Orders, Charles II was not inactive; but plans were no substitute for action. He could hardly launch a crusade while the rebels were still installed on the mainland of southern Italy. Indeed, his struggle with Frederick seemed only to possess greater justice while the Sicilians were in rebellion against the house of Anjou, since their obstinacy could be said to have prevented him from saving Acre from the Mamluks. The sale as slaves of the Muslims of Lucera should probably be seen as an expression of his determination to strike at the Muslims in all quarters, but it was in a sense a confession of impotence; there was a world of difference between subject Muslims and the powerful Mamluk empire in Egypt and Syria (with which, at this time, the kings of Aragon were managing to make more peaceful contact). Even after 1302 Charles II was not in a position to move; he was increasingly sucked into north Italian politics, and developments in the Balkans threatened his interests as well. The Byzantine ruler Andronikos II and the Serbian king Stephen VI Uroš ate away at his Albanian ‘kingdom’, and Durazzo was thrown back and forth between Serbian, Greek and Angevin conquerors. Charles appointed his son Philip of Taranto lord of Albania, Corfu and Achaea, and Philip’s subsequent marriage to Catherine of Valois, daughter of Charles of Valois and Catherine de Courtenay, brought Philip the title to the Latin empire of Constantinople in 1313, but this was a much more modest outcome than that which Charles I had been planning by force of arms in 1282.

On another Balkan front, the house of Anjou built ties with its near neighbours the rulers of Hungary. Existing marriage alliances between Charles II and his sister on the one hand and King Ladislas the Cuman of Hungary and his sister on the other hand resulted in an Angevin claim to the throne of a powerful eastern kingdom whose dominions stretched to the shores of the Adriatic. The death of Ladislas without male heir in 1290 occurred at a time of deep crisis in southern Italy, and his sister the queen of Naples could do little more than proclaim her son Charles Martel, Charles II’s second son, king of Hungary. But another claimant, Andrew the Venetian, descended from the Magyar royal house of Arpad and from the Morosini doges of Venice, took advantage of Charles II’s preoccupations to consolidate his own claim to the Hungarian throne. Charles Martel never took charge of the kingdom he claimed; he died in 1296 and the title to Hungary passed to his son Charles Robert, usually called Carobert, who by 1310 was able to make his authority
real in much of Hungary. About the same time Charles II’s eldest son Louis renounced his claim to the throne of Naples, and entered the Franciscan Order, in a move which was to become popular among the princes of Anjou and Aragon in later decades. Louis’s supreme renunciation left Charles II’s third son, Robert as heir to southern Italy and Provence.

Shadowy territorial rights in Achaea were matched by extension in other areas too. Charles II took willing advantage of appeals by the towns of Piedmont, where Charles I’s authority had earlier fallen apart; he intruded Angevin administrators into Piedmont, and they worked hard to win the submission of the great local lords such as the marquis of Saluzzo. Between 1303 and 1309 the ‘county of Piedmont’ became a political and administrative reality as it had never been before. As Emile Léonard said, ‘Charles I was content to let himself be recognised as seigneur of this town or that; Charles II, on the contrary, was going to bring together into organic unity the lands he aspired to reconquer, and to make of them a real principality.’ His aim was as much to protect the frontiers of Provence as to strengthen his position in northern Italy. But there too the Angevins managed to consolidate their alliances in the years after the peace of Caltabellotta. Robert, Charles II’s third son, was busy in Tuscany against such Ghibelline strongholds as Pistoia. He began to build the close relationship with Guelph Florence which was to characterise his reign. The Ghibellines were very tightly pressed and even their greatest stronghold, Pisa, weakened in past wars with Genoa, was eyed covetously by the Florentines.

Charles II died in 1309, just as Carobert was establishing his firm command in Hungary. Hungary was Charles’s greatest success. He preferred to find a practical formula for peace, rather than to pursue relentlessly the war with the Aragonese in Sicily, and this was the mark of statesmanship. Charles II was less ambitious politically than his father; but his extreme harshness towards Jews and Muslims betrays a fierce-minded piety and a passion for moral reform that he shared with his uncle Louis IX. His mission was to be a Christian king ruling over Christian subjects.

It has been seen that the Sicilian kingdom was undergoing significant changes in its cultural and religious identity in the thirteenth century, particularly on the island of Sicily. Latin settlers were found on the mainland as well; the Angevins appear to have brought settlers from the south-east of France to the villages outside Lucera, perhaps in the hope of displacing the Luceran Muslims by good Christians. Another form of Latin penetration was the presence of Italian and Catalan merchants who played a large role in the export of primary commodities such as grain and raw wool from the ports of the Regno. The
need for cash made the Angevins increasingly dependent on the Florentine merchants, who were prepared to offer interest-free loans in return for enhanced export privileges, normally involving exemption from basic trade taxes on exported wheat. Even under Frederick II, the crown found itself forced to turn to the bankers for short-term loans, and Frederick’s deals with merchants from Piacenza, Rome and even Vienna were the precursors of much bigger contracts entered into by the Angevins, for whom, indeed, business ties to the Guelfs of central Italy also had significant political implications. What was thus being created was not simply a commercial network, but also a close Guelf alliance which bonded Florence and its Tuscan friends to the kingdom of Naples. For the island of Sicily, the wars at the end of the thirteenth century may have had grave consequences of a different order: the blocking of trade routes as Sicily found itself at war with its neighbours, and the ravaging of fields by marauding armies, damaged the local economy, and a major priority of Frederick III after 1302 had to be the economic recovery of his island kingdom. The War of the Vespers thus had significant structural effects on the two Sicilian kingdoms which emerged out of it.
PART V

THE MEDITERRANEAN FRONTIERS
CHAPTER 17(a)

THE LATIN EMPIRE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE FRANKISH STATES IN GREECE

David Jacoby

The western or Latin conquest of Constantinople on 13 April 1204 heralded a new era in the history of the Byzantine lands, known in the west as Romania. It was a severe blow to the military might, political organisation and prestige of the empire. Moreover, it furthered and hastened its disintegration, initiated some twenty-five years earlier, and led to its dismemberment. In March 1204, about a month before the fall of Constantinople, the leaders of the ‘French’ crusader armies and the commander of the Venetian army and fleet, Doge Enrico Dandolo, reached an agreement in which they addressed five major issues: the election of the Latin emperor, the political regime of the empire, its military organisation, the partition of the lands of Romania and, finally, the election of the Latin patriarch of Constantinople and other ecclesiastical matters. On 9 May 1204 Count Baldwin IX of Flanders, and VI of Hainault, was elected emperor with a share comprising two imperial palaces at Constantinople and a quarter of the empire. Emperor Baldwin I (1204–5) awarded out of his domain many fiefs to knights and mounted sergeants of the ‘French’ host and assigned to Venice its portion, three-eighths of it in land and revenues. The remaining three-quarters of Romania were equally divided between the ‘French’ or Frankish crusaders and Venice. By then only Constantinople was in Latin hands. The difficulties encountered in the conquest of Romania, which was never completed, and the individual expeditions undertaken by Latin knights or commoners, as well as by the Venetian state, prevented the systematic implementation of the partition plan. Instead, the extensive territories occupied by the Latins became a mosaic of political entities, many of them small, whose rulers were linked to each other within a complex and shifting web of vassal relations.

Boniface, marquis of Montferrat, who had expected to be elected emperor, obtained Thessalonika from Venice in exchange for Crete and, though a vassal of Baldwin I, in fact established in 1204 an independent kingdom extending from Thrace to the area of Corinth in central Greece. After conquering
The Latin Empire and its vicissitudes c. 1214
Venetian possessions (and thus Modon)
The Bulgarian Empire before 1230

Acquisitions of John II Asen (1218-41)
The Empire of Thessalonica and Despotate of Epirus c. 1230
Acquisitions of John III Vatatzes (1222-54)

Map 8 The Latin empire of Constantinople and its neighbours
Euboea or Negroponte in 1205, he granted it first to a French knight and, following the latter's death the same year, to three Veronese lords. After that, except for the years 1208–16, the island was divided into three main feudal units. Boniface awarded several small lordships to French and Italian knights under his suzerainty in Attica and Boiotia, soon united in the duchy of Athens under Othon de La Roche, who from 1210/11 also held Argos and Nauplion in the Peloponnese from the ruler of the Frankish principality of Morea, Geoffrey I de Villehardouin. A few years earlier, in 1205, William of Champlitte and Geoffrey had jointly begun the conquest of the Peloponnese and had laid the foundation to the principality. In 1204 or 1205 Marco I Sanudo, nephew of the doge of Venice, established the centre of his duchy in Naxos, directly held from the emperor from 1207. In association with Venetians and foreigners and with the backing of Venice he conquered in the same year other Cycladic islands, which he granted out in fief. Small lordships were also created elsewhere in the Aegean. Corfu was occupied by Venice in 1207, awarded to ten Venetians, yet lost about 1215 to the Greek ruler of Epiros, Michael I Doukas (1204–c. 1215). Finally, Venice extended her sway in 1207 over the two ports of Modon and Coron in southern Messenia, at the south-western tip of the Peloponnese, and between 1207 and 1211 (in the face of Genoese competition) over the island of Crete, the first colonies of an overseas empire some of which was to last up to the time of Napoleon Bonapart’s campaign in Italy. The extreme fragmentation of Romania, in sharp contrast to the earlier unity of Byzantium, accounts to a large extent for the diversity of political and social regimes established in Latin Romania, as well as for the nature and orientation of demographic currents and economic activity in this region. While the encounter between the Latins and the overwhelmingly Greek indigenous society generated a break on the political level, it resulted in accommodation and continuity in other spheres.¹

The Latin empire led a tumultuous life throughout the fifty-seven years of its existence, up to its collapse in 1261. The imperial and territorial claims of the neighbouring rulers of the Vlacho-Bulgarian kingdom and the two Byzantine successor states founded after the fall of Constantinople, one in Epiros and the other in western Anatolia, the so-called empire of Nicaea,

exposed the Latin empire to almost continuous warfare. War broke out shortly after its establishment. In alliance with Greek leaders in Thrace the ruler of the Vlacho-Bulgarian kingdom, Kalojan, advanced deep into Latin territory and captured Emperor Baldwin in May 1205. Henry, Baldwin’s brother and successor (1206–16), repulsed Kalojan’s attacks. After the latter’s death the following year he captured extensive territories to the north and succeeded in stabilising the Latin-Bulgarian borders and political relations for a few years. In Anatolia Henry faced Theodore I Laskaris, the ruler of Nicaea (1204–22). He managed to overcome his own shifting fortunes by achieving a decisive victory over him in October 1211, which resulted in the renewal of Latin rule in Anatolia along the entire coastline stretching from Nikomedia to Adramyttion. The treaty signed between the two rulers, presumably in the following year, ensured peace between their states until 1224. Henry died in 1216, leaving an empire temporarily strengthened by his military and diplomatic skills, his conciliatory attitude toward his Greek subjects and his use of Greek troops against his enemies.

The fate of the Latin empire was closely linked to that of the kingdom of Thessalonika. After the sudden death of Boniface of Montferrat in battle with the Bulgars in 1207 Henry was compelled to intervene for two years against ‘Lombard’ rebels, including the three main lords of Negroponte, who advocated the coronation of William VIII, marquis of Montferrat. In 1209 Henry secured the orderly succession of Boniface’s son, the infant Demetrius. In addition he ensured at Thebes the direct subordination of the lords of Negroponte to himself, and at Ravennika that of Geoffrey I Villehardouin, lord of Frankish Morea. However, in 1217 Peter de Courtenay, crowned Latin emperor by Pope Honorius III in Rome, was compelled to transfer effective authority in the kingdom of Thessalonika to William VIII. Theodore of Epiros (c. 1215–25, emperor 1225–30), who captured Peter de Courtenay on his way from Rome to Constantinople, took advantage of the internal feuds in the kingdom to penetrate into Macedonia and Thessaly and to encircle Thessalonika, which he occupied in 1224. Two years later he reached the walls of Constantinople, yet John Asken, king of the Vlachs and Bulgars (1218–41), prevented him from dealing a fatal blow to the city because he coveted it for himself. In 1230 John Asken defeated Theodore and conquered large territories of his as far afield as Albania. In the meantime, by 1225, the Nicaean forces of John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222–54) had reduced the Latin hold in Anatolia to Nikomedia and a strip of land opposite Constantinople. In 1233 the Latin emperor John of Brienne (1229–37) launched a short campaign in Anatolia, which failed to produce any lasting benefits. Two years later he faced a coalition of John III and John Asken that endangered the existence of the Latin empire, by then reduced to the city of Constantinople itself. In 1246 John III took hold
of Thessalonika under the nose of the Greek ruler of Epiros. His successor Theodore II Laskaris (1254–8) was too engaged in warfare against neighbours in the Balkans to move against Constantinople, and gave some respite to it.

The existence of the Latin empire was thus prolonged by temporary agreements and shifting alliances with its neighbours and particularly by the rivalry between the latter. In the long run, however, the empire’s ability to survive was seriously impaired by the chronic absence of adequate financial and military resources and the lack of a firm, permanent and general commitment of the west to assist it. The intervention of the papacy on its behalf yielded only limited and temporary results. Repeated ecclesiastical negotiations with the empire’s neighbours failed to achieve their submission to the Church of Rome and to reduce their pressure. Neither the papacy’s pleas with western rulers for help nor the proclamation as crusades of military expeditions to aid the empire produced meaningful and sustained support. The hard-pressed Baldwin II (1237–61) travelled extensively in the west, first in 1237–9 and again in 1243/4–8, in desperate attempts to enlist help. During his first absence the barons of the Latin empire mortgaged a precious relic, the Crown of Thorns, to Venetian creditors as surety for the repayment of 13,134 hyperpers. It was redeemed in 1238 by the king of France, Louis IX, who placed it in the specially built Sainte-Chapelle in Paris. In 1248 Baldwin II owed 24,000 hyperpers to some Venetian merchants in Constantinople; later, in return for another loan, he mortgaged his only son Philip of Courtenay, who spent several years in Venice in the custody of the creditors. In 1260 Baldwin II was compelled to strip lead from the roofs of Constantinople’s palaces to raise money for the empire’s defence. The western lay powers each pursued their own interests. Even Venice, despite its economic stake in the empire’s survival, only intermittently extended naval help. When it became aware of the acute danger to the empire’s existence in 1260, it was already too late.2 The empire was also significantly weakened from within by the growing willingness of its Greek subjects to turn to foreign rulers, in particular those of Epiros and Nicaea who appealed to their Greek identity, and even to assist invading armies. Eventually it was Michael VIII Palaiologos who, after seizing the throne of Nicaea in 1258, three years later reinstated Byzantine rule in the imperial capital and put an end to the Latin empire. Baldwin II escaped to the west, where his efforts to obtain support for the recovery of his state were to no avail.

The internal structure and development of the Latin empire was rather complex. At the coronation of Emperor Baldwin I on 16 May 1204 various trappings recalled similar Byzantine ceremonies. The Byzantine imprint was also reflected by the titles of the emperors, their officers and their dignitaries,

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2 See n. 1; Setton (1976), pp. 1–153; Barber (1988); Angold (1989); Wolff (1954b).
as well as by imperial documents and the empire’s coinage. The adoption of these features was partly prompted by the emperor’s desire to emphasise continuity from Byzantine imperial tradition and thereby enhance the legitimacy of their own rule. Greek officers serving in the imperial court also acquainted the conquerors with the intricacies of the Byzantine fiscal system and ensured its survival. Yet the principles of operation of the regime, defined in the treaty of March 1204, were largely moulded along western feudal patterns and in response to pressing military needs. The conquest and the distribution of fiefs that followed led to the territorialisation and geographical extension of the network of vassallic hierarchy existing within the ‘French’ host during the crusade. Each fiefholder, however, also swore to render military service to the emperor, the supreme lord. An original feature of the empire was the institutional and political position of Venice in its framework, which combined elements of subordination and equality. Subordination was expressed in two ways: first, Venice was inserted as a collective political entity within the feudal system of government headed by the emperor; secondly, the individual fiefholders in its portion of the empire undertook to fulfil the same military obligations as their ‘French’ counterparts. In fact, however, Venice played the role of an intermediary between the emperor and its own fiefholders. Its officers apportioned the fiefs among Venetians and foreigners who assumed military and fiscal obligations toward the doge and swore fealty to him; its chief representative in the empire, the podestà serving in Constantinople, was responsible for the collective discharge of the military service owed by the fiefholders; and, finally, the Venetians remained a separate military contingent under Venice’s own command. In addition, Venice maintained exclusive control over other components of its portion of the empire and exercised its authority over those holding property in it. Its decisive contribution to the crusade and the conquest of Constantinople, as well as the existence of its separate military contingent, not attested, however, beyond the 1220s, ensured it a strong political standing with respect to the emperor, establishing virtual parity with the ‘French’ barons in the formative political stage of the empire. Venice’s representatives participated after this in various governing bodies, the decisions of which affected long-range political, territorial, legal and institutional developments.

The combination of subordination and parity in Venice’s position was extended and amplified on a symbolic level by the podestà. They used titles and regalian elements borrowed from Byzantium alongside those utilised by the emperors themselves, in order to project a quasi-imperial standing both within and outside the empire. The long distance from Venice and political expediency

explain the diplomatic initiative displayed by several podestà up to the 1230s. It is clear, though, that their policies conformed with the interests of the Venetian metropolis and were closely co-ordinated with it. There is no foundation, therefore, for the assumption that they adopted an autonomous political course or attempted to bolster their own status. Venice’s position in the Latin empire was also enhanced by its hold on the Church of Constantinople. Soon after the proclamation of Baldwin I as emperor Venice obtained, in accordance with the treaty of March 1204, the election as patriarch of a Venetian, Tommaso Morosini, whose successors up to 1261 were also Venetians. The patriarchs were influential in the political life of the empire and controlled property yielding substantial income in Constantinople. Venice also took advantage of its major role as a maritime and commercial power. On several occasions Venetian ships assisted the emperors in the defence of Constantinople; Venice’s subjects played a dominant role in the city’s trade; and its quarter there, enlarged in 1204, attracted both Venetian and foreign settlers. The same holds true of Rhaidestos and Gallipoli, ports of call on the Dardanelles belonging to Venice and administered by its representatives until 1235, when they were occupied by John III Doukas Vatatzes. In order further to strengthen its position in the empire Venice enlarged the number of its subjects by granting Venetian nationality to Latin foreigners among her feeholders, Latin city dwellers, Greeks and descendants of mixed Venetian-Greek parentage known as gasmonoloi.4

The principality of Morea, the third major Frankish state of Latin Romania, survived the Latin empire by some 170 years. It took Geoffrey I (1209–29) and both his sons Geoffrey II (1229–46) and William II (1246–78) up to 1248 to conquer the whole Peloponnese, except for the Venetian enclaves in southern Messenia. After the fall of the kingdom of Thessalonika in 1224 the other Frankish lords rallied around Geoffrey I. From 1236 the counts of Cephalonia recognised the suzerainty of the princes of Morea. In 1248, in return for a promise of assistance, Baldwin II transferred to William II the suzerainty over all the Aegean islands except four. This bond, originally established for the prince’s lifetime, persisted into the fourteenth century. William II proceeded some years later to assert his new position. From 1209 the main lords of Negroponte also acknowledged the suzerainty of Venice, which intervened on several occasions in the feudal affairs of the island, in particular from 1256 to 1262 in support of two of these lords, who refused to recognise their vassalic subordination to William II. Yet eventually, in 1262, the danger of a Byzantine reconquest prompted them to agree. The duke of Athens, Guy I de la Roche, an ally of the rebel lords, had already acknowledged the overlordship of the

prince after being defeated by him in 1258. The military might of the principality was illustrated on several occasions, as in 1236 and 1238, when Geoffrey II came with his forces to the rescue of Constantinople, and from May 1249 to May 1250, when William II joined the crusade of Louis IX of France to Egypt for a whole year. However, in 1259 the troops of Michael VIII (1258–82), then still ruling at Nicaea, inflicted a severe defeat at Pelagonia in Macedonia upon this prince, his vassals and his allies. For about two years the principality was governed by women in lieu of their captive husbands. After the Byzantine recovery of Constantinople in 1261 William II consented, as the price of his release, to cede to Michael VIII three important strongholds in the south-eastern Peloponnesian, among them Monemvasia, which had remained in Frankish hands for some fourteen years only.

After regaining a foothold in the peninsula the following year the Byzantines proceeded to expand. To counter their mounting pressure and in return for promised assistance, William II agreed in the Treaty of Viterbo, signed in 1267, that after his death the principality of Morea and its dependencies should be transferred to the new king of Sicily, Charles I of Anjou (1266–85). This move was made with the acquiescence of William’s lord, Emperor Baldwin II, who also granted to Charles suzerainty over the islands of the Aegean, Corfu and all Latin possessions in Epiros. After the death of William II in 1278 Charles took hold of the principality of Morea and sent his bailiffs to govern it. In 1289 his son Charles II (1285–1309) awarded it to Isabelle de Villehardouin, daughter of William II, upon her second marriage to Florent of Hainault, and the couple took up residence in the principality. Florent established a truce with Byzantium, yet in 1295 war again broke out. Byzantine territory extended then from the south-eastern area recovered by Byzantium in 1262 to Kalavryta in the north, and thus covered a large portion of the Peloponnesian. Florent’s most serious problem was the refusal of Helena, mother of the young duke of Athens, Guy II de la Roche, and regent for him, to acknowledge his suzerainty. Yet after coming of age in 1296, the duke did homage to Isabel and Florent. A stronger alliance between the two parties was established in 1299 when Isabel affianced her little daughter Mahaut of Hainault to Guy II. In 1294 Charles II had assigned all his eastern dependencies to his son Philip of Taranto, who thus became immediate overlord of Frankish Greece. In 1301 the widowed Isabelle de Villehardouin wedded the count of Piedmont, Philip of Savoy (1301–7), who shortly after his arrival in the principality aroused the opposition of various barons and knights by his infringements of Moreot feudal custom. The next year Philip put down a revolt of the inhabitants of the mountainous Skorta region, prompted by new taxation. In 1303 he campaigned in Epiros in support of Charles II, yet later

refused to provide further assistance. Since he delayed doing homage to his immediate overlord, Philip of Taranto, Charles II in 1307 declared Isabel to have forfeited her fief. In 1311 she still affirmed her rights and those of her daughter Mahaut, yet to no avail. Philip of Taranto had definitively become prince of Morea (1307–15).

The establishment of Latin rule over extensive portions of Romania opened the way to western immigration and settlement in these territories on a scale much larger than before 1204. The first Latin settlers came from the ranks of the conquerors, many of whom were knights, except in the Venetian contingents. The Latin population was gradually reinforced in numbers and became more diversified, the majority of the newcomers hailing from Italian cities. For lack of adequate quantitative data, however, it is impossible to assess the scope of Latin immigration. About 1225 some 450 mounted warriors were dispersed throughout the principality of Morea, yet it is not clear how many of them lived there with wives and children. In 1210 Othon de La Roche, duke of Athens, mentioned localities in which only twelve Latins resided, a reference to feudal lords and their retinue settled in isolated mountain castles or fortified rural mansions. Even these lords, though, occasionally spent some time in the houses they owned in cities. Most Latins, whether knights or commoners, tended to live permanently in an urban centre, preferably protected by walls, or inside an acropolis, regardless of their previous life style or occupations. Such was the case, for instance, with the ‘French’ knights and Venetian fielholders in the Gallipoli peninsula. To be sure, to some extent the marked preference of the Latins for urban settlement in Romania derived from economic considerations, in particular those of merchants and craftsmen. Yet it also arose from the psychological urge for security of a minority group, conscious of its isolation in the midst of an overwhelmingly Greek population. The largest Latin concentration in the conquered territories outside the Venetian colonial empire occurred at Constantinople in the years 1204–61. The major economic role of the city as well as Venice’s enhanced position and enlarged quarter attracted primarily Venetian immigrants. In Frankish Morea the establishment of the princely court at Andravida (Andreville) prompted further settlement in this locality and contributed to its urban development. Italian bankers and merchants took up temporary or permanent residence at Clarence (Chiarenza, Klarentza), the port founded at a short distance from Andravida in the first half of the thirteenth century, and turned it into an economic centre connecting the principality of Morea with the kingdom of Sicily and Venice. The movement of the Latins, however, was not restricted to immigration. Some of those settled in Latin Romania left it after some time for other destinations. Since the establishment of the Latin empire knights whose pay had been delayed or who were dissatisfied with their living conditions either returned to
the west or left the emperor’s service to fight in the armies of his neighbours. In addition, some Venetians who had maintained close ties with their kin and retained real estate in Venice returned to this city after spending many years in Constantinople. The Byzantine recovery of the imperial capital in 1261 generated the exodus of some 3,000 Latins, the majority of whom were undoubtedly Venetian settlers.6

As already noted in passing, the conquering knights transplanted from the west to the territories of Romania examined here, apart from the Venetian portion of the Latin empire, their own political organisation and social regime. Yet their encounter with the indigenous population required some significant accommodation. As in the west, the society of the territories they settled became highly stratified, a clear distinction existing between the upper, knightly class and the other strata of society. This distinction was bolstered by the knights’ strong class consciousness, expressed in the ceremony of dubbing, their particular values, life style, mentality and culture. Yet even within this Frankish elite there was a pronounced social differentiation. Vassalage and the holding of fiefs entailing military service provided the backbone of the social and political hierarchy, yet only higher- and middle-ranking noblemen exercised judicial and legislative authority and the right of taxation. The stratified nature of the feudal hierarchy is best known from the principality of Morea. The barons enjoyed there a strong position and participated in the decisive deliberations of the princely court. Among the other tenants-in-chief of the prince we find the Latin bishops and, from the second half of the thirteenth century, some Italian bankers and merchants to whom the princes granted knighthoods and fiefs in return for financial assistance. There were several ranks of feudatories below the direct vassals of the prince. The lowest stratum included individuals who were not members of the knightly class, namely sergeants owing mounted military service and archontes, members of the indigenous social elite whose condition will soon be discussed.7

Our knowledge of thirteenth-century feudal custom in Frankish Morea mainly derives from a private legal treatise, known as the Assizes of Romania. This compilation was completed between 1333 and 1346 in French, the language of the Frankish knights, yet has survived in a Venetian translation presumably prepared in Negroponte in the late fourteenth century.8 Moreot


8 Recoura (ed.), Les assises de Romanie, with French translation; English translation by Topping (1949), yet see numerous corrections to both translations in Jacoby (1971), passim (index of Assizes on pp. 333–6).
feudal custom progressively evolved from a mixture of imported and indigenous elements. The conquerors and their successors borrowed principles, rules and formulations from the feudal custom of their lands of origin, among them Champagne, as well as from the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, where the Frankish kings and nobility faced many problems similar to their own. A limited imprint from the feudal custom of the kingdom of Sicily was added after 1278, when the principality came under the rule of Charles I. The determining factors in the development of the legal system, though, were legislative acts and judicial precedents established by the princely court of Morea, which reflected the dynamic resolution of actual problems encountered by the Franks. In this framework the feudal custom of the principality displayed an original feature, as it incorporated elements of Byzantine law bearing on the patrimonial lands held by Greeks and on the status of dependent peasants. The Assizes confirm the strong legal and political position of the prince, and reflect both the tensions occasionally arising between him and his barons and the latter’s co-operation in his court, also known from other sources. They deal extensively with vassalic relations, fiefs, the corresponding military service, the rights of lords over their peasants and only marginally with non-feudal tenements, commercial cases and the drafting of wills. The extension of Moreot suzerainty over the islands of the Aegean in 1248 resulted in the greater participation of the Aegean lords in the political, military and above all the feudal life of the principality, alongside those of Athens and Bodonitsa. The collapse of the Latin empire in 1261 enhanced this trend, which continued after 1278 under the bailiffs appointed by Charles I and the princes directly ruling the principality. It generated the dissemination of Moreot feudal custom in all the territories subject to its suzerainty. The representatives of Venice serving as bailo in Negroponte since 1211, who dealt with judicial cases involving Venetians and their assets in the island, extended their jurisdiction to feudal matters on the basis of Moreot custom. Their interference in this area was checked in 1262, for about half a century, by the overlord of the island, William II of Morea. On the other hand, some Venetian lords in the Aegean continued to submit feudal cases to the Venetian baili. The latter’s exercise of judicial authority stimulated Venice’s interest in the use and preservation of Moreot feudal custom and eventually induced it formally to sanction, in 1452, a Venetian version of the Assizes, the dispositions of which acquired legal force in its colonial empire, except in Crete. The reliance on Moreot custom contributed decisively to the progressive extension of Venetian lordship over Frankish Negroponte and some neighbouring islands, completed in 1390.

As a result of Latin settlement, society in the territories of Romania exam-

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ined here was divided into two distinct groups. While religious affiliation was not of major importance in daily life, it constituted a criterion of basic social stratification and individual identity. The Latins belonging to the Roman Church enjoyed the superior status of freemen, *Francus* or Frank being synonymous with both Latin and freeman, while the indigenous society remaining faithful to the Greek Church was collectively debased. This society underwent an important change, generated by two factors. First, the conquering knights projected upon it their own conception of society as a rigidly stratified body, and translated Byzantine social realities into legal terms. Secondly, since the abstract concept of statehood upheld in Byzantium was alien to them, all the prerogatives and functions of the imperial government, which had retained their public nature in the empire, were transferred into the hands of feudal lords. This again was in accordance with the legal system prevailing in western society. The overall privatisation and decentralisation of state authority in judicial and fiscal matters, the twin features of feudalisation in Latin Romania, except in territories held by Venice, arrested social trends in Greek society and had a direct bearing on the status of its members. Prior to 1204 the basic social and legal distinction within Byzantine society had been between free individuals and slaves. Social as well as economic differentiation among freemen was not expressed in legal terms, and all of them were subject to the same imperial laws and courts. The Byzantine elite composed of *archontes*, great landlords, high- and middle-ranking imperial officers and imperial dignitaries who mostly lived in cities, thus lacked a legal definition. The Frankish knights, however, considered them members of a well-defined socio-legal class, similar yet not equal to their own, whose status was hereditary and who were subject to a legal system different from the one governing the bulk of the indigenous population.

With the breakdown of imperial government in the years immediately preceding and particularly those following the fall of Constantinople the *archontes* in many areas of Romania exercised effective rule over the local population. By and large those who negotiated the submission of the cities and territories under their control were allowed to retain all or portions of their patrimonial estates and the dependent peasants living in them. In the duchy of Naxos the small number of Latin settlers prompted the conqueror, Marco I Sanudo, to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Greeks and to integrate *archontes* among his feudatories. In Frankish Morea the converging interests of the Frankish knightly class and the *archontes*, more numerous than elsewhere, generated the gradual absorption of the latter and other Greeks into the ranks of the feudatories owing simple homage, the lowest stratum in the feudal hierarchy. This legal integration did not affect the status of their patrimonial estates, which remained hereditary and were governed by Byzantine law as
before the conquest. From the mid-thirteenth century, especially after the return of Byzantium to the Peloponnese in 1262, the strong urge of the Frankish leaders to ensure the loyalty, co-operation and services of the *archontes* prompted them to further the latter's social ascension by granting them fiefs subject to feudal custom and even by dubbing some of them to knighthood, a status that became hereditary. In most cases, however, this social process did not prompt the Greeks to adopt the Roman faith, nor did it reduce the reluctance of the Latin knights to intermarry with them. The limits of the legal and social assimilation achieved by the *archontes* were also illustrated by the persistence of a cultural gap between the two groups. The social promotion of the *archontes* enhanced their traditional status within their own community, yet deprived the latter of an elite willing to oppose Latin rule.11

As noted above, the entire indigenous population underwent a process of debasement as a result of the conquest. Except for the *archontes*, all Greeks sank into a state of dependency since in principle they were assimilated to *paroikoi* or dependent individuals, regardless of their personal status or place of residence prior to 1204. The *Assizes of Romania* distinguish between only two categories of Greeks, *archontes* and *paroikoi*, the latter also called *villani* by the Latins. In practice, however, the situation was more complex and a distinction apparently subsisted in some areas between urban and rural population, in any event in the early years after the Latin conquest. Political expediency accounts for Greek autonomy in Adrianople, held since 1206 by the Greek archon Theodor Branas under Venetian lordship. We may safely assume that the Greek court operating with Latin consent in Thessalonika in 1213 upheld the rules of Byzantine law regarding the *paroikoi* and their assets, as distinct from those of non-dependent city dwellers.12 Continuity in the use of the Byzantine term *paroikos* conceals a major change in the legal status and social condition of the Greeks to whom it was applied. Under Byzantine rule *paroikoi* were peasants considered legally free and as such having access to imperial courts, though tied to the imperial fisc, an ecclesiastical institution or an individual lord, and subject to some important personal restrictions. With the privatisation of governmental authority under Latin rule they were considered legally unfree, like dependent serfs or villeins in the west, and therefore members of a legal class from which they could escape only by a formal act of emancipation. The presumption of dependence was so strong that free status had to be duly proven by the Greeks who enjoyed it, preferably with the help of documents, if some doubt arose. The subjection of the *paroikos* or villein to his lord was far more rigorous than in the Byzantine period. He was considered a mere chattel and tied to the estate

of his lord, who wielded almost unlimited authority over him, except with respect to criminal justice exercised by competent courts only. The legal capacity of the paroikoi in the handling of landed property and goods was also far more restricted than in the Byzantine period. Cases of manumission appear to have been rare. Paradoxically, in the absence of Byzantine imperial authority this whole evolution also affected for the worse the condition of dependent peasants subject to archontes and Greek ecclesiastical institutions. Even lower on the social scale than the villeins were the slaves, whose numbers increased as a result of frequent warfare and piracy in Romania. Many of them were exported to the west or to Muslim countries. In its own portion of the Latin empire Venice adopted the principles and policies applied by the Frankish knights with respect to the social stratification of Greek society and the privatisation of taxation owed by the peasantry, yet it maintained state control over the property and rights it granted. By contrast, in the territories of Romania under its direct rule Venice strictly upheld the public nature of Byzantine judicial and fiscal authority as exclusive prerogatives of the state.13

The Latin conquest and the subsequent redistribution of real estate in favour of the Latins did not alter the nature of Romania’s economy. Land remained the main source of income, wealth and taxation, the agrarian infrastructure of the countryside was hardly affected, and the basic pattern of agricultural exploitation persisted. This continuity, furthered by the inclusion of Greek officers in the Latin administration, is illustrated by the survival of Byzantine administrative, fiscal and legal institutions and practices, the structure of the large estates of Frankish Morea, documented by fourteenth-century surveys, and various agricultural contracts.14 The Latin conquest, however, put an end to the dominant role of the Byzantine archontes in the financing of economic activities and definitively abolished the restrictive control of the Byzantine state over specific branches of manufacture and trade. Central and western Greece and the islands of the Aegean, which remained under Frankish rule longer than the territories recovered by Byzantium in the thirteenth century, experienced henceforth the development of an ever stronger economic interaction between the rural sector, the cities and long-distance maritime trade. The free flow of cash between these sectors of the economy was furthered by various factors: the temporary or permanent presence of Latins, mainly in coastal cities, the population of which grew; the supply of goods and services to merchants and ships in transit; the expanding western demand for agricultural and industrial commodities; and, finally, the infusion of liquid capital from the west. This last process was promoted since

the 1270s at the latest by the activity of mercantile and banking companies from Siena (Piccolomini, Tolomei), later joined by some from Florence (Cerchi, Bardi, Peruzzi). The range of their large-scale business extended from the Latin east to the fairs of Champagne and England. In Latin Greece Clarence constituted their main credit centre, yet they also operated in Corinth, Thebes and Negropont. The Italian merchants and bankers introduced new forms of profit-sharing ventures, credit, business and estate management, as well as marketing, and invested in manufacture and the exploitation of rural land. Thus in Thebes Genoese merchants acted as entrepreneurs in the silk industry since before 1240. On the whole, the presence and activity of Italian bankers, merchants and administrators in the second half of the thirteenth century stimulated a growth in agricultural, pastoral and industrial productivity, output and profit, and boosted the economy of the former western provinces of Byzantium occupied by the Latins. Industrial evolution, however, followed a different pattern. Silk textiles produced in Thebes and other silk centres continued to be shipped to the west. Yet the expanded manufacture of prized silks in Italy and of improved glass in Venice, partly intended for export to Romania, stifled the expansion of these same industries in western and central Greece and neighbouring islands. These regions increasingly supplied industrial raw materials to the west, a development that foreshadowed their absorption of the latter’s finished products. In short, an important aspect of their economic evolution was the reorientation towards the west of their long-distance exports, largely geared towards Constantinople before 1204. To be sure, the Greeks of these same regions continued to participate both in short-range and regional trade and in transportation, by land and by sea, as well as in seasonal fairs. Yet the overall share of the Latins in these activities grew at their expense, and from the 1270s the Greeks appear to have increasingly relied on Latin shipping. The seaborne commerce of western and central Greece was increasingly subordinated to the requirements, routes and seasonal rhythm of long-distance maritime trade, dominated by Venetian merchants and carriers who took advantage of Venice’s naval and diplomatic protection and the infrastructure offered by its colonies and commercial outposts. This evolution led to the growing integration of these territories into a triangular trade pattern linking Romania with Italy and the Levant. The enhanced activity of pirates and corsairs along the main sea-lanes of this network in the second half of the thirteenth century illustrates the overall growth of maritime trade in the eastern Mediterranean in this period.15

One of the most important economic effects of the Latin conquest of

Constantinople was the opening of the Black Sea to unrestricted western commerce. This development could not be reversed by the Byzantine emperors after their recovery of the city in 1261, except with respect to wheat under specific circumstances. Trade in Constantinople and the Black Sea in the years 1204–61 is poorly documented, yet its development can nevertheless be reconstructed. The crucial role of Venice in the conquest and the political life of the Latin empire ensured its traders, whether itinerant or settled, a dominant share in this trade, in which Pisan, Anconitan, Amalfitan and Provençal merchants also participated, while the Genoese made only intermittent appearances before 1261. The considerable sums handled in Constantinople by some Venetians offer an insight into the scope of their commercial operations. The treaties concluded by Giacomo Tiepolo, Venetian podestà in Constantinople, with Theodore I Laskaris in 1219 and with the Seljuqid sultan of Konya the following year attest to Venetian trade with Anatolia, and the truce between Theodore I and the Latins in 1228 to commerce with Greek-held Thrace. In the Black Sea, however, the Latins appear to have relied at first upon the customary provisioning of Constantinople, mainly in wheat, salt, fish, hides and furs, operated by indigenous Black Sea traders, and engaged only in limited ventures in this area. The commodities they brought were transshipped in Constantinople when intended for Mediterranean markets. It is only after the consolidation of Mongol rule in southern Russia in 1239–40 that the Latins markedly increased the geographical and financial range of their business in and around the Black Sea. Some of them settled in Soldaia, on the southern shore of the Crimea, which became a base for penetration into southern Russia as far as Kiev and beyond, and for the export of slaves from Mongol territory to the Mediterranean. Significantly, in 1260 two Venetians who passed through Constantinople, Niccolò and Matteo, respectively father and uncle of the famous Marco Polo, sailed from there to Soldaia on their way to China. The presence of Venetian ships in Constantinople and the Black Sea in the following year confirms the growing Latin activity in this region. Latin Constantinople thus served as an important transit station and fulfilled a pivotal function in the integration of the Black Sea area into the Mediterranean trade system.16

We have already noted a limited rapprochement between Frankish and Greek social elites. The pursuit of manufacture, trade and shipping by both Latins and Greeks, sometimes jointly, prompted some measure of economic co-operation and social intercourse between them on a daily, practical level in

urban centres. All these contacts, however, did not affect the deep-seated attitude of the bulk of the Greek population of Latin Romania toward the Latins, largely shaped by religious affiliation and ecclesiastical developments. Few Greeks joined the Roman Church in the thirteenth century, while most of them remained within their own religious community. The Latin conquerors of Constantinople first humiliated the Greeks by desecrating their sanctuaries and seizing their relics. The Greek Church of Latin Romania was soon subjected to papal authority, and its structure was reorganised along the pattern implemented in southern Italy and Sicily, which provided for the maintenance of the Greek Church wherever Greeks constituted the majority of the population. In fact, however, this Church gradually lost its bishops and many of its monastic institutions to the advantage of the Latin Church. In addition, the conquerors confiscated large portions of its extensive landed property. The growing activity of the Franciscans and the Dominicans from the 1220s put further pressure on the Greek Church of Latin Romania. Nevertheless, it displayed considerable vitality, illustrated by its continuous presence and activity among the Greeks, especially in rural areas from which the Latin Church remained practically absent. Already in the first years after the conquest the Greek clergy turned for support and inspiration to the patriarchal see of Nicaea and to the Epirote clergy. To the Greeks of the conquered territories it conveyed at a popular level the staunch theological opposition of the Byzantine Church to the papacy, and fuelled their opposition to Latin lay rule and ecclesiastical supremacy. As a result, it became the focus and promoter of Greek ethnic awareness and collective identity. Its role in this respect was particularly important in areas such as the principality of Morea, in which the archontes refused to oppose the Franks. As noted above, Greek animosity toward the conquerors and their successors contributed to the collapse of the Latin empire, yet elsewhere it had limited practical effect.17 The permanent sense of alienation felt by the Greeks and their affinity with Byzantium was described by the Venetian Marino Sanudo about 1350, more than a century after the Latin conquest: ‘Although these places are subjected to the rule of the Franks and obedient to the Byzantine Church, nevertheless almost all the population is Greek and is inclined toward this sect [i.e. the Greek Church], and their hearts are turned toward Greek matters, and when they can show this freely, they do so.’18


18 Hopf (1873), p. 143: ‘Benché detti lochi siano sottoposti al dominio de Franchi e obbidienti alla Chiesa Romana, non dimeno quasi tutto il popolo è greco e inclina a quella setta, e il cuor loro è volto alle cose greche, e quando potessero mostrarlo liberamente, lo farianno.’
it was almost unthinkable that the Queen of Cities should fall. It was in the words of Byzantine contemporaries a ‘cosmic cataclysm’. The Byzantine ruling class was disorientated and uprooted. The Constantinopolitan elite sought refuge where they could. Among the common people there was at first a sense of jubilation at their discomfiture: the proud had been humbled. Such was the demoralisation that at all levels of society submission to the conquering crusaders seemed a natural solution. Many leading Byzantines threw in their lot with the Latins. The logothete of the drome Demetrios Tornikes continued to serve them in this capacity. He was the head of one of the great bureaucratic families, who had dominated Constantinople before 1204. In the provinces leading families made deals with the conquerors. Theodore Branas governed the city of Adrianople – the key to Thrace – on behalf of the Venetians. Michael Doukas – a member of the Byzantine imperial house – took service with Boniface of Montferrat, now ruler of Thessalonika. The cooperation of the local archontes smoothed Geoffrey de Villehardouin’s conquest of the Peloponnese.

The crusaders elected a Latin emperor and created a Latin patriarch of Constantinople. There seemed every possibility that Byzantium would be refashioned in a Latin image. For exactly a year the Latins carried all before them. Then in April 1205 their success came abruptly to an end. They had alienated and underestimated the Bulgarians, who crushed them at the battle of Adrianople. Many of the crusade leaders were killed. The Latin Emperor Baldwin of Flanders was led away into captivity, never again to be seen alive.

This defeat revealed how insecure the Latins were in their newly conquered lands. It gave heart to the three Byzantine successor states that were emerging in exile. The most remote centred on the city of Trebizond, where Alexios and David Komnenos, grandsons of the tyrant Andronikos I Komnenos,
established themselves early in 1204. David then pushed westwards to secure control of Paphlagonia, which had been held by his grandfather. This brought him into conflict with Theodore Laskaris, who was organising resistance to the Latins from Nicaea. Laskaris was the son-in-law and heir presumptive of Alexios III Angelos (1195–1203). He had escaped from Constantinople in September 1203, soon after his father-in-law had abandoned the capital to the young Alexios Angelos and the soldiers of the Fourth Crusade. Theodore Laskaris secured control of the Bithynian cities in his father-in-law’s name. By the summer of 1205 it had become clear that Alexios III Angelos was a Latin prisoner. Theodore therefore had himself acclaimed emperor, the better to deal with his various rivals, of whom David Komnenos was the most dangerous. Meanwhile, the foundations of a third Byzantine successor state were being laid in Epiros behind the Pindos mountains by Michael Doukas who had quickly abandoned his Latin allegiance.

The Latin defeat at Adrianople allowed the Greeks to ponder the true meaning of the Latin conquest. The horror of the sack of Constantinople began to sink in. Sanctuaries were desecrated, nuns raped and boys of noble family sold into slavery among the Saracens. The atrocity stories that now started to circulate had only a single theme: the crusader sack of Constantinople was a calculated insult to Orthodoxy. At the hospital of St Sampson the Latins turned the marble altar screen with its scenes from sacred history into a cover for the common latrine; at the shrine of the Archangel Michael at Anaplous a cardinal smeared the icons of saints with chalk and then threw icons and relics into the sea.  

1 But how were the sufferings of Constantinople to be avenged? The Orthodox Church was effectively without leadership. The Patriarch John Kamateros does not cut an impressive figure. He had escaped from Constantinople to the relative security of the Thracian town of Didymoteichos. He refused an invitation to move to Nicaea where resistance to the Latins was strongest. When he died in June 1206, it was imperative that a new Orthodox patriarch be elected. Otherwise, the patriarchate of Constantinople would pass by default to the Latins. The people and clergy of Constantinople hoped that Pope Innocent III would approve the election of a new Orthodox patriarch. They cited the example of the crusader states, where the patriarchal sees of Antioch and Jerusalem had been divided between an Orthodox and a Latin incumbent. This initiative appears to have been blocked by the Latin authorities in Constantinople.  

2 The Orthodox clergy of Constantinople therefore turned to Theodore Laskaris at Nicaea. He gave his support to the election of a new Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople. Michael Autoreianos was duly ordained patriarch

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1 Cotelerius, Ecclesiae graecae monumenta, pp. 311–13.  
2 Gill (1973).
at Nicaea on 20 March 1208. His first official act was to crown and anoint Theodore Laskaris emperor on Easter Day. Thus was a Byzantine empire recreated in exile in Nicaea.3

Members of the old elite gravitated to the new capital. The historian Niketas Choniates was one of them. He picked up the threads of old acquaintances. He commiserated with Constantine Mesopotamites, the archbishop of Thessalonika, who had fallen into the hands of pirates, but was now safe in Epiros.4 He hoped to persuade his brother Michael, the archbishop of Athens, to come to Nicaea. Theodore Laskaris had a ship ready to whisk him away from ‘windy Keos’ where he had found refuge. The archbishop refused the invitation. He preferred to remain within easy reach of his Athenian flock.5 At Nicaea Niketas Choniates found time to complete his great history, in which he tried to explain why the disaster of 1204 should have overtaken Constantinople. He also looked to the future. He compiled his *Treasury of Orthodoxy*, which was designed to counter heresy. The defence of Orthodoxy became central to the ideology of exile which he elaborated as court orator for Theodore Laskaris. Exile was punishment for the sins of the past. The parallel with the Israelites was much in Niketas’s mind. He compared the waters of Nicaea’s Lake Askania to the waters of Babylon. In exile the Byzantines, like the Israelites, would atone for their sins and would recover divine favour. The New Jerusalem would be theirs again. Their immediate task was to preserve the purity of Orthodoxy in the face of the Latin threat.6

The ideology of exile would at first be virulently anti-Latin in contrast to the more restrained attitudes that prevailed before 1204. The impressions created by the sack of Constantinople were reinforced by the intransigence displayed by the Latin Church in discussions that were subsequently organised between representatives of the two Churches. These discussions only underlined the contempt felt by the Latins for the Greeks. The papal legate Pelagius provided further confirmation of Latin arrogance towards the Orthodox Church. In 1214 he closed the Orthodox Churches in Constantinople and persecuted Greek monks who refused to recognise papal primacy. As a counterblast to his activities, Constantine Stilbes, the bishop of Cyzicus, produced his

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3 Heisenberg, ‘Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion. iii’, pp. 5–12. Gounaridis (1985) prefers 1207 to the traditional date of 1208. The balance of probabilities still favours 1208 as the date of the election of a new Orthodox patriarch at Nicaea and of the coro


Griefs (aitiamata) against the Latins. This is one of the key documents of anti-Latin polemic. It marked a decisive shift from reasoned debate to justified prejudice. Stilbes had little to say about theological differences. Instead, he concentrated on two issues: papal primacy and holy war. These were interlinked. They had pervaded Latin Christianity and had produced the tragedy of 1204.

To take papal primacy first, Stilbes charged that the Latins did not simply regard the pope as the successor of St Peter. It was not even that they identified the two. It was worse than this: they deified the pope and insisted that all Christians submit to his authority. The perversion of papal authority was apparent in the issuing of indulgences. Stilbes was the first Byzantine theologian to draw attention to this Latin practice. What horrified him was not so much that past sins were pardoned, but those that were still to be committed. It was the same with oaths: the pope was capable of releasing Latins not only from those that had already been sworn, but also from those yet to be taken. Papal authority thus undermined the moral order that Christianity was supposed to uphold. It was also used to promote warfare.

The Byzantines had considered, but always rejected, the notion of Holy War. They followed St Basil of Caesarea’s teaching that in all circumstances the taking of human life was wrong. The notion of the crusade disturbed the Byzantines. It was mostly clearly expressed in Anna Komnena’s story about the fighting priest. She concluded: ‘thus the race is no less devoted to religion than to war’. It was Stilbes who fused this disquiet into an outright condemnation of the Latin Church’s devotion to war. He accused the Latin Church of teaching that men dying in battle went to paradise. This might not have been official doctrine, but beliefs of this kind circulated among crusaders. Latin bishops were supposed to sprinkle naked youths with holy water and in this way to turn them into invincible warriors. Stilbes seems to be garbling the Latin Church’s role in the making of a knight. Again he was not so far off the mark.

The sack of Constantinople confirmed Stilbes’s portrayal of the Latin faith as one perverted by papal primacy and its espousal of war as an instrument of expansion. The crusaders had desecrated the churches of Constantinople and had profaned the cathedral of St Sophia. Latin priests and bishops had played an active role in the assault on the city. A bishop had been in the van holding aloft a cross. The Latin clergy had done nothing to prevent the excesses of the crusaders. If anything, they had encouraged them. They had desecrated the holy images. Stilbes closed his tract with a demonstration that because of its addiction to war the Latin Church had lapsed into heresy. Stilbes fixed in the Byzantine mind an image of the Latins that would never be erased. Some years

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7 Darrouzès, ‘Le mémoire de Constantin Stilbès contre les Latins’.
later in 1231 when there was talk of a compromise with the Latin authorities on the island of Cyprus, the Orthodox clergy and people of Constantinople sent a delegation to Nicaea. They protested that this was to ignore their sufferings at the hands of the Latins: they had been imprisoned; they had had their beards pulled out. Any deal with the Latins would mean ‘a betrayal of the faith handed down from their fathers’. The members of the delegation insisted that an obsession with war had driven the Latins ‘raving mad’, priests and laity alike. They would take any concession on the part of the Greeks as a sign of weakness and surrender.9 The events of 1204 brought the Latins into sharper focus. It was part of the way that the Byzantine identity was reconstructed in an anti-Latin sense in the course of the period of exile. The new patriarch Michael Autoreianos even offered spiritual rewards to those Byzantines laying down their life in the fight against the Latins.10

Having laid the foundations of a Byzantine empire in exile Theodore I Laskaris found himself under threat from an unexpected quarter. In 1211 his imperial claims were challenged by his father-in-law Alexios III Angelos who had the backing of the Seljuq Turks. Theodore Laskaris engaged the Seljuq armies at the border town of Antioch on the Meander. The battle started to go against him, so he sought out the Seljuq sultan and killed him in single combat. The Seljuq forces melted away. Alexios III Angelos was led off to end his days in a Nicaean monastery. The manner of Theodore Laskaris’s triumph did wonders for his prestige, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. He had lost his best troops – paradoxically Latin mercenaries. The Latin emperor Henry of Hainault invaded from the north and swept all before him. Laskaris had to cede to the Latins the north-western corner of Asia Minor. This placed a wedge between his territories in the north around Nicaea and those in the south around Smyrna, making communications difficult. The death of David Komenos in 1212 provided some compensation. It allowed Theodore Laskaris to annex Paphlagonia. This had the effect of cutting off the empire of Trebizond from the mainstream of Byzantine history. It became instead a ‘Greek emirate’. Its history belongs with that of Anatolia and the Black Sea rather than with that of the late Byzantine empire.

III

Theodore Laskaris died in 1221. His death was followed by civil strife, out of which his son-in-law John Vatatzes (1221–54) emerged as victor. Later generations remembered Theodore with gratitude. He had recreated Byzantium in

9 Sathas (1873), p. 11.2–11.
exile, but his success was limited. This contrasted with the fortunes of Theodore Angelos who had taken over the leadership of resistance to the Latins in Epiros. Theodore was a younger brother of the Emperor Alexios III Angelos. In 1217 he was able to waylay a Latin army advancing down the Via Egnatia from the Adriatic coast. It was commanded by Peter de Courtenay, the new Latin emperor. The Latins were defeated and Peter de Courtenay disappeared for ever. This Latin defeat bears comparison with that suffered at Adrianople at the hands of the Bulgarians. It prepared the way for Theodore Angelos’s occupation of Thessalonika in the autumn of 1224. This set the seal on his military achievements. He had made himself the most powerful ruler in the southern Balkans. He pushed eastwards and by 1228 he was within striking distance of Constantinople. To enhance his claims he had himself proclaimed and crowned emperor. Although the existence of rival emperors was nothing new, there were now two Byzantine emperors in exile with a claim on Constantinople. In the background there remained the formidable strength of the Bulgarian tsar John Asen II (1218–41). Though nominally a Catholic, he too had designs on Latin Constantinople. These were sharpened when in 1228 the Latins contemptuously rejected his offer to act as regent for the young Latin emperor, Baldwin II.

These competing ambitions helped to ensure the survival for another thirty years or more of the Latin empire of Constantinople, which was reduced to little more than the city and its immediate hinterland. In the end, it was the so-called Nicaean empire that would emerge as the victor. This outcome was far from obvious in 1228, when the forces of Theodore Angelos drove those of the Nicaean Emperor John Vatatzes out of the key Thracian city of Adrianople. It became less unlikely two years later when Theodore Angelos invaded Bulgaria. He was defeated and captured by John Ašen at the battle of Klokotnitsa. He was blinded and spent the next seven years in a Bulgarian prison. His Balkan territories, as far west as the Adriatic, fell into the hands of his captor. Of Theodore’s territories only Thessalonika, Thessaly and Epiros eluded the Bulgarian conquest. These were divided among members of the Angelos dynasty.

Once John Ašen had consolidated his new territories, he entered into an alliance with his potential rival, the Nicaean Emperor John Vatatzes, against the Latins of Constantinople. The initiative came from the Nicaean emperor. He was by far the weaker party, but he deployed one tempting bargaining counter. He could offer patriarchal status to the Church of Bulgaria. The alliance was sealed by the marriage of the heir apparent to the Nicaean throne to a daughter of the Bulgarian tsar. There was an ineffective siege of the city in 1235. Then the allies broke up in acrimony. The only positive result was that the Nicaeans gained a permanent foothold in Thrace. It provided their emperor
John Vatatzes with a base for intervention in the Balkans. After the death of John Asen he took advantage of the ensuing uncertainty to annex much of the southern Balkans. His campaign culminated in December 1246 with his triumphant entry into the city of Thessalonika. The recovery of Constantinople now seemed a distinct possibility.

Contemporaries conceded that John Vatatzes’s great virtue was patience. This, in its turn, was a reflection of the underlying strengths of the Nicaean empire, which Vatatzes knew how to enhance and exploit. He could afford to be patient. He could also afford to keep armies in the field and to maintain an impressive fleet, something that had proved too costly for Byzantine emperors before 1204. This was an indication of the soundness of his fiscal administration. Paradoxically, the loss of Constantinople made for more efficient government. In the years before 1204 it had become bloated and inefficient. In exile, administration had to be simplified. There was no place for the old departments of state (logothesia). Central government was reduced to little more than a household administration. The financial side was concentrated in the imperial wardrobe (vestiarion). The whole administration was run for much of Vatatzes’s reign by one minister, Demetrios Tornikes. On his death in 1247 his duties were split between four secretaries, who in all probability had been his subordinates. The simplification of central government dramatically reduced its costs. The burden of administration was shifted to the provincial authorities. This was possible because in western Asia Minor the theme organisation had survived the fall of Constantinople intact. It meant that the tax-raising machinery was still in place. However, the main taxes acquired new names. Synone – land tax – and kapnikon – hearth tax – were replaced by sitarkia and agape. The meaning of this change of names remains unclear. It may only have been a matter of adopting local terminology. It does not seem to have entailed any radical reform of the taxation system. Tax payers continued to be divided according to their means into the same fiscal categories as before: zeugaratoi, boidatoi, aktemones and aporoi. The only major fiscal innovation of the period of exile was the expedient known as epiteleia, which attached a fiscal value to property. It had three main purposes: it was a way of transferring fiscal obligations from one taxpayer to another; it could be used to safeguard the fiscal privileges; and finally payment of epiteleia could be cited as proof of property rights. It acted as a lubricant of the fiscal system at a time when there was a significant growth of privileged property. Its importance is evident from the way it was retained until the demise of the Byzantine empire.  

The efficacy of the Byzantine fiscal system depended on the maintenance of a cadastral register. John Vatatzes instituted a revision of the cadastral register

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for his Anatolian provinces early on in his reign. This was in keeping with his
careful supervision of fiscal administration. He learned on one occasion that
two of his receivers were carrying out their duties improperly. He had one
beaten so severely that he died. The other had the good sense to flee to
Trebizond. On another occasion, a local official made a wrong tax assess-
ment. To teach him a lesson the emperor forced him to pay the sum wrongly
assessed.

The simplification of government inevitably meant some devolution of
authority. The most obvious form this took was the creation of new immuni-
ties and pronoiai, which entitled the holder to some or all of the state revenues
from a particular area. The period of exile saw a decisive growth of privileged
property. In these circumstances stringent control over fiscal administration
was essential for the protection of remaining imperial rights and revenues. It
was inevitable that there should have been some decline of revenue, but the
emperors of Nicaea were able to compensate for this by building up the impe-
rial demesne. They were able to exploit the confused situation following the
fall of Constantinople to appropriate properties without clear title of owners-
ship. They took over, for example, many of the estates in western Anatolia
belonging to the monasteries of Constantinople. John Vatatzes insisted on the
careful management of the imperial demesne, which was undoubtedly a lucra-
tive source of revenue. All the signs are that the period of exile was a time of
agrarian prosperity in western Asia Minor. It was able to export grain and other
foodstuffs to the Seljuqs of Konya. Later descriptions of the wealth of the
Nicaean empire owed something to nostalgia, but seem essentially correct.

John Vatatzes is one of the few medieval rulers credited by contemporaries
with an economic policy. He is supposed to have adopted a policy of autarky.
This took the form of a sumptuary law that his subjects should wear clothes
made of home-produced cloth. Here was an attempt to stem the tide of
imported western and Muslim materials. This measure seems to have been
a response to the sudden appearance on the markets of the eastern
Mediterranean from the late twelfth century onwards of huge quantities of
western cloth. John Vatatzes’s sumptuary law was not likely to make very much
difference in the long run, but in the short term he seems to have been able to
protect his territories from Italian commercial penetration. Despite the
respectable number of Italian, and particularly Venetian, commercial docu-
ments surviving from the period, there are precious few indications of Italian
trade with the ports of the Nicaean empire. Vatatzes’s autarkic policy was
intended as an assertion of Byzantine independence. It may have been practi-

cal for a time because western Asia Minor was relatively remote from the major trade routes of the Mediterranean. Autarky had some political value: it allowed Vatatzes to pose as an emperor who had the well-being of his subjects at heart. This was one of his strengths as emperor.

Another was the presence at Nicaea of the Orthodox patriarchate of Constantinople. John Vatatzes was fortunate in the Patriarch Germanos II (1223–40), who supported him loyally in the difficulties he encountered at the beginning of his reign. There was a series of conspiracies against him involving leading court families. The most serious was the work of brothers of the late emperor Theodore Laskaris. They engineered a Latin invasion of the Nicaean empire, but to no avail. John Vatatzes won a resounding victory over the Latins at Poimanenon in 1224 and followed it up by driving the Latins out of Asia Minor. John Vatatzes rewarded the patriarch for his loyalty during this critical period by acceding to his request and issuing a chrysobull protecting episcopal property during a vacancy.

The major achievement of the Patriarch Germanos II was to restore the moral standing of the Orthodox patriarchate which had been bruised by its ignominious role in the years leading up to 1204. He connected the depravity of Constantinople before its fall with its ethnically mixed population. He describes its population as ‘the sordid droppings of prostitutes and adulterous connections, offspring of servant girls bought for cash, sprung willy nilly from the Rhos or the descendents of Hagar and the rest of the racial stew’. Exile provided the opportunity to ‘purify the dialect of the tribe’ and to create a healthier society. The patriarch reveals something of the motive force behind the growth of a Byzantine proto-nationalism, which otherwise tends to be seen in terms of a nostalgia for a Hellenic past. Its greatest strength came from its identification with Orthodoxy. The defence of Orthodoxy was Germanos II’s main concern. He renewed the attack on the Bogomil heresy, which had recovered some of its support in the turmoil that followed the fall of Constantinople. But of more immediate importance to the patriarch was the condition of the Orthodox communities at Constantinople and in Cyprus which were suffering under Latin rule. Germanos sought to strengthen them in their faith. By ministering to the Orthodox beyond the political frontiers of the Nicaean empire Germanos II was able to underscore the fact that Constantinople might have fallen into Latin hands, but Orthodoxy still stood, though with its centre now at Nicaea. To some this might have seemed an idle boast. The Greeks of the Peloponnese acquiesced in the rule of their Frankish princes who had the sense to guarantee the rights of Orthodox parish priests.

15 Lagopates, Γερμανός δ’ Β’, Πατριάρχης Κωνσταντινουπόλεως-Νικαίας.
17 Lagopates, Γερμανός δ’ Β’, Πατριάρχης Κωνσταντινουπόλεως-Νικαίας, p. 282.23–6.
Bulgaria was still nominally Catholic. The Serbian king Stefan the ‘First-crowned’ obtained a royal crown from the papacy in 1217. To avert the possibility that Serbia would drift into the Catholic orbit the patriarch at Nicaea recognised the autocephalous status of the Serbian archbishopric.\(^\text{18}\) Germanos II had to face the danger that the Orthodox Church would fragment along political lines, leaving it an easier prey for the Latin Church.

Such considerations bedevilled Germanos II’s relations with the Orthodox bishops of Epiros, whose primary loyalty was to their ruler Theodore Angelos. The latter’s assumption of imperial honours in 1227/8 produced a schism between the Orthodox patriarchate at Nicaea and the Church in Theodore Angelos’s territories. Germanos II refused to accept the validity of Theodore Angelos’s imperial coronation. This was performed by Demetrios Chomatenos, the archbishop of Ohrid. His Church enjoyed autocephalous status. Increasingly he assumed a patriarchal role. His tribunal became a court of appeal for cases throughout the territories of Theodore Angelos. His stance became less easy to justify after the break-up of Theodore Angelos’s ‘empire’ in the wake of his capture by the Bulgarians at the battle of Klokotnitsa in 1230. Two years later the schism ended with the western bishops recognising the authority of the patriarch at Nicaea. Germanos was vindicated. In 1238 he made a progress around the churches of Epiros which took him as far as Arta.

His intransigence in his dealings with the bishops of the ‘western’ Church contrasted with the line he took over the Bulgarian Church. In 1235 he granted it patriarchal status, but always safeguarding the primacy of honour due to the Orthodox patriarch. This concession was made as part of an alliance between the Bulgarian Tsar John II Asën and the Nicaean emperor John Vatatzes. It was largely a political move. The patriarch was doing the emperor’s bidding. The patriarch might have found some consolation in the thought that the alternative was worse: the Bulgarian Church would in all likelihood have returned to its Roman allegiance. This would have been a negation of Germanos’s endeavours over the preceeding three years to bring the Bulgarian Church once again into the Orthodox communion.

IV

Germanos II bowed to one of the facts of Byzantine political life: emperors were always likely to use Orthodoxy as a weapon or a bargaining counter in their foreign policy. The emperors of Nicaea continued the practice. In 1207 Theodore I Laskaris turned to Pope Innocent III for recognition as the leader of the Orthodox community. This was done in conjunction with a request that

the pope should authorise the election of a new Orthodox patriarch of Constantinople. Innocent ignored both requests. Theodore therefore went ahead with plans for the creation of a new patriarch at Nicaea. Innocent despatched his legate Cardinal Pelagius in 1214. His main task was to discipline the Greek Church, but he also entered into negotiations with the Nicaean emperor. There was a series of inconclusive debates about a reunion of the Churches, first at Constantinople and then at Pontic Heraclea, where Theodore Laskaris was encamped. The Nicaean emperor used these as a cover for the completion of a peace treaty with the Latin emperor Henry of Hainault. The lesson was an old one: that there were political advantages to be gained from negotiating over the union of Churches. Theodore Laskaris tried again in 1219. By this time he had married a Latin princess and he had plans to marry one of his daughters to the heir to the Latin empire of Constantinople. The Latin patriarchate was vacant. Theodore Laskaris proposed summoning a council that would consider the possibility of the reunion of the Churches, as a first step towards the peaceful recovery of Constantinople. The emperor’s complicated manoeuvre was frustrated by opposition from within the Orthodox Church.

In any case, it would have been unrealistic to expect anything concrete to emerge from negotiations over the reunion of the Churches given the hatred engendered by the conquest of Constantinople which was only intensified by the subsequent Latin discrimination against the Orthodox under their rule. However, a new force was about to make its presence felt. By 1220 the Franciscans had established a house at Constantinople and by 1228 the Dominicans too. They introduced a spirit of reasoned dialogue to which the Greeks responded. The Patriarch Germanos II first came into contact with the friars in 1232. In that year a party of Franciscans was travelling overland through Turkey and was seized by the Seljuq authorities. With the help of the emperor the patriarch was able to ransom them and had them brought to Nicaea. He was struck by their poverty and by their humility, so unlike other Latin churchmen. He was impressed by their desire for peace and for reconciliation between Latin and Greek.

It seemed that there was a new spirit abroad in the Latin Church which would make possible a reunion of the Churches by methods and on terms that were acceptable to the Orthodox Church. Germanos II induced the Franciscans to act as intermediaries with the papal curia. They were to sound out the possibilities for preliminary discussions that might pave the way for the holding of a general council of the Church, which was the appropriate arena for a reunion of the Churches. Some eighteen months later a delegation made

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19 Wolff (1944).
up of two Franciscans and two Dominicans set out from Rome for Nicaea where they were welcomed in January 1234 by the emperor and the patriarch. The friars’ remit went no further than an exchange of views with the patriarch. The friars had much the better of the argument. Their knowledge of Greek patristics made them formidable opponents. One of them read out in Greek the anathema pronounced by St Cyril of Alexandria: against those denying that the Spirit through which Christ performed his miracles was His own Spirit. The friars argued that this supported the Latin position on the Procession of the Holy Spirit: that it proceeded from the Father and the Son (filioque). Germanos wound up the proceedings on the grounds that nothing more could usefully done until the Orthodox patriarchs of Antioch, Jerusalem and Alexandria arrived to participate in a council. The friars departed; they had not received papal authorisation to take part in a council with representatives of the Orthodox Church, but they held out the prospect that the reunion of the Churches would lead to the restoration of the Orthodox patriarchate to Constantinople. They requested to be kept informed of future developments.

Germanos II therefore invited the friars to take part in the council that was assembling at the imperial residence of Nymphaion near Smyrna. They sounded out opinion in Latin Constantinople. To accept the invitation would mean exceeding their instructions, but the situation at Constantinople was so desperate that any contact with the Nicaean court was to be welcomed. They therefore journeyed to Nymphaion, but they were simply playing for time. They had no authority to negotiate, but they did make one damaging admission. They insisted that the Latin conquest of Constantinople had never received the approval of the papacy. It was the work of ‘laymen, sinners and excommunicates presuming on their authority’. The implication was that the pope might one day abandon his support for the Latin empire of Constantinople. But the friars refused to accept that the onus for the sack of Constantinople should fall on the Latins alone. The Greeks had to take their share of the blame for the way they had treated Latins. The friars raised the old accusations that the Greeks washed altars after they had been used by Latins; that they forced Latins to renounce their sacraments as the price of attending Orthodox services. The council broke up in displays of bad temper. The friars fled for their lives. The Nicaeans resumed the blockade of Constantinople.20

Though this episode produced no concrete results and only seemed to confirm the gulf that separated Greek and Latin, it was nevertheless important. Byzantine emperors and patriarchs remained susceptible to the appeal of the friars. Their ideals seemed so different from those of the Church militant,

which was the face that the Roman Church normally presented to the outside world. Those friars operating out of Constantinople as often as not knew Greek and were well versed in Greek patristics. They were willing to debate with representatives of the Orthodox Church on their own terms. Their knowledge of Orthodox theology, even their appreciation of Byzantine art, made them seem more sympathetic than perhaps they were. Francis of Assisi was, indeed, to become one of the few western medieval saints to acquire a popular following in the Greek world. Their presence at Constantinople meant that there was always a temptation to enter negotiations with the Latin Church.

The friars were not exclusively in the service of the papacy. Elias of Cortona, the minister general of the Franciscans, was close to Emperor Frederick II. He was sent on a mission to Constantinople to broker a peace between the Latin empire and John Vatatzes, who presented him with many gifts and relics. These negotiations laid the foundations for a formal alliance between Frederick II and John Vatatzes. This was sealed by the marriage in 1243 of the latter to the former’s bastard daughter Costanza Lancia. The main advantage that John Vatatzes derived from this alliance was prestige. It was under its cover that he accomplished his major conquests in the southern Balkans, culminating in the occupation of Thessalonika in 1246. Thereafter the alliance seemed to offer little in the way of concrete reward. The recovery of Constantinople seemed as far off as ever. Vatatzes began to consider other possibilities. His sister-in-law was married to the Hungarian king. She tried to interest him in an understanding with Pope Innocent IV. Her efforts only bore fruit when John Vatatzes learnt that John of Parma had been made minister general of the Franciscans in July 1247. Why this appointment should have had this effect on John Vatatzes is not immediately clear. It may have had something to do with Vatatzes’s choice of two Franciscans from Constantinople to act as his intermediaries with the papal curia. They may have been able to convince the Nicaean emperor that their new minister general favoured an understanding with the Orthodox Church.

John of Parma received his commission from Pope Innocent IV on 28 May 1249. His task was to negotiate the return of the Greeks ‘in obedience and devotion to the Roman Church . . . from which they have for so long withdrawn themselves’. He was given very precise instructions. Orthodox teaching on the procession of the Holy Ghost must conform to that of the Roman Church. To this end John of Parma was empowered to convolve in the pope’s name a Church council for discussions with the Orthodox Church. He reached the Nicaean court by the autumn of 1249 at the outside. Preliminary discussions must necessarily have focused on one difficult question: under whose auspices was a council to be held? In his instructions to John of Parma Innocent IV made the following claim: ‘some Greek theologians – as is true –
assert that the Roman pontiff, who alone has the authority to convolve a
council, is able to effect an agreement between our creed and that of the
Greeks – once a council has assembled – on the basis of his authority and that
of the council’. Underlying such an assertion there must have been some
concession made by the Nicaean emissaries, to the effect that any agreement
over the creed reached by a council of the Orthodox Church must then receive
papal approval. The claim that the pope alone has authority to call a council can
only have been a papal gloss on the Orthodox position. It would not have been
acceptable to representatives of the Orthodox Church.

A council assembled at Nymphaion in the spring of 1250 under the presi-
dency of the Nicaean emperor. The question of the procession of the Holy
Spirit was duly debated. John of Parma argued that God the Father operates
through the Son and the Son through the Spirit. He then put forward as its
corollary the following proposition: just as the Son is from the Father, so the
Spirit is from the Son. This left the Greek representatives stunned. They
turned for help to their most expert theologian Nikephoros Blemmydes, who
was present but had held aloof from the proceedings. Blemmydes protested
that there was no scriptural authority for the Son operating through the Spirit.
The Son operated in the Spirit, which was quite another matter. Blemmydes’s
intervention does not seem to have spoiled the irenic atmosphere that pre-
vailed, to judge by the letter sent at the close of the council by the Orthodox
patriarch Manuel II to Innocent IV. The patriarch claimed that there had been a
free and open discussion of the outstanding issues. The official Latin minutes
of the council show that the Greeks were apparently willing to make unpre-
cedented concessions over Roman claims to primacy and to accept papal
authority over the general council with certain safeguards. In return, the
Greeks – somewhat naively – requested the return of Constantinople and the
removal of the Latin emperor and patriarch. A Nicaean delegation was
despached to the papal curia with full powers to continue the debate on these
issues.

Innocent IV gave his reply early in 1252. He approved the Greek conces-
sions on papal primacy and authority over the council. The addition of the
filioque to the creed remained a problem. The Greek delegates refused to coun-
tenance it unless it could be supported by scriptural authority or some divinum
oraculum. Innocent IV did not think this reasonable, but in a spirit of reconcilia-
tion allowed the Orthodox Church to omit the filioque, pending the final deci-
sion of a general council. Innocent IV was not able to offer anything concrete
over the return of Constantinople to the Greeks. Negotiations continued, but
the pope made his intentions crystal clear by appointing to the Latin patriar-
chate of Constantinople which had been vacant. There was also vague talk at
the papal curia of organising a crusade to aid the Latin empire. The almost
simultaneous deaths in 1254 of pope, Nicaean emperor and patriarch put an end to this round of negotiations over the Union of Churches, but they had been doomed to deadlock ever since the death of Frederick II in December 1250.\(^{21}\)

John Vatatzes understood that it was in his interests to play off empire against papacy. To this end Vatatzes strove to keep alive his alliance with Frederick II, while negotiating with the papacy over the reunion of Churches. He continued to supply his father-in-law with troops right down to the time of the latter's death. Frederick remonstrated with his son-in-law. Did he not realise that the pope was trying to drive a wedge between them? Was it not this pope who had excommunicated the Greeks as schismatics, when the true blame for the schism lay with Rome? Frederick was nevertheless, at first, willing to put ships at the disposal of the Nicaean delegation that was making its way to the papal curia. They were playing a complicated diplomatic game. Vatatzes found his continued alliance with Frederick II a useful means of constraining the papacy. Frederick's death in December 1250 meant that the papacy was no longer under such pressure to accommodate the Nicaean emperor.\(^{22}\)

It has become usual in recent years to emphasise the importance of this episode of Nicaean diplomacy. It is presented as the moment when a reunion of Churches on terms acceptable to both sides was most likely to have come about. That is how it was later seen by Michael VIII Palaiologos, who used it as a precedent to justify his unionist policy. Unlike Michael Palaiologos, John Vatatzes seems not to have encountered opposition to rapprochement with the papacy, despite the concessions over papal primacy that he was willing to make. This is all the more surprising for the bitter feelings that were often expressed about the Latins. The loss of Constantinople should have warned against any dealings with the west. The ideal was that in exile the Byzantines would rebuild their strength, but the reality was that the lands of the old Byzantine empire were permeated by western interests. It was a fact confirmed by the conquest of Constantinople in 1204. While the Nicaean empire was limited to western Asia Minor it was possible to preserve an isolationist stance. However, the moment John Vatatzes felt confident enough to aim at the conquest of Constantinople, he had to come to terms with western hegemony. Conditions seemed propitious because of the conflict between empire and papacy, which Vatatzes sought to exploit. In principle, this was little different from the line of

\(^{21}\) Franchi (1981); Gill (1979), pp. 88–95.

\(^{22}\) Borsari (1951); Merendino (1974). Brezeanu (1974) has redated the marriage of John Vatatzes and Costanza Lancia to 1241/2. The document he relies on is to be dated to 1243 and not, as he supposed, 1242. This means that the marriage can now be safely ascribed to 1242/3 and not 1244, the traditional date for this marriage.
policy pursued by Manuel I Komnenos, but John Vatatzes was operating, in comparison, from a position of weakness.

This is clearest in his dealings with Frederick II. In the earlier exchanges of letters dating from the 1230s Frederick II fails to accord Vatatzes the imperial titles. After the marriage of his daughter to Vatatzes he addresses him as emperor of the Greeks, a title that Manuel Komnenos would have found insulting. It was an unequal alliance. Vatatzes was the junior partner. Frederick II’s interest in the Byzantine world is hard to unravel. He inherited his father Henry VI’s ambitions which included hegemony over Byzantium; this was not likely to have been one of his major concerns. But any ruler of Sicily had an interest in Corfu and the Ionian islands. George Bardanes, the Orthodox bishop of Corfu, had the task of diverting this interest. In a letter written in about 1236 to Frederick he queried the value that such an insignificant possession could have for so great a ruler. He indicated that his lord Manuel Angelos, the ruler of Thessalonika, was willing to recognise Frederick’s suzerainty.23

It was around this time that a rumour was circulating in the west to the effect that Manuel Angelos, John Vatatzes and the Bulgarian tsar John II Ašen had offered Frederick homage in return for an alliance against the Latin empire of Constantinople. Homage is unlikely to have been strictly accurate, just a western gloss on an unequal partnership. There were plans at this time for John Vatatzes to make a state visit to Frederick’s court.24 By 1238 Vatatzes was sending troops to Italy to help Frederick and continued to do so until the latter’s death. Frederick’s ascendancy extended to the other petty rulers of the Greek east. At the very end of his reign he wrote to the ruler of Epiros insisting that he allow Nicaean troops to pass through his territories on their way to Italy. This episode illustrates the dilemma of the Byzantine states in exile. Their foreign relations necessitated recourse to the papacy and the Hohenstaufen; the ideology of exile condemned any contact with the Latins. John Vatatzes managed to avoid the consequences of this contradiction, but they would come back to haunt Michael VIII Palaiologos.

After Frederick II’s death the Regno eventually passed to his bastard son Manfred. He strove to retain Frederick’s hegemony over the various Greek rulers. Instead he found himself being dragged into the struggle between Nicaea and Epiros. Michael II Angelos, the ruler of Epiros, understood that only with Latin aid would he be able to capitalise on the internal divisions that opened up at the Nicaean court following John Vatatzes’s death in November 1254. The new Nicaean emperor was his son Theodore II Laskaris, who adopted — perhaps in imitation of Frederick II — a more autocratic stance.

24 Wellas (1983), pp. 130–41, but see Longo (1985–6), who argues that the John Vatatzes in question was not the emperor, but the governor of Corfu.
towards his aristocracy. His chief opponent was Michael Palaiologos, the future emperor. He held the position of grand constable, which gave him command of the Latin mercenaries in Nicaean service. Rather than face a charge of treason Palaiologos preferred to seek refuge among the Seljuq Turks. He returned to the Nicaean court shortly before Theodore II Laskaris’s death in August 1258. Thereupon Palaiologos organised a coup with the help of the Latin mercenaries under his command. He respected the constitutional niceties in the sense that he claimed to rule in the name of Theodore’s son John Laskaris, the legitimate heir to the Nicaean throne. But this was merely a cover for usurpation, which took him inexorably from regent to co-emperor and finally to sole emperor.

This dynastic interlude gave Michael II Angelos his opportunity. He was able to draw both the Frankish prince of the Peloponnese and Manfred into an anti-Nicaean coalition. The allied forces met the Nicaean army in the late summer of 1259 at Pelagonia on the Via Egnatia and were completely defeated. The prince together with the flower of the chivalry of the Frankish Peloponnese fell into Nicaean hands. This victory left Michael Palaiologos as the dominant force in the Balkans. It could only be a matter of time before his armies recovered Constantinople. This duly occurred in July 1261 when a small Nicaean force slipped into Constantinople while the Latin garrison was temporarily absent. On 15 August 1261 Michael Palaiologos entered the city in triumph. It was a return to the Promised Land.25

V

What then was the historical importance of the period of exile?26 Later generations remembered it as a heroic period. In retrospect it seemed a time of hope, when the body politic was purged of the corruption that characterised Byzantium before 1204, when imperial autocracy was curbed and a more equitable society came into being. The emperor was no longer above society but responsible to it. The historian George Pachymeres illustrated this with a single anecdote. Emperor John Vatatzes caught his son Theodore Laskaris out hunting dressed in cloth of gold. He rebuked the young prince: ‘Did he not realise that these vestments of gold and silk were the “blood of the Romans” and should be employed for their benefit, because they were their property?’ They were not to be wasted on frivolous pursuits.27 Public utility was the justification for imperial authority.

Expulsion from Constantinople compelled a reassessment of the limits of

27 George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, 1, pp. 61–3.
imperial authority. Without the validation of the capital emperors needed the moral support of the Orthodox Church more than ever. This was symbolised by the introduction during the period of exile of the patriarch anointing with myrrh as a regular feature of the coronation ordos. Its meaning was made clear by Patriarch Joseph I (1266–75). In his will he refused to accord to Michael VIII Palaiologos the epithet ‘holy’, much to the latter’s indignation. The emperor insisted that it was his by virtue of his unction with myrrh. The patriarch was dismissing him as unworthy of the imperial office. In other words, the rite of unction conferred moral authority on the emperor, but it also left the emperor more vulnerable to ecclesiastical censure – a situation reminiscent of experiences in the west over several centuries.

During the period of exile Orthodox patriarchs continued to pay lip-service to imperial tutelage. Germanos II’s defence of the rights of the patriarchate over the Church in Epiros was couched in the traditional terms of One Church, One Empire. But George Bardanes, the spokesman for the Epirots, was far more realistic. He made it clear that the Church in Epiros would gladly recognise the authority of the patriarch at Nicaea, but not that of the emperor. He did not understand why imperial authority was necessary to a unit based on a common adherence to the Orthodox faith. Why was co-existence not possible? ‘Let each come to an understanding on these terms and “let each enjoy the Sparta which it has been allotted”’, not stupidly gazing on the ends of the earth, but being satisfied with one’s own territory, fearing God, and honouring in a spirit of brotherly love the appropriate ruler. It seemed a reasonable plea: the unity of the Byzantine world after 1204 was essentially religious and cultural and no longer dependent upon imperial authority. Political unity was irrelevant or would have to wait until Constantinople was recovered.

It was a point of view that also had its adherents at the Nicaean court. Its leading intellectual and theologian Nikephoros Blemmydes defended the political independence of the Greek ruler of Rhodes. The only unity that mattered in Blemmydes’s opinion was that provided by Orthodoxy. He was outraged when in 1256 Theodore II Laskaris compelled the patriarch of the day to place the territories of the Epirot ruler Michael II Angelos under interdict. This was blatant exploitation of ecclesiastical power for political purposes. In a quite different way Theodore II Laskaris also recognised the divisions of the Byzantine world that exile had fixed. He dedicated his victories in Europe to ‘our Holy Mother Anatolia’.

The fall of Constantinople necessitated a reassessment of Byzantine identity. It could hardly be otherwise, since it was so closely bound up with the imperial and universalist pretensions of the capital. In exile the core of the Byzantine identity remained Orthodoxy, but it was given a more obviously nationalist twist. In the past, the Byzantines had defined themselves against Hellenes (or pagans) and Jews, and occasionally against Armenians. From the time of the First Crusade the Latins featured more prominently, but it was only after 1204 that they became the ‘Other’ against which the Byzantines measured themselves. This was a negative shift. More positive was the re-evaluation of the meaning of Hellene. It lost the connotation of pagan and came to be identified with the cultural legacy of classical Greece. This had begun before 1204, but it was only given coherent expression after the fall of Constantinople. It is set out most clearly in a letter of Emperor John of Cattaro to Pope Gregory IX. He claimed that his imperial authority had a double validity. On the one hand, it could be traced back to Constantine the Great and, on the other, it was founded in Hellenic wisdom. Orthodoxy and imperial authority fused with a cultural tradition to produce a shift in the Byzantine identity.32

This shift inspired the achievements of Byzantine scholars during the period of exile. They were able to recover the intellectual heritage of Byzantium which was threatened by the fall of Constantinople to the Latins. Emperor John Vatatzes organised a palace school, which preserved the traditions of higher education.33 But the most eloquent testimony to the power of Hellenic wisdom to inspire comes in the shape of the autobiography of the future Patriarch George of Cyprus. He describes how bitterly he resented the Latin conquerors of his native island. They made it virtually impossible for him to get a proper education. Hearing of the fame of Nicaea as a centre of Hellenic education he ran away from home and made his way to Nicaea. Whatever his disappointments, he treats his search for Hellenic illumination as a form of conversion.34

Cultivation of Hellenic wisdom defined the Byzantine elite culturally against the Latins. In 1254 there was a disputation between Nicaean scholars and members of a Hohenstaufen embassy. Theodore II Laskaris presided. He adjudged victory to the Nicaeans and thought it reflected great credit on the Hellenes. A consciousness of a Hellenic past became an integral part of the Byzantine identity, but its expression was the preserve of an intellectual elite. There was surprisingly little friction between Hellenism and Orthodoxy despite their apparent incompatibility. The Patriarch Germanos II could

compare John Vatatzes’s victories over the Latins to Marathon and Salamis. This illustrates the way Hellenism gave Orthodoxy during the period of exile a more obviously Greek complexion. The Orthodox patriarchate did not hesitate to abandon its rights over the Orthodox Church in both Serbia and Bulgaria and came close to doing so in Russia. This was in contrast to the stubborn and eventually successful defence of its authority over the Church in Epiros. Whatever claims the Patriarch Germanos II may have continued to make to a universal authority, his stance over the Church in Epiros indicates a more obviously nationalist understanding of Orthodoxy. It was the faith of the Greeks.

The recovery of Constantinople from the hated Latins was always the goal, but Constantinople itself became less and less relevant to the sense of identity that evolved during the period of exile. Political loyalties became more localised. A sense of common purpose was provided by the Orthodox Church and of cultural unity by the Hellenic tradition. At the same time a rather different structure of government and society was crystallising. Many of its features can be traced back before 1204, but they were held in check by the power and tradition of Constantinople. Its fall produced necessity a simplification of the machinery of government. Even the tradition of Roman law weakened, allowing the introduction of the ordeal. There was a devolution of authority. This took the form of a marked growth of immunities and pronoiai, but it can also be seen in the widespread grant of urban privileges. Power became increasingly localised.

Michael Palaiologos ignored these changes at his peril. He was proud to be hailed as the ‘New Constantine’, but his autocratic style of government created many difficulties. His attempt to restore the old ideological and institutional foundations of the Byzantine empire went counter to the changes that had occurred during the period of exile. The restored Byzantine empire was not able to escape the legacy of exile. It remained a conglomeration of independent or semi-independent political units. Except very briefly, Epiros was never persuaded to return under the direct authority of Constantinople, while Asia Minor was never reconciled to Palaiologan rule. Still more seriously, Michael Palaiologos’s efforts to impose union with the Latin Church on Orthodoxy alienated all sections of society. This reflected a shift in attitudes that occurred over the period of exile. An emperor could no longer use the Orthodox faith as a diplomatic bargaining counter with the Latin west without provoking bitter opposition. The Church could now count on popular support. This had not been the case before 1204. Michael Palaiologos’s attempt to restore imperial authority to its former eminence only left Byzantine society

hopelessly divided. To bewail the recovery of Constantinople, as one Nicaean official did in the summer of 1261, was to show uncanny prescience.37

VI

These changes would in the long run work against Michael VIII Palaiologos’s efforts to restore the Byzantine empire, but failure hardly seemed possible as the emperor took formal possession of Constantinople on 15 August 1261. Early successes suggested that the Byzantine empire would soon be returned to its pre-1204 boundaries. Michael Palaiologos quickly obtained a foothold in the Peloponnese. Guillaume de Villehardouin, the prince of Achaea, had fallen into Byzantine hands, along with many of his barons, at the battle of Pelagonia in 1259. He now agreed to come to terms. He ceded to Michael Palaiologos the fortresses of Monemvasia, Mistra and Maina in the south-eastern corner of the Peloponnese. The recovery of the Greek lands beckoned. In 1264 Michael II Angelos, the ruler of Epiros, accepted the hegemony of the new emperor of Constantinople. Substantial gains had been made in the previous year at the expense of the Bulgarians. Plovdiv (Philippopolis), the gateway to the Balkans, was recovered together with the ports of the Black Sea coast. Michael Palaiologos then secured control of the Dobrudja, the region at the mouth of the Danube, where he established Turkish colonists. They had come over to Byzantium with the last Seljuq sultan of Rum, Izz ad-Din, who had fled to Michael Palaiologos in April 1261. Even if it meant accepting baptism, the sultan found this preferable to remaining under the Mongol yoke. Such a spectacular defection gave Michael Palaiologos reason to hope for further gains in Asia Minor. The recovery of Constantinople also put the Venetians on the defensive. They were driven from Constantinople and replaced by the Genoese, who were Byzantine allies. They in their turn were temporarily banned from the capital in 1264. Michael Palaiologos had no intention of allowing the Italians a dominant position in Constantinople. He built up the Byzantine fleet, which for the last time would be a major force in the waters of the Aegean.38

The tragedy of Michael Palaiologos’s reign was that he was never able to capitalise on these early successes. He failed to drive the Venetians from their Aegean bases in Crete and Euboea. The Franks of the Peloponnese stubbornly refused to cede any more territory to his armies. The Greek rulers of Epiros and Thessaly threw off their Byzantine allegiance. Opposition to Byzantine rule was stiffened by the appearance of a new figure on the scene. This was

37 George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, 1, p. 205.1–12; Talbot (1993).
38 Geanakoplos (1959), pp. 119–85.
Charles of Anjou, the youngest brother of the French king Louis IX. His victory at Benevento over Manfred of Hohenstaufen in 1266 established him as papally approved ruler of the Regno and heir to ambitions in the east. In 1267 he entered into separate treaties with Guillaume de Villehardouin and with Baldwin II, the dispossessed Latin emperor of Constantinople. He took the former under his protection and secured succession to the principality of Achaea for his son Philip through a dynastic marriage. He promised the Latin emperor that within seven years he would launch an expedition to recover Constantinople on his behalf. The petty rulers of the Balkans and Greek lands, Orthodox and Catholic alike, turned to him for support against the pretensions of Michael Palaiologos. The Albanians seized the Byzantine base of Durazzo (Dyrrachium), at the head of the Via Egnatia, and in February 1272 recognised Charles of Anjou as their king. He thus secured the key positions along the Albanian coast. It was a serious set-back for Michael Palaiologos.

The Byzantine emperor sought to counter the Angevin threat in various ways. He strengthened the sea walls of Constantinople. The lesson of the Fourth Crusade was its vulnerability to an attack from the sea. Michael Palaiologos therefore wooed Venice to prevent it from joining the Angevin camp. He finally induced the Venetians to make a treaty with Byzantium rather than with Charles of Anjou in 1268. The Venetians recovered control of their old quarter in Constantinople. Byzantium’s major diplomatic offensive was directed towards the papacy. Michael Palaiologos employed the age-old ploy of offering a reunion of the Churches. The papacy was at first unconvinced of the sincerity or the utility of the offer. This changed in 1271 when Gregory X ascended the throne of St Peter. He was not interested in supporting Charles of Anjou’s designs on Constantinople. His purpose was instead to rescue the crusader states from the Mamluk menace. An alliance with Byzantium might have its uses, but the pope insisted that it had to be cemented by the reunion of Churches on Rome’s terms. Essentially, this meant Byzantine recognition of papal supremacy. It was a price that in the circumstances Michael Palaiologos thought was worth paying. In 1274 he despatched a Byzantine delegation to Lyons where a council of the Church was gathering (this has been discussed in the chapter on the papacy). Without any serious debate of the issues Michael Palaiologos accepted a reunion on papal terms. He cited as a precedent for his actions the negotiations with the papacy initiated by John III Vatatzes.39 These had produced little, if any, protest, perhaps because they were never brought to a conclusion. But Michael Palaiologos’s unionist policies would earn him the hatred of all sections of Byzantine society. Why were people unwilling to accept his reassurance that almost nothing worthwhile had been conceded?

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39 George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, v, xii: 11, p. 479.20–4.
Why did the Orthodox Church refuse to approach the question of union in a spirit of *oikonomia*?40

The answers to these questions reveal that it was not only Charles of Anjou’s ambitions that thwarted Michael Palaiologos’s plans to restore the Byzantine empire. Michael’s unionist policy confirmed the tyrannical nature of his rule. His usurpation of the throne was not easily forgotten. On Christmas Day 1261 he had had the legitimate heir to the imperial throne, John Laskaris, blinded and exiled to a fortress on the Asiatic shores of the sea of Marmora. The Patriarch Arsenios protested. He was responsible for protecting the rights of John Laskaris, which the usurper had solemnly sworn before God to uphold. The patriarch therefore excommunicated Michael Palaiologos. It took three years before the emperor could rid himself of Arsenios, but his dismissal only produced a schism within the Orthodox Church, which weakened the authority of subsequent patriarchs. Arsenios gave his support to an uprising around Nicaea in favour of John Laskaris. Michael Palaiologos may have suppressed it with some ease, but thereafter he found the Anatolian provinces increasingly alienated from Constantinopolitan rule. The historian George Pachymeres singled this out as the underlying cause of their subsequent fall to renewed Turkish pressure.41

Michael Palaiologos’s unionist policy reinforced the growing distrust of his rule. He refused to listen to the reasonable objections of the Patriarch Joseph I (1266–73). As soon as it became clear that the emperor intended to do the pope’s bidding the patriarch retired to a monastery rather than be party to the reunion of the Churches. This produced another schism within the Orthodox Church, when Michael Palaiologos pressed ahead with his designs. Efforts to win support for the union were crude and largely counterproductive. The story goes that when the members of the Byzantine delegation to Lyons returned to Constantinople they were greeted with cries of ‘You have become Franks!’42 It catches a sense of betrayal that spread throughout Byzantine society.

This was confirmed by the harsh way in which Michael Palaiologos and his new Patriarch John Bekkos (1275–82) implemented the union. In 1276 the patriarch convened a council which not only confirmed the union, but placed under ban of excommunication all those that opposed it. The next year the emperor and his son publicly swore to recognise the supremacy of the papacy and read out a profession of faith that included the Roman addition of the *filioque*.

Michael Palaiologos’s opponents seized on his unionist policy to justify their actions. The Greek rulers of Epiros and Thessaly used it as a pretext for their

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refusal to submit to his authority. John of Thessaly held an anti-unionist council in 1275/6 which attracted many of Michael Palaiologos’s opponents within the Church. This was blatant exploitation of the unionist issue for political ends. Less easy to explain is the opposition to the Union of the Churches of some of Michael Palaiologos’s closest relatives and political associates. Even his favourite sister, the nun Eulogia, turned against him and fled to Bulgaria. Such was the hostility within the imperial family to the union that Michael Palaiologos was compelled to imprison many of his relatives. The papal emissary was taken down to see them languishing in the dungeons of the Great Palace. Michael Palaiologos hoped that their misery would convince the papacy of the emperor’s sincerity over the union.43

This opposition from within the imperial family was prompted in the first place by concern for Orthodoxy, which was being needlessly compromised by the emperor; but it went deeper than this. Michael Palaiologos was seen to be using the unionist issue as a way of imposing his arbitrary power over Byzantine Church and society. Like all Byzantine emperors, Michael Palaiologos was faced by the conundrum of imperial authority. In theory, he wielded absolute power; in practice, it was limited by obligations to the Church and the ruling class, and to society at large. Michael Palaiologos came to power as the leader of an aristocratic faction. He ensured that the chief offices of state went to his close relatives. He also widened his basis of support through a series of shrewd marriages that linked his family to other great houses.44 At first, his style of government was conciliatory. Apart from donations to the army and monasteries, he clamped down on the dishonesty and oppression of provincial governors and military commanders. He improved the quality of justice by setting up a court of appeal, the sekretone, and abolished the use of the ordeal by hot iron which had become an instrument of arbitrary government. He showed exaggerated respect for the Church and patriarch.45 This changed once Michael Palaiologos became master of Constantinople. He employed the western notion of the ‘Law of Conquest’ to justify a more autocratic approach to government. He claimed that, since he had conquered Constantinople, it belonged to him exclusively. He used this as a pretext to threaten opponents of the union with the confiscation of their property, if they did not comply with his wishes. He was, after all, the ‘New Constantine’.46 He became increasingly remote from his natural basis of support. He made use of western adventurers, such as Benedetto Zaccaria, who received the alum concession at Phocaea near Smyrna.47 He also relied heavily on trusted bureaucrats, such as the Grand Logothete George Akropolites, who was a leader of the Byzantine delegation to Lyons.

45 George Pachymeres, Relations historiques, ii, i:1, p. 130.10–26; Burgmann and Magdalino (1984).
The humiliating concessions made by Michael Palaiologos to the papacy brought little in the way of concrete advantage. This only increased distrust for the emperor. The papacy, for its part, continued to have doubts about the Michael Palaiologos’s sincerity, so much so that in 1281 Pope Martin IV had him excommunicated. This was at Charles of Anjou’s behest, and provided him with the justification he needed for a new assault on Byzantium. This time Charles was able to win over Venice to his cause. Unionist diplomacy had apparently left Byzantium stranded. The Byzantine armies were able to stem the Angevin advance down the Via Egnatia with a victory at Berat in 1281. But salvation came from an unexpected quarter. On 30 March 1282 the inhabitants of Palermo rose up against their hated Angevin rulers. This was the famous revolt of the Sicilian Vespers. With Sicily in revolt, Charles had to abandon his plans for an expedition against Constantinople.

Michael Palaiologos saw himself as the saviour of his people. In the autobiographies that he wrote at the end of his life he took sole credit for throwing back the Angevins in Albania and for organising the Sicilian Vespers. He was unable to comprehend his unpopularity: had he not restored the seat of Church and empire to Constantinople? This could not be denied, but few would have accepted his other claim: to have ruled according to the best traditions of his family and of the imperial office. It seemed much more like a betrayal. It comes as no surprise that, when Michael Palaiologos died on 11 December 1282 in a small Thracian village, the Orthodox Church refused him a proper burial.

Under Michael Palaiologos Byzantium was for the very last time a major force on the world stage. His diplomatic contacts stretched from Aragon and France in the west to the Il-khans of Persia in the east; from the Golden Horde on the Caspian to the Mamluks of Egypt. But his efforts left Byzantium exhausted and virtually bankrupt. His legacy was one of schism, poverty and rapid decline. He was a victim of the profound changes which occurred during the period of exile. The defence of Orthodoxy against the Latins gave the Byzantine identity an anti-Latin twist. Any compromise with the Latins over dogma was seen as an act of betrayal. Michael Palaiologos was even more vulnerable to accusations of this kind because of the way Laskarid propaganda instilled the notion of the emperor as the servant of his Church and people. Political power had become more diffuse. The different regions of the old Byzantine empire developed separate identities and interests. At best, the

emperor of Constantinople could expect to exercise a degree of indirect authority. These problems existed before 1204, but Constantinople had – it is true with increasing difficulty – the prestige and resources to hold together the empire. The city that Michael Palaiologos recovered was but a husk. It had been wasted by the years of Latin rule. He made great efforts to restore his new capital, but it was expensive and time-consuming.\textsuperscript{52} Constantinople no longer dominated. 1204 had destroyed the myth of Byzantine invulnerability.

\textsuperscript{52} Talbot (1993).
As it entered the thirteenth century, crusading in the east was shaped by three principal factors. The first was the very mixed legacy bequeathed to it by the Third Crusade and the German Crusade of 1197–8. For all their military victories and territorial gains, these expeditions had failed to restore to the kingdom of Jerusalem either its capital or the sound defensive framework which it had possessed before the battle of Hattin (1187). Throughout the thirteenth century the Latins in the Holy Land were vulnerable to attack from both Syria and Egypt, and they never ceased making this known to their relatives and co-religionists in Europe. It was clear that despite the increasingly important contribution which was being made to Latin Syria’s defence by the military Orders, Syria would fall without assistance from the west. Secondly, enthusiasm for the crusade was at its height, certainly amongst the Catholic west’s rulers and their nobility, and probably too in society at large; papal appeals to take the cross, not only for service in the east but also for crusades in Iberia, Prussia, Languedoc and elsewhere, found a ready response throughout the first half of the century. Thirdly, Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) threw the weight of his personal dedication to crusading, and his powerful intellect, into the task of making the best possible use of this enthusiasm for the benefit of the Holy Land. No pope since Urban II had possessed Innocent’s degree of ability and commitment.

The Fourth Crusade (1198–1204) originated in an encyclical which Innocent promulgated in August 1198, just seven months after his election. The quarrels between Richard I and Philip Augustus on the Third Crusade had left a poor impression of what occurred when secular leadership was too dominant; and the new pope was determined that the Church, and in particular the curia, would play a greater role in the organisation and direction of the crusade than had been the case on earlier expeditions. There was, literally, a price to pay for this role, for Innocent accepted that the need for a more systematic approach towards the problem of crusade finance should be met by the Church, and
levied a tax of a fortieth on clerical incomes in 1199. The response to preaching was good. In the course of a tournament in 1199 Counts Thibaut III of Champagne and Louis of Blois took the cross, and they were followed by Count Baldwin of Flanders on Ash Wednesday 1200. No crowned king would commit himself, but these three influential French magnates assumed the command of the crusade. Around them there clustered a large force of crusaders, many of whom had responded to the sermons of Fulk of Neuilly, a charismatic preacher and moral reformer earlier dubbed ‘a second Paul’ by Jacques de Vitry. Following the death of Thibaut of Champagne in May 1201, the crusaders came under the overall command of Marquis Boniface of Montferrat, chiefly by virtue of his military renown and widespread dynastic connections both in Europe and in the east.

In the winter of 1200–1 the crusade’s leaders sent six envoys to Italy, including the expedition’s future historian, Geoffroy de Villehardouin; they were to negotiate terms for the army’s transport to the east with the Italian maritime cities. The treaty which the envoys agreed with the doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo, in February 1201, specified that the Venetians would be paid 85,000 marks of Cologne for transporting the army. This was a fair sum in relation to the numbers of men and horses who the envoys optimistically reckoned would require transport. But these estimates were too large by a factor of at least three, an error which was curiously at odds with the careful manner in which other features of the expedition’s organisation were handled, and which changed the course of the entire crusade. When the crusaders assembled at Venice in the early autumn of 1202, a deficit of 34,000 marks was discovered. It seemed likely that the crusade, which by a secret agreement between the Venetians and the French was destined to attack the centre of Ayyubid power in Egypt, ‘the serpent’s head’, would never leave the lagoons. Dandolo, however, proposed a moratorium on payment in exchange for the help of the crusaders in recapturing the Dalmatian port of Zara (Zadar), which had fallen into the hands of the king of Hungary in 1186. Despite opposition within the army to this assault on a Christian town, the proposal was accepted and the army sailed from Venice in October. Zara fell in November 1202. The furious Innocent III excommunicated the entire army, and although the sentence was later rescinded, the Zara episode proved that this crusade had already fallen out of papal control.

Much worse soon followed. Wintering at Zara, the crusade’s leaders received a suggestion from Alexios (IV) Angelos, an exiled claimant to the throne of Byzantium, that they should help him to recover Constantinople from Alexios’s usurping uncle, Alexios III, and to release his blinded, imprisoned father, Isaac II. Alexios’s cause was a just one and undoubtedly appealed to the chivalrous instincts of the crusaders. Moreover, Alexios was prepared to make
extraordinarily sweeping and attractive promises in return for this assistance: Church union with Rome, financial subsidies which would more than pay off the crusade’s debt to the Venetians, ample provisions and a big Byzantine contingent for the remainder of the crusade. The whole proposal was presented by envoys from King Philip of Germany and enjoyed Philip’s enthusiastic support. Opinion within the army was divided, strong opposition to the new diversion being voiced by a group led by Simon de Montfort, an important lord from the Ile-de-France, and the Cistercian Abbot Guy des Vaux-de-Cernay. But given the financial problems still facing the crusaders, the stark choice seemed to lie between adopting Alexios’s cause and allowing the crusade to collapse. Many returned home rather than take part in what was beginning to look like a campaign of plunder, but the fleet and the majority of the crusaders sailed to Constantinople in April to June 1203.

A general assault on the city on 17 July 1203 failed, but Alexios III panicked and fled during the following night. Isaac II was released, the crusaders entered Constantinople and Alexios IV was crowned as Isaac’s co-emperor on 1 August. The diversion appeared to have served its purpose, and the crusaders made plans to sail south in the spring of 1204. Not surprisingly, however, Alexios IV now discovered that he could not keep his lavish promises. Anti-Latin feelings were strong within Constantinople, and Alexios’s relations with his western allies deteriorated. By December 1203 they were at war. In January 1204 Alexios IV and Isaac II were overthrown in a coup d’état. The new emperor, Alexios V, conducted a spirited defence of Constantinople against the crusaders and Venetians in the early spring of 1204. Having drawn up a detailed treaty for the division, not just of movable plunder but also of the whole empire, the allies stormed Constantinople in April 1204. In one of the most devastating acts of pillaging in the Middle Ages, the city was mercilessly sacked for a period of three days. Its collections of relics, ‘the holy booty of the Church’, as the eye-witness Gunther of Pairis described it, proved as irresistible an attraction as its material treasures. Baldwin of Flanders was crowned emperor of a new, Latin empire of Constantinople (the fate of which has been addressed in earlier chapters), and the crusaders either settled in the newly won territories or returned to the west.

The question why Innocent III’s great expedition went adrift has always fascinated historians. This is not surprising. The course taken by the crusade had baleful consequences, including the loss of a fine army, the permanent alienation of the Greek world and the creation of a new crusading ‘front’ which subsequently acted as a drain on western resources. Moreover, the two possible explanations for the crusade’s fate constitute the twin causal poles of conspiracy and accident. Several individuals have in the past been accused of causing the crusade’s diversion, in particular Enrico Dandolo, Boniface of Montferrat...
and Alexios IV’s chief western backer, his brother-in-law King Philip of Germany, who was also Boniface’s lord and friend. Certainly the Venetians arguably had much more to gain (and gained it) from the destruction of the Byzantine empire, with which their relations had reached a nadir, than from an assault on Egypt. From their own knowledge of the empire’s condition, they must have realised that Alexios IV was not in a position to keep his promises. They could have predicted the way events would go from Zara onwards: but this is not the same as saying that they created those events. There is no direct evidence for conspiracy, and while it is true that this is in the very nature of successful conspiracies, none of the circumstantial evidence (such as the thoroughness of the dismemberment treaty of March 1204), let alone the stereotypes of Venetian Realpolitik or Frankish greed, is strong enough to ‘convict’ anybody.

No conspiracy is needed to account for the diversion of the crusade. The situations in which the crusaders were placed at Zara and Constantinople formed a sequence of intractable problems; the solutions adopted were regrettable, but essential if the crusade were to be saved. The leaders’ relationship with Alexios IV – first as allies, then as antagonists – was a predictable (although not inevitable) culmination of Greco-Latin relations since the First Crusade. But perhaps the strongest argument in favour of the ‘theory of accidents’ is the fact that the Fourth Crusade was only one of a number of diverted crusades: the Tunis Crusade of 1270, which we shall encounter later, was very similar, and almost every crusade to the east displayed a tendency to lose sight of its objective. At this point in particular, with monarchical leadership in abeyance and papal control lacking credibility, crusading armies were subject to ‘drift’. In the case of the Fourth Crusade, the drift was far from thoughtless, for at each stage in the diversion there was intense debate within the army. But in such circumstances, it has been plausibly argued that the conspiracy theory is based on a false view of the extent to which firm leadership could be exercised by Boniface of Montferrat and Enrico Dandolo.

In 1213, less than a decade after the failure of this crusade, Innocent III issued the bull \textit{Quia maior}, a call for a new expedition to the east. As in the case of the Fourth Crusade, the reason was the long-term weakness of the kingdom of Jerusalem rather than a specific crisis of the kind which was to prompt crusade appeals later in the century. The roots of Innocent’s new crusade lay in the west. In the previous year thousands of German and French adolescents had attempted to go to the assistance of the Holy Land by marching to Mediterranean ports, at which they hoped that shipping would be provided. There was no chance of this movement reaching its objective, and its participants returned home in shame; according to one account, many were tricked into taking ship to North Africa, where they were sold as slaves. Despite its
abject failure, this so-called ‘Children’s Crusade’ had revealed the depths of popular crusading zeal which existed. Also in 1212, one of the greatest of crusading victories, Las Navas de Tolosa, in Spain against the Almohad caliph, had convinced enthusiasts that God could still favour the Catholic cause. Papal direction of the new crusade was intended to be firm and comprehensive. *Quia maior* itself, and other bulls issued in 1213, established a refined structure of crusade preaching, and prescribed a much more liberal approach towards recruitment than had formerly been the case. Those who took the cross but were unsuitable for fighting could ‘redeem’, or buy back, their vows with cash; it was hoped that the proceeds would help to forestall the sort of financial crisis which had beset the Fourth Crusade. The bulls also provided clear evidence for the formulation of a papal ‘crusade policy’, which we shall examine later.

It was, however, at the Fourth Lateran Council (1215–16) that the full extent of Innocent III’s ambitions for the crusade became evident. In the hands of able preachers like Robert de Courçon and Oliver of Paderborn, recruitment for the crusade had been extraordinarily successful, and the pope set out to ensure that the council’s legislation for the expedition would make the best use of these resources. The resulting decree, *Ad liberandam*, was so authoritative and full that its measures, and even its phraseology, were copied and imitated throughout the remainder of crusading history. Of particular importance were three features of the decree: the definitive wording of the indulgence, the levy of a three-year ‘twentieth’ on churchmen and the attempt not only to ban all trade with the Muslims in war materials, but also to impose a four-year embargo on any commerce with them. In its far-reaching claim to intervene in secular activity when the cause of the crusade demanded it, *Ad liberandam* is rich testimony to the emerging ideology of ‘papal monarchy’. Royal authority was ignored, and even the ports at which the crusaders were to embark, Brindisi and Messina, were located in a kingdom (Sicily) which lay under papal suzerainty.

Innocent III died in July 1216, but the impetus had been achieved to set in position a series of military expeditions, which spanned the years 1217–29 and are now generally grouped together as the Fifth Crusade. The first crusaders, Austrians and Hungarians led by King Andrew of Hungary and Leopold VI of Austria, sailed to Palestine in the summer of 1217. Here, in November and December, they took part in a number of minor campaigns of limited value; these showed the importance of attempting to implement the bolder strategy of attacking Egypt. This had been planned for the Fourth Crusade and had almost certainly been in Innocent III’s mind for the Fifth; the strategy’s origins lie almost at the very start of crusading to the east. The loss of King Andrew and many of the Hungarians, who began the long march home in January 1218,
was a blow, but it was more than balanced by the arrival, in April and May, of
the first wave of crusaders from Italy, Frisia and the lower Rhine. With such
troops and galleys the ‘Egyptian strategy’, beginning with an attack on the
eastern port of Damietta, could be initiated with confidence, the more so since
the Seljuq sultan of Anatolia, Kaikhaws, agreed to launch a simultaneous
attack on the Ayyubid lands in northern Syria. In late May 1218 the crusaders
sailed to Damietta and began to besiege the port.

According to Oliver of Paderborn, an active participant in the crusade who
wrote a vivid account of events, Damietta possessed three sets of walls; the
outer two were divided by a moat which could accommodate vessels. The siege
of this great city, which lasted eighteen months, was an epic episode in crusad-
ing history. Although the Seljuq alliance failed, Kaikhaws withdrawing his
troops after an abortive campaign against Aleppo in the summer, the crusaders
pursued military operations against Damietta with vigour and ingenuity. This
applied in particular to their early assaults on the formidable chain tower, a
fortification built on an island in the Nile which stopped the crusaders bringing
their ships south of Damietta and encircling the city. The tower was stormed in
August with the help of a siege machine invented by Oliver of Paderborn. This
was brought alongside the tower on the decks of two cogs which had been
lashed together. The capture of the chain tower was a striking success – Sultan
al-Adil reportedly died of grief when the news reached him – but the Muslims
blocked the Nile by sinking ships, and the crusaders were still unable to cross
the river.

By September 1218 it was clear that the crusading army would have to
remain in the field for some time. Fresh troops, mainly from England, France
and Italy, arrived in the ‘autumn passage’, but others returned home, their term
of service completed. This set a pattern of simultaneous reinforcement and
depletion in the spring and autumn months which lasted until the crusade’s
end; the uncertainty which it brought with it induced a tendency to put off deci-
sions. In the absence of western monarchs, such decisions were taken by a
council of prominent individuals. Initially, it was strongly influenced by King
John of Jerusalem, but in September 1218 the papal legate Pelagius of Albano
arrived, and he used his office and assertive personality to dominate pro-
cceedings. In February 1219 crusader successes, together with domestic political
difficulties, persuaded Sultan al-Kamil to make an attractive offer, including the
return to Christian hands of most of the twelfth-century kingdom of
Jerusalem, in exchange for the crusade’s withdrawal. The offer was rejected, as
was an even more generous proposal put forward in the late summer; on both
occasions Pelagius and the military Orders headed the ‘hawks’. Their intransi-
gence appeared justified, for in November Damietta finally fell, producing
shock waves throughout the Muslim lands of the Middle East.
The crusade had, however, passed its high-water mark. Denied rule over the captured port, and concerned about Sultan al-Mu‘azzam’s activities in Palestine, King John left the army early in 1220. This was disastrous, for the Christians took no effective military action in 1220, allowing al-Kamil to build up a strong position at al-Mansura, a few miles up the Nile from Damietta. Only in the early summer of 1221, following the arrival of 500 German troops, did the crusaders initiate an advance southwards. Encouraged by prophecies about the appearance of support from both west and east, which were stimulated by rumours of the Mongol advance, the crusaders were in buoyant mood. On 24 July they besieged al-Kamil’s camp at al-Mansura. But it was too late for such operations. The sultan had himself received reinforcements, from his brother al-Ashraf, and the Muslims used their superior knowledge of the terrain to outmanoeuvre the crusaders and cut them off from their base at Damietta. There was no alternative to agreeing to peace terms, and at the end of August a truce of eight years was sealed. It allowed the crusaders unopposed withdrawal from Egypt but nothing else. A few days later Damietta was in al-Kamil’s hands.

Failure on this scale, coming after such hopes, led to a mixture of recriminations and soul-searching which prefigured later bouts. But a momentum had been established. Richard of San Germano blamed Pelagius, King John and Frederick II’s representative, Duke Louis of Bavaria, for the catastrophe, but concluded his lament by praying Christ to vindicate His cause. The man regarded by many as Christ’s supreme temporal vicar, Frederick II, had taken the cross after his coronation as king of the Romans at Aachen in 1215. At his imperial coronation in November 1220 he promised to come east in the summer of 1221. The emperor’s much-delayed expedition formed the last act in the Fifth Crusade. The delay was caused by Frederick’s political difficulties in Germany and southern Italy, which were immense. The deadline of June 1225 was set in 1223, but it passed without action, and under the terms of the Treaty of San Germano (July 1225) the new deadline of August 1227 was agreed to. So far as we can tell, Frederick was a sincere crusader. Granted that it was a useful pose to assume for a man who portrayed himself as a second Charlemagne, he felt a personal debt of gratitude to God for His support in restoring Germany to Hohenstaufen control. The emperor’s marriage in November 1225 to Isabella-Yolanda of Brienne, which gave him the crown of Jerusalem, manifested his interest in the east rather than creating it. Recruitment in Germany, England and Italy produced a large army which sailed from Brindisi in the late summer of 1227. The crusaders, however, suffered badly from disease, and three days out of port the emperor himself was so ill that his galley put into Otranto and he went to the baths of Pozzuoli to recover and convalesce.

Frederick’s decision further to postpone his crusade, rather than to re-enact
the determination and resilience displayed on crusade by his grandfather Frederick I, was a disaster for his expedition. In the first place, his fine army had no leader during the initial phase of its operations in Palestine, and the truce of Damietta, which was still active, could only be broken by the arrival of a crowned king. The fact that the crusaders still achieved some successes, including the building of a new castle, Montfort (Starkenberg), indicated what might have been done had Frederick been there to lead them. Of equal importance, the new delay brought to a head the political tensions which had been rising between papacy and empire since Frederick’s coronation. The papal curia, especially under Pope Gregory IX (1227–41), had observed with concern the emperor’s burgeoning success. Acting no doubt partly in accordance with a political agenda of curtailing Hohenstaufen strength, and partly from sheer exasperation at another missed deadline, the pope excommunicated Frederick, effectively cancelling his crusade. In two powerfully phrased encyclicals, Gregory accused Frederick of duplicity and listed his crusading career amongst many injuries which the emperor had inflicted on the Church. Frederick was faced with an impossible choice: to proceed on crusade would be to defy the pope, but to remain in the west would be to confirm his own lack of sincerity. He chose the former case, sailing from Brindisi in June 1228.

Frederick’s response to the excommunication was audacious and courageous – he may even have suspected that the pope might dare to use his departure to invade the kingdom of Sicily – but it could not save his crusade. When he finally arrived at Acre in September 1228, many of his crusaders had already left for home, though it would be wrong to suppose that his own army was as small and ill-equipped as his later detractors would suggest. However, his excommunication created great discord in the Latin establishment in Palestine; the Teutonic Knights, Genoese and Pisans supported him but most other figures of authority, led by the patriarch of Jerusalem, were locked into antagonism. This mattered less to Frederick than it might have done, since Ayyubid dynastic politics were favourable to a diplomatic démarche: al-Mu‘azzam had recently died and Sultan al-Kamil needed peace with the Christians to facilitate his absorption of his deceased brother’s Palestinian lands. In these circumstances the emperor could achieve, without major fighting, the two goals which he appears to have set himself, the return of at least some territory to the kingdom of Jerusalem, and Christian control over the key shrines of Jerusalem itself, in particular the Holy Sepulchre, though not the Temple Mount. This was the essence of the Treaty of Jaffa (February 1229), which was soon followed by Frederick’s departure for Italy.

Although all crusades were influenced by political circumstances within Christendom, Frederick II’s expedition was exceptional in this respect: indeed, it is hard to see events in Palestine as anything other than an extension of the
great struggle for power which was beginning in the west. Even Frederick II's apologists have been hard-pressed to portray the Treaty of Jaffa as more than a public relations exercise, the return of the Holy City itself being specifically geared to the use which the emperor made of eschatological ideas relating to the Last Emperor’s programmatic role. The climax of Frederick’s crusade was his solemn wearing of his imperial crown in the church of the Holy Sepulchre on 18 March 1229; on the following day the archbishop of Caesarea arrived in Jerusalem to impose the interdict decreed by the patriarch of Jerusalem. So bizarre is this sequence of events that we need to remind ourselves that it characterised a gulf between the papal and imperial ideologies which was to have profoundly deleterious consequences for the defence of the Latin east. The immediate loss was bad enough. An expedition of some substance which should, in terms of its resource base, have been one of the greatest of all crusades, had proved bitterly disappointing. Its diplomatic triumph was hollow, for cut off from the coastal cities and fortresses, and apparently without walls (these had been dismantled by al-Mu’azzam in 1219), Jerusalem was indefensible.

Frederick’s failure, which in a broader sense was that of the whole chain of military activity going back to Quia maior, made it necessary for the papal curia to address itself to the needs which would face the Latin east once the truce incorporated into the peace of Jaffa expired in the summer of 1239. In 1234 Pope Gregory IX, planning well ahead, decreed crusade preaching for a new expedition. The response in France was good, and in July 1239 a sizeable army, including a large group of counts and other great lords, assembled at Lyons. Their leaders were two peers of the realm, Count Thibaut of Champagne (who was also ruler of the small Iberian kingdom of Navarre) and Duke Hugh of Burgundy. Although an assault on Egypt was again considered, the crusade’s leaders decided on operations in Palestine. The crusaders sailed from Marseilles to Acre in August 1239. But they fell victim to the disagreement in the Latin kingdom about whether military activity should focus on Damascus or Egypt. After losing a battle near Gaza in November, Thibaut allied with Damascus, and although the alliance was militarily unsuccessful, it gained valuable territory for the Christians in the north of Palestine. In September 1240 Thibaut left for the west. Hugh of Burgundy, the count of Nevers and others remained to rebuild the fortifications of Ascalon.

Thibaut’s rather lacklustre crusade was immediately followed by an expedition led by a magnate of similar status, Richard, earl of Cornwall and younger brother of King Henry III. Richard took the cross in 1236 in response to Gregory IX’s appeal of 1234. In the face of opposition both from his royal brother and from the pope (who, as we shall see, had entertained other plans for the fruits of his crusade appeal), Richard set out to cross France in June
1240. He sailed from Marseilles to Acre, arriving in October. Including a second group of crusaders under Simon de Montfort, which travelled separately, the English forces numbered about 800 knights. Richard, who tended to pursue the policies and promote the interests of his brother-in-law Frederick II, was persuaded that the best option for the kingdom of Jerusalem lay in peace with Egypt. In February 1241 he agreed to a treaty with Sultan as-Salih which gained for the Christians territory stretching as far south as Ascalon, and reaching the Jordan in Galilee. Richard enjoyed other successes. The refortification of Ascalon was completed and the fortress handed over to the supporters of Frederick II; and the French prisoners taken at Gaza were regained by an exchange of captives. In May 1241 the English crusaders sailed home.

Richard of Cornwall publicised his achievements in the east with some skill, playing down the preparatory work done by Thibaut. Giving Thibaut the credit due to him, the two expeditions of 1239–41 yielded more positive results than any other crusading in the east in this period; with the exception of Hebron in the south and Samaria in the centre, they restored the kingdom of Jerusalem to its 1187 boundaries. But the restoration was ephemeral. The kingdom’s defensive framework was fragile, its internal government paralysed by the conflict in progress between the supporters of Frederick II and the Jerusalemite barons. Moreover, since the death of Saladin in 1193 the crusader states had been beneficiaries of the dynastic power struggle between his descendants in Egypt, Syria and western Iraq. This made possible the diplomatic successes of 1229 and 1240–1. More importantly, since none of the Ayyubid sultans had the ability or desire to wipe out the Latin states, it meant that the diversion of the Fourth Crusade and the mismanagement of the Fifth were far less prejudicial than they might have been to the Christians in Palestine. This favourable scenario, however, was now coming to an end, owing to the westwards advance of the Mongols. Their destruction of the empire of the Khwarizmian Turks in 1220 injected large numbers of skilled Turkish troops into the mercenary market. The balance of power between the sultans of Damascus and Cairo was irremediably distorted in favour of the latter, who had the superior financial resources needed to employ the Khwarizmians. In 1244, fighting in the hire of Sultan as-Salih, the Khwarizmians first effortlessly took Jerusalem from the Christians, and then, in October, joined forces with Egyptian troops to inflict a crushing defeat on the Franco-Damascene army at the battle of Gaza.

These events demanded a response on the scale of the Third Crusade. It could not be expected from either Henry III or Frederick II, but Louis IX of France took up the burden with such extraordinary commitment that throughout the middle decades of the century he dominated the crusading movement in the east. The king took the cross in December 1244. His action was perhaps a
means of declaring himself free from the long tutelage of his mother, Blanche of Castile; probably it resulted from news of the disasters in Palestine; certainly it manifested a deep and unflagging adherence to the ideals of crusading at a time when it had attained its fullest spiritual crystallisation. The significance of Louis’s enthusiasm for crusading resided in the fact that his remarkably pure motivation had at its disposal the military capacities of a monarchy enormously enriched by its recent gains in Normandy and the south, and embarking on sweeping administrative and judicial reforms. Characteristically, these were linked to the king’s projected crusade. The despatch of investigators (enquéteurs) in 1247 to make enquiries into the abuses of resident royal officials, was typical both of Louis’s determination to govern fairly as a Christian monarch, and of his concern that his crusade should not be tainted by grievances at home. The chance now presented itself for the west’s leading monarchy to attempt what imperial ideology and strength had failed to achieve.

The supremacy of royal effort and control in the planning of Louis’s crusade did not mean that the papacy was deliberately excluded, nor that the enterprise was self-consciously French. The expedition received a great deal of consideration from the pope and churchmen at the first Council of Lyons in 1245, which among other measures relating to the crusade facilitated its financing by taxing the French Church. Innocent IV appointed a legate, Eudes de Châteauroux, to preach the crusade, and there was preaching on a large scale in England, Germany and Scandinavia. But at Lyons Frederick II was also formally deposed by the pope, and the years of Louis’s planning and crusading witnessed a series of crusades against the emperor and his son, Conrad IV, in Germany and Italy. Germany and Italy were thus convulsed by the papal–imperial struggle, and eastern Europe faced the Mongol onslaught. Political circumstances therefore converged with royal planning to make the crusade a predominantly French endeavour. In keeping with his intention that his crusade should be the biggest ever, Louis’s preparations were thorough and deliberate. He lent money to other crusaders, hired ships, and further developed the port facilities at Aigues-Mortes, his chosen embarkation point. Agents were even sent ahead to Cyprus to build up supplies of grain and wine in preparation for the crusade’s arrival.

The king’s fullest attention was paid to the financing of the expedition. Thanks to contemporary accounts, and to governmental estimates from the early fourteenth century, both the costs faced by Louis, and the sources of revenue which he exploited to meet them, are known in greater detail than in the case of any previous crusade. It was reckoned that he spent over 1.5 million livres tournois, or six times the annual income of the French crown. He could draw on little of the latter, which was required for normal expenses in France, and so relied mainly on extraordinary sources of money. Two-thirds of his
expenses came from a total of five years' worth of taxes on the French Church, levied in the form of a tenth of clerical income. Although hard to collect and bitterly resented, these taxes had become crucial for crusade finance, and their collection in this instance accustomed the French clergy to regular disbursements in future. Perhaps a half of the remaining money originated in grants ‘voluntarily’ made by towns lying within the royal domain. The rest came from a miscellaneous range of sources, including governmental economies, the proceeds of selling the property of convicted heretics, and punitive levies on France’s Jews. Little if any money came from outside the kingdom. Louis’s crusade was well financed, perhaps because his officials overestimated his costs rather than because they budgeted accurately, and it was only in 1253, five years into the expedition, that he had to borrow.

In the early months of 1248 Louis made the final preparations, political, administrative and spiritual, for his expedition. These included a tour of the royal domain, the dedication of the Sainte-Chapelle, built to house the relics of the Passion which the king had purchased in 1238 from the Latin emperor of Constantinople, and the receipt by Louis of the pilgrim’s scrip and staff (at Notre Dame), and oriflamme (at St Denis). In August he embarked at Aigues-Mortes, and the bulk of his soldiers did so in Marseilles. The army probably numbered about 15,000 men, nearly all Frenchmen, including 2,500 knights. It wintered on Cyprus, where it was joined by contingents from Latin Palestine and Greece. After Gaza its destination was not in doubt: only a blow to as-Salih’s power in Egypt could relieve the growing pressure on the Holy Land. This meant first capturing Damietta, which had posed such difficulties for the Fifth Crusade. Louis, by contrast, enjoyed a signal early success. The French army reached the port on 4 June 1249 and launched an amphibious assault on the following day. The crusaders landed in the face of heavy opposition, and panic amongst the garrison of Damietta caused them to abandon the city. Louis occupied Damietta in triumph, regarding it as permanently incorporated into the French crown; he even endowed an archbishopric and chapter.

The victory was not followed up, the crusaders remaining inactive at Damietta for more than five months. This has usually been attributed to Louis’s desire to await reinforcements under his brother Alphonse of Poitiers, and to a reluctance to advance up the Nile during a season which had proved disastrous for the Fifth Crusade. But the advantage gained by the quick occupation of Damietta, and the demoralisation which it caused in the Ayyubid camp, was forfeited. The delay enabled the Muslims to refurbish their formidable defensive fortifications at al-Mansura. When the march southwards finally began, on 20 November 1249, the French enjoyed another stroke of good fortune in the death of as-Salih two days later. But a smooth transition of power to his heir Turanshah was achieved, and when the crusaders finally
reached al-Mansura, in the middle of December, they faced the problem of storming the town. Not until February 1250, when a local betrayed the existence of a vital river crossing, was a plan formulated for a circling movement to take al-Mansura in the rear. The attack was entrusted to Louis’s brother, Robert of Artois, and Robert led a foolhardy charge into the narrow streets of the town, where he and his men were cut down. In the battle which followed outside al-Mansura Louis saved the day by his courage, but French losses had been heavy and al-Mansura remained untaken.

Having faltered, the crusade now collapsed. Louis did not lose a major battle, but his troops suffered heavily from disease. At the beginning of March the Muslims transported boats on camels around the French position and launched them on the Nile in the rear of the crusader army, cutting off their easiest contact with Damietta and imperilling their supplies. The terrible situation in which the crusaders found themselves was described in heart-rending terms by the expedition’s chief chronicler, Jean de Joinville. Still the king would not retreat until the early days of April, and the diminished army was by then so enfeebled, and so encumbered with the sick, that its progress down the Nile ground to a halt halfway to Damietta. The king had no choice but to surrender. The shock of defeat was profound, its most telling symptom the ‘shepherds’ crusade’ (Pastoureaux) which mobilised itself in France in 1251; these soi-disant crusaders, who numbered several thousands, tried unsuccessfully to set out for the east to reinforce their king. Louis’s ransom, and that of his tattered army, cost the cession of Damietta and 400,000 livres tournois, of which half was paid immediately. The treaty was concluded on 6 May 1250, and two days later Louis sailed to Acre. He had few troops with him (the rest either were still captives or had returned to France), and his decision to remain in the east, in circumstances in which most crusading leaders fled for home, was an act of extraordinary resolution.

Louis IX remained in the Holy Land for nearly four years. With only 1,400 men, he could not take the field, but he rebuilt the fortifications of Acre, Caesarea, Jaffa and Sidon, virtually ruled the kingdom of Jerusalem and played an important political role in the affairs of Antioch and Cilician Armenia. Meanwhile the scenario in the surrounding Muslim states changed in a manner even more significant than in the lead-up to the battle of Gaza. In the first place, the Mamluk revolution in Egypt, in May 1250, placed in power a regime which was hostile to the Ayyubids, who still ruled in northern Palestine and Syria. Initially it seemed as if the Franks could resume their former policy of benefiting from Muslim division: by allying with the Mamluks against Damascus in 1252, Louis gained the remission of the second half of his ransom and the release of his remaining captives. As important as the political arrival of the Mamluks was that of the Mongols. In 1253 Louis sent the Franciscan William of Rubruck to convert the Mongols, and William broached
with Great Khan Möngke the subject of an alliance of crusaders and Mongols against the Muslims. Impracticable though it was, this idea was so seductive that it remained a popular theme of crusade theorists for decades. Soon after Louis’s return to France in May 1254, Möngke’s brother Hülegü invaded the Middle East. He sacked Baghdad and established the Mongol Il-khanate of Iran, and took Damascus (1259) and Aleppo (1260). In the latter year, however, Hülegü’s general Ked-buqa was defeated by the Mamluks at Ain Jalut, thereby failing to conquer Palestine.

Between them, the Mamluks and Mongols transformed the crusading agenda. The new regime in Egypt posed a threat to the Holy Land to an even greater degree than did as-Salih after Gaza. In the first place, since Ain Jalut delivered the whole of Syria, from Aleppo southwards, into Mamluk hands, the Franks faced a unification of enemy power greater than at any time since Saladin’s death. Secondly, the Mamluk sultanate was implacably hostile to the Franks. This was partly because the Mamluks, as recent converts to Islam, were more fanatical in their beliefs than their Ayyubid predecessors, and accordingly placed greater emphasis on pursuing the holy war. But it was also because they feared the possibility of an alliance between the Mongols and the Franks, particularly in conjunction with a major crusade from the west, which would present them with a war on two fronts. Thirdly, this power and aggression rested, after his seizure of the sultanate in 1260, in the hands of the greatest Islamic commander the Franks in the east ever faced, Baybars. After a period of careful preparation, the new sultan began a systematic series of campaigns which, between 1263 and 1271, robbed the crusader states of most of their surviving castles and towns. Most ominous was the fall of well-fortified Antioch in 1268. Only the sultan’s caution, and the loss of his entire fleet off Cyprus in 1271, saved what was left. Not since Hattin had a crusade been so imperative.

Not surprisingly, it was Louis IX who responded. Following his return from Palestine in 1254, the king spent an average of 4,000 livres tournois a year on the Latin east, chiefly on maintaining a French garrison at Acre. In 1267 Louis again took the cross. He repeated the painstaking preparations for his first crusade, learning from his earlier mistakes. With sound royal planning, generous Church support in the form of a three-year tenth, and the participation of the king’s brothers, Alphonse of Poitiers and Charles of Anjou, a big French crusade had taken shape by the summer of 1270. The crusade was, moreover, more international than Louis’s first expedition. Charles of Anjou was now king of Sicily and the resources of the Regno were therefore placed alongside those of his French lands. King James I of Aragon responded to papal appeals by raising an independent force which set sail from Barcelona in September 1269, though he was criticised by the pope for his failure to consult closely. And the crusade was preached with success in England from 1266 onwards. Prince
Edward took the cross in June 1268, and bound himself contractually to serve Louis at Paris in the following year. This was a powerful crusade, and most of it was under Louis’s control at least to some degree: had it reached Egypt or Palestine, it could have achieved much.

What occurred was, however, a debacle akin to the Fourth Crusade, although it has never exerted the same fascination for historians. By leaving early, with their own agenda, the Aragonese robbed the crusade of its maximum effect. In practice this did not matter, since James’s fleet was so mauled by a storm that the king soon turned back with most of his army. He allowed two of his illegitimate sons to proceed eastwards, effecting a token Catalan-Aragonese appearance at Acre. Much more important was Louis’s decision to preface his attack on Baybars’s lands with a landing in Tunisia. Its Hafsid emir, Muhammad I, had sent an embassy to the French court pleading that the crusaders should first land on his soil, so that they could protect him while he accepted baptism in the teeth of popular hostility. Traditionally the diversion to Tunisia has been ascribed to the influence of Charles of Anjou, who welcomed the chance to exert pressure on the emir, an unruly protégé. But more recently historians have become dissatisfied with the implication that Louis was duped by his brother. It is more likely that Louis simply could not resist the opportunity to begin his crusade by laying the foundations for the conversion of Tunisia, before going on to the east. If the landing bound his brother more fully to the crusade, by providing a chance for reconciling Charles and Muhammad, so much the better.

Predictably, the diversion proved fatal. Sailing from southern France in July 1270 on a mixture of French and Genoese ships, the French crusaders effected their rendezvous with Charles of Anjou’s vessels off Cagliari. The landing near Tunis was made without difficulty on 18 July, but Muhammad I resisted the invasion. The French army was forced into inactivity while waiting for the arrival of Charles of Anjou with reinforcements. Under an unfamiliar Maghribi sun in July, disease was unavoidable. Louis’s youngest son Jean Tristan, born at Damietta in 1250, died, followed by his father on 25 August. Although Charles of Anjou arrived on the same day, the crusade could not survive the blow of Louis’s death. Charles concluded a favourable treaty with Muhammad I and conducted a withdrawal to Sicily. His ships heavily damaged by a storm off Trapani, the new king of France, Philip III, abandoned the crusade and took the land route home. With him went the remains of his father, brother, wife, stillborn son and brother-in-law. Only Prince Edward resolved to continue eastwards, reaching Acre in May 1271 with perhaps 1,000 men. Here he could do little to stop Baybars’s last big successes, and following the conclusion of an eleven years’ truce between the Franks and the sultan, in May 1272, the English crusaders left for home.
Although it did not prove very helpful to the Latin establishment in the Holy Land, Prince Edward’s expedition impressed his contemporaries in the west. Together with his own frequently enunciated enthusiasm for the crusading cause, Edward I’s crusade ensured that the mantle of St Louis fell on to his shoulders. But it was Pope Gregory X (1271–6) who seized the initiative after Louis’s death. The new pope set in train a process of planning and activity which, while it bore relatively little military fruit, revealed the depth of concern which Catholics in the west felt for the Latin east in its twilight years. Of particular importance was Gregory’s convening of the Second Council of Lyons (1274). This general council demands comparison with Innocent III’s Fourth Lateran Council for its authoritative handling of crusading matters. Its crusading measures, the *Constitutiones pro zelo fidei*, were a characteristic mixture of old and new. Traditional features included an attempt to impose a trade embargo on Mamluk Egypt, and the Council’s emphasis on peace amongst Catholic rulers in the west. The Council was, however, innovative in its approach to the ever-growing problems of crusade finance, giving institutional form to Church taxation by establishing twenty-six collection zones, and making a bold attempt to introduce taxation of the laity for crusading.

The impetus given by the pope and his Council had much more effect than some historians have been ready to accept. Conscious of the fact that St Louis’s second crusade was the last great *passagium* which actually embarked for the east, and over-impressed by colourful contemporary reports of gloom-mongering at Lyons, they have dismissed Gregory’s project in their eagerness to ring down the curtain on the crusading movement. In fact three of Europe’s most important rulers, the kings of France, Sicily and Germany, took the cross; a six-year tenth, the biggest clerical tax ever levied for crusading, was collected; and Gregory’s crusade planning took place against the tremendously hopeful background of the reunification of the Latin and Greek Churches, achieved at the Lyons Council in 1274. The pope’s death, in January 1276, brought an end to hopes that the general passage would set out for the east in the spring of 1277, but Gregory’s project did not die with him. This was ensured by the flow of bad news from the east as Sultan Qalawun renewed Baybars’s strategy of conquest after 1285. In addition, vows taken and money collected for Gregory’s project meant that crusade planning became a fixture on the political programmes of Christendom’s rulers.

The news of the fall of Tripoli in 1289, and of Acre and the remaining Latin holdings two years later, caused general consternation and, for many, anguish. The crusading movement entered one of its most curious phases, which lasted until the outbreak of the Hundred Years War in 1337. Desire for the recovery of the Holy Places was widespread. There was great excitement, for example, in 1300, following the victory which the Mongol Il-khan Ghazan won over the
Mamluks at Homs, when the chances of a rapid Christian reoccupation of Palestine seemed to be very good. This continuing enthusiasm generated a cluster of ‘recovery treatises’, much debate and some serious planning. The crusade was widely preached and the clergy heavily taxed. The fact that, despite this, no great recovery crusade set sail, may be attributed to a number of factors. In the first place, Christendom was paralysed by internal warfare, especially the great conflicts between the royal houses of Anjou and Aragon (1282–1302), and England and France (1294–1303). Secondly, the movement lacked committed leadership. The financial and organisational demands of crusading meant that royal command was essential, and although the Holy Land meant a great deal, in different ways, to Edward I of England and Charles I of Sicily, their vision of the crusade was not St Louis’s. After the death of Gregory X papal leadership, too, was much diminished. Popes like Martin IV and Honorius IV gave their full support to the Angevin court at Naples, which meant that crusading against the Byzantines, or the rebels of Sicily, enjoyed priority over crusades to Palestine; while those like Nicholas III and Boniface VIII, who pursued more independent policies, found that the complexity of Italian affairs stopped them focusing on the Holy Land.

But perhaps more important than either of these two factors was the strategic impasse which confronted crusading in the east. The total failure, either through defeat or by diversion, of no fewer than four great passagia, and the relative success enjoyed both by smaller expeditions and by the garrison which Louis IX had maintained at Acre, led many in the century’s final decades to emphasise the value of ‘small-scale’ crusading. Most theorists insisted that a naval blockade was needed to enforce the papal ban on Christians trading with the Mamluks, and that a limited expedition, or passagium particulare, should pave the way for a passagium generale. By 1300 it was appreciated that these two forces called for planning, organisation and finance which were onerous enough in their own right. And yet they were perceived to be futile without a culminating general passage, which alone could defeat the Mamluks in the field and reconstitute a defensible kingdom of Jerusalem. The problems attached not just to the assembly of the general passage, but also to the creation of a viable timetable for the supporting taxation and the preliminary operations in the east, both military and diplomatic, were massive. They were much more fully appreciated than in the days of St Louis, Frederick II or Boniface of Montferrat, and the fact that recovery planning occurred at all is testimony to the endurance of the crusading ideal. The Catholic west was unable either to hold Palestine or, for several generations, to face its loss with equanimity.

Repeated defeat in the east did not, at least in this period, destroy the crusading movement. One reason was that the crusade had come to occupy a secure,
central place in European society. The position of the *crucesignatus*, in terms of canon and civil law, was well defined in the thirteenth century. The vow, which was at the heart of individual participation in crusading, received definitive attention from such leading decretalists as Ramon de Penyafort, Pope Innocent IV and Hostiensis. Canonists also considered the nature of the crusader’s obligations, and the spiritual and temporal privileges which he or she was entitled to claim. The latter were extensive and valuable. They included the right to protection of both family and property, exemption from the payment of interest on debts, the enjoyment of non-taxable status and the right to dispose of property, especially fiefs, which was normally inalienable. The efficacy of these privileges in practice is hard to gauge: against the many attempts by civil authorities to stop the abuse of crusader rights, which points to their usefulness, must be set the numerous instances of *crucesignati* claiming that their rights had been over-ridden. What is certain, as recent studies of thirteenth-century England have clearly shown, is that the legal status of *crucesignati* was second only to the frantic economic activity generated by their financial needs, in ensuring that their decision to crusade impacted on the lives of all around them.

The crusader was a knight of Christ and the pope Christ’s earthly vicar. Buttressed by the arguments of their canonists, the popes claimed the right to decree that crusading vows, in the case of either individuals or groups, should be redeemed (bought back) or commuted (carried out by fighting on a different front). This, together with existing papal authority over the launching of crusades, the invention of clerical taxation for crusading, and the evolution of the papal curia itself as an agent of government, enabled and compelled all the thirteenth-century popes to formulate a full-scale crusading policy. In particular, the comparative needs of a number of crusading fronts had to be weighed up and prioritised, in a much more sophisticated manner than in the twelfth century. Thus in 1213 Innocent III revoked preaching both for the Albigensian Crusade and for crusading in Spain, because he wanted to focus Catholic energies on the projected Fifth Crusade. In 1236 Gregory IX commuted the vows of several hundred French knights from fighting the Muslims in the Holy Land to defending Constantinople against the Greeks. And in 1264–5 the curia commuted the vows of French crusaders from fighting Sultan Baybars to fighting for Charles of Anjou in Italy against Manfred of Hohenstaufen; after Charles’s victory the flow of manpower was reversed. Funds raised for the crusade, in the form of alms, legacies, the proceeds of redeemed vows and above all clerical taxes, were treated in the same way.

In practice this dirigiste policy, which reflected the ambitious theories of some contemporaries that the papacy should exercise monarchical powers, enjoyed at best partial success. Most *crucesignati* regarded the practice of
commutation as an affront to a highly personal process of self-dedication. Typically, many of those whom Gregory IX tried to persuade to accompany the Emperor Baldwin II to Constantinople in 1236 insisted on fulfilling their vows to fight in the Holy Land. The practice of organising large-scale redemption of vows was susceptible to abuse: indeed, it was phased out for this reason in the period following the Second Council of Lyons. Scarcely less palatable was the siphoning off for one purpose of funds which had been given for a different one. For many, this remained a fraudulent procedure, irrespective of the arguments which were deployed about the papacy’s overall responsibility for the well-being of Christendom. The implications for Church–state relations were also unacceptable. The role of the civil authorities was reduced to that of implementing papal policies, even if the latter proved politically disadvantageous. For example, the use of the crusade first to bring in, and later to sustain, the Angevin dynasty in southern Italy and Sicily entailed a massive bolstering of French and of Guelf power. Apart from these considerations, the papal curia found that however substantial its role became in the promotion, recruitment and financing of crusades, it could exert little influence on the way the expeditions operated in the field: the Fourth Crusade gave the clearest proof of this at the very start of our period.

All of this means that it is extremely hard to generalise about either the extent or the consequences of the papal curia’s control over crusading in the east. It is much easier to relate the increasing attention which papal bulls, conciliar decrees and canonists paid to the organisational mechanics of crusading, to a broader tendency to focus on operational detail. There were a number of reasons for this. In the first place, all the crusades considered here went east by sea, which meant that approximate numbers of participants had to be ascertained, the proper types of vessel hired, and victuals and fodder laid in for the voyage. Even the vocabulary of crusading reflected this change, the word *passagium* deriving from the spring and autumn ‘passages’ of the Mediterranean sailing year. Again, the growing problems of crusade funding, the development of Church taxation in response to these, and the complex negotiations which resulted between the curia and crusading commanders, meant that the latter needed to know, in much greater detail than in the twelfth century, for whom they would bear financial responsibility, and for how long. All this, moreover, took place against a background of failure, or partial success, which led commentators increasingly to examine past errors and to attempt to lay firmer foundations for victory in future. And as military expeditions the crusades naturally shared the general trend for European fighting to be better planned, organised and controlled. The contractual element in particular increased, so that by the time of St Louis’s crusade of 1270 the outlines are
visible of an army held together largely by multifarious contracts for personal service.

The expeditions of St Louis show clearly that in the second half of the century the balance between private commitment and public organisation which had existed since the Third Crusade was tipping in favour of the latter. The state, represented at its most precocious by western Europe’s bureaucratic monarchies, had begun to gather more and more crusading activity into its hands. This applied most strikingly to France, but to a large extent also to Sicily, England and Aragon. This generalisation is, however, potentially just as deceptive as the suggestion that crusades were simply instruments of the papacy’s authority. For without a ground-swell of popular feeling, the public authorities could not have acted: in this period, as earlier, large-scale crusading could not occur without a recurrence of the *valida motio* described by one chronicler as creating the First Crusade. This ground-swell had probably diminished by the time of Louis IX’s first crusade, and certainly it found itself increasingly frustrated of expression after the king’s death. But it was in evidence throughout the century to some degree. Crusading seemed to have everything in its favour. It was unquestionably orthodox, yet popular. It was served both by the century’s vibrant new religious orders, the mendicant friars, who preached the cross with great vigour, and by its burgeoning secular officialdom. It spanned social classes, as the Children’s Crusade of 1212 and the French *pastoureaux* of 1251 showed, but exerted a uniquely powerful appeal to the chivalric aristocracy. It crossed regional and national boundaries, yet retained its original heartland in a broad swathe of northern France, the Low Countries and the western provinces of Germany. And it could depend on the persuasive effects of powerful family traditions of crusading, while also exerting an intensely vocational appeal on some individuals, like the French nobleman Geoffroy de Sergines, who devoted more than twenty years of his life to the cause of defending the Holy Land.

Above all, thirteenth-century crusading in the east held the devotional and military elements of holy war in something approximating to harmony. Its failure, which is after all scarcely surprising when one considers the odds against success, should not disguise this fact. From a host of examples two may be selected to illustrate it. The first is Oliver of Paderborn’s striking image of the patriarch of Jerusalem lying penitentially prostrate on the ground, before a relic of the true cross, while the crusaders assaulted Damietta’s chain tower in August 1218. The second is Jean de Joinville’s account of the mixture of practical and spiritual preparations which underpinned his crusade, just as they did that of his king. Joinville went on to narrate that when he departed on crusade in 1248, he dared not let himself look back, so strong were his feelings for his castle and children. This was not the first time that a *crucisignatus* described the
inherent tension between the earthly and the heavenly *patria*, but it is characteristic that its most poignant expression should come from a thirteenth-century source. Such a synergic concentration of military power and religious conviction could not endure; indeed, it remains astonishing that it lasted as long as it did.
The departure of Richard Coeur de Lion and his army from Acre in October 1192 marked the end of the Third Crusade. The combined might of the west had failed in its primary object of winning back Jerusalem and the other holy places for Christendom, but the crusade had nevertheless achieved some signal successes. The truce agreed with Saladin the previous month had restricted Frankish-held territory in what remained of the kingdom of Jerusalem to the coastal areas, but at least the Christians had salvaged something from the disasters of 1187, and the kingdom was to survive, though within greatly reduced borders, for another hundred years. It was not until 1291 that the Muslims finally put an end to the Latin presence in Syria. To the north the cities of Antioch and Tripoli had held out against Saladin, and they too had a long future ahead of them, with the Christians maintaining their rule in Antioch until 1268 and in Tripoli until 1289. But here again there had been serious territorial losses. Further north still, beyond the Amanus mountains and now occupying a wide area including the plain of Cilicia and the Taurus mountains, lay the principality of Armenia. The collapse of Byzantine power in this region in the early 1180s had given the Armenians the opportunity to expand, and in 1198 their prince, Leon, received his royal crown from pope and emperor, and so inaugurated a monarchy which throughout its existence looked alternatively to western Europe and to Armenian traditionalism for inspiration and sustenance. For most of the thirteenth century the Cilician kingdom of Armenia was a considerable force, and it did not finally succumb to Muslim encroachments until the 1370s. The other Christian possession in the east was Cyprus. Richard's seizure of the island in 1191 and his establishment of a Latin regime headed by the former king of Jerusalem, Guy of Lusignan, proved to be the most durable achievement of the Third Crusade. Guy died in 1194. Two years later his brother Aimery persuaded the western emperor, Henry VI, to constitute Cyprus as a kingdom with himself as the first king. Aimery and his descendants ruled their island realm until the 1470s when the line failed and the island passed into Venetian control.
The crusader states

Map 9  The Latin east, c. 1220
At first sight it may seem surprising that the truncated and war-ravaged remnants of the crusader states should have lasted as long as they did. In fact, after the Third Crusade there was no serious attempt on the part of the Muslims to embark on a systematic conquest of the Christian-held territories until the 1260s, and the explanation for this respite for the Latins lies largely in the political rivalries which preoccupied their Ayyubid neighbours. Saladin had ruled an enormous empire, but there had never been any suggestion of welding his lands into a single polity. Before his death in 1193 he divided his acquisitions among the members of his family, with the richest provinces, Egypt and those parts of Syria centred on Damascus and Aleppo, going to his sons. In 1196, however, one of Saladin’s brothers, Sayf ad-Din al-Adil, seized Damascus, and four years later he succeeded in supplanting his kinsman in Egypt as well. Al-Adil’s supremacy over the other Ayyubid princes was to survive until his death in 1218. There then followed a lengthy period in which his sons jockeyed for control. Initially the struggle centred on the rivalry between al-Kamil, the ruler of Egypt, and his brother, al-Mu’azzam, the ruler of Damascus. Then, after al-Mu’azzam’s death in 1227, there was a period of flux which ended with al-Kamil ruling in Egypt and Palestine in an uneasy alliance with another brother, al-Ashraf Musa, in Damascus. This state of affairs continued from 1229 until the latter’s death in 1237. Al-Kamil’s death the following year marked the start of a further round of protracted conflict from which his son, as-Salih Ayyub, eventually emerged as the victor. He wrested Egypt from his brother in 1240 and then took Damascus from his uncle, another son of al-Adil named as-Salih Ismail, in 1245. As-Salih Ayyub’s death in 1249 was quickly followed by a military coup d’état in Egypt which signalled the end of the Ayyubid dynasty there and the foundation of what came to be known as the Mamluk sultanate. This regime too, especially during its first ten years, was characterised by political instability. Meanwhile, in 1250, Saladin’s great-grandson, an-Nasir Yusuf, who had been ruling in Aleppo in succession to his father and grandfather, was able to take advantage of the multiple turn of events and occupy Damascus.

The constant rivalry within the Muslim camp had important ramifications for the Christians of Latin Syria. On occasion it could mean that one protagonist might look to them for military assistance against his kinsmen. Thus in 1244 as-Salih Ismail of Damascus and the Latins joined forces against as-Salih Ayyub of Egypt in an alliance which ended in a crushing defeat for the Christians in pitched battle at La Forbie (Harbiyya) near Gaza. The infighting among the Ayyubids also meant that they were especially apprehensive about the possible effects of crusades from the west. Despite the fact that neither had ended in a Christian triumph, both the Third Crusade (1189–92) and the Fifth Crusade (1217–22), which in 1219 captured the Egyptian port of Damietta,
had given the Muslims pause for thought. Even if a crusading army had only limited success, its presence in the east might easily upset the balance of power between the various Ayyubid princes. It was a combination of fear of what a crusade might yet achieve, and fear that the presence of crusaders might give his rival in Damascus the chance to steal a march on him, that in 1226 prompted al-Kamil to attempt to head off the crusade then being prepared by Emperor Frederick II by offering to cede him territory in the Holy Land. However, by the time Frederick arrived in the east in 1228 the political situation had swung decisively in al-Kamil’s favour, and, although the emperor was still able to negotiate the restoration of Jerusalem to Christian rule, he had to settle for substantially less than he had earlier been led to expect. A decade later the crusades of Thibaut of Navarre and Richard of Cornwall coincided with a particularly fraught episode in Ayyubid politics. Both as-Salih Ismail of Damascus in 1240 and as-Salih Ayyub of Egypt in 1241 were prepared to hand over territory as the price of support against their rivals, although in the case of al-Salih Ayyub he was offering land he did not actually possess. Be that as it may, by 1241 the Christians controlled substantially more of the Holy Land than they had done in 1192.

Another consequence of the unstable political conditions in the Ayyubid principalities was the willingness on the part of the Muslims to agree to truces with the rulers of the kingdom of Jerusalem. Islamic law prevented the Muslims from finalising a permanent peace treaty with their Christian neighbours, but Saladin’s truce with the crusaders in 1192 was the first of a series of short-term agreements which typified subsequent relations. The 1192 truce was to last three years and eight months. In 1197 there was spate of hostilities, with the Muslims seizing Jaffa and the Christians occupying Beirut; and then in 1198 the truce was renewed. There were further truces in 1204, in 1211, in 1221 at the end of the Fifth Crusade, in 1229 when Frederick treated with al-Kamil, in 1241, in 1254 with Damascus and in 1255 with Egypt. Clearly it suited neither the Muslims nor the Christians to continue the endemic warfare which had been such a feature of the twelfth century. Both sides seem generally to have observed the truces, with the result that the Latins were at peace with their neighbours more often than not. Indeed, when added together, the truces covering Acre account for almost eighty out of the hundred years between 1192 and 1291.

Although the Latins could never hope to be able to rival the Muslims in manpower, western shipping dominated the eastern Mediterranean, and control of the seas undoubtedly played an important part in the preservation of crusader possessions along the coast. Between 1204 when Jaffa was recovered and the

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1 Jackson (1987), pp. 41-8.
1260s, Christian rulers held the entire littoral from southern Palestine to the western extremity of Cilician Armenia with the exception of Latakia in northern Syria. In practice this meant that it was not possible for hostile shipping based in Egypt to take on fresh water and supplies anywhere north of Ascalon, and so the range of any Ayyubid or Mamluk naval activity was necessarily constricted. The Egyptians therefore had difficulty in mounting combined land and sea operations against Christian targets, and it was equally difficult for them to interfere with the Christian shipping lanes. European merchant ships plying between Acre and the west tended to sail via Cyprus to some point off the county of Tripoli and then stay within easy reach of the coast as they made their way south to the principal ports. They would have been reasonably safe once they were within sight of land, and the short stretch of open sea between Cyprus and Syria was beyond the normal reach of ships operating from Egyptian ports. Some idea of the limitations on Muslim naval potential can be gained from the fact that only two Egyptian-based raids on Cyprus have been recorded for the whole of the thirteenth century, one during the Fifth Crusade, the other, which ended in disaster, in 1271.

Directly after the Third Crusade there were few places in the Latin Kingdom other than Tyre and Acre that could have held out against full-scale assault. But it seems to have been only slowly that defence works elsewhere were put in hand. The castle of Atlit was begun in 1218, as was work on the fortifications at Caesarea; in the 1220s a start was made on refortifying Jaffa and Sidon and building the castle of Montfort in the hills to the north-east of Acre; Safed in Galilee was completely rebuilt at enormous expense in the 1240s. In the early 1250s King Louis IX of France sponsored a major programme to improve the city walls and defence works at Acre, Sidon, Caesarea and Jaffa. Even so, when in 1260 a Mongol invasion was thought to be imminent, Thomas Berard, the master of the Temple, reported that, apart from Tyre and Acre, there were just two Templar castles (presumably Safed and Atlit) and one fortress belonging to the Teutonic Knights (Montfort) in a state of defence in the kingdom of Jerusalem. He also mentioned three castles in the principality of Antioch and two of the county of Tripoli belonging to his own Order, as well two in Tripoli belonging to the Hospitallers. One of these Hospitaller castles must have been the famous Crac des Chevaliers, a fortress which had survived Saladin’s conquests after Hattin, and which had been greatly improved and enlarged in the course of the thirteenth century. By any standard it is impressive; but there were few others that came even remotely close to it in size or importance. The Christians held many small forts that could give protection against brigands

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or raiding parties; but there were not many strongholds that could defy a large and determined army.

It is difficult to estimate the military resources at the disposal of the rulers of the kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century. The battle of La Forbie in 1244 seems to have been the only battle fought by the Latins settled in the east during the thirteenth century in which they deployed their full military might, and from the descriptions of that encounter circulating in the west it appears that the Christian losses were comparable in scale to those at Hattin over half a century earlier. If so, we might then assume that the available manpower at that period was of the same order as it had been before 1187. The chief differences would have been the greater proportion of troops provided by the military Orders and, in all probability, a contraction in the number of enfeoffed secular knights. It is certainly true that in the thirteenth century the holders of lay lordships were finding it increasingly difficult to remain solvent, and at the same time make adequate provision for the defence of their lands. Even in time of peace, the costs of maintaining sufficient forces may have outstripped most lords’ resources, so much so that in the years after 1260 the previously buoyant lordships of Arsuf and Sidon were transferred to the Hospitallers and Templars respectively.4 From the early 1250s a permanent force of men-at-arms paid for by the French crown and stationed in Acre proved a valuable addition to the Christian forces.

The ability of the military Orders to build and garrison substantial fortresses, take a share in the defence of the cities and provide an appreciable part of the fighting strength of the Latin east is an indication of the enormous wealth they derived from their possessions and business interests in the west. Their assets and their military role ensured them an important voice in the political life of the Latin east, even although they recruited almost all their members in western Europe. Secular rulers on the other hand relied to a considerable extent on their ability to tap the commercial wealth of their cities to pay for their military needs. The revenues from the countryside were clearly insufficient to support the military requirements of either the Orders or the kings and lords, and many feudatories derived their livelihood not from landed endowments but from fief-rents, assigned against the lords’ income from commercial taxation. Urban wealth also encouraged the emergence of burgess confraternities which combined responsibilities for local defence with religious and charitable activities and provided a framework within which townspeople could organise themselves into militias. In the course of time their popularity and military function meant that these associations acquired a major role in the social and political life of the cities, especially Acre.

It is difficult to know how far agrarian wealth contributed to the prosperity of the Latin east in the thirteenth century, or even whether the rural areas under Christian control were capable of feeding the urban population. On the other hand, there is abundant evidence that the principal ports – Acre, Tyre, Tripoli and to a lesser degree Beirut and Jaffa – flourished as a result of their place in the rhythm of international commerce, and that their commercial wealth did much to compensate for the loss of territory in 1187. Acre and Tyre provided the outlet to the Mediterranean for trade through Damascus, and it seems that until about 1260 they served as important staging-posts for the movement of merchandise from much further east en route to Europe. Following a pattern of trading already established in the twelfth century, Italians and other westerners came to Acre and Tyre, where they purchased Syrian and other Asian wares. The ports of the Latin east thus became the entrepots in what was evidently a most lucrative commerce. When the fleets arrived the cities were thronged with traders bent on supplying the ever-increasing western demand for spices, dyestuffs, silks, precious stones and other oriental goods. The local population grew rich supplying their needs; and their lords took a share of the wealth they generated in the form of tolls. In the 1240s it was claimed that Acre alone was worth £50,000 annually to its ruler. The commodities did not only include luxuries: foodstuffs, wine, cotton, metals and timber were also traded. Nor was it simply a matter of merchandise passing between Syria and Europe: there was clearly a vigorous trade along the coast from Cilicia to Egypt.

Trade and the wealth generated by trade were of the utmost importance to the rulers of Latin Syria. The presence of western merchant shipping in eastern waters was what gave the Christians naval superiority. The merchants themselves must have been well aware of the significance of their role in the economic life of the Latin east, and, like the military Orders and the burgess confraternities, their representatives came to demand a share in political decision-making processes. The trade through Acre and Tyre was also valuable to the Ayyubid masters of Damascus. However much they may have wished that the Latins had never established themselves in the east, they recognised that it was in their own interests to allow the rhythm of commerce to remain in being, undisrupted by warfare. Quite apart from considerations of military power and Ayyubid dynastic politics, there was good reason for both Christians and Muslims in Syria to want to live in peace with one another.

The survival, and indeed the success, of the Latin states in the east can thus be understood partly in terms of Muslim disunity, and partly in terms of the Christians’ own military and naval strengths, which in turn depended on

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5 Riley-Smith (1977), p. 17.
commercial wealth and the availability of western resources. Help from the west came in many different forms: crusades; financial support organised by the Church; the generosity of individuals; the aid of the military Orders; the willingness of merchants to co-operate in undertakings in which defence of the Christian possessions in the east and the defence of their own trading bases and routes were perceived as being one and the same. But at the same time it is glaringly apparent that Latin Syria was itself frequently torn by dissensions and often lacked strong leadership. As the thirteenth century progressed, political fragmentation became increasingly evident.

In the decades immediately following the Third Crusade the chief theatre of conflict in the east was Antioch. At root the problem arose from the ambitions of Leon, the ruler of Cilician Armenia, to wrest the city and its dependent territories from the descendants of Bohemond of Taranto who had been ruling there since 1098. In 1194 Leon, who had taken Prince Bohemond III captive by trickery, tried to seize Antioch; but he was thwarted by the combined efforts of the local Greek and Latin population, who organised themselves into a commune for the purpose. The parties were then reconciled, thanks to the mediation of Henry of Champagne; and as part of the settlement Bohemond’s elder son, Raymond, married Leon’s niece. However, Bohemond’s death in 1201 occasioned a resumption of hostilities. Raymond had died in the meantime, and the pretext for the war was now the succession rights of Raymond’s infant son, Raymond Roupen, championed by Leon, as against those of Raymond’s younger brother, Bohemond (IV), who had been governing Tripoli since the death of Count Raymond III without heirs shortly after the battle of Hattin. Despite repeated attacks, Bohemond IV managed to hold out in Antioch until 1216. He enjoyed the support of the local Greek community and also of the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo, who preferred a comparatively weak Latin prince in Antioch to the king of a much enlarged Armenian kingdom. The Templars and the Hospitallers as well as the Latin Church found themselves drawn into the conflict, and the papacy and the rulers of Cyprus and Acre became involved in diplomatic activities, either as mediators or as supporters of one or other of the combatants. In 1216 Raymond Roupen occupied Antioch, but he was ousted in a revolt three years later and Bohemond IV was restored. Leon’s death that same year (1219) was followed by dynastic problems within Armenia itself. Bohemond took the opportunity to consolidate his position, and henceforth he ruled in both Antioch and Tripoli until his own death in 1233.

Dynastic problems were also a perennial problem in the kingdom of Jerusalem, in particular the failure of a male line to be established. In 1192 the ruling dynasty was represented by Isabella, the younger daughter of King
Amaury (1163–74), who in that year took as her third husband Count Henry of Champagne. Henry fell to his death in an accident in 1197, and Isabella was hastily married off to the new king of Cyprus, Aimery of Lusignan, thus temporarily uniting the monarchies of the two kingdoms. But not for long. Isabella and Aimery both died in 1205. In Cyprus the throne thereupon passed to a son of Aimery’s earlier marriage, while in Jerusalem Isabella, whose only son had predeceased her, was succeeded by Maria, her child by her second husband, Conrad of Montferrat. Until 1210, when Maria married a French nobleman named John of Brienne, her kinsman, John of Ibelin, lord of Beirut, acted as regent. Maria died in 1212, but John of Brienne, as the crowned and anointed king of Jerusalem, continued to exercise royal authority. In 1222, however, he returned to Europe, and then in 1225 his daughter and heiress, Isabella, wed the western emperor, Frederick II. Frederick at once made clear his view that John no longer had constitutional rights in the Latin Kingdom and started appointing his own men to act as his lieutenants there. In 1228 Isabella died after giving birth to a son named Conrad. So between 1192 and 1228 the succession to the throne of Jerusalem passed through a series of heiresses, while royal authority was wielded either by their husbands or, as in 1205–10 and 1222–8, by officers to whom royal prerogatives were devolved. Henry of Champagne, Aimery of Lusignan and John of Brienne were all capable and energetic rulers, but the fact that they were consorts and not kings in their own right must have lessened their effectiveness.

The younger Isabella’s marriage to Frederick II failed either to bring about an increase in western help for the Latin east or to provide good government for the kingdom of Jerusalem. Frederick was in the east on crusade in 1228–9, but neither Conrad who lived from 1228 until 1254 nor Conrad’s son, Conradin, who died in 1268, ever set foot in the east. In other words, the Hohenstaufen monarchs were absentees, and, although they attempted to rule through lieutenants either sent out from the west or drawn from the local nobility, the system quickly foundered and rule in Acre passed into the hands of a group of leading Latin Syrian aristocrats. Ironically, it was the brief period when Frederick himself was present in the east which provided the catalyst for this breakdown in monarchical authority. The fact that he was excommunicate at the time and the controversial nature of his treaty with al-Kamil, which restored Jerusalem to the Christians on terms which meant that it was little more than an indefensible enclave in Muslim territory, together with his generally high-handed behaviour, all conspired to turn opinion against him.

In particular Frederick had incurred the hostility of the Ibelin family and its affinity. Besides being closely related to the royal houses of both Jerusalem and Cyprus, John lord of Beirut was a man of considerable wealth and power. Regent in Acre in the years 1205–10, he then seems to have quarrelled with the
new king, John of Brienne, and thereafter divided his time between Beirut and Cyprus. He evidently tried to build up Beirut as a commercial centre to rival the royal ports of Tyre and Acre, while in Cyprus he and his brother, Philip of Ibelin, became leading counsellors of King Hugh I (1205–18). When Hugh died, Philip took charge as regent for the infant Henry I, and then on Philip’s death in 1227 or 1228, John himself assumed control. The Ibelin regency in Cyprus had to be sustained in the face of opposition from the queen-mother, her second husband (the future Bohemond V of Antioch), and a group of Cypriot nobles. The legality of their rule was questionable, but the brothers were able to maintain themselves thanks to their wide-ranging network of kinsmen, vassals and clients. In 1228 Frederick arrived in the east determined to reassert the imperial suzerainty over the island which dated from the time of his father’s inauguration of the Cypriot monarchy in 1196, and he put an end to the Ibelin ascendancy. So long as he was in the east, John of Ibelin was overawed; but when in 1229 Frederick returned to the west, John was able to strike back at the Cypriot nobles to whom Frederick had entrusted the island’s government, and re-established his own power.

The crunch came in 1231 when Frederick sent his lieutenant, Riccardo Filangieri, to the east with a substantial military force and instructions to destroy the Ibelin clan once and for all. Filangieri began by laying siege to Beirut, but his insensitivity to local sentiment gave the Ibelins the chance to rally opinion against him. John brought his followers across from Cyprus in a vain attempt to raise the siege, and in May 1232 they suffered defeat north of Acre at Casal Imbert. But despite these setbacks the siege was then lifted. Acre and most of the other places in the kingdom refused to acknowledge Filangieri’s authority, the chief exception being Tyre, which the Hohenstaufen forces had occupied soon after their arrival. In Acre resistance to Filangieri was focused on the Confraternity of St Andrew, which now developed as the nucleus of a communal movement aimed specifically at opposing imperial rule. The ‘Commune of Acre’, as it became known, was dominated by the Ibelins’ vassals and other clients, and it brought together knights and burgesses in common cause. In the summer of 1232 John’s attention was diverted by the need to overthrow a pro-Hohenstaufen regime that had seized power in Cyprus while he himself had been preoccupied with the defence of Beirut. Filangieri sought to bolster this regime by despatching some of his troops to the island. But victory in battle at Agridi, to the north of Nicosia, and then the reduction of the imperialists’ remaining fortresses, meant that by early 1233 John had re-established his authority in Cyprus once more. The Ibelins and their allies were now masters of almost all the Latin kingdom apart from Tyre, although Filangieri could still look to the Teutonic Knights, the Hospitalers and the prince of Antioch for support. In Cyprus the young king, Henry I, had
now come of age and was prepared to work closely and, so far as we can tell, harmoniously with the Ibelins. In the kingdom of Jerusalem, however, the Hohenstaufen remained the legitimate rulers, and so arguably the bulk of the kingdom was in a state of rebellion.

The significance of these developments cannot be underestimated. Although there had been no male heir to the throne since as far back as 1185, until 1231 the kingdom had retained some semblance of unity and the monarchy had been reasonably effective. But after 1231 no ruler ever again had direct control over both the principal royal cities, Acre and Tyre, and in place of a king or king-consort the direction of affairs had passed into the hands of an aristocratic faction whose capacity to act was curtailed by the need to take into account the views and interests of the military Orders, the western mercantile communities and the clergy and burgesses. Over and above the normal problems of government and the intricacies of relations with their Muslim neighbours, the rulers now had to worry about the possibility that the Hohenstaufen might yet return in force; and they had also to persuade themselves and their subjects that they were legitimately empowered to administer justice and to command obedience. In 1242, after almost a decade of political stalemate, the Ibelins and their allies forcibly ousted the imperial administrators from Tyre.6 By then events in Germany and Italy had precluded any immediate possibility of further Hohenstaufen intervention in the east, and the occupation of Tyre set the seal on the Ibelin triumph. Demonstrating the legitimacy of their own rule was another matter, and their apologists had their work cut out to justify both their resistance to Filangieri and their right to nominate particular individuals to preside in the High Court and supervise the day-to-day administration; considerable intellectual energy was expended on demonstrating the legal validity of the Ibelin position.

John of Beirut died in 1236. His dominant position in the kingdom of Jerusalem devolved on a group of nobles led by his sons, Balian, the new lord of Beirut, and John, lord of Arsuf, together with their cousins, John, the son of Philip of Ibelin, and Philip de Montfort, whose mother was one of John of Beirut’s sisters and whose father was the brother of the celebrated leader of the Albigensian Crusade. Between them these men controlled affairs until the late 1250s. Arguments of varying degrees of speciousness were put forward to justify their position. They refused to recognise Filangieri’s letters of appointment. When in 1242 Conrad came of age they claimed that his regent could no longer be the nominee of his father and guardian, but should be his closest relative present in the east, and they lighted upon the queen-mother of Cyprus, Alice of Champagne, as the rightful occupant of that position. Alice was no

6 For the date and circumstances, see Jackson (1986); Jacoby (1986a).
more than a figurehead. When she died in 1246, her role passed to her son, King Henry I. Exactly what happened at that point is not clear, but it looks as if Henry entered into a deal with the nobles whereby he became regent in return for major territorial concessions: Philip de Montfort was given Tyre, John son of Philip of Ibelin became count of Jaffa, and Balian of Beirut and probably John of Arsuf acquired portions of the royal domain. What was more, Henry allowed these same men to exercise authority in his name in Acre.

Rule by an aristocratic coterie no doubt suited the interests of those involved; but it may be wondered how far it was to the advantage of the kingdom as a whole. For example, there is evidence that judicial processes became bogged down in arguments about the extent of a regent’s juridical authority and the permanence of the judgements of his court. On the other hand, legal affairs and the preservation of noble privilege were clearly matters that exercised the minds of the ruling clique, so much so that they spawned a remarkable series of treatises on court procedures and feudal custom, the most notable being written by John of Ibelin, count of Jaffa. So far as military or diplomatic affairs were concerned, since no one man had over-riding authority some sort of consensus among all the major interest-groups in the kingdom was necessary if effective action were to be taken. Total agreement, however, was rarely in evidence. Paradoxically it was in the early 1240s, during the rule of these nobles, that the kingdom of Jerusalem attained its greatest territorial extent this century, but these years also witnessed some serious setbacks including the final loss of Jerusalem.

In 1244 a force of Turkish tribesmen over-ran Jerusalem and immediately afterwards went on to play a major part in the Christian defeat at La Forbie. They were the Khwarizmians, a particularly turbulent people who had moved under Mongol pressure into Syria from their homelands in the steppes beyond the Caspian, causing widespread disruption throughout the region. They were no respecters of frontiers, and, though they may not have ravaged the lands of the kingdom of Jerusalem as much as some other areas, their depredations clearly had a serious effect on the principality of Antioch as well as in the neighbouring Muslim lands. The Mongols themselves had appeared in the Near East in the winter of 1242/3, and after their victory at Köse Dağ (1243) they were able to establish suzerainty over the Seljuq sultanate of Rum. The king of Cilician Armenia thereupon sought Mongol protection, and in the 1250s his example was followed by Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch. It was only to be expected that after their recent forays into Russia, Europe and now Anatolia the Mongols would turn their attention to Syria and Egypt.

The loss of Jerusalem and the defeat at La Forbie were followed in 1247 by the Muslim capture of Ascalon and Tiberias. Then, on top of the military
disasters, the devastation of the countryside and the rumours of Mongol advance, came the tragic fiasco of Louis IX’s crusade. The French king remained in the east until 1254, but he was unable to repeat the success of earlier thirteenth-century crusaders and negotiate the cession of territory to the Christians. He did, however, take steps to see to it that the Latin kingdom was better defended by improving coastal fortifications and by establishing at his own expense a permanent garrison in Acre. But he could do nothing about the lack of strong government. King Henry I died in 1253, leaving a minor heir in Cyprus. In Acre the pretence of using a relative of the legitimate but absentee Hohenstaufen monarch as regent was for the time being allowed to lapse, and the same nobles who in effect had been running the kingdom of Jerusalem since the 1230s simply carried on by their own authority.

In 1256 fighting broke out in Acre between the Genoese and the Venetians. The occasion was a dispute between them over the sale of some property belonging to the Basilian monastery of St Sabas, which meant that Genoese access to the harbour in Acre was in danger of being blocked by their chief competitors. There had been violent affrays involving European merchants and seamen before, but this time the dispute developed into a major war. The Pisans and the other westerners were drawn in on one side or the other. So too were the nobles, although it is difficult to know whether the local rulers were motivated by their own ambitions and mutual rivalries, or simply by a desire to back whichever side they thought was going to win. At first the initiative lay with the Genoese, and most of the leading figures in Acre seem to have given them their support. Philip de Montfort took advantage of the situation to expel the Venetians from Tyre, where they had received a third of the city and its contado at the time of the original Christian conquest in 1124. But in 1258 opinion in Acre swung behind Venice whose navy now inflicted a crushing defeat on the Genoese. The upshot was that while the Venetians were unable to regain their quarter in Tyre, the Genoese were driven from theirs in Acre. Skirmishing between the Italians continued until 1270 when the Genoese were allowed back into Acre. The Venetians did not return to Tyre until 1277.

Hard on the heels of the war between the Italians came the Mongol invasion of Syria. In 1258 their forces had ravaged Mesopotamia and destroyed the Abbasid caliphate; then early in 1260 they conquered Aleppo and Damascus. It was assumed that they would now advance on the Christian cities of the coast and then into Egypt. But the blow never fell. Instead, on learning of the death of the Great Khan Möngke, his brother Hülegü who was in command in Syria withdrew with part of his army into central Asia so as to stake his claims in the succession disputes that were sure to follow. The Mamluks under their sultan, Qutuz, then advanced from Egypt, and in September 1260 they met the remainder of the Mongol forces in battle at Ain Jalut in Galilee. The hitherto
invincible Mongols were defeated and forced to abandon Syria. The reputation of the Mamluk regime which had come to power in Egypt just over a decade earlier, and whose history had to this point been largely one of faction struggles and coups d'état, was immeasurably enhanced.

With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that between them the War of St Sabas and the Mongol campaign in Syria form a watershed in the history of the Latin states. The Mamluks were quickly able to fill the void left by the collapse of the Ayyubid dynasty in Aleppo and Damascus, and so from about 1262 onwards a single, Egyptian-based Muslim power encircled the Christian territories. The military threat was now greater than at any time since the days of Saladin. Beyond Syria to the east lay the Mongol Il-khanate of Persia; and continuing hostility between the Mamluks and the Il-khans blocked the caravan routes from Persia to Damascus, and thus exacerbated the disruption to the urban life of Muslim Syria brought about by the Mongol conquest. It is difficult to assess the precise effect of these developments on the prosperity of Tyre and Acre, but there can be little doubt that European demand for Asiatic luxury goods was henceforth being satisfied to a significant extent by merchandise shipped from ports in the Black Sea, Cilician Armenia or Egypt. Loss of trade consequent on changing trade routes aggravated the harm the conflict between the mercantile powers was doing to Latin Syrian commerce. The War of St Sabas had caused a considerable amount of damage in Acre itself, impeding trade with Syria; it is doubtless significant that it was in about 1260 that the minting of coins in Acre ceased. It was also at this point that the Ibelin hegemony in Acre gave way. This can partly be explained by the fact that the old guard was dying off – Balian of Beirut had died in 1247, John of Arsuf in 1258 – partly by the fact that the War of St Sabas had the effect of driving a wedge between Philip de Montfort and the others. The younger generation, as represented by John II of Beirut and Balian of Arsuf, never seems to have acquired the same pre-eminence as their fathers had, and in the 1260s both these men found themselves in severe financial difficulties. John of Beirut had the misfortune to be captured by Turcoman tribesmen and was ransomed for a huge sum; Balian of Arsuf had to let the Hospitallers take over his lordship. The end of the Ibelin government is perhaps signalled by the appointment of the commander of the French garrison in Acre, Geoffroy de Sergines, as lieutenant in 1259. The circumstances of his appointment are shrouded in mystery, but it may be that we can detect the hand of the prince of Antioch and his relatives. Bohemond VI

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(1251–75) had already intervened in Acre in 1258; his sister Plaisance was deemed to be exercising the regency of Jerusalem for the absentee Hohenstaufen on behalf of her son, King Hugh II of Cyprus, and so was technically responsible for making the appointment; behind them stood their uncle, Henry of Antioch, a younger brother of Bohemond V and husband of a sister of the late king of Cyprus, Henry I. For their part, the Ibelins may not have given way gracefully: in 1264 the pope wrote calling on Henry of Antioch, Geoffroy of Sergines and the Ibelins, John, count of Jaffa, and John II of Beirut, to put an end to the discord among them that was endangering the security of the kingdom.8

In 1260 the authorities in Acre had favoured the Mamluks in their campaign against the Mongols, but both King Hethoum of Armenia and Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch had been Mongol allies, and had even made territorial gains at Muslim expense during the Mongol push into Syria. The idea that it would be in their own best interests for the Christians in the east to cooperate with the Il-khan of Persia against the Mamluks achieved general acceptance during the years that followed. Indeed, until the opening years of the fourteenth century crusading theorists took the view that the best way to recover Jerusalem and the rest of the Holy Land was by means of a Mongol alliance; and their optimism was underpinned by hopes that the Mongols themselves might accept Christianity. It was not to be. Projected combined operations in 1271 came to nothing; and when in 1281 the Mongols invaded Syria in force for a second time the Latins preferred to abide by their truce with the Mamluks.

No one, least of all the Mamluks, could have anticipated that it would take the Mongol Il-khanate over twenty years before it could make a serious attempt to avenge the defeat at Ain Jalut. Qutuz, the victor of 1260, was murdered almost immediately after the battle by a group of rival emirs, and a senior officer named Baybars emerged as the new sultan. Baybars was to rule until 1277, and it was under his guidance that the sultanate was able to capitalise on its success and military potential. From his standpoint, the natural course of action was to safeguard his flank in anticipation of renewed Mongol attack, and accordingly he devoted much of his attention to rendering the Christian states impotent. In 1266 and again in 1275 Mamluk troops raided deep into Cilicia. An attempt on Antioch in 1262 failed; but in 1268 Baybars led his forces in person and stormed the city. The plunder was vast; so too was the slaughter. Further south he concentrated on the inland fortresses, capturing Mount Tabor in 1263, Safed, Toron and Chastel Neuf in 1266, Beaufort in 1268 and Montfort, Gibelacar and Crac des Chevaliers in 1271. In effect this meant that

the county of Tripoli and the kingdom of Jerusalem had lost control of their hinterland and were now restricted to a narrow strip of land along the coast, while the Mamluks had gained not only territory but also unrestricted lines of communication. Baybars also seized the southern cities of the kingdom, taking Caesarea and Arsuf in 1265 and Jaffa in 1268. His run of success was not entirely unbroken – in 1266 he chose not to press the siege of Montfort, and in 1271 a Mamluk naval raid on Cyprus was wrecked near Limassol – but he had exposed the essential frailty of the Latins and had weakened them severely.

The Christian response shows the extent to which the kingdom of Jerusalem had fragmented since the early part of the century. There was no central direction: instead individual lords and the military Orders made their own truces with the Mamluks to cover their own seigneuries. So, for example, the count of Jaffa and the lord of Beirut negotiated separate agreements in 1261; the Hospitallers and the lord of Tyre followed suit in 1267; the lady of Beirut in 1269; the authorities in Acre in 1272. These truces normally specified which villages were to be retained by their Christian lords, and made provision for sharing the revenues from particular areas. The terms left the Latins in no doubt that their continued presence in the east largely depended on Mamluk suzerainty.

Baybars’s conquests coincided with the rise of Henry of Antioch’s son Hugh, usually known as Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, to prominence within the Latin states. From 1261 he was regent of Cyprus, and it was probably in 1264 that he was accepted as regent in Acre as well. In 1267, on the death of his cousin Hugh II, he mounted the throne of Cyprus and reigned as King Hugh III until his own death in 1284. In 1268 Conradin, the last legitimate descendant of Frederick II and Queen Isabella, was put to death in Naples, and the following year Hugh, who could claim the twelfth-century kings among his ancestors, was crowned king of Jerusalem in Tyre. Henceforth, the crowns of Cyprus and Jerusalem were united, and for the first time since the early 1220s the kingdom of Jerusalem had a resident monarch. Hugh certainly looked as if he might be able to give the Christians the leadership they so desperately needed, and, as regent and then king of both Cyprus and Jerusalem, he showed himself willing to deploy Cypriot troops in the defence of the mainland. But things did not work out. There was no way that Baybars could be stopped by military means, and by 1271 the Cypriots were protesting loudly against being made to serve in Syria. Hugh found that he could do little to turn the clock back and reassert monarchical control over a kingdom which had to all intents and purposes broken down into its component lordships and castellanies: he was, as the Muslims called him, simply ‘king of Acre’. What was more, his title to the

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9 For the processes by which Hugh came to power, see Edbury (1979).
The kingdom of Jerusalem was challenged by a relative, Maria of Antioch, who, with papal connivance, transferred her rights to the king of Sicily, Charles of Anjou (1266–85). In 1276, frustrated by his failure to weld the remnants of the kingdom into a coherent polity and by the opposition he was now encountering, Hugh retired to Cyprus.

After the diversion of St Louis’s second crusade to Tunis in 1270, the pre-occupation of the papacy with crusading warfare in Europe, coupled with the intrinsic difficulties of organising and paying for a major expedition to the east, precluded the possibility of effective military aid from the west. From 1277 until 1286 Acre was ruled by officers appointed by Charles of Anjou, but in practical terms the Sicilian Angevins had even less to offer than the kings of Cyprus. Although Charles’s representatives renewed the truce with the Mamluks in 1283, in Tyre and Beirut Hugh III was still recognised as the rightful king. The rebellion known as the Sicilian Vespers which began in 1282 marked the end of any possibility that Charles could contribute decisively to the survival of the Latin east, and in 1286 the new king of Cyprus, Henry II (1285–1324), regained the government of Acre for the Lusignans. But by then Acre’s days were numbered. 1287 saw the fall of Marqab, the last Hospitaller fortress in the east. In 1289 it was the turn of Tripoli, which under its counts had perhaps fared better than many places in the east: unlike the rulers of Acre, they had for example been able to maintain their silver coinage to the end. Then in 1291 the new Mamluk sultan, al-Ashraf Khalil, anxious to prove himself as a military leader, embarked on the siege of Acre. It was well defended and a Muslim victory was by no means a foregone conclusion, but on 18 May the city was taken by storm. The survivors escaped to Cyprus; the remaining cities and fortresses, including Tyre which in 1187–8 had defied Saladin, surrendered without offering further resistance.
In Egypt, the thirteenth century of the Christian era began inauspiciously. The country’s agricultural prosperity was dependent on the Nile and its annual flooding, which normally reached its peak in September or October. In 1200, however, there was no such inundation in the autumn. Within weeks of the failure of the Nile, the prices of all foodstuffs climbed steeply. In the months that followed, if the chroniclers are to be believed, whole villages were depopulated, cannibalism became widespread and things came to such a pass that doctors were afraid to make house calls for fear lest they be eaten by the families of their patients. It was also a turbulent year politically, for in January 1200 Saladin’s brother, Sayf ad-Din al-Adil, supported by a regiment of Mamluks (or slave soldiers) formerly in the service of Saladin, removed Saladin’s grandson, al-Mansur Muhammad, from the throne of Egypt and al-Adil declared himself sultan in the boy’s place. By then, Saladin, the founder of the Ayyubid empire in Egypt and Syria, had been dead for seven years. Even during Saladin’s lifetime, his empire had been run as a family business, with his kinsmen controlling large, semi-independent principalities, only loosely responsive to the sultan’s authority. After Saladin’s death those kinsmen, based in Cairo, Damascus and Aleppo, fought amongst themselves for supremacy in Egypt and Syria. They were supported in their struggles by small armies composed of freeborn Kurds and Turks, as well as Turkish Mamluks. At times, indeed, the clansmen and Mamluks dictated the actions of the Ayyubid princelings who were their nominal masters.

Al-Adil was already old when he assumed the sultanate. Inordinately fond of food and sex, he was a very different sort of man from the austere and lachrymose Saladin. Nevertheless, al-Adil’s authority and the authority of those Ayyubids who ruled after him drew on Saladin’s prestige and on a legacy of military and religious achievement. The Ayyubid dynasty, descended from Kurdish soldier adventurers, ruled over lands which were largely populated by Arabs. To some extent, they were able to justify their rule by their leadership of
a continuing jihad (or Holy War) against the remnants of the crusader principalities in Syria and Palestine. Besides waging war against the Franks in Syria, Saladin had acted as a sponsor and patron of Sunni Islam against Shi‘ism. In 1171, he had returned Egypt to its ancient allegiance to the Sunni Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. Subsequently, in Syria, he had found himself in conflict with the Shi‘i Assassin sect, as well as with Shi‘i minorities in the big cities. He had established many Sunni madrasas, or teaching colleges, with the twofold aim of creating an educated religious and clerical elite and of challenging the former intellectual prestige of Shi‘ism; more madrasas were to be founded by his Ayyubid and Mamluk successors in the thirteenth century.

When the Ayyubids took over in Egypt, they brought with them a fairly simple household and military administration, which was modelled in its entirety and protocol on Seljuq and Zangid precedents. Most of the officers and senior palace officials were Turks or Kurds. However, this military elite made use of an elaborate civilian bureaucracy, which they had inherited from the previous Fatimid dynasty. Staffed by Copts and Muslim Arabs, this large and sophisticated bureaucracy was needed to administer the collection and distribution of Egypt’s agricultural and industrial revenues. Much of what was collected was distributed to soldiers and officials in the form of iqta’. Under the Ayyubids and, later, the Mamluks, the muqta (or recipient of iqta’ revenue) collected his pay himself in the form of taxes, levied usually in kind on a designated village or agricultural estate. Though most iqta’ revenues came from agriculture, there were also assignments of iqta’ on industries. In the early thirteenth century, towns such as Alexandria, Damietta, Rosetta and Tinnis, on the Nile Delta, were still important centres of industrial production. However, European piracy and crusading raids (especially in 1204 and 1212) certainly damaged their industrial enterprises, and in 1227 Tinnis was destroyed by command of the sultan in order to prevent it falling into the hands of future crusaders.

Alexandria and Damietta were the chief Egyptian ports for commerce with Europe. During the lifetime of Saladin, the Genoese, Venetians and Pisans had all established small commercial colonies in Egypt. Under al-Adil and his successors, the rights of the European merchants were more precisely defined and their customs privileges sometimes extended. Venice concluded no less than six such agreements with al-Adil between 1205 and 1217. Though the Ayyubid Sultans were keen to buy strategic materials, such as wood, copper and iron from the Europeans, Muslim suspicions about the collusion of the Italian commercial republics with crusading ventures often gave rise to conflict. In 1212, when the sultan learned of rumours of an imminent crusade against Egypt, he ordered the arrest of some 3,000 European merchants in Alexandria. Moreover, Italian merchants were not welcome in Egypt in the
immediate aftermath of the Fifth Crusade, and direct trade between Venice and Egypt does not seem to have been resumed until the 1230s. However, thirteenth-century Egypt was not yet as dependent on the export of pepper, spices, silks and cotton to Europe as it would be in the centuries which followed. Egypt's trade with its Muslim neighbours, Syria, Iraq and the Maghrib, was far more important and it is probable that the Red Sea trade with India and points further east was more important yet. This Red Sea trade was conducted under the auspices of a loose grouping of spice merchants, known (for reasons which are obscure) as the Karimis.

By 1200 al-Adil was in control of both Cairo and Damascus, though neither city was really his capital, for al-Adil was usually on the move. Although he was master of the greatest city in Syria, he did not govern all of Syria. One of Saladin's sons, az-Zahir Ghazi, continued to rule in Aleppo and other Ayyubid princes governed in Hama, Homs, Baalbek, Banyas, Bosra and Karak. Moreover, there were other small enclaves of independent authority such as the castles of the Shi'ite order of the Assassins in the mountains of north-west Syria, while the Christians of the crusader principalities continued to hold most of a coastal strip extending from Ramleh in the south to Antioch in the north. However, the north Syrian ports of Latakia (Laodicea) and Jabala were held by the Muslims and served as outlets for the export of silk and cotton coming from Aleppo. (Throughout the early thirteenth century, the rulers of Aleppo had good commercial relations with the Venetians and the Venetians maintained a factory in the city.)

The sway of the Ayyubid clan extended beyond Syria. A branch of Saladin's family was to govern the Yemen from 1174 to 1229, and in upper Iraq the Ayyubids had been fighting to extend their territory at the expense of the Turcoman dynasty of Artuqid princes who controlled Malatya and Diyarbekir. Ayyubid ambitions in upper Iraq were contested by the Seljuq Turkish sultans of Rum. From their capital in Konya, the Seljuqs reigned over central and eastern Anatolia. Although the Seljuqs were Turks, the culture and the entitulation of their court was largely Persian. Konya was one of the cultural capitals of the Muslim world in the early thirteenth century. Since the prosperity of the sultanate was heavily dependent on a transit trade in goods coming from Persia and the Black Sea, the Seljuqs sponsored the building of a network of caravanserais for the protection of merchants and their goods as they crossed Anatolia.

Mosul in upper Iraq was the only important possession of the Zangid dynasty not to have been taken by the Ayyubids. However, from 1210 onwards their vizier, Badr ad-Din Lulu, was the effective ruler of the city. Mosul was an important industrial and commercial centre, and Marco Polo reported that ‘here are made all the cloths of silk and gold called mosulin [muslin]. And from
this kingdom hail the great merchants, also called Mosulin, who export vast quantities of spices and other precious wares.’ Mosul was threatened both by the ambitions of the Ayyubids in the west and by those of the Abbasids in lower Iraq. From the tenth century onwards, the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad had been puppet figures under the control of a series of first Buyid and then Seljuq warlords, and the caliphs had exercised only a modest degree of spiritual authority. However, the break-up of the sultanate of the Greater Seljuqs in Iran had allowed the Abbasids to reassert their independent authority and, under Caliph an-Nasir (1180–1225) and his successors, attempts were made to re-establish Abbasid control over first lower Iraq and then upper Iraq.

The empire of the Khwarazmshahs (or Khwarizmians) was certainly the greatest power in the Muslim world in the opening decades of the thirteenth century. Since the Khwarazmshah sultans governed central and eastern Persia as well as Transoxiana, they ruled over most of the territories of the former Seljuq sultanate in the east, and the court of the Khwarazmshahs was modelled on that of its predecessor. Their vast empire was defended by a huge cavalry army composed largely of Kipchak Turks. However, from 1219 onwards, the Khwarazmian empire was under attack from the Mongols to the north and east and the consequences of the break-up of that empire would dominate events further west, even as far west as Syria, for decades to come.

Ayyubid preoccupation with affairs to the north and east of Syria, and, more specifically, their ambitions in the Jazira region of Iraq, meant that they were ill prepared for the onslaught of the Fifth Crusade. When, in May 1218, a force of crusaders led by John of Brienne landed outside Damietta and began to besiege it, al-Adil was in Syria. Though he charged the na‘ib (or viceroy) in Egypt, his son al-Kamil, to conduct defensive operations in Egypt, al-Adil himself remained for some months in Syria, preoccupied doubtless by the attack of the Seljuq Sultan Kaikhawhs of Rum on Aleppo. Only in August did he set out back to Egypt, but then, as Oliver of Paderborn put it, ‘Saphadin grown old with evil days and sickness, the disinheritor of his cousins and the usurper of the kingdoms of Asia, died and was buried in Hell.’ Naturally, al-Adil’s Muslim subjects had a different view of the matter and people wept in the streets when they heard of his death.

Al-Adil’s son, al-Kamil, succeeded him, both as sultan in Egypt and as head of the Ayyubid clan. Unnerved by growing crusader pressure on Damietta, al-Kamil offered to surrender Jerusalem and all of the former territories of the kingdom of Jerusalem lying west of the Jordan. Damietta fell to the crusaders in November 1219; in 1221 the crusaders commenced their advance down the Nile. Cut off from supplies and prevented from retreating, the crusaders were obliged to negotiate their withdrawal from Egypt without receiving any significant concessions. During this crisis, the bonds of Ayyubid clan solidarity
held, but only just. Al-Mu'azzam, one of al-Kamil's brothers and ruler of Damascus, had twice brought Syrian troops to the assistance of the hard-pressed Egyptians. Although al-Ashraf, another brother and controller of much of upper Iraq, was reluctant to become involved, in the end, in the summer of 1221, he brought more Muslim reinforcements to Egypt and these troops played a crucial role in the final discomfiture of the crusaders. Once the crisis was over, however, brotherly rivalry took precedence over clan solidarity and al-Kamil and al-Ashraf formed an alliance, the aim of which was to dispossess al-Mu'azzam of his Syrian possessions. Although this struggle came to a sudden end with al-Mu'azzam's unexpected death in 1227, al-Mu'azzam had already called in the Khwarizmians and al-Kamil had already sought assistance from Emperor Frederick II.

After the Mongol occupation of the Khwarizmian empire in Transoxiana and eastern Iran in the early 1220s, the son of the last Khwarazmshah, Sultan Jalal ad-Din Mingburnu, fled westwards and, assembling an army of free-booters, attempted to refound a Khwarizmian empire in western Iran and Iraq. Egged on by al-Mu'azzam, in 1226 Jalal ad-Din attacked al-Kamil's fortress of Akhlat in upper Iraq. He also threatened the eastern frontiers of the Seljuq sultanate of Rum, and for a while the Seljuq sultan, Kay Qubad, and al-Ashraf combined against Jalal ad-Din, defeating him at the battle of Erzinjan in 1230. The following year Mongol generals appeared in the Near East and pursued Jalal ad-Din into the Diyarbekir region where he was betrayed and killed by local Kurds. Although he had spent as much time preying on his Muslim neighbours as resisting the westward advance of the Mongols, Jalal ad-Din, once dead, came to be regarded as a hero and martyr in the struggle against the pagan Mongols. It was to be almost thirty years before another sultan would win a similar renown. After the collapse of his regime in western Iran, many of his Khwarizmian and Kipchak bandit-soldiers fled westwards to find employment in Syria's little wars. Nothing now stood in the way of a Mongol advance on Iraq and Syria.

As has been noted, al-Kamil countered al-Mu'azzam's appeal to Jalal ad-Din by himself entering into diplomatic correspondence with Frederick II. He urged Frederick to come out to the Holy Land and take Jerusalem and Damascus from al-Mu'azzam. However, by the time Frederick landed at Acre in September 1228 al-Mu'azzam was dead. It was easy for al-Kamil, ruler of Egypt, to cede what Damascus claimed. An-Nasir Daud, al-Mu'azzam's heir, roundly denounced the surrender of Jerusalem as a betrayal of the jihad ideal, but an-Nasir Daud was not able to hold on to Damascus (and later, when he was in a position to do a deal with the Franks, he proved himself to be as pragmatic as his uncles). After Damascus had passed into the hands of al-Ashraf, however, al-Kamil found that he was no closer than before to having his claim
to paramountcy in Syria recognised, for al-Ashraf refused to recognise any such claim.

Al-Ashraf died in August 1237 and Al-Kamil died in March 1238. A two-year family power struggle in Egypt and Syria ensued, at the end of which Al-Kamil’s son, al-Adil II, was removed from the throne of Egypt by Fakhr ad-Din ibn al-Shaykh (the leading representative of a Turco-Iranian clan and a great power-broker) and by Mamluks formerly in the service of Al-Kamil. As-Salih Ayyub, an older brother of the deposed prince, was invited to take over. Damascus, which had been briefly held by Al-Kamil after Al-Ashraf’s death, was eventually occupied by as-Salih Ismail, a brother of Ashraf’s, who had previously been governing in Bosra and Baalbek. The rivalry of as-Salih Ayyub and as-Salih Ismail (in which other Ayyubid princelings took sides) was further complicated by the arrival of substantial crusading contingents in Palestine during these years. The leaders of these expeditions, hardly more than chevauchées, were successful in capitalising on the divisions in Ayyubid ranks. In September 1239 Thibaut of Champagne brought a large number of French crusaders to Palestine. Despite defeat by an Egyptian army near Gaza, Thibaut was later able to negotiate advantageous treaties with both Egypt and Damascus. In 1241 Richard of Cornwall led an English contingent of crusaders out to the Holy Land. Even though he and his men did not conduct a campaign, Richard was able to conclude a further treaty with Egypt on terms favourable to the Franks, so that the Franks briefly held more territory in Palestine than at any time since 1187.

However, the Franks’ continuing involvement in the wars between the Ayyubids and their switch to an alliance with Damascus against as-Salih Ayyub in Egypt brought them swiftly to disaster. In 1244 as-Salih Ayyub summoned to his aid the Khwarizmians from upper Iraq. The Khwarizmians swept through Syria and Palestine, pillaging on their way, and in August they took Jerusalem from the Franks without any difficulty. As-Salih Ayyub and the Khwarizmians then joined forces and defeated as-Salih Ismail and the Franks at the battle of La Forbie on 17 October.

The Khwarizmian alliance had given as-Salih Ayyub Damascus but, in the long run, their service was as dangerous to the sultan of Egypt as the enmity of as-Salih Ismail had been. Finding themselves to be insufficiently rewarded by the sultan, they rebelled, but in 1246 an army led by Ayyubid princes in northern Syria defeated and dispersed them. The disruptive appearance of the Khwarizmians in Syria was a striking example of a more general phenomenon. Turcomans and Kurds also moved westwards in tribal groups or mercenary regiments, fleeing in advance of the Mongol armies. Many such groups entered Syria, but Seljuq Anatolia seems to have suffered as much as Syria from the Turcoman influx. The Mongols, having established themselves in eastern
Persia, continued to advance westwards. The grazing lands of Azerbaijan and Anatolia seemed particularly attractive to the pastoralist Mongols. In 1243 Baiju defeated the Seljuq Sultan Kaikhawsrau (Kaikhusraw) at Köse Dağ and most of the Seljuq principality became a protectorate of the Mongols.

On the south Russian steppes inter-tribal warfare and famine among the pagan Kipchak Turks were also exacerbated by Mongol incursions into the region. These disorders led in turn to a plentiful supply of young Turkish slaves, boys who had been captured in war or sold by desperate parents. Genoese merchants, based at the Black Sea port of Caffa, played a leading part in this white slave trade. Though some of these slaves were sold in western Europe, the chief purchaser of these slaves in the 1240s was the sultan of Egypt and Damascus. As-Salih Ayyub was following common Ayyubid practice when he recruited and trained Mamluk slave soldiers. However, he purchased an unusually large number (by the time he died he possessed about 1,000); and he trained them thoroughly. His Mamluk regiment was garrisoned in a fortress on an island in the river Nile (Bahr an-Nil) and for this reason they were known as the Bahri Salihi Mamluks. The fact that most of the regiment consisted of Kipchak Turks gave it an ethnic cohesion, further strengthened by a cult of obedience to and imitation of the austere and taciturn sultan.

The Bahri Mamluks were to play a decisive role in the defeat of the crusade under Louis IX of France in 1249–50. The French crusaders landed outside Damietta on 5 June 1249. As-Salih Ayyub, who had conducted the Muslim defence from al-Kamil’s old army camp of al-Mansura, died in that same month. A message was hastily sent to as-Salih’s son, Turanshah, who had been exiled in Iraq, asking him to come to Egypt and assume the sultanate. In the meantime, a coalition of senior figures, including as-Salih Ayyub’s widow Shajar ad-Durr, his senior army commander Fakhr ad-Din ibn al-Shaykh and a number of Mamluk officers and court eunuchs took charge of affairs.

The French found that their progress towards Cairo was blocked at al-Mansura. On 9 February 1250 the Ayyubid commander and effective head of state, Fakhr ad-Din ibn al-Shaykh, was cut down in the first rush of the Frankish onslaught; but, after an abortive penetration of the town, the French crusaders could make no further progress and many fell to the arrows of the Bahri Mamluks. Shortly afterwards, the rump of the French forces under Louis began to retreat slowly towards Damietta. Turanshah arrived in Egypt a few weeks later to find the direction of affairs in the hands of the informally constituted junta of officers and courtiers. None of the latter was happy at handing over power to Turanshah and his retinue. In the meantime, the French were unable to cut their way back to Damietta, and they were forced to surrender in April. Louis agreed to relinquish Damietta and to ransom himself and his army for 800,000 besants.
Turanshah, a heavy drinker with a nervous twitch, had brought his own retinue of Mamluks with him from Iraq. He had few or no supporters in Egypt. In May 1250 he was murdered by a gang of Bahri Mamluks, who feared that they were to be edged out of power by Turanshah’s retinue. His murder inaugurated a decade of shifting alliances, plots, purges and small wars in both Egypt and Syria. In Egypt, despite the Bahri Mamluks’ successful move against Turanshah, they seem to have had no plans to take power, and the throne passed to a succession of anti-Bahri rulers. First, Shajar ad-Durr reigned for a few days; then al-Mu’izz Aybak, a Mamluk officer, also for a few days. Then an Ayyubid child-prince, al-Ashraf Muizzafar, the great-great-grandson of al-Kamil, was placed on the throne. The child-sultan exercised no independent authority, for his mock reign only concealed the division of power between the mutually hostile supporters of al-Mu’izz Aybak on the one hand and the Bahri regiment on the other. After the murder of Aqtay, the commander of the Bahris, and the flight of most of his supporters to Syria in 1254, al-Mu’izz Aybak resumed the sultanate. However, Aybak was murdered in 1257 at the behest of Shajar ad-Durr. She in turn was hunted down by loyal servants of Aybak and these ensured that nominal rule passed to Aybak’s small son, Nur ad-Din ‘Ali. Real power, however, remained with a competitive coalition of officers. In November 1259 one of Aybak’s senior emirs, Sayf ad-Din Qutuz, felt strong enough to depose his master’s son and assume the sultanate himself. He argued that the crisis brought on by the entry of the Mongols into Syria made this necessary.

In Syria, once news had been received of the murder of Turanshah in 1250, an-Nasir Yusuf, the Ayyubid prince who ruled over Aleppo, moved swiftly to occupy Damascus. An-Nasir Yusuf governed, or rather attempted to govern, Syria, as the head of a coalition of Kurdish officers (notably the Qaymari Kurds), Mamluks and prominent refugees from turbulent Egypt. Not all of Syria was even nominally under an-Nasir Yusuf’s sway. From Karak, al-Mughith, a grandson of al-Kamil, controlled much of the land to the east of the Jordan. Turcoman tribesmen moved through northern Syria into Palestine and warred with what was left of settled government. The Christians on the coastal strip of Palestine took advantage of Muslim weakness to extend their power in Galilee. The Ayyubids in Syria made hardly any pretence of sustaining Saladin’s jihād against the Christians; they preferred to dream of conquering Egypt. An-Nasir Yusuf made his attempt in the winter of 1250–1. Later, al-Mughith, egged on by refugee Bahri officers, made unsuccessful attempts to invade Egypt in 1257 and 1258. The feuds, plots and civil strife which characterised Syrian and Egyptian political life in the 1250s were in a sense a luxury – a luxury which was brought to an end by the coming of the Mongols.

On 1 June 1256 Hülegü, a general acting on behalf of his brother, the
Mongol Great Khan Möngke, crossed the Oxus with an army numbering perhaps 100,000. Hülegü’s first aim was to capture the fortress of Alamut, and with its capture to eliminate the power of the Assassin sect in northern Iran. The successful reduction of Alamut was the prelude to the conquest of the rest of Iran and of Iraq. In February 1258 Baghdad was thoroughly sacked and al-Musta’sim, the last Abbadid caliph of Baghdad, was trampled to death under the hooves of the Mongol cavalry. Baghdad became once again a small provincial town, one among many decaying Iraqi towns, now commercially and culturally isolated from Syria. After the occupation of Baghdad, the main Mongol army moved into Azerbaijan and prepared for an invasion of Syria.

In December 1259 the Mongol army crossed the Euphrates and entered northern Syria. The Mongols’ aims in invading Syria are not altogether clear, but it seems that they intended to reduce Syria to vassalage and even envisaged going on to conquer Egypt. Although an-Nasir Yusuf had been in diplomatic contact with the Mongols from as early as 1250, he was not now prepared to submit to Hülegü. Many of an-Nasir Yusuf’s officers were in favour of defying the Mongols. A prey to conflicting counsels, an-Nasir Yusuf vacillated and took no part in the defence of Aleppo. In January that city was taken, but, a few weeks later, Hülegü withdrew from Syria, taking the greater part of his army with him. It is uncertain why Hülegü withdrew to Azerbaijan, but it may be that, having heard news of the death of Möngke (who died in August 1259), Hülegü, who had no formal mandate for rule in Iran and the Caucasus, anticipated conflict with his cousin Batu, khan of the Golden Horde, Hülegü left his general Ked-buqa (Kitbugha) with perhaps 15,000 men in Syria. Though the Mongol forces were now much diminished, an-Nasir Yusuf made no attempt to defend Damascus, but fled south into the desert. Therefore Damascus put up no defence and Ked-buqa occupied it in March. Having taken Syria’s chief city, Ked-buqa sent Mongol reconnaissance forces as far south as Gaza. Ked-buqa was assisted in his occupation of Syria by Armenian levies under King Hethoum. In the north, Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, had submitted to Ked-buqa and the citizens of Antioch paid the Mongols tribute.1 The Christians in the south, however, declared their neutrality in the imminent conflict between the Mongols and the Mamluks.

In Egypt, Qutuz, having taken advantage of the emergency to depose his master’s son, took the surprising decision to confront the Mongols in Palestine. He was perhaps encouraged to do so by Bahri Mamluks and other soldiers, who had fled to Egypt after despairing of the leadership of an-Nasir Yusuf. Qutuz entered Syria with a motley army, probably about the same size as Ked-buqa’s force. Ked-buqa, having collected Mongol detachments from all over

Syria, entered Palestine, probably to rescue his reconnaissance forces in the region. The two armies encountered one another at Ain Jalut, in north-eastern Galilee, on 3 September 1260. Ked-buqa was killed and the Mongols were defeated by a predominantly Turkish army employing much the same tactics as themselves. The remnants of the Mongol army were chased out of Syria. Qutuz’s victory over the infidel at Ain Jalut not only gave a sort of retrospective legitimacy to his usurpation of rule in Egypt; it also made him the chief power in Syria. An-Nasir Yusuf, the fainéant former ruler of Damascus and Aleppo, had been taken prisoner by the Mongols and was shortly to die at their hands. Some of an-Nasir Yusuf’s Ayyubid kinsmen had been discredited by their collaboration with the Mongol invaders; but al-Ashraf Musa, who had fought with the Mongols at Ain Jalut and had then deserted to Qutuz on the battlefield, was left in possession of his principality of Homs, while al-Mansur, who had fought on the Muslim side, kept his principality in Hama. However, Qutuz’s distribution of territory and office in Syria caused dissatisfaction among some of his former supporters and, on 24 October, Qutuz was assassinated by a group of Mamluk emirs, among whom was Baybars, the most prominent of the Bahri Mamluks. Baybars was promptly acclaimed as the next Sultan by the leading emirs, most of whom were fellow Salihī Bahris. Doubtless, these emirs expected their fellow officer to promote their interests. As it turned out, while Baybars did not dare to attack those interests directly, he did little to promote them.

It is unlikely that the Christians of the crusader states thought that they had anything to fear from the accession of yet another usurper. The previous decade of coups and murders did not augur well for the new sultan’s prospects. Indeed, for a few years, the crusader coastal strip was left in peace, while Baybars concentrated on securing control over the Muslim hinterland of Syria. After Qutuz’s murder, a rival emir, Sanjar al-Halabi, declared himself sultan in Damascus; but he was ousted by an army sent from Egypt by Baybars in 1261. Aleppo, similarly, was seized by a Mamluk emir; and Baybars only took direct control of the city in 1262. When the ruler of Homs died in the same year, his possessions were annexed by the sultan (and the same happened to the principality of Sahyun in 1272). Al-Mughith, the Ayyubid ruler of Kerak in Transjordan, was tricked into surrendering his castle in 1263 and was executed for collaboration with the Mongols. Hama continued to be ruled by a line of Ayyubid princes, but these princes deferred to the sultan in Egypt, and in practice Hama was treated as a province of the Mamluk sultanate. (Hama was only formally annexed to the sultanate in 1341.) Under Baybars and his successors, the greater part of Syria was controlled by Mamluk officers sent out from Egypt to govern and garrison the cities.

In Egypt, developments that were already under way in the first half of the
thirteenth century were taken further, so that the Mamluks’ preponderance in government became more overt. Soldiers held most of the senior offices in the palace household, while the civilian administration, especially the chancery and the tax bureaus, was increasingly subject to military supervision. The civilian vizier was stripped of most of his powers. In the army, officers of Mamluk origin came to hold a near monopoly of the higher echelons of command. However, free-born troops (halqa) continued to provide some of the officers and most of the troopers. The ranks of the halqa were swollen by military refugees from Iraq, Anatolia and, most importantly, by considerable numbers of Mongols, who, refusing to accept Hulegui’s creation of an Il-khanid regime in Iran and Iraq, crossed over to the Mamluk side. In the decades to come, sons of Mamluks (known collectively as the awlad an-nas), who were denied the privileges and prospects of rapid promotion open to those of slave origin, also tended to join the halqa. In Syria, the halqa also included free-born emirs and sheikhs and tribal auxiliaries. As the numbers of both Mamluks and halqa troopers in the service of the sultans increased, a growing amount of land came to be held as military iqta’. While reliable figures are not available, it is clear that the Mamluk sultans of the late thirteenth century were able to field substantially larger armies than their Ayyubid predecessors; and al-Yunini estimated that the army trebled or quadrupled in size under Baybars.2

The maintenance of a large standing army was expensive, but increased agricultural productivity covered much of the expense. The bureaux, or diwans, which supervised the taxes in kind produced by agriculture, seem to have taken on more staff. Soldiers supervised the husbanding of the Nile’s waters and the seasonal opening of the irrigation canals. They were also employed in corvées digging out irrigation works. Military campaigns undertaken against the disorderly Arabs of upper Egypt probably also helped increase agricultural productivity. Senior Mamluk emirs also doubled as leading merchants, dealing in the excess produce of their iqta’s and selling grain, cotton and sugar. Some even owned merchant vessels which traded in the Mediterranean. Except in the spice trade with the Indies, which was more or less monopolised by the wealthy Karimi merchants, civilians were poorly placed to compete with the military in trade. Merchants do not seem to have had any influence at court until the 1290s, when the Sultan al-Ashraf Khalil made one, Ibn Salu’s, his vizier. The establishment of a Mongol Il-khanate led to the almost complete cessation of the overland trade between Syria and Iraq; and this must have had adverse consequences not only for the Muslims, but also for the Christians on the Syrian littoral.

Under the Mamluks, the Abbasid caliphate was revived in Cairo. A relative

2 Al-Yunini, Dhayl Mir’at al-Zaman, iii, pp. 261–3.
of the last caliph of Baghdad was installed by Baybars as al-Mustansir in 1261. The caliph, in his turn, proclaimed Baybars sultan, not only of Egypt and Syria, but also of Iraq, Hijaz and Yemen, an indication perhaps of Baybars’s grandiose ambitions. It is possible that Baybars had not realised how firmly the Mongols had entrenched themselves in Iraq, for, soon afterwards, he despatched al-Mustansir and a tiny army to retake Baghdad. The Mongols effortlessly slaughtered this expeditionary force. The caliphs who succeeded al-Mustansir in Cairo were puppets manipulated by the sultans, and there is little evidence to suggest that their claims to religious pre-eminence were taken seriously outside the frontiers of the sultanate. However, Cairo and Damascus did become havens for scholars and courtiers fleeing from the Mongol lands. Although Baybars failed to conquer Iraq or Yemen, a demonstration in force in the Hijaz in 1269 secured him the privilege of protecting the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a privilege which conferred considerable prestige on him and his successors.

It is doubtful whether Baybars would have been able to consolidate his rule in Egypt and Syria had not Hülegü and his successor, Aqaqa, been distracted by their war in the Caucasus with the Mongols of the Golden Horde. However, with the Mongols thus occupied, Baybars was eventually able to turn his attention against the Christians and revive the Ayyubid tradition of jihad against them. One of Baybars’s first priorities was to secure the route from Egypt to Damascus via Palestine. To this end, Baybars besieged and captured Caesarea, Arsuf and Haifa in 1265, Safed in 1266 and Jaffa in 1268. In the north Bohemond was punished for his alliance with the Mongols by having Antioch taken from him in 1268. In the years 1265–71 Mamluk forces operating in northern Syria slowly took over the castles of the Ismaili Assassins. The Assassins had been allies and tributaries of the Hospitallers. The siege and capture of the great Hospitaller fortress of Crac des Chevaliers in 1271 followed on from the reduction of the Assassin castles. Besides the great siege campaigns, Mamluk troops and Turcoman auxiliaries also put pressure on the Christians by rustling their cattle and burning their crops and vineyards. Additionally, Baybars made use of divisive diplomacy to allow him to take territories piecemeal from the Franks. Truces were concluded with Jaffa and Beirut in 1261, with the Hospitallers and Tyre in 1267, with Beirut in 1269 and with the Hospitallers, Templars and Tripoli in 1271. Such truces may have seemed to offer the Christians security; but in practice the texts of the truces often furnished the Mamluks with pretexts for resuming the war.

In the last years of his reign, Baybars attempted to take the offensive against the Mongols and their tributaries. From 1275 onwards Baybars had been plotting with the Pervaneh, the chief minister at the puppet court of the Seljuqs in Mongol-controlled Anatolia. Baybars had also received promises of assistance
from the Qaraman tribesmen in south-east Anatolia. In 1277 Baybars’s invasion force defeated the Mongols at the battle of Elbistan. Baybars briefly occupied Kayseri, the Seljuk capital, and held audience on the Seljuk throne. However, neither the Pervaneh nor the Qaramans provided the assistance that they had promised; and Baybars was forced to withdraw before the advance of a second Mongol army.

Baybars died on 30 June 1277. His regime had proved more durable than many contemporary observers had expected; but then so too had the regime of the Mongols in Iraq and Iran, and Baybars’s attempts to take first Baghdad and later Anatolia from them had failed. Moreover, though the sultan commanded huge armies, it was still not possible to contemplate a final offensive against the crusader states; an attempt to launch a sea-borne attack on Cyprus in 1271 had failed disastrously with most of the ships foundering and their crews drowned or captured.

As-Sa’id Berke Khan (1277–9) had been designated as Baybars’s successor during his father’s reign. Although he went through a show of maintaining the offensive against the Mongols, sending a large army against the Mongols’ ally, Cilician Armenia, his generals suspected that they were being sent on campaign in order to keep them away from the centres of political decision making. A coalition was rapidly formed between senior emirs who had been purchased by Baybars and the even older cadre of Salih Bahri emirs. As-Sa’id Berke Khan was deposed and, after the brief stop-gap reign of as-Sa’id’s seven-year-old brother Sulamish, Qalawun replaced the puppet on the throne in November 1279. A seasoned general, Qalawun (who took the regnal name al-Mansur) had come to power as the leader of the old Salih Bahri group. However, he took steps in the early years of his reign not only to remove Baybars’s Mamluk emirs from positions of real power, but also to free himself from the tutelage of his original sponsors. Qalawun naturally preferred to promote his own Mansuri Mamluks.

Just as Baybars had been faced with resistance in Damascus at the beginning of his reign, so Qalawun, when he became sultan, had to deal immediately with a revolt in Damascus. The revolt was led by another Bahri Mamluk emir, Sunqur al-Ashqar. An army from Cairo easily defeated Sunqur and drove him from Damascus, but Sunqur fled to Sahyun, which he made the capital of a small north Syrian principality. Sunqur also began to correspond with the Mongols, asking for their assistance against Qalawun. The Mongols, encouraged by this sign of dissension in the Mamluk ranks, sent an army to raid northern Syria and sack Aleppo in the autumn of 1280. Qalawun correctly anticipated that this was only the preliminary to a larger Mongol invasion, so he was driven to come to terms with his other potential enemies. In the spring of 1281 he made truces with Bohemond of Tripoli, with the government in Acre.
and with the Hospitallers in the south. (There is, however, evidence that the Hospitallers from Margat in northern Syria fought on the side of the Mongols at Homs.) Qalawun also succeeded in detaching Sunqur from the Mongols by offering to recognise his autonomous principality of Sahyun.

In the autumn of 1281 the Mongols invaded in force. Numbering perhaps as many as 80,000, they were nominally led by Möngke Temur, the young brother of the Il-khan Abaqa, but actually commanded by two experienced generals. The battle of Homs, fought on 29 October, was a much bloodier affair than Ain Jalut. The army fielded by Qalawun numbered perhaps as many as 100,000, though much of this large army was made up of Arab and Turcoman irregulars, civilian volunteers and grooms. In the end, Qalawun won a costly victory in which Mamluk casualties were certainly very high. After the battle Sunqur, who had fought on Qalawun’s side at Homs, withdrew to Sahyun. Sunqur was not to be dislodged until 1287; the continued existence of his regime was to impede Qalawun’s operations against the remaining Frankish possessions in northern Syria.

After Homs, Qalawun undertook no major offensive operations against anyone for some years. When Mamluk armies did take the offensive, it was against Cilician Armenia, the feeble ally of the Mongols. As a result of successful campaigning in 1283 and 1284, Qalawun was able to force the Armenian king to pay a tribute of half a million dirhams for ten years. Only in 1285 was Qalawun able to take revenge on the Hospitallers who had supported the Mongols at Homs, by besieging and taking Margat. Nearby Maraclea, which was also held by a pro-Mongol lord, was occupied at the same time. In 1286 an earthquake allowed the Mamluks to occupy Latakia without any trouble. In 1289, prompted by fears that Tripoli was about to be taken over by a Genoese adventurer, Benedetto Zaccaria, Qalawun led an army against Tripoli and took it by storm. After the fall of Tripoli, Qalawun straightaway began to prepare for an even grander siege operation against Acre in the south, but he died in November 1290.

Qalawun’s successor, al-Ashraf Khalil (1290–3), reaped the benefits of his father’s preparations, and Acre fell to him in June 1291. In the wake of its fall, Tyre, Beirut and Sidon were occupied without any resistance. Although Qalawun had not been fond of his son, Khalil was brave, energetic and ambitious. Like Baybars, he dreamed of expeditions against Cyprus and Baghdad. In the event, military operations in his reign were restricted to attacks on Cilician Armenia and attempts to bring the Lebanese highlands under more effective control. However, Al-Ashraf Khalil attempted to rule from a narrow

3 Cartulaire général de l’ordre des Hospitaliers de St-Jean de Jérusalem (1100–1310), ed. Delaville Le Roulx, nos. 3653 bis, 3702, 3766, 3781.
power base, and a group of his father’s Mansuri emirs, sensing that they were
being excluded from power and influence, organised the sultan’s assassination
in 1293. That murder initiated a renewed period of instability in Egypt and
Syria which was not to end until 1310.

An-Nasir Muhammad, al-Ashraf’s eight-year-old brother, was placed on the
throne by a coalition of senior Mansuri emirs who used the child sultan as a
front to cover their factional manoeuvrings. Eventually, in 1294, Kitbugha al-
Mansuri secured the throne for himself and took the regnal name al-Adil.
Kitbugha was deposed by his erstwhile ally Lajin al-Mansuri in 1296. Lajin was
murdered in 1299 and an-Nasir Muhammad was brought back to the throne
for the same purpose as before, while two powerful emirs, Baybars al-Jashnikir
and Salar, contended for supremacy. As before, factionalism in the Mamluk
sultanate encouraged the Mongols to attempt the conquest of Syria. A
disaffected Mamluk emir, Sayf ad-Din Qipchak, fled to the Mongols in 1298.
At his urging, the Mongols entered Syria in the winter of 1299. The main
Mamluk army hurried out of Egypt to meet them in Syria. Pasturage was
scarce; and, as the army passed through Palestine, it was thrown into confusion
by a plot mounted by emirs of Mongol origin. The battle of Wadi al-Khazindar
in December 1299 was a Mongol victory, in the wake of which the Mongols
occupied most of Syria for several months. However, the forces left by Ghazan
were insufficient to hold the province, Syria was reoccupied by the Mamluks
and Sayf ad-Din Qipchak defected back to the sultanate. Ghazan’s attempt to
re-establish his position in Syria in 1301 had proved inadequate. Although there
were no further major invasions of Syria by the Mongols after this, internal tur-
bulence in Egypt and Syria was not to be brought to an end until the accession
of a by now mature and politically seasoned an-Nasir Muhammad for the third
time in 1310.

In the second half of the thirteenth century, despite the bitter infighting
which was the hallmark of Mamluk politics, a Mamluk system of centralised
military government had been established in Egypt and Syria. The Mamluks
had also succeeded in eliminating the crusader presence in Syria and, for most
of the time, they were also able to hold the Mongols on the Euphrates frontier.
During the same period the Mongols had established a territorial state in Iran
and Iraq and many of their leaders had converted to Islam. The patchwork
map characteristic of the Muslim world of the early thirteenth century had
been greatly simplified. Only in Anatolia was the Seljuq puppet regime of the
Mongols beginning to fall apart, and new beylicates slowly cast off Mongol
hegemony. The tiny Osmanli or Ottoman beylicate on the edge of Byzantine
territory in north-western Anatolia was one of these new principalities, but in
the early fourteenth century the attention of western crusaders was still
focused on other enemies.
IN 1199 the Almohad empire stood at the height of its power and extent from the Gulf of Syrtis in Libya to the Tagus in Spain and the Sous in Morocco. Despite its possession of al-Andalus or Muslim Spain, still the richest and most cultivated province of the Muslim west, it was essentially a North African empire, whose great achievement had been to complete the unification of North Africa by Islam. While the Romans had divided the bloc of the Atlas to the north of the Sahara by a frontier which separated the civilisation within from the barbarism without, the Almohads had joined the two halves together in a single whole. They had done so, moreover, from a base at Marrakesh in the far south-west, at the opposite extreme from the old centre of civilisation at Carthage-Tunis in the far north-east, in other words, in the lands beyond the Roman pale. That was because they had drawn their forces, not from the civilised peoples of old Roman North Africa, but from the barbarous tribesmen whom the Romans had endeavoured to exclude. They had, in other words, succeeded where the Romans had failed, in seizing upon Berber tribalism, the common denominator of native society throughout the region, and using it for the purpose of the dominant civilisation.

Their success went back to the days of the Arab conquest at the end of the seventh and beginning of the eighth century, but more especially to the formative years of the ninth, when Islam as a creed, a way of life and a civilisation finally took shape in the Mashriq, the Muslim east, as well as in the Maghrib, the Muslim west. Such success derived from the appeal of the zealous Muslim preacher to the tribal population which surrounded the islands of urbanity formed by the Islamic cities, and it rested on a paradox, the willingness of such ‘stateless’ tribal peoples to submit to the dictatorship of such a prophet for the sake of God. The ‘statelessness’ or government of these peoples by custom rather than by kings must certainly be qualified; the feuding of families which was the basic sanction of law and order was over-ridden by the disapproval of the *jama‘a*, an Arabic term for the council of elders. It was controlled by the *laff*
or *suff*, the ‘bundling’ of clans into traditional allies and opponents; and was finally overlaid by the pre-eminence of forceful chiefs. The range of possibilities was described in the nineteenth century by Masqueray, who saw in this tribal society a modern example of early Rome;¹ but is attested for the Middle Ages by the tenth-century Qadi al-Nu’man and the fourteenth-century at-Tijani.² The common denominator from the ninth century onwards was the marginal character of this tribalism on the fringe of the new urban civilisation of Islam, by which the Berbers were both attracted and repelled. Accepting its values but not its way of life, they resisted the efforts to subject them to the princes who partitioned the Arab empire, while responding to the example of a Book, a Prophet and a Community destined to rule the world. The outcome was the three great revolutions, Fatimid, Almoravid and Almohad, which between AD 900 and 1200 effected the unification of North Africa by Islam.³

The specific doctrines of the prophets of the Fatimids, the Almoravids and the Almohads not only varied widely within the developing range of Islamic belief, but were violently opposed to each other. The results of their preaching, on the other hand, were in every case the same. As Wansbrough remarked of the Fatimid revolution 890–910: ‘that the propaganda in this particular case should have been Isma’ili is historically, but not phenomenologically, relevant’⁴ But while the phenomenon was typical it was nevertheless historical, an aspect of the growing incorporation of tribal populations from the Atlantic to central Asia into the new civilisation. Beginning with the Kutama of eastern Algeria, and continuing with the Sanhaja of the western Sahara, the series of revolutions was completed by the Almohads utilising the strength of the Masmuda of the High Atlas; their empire introduced a new period in the Islamisation of North Africa, whose pattern became clear in the course of the thirteenth century.

Abu Yusuf Ya’qub, who reigned over the empire in 1199 with the title of al-Mansur, the conqueror, cannot be expected to have viewed the matter in this light. As caliph of the Mahdi Ibn Tumart, he ruled as custodian of the supreme truth. The triumph of Islam in the Maghrib was the victory of the pure faith of the Prophet over *adawa*, enmity to the Law on the part of pagans, Christians and Jews, and all Muslims blinded by the ramifications of traditional jurisprudence.⁵ Foremost among these were the Malikites, whose school predominated in North Africa and Spain, not least because it had been championed by the Almoravids, whom the Almohads had overthrown. The definition of this new faith was that of the great theologian al-Ghazali at the end of the eleventh

¹ Masqueray (1886).
⁵ For the concept of *adawa* and its political implications, see Brett (1985) and (1991b).
century, as preached in the Maghrib at the beginning of the twelfth by the Mahdi Ibn Tumart. It proclaimed the unity of God as revealed by the Koran, in whose light the unity of the divine Law was apparent. For this reason, the followers of the Mahdi were called al-Muwahhidun, ‘the Unitarians’, to distinguish them from the schoolmen who had divided the Law into separate rites. His messianic mission had been to abolish these divisions by placing the Law upon the one, self-evident scriptural footing. By the time Ya'qub came to the throne in 1184, the reunification of Islam had taken the shape of government of the Muslim majority by the minority of the elect; but the doctrinal issue was still very much alive.

Established on this pedestal, the regime had two feet of clay. The division of its subjects by religion was only an aspect of their division into townsmen and countrymen, tribes and other tribes, Mediterraneans and Saharans, Arabs and Berbers, politically united in principle against the infidel, in practice only by their subjection to the caliph. The caliphate itself was elaborately structured. On the one hand were the original Berber tribes of the High Atlas, who continued to provide a militia based on Marrakesh; their sheikhs were the aristocracy of the movement. On the other was the dynasty descended from 'Abd al-Mu'min, the successor of Ibn Tumart, who had introduced the hereditary principle into the leadership. Under the auspices of the dynasty, an elite of disciples had been educated to form a corps of administrators, sent out to supervise the government of cities and to oversee the behaviour of the tribes. Apart from the Almohads, the army was a mixture of professionals and levies. The empire nevertheless remained a disparate collection of provinces and peoples whose allegiance depended upon their oath of obedience to the Amir al-Mu'minin or Commander of the Faithful made at his accession to accept him as their leader in the holy war, in return for an undertaking not to prolong their military service; to pay them properly; and to distribute the booty fairly. The effect of this elementary declaration depended upon the effectiveness of his personal leadership. That was by no means assured. The sheer size of the empire created by al-Mansur's father and grandfather would have strained the capacity of any medieval administration. By the end of the twelfth century, it exposed the dynasty to defeat. In the defence of its patrimony, the caliphate was dangerously overstretched.

Its problems began in the capital, Marrakesh. The opposition of the Almohad aristocracy to the establishment of the dynasty in the middle of the century had developed into a doctrinal division between the sheikhs who upheld the scriptural authority of the works of Ibn Tumart, and a monarch

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7 Hopkins (1958).  
who preferred the Koran and the Traditions of the Prophet in accordance with
the message of the Mahdi. At issue was the superiority of the caliph and his
talaba\textsuperscript{9} or disciples to the sheikhs, although the public victims were the Jews,
who were obliged to dress in accordance with the Law, and the Malikites,
whose books were burnt.\textsuperscript{10} The Malikite school survived, but the great days of
philosophy in the Muslim west came to an end with the fall from favour of
Averroes, the emigration of Maimonides to Cairo and the departure of Ibn al-
‘Arabi for the east.

The cloud itself was no bigger than a man’s hand; and in 1199 the caliph
basked in the sunshine of Alarcos, the great victory over Castile in 1195 which
had earned him the title of al-Mansur. The battle had finally restored the situation
in the peninsula after the killing of Ya‘qub’s father at Santarem in 1184; but the massive Almohad fortification of Muslim Spain bore witness to the enduring threat of the \textit{Reconquista}. Less ominous but more serious in the long term was the situation in the eastern Maghrib or Ifriqiya, where the Almohads were faced with a mercurial enemy composed of Almoravids, Arabs and Turks. This impossible alliance was animated by the brothers \‘Ali and Yahya Ibn Ghaniya, the last survivors of the Almoravid empire, who had fled from the Balearics to Ifriqiya at Ya‘qub’s accession. Recruiting the warrior Arab tribes of the Banu Hilal and Sulaym, and co-operating with Qaraqush, a Mamluk of Saladin out on his own from Egypt, they had virtually conquered the province by 1187. Then, driven down into the Sahara by Ya‘qub’s grand expedition in 1187–8, Yahya remained in waiting for a second chance.

The chance came at the death of al-Mansur in 1199. His great mosque at
Rabat was never completed; his son and successor, Muhammad an-Nasir, was a scholarly introvert confronted with the gigantic task of leading his armies successfully from end to end of his dominions. The Almohad army and navy was an impressive military machine, but not lightly built. It did not move against the insurgents in the eastern Maghrib before Yahya Ibn Ghaniya had taken Tunis in 1203, the year in which the new caliph finally conquered the Balearics. Not until 1205–6 did an-Nasir go, again in person, against Yahya himself. The question of Ifriqiya was solved in 1207 with the appointment of the leading Almohad sheikh, Abu Muhammad \‘Abd al-Wahid Ibn Abi Hafs \‘Umar, as viceroy. Son of a major figure in the original movement, \‘Abd al-
Wahid was an ally of the dynasty to be trusted and rewarded, as well perhaps as an overmighty subject to be distanced from the capital. On the one hand he effectively confined Yahya and his allies to the desert; on the other he reconstituted Ifriqiya, the former Byzantine province of Africa which had been the

realm of the Aghlabids, the Fatimids and the Zirids, as a state after a lapse of 150 years. The restructuring of the Almohad empire had begun with a positive reform.

Yet defeat was inevitable. The Almohad military machine was broken by the combined forces of Christian Spain at Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212; an-Nasir barely escaped from the battle, and died in humiliation in 1213. The Christian kings failed to follow up their victory, and the empire survived under an-Nasir’s son, Yusuf al-Mustansir. But the young man preferred bull-fighting to government, and at his death in 1224 the regime broke down in competition between rival candidates from the dynasty, either made or murdered by the Almohad aristocracy at Marrakesh, or coming from Spain to reassert the authority of the monarchy over the sheikhs.11 The triple knot of rebellion on the part of the Almohad clans, of insubordination on the part of the Arab tribal warriors brought into Morocco from Ifriqiya, and of invasion on the part of the Berber nomads of the central Maghrib, was only briefly cut in 1229 with the arrival from Spain of yet another claimant, al-Ma’mun, with an army that included some 500 Christian mercenaries.12 Massacring the sheikhs and the partisans of his rival Yahya, whom he drove into the mountains, he formally repudiated the doctrine of Ibn Tumart.

As a weapon in the conflict in Morocco, this repudiation of the Mahdi was discarded after the death of al-Ma’mun in 1232, when the Almohads closed ranks behind his successors ar-Rashid (1232–42) and as-Sa’id (1242–8).13 To the empire, however, it was a fatal blow. Al-Andalus fell to the pretender Ibn Hud at Murcia, while Ifriqiya became independent under Abu Zakariya Yahya, the son of the previous viceroy ‘Abd al-Wahid, who refused to recognise the new caliph.14 The uncertainty of the situation was resolved in 1236 with the fall of Córdoba to Castile, a shocking event which precipitated the collapse of Muslim Spain. Within twelve years al-Andalus was largely over-run, and in 1265–6 the annexation of Murcia (already for some years a tributary of Castile) left little more of al-Andalus than the new Nasrid kingdom of Granada. At Tunis, the response of Abu Zakariya was the addition of his own name to that of the Mahdi in the Friday prayer, a decisive move to claim the leadership of the Almohads for the Hafsids, the dynasty of his grandfather, the great Abu

11 Thus Abu Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahid al-Makhlu’ (‘the Deposed’: not to be confused with the viceroy of Ifriqiya), 1224, strangled; Abu Muhammad ‘Abd Allah al-Adil, 1224–7, drowned; Yahya al-Mu’tasim, 1227–9, driven out. For the full names of the Almohads and other dynasties, see Bosworth (1996).
12 Not the 12,000 Castilian knights of the hostile Muslim tradition: O’Callaghan (1975), p. 339.
14 ‘Abd al-Wahid died in 1221, to be replaced by members of the royal family till 1226, when first one and then another of his sons was appointed to succeed: Brunschvig (1940–7), i, pp. 18–20.
Hafs ‘Umar. On the strength of his claim, he invited recognition from the Muslim west as the new defender of the faith. Unable to relieve the siege of Valencia in 1238 or of Seville in 1248, he established his suzerainty over Tlemcen with a major expedition in 1242, which in turn provoked the final crisis of the caliphate in Morocco.

At Tlemcen yet another dynasty was taking shape under the Berber chieftain Yaghmurasan Ibn Ziyan, who came to power in 1236 following the appointment of a member of his clan as governor of the city in 1230; this was the dynasty of the ‘Abd al-Wadids or Ziyanids. Since its conquest by the Almoravids in the eleventh century, Tlemcen had formed an integral part of the Moroccan empire; and Yaghmurasan’s enforced submission to Tunis was a cause for concern to Marrakesh, not least because in that same year the Caliph ar-Rashid died, and Sijilmasa, Ceuta and Tangier turned to the Hafsids. Obliged by the Hafsid challenge to assert his authority in the north and east of his dominions, however, the new Caliph as-Sa‘id faced the consequence of thirty years of tribal dissidence encouraged by the struggle for the throne, especially under al-Ma‘mun and ar-Rashid, who for years had been obliged to campaign against the rebellion of their predecessor, Yahya al-Mu‘tasim. Thus in the aftermath of Las Navas de Tolosa, the Banu Marin, Berber nomads from the steppe to the east of the Atlas, had crossed the mountains to find pasture and tribute from the lands around Fez, and establish an unofficial hold over the region and its towns. By 1245 not only were they in control of Meknes, but professing their own allegiance to Abu Zakariya’. In 1248 as-Sa‘id’s great expedition against Yaghmurasan obliged their leader Abu Yahya to submit while the caliph went on to Tlemcen. But as-Sa‘id was ambushed and killed by the Ziyanids, and his retreating army was massacred by the Marinids. Abu Yahya installed himself in Fez as the new ruler of northern Morocco, extending the nominal empire of Tunis to include the bulk of Almohad North Africa. Under the Hafsid aegis, the old empire had been reorganised, on the one hand into an ideal, on the other into a political community of rival dynasties (including the rulers of Granada), whose expansionism governed the political history of North Africa down to the fifteenth century.

The framework for this history is supplied, and very largely determined, by Ibn Khaldun. Writing in the second half of the fourteenth century as a participant as well as an observer, he combined the role of dynastic with that of racial historian to classify his material on North Africa in terms of Arabs and Berbers, subdivided into Sanhaja and Zanata, according to the dynasties to which these nations gave rise, and which entitled them to fame. The history of the Berbers thus becomes the history of the Hafsids, Ziyanids and Marinids, breaking the story down into dynastic compartments. The history of the Arabs, that is, the
bedouin who appeared in North Africa in the eleventh century, was less easily quantified, for they built no empires; and we must be grateful to Ibn Khaldun that his fascination with them has rescued them and their affairs from oblivion. Islam, on the other hand, is a category relevant only insofar as it motivates the political actors, so that we get little sense of the transformation of society by religion, and religion by society, in this post-Almohad period. The categories of government, society and economy are famously discussed in the *Muqaddima*, the introduction to the *Kitab al-ībar*, of which the history of the Berbers and Arabs in North Africa is the final part. But the discussion, though suggestive, is not historical. To pull the narrative together into a history of the period requires an effort of collation, in consultation with the disparate but usually dynastic works of other authors. To evaluate the social history of religion requires the combing of the hagiographical literature for anecdotal evidence, which incidentally illustrates the social and economic history for which the documentation is provided by the equally voluminous juridical literature. That said, the work of Ibn Khaldun remains indispensable, not only as a mine of information, but as an interpretation in accordance with the views of the actors.15

Ibn Khaldun began his career in the service of the Marinids, becoming the historian of the Berbers through extolling their own Zanata dynasty over the Sanhaja Almohads.16 As described in the Arabic literature, the Berbers and their various races were a political fiction, ideologically intertwined with Arabism and Islam.17 This is well shown by the Marinids, who in opposition to the Almohads took the title of Amir al-Muslimin or Commander of the Muslims, rather than the caliphal title of Amir al-Mu’minin, thus harking back to the Almoravids and their championship of Malikite Islam. Racially, on the other hand, the Almoravids were classed as Sanhaja, except that they themselves had claimed to be Arabs of Yemeni descent. Intellectually, Ibn Khaldun’s racial scheme was a rationalisation of perceptions dating back to the Arab conquest, which habitually served to locate the native rulers of North Africa within the prophetic tradition of Islam. In the case of the Marinids, such perceptions placed them firmly within the prophetic tradition of their predecessors, the Almoravids and Almohads, which in the absence of yet another revolutionary doctrine, they sought in this way to appropriate. Their success was a tribute to the achievement of the caliphate they set out to destroy.

They came as crude warriors whose repression of the revolt in their new

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15 The best introduction for this purpose to the work of Ibn Khaldun is Cheddadi (1986). For the enormous bibliography, see al-Azmeh (1981).
capital Fez in 1250 earned them the undying hostility of its citizens. From his rout of the Almohads in 1248 until his death in 1258, their first ruler, Abu Yahya, was continually at war with Marrakesh on the one hand, Tlemcen on the other, as the Almohads and the Ziyānids allied to prevent the consolidation of his dominions. A particular bone of contention was the Saharan ‘port’ of Sijilmassa in the Tafilalt, vital for the trade of both Fez and Tlemcen with West Africa, and almost equally so for Marrakesh. Conquered by Abu Yahya in 1255, it was only finally retaken from Yaghmurasan in 1274, after the elimination of the Almohads by his successor Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub between 1258 and 1286. The conquest of Marrakesh from the caliphs al-Murtada (1248–66) and (Abū Dabbūs) al-Wathiq (1266–9) was not attempted until 1262, and was delayed until 1269. The last Almohad prince, Ishaq, survived at Tinmal, the birthplace of the movement in the mountains, until 1275.

Master of Morocco, Abu Yusuf abandoned any pretence of Hafsid allegiance, aiming to enter into his imperial inheritance through the holy war in Spain. The reconquest of Sijilmassa, followed by a truce with Yaghmurasan, freed the Marinid monarch to accept the invitation of the Nasrid sultan of Granada to invade the peninsula, in return for the cession of Algeciras and Tarifa as a bridgehead. His celebrated victory at Ecija in 1275 could not disguise the fact that the warfare was a matter of raids rather than of the repossession of Islam’s lost land, or that his three further expeditions in 1277, 1282–3 and 1285–6 involved him less in holy war than in shifting alliances with Granada and Castile. What he gained was the prestige of the title Amir al-Muslimin, symbolised by the royal city of Fas Jadid or New Fez that he built above the old city as the seat of his government. Like the Alhambra of the Nasrids, New Fez was a monument to a patriarchal, patrimonial style of government, a palatial household of chamberlains extended by the lesser households of his ministers and governors, all contained within the fortress walls. The chamberlains were variously eunuchs, slaves and freedmen, absolutely dependent upon the master. The ministers belonged to the warrior aristocracy of the Banū Marin, whose offspring were brought up to their duties as cadets in the households of the royal princes. At some stage in their career they received the title of ṭazīr, with or without any ministerial function. Beneath them were the secretaries drawn from the cultured elite of ‘ulama’, religious scholars, and udabā’ or men of letters, for whose education Abu Yusuf built the first of the madrasas or colleges which are the glory of Fez; Ibn Khaldun himself was such a person, a representative of the

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19 Not to be confused with the Almohad Caliph al-Mansur. The Almohad style of the early Marinids is further evidence of their image of royalty. See Bosworth (1996).
Andalusian diaspora which was the backbone of the class. Jews from al-
Andalus or from the Jewish community of Fez may have played a role at
court or in finance. Administration, however, was undeveloped. Although
there was a treasury supervised by a secretary called *sahib ashghalihim* or
‘master of their financial affairs’;\(^\text{22}\) there was little central reckoning. Specific
revenues, such as rents, were allocated to specific expenses, such as a
company of guards. Specific individuals collected them for specific purposes:
the Great Mosque of New Fez was built by the governor of Meknes from the
revenues of the oil presses of the city; however, in the normal course of
events, governors appear to have treated their provinces as fiefdoms for
whose revenues they were only generally accountable.\(^\text{23}\) The famous Circle of
Equity to which Ibn Khaldun alludes seems to have been honoured more in
the breach than in the scrupulous observance that he recommends: no justice
without the army; no army without taxes; no taxes without wealth; no wealth
without justice.\(^\text{24}\)

Derived from the Almohad model, the system nevertheless worked, as the
Marinid elite, growing more civilised, maintained its overlordship over a tribal
population on the one hand, an urban bourgeoisie on the other. Its problems
stemmed from its reliance on warrior nomads to turn its bodyguards and
mercenaries, typically Andalusian and Castilian, into an army. The Akhlat or
Khlot, ‘the Mixture’ of Arabs imported from Ifriqiya by the Almohads, was
still sufficiently foreign to be loyal; but the dynasty was unable to prevent the
growing domination of the Sahara to the south of the High Atlas by the
Ma‘qil, Arab tribesmen making their way south-westwards from the central
Maghrib. The fickleness of the warrior nomads was provoked by the family
quarrels of the dynasty. Thus Abu Ya‘qub Yusuf (1286–1307) spent the first
part of his reign campaigning against rebel kinsmen, including the son he had
made governor of Marrakesh. Spain and the holy war played a minor role in his
policy; he lost Tarifa to the Castilians in 1291 and failed to retake it in 1293. Far
more important was Tlemcen, where Yaghmurasan’s son Abu Sa‘id ʿUthman
(1283–1304) had extended his dominions to the gates of Bougie (Bijaya), the
western capital of the Hafsids.

Annexed to the Moroccan empire by the Almoravids in the late eleventh
century, Tlemcen had been transformed by the Arab conquest in the early
eighth century from the self-sufficient little Roman town of Pomaria, into a
strategic fortress and commercial centre at the crossing of routes from Ifriqiya
to Morocco and from the Sahara to Spain. Returning to independence under

\(^{22}\) For this officer, Hopkins (1958), pp. 50–1; Brunschvig (1940–7), 11, pp. 53, 56–9.
\(^{23}\) Brett (1984), pp. 38–9, with ref. to the mid-fourteenth-century author Ibn Marzuq, *Al-Musnad al-
the Ziyanids, it added to these advantages the presence of a royal court, a major ‘island of purchasing power’ to attract the long-distance trader. For the dynasty and the merchant, it became almost literally a gold-mine, for the ‘special relationship’ established with Aragon-Catalonia via the port of Oran made the city into a major supplier of West African gold to the Mediterranean. Although the Ziyanids, like the Marinids, relied upon a makhzan of Berber and Arab tribes, they were thus far more identified with the city than were the Marinids with Fez. The creation of a new empire in the central Maghrib, however, was a novel enterprise which threatened the monarchies of Ifriqiya and Morocco. Abu Ya’qub Yusuf set out to appropriate their kingdom for himself.

Major expeditions in the 1290s culminated in 1299 in the investment of Tlemcen itself, a massive fortress requiring a prolonged siege. In effect, the Moroccan sultan transferred his capital to his camp, which he built into a replacement for the city he had surrounded. Al-Mansura or New Tlemcen flourished on the commerce of the old, including that with the Catalan lands, so much so that Yusuf was in no hurry to conclude. When finally he was murdered in a palace intrigue in 1307, Tlemcen had still not surrendered; the Moroccans abandoned both the siege and their new city, and the Ziyanids re-entered upon their dominions. Dynastic ambitions remained at the mercy of dynastic accidents.

At Tunis, they had given way to political reality. Abu Zakariya’ Yahya, the founder of the Hafsid dynasty, had died in 1249, to be succeeded without difficulty by his son Abu ‘Abd Allah (1249–77), who took the caliphal title of al-Mustansir bi’llah, Commander of the Faithful, in 1253. Recognised at Fez as well as Tlemcen, he was briefly saluted by Mecca and Cairo after the killing of the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258. Under this title he recreated the Almohad caliphate. The Almohads were maintained in their tribal companies as a militia under the command of a sheikh of the Almohads, while the doctrine of the Mahdi, with its accent upon the Koran and the Traditions, was taught in the madrasas founded at Tunis from the time of Abu Zakariya onwards. The symbol of the regime was the Qasba or citadel of Tunis, built like New Fez on the hill above the madina, with its Almohad mosque and minaret overlooking the Great Mosque of the Zaytuna in the heart of the city. Politically and ceremonially important as they were, however, the Almohads fitted into a pattern of government resembling that of the Marinids, down to the Christian guard, while Mustansir raised no objection to the revival of the

26 Makhzan, lit. ‘storehouse, treasury’, cf. Eng. ‘magazine’, became the common term for government in the Maghrib, neatly expressing the Circle of Equity with reference to the state itself and to its army.
Malikite school after a century of impoverishment. As at Tlemcen, the
magnificence of the regime was dependent from the beginning upon trade
with Sicily, the Italian city-states and Barcelona, which was regulated by a whole
series of treaties made and renewed from 1231 (or indeed 1180) onwards.
Inland it was rendered precarious by the dominance of the Arab warrior tribes
of the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym. A century after 'Abd al-Mu’min had
driven the Normans from Ifriqiya by land and sea, both factors converged to
expose the hollowness of the new caliph’s pretensions. During the attack of St
Louis’s crusaders upon Tunis in 1270, the enthusiasm of the Ifriqiys for the
holy war was offset by the military superiority of the invaders, and undermined
by the imminent return of the bedouin to their winter pastures in the south.
After the death of the king, the crusaders were bought off with a heavy indem-
nity and the renewal of tribute to the kingdom of Sicily.

From the point of view of Tunis, the crusade was the beginning of Sicilian,
followed by Aragonese, intervention in the affairs of the Hafsids, facilitated by
the quarrels over the succession after the death of al-Mustansir in 1277. The
principal agents were Peter of Aragon (1276–85) and his sons, Alfonso of
Aragon and James of Sicily. Their fleets occupied Jerba in 1284, and the
Kerkenna islands in 1287; their intrigues down to the death of Alfonso in 1291
helped to divide the Hafsids and their dominions into two. By the end of the
century one branch was established at Bougie, the other at Tunis, while the
desert to the south resumed its role under the Almohads, as a breeding-ground
of pretenders. Oasis cities such as Biskra under the Banu Muzni were falling to
petty local dynasties, while the Arabs came into their own as the arbiters of
power.

The Arabs in question were the Dawawida of eastern Algeria, the region
ruled from Bougie; the Ku’ub in central Tunisia; and the Dabbab in the Djerid
and Tripolitania; they belonged with all their clans to the Banu Hilal and the
Banu Sulaym. The Banu Hilal had appeared out of the Libyan desert in the
eleventh century, the Banu Sulaym in the Almohad period; they belonged to
what Ibn Khaldun called the Arabs of the Fourth Race, that is, the bedouin
culture that had arisen in the deserts of Arabia and northern Africa since the
Arabs of the Third Race had created the great Arab empire, and vanished into
its maw. They are as problematic for us as they were for him. They were not
sent from Egypt in 1051 like a swarm of locusts to devour the land, as he
claimed. On the other hand, they were a part of the process of Arabisation of
North Africa, which has gradually reduced the Berbers to a minority of the
population. Were they cause or effect? As cause, they rapidly achieved the
status of warrior tribes who provided the quarrelling monarchs of the Maghrib

27 Brett (1991a), with ref. to idem (1986). 28 For the origin of the legend, see Brett (1993).
with a double-edged weapon, a reservoir of horsemen who maintained themselves in readiness for war and, on the other hand, a nomadic population inimical to the administration of the countryside. By the end of the thirteenth century in Ifriqiya, they had exploited the endless disputes of the dynasty to become an estate of the realm, representing the government over wide regions of the country. They were thus in a position of strength to introduce their lineages, and their Arabic vernacular, into the Berber populations of the plains and deserts which they controlled. In the same way, to the west of Ifriqiya, the nomadic Zanata of the central Maghrib, and the Sanhaja of the western Sahara, eventually turned into Arabs, an effect of the long process of mounting political, cultural and linguistic pressure.29

In this process, however, a great many of the bedouin were the victims, squeezed out of the warrior elite to live in poverty on the fringes of settlement, repopulating the countryside with a new underclass of migrants and cultivators. This emerges from the account of at-Tijani, who spent some months in 1307 waiting in southern Tunisia to join a state caravan from Morocco to Egypt which was delayed for two years by the murder of the Marinid sultan at al-Mansura.30 A guest of the Arab chieftains of the region, he nevertheless describes the process of fission and fusion whereby losers dropped out of the clan to mix with others in new tribes. The poverty of such failures is brought out by Ibn Khaldun’s history of Biskra, where at the beginning of the fourteenth century the bedouin rebelled against the lords of the Dawawida on the one hand, the masters of the oasis on the other.31 What is important is that this rebellion was religious in inspiration and leadership, as was another at the same time in central Tunisia. The whole question thus returns from that of Arabisation to Islamisation, with which this chapter began.

Qasim Ibn Mara in central Tunisia and Sa’ada at Biskra were both religious revolutionaries in the manner of Ibn Yasin, the prophet of the Almoravids, who raised a sworn army of tribesmen to ‘command the right and forbid the wrong’. The difference, however, is at once apparent. Both movements were petty risings of local rather than general significance; the time for religious revolution was past. The political structure imposed by the Almohads was firmly in the hands of their successors; it was reinforced rather than undermined by Arab tribalism, whose tendency in Ifriqiya was to create a stratified society of lords and subjects over-riding the tribal divisions.32 The prestige of the Banu Hilal and the Banu Sulaym, moreover, offered a new and attractive

29 For the modes of this Arabisation, Brett (1979); Norris (1986).
30 Brett (1981) and (1975–6).
31 Brett (1991a).
32 In southern Morocco, and subsequently in the western Sahara, regions effectively beyond the reach of central government, the result was a highly stratified society dominated by the warrior Arab tribes of the Ma’qil and their offshoot, the Hassaniya; see Norris (1986).
paradigm to the tribal society of North Africa, in place of the model of the militant Muslim community embraced by the Berbers from the ninth to the twelfth century. This was identification with the race of the Prophet as celebrated in poetry and legend; its allure went back at least as far as the Almoravids and their claim to Yemeni ancestry, and subsequently developed into the phenomenon of the *shurafa* or *sharifs*, the ‘nobles’ laying claim to descent from the Prophet himself. More symptomatic still of the integration of North African society into Islam was the transformation of the *murabit* into the *marabout*, the reforming zealot into the pastoral saint.

The two types clearly overlapped, as in the case of Saʿada, whose *zawiya* or residence at Tolga fitted into the new pattern of Sufism on the one hand, monasticism on the other. As a form of doctrine, Sufism or Islamic mysticism had entered North Africa from Spain in the twelfth century; as a communal way of life identified with the *zawiya* or ‘niche’, it entered from the east in the thirteenth. Out of the cluster of founding fathers, 1150–1225, ranging from Marrakesh to Tunis, the outstanding names are Abu Madyan, who taught at Bougie till his death in 1197 on his way to be tried at Marrakesh by the puritan Caliph al-Mansur, and his pupil al-Dahmani (d. 1224), the epitome of the noble Arab bedouin warrior turned holy man. As at-Tijani makes clear, by the end of the thirteenth century the religious life of the Sufi had become the refuge for a whole class of bedouin forced out of the warrior elite. They established themselves as holy families in their *zawaya* or *zawiyas* along the main routes, not strictly monastic, since they were not necessarily celibate or rigorously rule-bound, but in every other way the counterpart of their Christian contemporaries. Their code of hospitality provided lodging for the traveller, while their sanctity gave safe-conduct from the brigandage of their own kith and kin. It kept the peace of the market place, and attracted settlement in the vicinity.

Whether or not the first saint had been his own gardener, the *zawiya* was in fact a colony, ‘bringing the dead land to life’. Paradoxical as it may seem, the reviled nomad was in this way largely responsible for the growth of an institution which, by the time of at-Tijani, was going some way to offset the spread of pastoralism at the expense of agriculture, which both at-Tijani and Ibn Khaldun observed and deplored.

As a form of Islam, Sufism must have benefited from the retreat of Malikism under the Almohads. When Malikite jurisprudence resumed, in or alongside the new madrasas created by the new dynasties, Sufism in Ifriqiya became intertwined with legal scholarship to produce an increasingly homogeneous religious elite. The popularity of the *marabout* as the conscience of the

33 Already in evidence at Fez in the thirteenth century; Shatzmiller (1982).
34 *Marabout* is a vernacular rendering of *murabit*, but makes an important distinction; Brett (1980b).
35 Mackeen (1971).
people was demonstrated at Tunis in 1270, when al-Qadadi and Sidi ‘Ammar led the rush to arms against the crusade. Neither doctrinally nor politically, however, was the marabout a prophet. His historic role in North Africa from the thirteenth century onwards was to preside over the social and economic consequences for rural society of an unholy alliance between the state and the warrior nomad. As the population was progressively subjected, frequently displaced and widely disoriented, so the holy man became what he claimed to be, the qutb or cardinal pole of a new social and political, as well as religious order.

No account of Islam in the west, nor indeed of the history of thirteenth-century Europe, would be complete that did not take into account the origins of the one Islamic state in Spain to survive throughout the fourteenth and nearly all the fifteenth century, the Nasrid kingdom of Granada. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, prior to the coming of the Turks, it was, indeed, the only Islamic political entity of any size in Europe. In the early thirteenth century the increasingly apparent weakness of the once formidable Almohad empire resulted in a process of fission familiar from earlier centuries of Islamic history in Spain; but the new generation of taifa or party kingdoms that emerged in the early thirteenth century was even more prone to interference by ever more confident Christian kings than had been the case in the earlier taifa periods, during the eleventh and mid-twelfth centuries. The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 ensured an end to Almohad dreams of further expansion in Spain; more than that, it revealed fundamental weaknesses in the management of the Almohad army by a less than careful caliph, an-Nasir, and an increasing dependence on hired soldiers. Following his defeat, an-Nasir retired to live at Marrakesh, and (though reports vary) he is said to have died after being bitten by a mad dog or after being hacked to death by black slaves; in any case, the point the Arabic writers wanted to make was that he met the ignominious end he deserved. This was not the spirit of the conquering armies that had overwhelmed North Africa and al-Andalus in the twelfth century.

The reluctance of the Almohad rulers to insist on the full force of Almohad doctrine was apparent by about 1230; indeed, their uncompromising rejection of anything that had the slightest suspicion of anthropomorphism had not won as many supporters in Spain as the movement’s founders may have expected. Andalusi Muslims tended to see the Almohads as outsiders, an impression reinforced by the widespread hostility in Spain to newly arrived Berbers. The Almohad caliphs themselves varied in their enthusiasm for the
movement’s ideals; the persecution of Mozarab Christians and of Jews came and went, though at its peak it even affected Jews who had accepted Islam. In 1227 a new Almohad caliph in Seville suppressed the traditional reference to Ibn Tumart (the movement’s founder) as the Mahdi in the sermon letter that was traditionally sent out by a new caliph; a few years later, he is found insisting on the identity of Isa (Jesus of Nazareth), not Ibn Tumart, as the only true Mahdi. Ibn Tumart’s name was removed from the regime’s coins, and the traditional use of the Berber language in some prayers, an important reminder of the origins of the Almohad movement in the highland Berber communities of Morocco, was dropped. Attempts to satisfy the Andalusi Muslims, who, as has been seen, were always less fervent in their adherence to Almohad doctrine, that the caliph did not support an extreme position, had the reverse effect elsewhere in the Islamic world, and North Africa became a battlefield between factions, with the Almohad Hafsids holding on in Tunis, while Morocco fell into the hands of the Berber Marinid pastoralists. Perhaps all that was keeping the Almohad regime alive in Spain was the weakness of Christian enemies early in the thirteenth century, notably the kingdom of Aragon during the minority of James I. A small victory at the start of the century was scored when the Almohads managed to gain control of the previously Almoravid Balearic islands, long the last major redoubt of their enemies the Banu Ghaniya. Even so, the Catalan conquest of the Almohad lands in Mediterranean Spain had begun, and the Castilians meanwhile ate away at the Almohad possessions in what was to become Christian Andalusia.

This was the context in which a small statelet emerged around Arjona and then Granada. It was one of several statelets that was prepared to ‘do business’ with the Christians, and in the early days it could only survive as a client state of Castile-León. In this it was similar to its close neighbour Murcia, which became a tributary of Castile in 1243, lasting twenty-two years before an uprising led to full-scale Christian invasion, Catalan colonisation and incorporation under the Castilian crown; until then Murcia was able to mint its own coins and possessed its own army, so that the tendency of historians to treat Murcia as a mudéjar entity, inhabited by Muslims under Latin control, seems rather excessive. For what was crucial to the evolution of Granada and its neighbours was the lack of real sources of outside support. Occasional talk of aid from Abu Zakariya of Tunis led to nothing, especially since Tunisian arms could not penetrate an effective Catalan-Aragonese blockade (1238). Elsewhere in Spain, Niebla, Crevillente and Minorca lingered on as Muslim entities with some degree of

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3 Harvey (1991), p. 45; ‘it set up a Mudejar state in Murcia itself’.
autonomy, but by the early fourteenth century the enclave at Crevillente had been finally absorbed into the crown of Aragon, after a period in which its rulers managed to play off their Aragonese neighbours against their Castilian ones; 4 Niebla, however, was subdued in 1262, while in 1287 the Minorcan Muslims suffered the extreme fate of mass deportation and sale as slaves. 5 Autonomous enclaves within the Catalan-controlled kingdom of Valencia also underwent gradual absorption, and local liberties, often extremely generous under James I, had shrunk greatly by the time that Peter III of Aragon had reasserted royal power in the Muslim regions of Valencia; the conquered Muslims were now required to pay more than lip-service to the crown, and they found themselves slipping into the degraded state of mudéjares, Muslims under Christian rule, with all the difficulties that then resulted for the free exercise of Islam.

The Muslim territories were exposed to Christian interference, since they lay alongside or were even virtually surrounded by Christian territories; Niebla, though quite substantial in size, was perched on the southern edges of Portugal and Spain and stood little chance against the Castilian armies that overwhelmed the statelet. The price of survival was co-operation with the Christians, and the ruler of Granada, of whom more shortly, was prepared to help the Castilians in campaigns against Seville (1248) and Jerez (1261), if that was one of the keys to his own survival. But the other key was surely the natural defences of Granada itself; in the eleventh century, the Zirid Berbers had established the capital of their taifa kingdom in what they regarded as a naturally well-defended site, with its high sierra making some parts of the territory difficult to penetrate. Geographical factors certainly played a major role in the long-term survival of Muslim Granada. It had natural frontiers in a way that few other Muslim states in Spain had them.

The origins of the Nasrid kingdom of Granada lay in the struggles within southern Spain from 1228 onwards, between factions flying the black banner of the Abbasid caliphs, descendants of the Huddite dynasty that had been powerful in Saragossa before the rise of the Almoravids, and the Almohad caliph al-Ma’mun, who was based in Seville and Granada. By the end of 1229 Córdoba was loyal to Ibn Hud, and seemed set to become the base for a revival of Muslim fortunes in Spain, until a formidable Christian counter-attack resulted in the erosion of Huddite power, with a victory by Ferdinand III of Castile at Jerez in 1230, and by Alfonso IX of León at Mérida in 1231; all this culminated in the fall of Córdoba itself to the Christians in 1236. As Ibn Hud’s power crumbled, so did that of the lesser Muslim lords who had until then been loyal to him. One was Muhammad Ibn Yusuf Ibn Nasr, or Ibn al-Ahmar,

a member of the Banu Nasr or Banu’l-Ahmar clan, who claimed eminent
descent from Sa’d, a companion of Muhammad. In 1232 he was in charge of
Arjona, and he became involved from there in factional struggles within
Córdoba; the Huddites, keen not to lose his support, tried to tempt him to stay
in their camp by offering him such prizes as Jaén. As Muhammad’s power in the
region grew, so did his awareness that he could benefit from deals not merely
with Muslim factions but Christian ones, and he played a delicate game which
won him power in Granada (1237), Almería (1238), and perhaps Málaga in
1239; Granada without access through these ports to the Mediterranean was a
much less considerable prize. Locally, he seemed a saviour, as Christian armies
overwhelmed the western parts of Andalusia, but he was prepared to acknowl-
dge Ferdinand of Castile as his overlord, if this was the best way to consoli-
date his own regional influence (later, he lost Arjona, but by then Granada had
become his power base). Ibn Khaldun’s description of his aims reads like a
repetition of the accounts of the Zirid arrival in Granada in the eleventh
century, reflecting the importance of the search for security from attack:
‘wishing to be safe from threats of aggression, he led the Muslims into the
harsh and mountainous terrain along the coast, selected Granada as his abode,
and built the Alhambra there as his palace’.6

Rachel Arié has pointed out that a whole area of the city was laid out to
receive the swarm of Muslim refugees moving into Granada; Castilian Islam
experienced a dramatic decline from the mid-thirteenth century, and one
reason was surely the drainage of population towards the last Islamic strong-
hold in Spain. Even so, Granada was not free of shackles, given the ties
between the Castilian kings and Muhammad I; still, submission to Castile did
not mean a reluctance to build ties with the Islamic world: Muhammad I was an
arch opportunist, and he at first formally recognised the Abbasid caliphs in the
east as his ultimate masters (though there was nothing they could do to help
him, which was part of the reason for accepting their authority). On a more
practical level, he built ties to the rulers of Tunis and Marrakesh, submitting to
Ibn Zakariya’ of Tunis in 1242 and 1264. His pragmatism extended as far as a
willingness to aid the Castilians in the capture of Seville (1248), and to surren-
der Jaén in 1246, after accepting the overlordship of Castile, an event which for
Ladero Quesada was the ‘birth certificate’ of the Nasrid state, guaranteeing
that the Castilians would not pursue their own conquests in southern Spain
further, but would turn their attention for the moment to North-West Africa:7
‘Farewell, farewell, Jaén, I shed my tears like a scattering of pearls. I hate to
leave you, but that is the judgment of Time’.8

6 Ibn Khaldun, Histoirre des Berbères, transl. de Slane, ed. Casenove (from the Ktob al-Ibar), iv, p. 74;
Traditionally, historians have laid much emphasis on the early Nasrid submission to Castile, and on the subsequent payment of tribute or *parias* to Christian masters. And yet L.P. Harvey has rightly insisted that there were lengthy periods when the Granadans ignored their vassal status, and failed to pay tribute to the Castilian kings. As early as 1264 the Granadans were taking the risk of becoming involved in the Muslim rebellions in southern Spain that resulted in the complete suppression of the Muslim statelet of Murcia; it was only by rapid and deft diplomacy that they managed to disengage themselves from a rebellion against the Christians which was too ambitious to succeed. Thus they were hardly the most loyal or consistent vassals. Harvey points out that the western vocabulary of vassalage had no real equivalent in Arabic, and that the Granadans were more conscious of their submission to the Abbasids in the east than they were of the implications of paying protection money to the Castilians. That did not stop the Castilian chroniclers from portraying the rulers of Granada, in particular Muhammad I, as rather insignificant vassals; Muhammad I was seen as no more than an Arab farmer who owed his station to Castile.

This perhaps says more about Castilian stereotypes of the Muslim than it does about Muhammad’s own intentions, which were subtly conceived. There is, it is true, some evidence that at the start of his reign Muhammad I presented himself as a humble Sufi who entered Granada for the first time dressed in coarse clothes, and he is even said to have claimed to be illiterate; whatever appeal the image of the holy man may have had, Muhammad was also aware that he could unite his subjects most effectively within the framework of traditional, mainstream Islam. The Muslim holy man played an important role in the radical religious movements of the Maghrib and North Africa, and yet it was not in this mould that Muhammad was to cast his reign. Starting on one note, he then made an important, dissonant jump into another note entirely. Granada became a home, as al-Andalus had been in earlier centuries, of strict but straightforward Maliki doctrine. One court official later in the thirteenth century was accused of adhering to the Zahiri heresy when he was seen raising his hands too high in prayer. After being told that if he did not conform he would have those offending hands chopped off, he fled to Egypt. The lesson that there was no room for religious deviance in what remained of al-Andalus was clear. Thus Granada was not, as al-Andalus and the Maghrib had been under the Almohads, any longer the centre of eccentric and controversial doctrines. In particular, Granada of the Nasrids differed from Granada of the Zirids in the lack of a sizeable non-Muslim population; there were some Jews, but many fewer than in the eleventh century, when their influence at court had

been substantial; there were virtually no Christians other than mercenaries and slaves. As Harvey has insisted, Granada was not another eye-catching example of Spanish *convivencia*, but a society whose raison d’être was its Islamic identity. Granada was not an attempt to replicate the old al-Andalus of Caliph ‘Abd ar-Rahman III, but a society consisting of devout survivors. ‘Because the cause of Spanish Islam has sometimes been espoused by the liberal opponents of Catholic extremism, there is a tendency for it to be assumed that Catholicism’s enemies were liberal and tolerant. We have seen that nothing could have been further from the truth.’

While Harvey probably exaggerates in suggesting that Muhammad actually wanted the other Muslim statelets to disappear, so that he could hold power as the unique Muslim ruler in Spain, the Islamic character of his state, its identity as the last bastion of Islam within Spain, gave Nasrid Granada a powerful sense of cohesion. Indeed, Ibn Khaldun was to insist, in the fourteenth century, that in Granada the old ties of solidarity represented by membership of a clan had been replaced by a potent new tie based on Islam; he points out that Muhammad II ‘had no tribal or clan leader on whom to rely’, especially after the Banu Ashqilula went their separate way:

> It is understandable that both people of power and influence and also the lower orders should have been united by a common hatred of the Christian king, whom they feared as the enemy of their religion. All felt the same fear, so all had the same desire to fight. To a certain extent this bond came to replace tribal bonds which had been lost.

The inhabitants of Granada were not, as has been hinted already, simply the old population of the region, but included large numbers of refugees who, aware of Muslim strictures against living under infidel rule, moved south from Valencia, Majorca and elsewhere. The old religious elite of al-Andalus gathered here, if they did not evacuate Spain altogether for the Maghrib.

One factor in the survival of Nasrid Granada was the survival of Muhammad I himself. He lived until 1273, though he had to face at the end of his reign trouble from his rivals the Banu Ashqilula, who seemed set to create their own statelet around Málaga and Guadix (they had earlier been closely associated through common aims and marriage ties). It seems, according to Arié, that the Banu Ashqilula actually expected the Nasrids to share power with them, and were mortified at the nomination of Muhammad’s sons as heirs to the throne. His son Muhammad II, who was to reign until 1302, had little difficulty gaining the throne, but he still needed the external support of the king of Castile, Alfonso X, who was flattered by Muhammad II’s decision to

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strengthen ties with Castile, and who as a result abandoned his plans to use the Banu Ashqilula against Granada, and to enter into an alliance with the Moroccan Marinids that might have spelled the end of Granadan independence. Still, Kennedy is probably right to claim that the Castilians at this point had no serious intention of conquering Granada, for the tribute payments gave the Christian king exactly what he needed. Awareness of this obliged Muhammad II to make his own overtures to the Marinids, and the scene was thus set for a long history of balancing acts in which Nasrid sultans would play off Castilians, Marinids and where appropriate Aragonese, in order to safeguard their small patch of territory. In 1275 a Marinid army, including the Volunteers for the Faith who were to remain a significant presence in the Nasrid kingdom, arrived, to help Muhammad II; these Zanata Berbers dedicated themselves to the ideal of the ghazi, the warrior of Islam; victories achieved included the capture of Algeciras and of Ashqilula Málaga, with the longer-term result that the Banu Ashqilula decided Spain was not promising territory, and moved across the Straits to North Africa (1288). It was probably this as much as the loss of hope of a throne or a section of the kingdom that led the Banu Ashqilula to seek their fortunes elsewhere. But the delicacy with which all these alliances had to be handled can be seen from the willingness of the Nasrids at one point to encourage Castile to gain control of Algeciras, if that meant the Marinids would be deprived of a permanent foothold on Spanish soil.

The history of Granada cannot, indeed, be understood without paying attention to the problem of the Straits of Gibraltar next door to Algeciras. The late thirteenth century saw the first attempts by Catalan and Genoese shipping to create a trade route linking Italy and the Balearic islands to Flanders and England, with a Genoese sailing to Flanders in 1277 and Majorcan and Genoese sailings to London in 1281. The security of this trade route depended on the pacification of the waters through the Straits, and it is no surprise that in 1278/9 the Genoese and the Granadans entered into a treaty. Yet in the struggle for the Straits, Aragon was not above helping Granada against Castile, despite giving aid to Castile in the 1290s to secure Tarifa; after 1296 Granada and Aragon drafted a pact according to which the Aragonese could have Murcia if the Nasrids could nibble away freely at Andalusia, now subject to the child-king Ferdinand IV of Castile. Though these plans came to little, they revealed that Granada could exploit its position near the Straits to act as an arbiter in regional politics, and to safeguard its own survival. The Majorcan kings too had treaties with Granada by the early fourteenth century, and there were Catalan and Italian commercial stations at Almería and Málaga. The terri-

tory of Granada also became quite important to western merchants, as a source of dried fruits and silks in particular, laying the foundations for a prosperous relationship between Genoa and Granada that persisted into the late fifteenth century, and that was crucial to the finances of the sultanate; the greatest monument to this prosperity, though largely constructed in the late fourteenth century, was the Alhambra Palace itself, while the survival of the Nasrid state is a tribute to the sure-footed policies established by its wily founders, Muhammad I and Muhammad II.
‘the rise of Aragon’ is a term that hides a great deal: in the thirteenth century it was not so much the highland kingdom of Aragon, from which they drew their royal title, as the seaboard county of Barcelona that was the jumping-off point for a remarkable series of successes, military, commercial and political, which catapulted the kings of Aragon from their lowly status as second-rate Spanish rulers into primacy in the western Mediterranean. Nor were these successes confined to the Catalan lands around Barcelona, as Majorca fell to the kings of Aragon and itself became the forward position of Catalan navies poised for the commercial penetration of Africa, and as Valencia became the capital of a newly acquired kingdom rich in potential resources. From 1282 Sicily also fell within the political sphere of the Catalan-Aragonese rulers, and it also had begun to play a role in the provisioning of Barcelona and Majorca which should not be underestimated. The relationship between trade and the flag was not, however, a simple one. There were areas intensively penetrated by the Catalan merchants which were never conquered by the king of Aragon; and there were political successes which were not, at least immediately, matched by generous favours to Catalan traders. The dynastic interests of the crown of Aragon were not necessarily the business interests of the merchant community of Barcelona; equally, those dynastic interests could rarely be fulfilled without the aid of Catalan navies, and thus some measure of reliance on the merchant community.

By the start of the thirteenth century certain broad features can be assigned to Catalonia-Aragon. The territories co-existed in a personal union, which had only been fulfilled in the emergence of effective monarchy within recent memory: Alfonso II of Aragon (I of Catalonia) had pursued a vigorous policy

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1 Considerable confusion can result from the differences in the numbering of the kings of Aragon and of the counts of Barcelona or Catalonia. In this text the Aragonese numbering has been adopted throughout.
of southward expansion into Moorish territory, agreeing in the Treaty of Cazorla (1179) to let Castile absorb Murcia in due course, but setting Aragonese-Catalan sights on the more accessible taifa state of Valencia. On the other hand, Alfonso faced more immediate challenges in southern France, where the Aragonese asserted their authority in the imperial county of Provence, only to find it challenged in nominally French Languedoc; it should be remembered that even as counts of Barcelona, let alone as significant territorial lords in Languedoc, the Aragonese rulers were still technically vassals of the king of France. It was in Languedoc that King Peter II (1196–1213) faced his greatest challenge. His wife Maria was heiress to Montpellier, an acquisition that notably strengthened Peter’s influence in Languedoc; so too did a marriage alliance with the count of Toulouse, who, like the king of Aragon, had to contend with the fractiousness of the southern French barons. The arrival of northern crusaders under Simon de Montfort, charged to suppress heretics and their supporters (fautores), left Peter with an obligation, as he understood it, to defend those of his vassals who had been dispossessed; in intervening, his aim was not to support the Cathar heresy, which he detested, still less to challenge Pope Innocent III, who had crowned him king of Aragon in person in 1204. The death of King Peter at the battle of Muret in 1213, fighting against de Montfort’s armies, was a severe check to Catalan ambitions in southern France; but it did not cause their complete abandonment, for the new king, James, remained in and near the Aragonese possession of Montpellier during much of his long minority, and a cadet line of Aragonese counts still ruled Provence until the 1240s. In other words, Languedoc remained an important focus of Aragonese interests throughout the early thirteenth century.

Peter’s legacy was not simply one of failure in southern France; in Spain his reputation stood high, and his joint stand with the Castilians against the fundamentalist Almohads, at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) endeared him to the papacy a year before Muret. As Almohad power disintegrated in Spain, where the movement had never struck very deep roots, autonomous Muslim warlords carved out for themselves petty statelets, a new generation of taifa kingdoms, loosely under Almohad lordship, but a far weaker challenge to Christian Spain than the unitary empire based in Morocco had been. Peter had plans of his own to invade the pirates’ nest at Majorca, which the Almohads only acquired at the start of the thirteenth century, and these plans were eventually taken up with great success by his son. However, the debit side of the reign is clearly revealed in T.N. Bisson’s study of the fiscal documentation of this period, showing that the count-king’s finances began to go into the red under Peter II, under the strain of internal conflicts, such as the endless struggles with the barons over the application of the count’s law (the Usatges de Barcelona), and over the ruler’s rights of taxation. By 1205 the barons were able
to force Peter to keep the coinage stable, to abandon the much disliked bovatge tax and to consult them on the appointment of the comital vicars who were generally lesser knights beholden to the count of Barcelona. The count's own claims had been expressed in the Liber feudorum maior of 1194. Yet it is important to distinguish the rights the count-king claimed, and those he could actually exercise; as count of Barcelona he was one of several great lords holding the title of count, and the idea of Catalonia as a coherent ‘principality’ only really emerged in the fourteenth century. Thus the count-king only gained control of key areas including Roussillon, across the Pyrenees, and Urgell, between Andorra and the borders of Aragon proper, by fits and starts, and the northern edges of Catalonia, where it faded into Languedoc, were rendered all the more imprecise by the oscillating loyalties of such feudatories as the counts of Foix. Even so, he gained the help of several lesser counts who were prepared to take up office as local judges, and he tried to build a financial framework that would enable him to support his ambitious enterprises. Under financial pressure, Peter turned increasingly to the Templars as managers of his fiscal affairs, and he also made use of Jewish advisers, building on their experience as effective tax farmers; a significant proportion of his fiscal documents carry the names of his Jewish officials, written in Hebrew characters. In this he was not greatly different from his neighbours in both Spain and in Languedoc (indeed, the suppression of Jewish ministers was one of the constant aims of the Albigensian crusaders and of Church councils). Jews were to remain active in the finances of the kings of Aragon until the late thirteenth century. Catalonia, and in many respects Aragon, were thus loose confederations which themselves made up the two elements in a super-confederation whose only real bond was the person of the count-king himself; this itself reflected the origins of Catalonia as a land of castellans, a territory which had a long history of localised power structures.

Under James I (1213–76) the power and in many respects the character of the monarchy was transformed. His own birth was widely viewed as a miracle, not least because of the cordial loathing of Peter II for Maria of Montpellier; but the true miracle was the survival of Peter’s bloodline. Others, notably James’s cousin Sanç of Provence, would gladly have asserted a right to James’s crown; yet a semblance of unity was maintained, expressed most notably in the general

2 It is essential to distinguish between moneylending and tax farming. Catalan Jews were no more heavily involved in the former activity than the Catalan Christian merchants; in the latter activity, as elsewhere in Spain, they played a notable role. Bisson, Fiscal accounts of Catalonia, especially 1, pp. 118–19.
cort at Lleidà (Lérida) in summer, 1214, at which the king’s leading Aragonese and Catalan subjects were pressed to swear fealty to a monarch many of them were actively trying to deprive of his lands, revenues and rights. Over the next few years royal revenues began slowly to recover, thanks in significant measure to the hard work of the crown’s Templar financiers, but thanks too to renewed confidence in the possibility of asking for taxes, as for example at assemblies at Huesca (1221) and Daroca (1223). Clever manipulation of the Catalan coinage by King James, which T. N. Bisson has analysed, brought the crown a profit of 25 per cent by replacing the old coinage. Very significant too were the agreements which were made with Catalan grandees, notably Guillem de Montcada, Nyno Sanç of Roussillon and Guillem Cabrera of Urgell, stabilising Catalonia and permitting a slow reassertion of control over lands which had been alienated during the minority or as a result of Peter II’s pledges; Catalonia, at risk of once again becoming a loose assemblage of autonomous counties, was once again being forged together into a coherent principality under the lordship of the count of Barcelona. This is not to suggest that James was consciously forging Catalan nationhood. A particularly important victory for the young king was his winning of influence in the county of Urgell, which had for long blocked the way between the lands held by the king as count of Barcelona and those he held as king of Aragon. In 1228 he set his sights on the heiress to Urgell, Aurembiaix, whose rights he promised to defend; he won back Urgell with a brief and successful campaign which culminated in a secret contract of concubinage between James and Aurembiaix. In this agreement reference was made to his intention before long to set out and conquer Majorca. The pacification of Catalonia and his expansionist plans were indeed intertwined; for, as he pointed out in his autobiography, by seizing Majorca he would be able to impress the Catalan barons with his warrior skills and so bring them into line; such methods were more promising than any number of corts, which could provide uncomfortable opportunities for the barons to press their own claims. The need for a prestige victory became more important after an initial failure to gain control of the Spanish coastal fortress at Peñíscola in 1225–6. And yet the conquest of the Balearics also had commercial implications, of which the citizens of Barcelona were well aware; the presence there of Muslim pirates had interfered with Christian shipping in the past, though there is some evidence that regular traffic between such Catalan ports as Tarragona and Majorca was possible at the start of the thirteenth century. Past attempts to conquer the Balearics had depended on Pisan or Genoese support; only with

3 Bisson, ‘Coinages of Barcelona’ and other studies gathered together in Bisson (1989).
4 Chronicle of James I king of Aragon, trans. Forster, i, pp. 98–104. This is an antiquated translation, and editions of the Catalan original are widespread, the handiest being part one of Soldevila, Les quatre grans cròniques.
the help of Italian shipping did it appear possible to overwhelm the islands, and the Italians were themselves bound to the Muslim rulers of Mayurqa by trade treaties which they had no great desire to forfeit. However, by the 1220s the situation favoured James: as well as Catalan shipping, some of it supplied through the wealthy Barcelona merchant Pere Martell, there was the opportunity to exploit existing family ties with the counts of Provence, and James relied heavily on Provençal naval contingents, and on the help of Montpellier, to supplement the resources organised in Catalonia. Majorca City, the modern Palma, was besieged and taken by the end of 1229. The rest of the island did not capitulate at once, and a further visit by James, who took the title of his Muslim predecessors of ‘king of Majorca’, was necessary in order to tame Muslim opposition in the mountainous north of Majorca; Minorca, scared by rumours of a Catalan invasion, submitted without shots being fired in 1231, on advantageous terms permitting self-government and the free practice of Islam. Finally, in 1235, Ibiza fell to a group of conquistadors operating with royal licence under the auspices of the see of Tarragona.

The invasion of the Balearics provides the first clue to James’s attitude to the Spanish Muslims, many more of whom were to fall under his sway after the invasion of Valencia. While the Minorcan case showed what advantages a rapid acceptance of the new order might bring, obstinate resistance could only result in expulsion, expropriation, enslavement or slaughter, in varying proportions. It is certainly striking that on the island of Majorca a slow process of attrition began; the crown was not particularly interested in allowing Islam to remain strongly represented in a strategically delicate position on the crossroads of the western Mediterranean. Majorca gradually lost its Islamic identity, and was repopulated by Catalan, Provençal and Italian settlers, including Jews from Spain, Languedoc and North Africa, among the most notable of whom was the wealthy Solomon ben Ammar from the great gold centre of Sijilmasa. The Muslims of Majorca appear to have lacked their own community organisation or aljama, unlike the Jews, during the thirteenth century; even the evidence for the existence of mosques in conquered Majorca is uncertain. The island was heavily catalanised in speech, religion and population. A few native Christian Mozarabs survived from pre-conquest days, including the prominent Abennasser family, who traded and held land, prospering in the new order; but the old Muslim communities were shattered in pieces, and were often resettled on newly carved up estates, subject to absentee lords such as the viscount of Béarn and the count of Roussillon; the Order of the Temple acquired plenty of land, fulfilling its classic role as manager of frontier territories, but, to meet manpower shortages, the Templars brought Muslim captives from the Spanish mainland and set them to work on Majorcan soil. This gave rise to papal protests; but in other respects the papacy was aware of the special circumstances,
and licensed trade between Majorca and North Africa on the grounds that otherwise the Christian inhabitants would be deprived of a livelihood. The island’s population appears to have consisted at least half of city dwellers, and it was trade that had made Muslim Mayurqa important, and that would make its successor Ciutat de Mallorca a major Mediterranean city once again.

The conquest of the Balearic islands is often taken to mark the moment when the outlook of the Catalan-Aragonese monarchy shifted decisively from southern France towards the Mediterranean frontier with Islam. From another perspective, however, the major result of the invasion of Majorca was actually the strengthening of ties to the southern French and Provençal cities, which were showered with commercial and landed rewards in Majorca following their crucial role in the conquest. Nunyo Sanç, count of Roussillon, also gained extensive properties in Majorca City and in the countryside. Indeed, after 1276 the Balearic islands entered into a form of political union with the territories of the Corona de Aragón in what is now southern France, Montpellier and Roussillon. On the other hand, James made little attempt to assert direct control over his new kingdom. He handed its day-to-day government to Pedro of Portugal, an adventurer whose record was to show him to be unreliable and easily distracted by other projects. It was Pedro who in the end had been given the hand of James’s cast-off mistress Aurembiaix, which brought him a claim to Urgell, even though Pedro was prepared to relinquish it in return for rights in Majorca. Thus indirectly the conquest of Majorca brought James Urgell, as in a sense he had prophesied by referring to Majorca in his original agreement with Aurembiaix. As for the exploitation of Majorca’s resources, the picture that emerges is one of rather light taxation of trade and of agricultural production; the crown at least was not especially interested in making a large profit out of the Balearics, and even the tribute from Minorca was apparently fairly modest. It was only later, when contemplating how to bequeath his kingdom, that James decided to make Majorca into the seat of an independent kingdom, which then began to develop a more fiscally minded set of policies.

In winning the approval of his Catalan subjects, who acquired lands and trading stations in Majorca, James only risked alienating the Aragonese barons, who were not worried by Muslim piracy, but who found themselves exposed to border raids from the unstable taifa kingdom of Valencia; James’s earlier attempt to gain control of Peñíscola proved that he was open to suggestions about Valencia as well as the islands. By the 1230s it was clear that the internal

5 Mut Calafell and Roselló (eds.), La remembrança de Nunyo Sanç.
divisions within Valencia could be usefully exploited to establish some sort of Aragonese mastery over at least the northern parts of the Muslim kingdom. Its ruler Abu Zayd no longer could claim universal acceptance, and even Valencia city was in the hands of one of his rivals, Zayyan. Abu Zayd not surprisingly turned back to the traditional strategy of Muslim border lords in Spain, appealing to the king of Aragon for help against his enemies in the south. The aim was purely that of more firmly establishing his authority, though in so doing Abu Zayd had slipped a long way from traditional Almohad refusal to do a deal with the Christians. Indeed, he was to slip a long way further, accepting baptism later on.

In 1233 James, newly victorious in the Balearics, was able to redeem his earlier failure at Peñíscola, and to capture Burriana, from which the Muslim population was cleared; in the early stages of the conquest of Valencia the idea of resettling the land with Christians seemed attractive, but James increasingly entered into surrender agreements similar to that already made with the Minorcans, guaranteeing local rights to self-government and the practice of Islam. It is difficult to see how he could have gained an ascendancy in the kingdom of Valencia otherwise; on the other hand, there was an inherent fragility in such a relationship with his Muslim subjects, since large areas were not genuinely controlled by the Aragonese. While Abu Zayd made sure that the major strongholds in the north fell under James’s sway, the situation in the centre and south of Valencia was more difficult, and the length of the war made it costly. James looked to the cortes at Monzón for financial aid; he benefited from crusade tithes granted by the papacy in recognition of the holy nature of his work; he also tried to persuade the Catalan shipper Pere Martell who had supported him eagerly in the conquest of Majorca to help him against Valencia, but here he was less enthusiastic. Valencia City proved a particularly hard nut to crack, and it was consistent with earlier policy for James to expel the Muslim population after the city surrendered in September 1238; henceforth the Muslims were confined to a morería in the suburbs but looting was kept under control, and Valencia became an important Catalan centre of settlement. Whatever the Aragonese barons had hoped, it was towards Catalonia that Valencia increasingly looked, using as its new vernacular a form of the Catalan language, and basing its legal code on Catalan practice; in 1239 James departed from prevailing Aragonese usages issuing a territorial law code or Furs for Valencia which closely reflected Catalan customs.

The prime difficulty that made Valencia less easy to manage than Majorca was quite simply that Majorca was an island, whereas Valencia had wide open frontiers linking it to other Muslim states, for Murcia, though technically under Castilian suzerainty from 1243, was not effectively conquered and colonised until 1265, and even then one of the major motives was to limit Muslim incur-
sions from the south into Valencian territory. The volatile nature of Valencia was further revealed in James’s last years, when continued uprisings led him to send in his heir Peter, who, as the chronicle of James’s reign remarks, conquered Valencia a second time. James took longer to call himself ‘king of Valencia’ than he had done to take the title ‘king of Majorca’, assuming at first that Abu Zayd would function as his agent in Valencia; in 1236 James started using the Valencian title.

Valencia was not, in the same measure as Majorca, another New Catalonia. In the north, Christian settlements were founded, such as the lands of Blasco d’Alagó around Morella, or the town of Burriana, and, as in Majorca, the Templars were invited to help hold down the frontier. However, the Muslim population was not generally uprooted, and the use of surrender treaties can be seen at Chivert, where the local Muslims appear to have been granted similar rights to those conferred on the Minorcans not long before. The small Muslim lordship at Crevillente, on the edge of the Castilian sphere of influence, held out until the start of the fourteenth century as a neutralised enclave generally friendly to Aragon. The Muslims of the Uxó valley were granted a typical enough charter in 1250, confirming that they could retain their marriage customs, instruct their children in the Koran, travel freely, appoint their own judges and even prevent Christians from taking up residence among them; the cost of this handsome privilege was a tax of one eighth. Not surprisingly, it was in and around Valencia City, with its fertile agricultural hinterland, that resettlement was most carefully organised, in documents detailing the ripartiment or division of the conquered territories among the citizens of several northern towns such as Jaca, Saragossa and Montpellier; while Barcelona had the right to claim one fifth of the urban property in Valencia city and one sixth of the surrounding borta. Thus the grants went far beyond the establishment of trade counters; a substantial Christian community came into being in the heart of Valencia City, and, as in Majorca, the Jews too received a significant area for themselves. The map of Valencia became a miniature map of Catalonia, Aragon and south-western France, as the men of Huesca, Roussillon and even of Pyrenean lands beyond James’s frontiers were granted the right to erect their own city quarters and suburbs. In the south, a scattering of Christian lordships emerged once Zayyan had been brought to heel, but there were few expulsions, and even fewer massacres, during the conquest; Christian lords here were masters of a Muslim population, and the situation remained volatile. The most dramatic revolt was that of al-Azraq (1247–8), but, as has been seen, trouble was still erupting in the early 1270s.

The financial value of Valencia has been amply demonstrated in the studies by Robert I. Burns of James I’s tax regime. But it also had an importance in royal administration of quite a different character: Xàtiva (Játiva), conquered in
1244, was the centre of a productive paper industry which offered James and his successors the chance to record the business of government in the paper registers which are still preserved in their hundreds in the archive of the crown of Aragon in Barcelona; a veritable ‘paper revolution’ occurred which benefited both modern historians and a king anxious to keep an eye on the political and fiscal conditions of his lands. Valencia City provided the crown with revenues from Muslim bath-houses, bakeries, butcheries, brothels, with poll-taxes charged on Muslims and Jews, with taxes on market place transactions and on trade through the port, itself a growing centre of trade, linking newly conquered Majorca to Spain. In large measure, the crown continued to operate the traditional administrative system established under Muslim rule, a feature of the government of Valencia which distinguished it from Majorca, where the break seems to have been cleaner; James had become the Christian king of a Muslim society, which would retain a sizeable Moorish population right through to 1610. But it was also a society marked by stark contrasts between conqueror and conquered, between Muslims speaking Arabic and Christians speaking Catalan; between Gothic church-towers and Islamic minarets; between clean-shaven pork-eating Christians and bearded Jews or Muslims subject to ancient dietary laws and regulated as far as possible by distinct law courts, which followed the lex or religion of the litigants. This was not a society all Muslims could accept; the traditional Valencian leadership, both religious and political, gravitated towards North Africa or Nasrid Granada, thereby underlining the Islamic identity of the one significant Muslim state to remain on Spanish soil, but also weakening the capacity of those who stayed behind to resist the new order. Some, for instance a sizeable group at Valencia City in 1275, converted to the faith of their new masters. Even so, the almost leaderless Muslim communities of Valencia proved to have considerable longevity, and it was only in the late fourteenth century that the Christians became a clear majority of the population.

James I could claim Valencia under the terms of twelfth-century treaties with the kings of Castile, carving up the greater part of the peninsula between Castilians and Aragonese. One territory which had been eyed covetously by both sides was Murcia, whose status varied from one treaty to another. Even so, by the 1240s it was clear that Castile now exercised greater influence in Muslim Murcia and, when Alacant (Alicante) indicated a willingness to accept Aragonese lordship (1240), James made it plain that he could not take over the city without doing injustice to Castile; here James generally took care to move carefully, and when the Murcian Muslims refused to renew their tribute pay-

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ments to Castile, in the wake of uprisings among the Muslims of southern Spain, the chivalric James seized the opportunity to quell Murcia on behalf of Alfonso X of Castile, who had enough difficulties on other fronts. Clearly the fear that trouble in Murcia could spill over into Valencia was a major motive for James’s intervention; but his honourable action meant that he laid no claim to Murcia for himself. Indeed, the old rulers, the Banu Hud, were installed in a position of continuing influence as ‘kings of the Moors of Murcia’. Yet the Aragonese invasion did have permanent results of a different order: Catalan settlers began to come south to Murcia, and nearly half of the known settlers at this time came from James’s realms, more than twice the number who came from Castile. The reality was that Castilian manpower was already overstretched as a result of the conquest of Andalusia in the 1230s and 1240s. Another reality was that James had shown himself to be the most successful of the Spanish kings in the struggle against the Muslims, conferring upon him a wider reputation which was only qualified by his reputation for promiscuity. It was, in fact, a reputation that his crusading contemporary St Louis of France might have had reason to envy, given his own failures in the wars against the Muslims.

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Louis IX was another of James I’s neighbours, and it is now time to turn to Aragonese relations with the French monarchy and with the rulers of the Pyrenees. Here the successes were uneven. On the death of Nyno Saç in 1235, Roussillon returned to his nephew the count-king; it remained firmly within the Catalan orbit politically and culturally. However, the kingdom of Navarre, to which the Aragonese rulers had long realistically aspired, was turned over in 1243 to the counts of Champagne, and after the absorption of Champagne by the Capetians the heir to the French throne acquired the title to Navarre in 1274; a wedge of French-dominated territory thus poked into Spain, though direct interference by the new rulers in the affairs of Navarre was limited. More positive were the results achieved in an attempt to define the boundaries between French and Catalan territory in what is now the southwest of France; this issue also extended beyond the frontiers of France into the imperial county of Provence, where the Aragonese line of counts was extinguished in 1243. The heiress (whose own claim was bitterly challenged by her sisters) in 1246 accepted the hand of Charles, count of Anjou and Maine, launching him on his headlong career in Mediterranean politics, but also initiating what at times seems almost a vendetta between the houses of Barcelona and of Anjou; by 1282 they had quarrelled over most of the great prizes in the Mediterranean, including Sicily, Sardinia and Tunis. Nearer home, the chances
of an Aragonese recovery in Languedoc were shattered when Alphonse of Poitiers acquired the county of Toulouse from the dynasty of Saint-Gilles. The French thus seemed to be tightening a noose around Languedoc, excluding the English and the Aragonese from the power games they had played in the region in the twelfth century. The Albigensian Crusade unexpectedly made Capetian fortunes in the Midi. But there were also economic interests at work: lacking an outlet to the sea, the French developed the stagnant waters of the abbey of Psalmodi into the first French royal port on the Mediterranean, with the intention not merely of offering an embarkation point for crusaders who were accompanying Louis IX on his crusade of 1248, but also as an alternative entry point for trade, rivalling the Aragonese city of Montpellier. Aigues-Mortes, as the new port was aptly called, did not strangle Montpellier; indeed, by the end of the thirteenth century Montpellier and the French port had developed a symbiotic relationship, for Aigues-Mortes was far from being a great city on the scale of Montpellier, and Montpellier lacked adequate ports in the surrounding territory under Aragonese lordship.

Given the high potential for renewed conflict in the region, Louis IX looked for a diplomatic solution which would confirm French ascendancy in southwestern France without humiliating his rivals; thus the years 1258–9 saw him come to terms with both the English rulers of Gascony (at the Treaty of Paris in 1259) and with James I of Aragon, in the Treaty of Corbeil of 11 May 1258.7 The price was generous recognition that past French claims to suzerainty over Barcelona, Urgell, Besalú, Roussillon, Ampurias, Cerdagne, Conflent, Girona and other border areas must be allowed to lapse; while the Aragonese reciprocated by renouncing any claim to interfere in Carcassonne, Rodez, Millau, Béziers, Agde, Albi, Narbonne, Minerve, Nîmes, Toulouse and the highly autonomous county of Foix, as well as their dependent territories. The full list of places provides a reminder of how extensive Aragonese interference had in the past been. Yet the peace treaty also had strange omissions. The city of Montpellier does not appear, or rather the royal lieutenant appears as the emissary of James I, without any concession being made in respect of Aragonese rights there, and the question of Montpellier would rumble on throughout the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The rural barony of Montpellier or Aumelas remained under Aragonese suzerainty. The small, remote enclave of Carladès on the borders of Auvergne and Rouergue was also left in Aragonese hands, for whatever obscure reason. To seal the alliance Louis and James agreed to a marriage alliance whereby Philip, heir to France, would take as his bride Isabella of Aragon, James’s daughter. This had limited effects

because Isabella died in 1271. James took the opportunity also to renounce any further claims in Provence. It is clear that a faction in Aragon-Catalonia was not prepared to accept the permanent annulment of Aragonese interests in southern France; even James I continued to endow the monastery of Valmagne, beyond Montpellier; and the Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña shows that Peter the Great attempted to resuscitate the Aragonese claim to Carcassonne and other lands in Languedoc in 1280. Yet from a Catalan perspective the treaty had great advantages, drawing a frontier to the north of Perpignan which was only broached by Louis XI and then, finally, by Louis XIV, though as has been seen the acquisition of Navarre by the French in 1274 posed new threats. The status of Barcelona and the lesser Catalan counties remained for a time imprecise: they were not actually part of the Aragonese kingdom, or indeed any kingdom, though the blanket label ‘Principality of Catalonia’ came into vogue in the fourteenth century as a way of solving this difficulty. Roussillon and Cerdagne were, however, assigned to the new Majorcan kingdom in James I’s will of 1262. The treaty was thus a milestone in the creation of Aragonese-Catalan and French realms which possessed defined boundaries.

It was not so much the senior branch of the house of Capet as Charles of Anjou’s cadet line that henceforth seemed to be the major obstacle in the way of Aragonese ambitions. Charles’s involvement in Italian politics, culminating in the conquest of southern Italy in 1266, appeared to block whatever hopes James I’s heir Peter might have of redeeming the claims of his own wife Constance, grand-daughter of Frederick II, whom he had married in 1262 to the consternation of the papacy; James’s protestations that this had no political implications were not entirely credited. In 1267 James I was pursuing plans to win Sardinia for his second son, James, to add to the Balearics, Roussillon and Montpellier, which he already intended to grant him; here again it was Philip of Anjou, Charles’s son, who stood in the way, and the pope refused to adjudicate the island to any of its claimants. In 1267–9, James begged the pope for a crusade privilege for an expedition to the east to which the pope was strongly opposed, partly on the grounds that James persisted in his immoral life; in any case the Catalan fleet was rapidly scattered by Mediterranean storms. When Charles of Anjou and Louis of France launched a crusade against Tunis in 1270, this again interfered with established Catalan interests, since Tunis was rapidly emerging as one of the major trading partners of Barcelona. Of course, several of the ‘challenges’ posed by the house of Anjou were not real ones: James had no chance of gaining Sardinia, and he did not have the means to conquer Sicily while engaged in the constant suppression of Valencian

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8 Chronicle of San Juan de la Peña, trans. Nelson.
rebellions. The issue remained, however, one of rights: the trampling of Aragonese rights in Provence, Sicily and elsewhere; and this rankled more insistently with James's eldest son Peter than with the king himself.

The question of what lands to bequeath to each of his sons had great significance for the future development of the crown of Aragon. By 1262 his two surviving sons were offered the last of a series of deals, in which James's many territories had been divided up several different ways. The disposition of 1262 ensured that virtually all the lands he held on the Spanish mainland would go as a core patrimony to Peter, while his second son James was to receive a kingdom of Majorca expanded to include Roussillon, Cerdagne, Carlat and Montpellier; the trans-Pyrenean counties were not to depend on the count of Barcelona, nor was the king of Majorca to do so. In a sense, he was taking advantage of the security provided by the Treaty of Corbeil to carve out a wedge of land on the French side of the Pyrenees, which, he artlessly assumed, would be ruled by James of Majorca in a spirit of harmony with Peter of Aragon. But Peter set his own face against such a division. James clearly suspected that things would not turn out well, for on his deathbed James was still urging his sons to work together in a spirit of brotherly love.9 Peter's difficulties with James were compounded by other family rivalries, notably that with his half-brother Fernan Sanç, and issues such as control of Urgell reared their ugly heads again. Taking into account too the trouble in Valencia, the reign ended on a rather sour note.

James was a man of intriguing paradoxes. At one extreme he threatened to empty Valencia entirely of its Muslims when they opposed him; at the other, he issued surrender agreements which could be read by their recipients, at least in the Arabic version, as little more than agreements to co-operate with the king of Aragon. Attuned to Moorish ways, on one occasion he received some Muslim emissaries from Murcia by offering them a feast of halal meat in a tent, telling them that he and his ancestors had always sought to foster the Muslim communities in all their realms, "just as well as if they were in a Saracen land"; only if Muslims failed to submit, he said, was it his habit to take their land and repeople it with Christians. This is a fair account, from his own presumed autobiography, of his philosophy of convivencia. He understood the need for good diplomatic relations with the North African rulers in whose lands his Catalan subjects traded, but he was desperately anxious to be seen in the Christian world as a great crusading hero and as a hammer of heretics. In his relations with the Jews, a similar ambivalence can be observed. James chose the company of the acerbic friar Ramon de Penyafort, who directed his campaigns against Jews, Muslims and usurers, all of whom could easily be found in James's

9 James I, autobiography, in Soldevila, Quatre grans cròniques, cap. 563.
realms. The same king who in 1263 presided over the damaging confrontation between the Girona rabbi Nahmanides and the zealous friar Pau Crestià, on the subject of whether the Messiah had come, also extended his protection to his Jewish subjects, quickly revoking his requirement that they should listen to missionary sermons, and he encouraged Jews to settle in Majorca. His private life, with its succession of mistresses, and his scandalous treatment of churchmen for whom he conceived a dislike (notably the confessor who lost his tongue for revealing what he had heard), only made him more aware of his need to placate God by serving Him in war, and only made the pope more aware of his moral turpitude. He was excommunicated twice, but he made easier going of his loss of the Church’s favour than his contemporary Frederick II. The truth was, as Catalan chroniclers emphasised, that under James thousands of masses were now being recited in lands that had once resounded solely to the call of the muezzin.

The rise of Barcelona in this century is as clear as it is inexplicable, though recent research by Stephen Bensch has done much to make it more comprehensible.10 Anyone observing the western Mediterranean at the end of the twelfth century would have concluded that Genoa and Pisa would simply block the chances of a third commercial power emerging in those waters. And, as Bensch has shown, the take-off of Barcelona was different in character from that of the Italian maritime cities; their strength lay in their capacity to emancipate themselves from the authority of a higher lord such as the emperor, and failure to shake off such a lord could inhibit the freedom to conduct an independent foreign policy, as can be seen in the case of Amalfi. By contrast, the strength of Barcelona lay precisely in the opposite direction; close co-operation with the king of Aragon brought diplomatic advantages in foreign ports, an acceptable tax regime and a court which was itself a good market for articles imported from al-Andalus, North Africa or the Levant. Its position within reach of but not perilously close to the Muslim border had brought the city a handsome income in tribute under the eleventh-century counts of Barcelona, though in the twelfth century there was a recession, coinciding with the appearance of aggressive Berber empires encompassing much of central and southern Spain. As the town grew, its role as a centre of consumption of primary foodstuffs channelled profits into the hands of mill owners and grain shippers, while its position at the end of trade routes bringing cloths from northern and southern France into the Mediterranean made it

a major centre of redistribution in the early thirteenth century. To these activities must be added the existence of finishing workshops, utilising dyes such as the kermis of southern Spain; Barcelona was thus able to bring together in one place the essential materials needed for a successful woollen cloth export industry. But even around 1230 other cities in James I’s realms seemed as likely to lead the commercial invasion of the western Mediterranean; Montpellier developed a close relationship with Barcelona, visible in mid-century commercial documents that reveal the activities of such men as Joan Hom de Deu, who moved easily between his hometown of Montpellier and the Catalan capital. Montpellier, it has aptly been said, was the ‘tutor’ of Barcelona, a relationship greatly reinforced by the fact that Montpellier was also a possession of the king of Aragon. From the late twelfth century, the trans-Pyrenean Catalan city of Perpignan also became a significant intermediary in the textile traffic between northern France and Spain, and it became a centre of cloth and leather production in its own right, a function still recorded in the street names of the old city. Its links to Saint-Antonin in the thirteenth century assured a regular flow of cloth down the western flanks of France. In Catalonia, the most obvious rival was Tarragona, which traded directly with Muslim Mayurqa among other places; it is no coincidence that Pere Martell, merchant and shipowner of Barcelona, was based there when he offered the king and his court a banquet at which plans were laid for the invasion of Majorca. Following its fall to the Catalans in 1229, Ciutat de Mallorca with astonishing speed became another important focus for Catalan commerce, a sort of clone of Barcelona itself, and a forward base from which it was possible to penetrate North African markets. Beyond these maritime cities, textile centres in the Catalan interior, notably Lleidà, and bankers from Girona and elsewhere, helped lubricate the expansion of the Catalan economy. By the end of James’s reign the consell de cent, the council of one hundred, had been granted day-to-day control of the affairs of Barcelona, while other towns such as Perpignan and Montpellier also possessed privileges guaranteeing internal self-government. The king had his own battle or bailiff in Barcelona, and he had the benefit of the support of the leading patrician families such as the Grony (who supplied bailiffs) and the de Banyeres.

Further afield, Barcelona played a more modest part in the commercial conquest of the eastern Mediterranean; together with several southern French and Provençal ports Barcelona acquired its first privilege for trade in the Holy Land, in 1190, but it was only in the late thirteenth century that the Catalans acquired a notable role in the Levant trade, for example the fur trade between Constantinople and the west. The Italian merchants stood in their way, and it was important for Barcelona to reach an understanding with the Genoese and Pisans, whose past support for the Muslim rules of Mayurqa and whose inter-
ests in North Africa had explosive potential; it was an act of statesmanship for James not to expel the Italians from Majorca, but instead to grant them a renewal and enlargement of the commercial privileges the Muslim emirs had bestowed on them. On the other hand, Italian merchants were not given free access to Barcelona itself, where Catalan shipping was not surprisingly given absolute priority; and Italian bankers were repeatedly declared expelled from Barcelona, a policy that was repeated often enough to suggest how half-hearted it was. In addition, the hostility to usury of leading courtiers, in particular Ramon de Penyafort, occasionally made the Italian bankers an obvious target (particularly since the Jews were much less heavily involved in money-lending than they tended to be in northern France or England). None the less fruitful partnerships of Catalans and Italians operated grain shipments out of Sicily and assured other essential supplies; and the image of Catalans and Italians literally at one another’s throats which is supplied by some of the fourteenth-century chroniclers needs to be set against a long tradition of co-operation in Maghribi trade.

A crucial factor in the rise of Barcelona was the reputation it gained for shipping skills; the conquest of Majorca acted as a vital stimulus, since close links to the Balearics could only be sustained by perfecting the art of year round navigation. Majorca itself became a major centre of cartography by the early fourteenth century, a further reflection of these realities. Evidence from 1284 shows that shipping was regularly leaving Majorca even in the depths of winter and heading across to North Africa; the mainstay of the merchant navy was the smallish leny (literally, ‘wood’), but growing demand for bulk goods such as Sicilian grain encouraged the use of big, slow roundships as well. Another sign of Catalan skills at sea was visible by 1281, when Majorcan ships reached England through the Straits of Gibraltar alongside Genoese vessels. Maritime law codes issued in the Catalan ports also became influential in the Mediterranean; the fifteenth-century versions of the Valencian Consulate of the sea code incorporate thirteenth-century material, including royal decrees. As has been seen, the role of the crown was very important; one area where the monarchy was able to make its influence keenly felt was the money supply: the king actively encouraged the minting of the doblench coins from 1222, and of the tern coins in 1258, the latter a quarter pure silver; the availability of reliable and widely used coins further fuelled the expansion of Catalan trade.

The influence of the crown over the fortunes of Barcelona is most clearly seen in the development of overseas consulates, particularly in North Africa; the aim was to represent the commercial interests of the Catalan merchants as well as the political interests of the king of Aragon. In the mid-thirteenth century, both the city of Barcelona and the monarchy asserted the right to
appoint consuls, but this did not give rise to serious rivalry, and in the longer term, the king obtained greater influence, even drawing under the wing of his own consuls the Catalans of Majorca and elsewhere. By the 1250s Tunis had a Catalan fonduk or warehouse; many fonduks also contained offices for the consul, accommodation for visiting merchants, a chaplain and a bakehouse. James I vigorously encouraged the establishment of new consulates, sending Raymond de Conches of Montpellier to Alexandria in 1262 to negotiate for a foundation there; later, Guillem de Montcada became consul in Egypt, a member of a leading family with personal links to the royal court in Tunis as well. However, relations with Muslim rulers were always delicate, and Raymond de Conches had returned to Alexandria in 1264 to complain at the seizure of Catalan cargoes. He was instructed to warn the sultan that the only result would be licensed piracy against Egyptian shipping. Thus force no less than diplomacy was needed in order to protect Catalan interests overseas. Royal motives were not entirely altruistic: the crown drew handsome revenue from its consulates. In 1259 James I was startled by the discovery that his consuls in Tunis were paying him a rent estimated at one third of what the fonduk was genuinely capable of producing; the rent was immediately trebled. In 1274 James sent a representative to Tunis to find out why two years of rent had not reached the royal coffers. The monarchy saw in the consulates a major source of revenue which might enable the king to emancipate himself from dependence on internal taxation within Aragon and Catalonia; in view of the value of the overseas fonduks, the establishment, from 1302 onwards, of rival Majorcan consulates subject to the king of Majorca was seen as an extremely serious development.

Still, the count-kings had little option but to ask the corts of Catalonia and the cortes of Aragon for votes of bovatge and monedatge, the former of which was tending to turn into a regular general tax. The corts did not possess the influence that they were to acquire under later kings, and James apparently became disenchanted with them, summoning them less often at the end of his reign; there was no simple linear development towards the ‘pactist’ monarchy of the late fourteenth century. Indeed, James relied less on the corts as his own finances became slightly firmer; the count’s Peace proclaimed early in his reign in Catalonia provided a framework for James’s vicars to extend their authority into the localities, so that, as in contemporary France and England, the ruler’s justice was increasingly experienced by all his subjects. Financial administration benefited from the expertise of Jewish advisers such as Aaron Ibn Yahya or Abinafia, who acted as a tax collector on James’s behalf in Valencia; even in the Catalan and Aragonese towns Jewish bailiffs looked after royal lands and rights, though under Peter the Great the corts insisted that Jews be excluded from public office.
The chivalric James was succeeded in Aragon-Catalonia by a determined and ambitious ruler whose programme consisted in the defence of the rights of the house of Barcelona, as he conceived them, whether in Majorca, where his younger brother was installed as independent king, or in Sicily, where his wife Constance possessed an unredeemed claim to the throne. He was, Bisson says, ‘that rarity in history: the greater son of a great father’. To keep relations with Castile evenly balanced, he took into his custody the Infantes de la Cerda, disinherited members of the Castilian royal house. Peter was, however, not prepared to accept his younger brother’s claim to independence, despite his awareness of his father’s intentions; and he twisted James II of Majorca’s arm successfully, forcing him in 1279 to acknowledge his elder brother as his suzerain. He also wanted to punish James for supporting his enemies in a renewed struggle for mastery of Urgell. His toughness towards James was a serious miscalculation; Peter aimed to draw James away from the French court, the obvious source of support for a Majorcan kingdom that ruled over Roussillon and Montpellier and was hard pressed by Aragon-Catalonia. But the resentment that James felt for his brother only pushed James of Majorca more rapidly into the French camp when conflict between France and Aragon finally broke out. James found himself obliged, technically at least, to attend the corts of Catalonia, an odd humiliation seeing that Catalonia was not even a kingdom; he was denied the right to mint his own coins in Roussillon, which Peter treated not as counties within the Majorcan state but as Catalan counties that happened to be held from him by the lord of Majorca; he became, to all intents, a powerful baron under Peter’s jurisdiction who was distinguished by an especially grand title, and not surprisingly he and his successors worked hard to re-establish the parity with Aragon that James I had envisaged in his will.

Peter’s less romantic approach to politics, by comparison with James I, is also apparent in his handling of his North African crusade in 1282. His attempts to convince the pope that he deserved a crusading indulgence fell on deaf ears (Pope Martin IV was an intimate ally of Charles of Anjou); the papacy, and the Angevins of Naples, rightly suspected Peter’s motives in campaigning so close to his wife’s claimed inheritance of Sicily. And, despite Peter’s insistence that he had useful allies in the Maghrib who would soon turn Christian, there is little doubt that Peter journeyed to Collo (Alcol) in the hope of influencing events in Sicily. In any case, his presence close to Tunis constituted a challenge to Charles of Anjou, who had been actively competing with the Catalans for influence in the Hafsid state since the Tunis Crusade of St Louis in 1270.

Map 10 Aragon and Anjou in the Mediterranean

- Lands of the house of Anjou
- Lands of the crown of Aragon
- Areas of Angevin influence
- Areas of Aragonese influence
- Major Catalan trade routes

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Peter was not the architect of the revolt of the Sicilian Vespers, which broke out apparently spontaneously in Palermo in March 1282. But his court was an obvious place of refuge for those south Italians such as John of Procida who had rejected or been rejected by Charles I of Anjou. Once invited to Sicily to take the crown in right of his wife, Peter came not as an Aragonese conqueror but as the vindicator of the rights of the house of Hohenstaufen. He was sufficiently conscious of this to decree that Sicily should not be passed on to his eldest son, but should be divorced from the other lands of the Corona de Aragón after his death, and ruled by a half-Catalan, half-Sicilian cadet dynasty, though the course of events proved more complicated. What was unacceptable in the case of Majorca, the separation of a conquered island territory from Catalonia-Aragon, was absolutely required, logistically and politically, in the case of Sicily.

The Sicilian war spilled into Spain, and threatened Barcelona itself. Capetian support for the Angevins of Naples and Majorcan sympathy for the Capetians almost spelled the end of Peter’s regime in Catalonia. By early 1283 Sicily was his, and his armies were beginning to make headway in Calabria, and there were serious hopes that the Angevins would be thrown out of southern Italy as well as Sicily itself; the farcical attempt to settle the quarrel of Anjou and Aragon by a duel at Bordeaux produced no results. But the Bordeaux duel brought Peter back from Sicily, leaving his wife in charge in what was, in any case, ‘her’ island. The Aragonese cortes exploited the king’s discomfiture to secure confirmation of its ancient privileges. The Catalan cortes demanded major concessions: not merely the usual promises not to levy a regular bovatge, but the dismissal of the king’s Jewish officials, such as the financiers Muça de Portella, Aaron Abinasia and Mossé Alconstantini. The same cortes also enacted legislation en les terres o llocs, ‘in the lands and places’, insisting that unfree peasants must pay a fee for their redemption, thereby setting on a firmer basis long-term trends towards peasant servitude in Catalonia. The cortes were clearly anxious to squeeze the monarchy while the chance was there.

Peter was obliged to march into Roussillon in search of his treacherous brother James, in an attempt to close James’s territories to French armies; holed up in the Palace of the Kings of Majorca at Roussillon, James of Majorca managed first to feign illness and then to escape down a drain, though he must have known that the price would be the seizure of a large part of his territories by Peter’s armies. The pope, meanwhile, declared the king of Aragon deposed from his throne, on the grounds that Aragon was a vassal kingdom of the Holy See (a relationship that had been largely ignored since Peter II was crowned by Innocent III in 1204); the new king was to be Philip III of France’s younger son Charles of Valois, a second-rate imitation of his own great-uncle Charles of Valois. A second, massive French invasion of Catalonia,
in 1285, launched as a full-scale crusade, was accompanied by civil unrest in Barcelona; this Peter ruthlessly suppressed by hanging the ringleader despite assuring him of a safe-conduct. James of Majorca proved his unreliability by opening the French campaign with an attack on Elne, the sometime capital of Roussillon, in the hope of wresting it from Peter’s men. The passes across the Pyrenees seemed sufficiently well guarded to hold back the French, until a route across the mountains was apparently betrayed by one of James of Majorca’s men. What saved Peter was not his military skill, for he largely avoided confronting the massive French host, but the outbreak of disease in the French ranks; even King Philip III was a victim, so that the army turned back when it was already in charge of Girona, and the dying Philip was borne to Perpignan, where he died, and with him the crusade.

Other factors ensured the survival of the house of Barcelona, too. The death early in 1285 of Charles I of Anjou occurred when his own heir Charles, prince of Salerno, was a captive in Aragonese hands, having been captured at sea by Admiral Roger de Loria. Peter saw the need to gain control of the western Mediterranean, leaving his brilliant admiral in charge of a small but deadly fleet which challenged his foes from Malta to the shores of southern France and Catalonia, and had a starring role in the otherwise ineffective resistance to the French invasion of Catalonia. Peter’s heir Alfonso was despatched to Majorca with an army that rapidly overwhelmed an island that had not yet had time to grow accustomed to the idea of independence from Catalonia-Aragon, and whose merchants, if anything, suffered during the war from lack of free access to Catalan markets. The same year, 1285, saw the death of Peter the Great; but, whereas he had spent much of his reign in ardent defence of his crown, it was abundantly clear now that his bloodline would persist on the throne of Aragon and on that of the island of Sicily (hopes of further gains on the south Italian mainland began to recede).

The new king, Alfonso the ‘Liberal’ (1285–91) began his reign on a high note, with the suppression of James of Majorca’s rights in Majorca itself, followed soon after by the invasion of Minorca (1287), whose surrender treaty was deemed to have been breached when the Minorcan Muslims had sent messages to North Africa advising their co-religionists of Peter the Great’s Collo cam-paign. There were also strategic advantages in directly controlling the largest natural harbour in the Mediterranean at Maó (Mahón). The mass enslavement

12 Ramon Muntaner, Crònica, caps. 170–2, in Soldevila, Quatre grans cròniques.
of the Minorcan Muslims was not simply a chance to make money: Alfonso’s actions were part of a wider trend towards the assertion of the Christian identity of the western Mediterranean kingdoms, and it was the same ruler who initiated the enclosure of the Jews of Majorca City in a *callor* ghetto. Such actions were perhaps all the more important for a ruler who faced the implacable hostility of the pope even after Charles of Salerno was released from captivity in 1289. Under pressure from the *unión* formed by the nobles and towns of Aragon, distracted by rebellious Aragonese barons in Valencia, Alfonso not surprisingly began to bend, and indicated that he would abandon his support for his younger brother James of Sicily. His unexpected death in June 1291 put a temporary end to such initiatives; he was childless, and his heir, James of Sicily (James II of Aragon) was not at first prepared to abandon the island for which he had fought so hard.

### VIII

James II was perhaps the wiliest of the thirteenth-century Aragonese rulers. He was able to beguile the Angevins and the papacy into plans for an exchange of Sicily for some other Mediterranean territory; Cyprus was one dream that had even been dangled in front of Alfonso III, but Corsica and Sardinia were close, larger and bereft of a single monarchy. Matters were eased when James’s attempts to discard Sicily were matched by Sicilian insistence that a descendant of Frederick II could alone sit on their throne; the prospect of an Angevin return was firmly rebutted with the connivance of James’s own younger brother Frederick, royal lieutenant in Sicily. And so Frederick was elected king, finding himself subsequently at war with James, who sent troops and ships in rather half-hearted aid of the Angevins, while maintaining a loving private correspondence with his brother. In 1297 Boniface VIII granted the title to the *Regnum Sardinie et Corsice* to James II, but he was deceiving himself if he imagined that James was now firmly in his camp. In 1298, resisting unsuccessfully, James of Aragon had to concede the restoration of his uncle James II of Majorca to power in the Balearics and Roussillon, though the Majorcan kings were obliged to acknowledge again the overlordship of the ruler of Aragon-Catalonia. This did not prevent James of Majorca from initiating ambitious schemes to establish tariff barriers around his kingdom: a new customs station at the port of Collioure claimed the right to tax Barcelonan merchants, similar measures were enforced in Majorca, and the king of Majorca began from 1302 to create his own consulates along the coast of North Africa, in open rivalry with James II of Aragon; the merchants of Barcelona responded with trade boycotts aimed at Majorca.13 This uneasy relationship, after a more open

13 Riera Melis (1986); Abulafia (1994).
period under King Sancho of Majorca (1311–24), culminated in the defiance of the king of Aragon by James III of Majorca and the invasion and incorporation of his kingdom in 1343–4.

The treaty of Caltabellotta in 1302 did not end the rivalry of Sicilian Aragonese and Neapolitan Angevins for control of Sicily; but it drew the houses of Barcelona, Naples and indeed Majorca closer together by means of marriage alliances and, later, trade treaties. The Aragonese monarchy was thus freed for new opportunities in southern Spain, where Alacant (Alicante) was ceded to James by the king of Castile (1304), and, ultimately, the invasion of Sardinia (1323–4). Hopes of securing glory in the Near East were revived with the Aragonese assertion of the right to protect the Christian holy places, and James pushed further his ambitions to become king of Jerusalem and Cyprus, though without final success. It was thus clear, at the start of the fourteenth century, that the house of Barcelona had not merely survived the War of the Vespers, but had emerged from the war with further grandiose ambitions. But the unity of the Catalan-Aragonese commonwealth should not be exaggerated. Three dynasties of Aragonese origin held sway in mainland Spain, Majorca and Sicily, sometimes at odds with one another. Looking back from the vantage point of the 1320s, the Catalan soldier-chronicler Ramon Muntaner enthused about the community of interest that bound together all kings of Catalan blood, indeed all men of Catalan speech. This was a pious aspiration, rather than an accurate observation.
Alfonso VIII of Castile’s victory in July 1212 reversed the thrust of half a century of peninsular history. Since the death of Alfonso VII in 1157 the kingdoms of León and Castile had been largely on the defensive, and at Alarcos in 1195 Christian Spain had experienced its worst military disaster in over a century, with casualties reportedly numbering 140,000 against a mere 500 of the ‘tremendous army’ of Muslims. The turning of the tables at Las Navas de Tolosa seventeen years later could scarcely have been more decisive: a death toll of 25 and 20,000 respectively, according to Archbishop Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada – who must have known because he was there, and who because he was a historian must have been telling the truth.

The cost of victory had been as spectacular as the outcome. In the months before the battle, Alfonso VIII’s recruiting sergeants at home and abroad had been offering to meet the expenses of all volunteers to Christendom’s cause. And although not that many came – at least not from abroad – the expense of Las Navas was, in Alfonso’s own words, ‘almost unbearable and onerous’. Twenty years on, the chronicler Bishop Juan of Osma confirmed this. The king had spent gold in the cause ‘like water’, distributing largesse as fast as his moneyers could supply coin. Of the three kingdoms to be considered in this chapter, Castile had by far the most extensive frontiers to defend, and the cost of doing so and of advancing the Christian reconquest of the peninsula was to cripple its kings throughout the thirteenth century and beyond, imposing strains on their realm with which their Navarrese and Portuguese neighbours were largely unfamiliar. For example, in the will which he made in October 1210 Sancho I had more than a million morabitini, as well as a fabulous collection of

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1 See this author’s contribution to the previous volume of The new Cambridge medieval history; William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Anglorum, ed. Howlett, p. 445; Lomax (1978), p. 120. 2 DRH, VIII, 10. 3 ‘Chronique latine inédite’ (hereafter ‘CLI’), c. 21; González (1960), III, p. 567.
Map 11  The Iberian peninsula, c. 1300
jewellery, plate and items of value to dispose of. And from that will all the churches of his kingdom, which he had harassed throughout his reign (1185–1211), benefited – even Coimbra whose bishop, Don Pedro Soeiro, had reached the papal curia ‘almost naked’ a month before the king’s death to inform the pope that Sancho was accustomed to parking his archers, dogs, birds and horses in churches of his diocese, and maintained a personal witch whom he consulted on a daily basis; even the pope himself, Innocent III, to whom the king bequeathed the sum of 100 marks of gold. 4 As Adán Fernández, archdeacon of Compostela, observed in the early 1250s,

What counts withal
Is the wherewithal.5

And even more valued than money was manpower. For between 1212 and 1248 the territorial extent of the kingdom of Castile increased by as much as 50 per cent. 6 In a single generation Christian Spain’s frontline advanced as fast as it had done in the previous half-millennium – and all without the assistance of the foreigners whose ignominious performance at Las Navas had brought to an end their dubious contribution to the peninsular reconquest. Throughout the thirteenth century Spain was by and large on its own, thrown back on its own resources, human as well as financial. The interest of northern Europe in Spanish affairs, which the catastrophe of 1195 had sharpened, declined as success followed failure. 7 ‘Reconquest’, however, is a deceptive term, out of which various shades of meaning can be conjured. Modern historians have conjured two in particular: *reconquista militar* and *reconquista lenta*, approximating to military occupation and the process of colonisation respectively: a distinction anticipated in the aftermath of the reconquest of Seville by the versifying monk Guillermo Pérez de la Calzada. Taking Seville was one thing, he warned, retaining it another. What you win today you may lose tomorrow. ‘Remember Damietta!’, he warned. 8 Seville in 1250 was not confronting the prospect of the sort of blockade that had reduced Damietta in 1219, of course. Even so, in 1212, the year of Las Navas, Castile had been afflicted by famine and ‘sterility’ of crops and livestock, and in 1245 there were reports from Segovia, at the very centre of the kingdom, of the combined effects of depopulation – *raritas habitantium* presumably created by the opportunities to the south during the previous thirty years – and agrarian exhaustion (*sterilitas possessionum*). 9

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7 Lomax (1988).
Settlers and land, the bishop of Segovia’s co-ordinates, provide a convenient framework within which to view the reign of Ferdinand III of Castile (1217–52). In order to appreciate the magnitude of Ferdinand’s achievements, however, it is necessary first to provide a brief summary of the events of that of his predecessor. Henry I (1214–17) was a good sort, the author of the Latin Chronicle reported, but he was only ten when on the death of his father Alfonso VIII in September 1214 he was raised to the throne of Castile, and within a month his mother, Eleanor Plantagenet, was dead too, whereupon the regency devolved first upon Berenguela, the boy-king’s elder sister, and then – ‘the condition of the kingdom worsening daily’ – upon Count Alvaro Núñez de Lara in whose custody Henry remained until June 1217 when, having been struck on the head by a tile (or stone) dropped (or thrown) by a playmate (or his child-minder), he expired.10

On this occasion Berenguela exerted herself to greater effect, against both the Castilian nobility and her former husband Alfonso IX of León whose ‘imperial’ designs at this juncture were commented upon by well-placed contemporaries.11 As Alfonso VIII’s elder surviving daughter, Berenguela was heiress of the kingdom, but mindful either of the modesty of her sex or of the incompetence which characterised it (an issue on which the two episcopal chroniclers were divided), she renounced her rights in favour of Ferdinand, the son she had born to Alfonso IX in 1201 and who (as another contemporary remarked) remained permanently subject to her rule, ‘like a little boy’.12 By November 1217 Alvaro Núñez de Lara had been captured and made to surrender all his castles in exchange for his liberty, and the king of León had recognised Ferdinand as king of Castile.13 It was at this stage of his narrative, rather than after his account of Las Navas, that the chronicler Lucas of Tuy inserted his triumphalist description of Spain’s new Golden Age, evoking Isidore of Seville’s celebration of a land in which the Catholic faith flourished, heresy was crushed and the citadels of the Saracens capitulated while men worked the land in prosperity and peace and churches and monasteries sprang up on all sides.14

The way was open to reuni

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11 ‘CLI’, c. 36 (‘elatus uento inanis glorie quam conceperat sicut dicebatur de imperio habendo’); DRH, ix, 5 (‘eo quod imperio inhiabat’). Almost certainly, the anonymous author of ‘CLI’ was D. Juan, Ferdinand III’s chancellor, bishop of Osma and Burgos (d. 1246).
12 ‘CLI’, c. 35 (‘cum ipsa femina esset labores reginis regni tolerare non posset’); DRH, ix, 5 (‘Ipsa autem intra fines pudicieic et modestie supra omnes mundi dominas se coartans, regnum sibi noluit retinere’); Lucas of Tuy, Chronicon mundi, ed. Schottus, p. 112 (‘ac si esset puer humillimus sub ferula magistrali’).
14 ‘O quam beata tempora ista’: Lucas of Tuy, Chronicon mundi, ed. Schottus, p. 113.
successor to the Leónese throne.\textsuperscript{15} The definitive reunion of the kingdoms of León and Castile in 1230 stands mid-way between the battle of Las Navas and the reconquest of Seville.

Meanwhile, however, there was al-Andalus to be attended to.

In 1214, after hunger had emerged the victor at the siege of Baeza, mutual exhaustion had driven Alfonso VIII and the Almohad caliph in Marrakesh to agree to a truce. So extreme, indeed, were the privations of the peninsula in that year that Archbishop Rodrigo even absolved the garrison of Calatrava from the rules of lenten abstinence – though in view of his description of such meat as was available as ‘unfamiliar to the human race’ fasting may have seemed preferable.\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, in securing the throne for her son Berenguela had spent the entire bequest she had had from Alfonso VIII.\textsuperscript{17} At this point, however, royal finances were relieved by crusading sentiments emanating from the Fourth Lateran Council. Honorius III’s legitimisation of Ferdinand III was prompted by the desire to facilitate the prosecution of the Reconquista, and in 1218–19 the pontiff appointed Archbishop Rodrigo as papal legate in Castile, Aragon and León, entrusting him with the proceeds of the crusading twentieth which the council had decreed and other ecclesiastical revenues besides. True, results were modest, and in July 1220 questions concerning the archbishop’s financial probity led to the cancellation of his commission.\textsuperscript{18} However, by then Ferdinand’s own position had materially strengthened. In 1219 he had married Beatrice, daughter of Philip of Swabia, and at Burgos in June 1224 he announced his intention of resuming the reconquest.\textsuperscript{19}

All his barons were delighted, the chronicler reports – which since there were rich pickings to be had in the south was understandable. But they were also amazed, he states – which is not understandable. After all, as Ferdinand observed, the gate to the south was open and the way was clear. In 1212 the Muslim defenders of Ubeda had offered the Christians a million gold pieces just to go away, which, with the eyes of the west on them, their leaders had declined to do – albeit, judging by Archbishop Rodrigo’s account of the occasion, with reluctance.\textsuperscript{20} As in the half-century before 1085, after Las Navas there would be a balance to be struck between personal profit – contemporary chroniclers regularly refer to the generous level of military stipends\textsuperscript{21} – and the profit of Christendom. But, whereas before 1085 the Christians had accepted payments of parias and postponed the elimination of the enemies of the Cross, after 1224 the other course was adopted.

\textsuperscript{15} González (1980–6), 1, pp. 247–8; Mansilla (1965), no. 179.
\textsuperscript{20} DRH, viii, 12: ‘... quod et aliqui acceptarunt, dolentibus admodum regibus, dissimulantibus tamen propter instanciam magnatorum’. \textsuperscript{21} ‘CLI’, cc. 46, 49, 70.
The gate to the south was open, and the way was clear because, whereas in 1224 Castile was for once at peace, as usual al-Andalus was in turmoil. On the death of the caliph Yusuf II (al-Mustansir) at the beginning of that year, impaled on the horns of a cow, the religious and social divisions of the Almohad regime immediately surfaced. Three claimants to the caliphate emerged: Abu Muhammad al-Wahid, the nominee of the sheikhs in Marrakesh, Abu Muhammad Ibn al-Mansur al-Adil in Seville, and at Córdoba Abu Muhammad abu Abdallah (al-Bayyasi), the last of whom al-Adil soon reduced to his native Baeza, whereupon in April 1226 al-Bayyasi made common cause with Ferdinand III. Meanwhile, at the curia held at Carrión (February 1224) orders were given for a general muster at Toledo in the following September. Shades of 1212! On this occasion, however, what was left of al-Andalus was in no condition to offer any sort of pitched battle. Instead, a series of successful sieges ensued, beginning at Quesada that October.

As to the sequence of events between then and 1248 we are probably no worse informed now than those involved were at the time. To Ibn Khaldun, writing a century later, it seemed that the Christians had erected a human wall around al-Andalus. The Castilian chroniclers, however, refrained from entering into details, and it would be out of place to attempt to do so here. Yet, for all the dizzying inconsequentiality of these twenty-four years, certain constants are distinguishable. One—in a period during which truces were no sooner made than broken, and within the remaining kingdoms of al-Andalus faction-fighting, coups and counter-coups were rife—was the failure of the Almohad caliphs of Marrakesh to provide the peninsular Muslims with assistance. Accordingly, the latter placed themselves under a series of native leaders. The earliest of these, Ibn Hud al-Yadami, first made a name for himself at Murcia in 1228 by denouncing the Almohads as schismatics. Styling himself emir, Ibn Hud acknowledged the Abbasid caliph at Baghdad. But it was to his military effectiveness that he owed the reputation which caused Christian Castilians to refer to him as almogàver. His ascendancy was short-lived, however. Routened at Alange in 1230 by Alfonso IX of León, who in a late spurt of activity then captured both Mérida and Badajoz, two years later Ibn Hud had his authority further undermined, when first Muhammad Ibn Yusuf Ibn Nasr (Ibn al-Ahmar: the red) seized control of Arjona (thereby laying the basis for the

23 Symbolically, their pact was made at Las Navas de Tolosa.
27 In the sense of ‘plebeyus strenuus’: ‘CLI’, c. 53.
establishment of the Nasrid dynasty which was to rule Granada from 1237 until 1492, and then his governor was ousted from Seville. Having lost both Trujillo and Ubeda, in the winter of 1232–3 Ibn Hud agreed to a truce with Ferdinand III.

One Muslim upstart had preferred peace with the Christians, and the payment of substantial parias, in the manner of the 1030s and to the tune of 1,000 dinars daily, to humiliation at the hands of an even more recent Muslim parvenu. This was a pattern regularly repeated, to the invariable advantage of the Christians – which after 1230 meant the Castilians. According to the Castilian witness who contrasted the failure of Alfonso IX and Sancho II to take Badajoz and Elvas respectively with the irresistible progress of Ferdinand’s III’s armies in 1225–6, even before that date neither León nor Portugal had been able to compete.

In fact, not even for the Castilians was southward progress either effortless or uninterrupted. Quesada, for example, having been recovered in 1224, was then lost again until 1231. Only after three sieges was a gap found in Jaén’s defences (1246). Nor were the benefits of advance either uniform or even self-evident. Despite the fact that it was from Mérida that his church had obtained its credentials in the 1120s, when Alfonso IX recovered the place in 1230 the archbishop of Compostela declined the lordship of what he was reported to have described as ‘the unhealthiest city in Spain’, preferring to share it with the Order of Santiago. Probably, half the period 1224–48 consisted of years of truce, at least formal truce. Certainly, more of what was recovered was secured by surrender than by force. Also, the Muslim south remained the refuge for Christian renegades that it had been for centuries: in the years after Las Navas Pedro Fernández de Castro and Fernando and Gonzalo Núñez de Lara all died in the service of the caliph. When Córdoba was taken in 1236, after a band of Christian freebooters had managed to secure a foothold in a suburb of the city and Ferdinand III had come flying southwards ‘like an eagle’, Ibn Hud had almost two hundred Christians in his service and the Christian king barely half that number. As on other occasions during these years, it was lack of manpower, together with the shocking weather through which Ferdinand had to travel in order to get there, that the Castilian chroniclers emphasised.

Juan of Osma’s narrative ends at Córdoba. So do those of both Lucas of Tuy and Rodrigo of Toledo, though all three authors survived for at least another decade. Their consensus can hardly have been fortuitous. Yet his-
torians seem not to have wondered at their drawing of the line at 1236. Was it that, with the recovery of the old caliphal capital, followed by the six-year truces which Ferdinand III then concluded with both Ibn Hud and his Nasrid rival, it seemed to them that the contribution of their generation was complete and that a new status quo had been established? Was it mere coincidence that it is in these very years, in the bishop of Osma’s chronicle and in documents emanating from the Castilian chancery while that same bishop was in charge of it, that the word ‘frontier’ is first encountered in Castilian sources?  

There was also another consideration, one which transcended the issue of peninsular hegemony in Ferdinand’s lifetime and was to dominate Castilian history after his death. For in 1234 the king who was now ruler of León as well as Castile, and whose queen was the granddaughter of two emperors, reportedly asked Pope Gregory IX to confer upon him the name ‘and blessing’ of emperor, ‘such as his predecessors had enjoyed’. As the centenary of the imperial coronation of Alfonso VII approached, Ferdinand III may have been looking backwards as well as sideways. But he may also already have been looking forwards, towards Seville where, according to Alfonso X, Spanish emperors had once been crowned, and the reconquest of which caused him to think of his ‘ssenorio’ not as a kingdom but as an empire and to seek imperial coronation for himself.  

In the event, whatever the nature of Ferdinand III’s secret agenda, the reconquest continued, towards Murcia in one direction and Seville in the other. And after the long years in the arid wilderness south of Toledo, perhaps the mere prospect of the warm waters of the irrigated south provided sufficient incentive. In the case of Murcia, however, even more influential was the proximity of the Aragonese after James I’s capture of Valencia in 1238. For although in 1179 the kingdom of Murcia had been assigned to Castile, in 1225 the basis of the partition of Muslim Spain had been brought into question when the sayyid Abu Zayd, al-Bayyasi’s younger brother, wali (governor) of Valencia – an adventurer whom some modern historians have been inclined to regard as a significant frontier figure – had followed al-Bayyasi’s example and become Ferdinand III’s vassal. Although he soon broke away, Abu Zayd’s initiative served notice on Aragon of Castilian ambitions – ambitions which were confirmed in 1243 when, by the Treaty of Alcaraz, the ruler of Murcia (Ibn Hud’s son al-Wathiq) surrendered his kingdom to Castile as Ferdinand III’s vassal and Ferdinand’s son – the Infante Alfonso – sought to have Játiva (Xàtiva) assigned as part of the dowry of his future wife, James I’s daughter Violante. Despite Alfonso’s scheming, however (in the course of which James

had the infante’s agent, Bishop Gonzalo of Cuenca’s brother, hanged), in March 1244 (the Treaty of Almizra) Castilian ambitions were foiled, and at about the same time it was to the Aragonese that Yahya, qa’id of Xàtiva, surrendered his city.35

Meanwhile, the Infante Alfonso’s capture of Cartagena in 1245 had extended Castilian authority to the Mediterranean, and in the following year this was matched in the west by his father’s success at Jaén and Ibn Nasr’s capitulation. With no prospect of aid from Africa, Seville’s fate was now sealed. For seventeen months the blockaded and besieged city endured appalling privation, with its defenders reduced to a diet of roots and human excrement (‘and even this was hard to come by’). Because his army was ‘not very large’ and Ferdinand was intent on total surrender and the complete evacuation of its population, not until 23 November 1248, with his vassal Ibn Nasr in his retinue, did he enter the city and take possession of its alcázar.36

In May 1252 he died there. Seven centuries on, the plaster-cast warrior saint, Spain’s solitary canonised king (an accolade to which he is uniquely entitled) awaits a credible obituarist still. A mother’s boy, Lucas of Tuy called him at the time, which was a more pertinent observation than many that have been made of the nephew of Blanche of Castile. More remarkable, according to the same authority, he was the first king of his line not to have been detected in adultery.37 And, each according to the imperatives of his own generation, subsequent panegyrists have expatiated on San Fernando’s heroic virtues, with his devotion to Holy Church and matters ecclesiastical always prominent.38 In this connection, therefore, as well as his ruthless persecution of the bishops of Calahorra and Segovia and his refusal to enforce the anti-Jewish decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council, his gracious permission to the clergy of Guadalajara in 1238 to bequeath their property to their children also deserves consideration.39 Ten years before, summoned hurriedly to Castile to superintend Abu Zayd’s opportunistic conversion, the papal legate Cardinal John of Abbeville had ordered the Castilian clergy out of their illicit beds. *El Rey Santo*’s encouragement to them to climb back in and his willingness to allow them to enjoy those forbidden fruits which he denied himself remind us that the seventeenth-century Roman saint was also a thirteenth-century Spanish king.40

At the end of the single-generation Great Leap Forward, Castile had 80,000

37 Lucas of Tuy, *Chronicon mundi*, ed. Schottus, p. 112. 38 Thus Retaña (1941), pp. 415, 430.
unoccupied square kilometres to colonise,\textsuperscript{41} and priests’ sons were as well equipped as any others to rise to the challenge. With the capture after 1248 of the Sevillian hinterland, from Arcos to Cádiz on the Atlantic coast, by 1252 ‘in one sense’, it has been suggested, ‘the Reconquest had ended’.\textsuperscript{42} In the sense that mattered most, however, it had hardly begun. Although, as the chroniclers record, the capture of Córdoba had been achieved by just a handful of warriors, once it was in Christian hands Christian settlers flooded in from all parts of Spain: ‘as to a royal wedding’, Rodrigo of Toledo reported – to the extent that the city could hardly accommodate the influx.\textsuperscript{43} Córdoba was not typical however.

The process of human in-filling tested Castile’s resources to the limits. For not only was Ferdinand III committed to providing a Christian presence to replace the Muslims expelled from Seville and elsewhere. According to Alfonso X, he also set himself the task of inhabiting areas of the south which had previously remained empty.\textsuperscript{44} So uneven was his success, however, and so imperfect our knowledge of it, that only the sketchiest of accounts can be hazarded. emptiest, for the best of reasons, were the wide open spaces to the north of the Sierra Morena. And, entrusted to the military Orders, so they remained, while at the other end of the spectrum even beguiling Córdoba had to have deterrents against leaving included in its fierno.\textsuperscript{45} Between the two, the vast opportunities that opened up provided a vacuum into which the apparently endless succession of ‘royal weddings’ drew further guests from the north. Some historians have envisaged a response as much Pavlovian as Malthusian. Others have insisted that even after 1248 the north remained relatively overpopulated.\textsuperscript{46}

Where they have survived, the detailed regional Domesdays (repartimientos) provide a means of estimating the scale of the human upheaval. It has to be stressed that many, perhaps most, ex-Muslim cities had not been conquered (or reconquered) but had surrendered on terms which had allowed for those dislodged from their old haunts at least to remain in the vicinity of the city. Over time, many of these sad relicts decamped to Africa. But not at once. To newcomers from the kingdoms of Castile and León, Andalusia in 1252 must have presented a wholly alien appearance. And, if the names of the settlers of Jerez de la Frontera provide any guide to their origins, it was principally from those parts of the peninsula that they came. According to the 1264 repartimiento, of the 1,014 toponymically identifiable settlers (out of a total of 1,828), 55 and 31 per cent respectively were natives of the kingdoms of Castile and León.\textsuperscript{47} However, figures such as

these, which refer to a small place and to limited numbers almost half of whom might have come from anywhere, hardly constitute a statistical guide to the unknowable. More circumstantial evidence is provided by the repartimiento of Seville itself where the 400,000 Muslims who are reported to have departed after the city’s surrender were replaced by fewer than 20,000 settlers from Catalonia, Aragon and Galicia as well as Old and New Castile. (González Jiménez has shown earlier calculations to be over-estimates.) Placed at the head of this immigrant community was an elite of caballeros hidalgos or de linaje, scions of the ancient houses which had by turns served and betrayed the kings of Castile and León from time immemorial. The numbers in which they made themselves available both in Seville and elsewhere during these years have given rise to all manner of speculation regarding the condition of the northern aristocracy which found itself with a surplus of sons to onload on to the south. However, this gilded youth had always existed. The difference was that in earlier generations it had sought profitable employment with the caliph in Marrakesh instead – as indeed it would continue to do after 1248. Attention should also be paid to the welcome offered to Jewish settlers from Castile, some of whom were evidently returning to those areas they had left under Almoravid and Almohad pressure. The speed with which Ferdinand III had achieved the reconquista militar determined the nature of the reconquista lenta. In view of the close proximity of such large numbers of resentful Muslims, the newcomers needed to have the most scrupulous regard for the terms on which the surrender of the cities had been negotiated. Moreover, the allotment of land in accordance with established territorial divisions required information which could only be provided by those whose own inheritances were in jeopardy. To this extent, the situation of the Castilian reconquerors closely resembled that of their Catalan and Aragonese co-religionists to the east, whose colonial management of their affairs after 1238 has been described in detail by R.I. Burns. What distinguishes it is the absence of specific information of the sort that makes the history of the post-reconquest kingdom of Valencia capable of elucidation.

II

Although James of Aragon’s report to the effect that, out of embarrassment at his extreme corpulence, during the last twenty-five years of his life Sancho VIII of Navarre, el Fuerte (1194–1234), never once stirred from the town of

Tudela certainly does less than justice to the king who had struck the first blow at Las Navas de Tolosa, it is nevertheless the case that for the kingdom of Navarre the later years of Sancho’s reign were a time of singular inactivity. Thus, no attempt was made during Henry of Castile’s troubled reign to recover the regions of Alava and Guipúzcoa which Alfonso VIII had appropriated, thereby depriving Navarre of access to the sea and driving it into alliance with England (1201). After his participation in the Castilian campaign of 1219, the land-locked and childless monarch devoted himself increasingly to settling the succession question and to extending his domain by use of his considerable purchasing power. At Tudela in February 1231 he and James of Aragon each agreed to institute the other his heir: an arrangement which, since Sancho was now in his seventies, was tantamount to the transfer of Navarre to the twenty-three-year-old Aragonese. On the king’s death in April 1234, however, the Navarrese political establishment opted instead for Sancho’s nephew Thibaut IV, count of Champagne, preferring rule by a foreigner of whom it knew little to submission to a neighbour of whom it knew all too much. As Teobaldo I (1234–53), the French-educated newcomer brought with him northern notions of the anointed ruler’s place in society which were wholly alien to the traditions of a kingdom accustomed to institute its king in the antique Germanic manner. An accomplished poet, he had inherited his uncle’s tendency to stoutness but none of his aptitude for political management. Leaving a Frenchman as his seneschal in Pamplona, the part-time king attended to his interests north of the Pyrenees, neutralised opposition by taking the cross, thereby securing Pope Gregory IX as his ally, and – even though in 1238 mounting local discontent had culminated in the codification of the customs which at his accession Teobaldo had vowed to defend (the so-called Fuero Antiguo) – in 1239, before departing for the Holy Land (rather than Andalusia), he did not hesitate to bequeath his kingdom to his daughter Jeanne, the wife of Duke Jean of Brittany. Within five years of returning from his ignominious but ‘not entirely valueless’ venture, however, he fell foul of an adversary altogether more resourceful than the Muslims. Throughout the previous reign successive bishops of Pamplona (the kingdom’s only see) had been subjected to constant attacks on their jurisdiction both within the city, whose temporal lordship they possessed, and beyond. In his opposition to such depredations Bishop Pedro Ximénez de Gazólaz, elected in 1242, proved himself ‘in some respects Pamplona’s Gregory VII’, and in 1245 – a fateful year for Spanish monarchs – caused the king to be summoned to Lyons to answer to Innocent IV for his actions. The struggle which ensued continued to the end of the reign, with the implacable

Prelate enjoying both the moral and the legal advantage when the former crusader died excommunicate in July 1253.  

Throughout the lifetime of his son, Teobaldo II (1253–70), French domination intensified. For the fourteen-year-old newcomer Navarre was another world where kings were inaugurated by swearing to defend the _fueros_ and being raised on the shield, and after Alexander IV had refused to ratify the concordat agreed at Estella with the bishop of Pamplona (December 1255), and the local nobility had foiled his attempt to have himself anointed and crowned ‘like other Catholic kings’, he chose to entrust the government of his kingdom to French seneschals and to spend two-thirds of his reign either in Champagne or in the company of his father-in-law, Louis IX, whom he accompanied on the ill-fated crusade to Tunis in 1270, dying at Trapani on the way home. He was succeeded by his brother, Henry I, a king chiefly renowned for his monumental fatness: a condition which in 1274 finished him off at the age of twenty-five.  

The crisis which Henry’s early death precipitated stemmed from a recent moment of inattention. In 1272 Teobaldo, the infant heir to the throne, had been promised in marriage to a daughter of Alfonso X of Castile. Shortly after, however, the child reached out to stroke a squirrel on the ramparts of the castle of Estella and fell from the arms of his nurse, leaving his younger sister Juana to inherit and his mother, Blanche of Artois, to pick up the pieces. Shark-like, the rulers of Aragon and Castile moved in, King James resuscitating the agreement he had entered into with Sancho VIII forty-three years earlier, and Alfonso X advancing the claims of his son and heir Fernando de la Cerda. In the event, however, because both Navarre’s near neighbours were distracted by domestic developments, it was the inevitable French who secured the defenceless prey. The regent Blanche was yet another of Louis IX’s nieces, and by the Treaty of Orleans (May 1275) a marriage was arranged between her daughter, the heiress Juana, and the son of Philip III of France, the future Philip the Fair. The prospect of annexation opened up fissures which had existed longer still, the deepest, and oldest, of which was the apartheid system of ditches and barriers which separated the Navarrese and the French communities within the city of Pamplona. With a Castilian installed as bishop, which further complicated matters, in September 1276 the _Navarreria_ rose, an army of Frenchmen numbered at 30,000 entered the city and, in an unparalleled orgy of vandalism the _Navarreria_ was razed to the ground, and the cathedral devastated. It remained in

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54 Who, according to one account – Lacarra (1972a), p. 197 – then jumped. As to the fate of the squirrel history is silent.
ruins until 1324. Using Pamplona as a training-ground for later exploits further afield, at last the French had well and truly arrived in Navarre. Despite the show of resistance offered in 1297 by representatives of the principal towns of the kingdom, the reign of Juana I (1274–1305) is to be regarded as an experiment in French colonialism, and ought perhaps to be considered elsewhere.55

While Castile, having absorbed León, was striking south, and in the north Navarre was being drawn even further into the French orbit, the young kingdom of Portugal had been experiencing almost uninterrupted political crisis. The reign of Afonso II (1211–23) was as crucial in Portuguese history as it was short. With regard to Islam, it was no less inglorious, its one recorded victory (at Alcácer do Sal in 1217) being the achievement of the military Orders of the Temple, the Hospital and Santiago, assisted by a fleet of Palestine-bound Germans and Flemings. The inducements which the latter were offered by Bishop Soeiro of Lisbon recalled the circumstances of the capture of Lisbon itself seventy years earlier. The difference was that on this occasion the king himself was absent. Yet, in the words of Herculano, ‘though there was no king less bellicose there was none more combative’. Characteristically, while the bishop was at Alcácer, he combined with the dean of Lisbon, Master Vicente, to pillage his church – or so the bishop informed Honorius III. Afonso II was an inward-looking ruler. A comparison of their two wills points the contrast with his father. Whereas, in addition to all the churches which he had persecuted during his lifetime Sancho I made bequests to every one of his numerous offspring on both sides of the blanket, Afonso – ‘consistent in his hatreds’, as Herculano characterised him – remembered only the see of Guarda (where by then Master Vicente was bishop) and paid his bastards off in small change.56

His exalted view of royal authority was not novel; the principles which inspired it were already enshrined in the chancery formulae of the layman Julião Pais, royal chancellor from 1183 to 1215. What was novel was Afonso’s implementation of it, achieving the transition from memory to written record by means of his ‘precociously centralist’ and distinctively secular-minded administration, the notariate he instituted and the practice of record-keeping.57

It was his commitment to the cause of national integrity, as reflected in the substitution of the title ‘king of the Portuguese (rex Portugalensium)’ by ‘king of Portugal (rex Portugalie or Portugaleis)’, that determined his attitude to Sancho I’s territorial bequests to his daughters, the Infantas Theresa, Sancha and Mafalda. Sancho I’s bequests set the agenda for the reign of his son, and his son’s repudiation of them set the agenda for the rest of the century. Afonso II’s objection to his father’s testamentary dispositions was that any diminution of the royal patrimony was invalid *per se*, and, after four years of excommunication and interdict, in 1216 Innocent III sustained that objection, assigning the sisters the usufruct of the castles and convents at issue but not their jurisdiction, and placing the disputed properties under Templar control. During Sancho I’s lifetime the pope had ruled otherwise, in favour of the king whose disdain for the Roman Church he had earlier described as reeking of heresy. 58

The eventual outcome (which the fact that in the course of reaching it the pontiff best known for his adherence to the rule of law had shifted his stance not once but twice made deliciously ironical) was therefore rendered doubly so, inasmuch as it was with a measure of pontifical approbation that Afonso II now proceeded to consolidate his inheritance, and in doing so fell foul of the Portuguese Church.

This too was ironical, in strictly Portuguese terms. Yet another fat king, ‘o Rei Gordo’ was also, and *par excellence*, ‘o Rei legislador’, as the promulgation of the earliest corpus of Portuguese law in the first year of the reign gave notice. For the laws of 1211 provided the clergy with privileges previously unheard of, notably exemption from secular tribunals. Also, in 1218 Afonso guaranteed them payment of the ecclesiastical tithe due from royal lands (reguengos) ‘which in the time of our ancestors they were not accustomed to receive’. 59 What underlay these provisions, however, was the radical ‘principle of separation’ between the secular and the ecclesiastical spheres, the implications of which found out the neuralgic spot of churchmen qua landlords. The co-ordinates of Afonso II’s new deal cut across the ragged diagonals of the Portuguese past, with effects which were immediately felt when in 1220, in order to discover the extent of the losses incurred by the reguengos, especially during the reign of Sancho I (the so-called ‘municipal king’), and to determine by what warrant not only the concelhos but all landowners enjoyed the properties they possessed, enquiries were instituted for the establishment and confirmation of title (*inquirições gerais; confirmações*). For, deeply though the secular nobility (already polarised on the infants issue) was affronted, most of all exposed to scrutiny


were the kingdom’s bishops under the leadership of their litigious primate, Archbishop Estêvão Soares of Braga. By June 1222 the dispute had resulted in the imposition of sentences of excommunication and interdict and brought Honorius III to the point of serving summonses threatening deposition. Though in his will Afonso professed to kiss the ground beneath the pope’s feet, on his death from leprosy in March 1223 he was denied ecclesiastical burial.60

His son, Sancho II, was (perhaps) just fourteen on his accession, and the direction of affairs of state remained in the hands of survivors from the previous regime, those ‘frogs lurking in the royal penetralia’ whom the pontiff had recently castigated – notably the mordomo of the royal household Gonçalo Mendes, and the aforementioned dean of Lisbon Master Vicente, royal chancellor from 1224 (alias the noted canonist Vincentius Hispanus).61 Although the reign had commenced with the payment of substantial reparations to the archbishop of Braga, relations with the Church soon deteriorated again. In 1224, and again in 1231, the bishop of Lisbon reported to Rome that, on the strength of a certain ‘constitution’ of King Afonso I, royal officials, with Jews and Moors in attendance, were in the habit of breaking in on priests by night in order to check whether they had anyone in bed with them.62 Sancho II was able to indulge his obsession with clerical morality in these years with as much impunity as Ferdinand III was permitted to condone it, however, for as well as pursuing his father’s inquisitorial activities between the Douro and the Minho, he was also keeping pace with the king of Castile in the fight against Islam. Indeed, in October 1234 Gregory IX granted participants in the Portuguese reconquest the crusading indulgence. The capture of Mértola four years later took the Christians to within fifty kilometres of the south coast, and in 1242, with the Orders of Santiago and the Hospital prominently involved, Tavira was taken. With the Alentejo and the Algarve under Sancho II’s control the military phase of the Portuguese reconquest was more or less complete.63

What little that control amounted to soon became apparent. True, the achievement of the final stages of Portugal’s reconquest without assistance from abroad indicates a degree of demographic recovery which the foros granted to new settlements in the centre of the kingdom after 1226 imply. By

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1220, for example, the northern region of Guimarães appears to have emerged from the effects of the plagues, famine and Almohads of the years 1190–1210, and between then and 1258 its population may have increased by as much as 45 per cent. However, demographic recovery – or redistribution – did nothing to cure the kingdom’s endemic political instability. Indeed, as in Castile, the effect of the migration towards the Algarve was rather to exacerbate the north–south tensions which the king’s political ineptitude proved incapable of allaying. Moreover, having reached the Algarve, Sancho II had served his purpose in the dialectic of the reconquest. The king was no longer indispensable, either to the Portuguese nobility or to the papacy.

Although the sequence of events of the later years of the reign is more than usually obscure, two factors or actors in particular appear to have played important parts in the process of political polarisation which culminated in the crisis of 1245. One was Martim Gil, who after the chancellor Vicente’s departure for the see of Guarda in 1235/6 was reported to have established a dominant influence over the king. The other – which provided the report as well as the detail that Martim Gil was the grandson of Sancho I’s live-in witch – was, of course, the Portuguese episcopate whose chorus of complaints had continued unabated since 1223. Successive popes had been properly sceptical of some at least of their more lurid allegations. But as Sancho’s armies neared the Algarve, unprecedented enormities were committed in the king’s name when Muslim troops commanded by Sancho’s brother, Fernando de Serpa, violated the sanctuary of a Lisbon church, which was broken into by Muslim soldiers, who then abused the crucifix and polluted the holy oils and the reserved sacrament. Despite the infante’s acceptance of a penance as spectacular as his offence, interdict was imposed. The chorus reached a crescendo. Then the bachelor Sancho incurred the wrath of Innocent IV by marrying Mência Lopes de Haro. It was from another of the king’s brothers – Count Afonso of Boulogne, whose prospects of the throne were most directly affected – that the complaint that the couple were related within the fourth degree was received. Although other pontiffs had condoned breaches of canon law far more flagrant than this, in February 1245 Innocent ordered the pair to separate.

Over the following six months, as preparations were in progress for the general council at Lyons, events moved rapidly to a conclusion. In January Count Afonso, who had been resident in Paris since 1233, took the cross. In March the pope denounced Sancho for moral turpitude and failure to govern his kingdom, threatening further measures unless he mended his ways forth-

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with. In April the count was authorised to take his crusading army to the peninsula rather than to the Middle East. And on 24 July 1245, in view of Sancho’s systematic persecution of the Church and of churchmen and the institutionalised debauchery of his regime, and ‘particularly because Portugal was subject to (censuale) the Roman Church’, by the bull *Grandi non immerito* Innocent IV transferred the administration of the kingdom to the count of Boulogne. At Paris on 6 September representatives of the Portuguese episcopate witnessed the count’s solemn undertaking to rule both wisely and well.66

Innocent insisted that his sentence was not a sentence of deposition: the king had not been deprived of his kingdom, only of the administration of it. But with the general council in session, and just a week after Innocent’s deposition of Emperor Frederick II, European public opinion judged otherwise. There would have been no lack of support for the protest allegedly delivered at Lyons by Bishop Aires Vasques of Lisbon that the effect of *Grandi* was to encourage conspiracy and rebellion.67 In the civil war which ensued after Count Afonso’s arrival in Portugal in 1246, Sancho II was abandoned by the military Orders which had profited so greatly during his years of triumph. But he enjoyed the active support of the infante of Castile, the future Alfonso X, whose own reign was to end in similar circumstances, and it was at Toledo that the effectively deposed king died in January 1248.68

If the bishops who had received his assurances at Paris imagined that in the count of Boulogne they had a puppet king, the course of the reign of Afonso III (1248–79) disabused them of the idea. The newcomer’s lengthy French sojourn had done nothing to sap his Portuguese resolve. What the undertaking to rule wisely and well which the churchmen had witnessed in 1245 amounted to was no more than that. However, the beginnings of the reign gave no hint of what was to come. In accordance with the crusading status under cover of which he had returned to Portugal, his first actions were directed against what was left of Portuguese Islam. Mindful of Ferdinand III’s recent example in Seville, in 1249–50 he eliminated the remaining pockets of resistance at Faro and elsewhere on the Algarve. The immediate effect of these successes was to complicate relations with Castile, for Ibn Mahfud, the ruler of Mellila whom Afonso’s victories had displaced, was a vassal of the Infante Alfonso. Moreover, whereas Castile’s boundaries with Aragon had long since been determined (at least in theory), those with Portugal had not. The Castilians had little compunction in straying across the river Guadiana.

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the natural boundary which geography had set, and in 1252 the former infante of Castile, now King Alfonso X, laid claim to Silves, though war was prevented by papal intervention, with Innocent IV arranging (January 1253) for the Castilian to retain use of the place without prejudice to Portuguese claims to sovereignty.\(^{69}\) The settlement was confirmed by a marriage pact between Afonso and Alfonso’s bastard daughter Beatriz, with the ultimate fate of Silves left in suspense until the couple’s eldest son reached the age of seven: a less than perfect solution inasmuch as the six-year-old Beatriz was Afonso’s close relation and the latter already had a wife of fourteen years’ standing, the Countess Mathilde, alive and well and living in France. Even for the rulers of Portugal, bigamy was a new departure, and in 1258 Alexander IV condemned the match. However, in the same year Mathilde died (1259), Beatriz (now eleven) produced her first child and in 1261 her third, the future King Dinis (thereby resolving the problem of the Algarve), prompting Urban IV to relent and in 1263 to raise the sentence of interdict to which the kingdom had been condemned by the act of diplomatic child-abuse. As in the case of Ferdinand III of Castile in 1218, in 1263 considerations of ‘urgent necessity and evident utility’ proved decisive. In 1245 Sancho II, whose relationship to his wife was no closer than his brother’s with his, and who furthermore was otherwise unmarried, had been less fortunate in his more scrupulous pontiff.\(^{70}\)

Another difference was that, whereas in 1245 Sancho II had had few episcopal supporters, in 1263 Afonso still did. Together with all his royal relations, it was his bishops who subscribed his petition to the pope. Half way through his reign Afonso III still retained the whip-hand. Behind him lay most of the events and achievements on account of which the anonymous fifteenth-century chronicler remembered him as ‘a very good and just king’. At the cortes of Guimarães (1250) and Lisbon–Leiria–Coimbra (1254), representatives of the conceitos had for the first time been present. Between 1253 and 1261 his subjects were familiarised with the monetary practices observed elsewhere in the peninsula by this date. And in 1258 the inquirições which his father had instituted in the 1220s were resumed.\(^{71}\)

This last initiative served notice on those who had no wish to have their affairs enquired into that recent history was about to repeat itself. In accordance with the customary imperatives, in the spring of 1268 Archbishop Martinho Giraldes of Braga placed the kingdom under interdict and, together with four other bishops, presented Clement IV with a detailed denunciation of


\(^{70}\) Almeida (1922), pp. 224–6; Guiraud and Clémencet, Registres, no. 375.

Afonso’s offences against the Portuguese Church. All the usual allegations were made – seizure of tithes and other ecclesiastical revenues, the lopping off of ears and other clerical parts, terrorisation and imprisonment, sacrilegious mimicry – and no doubt some of them were not exaggerations. If true, of course it was disgraceful that during the eight months he had spent under house arrest Bishop Arias of Lisbon really had not even been allowed to visit the lavatory unescorted. Plainly however, the basis of all these grievances was the resumption of the inquirições.72

In striking contrast to his predecessor, however, Afonso III was endowed with a capacity for survival which amounted to genius. He took the cross; the interdict was suspended (September 1268). He made a will remarkable for its extreme generosity to churchmen, not forgetting the pope (November 1271). He shifted the blame to his officials (cortes of Santarém, 1273). But in September 1275 time and excuses ran out. Because he had not mended his ways by so much as ‘a jot’, Gregory X directed him to make amends or accept the consequences, consequences which would culminate in deposition. For Gregory X, fresh from his diplomatic triumph over the king of Castile, the Portuguese problem he had inherited was one that had been running since the 1220s: an inexplicable case of the ‘spirit of tyrannical persecution’ rampant in a land bound to Rome in a ‘particularly special’ way.73

Even so, assisted by the deaths of four pontiffs in sixteen months, as well as by procrastination and prevarication on his own part, Afonso continued to hold nemesis at bay. Not until January 1279, when he was on his deathbed, did he give what were interpreted as sufficient indications of a firm purpose of amendment, and from the remarkable record of his meeting with the papal nuncio, the Franciscan friar Nicholas Yspanus, in October 1277, it is plain that he remained uncowed. Afonso III was sure of his ground. Even at this stage, the king who had been served throughout his reign by a single chancellor (Estevão Anes) and who, like his father, had spent most of it in the north, was coolly confident, even contemptuously so.74 Nor, according to his own account of their discussions, was the nuncio much cowed. This was a very different world from Germany in the 1240s. The nuncio stated that he held Afonso’s advisers (sapientes) responsible for his state of mind: an observation which, as well as reiterating the conviction of successive pontiffs over the previous half-century, anticipated the terms in which modern historians of

73 ‘Specialior jure’: Marques (1990), p. 130 (De regno Portugallie, 4 Sept. 1275).
differing persuasions have interpreted the strife of those years, as a confronta-
tion between the old order and a new spirit of aggressive secularism repre-
sented by the likes of Afonso II’s chancellor, Julião Pais, and the Romanist
ideas he had brought back with him from Bologna.\footnote{Marques (1990), pp. 571–2. Cf., respectively, the observations of the nineteenth-century liberal

IV

In Castile, meanwhile, just thirty years after the capture of Seville, the bishops
of the kingdom of Afonso III’s father-in-law were seeking to persuade the
pope that the same cosmic struggle was being waged for the possession of the
soul of the king whose reign was fast approaching a similarly inglorious con-
clusion.

According to one school of thought, if only he had remained at home with
his books, tidying up Castile after Ferdinand III’s tempestuous reign, Alfonso
X’s sheer intellectual virtuosity would have earned him the accolade \textit{Stupor
mundi} which one modern historian of thirteenth-century Aragon has awarded
him.\footnote{Mariana (1592), xiii, 20.} With the natural and observational sciences, astrology and astronomy,
law and poetry Alfonso X was on easy terms. And yet he died abandoned, at
odds with his family and with his subjects. And – just as they have wondered at
the spectacle of the collapse of Isidore of Seville’s Spain in 711 – from the six-
teenth century to the present day historians have wondered at the outcome and
have not improved on the conclusion that Juan de Mariana arrived at 400 years
ago: that while scanning the heavens above Alfonso X lost control of the land
beneath his feet;\footnote{\textit{Primera crónica general,} c. 1132. (The text of this part of the \textit{Estoria} is almost certainly post-Alfonsine.)} that ‘el Rey Sabio’ was cleverer than he was wise.

As his father’s eyes finally closed, Alfonso X began his reign with his own
eyes wide open. As he lay dying in May 1252, Ferdinand III reminded him that
he was leaving him in full control of the peninsula which had been lost in 711.
The judgement of history, and the balance that posterity would strike between
father and son, would be determined by his own performance. Would he
bequeath the same inheritance to his successor in due course? Or more? Or
less? That was the question as recorded in the \textit{History of Spain} – the vernacular
\textit{Estoria de España} which was yet another of Alfonso X’s achievements.\footnote{Marques (1990), pp. 571–2. Cf., respectively, the observations of the nineteenth-century liberal

His reign falls into three phases: from 1252 to 1256 during which the king
was engaged at home; 1256–75, the years of his imperial adventure; and the
period 1275–84 which was dominated by questions of the succession, political
strife and eventually civil war.

In death as in life, Alfonso X has had a bad press. Far from glorying in his

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vernacular history, in the 1590s the singularly unforgiving historian Juan de Mariana laid Spain’s ignorance of Latin letters at his door.79 As to the consolidation of his father’s achievement, however, the first decade of Alfonso’s reign appeared propitious. The king was energetic on a number of fronts. With temporary control established across the Guadiana to the south-west, and the Nasrid ruler of Granada, Muhammad I, his vassal in the south-east,80 Alfonso’s earliest initiatives were taken in the north, where both in Navarre and in Gascony he combined with disaffected elements within the local nobility as a means of reviving Castilian claims to suzerainty in those regions. True, in Navarre his intervention proved counterproductive, driving the young Teobaldo II into the arms of James I of Aragon (Pact of Tudela, August 1253; Treaty of Montceagudo, April 1254). In Gascony, however, where claims were advanced associated with his paternal great-grandmother, Alfonso VIII’s Angevin queen, he enjoyed greater success, and in April 1254 Henry III of England agreed to the marriage of the future Edward I to Alfonso’s half-sister, assigning the disputed territories to her as dowry. The celebration of the nuptials and the knighting of his new brother-in-law (Burgos, October 1254) – Alfonso was a great dubber – ratified the claim of the ruler of peripheral Castile to a place at the centre of European affairs, greatly to the discomfiture of Alfonso’s father-in-law James of Aragon. This was followed in May 1255 by the betrothal of the then heirs to the thrones of Castile and France, the Infanta Berengaria and Louis, son of Louis IX: an alliance frustrated in 1259 when the infanta acquired a baby brother and the young Louis died.81

By 1259, however, the king of Castile was cast on an international course on his own account. At Soria in March 1256 representatives of the Ghibelline commune of Pisa had made him an offer which, to the consternation of Castilians from that day to this, he had not refused. Superficially, which is how it has regularly been judged, the spectacle of Alfonso X accepting election as Roman emperor was in the nature of a charade: a commission which the recipient was as little capable of executing as his Pisan visitors were qualified to present it. However, both for the latter and for their associates, the city of Marseilles, the advantages – most favoured trading status under Castilian aegis in North Africa – were as evident as they were substantial. Nor, since the likely effect of what has been described as Alfonso’s ‘decaffeinated Ghibellinism’ was to divide Manfred’s Italian supporters, may Castilian intervention have been altogether unwelcome to Pope Alexander IV.82 At the very least, the pontiff’s acquiescence was consistent with the support that his predecessors had given

79 Mariana (1592), xiv, 7.
to Castilian pretensions to the Swabian inheritance ever since Ferdinand III had reminded Gregory IX in 1239 of his late wife’s nomination of their second son Frederick (Fadrique) – whose very name expressed his Germanic rather than Castilian expectations – as her universal heir. Ferdinand’s own imperial longings, five years before, have already been remarked upon. Moreover, Alfonso’s interest in his grandmother’s inheritance was not new in 1256. He had appropriated it ten years before, thereby earning the hatred of the younger brother he would later cause to be suffocated. And Innocent IV had expressed support on that occasion, as more recently had Alexander IV.

Although he may have been suggestible, Alfonso X was not ill-advised. Certainly he was better informed than his Pisan visitors who had told him that he was descended from Manuel I Komnenos (as James of Aragon really was). Well before 1256 he had surveyed the load-bearing branches of his family tree. Furthermore, as well as being acutely aware of his ancestral rights, as the references to his double imperial descent in manuscripts of his Partidas attest, in his recent Gascon forays he had demonstrated considerable energy in pursuing them. Even so, the questions remain. Why did Alfonso X accept the Pisan bait? Why did the imperial venture come to direct the policy of an otherwise both rational and fundamentally genial monarch? The frame of mind in which, with Castilian affairs by then in total disarray, he could refer to it in the course of an intimate letter to Fernando de la Cerda in 1273, as ‘the issue’ (‘la ida del Imperio, que es lo mas’) had not been inherited from Ferdinand III. The grovelling sycophancy of the letter drafted for him to be sent to the newly elected Gregory X in 1272, when he still had imperial prospects, was not Alfonsine. Altogether more his style, altogether more scabrously in keeping with the tone set by his Portuguese son-in-law, were the references to the pontiff in the verses he himself penned after those prospects had faded.

Why then? One explanation is that Alfonso X was schizophrenic. Another is that he was a fantasist, incapable of perceiving ‘the wide gulf fixed between velle and posse’. Yet another is that it was as much for use as for ostentation that he aspired to the imperial title, regarding it less as an end in itself than as providing a means to achieving a hegemony which, while peninsula-based, would extend his Leonese grandfather’s strictly peninsular horizons. Both James I of

83 González (1980–6), iii, no. 660; above, p. 675.  
84 Mondéjar (1777), p. 343; below, p. 695.  
85 Quintana Prieto, Documentación, no. 273; Rodríguez de Lama, Documentación, no. 23 (Feb. 1255).  
86 The two greatest emperors in the world from whom he was descended were, of course, Isaac II Angelos and Frederick Barbarossa, as had been recorded in connection with the marriage of Ferdinand III in 1219: ‘CLI’, c. 40, above, p. 672.  
Aragon and the chronicler Ramon Muntaner fifty years later suspected the lesser of the two. Alfonso’s own account of his conversations with the ruler of Granada in 1262 suggests the greater. If his German ambitions were disappointed, Muhammad I had indicated to him the prospect of a ‘larger and better empire still’,91 which can only have meant Africa where, in accordance with his father’s injunction. Alfonso had already been active. By 1262–3 the taifa king of Niebla, Ibn Mahfuz, had sued for peace, and Alfonso was declaring his intention of having himself buried in due course in recently conquered Cádiz, facing south.92 By the capture of Jerez in 1253 Castile had acquired further access to the Atlantic, and its king lost no time in exploiting the new opportunities thus presented. Within two months of entitling himself (optimistically, as it proved) ‘king of all Andalusia’, his forces had attacked and briefly occupied the Moroccan port of Saleh to the north of Rabat (September 1260). And in 1264 he had his sights firmly set on Ceuta.93 But that June Andalusia erupted in rebellion.

The suddenness of the mudéjar rebellion of 1264 took Alfonso X entirely by surprise. So did the extent of it. Hafsid forces from Tunis and Marinids from Morocco, as well as his vassal and recent confidant the king of Granada, were all involved in an uprising which the conspirators had planned to launch by assassinating Alfonso in Seville. Moreover, the ready response of the mudéjar population from Jerez in the west to Murcia in the east testified to the extreme fragility of the colonial superstructure imposed over the previous twenty years. In the kingdom of Murcia – for the recovery of which Alfonso was obliged to his father-in-law James of Aragon (February 1266) – only now was the task of territorial settlement systematically undertaken. However, in the words of the Chronicle of the reign, ‘its area was enormous and the king lacked sufficient manpower’. The choice was stark: either he expel the mudéjars, thereby creating a zone sanitare between Castile and Africa, though at the cost of converting the fertile south-east into an economic desert; or, at the risk of leaving a disaffected fifth-column in place, he retain them in order to provide profit-minded northerners with sufficient inducement to move south. Alfonso felt constrained to prefer the second option and to acquiesce in the establishment of non-Castilian, notably Navarrese, settlers and large numbers of Aragonese and Catalans (amounting to 40 per cent of the total) who had assisted in its recent reconquest.94

Inasmuch as they were conceived before he had secured his domestic base,

93 Huici Miranda (1952); Ballesteros (1963), pp. 204–84, 363.
Alfonso’s abortive African ventures were entirely characteristic undertakings. Inasmuch as they were complicated by the Tunisian alliance of his brothers, the Infantes Enrique and Fadrique, they were deeply ominous. But to the papacy — if not to other Christian powers engaged in trading in those parts — they were altogether welcome. Moreover, the Atlantic and Africa did not exhaust Alfonso’s extra-peninsular ambitions. After the collapse of the Latin empire of Constantinople in 1261, he also interested himself in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean, and in the summer of 1264, his Greek ancestry again providing ostensibly justification, he was planning to send his brother the Infante Felipe to those parts against the ‘schismatical Greeks’, thereby frustrating Manfred’s ambitions (and Aragon’s) and further ingratiating himself with Pope Urban IV. However, if the ultimate objective of Alfonso’s pursuit of his Swabian inheritance was peninsular aggrandisement, his willingness to ruin his kingdom in that cause must appear not the less but the more remarkable. Historians have found the rational basis for the king’s actions elusive; perhaps there was no rational basis for them. Certainly, that was how Nuño González de Lara interpreted Alfonso’s renunciation of Castilian claims to the Algarve in 1266. Possibly indeed, the cancer of the face by which he seems to have been increasingly afflicted after being kicked by a horse in 1269 eventually affected some of the functions of his celebrated brain.

By the late 1260s, of course, to all observers other than Alfonso X himself the king of Castile’s imperial prospects must have appeared hopeless. By then, for all the attempts of his agents at the papal curia, the Anglo-French rapprochement of 1259, and the commitment of successive French pontiffs to Charles of Anjou had determined Gregory X’s eventual dismissal of his claim at Beaucaire in 1273. In view of the desperate straits of Henry III of England, upon whom his imperial rival Richard of Cornwall was dependent, in 1257–8 his prospects were not wholly unrealistic, however; hence the proposed match between the Infante Felipe and Kristina of Norway at this time.

It was Castile’s condition itself that doomed Alfonso X’s imperial schemes from the outset. The Castilian situation in 1257–8 was as desperate as the English, with too many of those members of the political establishment in the north and centre who had exerted themselves over the previous forty years feeling themselves neglected by a ruler whose preferred places of residence were Toledo and Seville. The land was altogether too exhausted and impover-

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95 Dufourcq (1966a) and (1966b), pp. 24–1, 162; Ayala Martínez (1986), pp. 79–84.
97 Crónica de Alfonso X, ed. Rosell, c. 19.
ished for them to undertake the ‘almost unbearable expenses’ involved.100 Moreover, Alfonso’s encouragement of southward migration and his establishment of new settlements in the Castilian hinterland, as well as his alliance with the non-noble aristocracy in the old municipalities (caballeros villanos), endangered the interests of the old aristocracy, the churches and the military Orders. The royal infantes provided ever-active focuses of discontent. The currency was in disarray. And in the late 1250s, not just the Castilian climate but also the Castilian episcopate conspired against Alfonso X.101

And overarching all this there was what his subjects construed as the king’s tampering with their fundamental rights as they were enshrined in their fueros, but which for the king of Castile (as for the king of Portugal) were an infringement of regalengo. Although the inter-relationship of Alfonso X’s various initiatives in the fields of jurisprudence and legislation continues to exert its indubitable fascination, even now some scholars of the subject remain uncertain, especially regarding the dates of composition of the Alfonsine works and, which is a different matter, their promulgation.102 At least two conclusions appear certain however. One is that the ever-wider scope of the legal blueprints was related to the ever-increasing extent of Alfonso’s political ambitions. The other – whether it was the Fuero real (Alfonso’s uniform code for the kingdom of Castile) or the Espéculo, applicable to all his realms and the precursor of the work which came to be known as the Siete Partidas that was at issue – is that discontent was already being expressed in 1262,103 and that when in 1269 he assembled the disaffected nobles for the wedding of his heir Don Fernando to Blanche, the daughter of Louis IX of France (thereby providing them with an opportunity to discuss their grievances) the king’s contempt for their fueros was the main talking-point.104

The rebellion of the nobles which was planned on that occasion was led by the king’s brother, the inexhaustible Infante Felipe (sometime student at Paris on a clerical scholarship, ex-chargé d’affaires at the archbishopric of Seville, husband of three wives and liberator of Constantinople manqué), with Nuño González de Lara and Lope Díaz de Haro his principal acolytes (it took a king of Alfonso’s stature to manoeuvre those inveterate adversaries into the same camp), and the kings of Navarre (Henry I, 1270–4) and of Granada (again) also deeply implicated. In the open it lasted from 1270 until the very eve of Alfonso’s departure from Castile for his meeting with Gregory X. The

100 Jofré de Loaisa, Crónica, ed. García Martínez, c. 7.
104 Crónica de Alfonso X, ed. Rosell, c. 18.
fourteenth-century Chronicle of the reign records its development in exceptional detail. Allegedly the Chronicle’s account of the reign is unfavourable to the king. Not here, however, for as the rebels continually raise the stakes, the king remains endlessly patient and as ready for compromise as he was anxious for empire.

At Burgos in September 1272 the disaffected fijosdalgos presented their demands, the principal of which was the complaint presented everywhere else in the thirteenth-century west, namely that the king had been infringing their liberties – in this case that the fueros the king had granted to certain adjacent ‘villas’ had impinged on them and theirs. As elsewhere, of course, this appeal to their liberties was a pretence, or device. What the fijosdalgos meant when they spoke of their liberties (fueros) was the liberties they and their ancestors had acquired for themselves over the generations at the expense of others. And at one stage of the negotiations after 1272 Nuño González de Lara admitted as much. Alfonso X had an eye for recent fuerza dressed up as ancient fuero. The only fuero that the ricosomes were interested in was the freedom they enjoyed to keep their kings restrained (‘apremiados’), he informed his son and heir Don Fernando in 1273. In July 1274, however, he bowed to pressure and desisted from his attempt to unify Castilian jurisdiction (Ordenamiento of Zamora). In July 1274 imperial considerations were paramount.

From his meeting with Gregory X at Beaucaire twelve months later the king emerged with only a grant of ecclesiastical revenues as consolation for the destruction of the keystone of all his political calculations. Whereafter everything unravelled, fast. In his absence, at the instigation of Muhammad II of Granada, Abu Yusuf, the Marinid emir of Morocco, had invaded Andalusia and inflicted crushing defeats on the Castilians at Ecija and Martos (September, November 1275). Amongst the casualties were Nuño González de Lara, whose pickled head awaited Alfonso on his return, and Archbishop Sancho of Toledo, the son of James of Aragon. Worse still, his heir Fernando de la Cerda had died (July 1275). In the struggle for the succession which

109 ‘E, don Nuño, vos sabedes quel Rey vos preguntó por los pedidos que fecistes en su tierra si era fuero, é vos dejistes que non, mas que los ficiéron ante otros que vos, é que por esto lo ficiéridos vos, é dijovos el Rey que pues non era fuero, que era fuerza e robo’: Crónica de Alfonso X, ed. Rosell, c. 30.
110 ‘Esto es el fuero é el pro de la tierra que ellos siempre quisieron’: Crónica de Alfonso X, ed. Rosell, c. 52.
111 Iglesia Ferreirós (1971).
ensued, between Fernando’s son, Alfonso de la Cerda, and the king’s younger brother the Infante Sancho, Alfonso X understandably havered. In 1276, however, contrary to the provision of his own law code which stipulated lineal rather than collateral descent, he ruled in Sancho’s favour, thereby incurring the wrath of Philip III of France, brother of the dead infante’s widow Blanche, as well as that of Peter III of Aragon. Together with Alfonso’s queen (Violante, Peter’s sister), Blanche and her de la Cerda sons fled to Aragon. Peter’s possession of the two boys deprived Alfonso of the whip-hand he had long enjoyed in peninsular affairs.113

Suppurating from many sores and with one eye hanging half out, by the late-1270s the former imperial candidate presented a sorry spectacle. Yet these were the years of maximum intellectual activity, notable for the composition of treatises on astronomy and astrology, as well as for the exquisite and highly personal *Cantigas de santa María*, and the expansion of his historical interests from the national story to the larger canvas of world history. Yet even here, in a setting commensurate with the immensity of his curiosity, there are ample indications of the king’s haunted state and that obsession with conspiracy which seems to have prompted the savagery of the summary executions in 1277 of his brother Fadrique and the latter’s son-in-law Simón Ruiz de los Cameros.114 Moreover, the extinction of his imperial claim, as well as relaxing the restraint on him, had removed the immunity he had previously enjoyed from papal prosecution on account of his appropriation of church revenues and harassment of churchmen, and the investigations ordered by Nicholas III in 1279 raised the spectre of sanctions akin to those with which since the completion of the reconquest the kings of Portugal had become all too depressingly familiar.115

The year 1281 saw a marked deterioration in the relationship of father and son as a result of the former’s proposal to install the young Alfonso de la Cerda as vassal king of Jaén. The Infante Sancho (co-ruler of the kingdom since 1278) strenuously opposed the scheme, and in April–May 1282 usurped Alfonso’s authority by summoning a meeting of the *cortes* at Valladolid where anti-Alfonso resentment were channelled into the formation of a nationwide *Hermandad general*. Civil war ensued. In November 1282 Alfonso cursed and disinherited the rebel Sancho, restored the de la Cerdas as his heirs, and in their default nominated the king of France to succeed him: clear evidence of the weakness of his grip on reality.116 But Seville, Badajoz and Murcia alone

113 Macdonald (1965) and (1985), pp. 192–5; Daumet (1913), pp. 27–63.
remained loyal to him, and although Martin IV eventually condemned the infante, the only military assistance Alfonso received from abroad between then and his death in April 1284, surrounded by a mere handful of supporters, was from his old adversary the Marinid emir of Morocco, Abu Yusuf. (The king of Granada sided with the infante.)

The reign of Sancho IV (1284–95) was overshadowed by its beginnings. It was an indication of the new king’s vulnerability that, contrary to Castilian tradition, he inaugurated it by having himself crowned. For as well as his father’s curse, Sancho brought with him to the throne a wife, Maria de Molina, whom he had married in defiance of the laws both of consanguinity and of bigamy, and all his appeals to the papacy to regularise the union fell on deaf ears. With the de la Cerda claim reactivated by Alfonso X, the question of the succession dominated the next eleven years.

Sancho IV had inherited many of his father’s intellectual interests. His own contribution to the Castigos e documentos para bien vivir—a work of moral and practical guidance attributed to him and addressed to his son, the future Ferdinand IV—seems to have been no less personal than that of Alfonso X to any of those credited to him. There were poets in his entourage too. Pay Gómez Charino, his first admiral (almirante mayor), is as well remembered for his ‘vibrant barcaroles’ as for his defence of the straits in 1285. However, the tendency of those interests was, perhaps by design, altogether more conventional. Likewise, by contrast with those of his father, Sancho IV’s activities are chiefly characterised by the narrowness of his horizons. Moreover, they were associated with Burgos and Valladolid rather than Seville—though his northerly instincts seem not to have sustained him to the extent that Afonso III had been sustained. While the wider world was drawing Castile into its orbit—in 1277 if not earlier Genoese vessels had reopened the direct route between the Mediterranean and the North Sea, the route which when Seville was reconquered had been closed for 600 years—Castile was turning in upon itself.

The new king of Castile’s first task was to control the monster of his own making, the Hermandad general whose creation in 1282 had unleashed forces which would not be tamed for fifty years, and as he discovered on visiting Galicia in 1291, the provinces were tinder-dry. A single spark of insurrection was capable of causing widespread conflagration. And Sancho’s own effect was incendiary; his title El rey bravo was due to his irascibility. The reign was dominated by court intrigue, forged documents and mischief-making. On at

119 Rey, ed., Castigos; Kinkade (1972); Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), 1, pp. 36, 61; Linehan (1993), pp. 436–7. 120 Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), 1, p. 46; Lopez (1975), p. 244.
least two occasions, Juan Núñez de Lara was brought to the brink of rebellion by poison-pen letters and rumour-mongering.122 The influence of successive favourites was paramount. The earliest of these, Gómez García, abbot of Valladolid, was ousted in 1286 for having concealed certain conversations with Philip IV of France to the effect that in exchange for French disavowal of the de la Cerda (and the abbot’s promotion to the archbishopric of Compostela) Sancho might be willing to exchange María de Molina for a Capetian wife.123 The abbot was followed by his arch-enemy, Count Lope Díaz de Haro, mayor-domo mayor by January 1287. Because his family’s ancient enemies, the Laras, were de la Cerda partisans and resident in France, the count pressed for an alliance with Aragon. His real objective, however, seems to have been to remarry the king to Guillerma de Moncada, to whom Sancho had been betrothed as infante, and who although no beauty was the count’s cousin. In this scheme he was abetted by his son-in-law, the king’s turbulent brother the Infante Juan. To some the extent of the count’s domination of the king appeared unnatural. However, by farming the royal revenues to Don Abraham el Barchilón, in May 1287, he over-reached himself. The political community was outraged that the Christian king of Castile’s sealed letters should need to be countersigned by a Catalan Jew. After discussions with his nephew, Dinis of Portugal, at last Sancho’s eyes were opened. In the confrontation which occurred in June 1288 – the ‘Tragedy of Alfaro’ – the count was cut down after he had drawn a knife on the king. Only the intervention of the heavily pregnant María de Molina between her husband and the Infante Juan prevented Sancho from adding fratricide to his tally of crimes against the family.124 Events such as these were well calculated to confirm the congenital melancholia, morbidity even, of an accursed king who was himself to die at the age of thirty-six.

The count’s removal from the scene facilitated an approach to Philip IV of France. This was managed by two churchmen, Bishop Martin of Astorga and Archbishop Gonzalo Pérez Gudiel of Toledo, upon the second of whom in particular Sancho IV came increasingly to rely. Unflinching and indestructible, an old chancery hand and confidant of Alfonso X in the 1270s, rector of the University of Padua in the 1260s, the archbishop who had once dandled the infant infante on his clerical knee seems to have exercised an almost Svengali-like influence over him now that he was king.125 The new diplomatic departure led to the Treaty of Lyons (July 1288) which provided that, in return for Philip’s disavowal of the de la Cerda claim to the throne, Sancho would establish the

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122 Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), II, pp. 65–6, 81, 116.
123 Crónica de Sancho IV, ed. Rosell, c. 2 (p. 72b); Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), i, pp. 88–114.
124 Crónica de Sancho IV, ed. Rosell, c. 5; Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), i, pp. 132–204, suggesting (p. 196) that the deafness of the Infante Enrique, born later that year, may have been attributable to these disturbances.
infantes with sovereign rights in the kingdom of Murcia – a suggestion which he had fiercely resisted when it had been made by Alfonso X – and in Ciudad Real, where their father had died. The effect was instantaneous. In Vizcaya the Haro clan raised the de la Cerda pennant on their castles. The infantes’ French mother, Philip IV’s aunt Blanche, unwilling to countenance any diminution of their claim to the throne, appealed to Dinis of Portugal and Alfonso III of Aragon, and the latter formally defied Sancho IV, declared Alfonso de la Cerda king of Castile, invaded Castile and was unceremoniously seen off, with the result that when the treaty with France was ratified at Bayonne in April 1290 Sancho’s earlier provision for the de la Cerdas could be withdrawn. At which point their mother opted for the cloister.126

Six years into his reign, Sancho IV had secured his position. Just five years from the end of it, however, that was not much. His initiatives were only as brilliant as was compatible with the instability of his family relationships. His own marriage remained irregular, and his new alliance with James II of Aragon, sealed by yet another uncanonical union between the latter and the Infanta Isabel (Peace of Montecagudo, Treaty of Soria, November/December 1291), was practically valueless since in the event of Franco-Aragonese hostilities Castile would be equally committed to both parties. The diplomatic negotiations in which he engaged were characterised by bad faith and dissimulation on all sides. For example, having agreed to the (flagrantly uncanonical) marriage of his heir Don Fernando and the daughter of Dinis of Portugal in September 1291, Sancho then offered him to a princess of France. Inevitably, his mediation of the Sicilian dispute between James II and Charles II of Naples (vistas de Logroño, July 1293) proved ineffectual.127 The contrast with the figure that his father had once cut on the European stage was unmistakable. Despite appearances, the kingdom of Castile was back at the margin of affairs, with its ruler permanently dogged by the traditions of family treachery which he himself personified. Thus, while he was at Logroño, the late count’s confederate, the Infante Juan, recently released from prison, went on the rampage again, and made common cause with the Marinids of Morocco.128

At the beginning of the reign Sancho had had to repel the Marinids whom his father had brought into Castile. In continuation of his own counter-alliance with the Muslim ruler of Granada between 1282 and 1284, when the Christian king of Castile invested the Marinid outpost of Tarifa in 1292 – in the words of

Salvador de Moxó, the reign’s ‘most brilliant contribution to the reconquest’ – it was with a view to handing the place over to Muhammad II in exchange for six frontier fortresses. Having taken the place with the assistance of the Aragonese fleet, however, Sancho IV chose to retain both it and the fortresses himself. Whereupon Muhammad reverted to the Marinids, the Marinids besieged Tarifa, and in 1294, while James II played an astute double game in order to maintain Catalan trading interests in North Africa, the Castilian commander Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán, on being presented with the terrible dilemma of either sacrificing his son or surrendering his citadel, opted against nature, thereby earning himself the sobriquet Guzmán el Bueno.129

The Chronicle of his reign reports that Sancho IV died on 25 April 1295 of a mortal illness. What the illness was that carried off a man not yet thirty-seven it does not say. Nor does it provide a judgement on the reign. Jofré de Loaisa tells us what the trouble was. It was tuberculosis. The history of the reign of Sancho IV is in need of overhaul. It was last looked at seventy years ago by Gaibrois de Ballesteros. Gaibrois was perhaps too much impressed by the Chronicle’s reliability as to chronology to ask herself whether, even as to ‘narration’, chronology is all.130 As to fourteenth-century ‘narration’ of thirteenth-century events, since the 1920s there has been a quickening of apprehension. And as to the reign of Sancho IV in particular, Hernández’s remarkable discoveries regarding his fiscal arrangements have now to be assimilated.131 For

What counted withal
Was the wherewithal.

Meanwhile, we must remain content with the considered view of a contemporary who was no enemy of good government, that, other considerations apart, for the Castilian taxpayer Sancho IV was an even greater scourge than his notorious father.132

130 ‘La narración de la Crónica es bastante exacta y su cronología casi siempre justa, como he podido comprobar documentalmente’: Gaibrois de Ballesteros (1922–8), i, p. v.
132 Jofré de Loaisa, Crónica, ed. García Martínez, c. 17.
PART VI

THE NORTHERN AND EASTERN FRONTIERS
THE MONGOLS AND EUROPE

Peter Jackson

THE RISE AND CHARACTER OF THE MONGOL EMPIRE

The founder of the Mongol empire was a chieftain named Temüjin, who in the late twelfth century had become leader of one of a number of nomadic tribes which paid tribute to the Chin dynasty (1123–1234) in northern China. But within a few years the Mongols had subdued their pastoralist neighbours, notably the Tatars, the Kereyid (Kereit) and the Naiman; in 1206 Temüjin was proclaimed Chinggis Khan at an assembly (quriltai) representing the tribes of the eastern Eurasian steppe; and from 1211 he was at war with his former overlord, the Chin emperor. By his death in 1227 his dominions extended from the Siberian forests to the Hindu Kush and from the Yellow Sea to the Caspian.

The Mongol empire rapidly evolved into more than just a confederacy of nomadic tribes as it incorporated semi-sedentarised and even settled elements: the Önggüd, inhabiting the intermediate zone between China and the steppe; the Khitan, semi-nomads in the region adjoining Manchuria; and the Uighurs, town-dwellers in the Tarim basin. The Khitan were remnants of an earlier imperial power which had reigned over Mongolia and part of northern China as the Liao dynasty until their overthrow by the Chin in 1125; under the form ‘Cathay’ (via the Arabic-Persian Khita), their name would later become current in the west for China as a whole. In their war against the Chin, the Mongols benefited from the assistance of Khitan officials and military units seeking to avenge the defeat of their forebears. The Uighurs too had been masters of an extensive steppe domain three centuries earlier, but had latterly been subject to the empire of the Qara (‘Black’) Khitan, founded by a fugitive Liao prince whose dynasty reigned over much of central Asia under the title of giir-khan (‘world ruler’). In 1218 the Qara Khitan empire, which had been taken over by one of Chinggis Khan’s enemies, the Naiman prince Küchlug, was in turn incorporated in the Mongol dominions. The influence exerted upon Chinggis Khan’s empire by these peoples, who served as intermediaries between the Mongols and the sedentary world and who possessed their own
imperial traditions, was profound. From the Khitan (and perhaps also from the Qara Khitan) Chinggis Khan borrowed administrative practices and terminology; the Mongols adopted the Uighur alphabet and employed it in their chancery. After about 1235 Qaraqorum, which lay in the vicinity of the old Uighur capital, became the principal residence of the itinerant great khan (qaghan).

Like other steppe nomadic peoples, the Mongols believed in a sky-god, Tenggeri, and their traditional religious practices belonged in the category generally classed as shamanistic, being derived from ancestor worship and involving contact with the spirits of the dead, prophecy and divination. They were, however, exposed to other religious influences, of which the earliest was Christian. For some centuries Nestorian Christianity had enjoyed a strong position in the eastern steppe, particularly among the Kereyid, the Naiman and the Önggüd. Some members of the Mongol imperial dynasty would in time adopt Christianity. But three points need to be stressed. First, in accordance with a decree (yasa) of Chinggis Khan, the Mongol government tolerated the practice of all faiths (except where they clashed with the customary law of the steppe) and members of each ‘religious class’ (Christian priests and monks, Buddhist monks, Muslim scholars and jurists) were exempt from taxation and forced labour. Secondly, the adoption of any particular faith by a Mongol ruler did not necessarily lead to the abandonment of shamanistic rites. And thirdly, whatever the personal religious affiliations of any individual prince or general, his over-riding commitment was to the maintenance and extension of the Mongol empire, for just as there was one God in heaven so there was one sovereign on earth.

At what juncture the Mongols developed an ideology of world conquest it is difficult to say. The notion had a long history among the steppe peoples: it is implicit in the style of the Qara Khitan sovereign and, possibly, in Chinggis Khan’s own title (which may mean something like ‘oceanic [i.e. universal] ruler’).¹ The Mongols were perhaps also influenced by the claims to universal dominion traditionally made by the Chinese emperors, in whose shadow the steppe tribes had lived for centuries. Whatever the case, the Mongols’ imperial aspirations found expression in the ultimata their rulers sent to potentates who had not as yet submitted. These documents claim an authority over the whole world by virtue of the mandate of Tenggeri, and warn the recipients of the consequences of persisting in ‘rebellion’.

Rulers who submitted to the Mongols were obliged to make their troops available to the conquerors, and by the time the Mongols reached Europe their armies were made up of numerous elements, both steppe nomad cavalry and

horse or foot auxiliaries from sedentary regions. It is therefore debatable how ‘Mongol’ these armies were, since the majority even of the nomads were probably of Turkish stock. Why the Mongols came to be known as Tatars in the Islamic world and in Europe is unclear: the standard sources for Chinggis Khan’s early career reserve the name for only one of the many tribes he conquered in present-day Mongolia. But it is possible that Chinggis Khan’s own people were a branch of the Tatars who sought to appropriate the ethnic name, Mangol, of an earlier imperial power that had briefly flourished in the mid-twelfth century. Muslim authors seem to have employed the term generally for the non-Turkish peoples of the eastern steppe, and this may help to explain its adoption in Europe, where it was corrupted to ‘Tartars’ (by a pun on Tartarus, the Hell of classical mythology).

Following the collapse of the Qara Khitan empire Chinggis Khan clashed with its Muslim neighbour, the Khwarazmshah. In the course of a seven-year campaign (1219–25) headed by Chinggis Khan himself, the Khwarizmian state, embracing Transoxiana and much of Persia, was destroyed. Two Mongol generals, Jebe and Sübödei, sent in pursuit of the Khwarazmshah, passed through northern Persia and the Caucasus. They devastated the Georgian kingdom, and crushed the nomadic Cumans (Polovtians, Kipchak) and their allies among the Rus’ princes on the river Kalka (1223), before heading back east to rejoin Chinggis Khan on his homeward march. It was these operations, as we shall see, which first brought the Mongols to the attention of the Latin world.

With the single exception of this seven-year expedition, the personal military energies of the qaghans were devoted to the campaigns in China. The conquest of the Chin empire was completed by Chinggis Khan’s son and successor, Ögödei (1229–41). The reduction of southern China, ruled by the Sung dynasty, took rather longer: begun by Ögödei, it was not accomplished until the reign of Chinggis Khan’s grandson Qubilai (1260–94). It is unlikely that any theatre of war enjoyed priority over China in Mongol eyes; and certainly Europe receives the sparsest notice in sources composed within the empire. Yet the advent of the Mongols was undoubtedly of considerable importance to the Latin world, which they threatened on two fronts: in eastern Europe and in Syria.

**THE WESTWARD ADVANCE**

Chinggis Khan never returned to the west, but the Mongol advance in this direction was resumed on the orders of Ögödei. Detachments sent to continue the subjugation of the western steppe and forest regions were from 1235

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reinforced by a large army under the qaghan’s nephew Batu. Batu overwhelmed the Volga Bulgars, the Bashkirs of so-called ‘Greater Hungary’, the Mordvins and the Cumans. In 1237 his forces attacked the Rus’, taking Vladimir and slaying the grand prince Iurii in an engagement on the river Sit’ (1238). After the fall of Kiev in December 1240 two Mongol divisions neutralised the Poles, sacking Cracow and Sandomierz and overwhelming the leading Polish prince, Henry II of Lower Silesia, near Legnica (Liegnitz) on 9 April 1241. They then passed through Moravia, conducting also a minor foray into Austria, on their way to link up with the main armies under Batu in Hungary. The Hungarian kingdom had collapsed, owing partly to King Béla IV’s vexed relations with his nobles and partly to the strain of accommodating some 30,000 to 40,000 Cuman refugees; and the sources also hint that Béla and his vassals had been lulled by the failure of the Mongols to appear after numerous earlier alarms. Batu’s forces routed the Hungarians in the plain of Mohi on 11 April, and Béla fled into Croatia. A squadron sent in pursuit failed to capture the king, who sought refuge on an island in the Adriatic, and this group then pushed on through Bosnia into the Balkans. Meanwhile, Hungary was systematically devastated until, at the onset of spring 1242, Batu’s armies moved back east into the Pontic steppe.

Had the Mongols pressed on into Europe in 1242, it is unlikely that they would have encountered co-ordinated resistance. The dispute between the pope and Emperor Frederick II was at its height. Frederick sent letters to his fellow monarchs urging them to arm against the invaders. But his enemies accused him of bringing in the Mongols for his own purposes – a baseless charge, but less outlandish than it might seem, once it is remembered that the pagan Cumans had been employed as auxiliaries by western rulers in recent decades. Certainly, the emperor appeared to benefit indirectly from the crisis, since in return for a promise of imperial aid Béla became his vassal, an obligation from which in 1245 Innocent IV would release him on the grounds that Frederick had rendered him no assistance. In fact, Béla received no help from any of his neighbours. The duke of Austria actually profited from Hungarian weakness to extort territorial concessions from him. Pope Gregory IX authorised a crusade against the Mongols before his death in August 1241, and a crusading army mustered by the German bishops and led by the emperor’s son Conrad (IV) had actually set out, only to dissolve when the Mongols failed to push through Austria in the late summer of 1241; the resources accumulated for the crusade were employed instead in a civil war between Conrad and the anti-Hohenstaufen party. That the deep divisions within the Latin world placed it at the mercy of a major Mongol attack was recognised by the papal

envoy Giovanni di Pian Carpini who in 1247 declined to bring back Mongol envoys with him from fear that they would report western disunity to their master.

The reasons for the Mongols’ sudden evacuation of Europe in 1242 are still imperfectly understood. One suggestion is that the Hungarian plains, after several months’ grazing by the livestock of an army which surely numbered over 100,000, were exhausted. This is highly plausible, especially since Hungary’s pasturelands had already been obliged to sustain large numbers of Cuman refugees; and it will be seen that similar logistical considerations probably dictated the Mongols’ retreat from Syria in 1260. But the older view, that Europe was saved by the death on 11 December 1241 of the qaghan Ögödei in Mongolia, cannot be altogether discounted. Batu also faced problems within his own command, for his army had been weakened by the desertion of the qaghan’s son Güyük, with whom he had quarrelled. He was apprehensive that Güyük would succeed his father and doubtless wished to watch events in the east. The object of the campaign may, finally, have been more limited than is usually supposed. In a letter brought back from Russia in 1237 by the Hungarian Dominican Julian – the first Mongol ultimatum addressed to a European ruler that has come down to us – Béla had been condemned for harbouring Cuman fugitives and murdering Mongol envoys. If the Mongols’ intention was merely to chastise the king, their retreat would stand in less need of explanation.

Why the Mongols did not return for several years, and why they did not then push beyond Hungary and Poland, are different questions, and here the answer does seem to lie in their own internal strife. Pope Innocent IV, who had despatched three embassies to the Mongols, can have derived little comfort from the reports they brought back, leaving as they did no doubt as to the hostile intentions of the newly elected qaghan Güyük (1246–8). The most celebrated of these envoys, the Franciscan Carpini, who visited Güyük’s own headquarters, conveyed an ultimatum requiring the pope’s attendance in person at the qaghan’s court along with the ‘kinglets’ (reguli) of the west. Carpini further learned that the Mongols planned a new expedition against the Latin west. But Güyük’s brief reign witnessed no campaigns of importance. Even on his return journey Carpini heard that the qaghan was in fact moving against Batu, and Güyük’s death averted a major civil war within the Mongol empire. After some manoeuvrings Batu secured the election of the sovereign of his choice, Möngke, the son of Chinggis Khan’s fourth son Tolui, despite the opposition of most of Ögödei’s family, who were ruthlessly suppressed (1251).

7 For the Latin translation of Güyük’s letter, see Benedictus Polonus, ‘Relatio’, pp. 142–3; the original (in Persian) is edited and translated in Pelliot (1923), pp. 17–23.
This purge restored some stability to the Mongol imperial government, and Möngke’s accession was followed by new campaigns against the empire’s unsubdued neighbours, leading to alarms in Poland in 1254. Batu died in about 1256, but in 1259 his brother Berke, who had become ruler of the Golden Horde, as the Mongols of the Pontic steppe became known, demanded the submission of King Béla, sent his troops into Prussia and launched an attack on Poland which according to one source exceeded in its ferocity the invasion of 1241. But for reasons that will become apparent these campaigns represent the high-water-mark of Mongol expansion in eastern Europe. In the southeast the limits of Mongol overlordship extended only as far as the Bulgarian kingdom, which is known to have been tributary to Batu by 1253. The Golden Horde, however immediate its stranglehold on the Rus’ princes, became for the Latin world a menace in the background. However, raids on Poland and Hungary intensified during the period from about 1280 until the end of the century, when the western half of the Horde was governed by the khan’s relative Noghai.

At around the time of the great invasion of eastern Europe the Mongols had also appeared on Latin Christendom’s other frontier. Forces sent to southwestern Asia by Ögödei in 1229, and commanded successively by the generals Chormaghun and Baiju (Baichu), had first fallen upon the residue of the Khwarizmian forces and reduced Georgia to tributary status. Then in 1242 Baiju launched a sudden attack on the Seljuq sultan of Anatolia (Rum). The Seljuq army was decimated at Kösé Dağ in June 1243, and the sultanate, hitherto the great power in the region, became a client state. The Mongol advance had indirect consequences for the Latins when a large body of Khwarizmian freebooters, dislodged from Iraq by the Mongols, moved south and sacked Jerusalem in August 1244, putting an end to Frankish possession of the city. That summer the Mongols themselves briefly penetrated into northern Syria and demanded the submission of local rulers, including Prince Bohemond V of Antioch who proudly refused. One consequence of Kösé Dağ was the submission of King Hethoum (Het’hum) of Lesser (Cilician) Armenia, who sent his brother Smbat (Sempad) to Güyüg’s court in 1247 and himself waited upon Möngke in 1254.

Baiju did not follow up his victory immediately, engaging in desultory operations against the minor powers of northern Iraq; and for a short time he was superseded on Güyüg’s orders by Eljigidei. But the Mongol advance gained fresh momentum when in 1253 Möngke entrusted the overall command of operations in south-west Asia to his brother Hülegü. While Baiju pushed west-

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wards into Anatolia, Hülegü reduced most of the Assassins’ strongholds in northern Persia (1256) and sacked Baghdad, putting to death the last Abbasid caliph (1258). In the winter of 1259–60 he invaded Syria. The Ayyubid principalities collapsed, and the Mongols over-ran the country. In March 1260, however, Hülegü withdrew east with the bulk of his army, leaving in Syria a small contingent under his general Ked-buqa (Kitbugha). The Frankish coastal enclaves were spared a major assault. Bohemond VI of Antioch-Tripoli had submitted, possibly at the instance of his father-in-law King Hethoum, and the Frankish government at Acre had received a Mongol ultimatum; but the only harm done to the kingdom of Jerusalem was the sack of Sidon in the summer. The Mongol threat was shortly eliminated when the Egyptian Mamluk sultan, Qutuz, moved against Ked-buqa, who was defeated and killed at Ain Jalut in Galilee on 3 September 1260; and in December another Mongol force was annihilated at Homs. The power vacuum in Syria was filled by the victorious Mamluks under their new sultan, Baybars, who had murdered Qutuz within a few weeks of Ain Jalut.

As in 1242 the retreat of a large Mongol army at a critical juncture might appear to be linked with the death of the qaghan, for Möngke had died in August 1259 while besieging a fortress in China: an event that has been seen as the salvation of the Islamic world, just as Ögödei’s demise may have reprieved the Latin west. But in the letter he wrote to Louis IX in 1262, Hülegü himself gave as the cause of his withdrawal the dearth of pasturage. One purpose in Hülegü’s mind was probably to watch events further east. His brothers Qubilai and Arigh Böke emerged as rivals for the imperial dignity in the late spring of 1260 and unleashed a civil war. Hülegü, who supported Qubilai, and Berke, an adherent of Arigh Böke, also clashed in 1261 over territory in the Caucasus, a region which may have been of more interest to the Golden Horde than was eastern Europe. This secondary dispute persisted well into the fourteenth century.

These struggles marked the dissolution of the Mongol empire into four regional khanates: the Golden Horde in the west, which traditionally enjoyed a good deal of autonomy; the khanate of Chaghadai in central Asia, ruled by the progeny of Chinggis Khan’s second son; the state founded by Hülegü in Persia and ruled by his descendants, the so-called Il-khans; and the dominions of the qaghan in China and Mongolia, under Qubilai, who emerged victorious from his struggle with Arigh Böke in 1264. But even after his triumph, Qubilai, who abandoned Qaraqorum to reside in China, was recognised only by Hülegü and his successors, to whom he was more closely bound by ties of blood. From 1269, moreover, he was confronted in central Asia by another anti-qaghan,
Ögödei’s grandson Qaidu (d. 1303). The Mongol world did not acknowledge a single emperor again until 1304.

The Mongol campaigns of 1259–60 in eastern Europe and in Syria were therefore the last military efforts of the united empire: significantly, the ultimatum received by Louis IX of France in 1261 (from Berke in all probability) is the latest recorded in western sources. The outbreak of hostilities in the Caucasus meant that neither the Il-khan nor the Khan of the Golden Horde was able to give his external frontiers single-minded attention. Now, moreover, for the first time, Mongol princes were ready to ally with foreign powers against fellow Mongols. From 1261–2 the Muslim Berke was engaged in reaching an understanding with his co-religionists the Mamluks, who were Hülegü’s chief external enemies and whose Qipchaq origin gave them a common ethnic background with the majority of his own nomadic subjects.

The diplomatic complexities to which this situation gave rise are well illustrated by the history of the empire of Nicaea. Although both John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222–54) and his son Theodore II (1254–8) had preserved their autonomy, they had to be on their guard against an attack from the east. Theodore’s successor, Michael VIII Palaiologos, profited from Mongol divisions by playing a game of consummate diplomatic skill. Having retaken Constantinople from the Latins (1261), Michael reopened the straits to the vital slave traffic between Egypt and the Pontic steppe, and when the army of the Golden Horde invaded Byzantine territory he was able to employ the good offices of the Mamluk sultan Baybars to secure peace. He placated Hülegü by sending him as a wife his niece Maria; though in the event she arrived after Hülegü’s death in 1265 and married his son and successor Abaqa. Later, when the Bulgarians joined a coalition formed against Byzantium by Charles of Anjou, Michael called upon the Golden Horde prince Noghai, who had married his illegitimate daughter, to distract them by ravaging their territory.

The friendship between Egypt and the Golden Horde, which would last until the conclusion of peace between the Mamluks and the Il-khan in 1320, posed a major threat to Hülegü. In order to avenge Ain Jalut the Il-khan needed external allies of his own; and he had begun to look towards western Europe.

When the first news of the assault on the Khwarazmshah had reached the army of the Fifth Crusade at Damietta in 1220, it had been assumed that the victors were Christians. In 1146 a garbled account of the Qara Khitan victory

12 Jackson (1978), p. 236; a different view in Richard (1979b) and in (1989), p. 519 n. 43.
13 For what follows, see Canard (1935–45); Saunders (1977).
over the great Seljuq Sultan Sanjar (1141) had found its way into the chronicle of Otto of Freising. This episode, interpreted as a Christian triumph, had given a significant impetus to the burgeoning legend of Prester John (*Presbyter Johannes*), a Christian priest-king marching to assist the Franks in the Holy Land against the common Muslim enemy. Mongol victories in the eastern Islamic world around 1220 were similarly ascribed to Prester John’s son ‘King David’, who was allegedly advancing on Baghdad and who in one version of the story was himself styled Prester John. The account of King David, it can now be seen, was based on events spread over several years and involving not only the Mongol conquests but also the careers of two of Chinggis Khan’s enemies: Küchlug, a one-time Nestorian Christian who persecuted his Muslim subjects after usurping the Qara Khitan throne, and the Muslim Khwarazmshah, whose expansionist designs in western Persia had brought him into conflict with the caliph. The confused and distorted rumours concerning the downfall of a major Muslim sovereign seem to have originated (as surely had those of 1146) in Nestorian Christian circles, with which the Latins of Syria were doubtless in contact through the pilgrimage to Jerusalem.14

The Mongol campaigns of 1241–2, and the ultimatums brought back by Innocent IV’s envoys in 1247–8, dispelled any notion that the new power was either friendly or Christian. And yet the west was alive to the opportunities afforded by the newcomers. When in 1238 Assassin envoys had sought Frankish assistance, the bishop of Winchester, Peter des Roches, had rejoiced at the prospects of such dogs devouring one another and looked forward to the triumph of the universal Church.15 While the Mongols devastated Russia, Novgorod was under attack from the Swedes (1240). The Latin west had no reason to regret the tribulations of its Muslim enemies nor of schismatic Christians. Such attitudes persisted even after the magnitude of the Mongol threat had become apparent. It was widely felt that had Louis IX in 1249 led his crusade against Anatolia instead of Egypt he would have been assured of success, given the enfeebled condition of the Seljuqs. In April 1260, when Hülegü had withdrawn and Ked-buqa commanded only a rump in Syria, the government at Acre wrote to Charles of Anjou urging the west to send troops to take over the country: the Muslim powers had been annihilated, and the Mongols would surely take to flight once the Frankish army appeared.16

In much the same way, it was believed that the Mongol threat would induce other pagans and schismatic Christians to seek shelter under the umbrella of Latin protection and to accept papal primacy. This emerges clearly in the relations of the curia with eastern Europe. The Carpini mission in 1245 spent

some time at the court of the Rus’ Prince Daniil of Galicia and Volyn trying to negotiate his submission to the Roman Church, and was authorised to treat also with the grand prince of Vladimir. Although the Grand Prince Alexander Nevskii opted instead for the ‘Tartar yoke’, which offered insurance against the rapacity of his Latin enemies, the Swedes and the Teutonic Order, Innocent IV succeeded in erecting a buffer of new Latin states in eastern Europe. Daniil received a crown in return for his adhesion to the Roman Church, as did the heathen Lithuanian Prince Mindaugas. But Daniil eventually defected and Mindaugas was killed in a pagan reaction in 1263. A similar policy is visible in the Levant. Of the two ambassadors sent to the Near East in 1245, André de Longjumeau at least is known to have passed several months on his outward journey in dealings with Ayyubid rulers and with high-ranking ecclesiastics of the separated Churches. It is conceivable that the diplomatic contacts with the Mongols made by these papal embassies of 1245–7, and the valuable reports they brought back, may have overshadowed what were more important goals at the time.

By the mid-thirteenth century, however, two things were beginning to complicate the question of Mongol–Latin relations. One was that Mongol domination in south-west Asia had clearly brought new hope and assurance to eastern Christians. We have already seen how Hethoum of Lesser Armenia, relieved of Seljuq pressure, saw acceptance of Mongol overlordship as offering the best prospects for his small kingdom. The Jacobite patriarch Ignatius, in his response to Innocent IV which was conveyed by André de Longjumeau, sought more equitable treatment for eastern Christians in Latin Syria. In 1248 the Mongol general Eljigidei made a similar plea in an embassy, of which more will be said below, to Louis IX of France, then in Cyprus preparing for his crusade against Egypt. In territories formerly under Muslim rule the Mongol policy of religious toleration improved the lot of the Christians and Jews, whom the conquerors in addition naturally saw as useful instruments. That the schismatic Christian subjects of the Latins would benefit from the advent of the Mongols is clear from the example of Antioch, the one part of Latin Syria that yielded to them, where the Greek Orthodox patriarch, repeatedly excommunicated and expelled from the city, was restored in 1260 on Hülegü’s express orders.

The second complication was that by about 1250 reports were also reaching the Latins concerning the adoption of Christianity by individual Mongol rulers. One of the encouraging assertions made by Eljigidei’s envoys was that Güyük had been baptised. It was a rumour that Batu’s son Sartaq had also become a Christian which prompted the Franciscan Guillaume de Rubruck to

17 See Halecki (1966); Szcześniak (1956); Zatko (1957).
travel to the lands of the Golden Horde; and in 1254 Innocent IV was notified of his conversion by the sole survivor of an embassy allegedly sent by Sartaq. Reports of this nature were assiduously fostered (and, according to Rubruck, sometimes invented) by Armenian and Nestorian Christians, who saw the Mongols as deliverers from the Muslim oppressor. In the early fourteenth century the Armenian monk Hayton would purvey similar stories in his eagerness to bring about Mongol–Frankish military co-operation. In some cases the reports may well have been justified: the Christian faith of Sartaq and of Güyük is attested by Muslim as well as by Armenian sources; Hülegü’s chief wife, Doquz Khatun, and his general Ked-buqa were both Nestorians.

In determining how much significance to attach to these details, however, it is important not to lose sight of the picture as a whole. Mongol policy towards previously disadvantaged subject groups was consistent, and it did not necessarily favour Christians: Batu employed Muslim agents to collect taxes and tribute from the Rus’. To be beguiled by the view of oriental Christians that Hülegü and Doquz Khatun were a second Constantine and Helena is to forget that in 1218 the Mongols had been hailed as liberators by Küchlüg’s Muslim subjects in central Asia. And Christian sympathies did not determine foreign policy. Neither Güyük’s Christian faith nor the fact that he was surrounded by Nestorian advisers prevented him from planning a new campaign against Europe in 1247.

These considerations acquire particular weight in the context of events in Syria in 1260, when the government at Acre, smarting from the attack on Sidon, adopted an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the Egyptians. Given subsequent developments – the Mamluk conquest of the Latin states by 1291 and repeated overtures from Hülegü and his successors for military collaboration with the west against Egypt – the support given to Qutuz’s forces and the failure to ally with the Mongols in 1260 have been seen as the height of folly. The Mongols were aided by their Christian satellites elsewhere: Georgian troops played an enthusiastic role in the Mongol capture of Baghdad, and both Hethoum and Bohemond VI were rewarded for their assistance in 1260 with erstwhile Christian territory taken by the Mongols from the Ayyubids. Yet we should not ignore the nature of Mongol rule or of Mongol religious affiliations. At this stage the Mongols had no allies, only subjects; even rulers who submitted voluntarily shouldered a heavy yoke. The Franks of Acre can hardly be blamed for preferring the victory of their Muslim neighbour.

This is not to deny that the Mongols’ uncompromising drive to conquer the world could be modified, temporarily and in certain circumstances. A case in point is Eljigidei’s embassy to Louis IX in 1248. Although Eljigidei’s ostensible

purpose was to secure more equitable treatment for the Latins’ eastern Christian subjects (and thereby to implement one at least of the *yasas* of Chinggis Khan), the embassy also seems to have been a ploy to deflect the crusading army away from territories within the Mongols’ own current sphere of operations like Syria and Anatolia.\textsuperscript{19} Louis had been persuaded by the tone of the message, which differed so markedly from the usual ultimatums, to send a return embassy to the Mongol imperial court where, much to the French king’s chagrin, it was interpreted by Güyük’s widow Oghul Qaimish as a gesture of submission. Eljigidei shortly perished in the purge of Ögödei’s family and their supporters, and his action would be denounced by Möngke in his own ultimatum to Louis which was brought back by Rubruck in 1235.

The dissolution of the Mongol empire in 1260–1 again caused Mongol rulers to tone down the traditional claims to world dominion. In the same way that Berke opened relations with the Mamluk Sultan Baybars, Hülegü was prepared to enter into more amicable relations with the Latin world. He wrote to Louis IX in 1262 asking him to blockade Egypt by sea while the Mongols attacked by land, and he also despatched an embassy to Pope Urban IV in 1263. This was the beginning of a series of overtures from the Il-khans of Persia to the pope, and generally also the French and English kings, and sometimes those of Aragon and Sicily, seeking military co-operation against the Mamluks. Hülegü died in 1265, but contact was resumed from 1267 by his son and successor Aqaqa (1265–82), whose envoys attended the Second Council of Lyons in 1274. Aqaqa’s brother Ahmad (1282–4), a Muslim convert who tried unsuccessfully to make peace with Egypt, was supplanted by his nephew Arghun (1284–91), under whom negotiations with the west reached their peak: embassies were sent to Europe in 1285, 1287, 1289 and 1290. The deaths of Arghun in 1291 and of Pope Nicholas IV in 1292 brought these contacts to a halt for some years, but Arghun’s son Ghazan (1295–1304), albeit a Muslim, resumed relations with the west in 1300. His brother Öljeitü (1304–16), also a Muslim but at one time a Christian with the baptismal name of Nicholas in honour of the pope, was the last Il-khan to maintain diplomatic correspondence with the European powers on the basis of their common hostility to the Mamluks, and in 1320 the Mongols of Persia made peace with Egypt.

The Il-khans were careful to choose personnel who would elicit the confidence of the west. Arghun’s embassy of 1287 was led by the Nestorian cleric Rabban Sawma, who acknowledged on behalf of his Church the primacy of Pope Nicholas IV. Expatriate Latins were frequently employed in Mongol embassies. Aqaqa’s envoys in 1274 were accompanied by a Dominican, David of Ashby, who had lived in Persia since 1260, when the gov-

ernment at Acre had sent him on an embassy to Hülegü. From 1289 to 1302 we find the Genoese Buscarello di Ghisolfi serving as the Il-khan’s ambassador to the west, and in 1305 one of Öljeitü’s envoys was the Sienese Tommaso Ugi, his sword-bearer. The undertakings given were sometimes highly specific. In 1289 Arghun promised Philip the Fair 20,000 or 30,000 horses for the Franks, although the figure of 200,000 horses and loads of grain found in Öljeitü’s letter of 1305 to the same monarch appears a trifle suspect.

The foremost theme in these exchanges is the Il-khan’s willingness to restore the Holy Land to Latin hands once it was conquered. But the ambassadors from Mongol Persia also emphasised their master’s favourable treatment of Christians within his dominions and his good will towards Christians in general. There are a number of references in the early correspondence to the release of Christian prisoners who had fallen into Mongol hands after battle with the Muslims. Writing to Louis IX in 1262 Hülegü disowned the action of his troops in attacking Frankish possessions two years previously. And naturally the envoys alluded to their master’s readiness to embrace the faith himself. Urban IV had in 1263 heard of Hülegü’s desire to accept Christianity, and Abaqa’s envoys at the Council of Lyons in 1274 again stressed Hülegü’s sympathy for the faith. In 1287 there was a suggestion that Arghun would be baptised in Jerusalem if only the Latins would help him in its recapture. The Latin powers, seemingly, were at no point informed of the conversions of Ghazan and of Öljeitü to Islam. This was precisely the contingency about which the Majorcan missionary Ramon Llull had voiced anxiety in the 1290s. But in the short term it perhaps did not matter: certainly the conversion exerted no influence on Il-khanid foreign policy.

These protracted Mongol–Frankish negotiations bore little fruit. The Lord Edward, on crusade in the Holy Land in 1271, endeavoured to contact Abaqa, but only a small Mongol force entered Syria, and even then after his departure. The major expedition launched against Syria by Abaqa in 1280–1 and the three campaigns mounted by Ghazan in 1299–1300, 1301 and 1303 did without any western assistance worthy of note; some Hospitallers from Marqab joined the invading Mongols in 1281, and Ghazan’s 1299–1300 operations, which caused such a stir in western Europe, led to nothing more than a brief occupation of the island of Ruad, off the coast of northern Syria, by the Templars.20 In 1291 800 Genoese were being employed on the Tigris by Arghun in the construction of a fleet to harass the Mamluks in the Red Sea, an enterprise which prefigured some of the crusade projects of the next century, but which was aborted when the Genoese fell out and slaughtered one another.21

The very circumstances that had led the Il-khan’s to seek Latin assistance,

namely dissension within the Mongol world, also made it difficult for them to
take the military initiative against the Mamluks. Mongol Persia was surrounded
by enemies. The Il-khans faced hostility not only from the Golden Horde but
also from the Mongols of central Asia. Abaqa’s envoys in 1274 were at pains to
stress that his failure to take the field against the Mamluks was due to entangle-
ments on his other frontiers.\(^{22}\) One reason for Ghazan’s withdrawal from Syria
in 1299, whatever the logistical problems, was the news that Qaidu’s forces had
invaded his eastern territories.\(^{23}\) In 1305 Öljeytu informed Philip the Fair that
the Mongol states had made peace and once more accepted the authority of a
single qaghan, Qubilai’s grandson Temür, based in China. But within a few years
the Mongols had again drifted into internecine warfare.

In seeking to understand why the west, for its part, did not respond more
wholeheartedly to the Il-khans’ overtures, we must surely emphasise the dis-
trust inspired by the Mongols in the past: not only through their attacks on
Latin territory, particularly in 1241–2 and 1260, but also through the disappoint-
ing outcome of Louis IX’s dealings with Eljigidei. Issuing his call for a
 crusade against the Mongols in Syria in December 1260, Pope Alexander IV
had referred to their tactics of simulating friendship towards (Latin) Christians.\(^{24}\) A few years later Urban IV reacted cautiously to Hulegu’s alleged
interest in the faith, promising military aid from the west only once Hulegu had
been converted; and in 1289 Nicholas IV was still sufficiently wary to insist that
Arghun should not wait for the recovery of Jerusalem before being baptised,
though he subsequently modified this stance on the news of the loss of Acre
(1291). It is also possible that western monarchs did not lack the desire to act,
but that they were distracted by concerns closer to home, like Edward I’s
embroilment in Scotland from 1290, or the War of the Sicilian Vespers. The
question is, in other words, inseparable from the neglect of the west to
despatch substantial forces to the Holy Land after the disastrous Seventh
Crusade in 1248–50.

Like the failure to assist Hulegu’s forces during their invasion of Syria in
1260, the lukewarm reaction accorded to his successors has been seen as a
wasted opportunity. Underlying both verdicts, of course, is the belief that, had
a Mongol–western alliance been forged and the Mamluk empire been over-
thrown, the Il-khanid state would in time have adopted Christianity and
thereby changed the whole history of Persia and the Near East – a dubious
proposition. It is noteworthy that Öljeytu’s letter to Philip the Fair, written in
1305 in the wake of a general reconciliation of the Mongol khanates, speaks of

\(^{22}\) Roberg (1973), pp. 300–1.
196, 200, has ‘Baido’ in error: cf. Latin text pp. 319, 321 (variant readings). For the logistical question,
see Morgan (1981).
\(^{24}\) Luard (ed.), ‘Annales monasterii de Burton’, p. 497.
the Mongol world as extending from China ‘as far as the ocean (talu dalai)’ – that is, the edge of the oikoumene.25 This phrase, which the translators took care to dilute, is tantamount to an explicit reassertion of the traditional Mongol theme of world conquest. We should not therefore dismiss the strong possibility that successful Mongol–Latin collaboration in the destruction of the Mamluk state would have been followed by renewed hostilities between the Mongols and their former allies. It was by such means that Chinggis Khan had first risen to power in the eastern steppe.

TRADE AND MISSION

The creation of the Mongol empire, uniting the greater part of Asia under a single government, considerably boosted east–west commerce and made it possible for European merchants to trade directly with the east, independently of Muslim middlemen. It is highly debatable whether one can speak of a Pax Mongolica, since for much of the time after 1260 the Mongol states were at war with one another and merchants were often caught in the crossfire. It is significant that those involved in trade with China tended to prefer the long sea route from Hurmuz (Ormuz) rather than the overland journey from Tana in the Crimea by way of Ürgench in Khwarizm and Almaligh in the Chaghatayid khanate. But within each of the Mongol khanates it was a different matter. The Il-khans in particular were able to provide relatively secure conditions for foreign merchants in their dominions. There was a Venetian colony at Tabriz, one of their principal residences, by 1264. In the Golden Horde territories, the Genoese established themselves not long afterwards at Caffa in the Crimea and at Tana on the sea of Azov. From here they exported Kipchak or ‘Tartar’ slaves not only to the Mamluk empire, a commerce much frowned upon by the curia, but also to Genoa itself.

We have seen how the Il-khans employed Italians in administrative positions and in their diplomatic exchanges with the west. Westerners also found employment with the qaghan, who favoured them, with other foreigners, over the native Chinese. The most famous example is of course Marco Polo, who claims to have been in Qubilai’s service from c. 1275 to 1291 and to have made the return voyage as escort for an imperial princess who was intended to marry the Il-khan Arghun. Even if Polo was not appointed to the governorship of an entire Chinese province, as he claims, he may nevertheless have been in charge of the government salt monopoly in some locality or other, though it has also been suggested that Polo never reached China and learned of the country from informants in Mongolia itself.26

25 Sinor (1972b); for the whole text, see Mostaert and Cleaves (eds.), Lettres.
26 Haeger (1978); Wood (1995).
Marco Polo, who travelled out to the east as a youth, gives no indication of having engaged in any commercial transactions himself, and it is disappointing that his account, committed to writing not by him but by the professional romancer Rustichello of Pisa in about 1298, says nothing of European mercantile activity in the qaghan’s dominions. The great age of such activity was in fact the fourteenth century, when the Genoese played a dominant role in western trade with China, prior to the collapse of Mongol rule in 1368 and the expulsion of foreigners by the native Ming dynasty; but we know of at least one Italian merchant who made the journey in Polo’s time – Pietro di Lucalongo, possibly a Venetian, who travelled out with the Franciscan Montecorvino in 1291.

From an early date Latin missionaries were moving along the trade routes into the Mongol empire. While the Mongol campaigns initially proved inimical to current missionary activity, destroying for instance the recently created bishopric of ‘Cumania’ in 1239, it was not long before their advent could be deemed beneficial. The newly founded orders of friars profited from the substitution of Mongol for Muslim rule over much of western Asia, which made possible public preaching and a fuller external expression of the Christian faith. This continued to be the case even in the Golden Horde after the khans themselves had become Muslims, and in Persia – apart from a brief period in which Christians were persecuted – following the conversion of Ghazan to Islam in 1295. The main obstacle to missionary work was in fact the lack of linguistic expertise among the friars themselves. To this problem, which was noticed by Rubruck as early as 1255, attempts to found schools of oriental languages in Spain, or the decree of the Council of Vienne establishing chairs in Arabic and Hebrew at the leading universities (1312) provided only a partial remedy. But the Codex Cumanicus, a Latin–Persian–Turkish glossary composed in the Crimea in about 1303, demonstrates that in the field there existed a sharper awareness of the linguistic needs of the missionaries.

Most of the thirteenth-century missionaries travelled simply on the authority of their order, as Rubruck did when he visited in turn Sartaq, Batu and Möngke in 1253–4 and as did the Dominican Ricoldo da Montecroce, who spent a number of years in Mongol Persia and Iraq towards the end of the century. Occasionally missions were despatched by the pope with the express intention of inducing a Mongol ruler to accept baptism. A number of the papal embassies to the Il-khans carried letters expounding the Christian faith, and in 1278 Nicholas III sent five Franciscans to Qubilai with the same purpose. But the establishment of a more formal framework belongs to the early fourteenth century. After some years in Persia, the Franciscan Giovanni de Montecorvino left Tabriz in 1291 for the Far East and settled first among the Önggüd in the northern part of the qaghan’s dominions and then at the
Montecorvino’s letters reveal that he had made no headway among the Buddhist and Taoist Chinese population and that his chief success was the conversion to the Latin rite of the Nestorian Önggüd prince Körgüz (George), a son-in-law of the qaghan Temür. It is evident that he encountered opposition from the local Nestorian clergy. But in 1307 Pope Clement V rewarded his labours by creating him archbishop of Khanbaligh, with five suffragans, and by subordinating to the vast new archdiocese the entire missionary effort in Mongol Asia. This arrangement persisted until 1318 when a separate archiepiscopal see was created for Mongol Persia; it was centred on Sultaniyya, which had replaced Tabriz as the Il-khan’s principal residence.

In the short term, western contacts with Mongol Asia might appear to have led into a blind alley. No military collaboration against the common Mamluk enemy resulted from the Il-khans’ frequent embassies. The Mongol rulers did not come over to the Roman Church; nor did the Latin missionaries succeed in winning many of their subjects to their faith. Even European trade with the Far East, though it flourished for some decades under the aegis of the qaghans, nevertheless dried up during the last decades of the fourteenth century. And yet the advent of the Mongols vastly broadened the west’s horizons. For a time Latins were able to travel for thousands of miles further than had previously been possible, and were introduced to a world of whose existence they had been hitherto unaware. China, which had receded from sight with the collapse of the Roman empire, became now, as ‘Cathay’, an idée fixe which would survive the severing of contact in the 1370s. By providing Europeans with direct access to the wealth of the east in the thirteenth century, the Mongol epoch laid the grounds for the voyages of discovery in the fifteenth.
by ‘the Scandinavian kingdoms’ are understood the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In modern English Scandinavia also generally includes Finland and Iceland, and these five countries are regarded, by foreigners as well as by the peoples themselves, as forming a coherent region, though in the Scandinavian languages the term ‘the Nordic countries’ is normally used for this extended area. In the Middle Ages, most of Finland was – like today – ethnically and linguistically distinct from the rest of the area. The country did not, however, form a separate political unity, but was gradually made part of the kingdom of Sweden. By contrast, Iceland was culturally and linguistically closely connected to Norway but was politically independent until the mid-thirteenth century. Further, whereas almost nothing is known about the oldest history of Finland, Iceland possesses an abundance of written sources and a literature of outstanding quality. It is therefore reasonable to pay some attention to Iceland, and rather less to Finland in the following account, though the main focus will be on the three kingdoms, which were politically the most important.¹

The three Scandinavian kingdoms were established long before 1200, as were also – with some exceptions – the borders that were to remain until the great changes of the seventeenth century. When dealing with the thirteenth century, it is convenient to extend the period until 1319, when the first union between Norway and Sweden was established and the death of Eric Menved in Denmark initiated the most severe decline of this country in the Middle Ages.

¹ The standard accounts of the three kingdoms during our period are Skovgaard Petersen (1977), Christensen (1977) and Paludan (1977) for Denmark; Helle (1974) for Norway; and Rosén (1962) for Sweden. Most of the exact information given in the following is to be found there. For Iceland, see Jóhannesson (1974), Byock (1988), Miller (1990) and Sigurðsson (1993). See also the articles on the various countries in Lexikon des Mittelalters (1977–98) and Medieval Scandinavia: an encyclopedia (1993), and the surveys of research on the period in Lindkvist (1979b) on Sweden; Paludan (1979) on Denmark; Suuvanto (1979) on Finland; and Helle (1981) on Norway.
Map 12  Scandinavia and the Baltic
At the beginning of the period, which does not coincide with any decisive event, Denmark was clearly the most powerful of the three kingdoms and was governed by a strong and united monarchy, while Norway and Sweden were torn apart by internal struggles. Denmark was actually the leading country in Scandinavia during most of the Middle Ages and the following period, having the largest population, most arable land and the additional advantage that its land and people were concentrated in a fairly small area, which made control and the extraction of resources easier. The other countries could only challenge the leading position of Denmark when Danish kings were engaged elsewhere or the country was divided by inner struggles.

At the beginning of our period, the Danish kings were clearly in a position to make foreign conquests. However, the target of these conquests was northern Germany and the Baltic, a region that was wealthier than Sweden and Norway. This wealth was in addition of a particularly attractive kind, money and precious metals, which could be easily transported and converted to other resources, armed men and salaries. The situation around 1200 was particularly advantageous for Danish expansion in northern Germany and the Baltic. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the German emperor increasingly became involved in Italy and the Mediterranean and ceased to be a threat to Denmark, as he had been occasionally during the previous period. The most important activity of the emperor in the north during this period was Frederick Barbarossa’s campaign against Henry the Lion in 1180, which put a stop to the duke’s attempt to create a strong principality in the north, thus indirectly opening the way for Danish expansion. At about the same time a new wave of crusading and economic expansion in the Baltic gave the Danish king new opportunities in this region.

These opportunities were exploited by King Valdemar I (1157–82) and his successors, notably Valdemar II (1202–41), surnamed Sejr (Victory), who conquered the northern part of present-day Estonia in 1219, and for a period managed to conquer or establish his overlordship over a number of German principalities and cities, including Hamburg and Lübeck. However, in 1223 Valdemar was taken captive through the treasonable behaviour of some of the German princes. After his release – against a huge ransom – he once more invaded Germany, but was defeated in the battle of Bornhøved in 1227. He then gave up his attempt to regain his German conquests and devoted the rest of his reign to internal affairs, among other things to legislation.

Meanwhile, the situation was changing in the other countries. Peace was gradually established between the two warring factions in Norway, and King Håkon Håkonsson (1217–63) emerged as sole king. Having put down the last rebellion in 1239–40, he ruled without opposition. In Sweden Earl Birger emerged as the real ruler of the country on behalf of his son, Valdemar, who...
was elected king in 1250. Birger finally defeated his opponents in 1251 and ruled without opposition until his death in 1266. Valdemar then ruled until 1275, when he was deposed by his brother Magnus, who managed to retain the kingdom until his death in 1290, despite the threat of Valdemar's return.

Internal peace brought about foreign expansion. An obvious aim for the Norwegian king was the islands in the north and west. From around 1220 the Norwegian rulers attempted to make Iceland submit to Norway. This could mainly be achieved by diplomatic means, as the country was both too distant and too poor and thinly populated to support an army long enough to make a conquest. During the twelfth century, a gradual process of the concentration of power had been going on in Iceland, until the country was divided between five families, who controlled different parts of it. From the 1220s onwards, violent struggles took place between these families. King Håkon intervened in these struggles, trying to make now one, now another of the magnates his ally, and attempting to exploit them for his own purpose. He also made use of the bishops, who were elected by the cathedral chapter of Trondheim. All bishops elected between 1238 and the end of the free state in 1262 were Norwegian. Finally, he could exploit the fact that the Icelanders were dependent on Norwegian shipping for their trade, as it was impossible for them to build their own ships at this time, for lack of timber. The result of these attempts was that the Icelanders in 1262–4 submitted to the Norwegian king in return for certain concessions. The union with Norway brought about considerable changes, but the country remained a separate entity and was governed in a different way from mainland Norway. Greenland submitted to the king of Norway in 1261 but was too remote for this extension of the ‘Norwegian empire’ to be of much practical importance.

In the British Isles, the king of Norway had claims, dating back to the Viking age, to Shetland, the Orkneys, the Hebrides and Man, which were asserted more or less successfully, according to circumstances. The favourable situation after the end of the internal struggles in Norway concided with a revival of the kingdom of Scotland, which also had claims in this area. A great Norwegian expedition against Scotland in 1263 proved indecisive, and in 1266 the king of Norway ceded the Hebrides and Man to Scotland against an annual tribute, while the king of Scotland recognised Norwegian control over the other islands, Shetland and the Orkneys. In the following years, the Norwegians did not attempt any further territorial expansion in the west but tried to secure their economic interests by diplomatic means.

The Swedish equivalent to Norwegian expansion in the north and west was expansion in the Baltic, particularly in the northern area, Finland. This expansion was to some extent a continuation of the Viking expeditions, but can also be regarded as a reaction to plundering expeditions by Finnish peoples in
Sweden. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the sources mention several Swedish crusades against Finland, which was still a pagan country, but give little exact information. A Finnish diocese was established in the early thirteenth century, and the town of Viborg, on the Karelian peninsula, was founded during a crusade in the 1290s. There was also a continuous process of settlement by Swedes along the coast of Finland during the century. Swedish expansion in Finland led to conflicts with Rus’, which were temporarily brought to an end by a peace treaty in 1323, dividing the Karelian peninsula and the northern areas between the two countries.

While to Denmark the most attractive aims of foreign expansion lay outside Scandinavia, Norwegian and Swedish expansion was more directed towards a country within the area, Denmark itself, which was wealthier than the islands in the west, possibly also than the area of Swedish expansion in the Baltic. Sweden had the additional motive for seeking expansion along its southern and western border that the country was almost land-locked in this region, only having a narrow passage to the sea at the mouth of Göta Älv, where Gothenburg is situated today. An opportunity for the two neighbouring countries turned up in the second half of the thirteenth century, when Denmark was torn apart by internal struggles, between the sons of King Valdemar II and their descendants, and eventually between the king on the one hand and the Church and an aristocratic opposition on the other. In 1286 King Eric Klipping was murdered, and the government established for the minority of his son Eric Menved accused nine Danish magnates of the crime, and had them outlawed and their goods confiscated, which led to a prolonged struggle. Further, the Danish monarchy had three major conflicts with the Church between 1252 and 1321. To a considerable extent these conflicts became intertwined in each other.

From the 1250s onwards, kings or princes in the two neighbouring countries tried to exploit these conflicts. There was, however, no clear-cut division between the countries based on territorial interests; dynastic and personal alliances and internal divisions also played their part. Norway conducted a fairly constant, fairly intense, anti-Danish policy. The direct occasion for this was the conflict over the inheritance of the Danish princess Ingeborg, who married King Håkon’s son and eventual successor Magnus (ruled 1263–80) in 1261. After 1286 the king of Norway supported the Danish outlaws and gave them a stronghold in the border region between the two countries, from which they fought the Danish king and government. Norway was on the offensive in the following years, fairly successfully. An important reason for this was internal peace and stability. Admittedly, there was a conflict with the Church in the 1280s, during which all the bishops went into exile for a short period, but this conflict was far less serious than the struggles in the neighbouring countries.

During the first phase of these conflicts Sweden mostly remained neutral or
adopted a friendly attitude to Denmark. A possible reason for this is that King Magnus had received aid from Denmark when deposing his brother, and was afraid that he might try to regain the throne. After Magnus’s death a marriage alliance was concluded between the two countries in 1296–8. However, in 1302 Sweden entered into an alliance with Norway, when Duke Eric, a brother of King Birger of Sweden, was engaged to King Hákon V of Norway’s daughter Ingeborg, who at the time was one year old. Shortly afterwards, a violent conflict broke out between King Birger and his brothers, the dukes Eric and Valdemar, which established the main pattern of later struggles, though there were short-term shifts of alliances: the ruling kings of Denmark and Sweden stood together against Norway in alliance with the opposition in both countries. The Swedish dukes tried to create an inter-Scandinavian principality in the rich border region between the three kingdoms, intriguing against all three kings. A Danish revival took place under Eric Menved (1286–1319), who conducted a defensive policy towards Sweden and Norway, while his main aim was northern Germany. He had considerable success here and was also generally the strongest in the internal struggles. Towards the end of his reign, however, his extensive use of castles and German mercenaries led to increasing financial problems, and he had to pawn a number of tithes in Denmark to obtain ready money. These problems gave the aristocratic opposition a new chance at Eric’s death in November 1319. At his election in 1320, the new king, Christopher II, had to issue a statute (håndfæstning), promising to govern according to the will of his electors on a number of specific points. In Sweden the long struggles between King Birger and his brothers ended in the victory of the latter, after the murder of Eric and Valdemar themselves. The new regime took over at an assembly in 1319, formally declaring the kingdom of Sweden to be elective, and not hereditary, and establishing an aristocratic council to govern on behalf of the three-year-old Magnus, the son of Duke Eric, who at the same time inherited the throne of Norway.

Sweden was the winner of the early fourteenth-century struggles in the sense that a Swedish prince was able to carve out a principality for himself at the cost of the two other countries, so that Sweden was bound to be the leading partner in the union with Norway of 1319. Despite its internal stability, Norway had not managed to maintain its prominent position in inter-Nordic politics after the turn of the century, when both the others became fully engaged in the competition. To the south, Denmark was in steady decline, and the opportunity seemed to open up to unite the rich border area of Scania to the Swedish kingdom. In internal struggles, the aristocracy was the winner, both in Denmark and Sweden. Even in Norway, where the relationship between the king and the aristocracy was generally harmonious, the succession in 1319 introduced a period of greater strength for the aristocracy.
STATE BUILDING, ELITE FORMATION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In the long run, the Swedish success of the early fourteenth century proved ephemeral, and Denmark once more emerged as the leading country during the second half of the century. The short duration of the changes described above should not, however, make us lose sight of the long-term development during the period, which has often been summarised under the headline ‘the growth of the state’. This may be based too much on modern analogies; and a better description would be centralisation and the growth of public power, consisting of the Church, the monarchy and the secular aristocracy, in short the emergence of a central elite more obviously distinct from the rest of the population than in the period before.

The description as well as the explanation of this development – at least in so far as the emergent state is concerned – has played a major role in Scandinavian historiography. The answers can be divided into three main categories. Focusing on the ‘service aspect’ of the state, notably in the field of justice, some historians have regarded the evolution of the state as a ‘natural’ development of institutions necessary to serve the needs of the population under new conditions. This interpretation was particularly strong in the nineteenth century, above all in Norway; but it continues to play some part in contemporary historiography. The second interpretation is primarily linked to the strong school of agrarian history, of a more or less Marxist persuasion, which emerged in Norway in the interwar period. This school focuses on demography and changes in landownership, regarding the development of the state as the outcome of a Malthusian situation. Finally, a third group of historians seeks the answer in military specialisation, which allowed the elite to force the peasant population to pay taxes and rents. This interpretation is also to some extent inspired by Marxist thought, particularly in the form developed by Althusser and the New Left from the 1960s on (although it also has its liberal or conservative varieties). By contrast, the recent trends towards ‘the history of mentality’ or cultural and symbolic interpretations of political phenomena has so far had little impact in Scandinavian historiography; but it may constitute a fourth line of interpretation which may serve as a stimulus to further research.

These interpretations are not mutually exclusive, allowing a number of combinations and intermediate forms. Here they will be utilised to discuss the main aspects of the social changes that took place in the period.

Economic change and the structure of society

In the later Middle Ages, the peasants, according to modern estimates, owned 15 per cent of the land in Denmark and 33 per cent in Norway, these percent-
ages being based on land value. As for Sweden, about half of the farms were owned by freeholders in the early sixteenth century. This percentage cannot be directly compared to those of the other Scandinavian countries, as it is based on number of farms, not on land value. Most historians have assumed that this situation was different from the one prevailing in the tenth or eleventh centuries, and consequently that there was a decline in peasant ownership during the high Middle Ages, corresponding to a shift towards a more aristocratic society. As for Iceland, there are indications of a more aristocratic social structure in the thirteenth century; but most of the farmers were freeholders even then.

There are widely divided opinions as to when and why the change in ownership took place in the three kingdoms, and how far-reaching this process was. According to the ‘Marxist-Malthusian school’ in Norway, the great transformation there took place in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as a direct result of demographic growth: the population increased until it reached the limits of what the available land could support with the existing technology. This made the peasants dependent on the great lords, who took over their farms, and out of the surplus of their production were able to build up an organised Church and state. In a similar way, there has been a tradition in Swedish and particularly Danish historiography of imagining a society mainly consisting of peasant owners in the early Middle Ages, which was then transformed in an aristocratic direction during the following period. In Denmark this change is said to have taken place particularly during the ‘age of unrest’, from 1242 to 1340, when most of the peasants became tenants under the great landowners in order to escape the increasingly heavy taxation.

However, recent research, particularly in Denmark, has raised doubts about this assumption, describing the ‘peasants’ of the Valdemarian age and earlier as the owners or tenants of fairly large farms, worked by numerous slaves and poor workers. This pattern of landownership was very labour intensive and must reflect the great population density, while the later system of smaller farms may have been caused by a fall in the population, either because of the Black Death or because of overpopulation and starvation in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, or both. Thus Danish society may have been highly stratified from very early on. We do not know how widespread the ‘Valdemarian’ pattern of landholding was; however, it is still possible that a considerable decline in peasant landownership took place during the century after 1241, though the society of the previous period was hardly egalitarian in the idealised way imagined by scholars in the nineteenth and early twentieth

2 Holmsen (1977).
3 Ersløv (1898); Arup (1925–32); see Paludan (1977), pp. 403–5, 416–24. For Sweden, see Lindkvist (1979a) and (1979b).
centuries. As for Norway, the most widespread assumption is still that a transition from freeholders to tenants did take place, but that this process was more gradual than assumed by the ‘Marxist-Malthusian school’, and consequently that the egalitarian character of the early period has again been exaggerated.

As for the explanation of this transition, the evidence of place names and to some extent archaeology suggests a considerable extension and intensification of cultivated land, which again means demographic growth, in all countries during the period, particularly in Norway and Denmark. The main agricultural areas of Sweden, the plains of Östergötland, Västergötland and the Mälar valley, were also fairly densely populated towards the end of our period. By the mid-fourteenth century the population of Denmark has been estimated at 1 million people, while the suggestions for Norway vary between 300,000 and 500,000. The Swedish number must be somewhere in between that of Denmark and Norway. The population of Iceland was hardly more than 50,000. However, while demographic growth can hardly be doubted, this fact does not necessarily mean that the pattern of landownership or the overall social structure in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries were the result of a Malthusian crisis. First, we cannot be sure that the Scandinavian countries were overpopulated by the mid-fourteenth century and even less that they were so a hundred years before. Second, other factors may have contributed equally or more to the social changes during the high Middle Ages. As for Denmark, scholars have pointed out that taxes were already very high in the twelfth century, while the land rent was low. This is an argument in favour of the military rather than the demographic explanation of the social structure of the high Middle Ages, which actually seems to be the explanation favoured by the majority of Danish and Swedish scholars.

Urbanisation in Scandinavia was mostly the result of the emergence of administrative centres for the king and the Church and of the growth of a landowning aristocracy. Increasing population meant increasing production of food. Most of Scandinavia was well suited to animal farming, and products like butter and hides were important export articles. When the landowning aristocracy appropriated more of the surplus of agriculture, a proportionally greater part of these products was brought to the market, in return for luxury products, like clothes, wine and beer. However, of the around 140 Scandinavian towns older than the early fourteenth century – fifteen in Norway, twenty-five in Sweden and the rest in Denmark – only three were really important centres for long-distance trade, Bergen, Stockholm and Visby, with probably around 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants each.

The most important export article from Scandinavia in the high Middle

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Ages was fish, which was in great demand in the expanding towns of western Europe. Large amounts of cod were caught during the first months of the year in Lofoten in northern Norway, dried and transported to Bergen as stockfish and finally exported to England and other countries of western Europe. Scania in Denmark (now southern Sweden) had extremely rich herring fisheries; and during the thirteenth century the great fair here became a meeting place for trade in general between Scandinavia, Germany and western Europe. Towards the end of the fourteenth century, the value of Lübeck’s trade through Scania was six times that of the city’s trade through Bergen. The iron and copper mining industry in Sweden dates back to the period before 1300, but did not become really important commercially until later.

The growth in the fish trade was not directly related to the change in landownership. Although part of the fish was sold by great landowners, who received the fish as land rent, the fishermen themselves also took an active part in this trade. The fish trade was economically important enough to sustain a class of wealthy merchants. However, these merchants were not of Scandinavian origin. By the thirteenth century the northern German towns had grown into important commercial centres, had taken over a major part of the great trade routes of the Baltic and the North Sea and were beginning to establish a union between themselves – what was later to become the Hanseatic League. The Germans also dominated the fish trade at the market in Scania. The relationship between them and the Scandinavian kingdoms was somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, they fulfilled an obvious need for the great landowners to sell their products and get others in return, and for money and credit. On the other hand, their trading conditions and the conditions for settlement in the Scandinavian cities were a constant source of conflict, and the wealth of the merchants and cities was a temptation, particularly for the Danish king. The events during the last years of Eric Menved’s reign and after his death in 1319 showed that they were too powerful to be conquered, and were a pointer towards further expansion during the following decades.

Both the phenomena discussed here, demographic expansion and change in landownership on the one hand, and urbanisation and growth of trade on the other, contributed to political centralisation and elite formation. However, it remains to be considered whether these factors give a full explanation, or whether political and military developments were an independent variable.

The military transformation and its consequences

The old military system in the Scandinavian countries was the popular levy (Norse leidang, Danish leding, Swedish ledung) primarily intended for sea warfare.

8 Nedkvitne (1983).
Its origin can probably be traced back to the Viking age in Denmark and Norway. In Sweden, it is only to be found in the eastern part of the country. Very little is known of it there, and it may be a later phenomenon than in the two other countries. The leidang, as described in the regional laws, was a division of the coastal regions into districts which were obliged to build and maintain a ship and equip it with armed men and provisions for a certain period each year. There were no taxes. As in many early societies, not least among the Germanic peoples, the payment of taxes was considered degrading. However, the king and his retainers had the right to be entertained while travelling around the country. Both these contributions could and did develop into permanent taxes. The Danish king was entitled to great contributions from the people in the form of hospitality. Most probably, such contributions went back to the Viking age, as is indicated by the king’s building activities and his expeditions against England during this period. Thus, the Danish king probably had considerable financial resources from early on. By the middle of the twelfth century, there are indications of a regular tax, which may be a commutation of hospitality. Hospitality was probably important in Norway as well. In addition, there is evidence of great royal confiscations of land, which made the king a far more important landowner in this early period than in the high Middle Ages, when most of the royal land had been donated to the Church.

As for military service, the king might issue an order of mobilisation and then take the provisions, while allowing the warriors to go home. Or he might reduce the number of men, but demand better equipment and longer periods of service. Examples of both these procedures are to be found from the twelfth century onwards. During the internal struggles in Norway (1130–1240), the contributions from the people were clearly developing into a regular tax, while the kings built up armies of retainers. Military reform was introduced in Denmark around 1170, reducing the number of ships but demanding longer service from the ones that remained. In addition, land warfare became relatively more important, and cavalry was used from the first half of the twelfth century in Denmark, somewhat later in Sweden. The process continued during the following period. In Denmark the peasant levy disappeared, to be replaced by full-time warriors, who were exempt from taxes in return for their service, while the tax burden on the rest of the population increased. The formal expression of the new order in Sweden came in Alsnö stadga (the statute of Alsnö), probably in 1280, which is usually regarded as a kind of ‘constitution’ for the Swedish aristocracy, confirming the principle of specialised military service in return for privileges. The closest Norwegian equivalent to Alsnö stadga are the decisions from two meetings between the king and his men in 1273, entered in the Law of the King’s retainers (Hirdskrå) shortly afterwards. Here the royal bailiffs agreed to maintain a specified number of men on the
incomes from their districts, to serve the king in war. Scholars have discussed whether in practice this force ever came into existence. In any case, it is clear that it was not intended as a substitute but rather as a supplement to the peasant levy.

The last step in this transition was the introduction of castles. The first ones were built in the twelfth century. In the 1240s, the king of Denmark had twenty of them, while ten belonged to the duke of southern Jutland. The great expansion took place in the following period, as the consequence of the more intense internal struggles from 1286, and during Eric Menved’s wars in the early fourteenth century. After a rebellion in Jutland, which was put down in 1313, the king built a number of castles in this region, while until then most of the castles had been in the border regions and along strategic sea passages. In Sweden, small and simple castles were built in the twelfth century, while the really large and elaborate constructions date from the thirteenth century, particularly from the second half. These new castles could serve as residences for the king and his representatives, and also as fortifications. The oldest Norwegian castles date from the internal struggles in the late twelfth century. During the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, castles were built in the king’s main residential cities and in some border areas.

The castles not only improved the king’s military capacity, they also led to far-reaching administrative and social changes. They were expensive both to build and maintain but enabled the king to exploit the people more efficiently, a small number of armed men in a castle being able to suppress a wide area. Thus, in reducing the number of armed men the king needed, and increasing the cost of keeping them, they furthered the transition from the popular levy to a limited number of royal retainers, financed by taxes from the majority of the population. Both for strategic reasons and because of the cost and labour necessary to build and keep the castles, they also turned into administrative centres. The older royal administration was based on the combination of stewards of the king’s estate, who fulfilled various functions on behalf of their master, and allies among the local magnates. Basically, this system was retained in Denmark and Sweden; but it was transformed through the development of castles, their commanders becoming the governors of the surrounding area.

However, this military specialisation did not take place all over Scandinavia. The central agricultural areas of Sweden underwent much the same transition as Denmark, while freeholders dominated in the less fertile areas, and continued to perform military service in person. Iceland and Norway form the greatest contrast to Denmark. Iceland, which was not threatened by external enemies, had no collective military organisation. The warring magnates

depended on ‘friends’ and allies among the peasants in their mutual struggles. The power concentration in the thirteenth century led to a certain degree of professionalisation but not to the development of a military aristocracy. In Norway the king managed to make the peasants pay an annual tax, which in the 1270s was fixed at half the amount of the provisions due at an actual mobilisation. This was far less than the taxes in the two other countries. The total annual income of the king of Denmark by the mid-thirteenth century was around 40,000 marks (7,500 kg) of silver. Much of this consisted of rents from landed estates but the tax incomes were also far higher than the Norwegian ones. The total annual income of the Norwegian king – taxes, fines, land rents and so on – is estimated at about 8,000 marks (1,500 kg) of silver. The Swedish incomes are more difficult to estimate; but the level of taxation is closer to the Danish than to the Norwegian one. But then the Norwegian peasants still served in person. The principal reason for this was the importance of the fleet.

Norway has an extremely long coast, along which most of the population lived, then as now. A strong fleet was therefore essential to control the country. With the naval technology that prevailed until the early fourteenth century, superior skill and training were not really able to compensate for numerical inferiority in warfare at sea by comparison with land, because of the large number of rowers needed, and the difficulty in defeating a numerically superior enemy by surprise attacks or tactical manoeuvring. Consequently, the peasant levy could not be substituted by a small force of royal retainers, and the state depended more than in most other countries on the people’s cooperation. The lack of military specialisation and the small tax incomes of the Norwegian king also explain why fewer castles were erected in this country than in Denmark and Sweden. The local administration therefore developed in a different way from that of the neighbouring countries. From the second half of the twelfth century a new official, a bailiff (yslumadr), a parallel to the English and continental officials of the same period, was introduced, and from the first half of the thirteenth century the country was divided into fixed districts, around forty in all, each headed by a bailiff, who often had no connection with the district in which he served. He might also be replaced and moved from one district to another. In this way, Norway developed a local administration more directly under the king’s control, while at the same time the Norwegian aristocracy became an administrative rather than a military class.

Wars against other countries no doubt played an important part in explaining these changes. But internal struggles were at least as important. In Sweden, a laconic entry in the annals states that the people of Uppland lost their freedom as a result of their defeat in 1247 at Sparrsäter, against Earl Birger, and had to pay taxes. A number of peasant rebellions or conflicts between members of the elite and the peasants may have led to similar results in the
other countries as well. But there are also examples of a gradual and more peaceful conversion of the contribution to the popular levy into a regular tax. Furthermore, the prolonged civil wars in all the Scandinavian countries can hardly be regarded primarily as confrontations between the elite and the common people, as some historians have maintained. They were also struggles within the elite, between the king and other power holders or between different dynasties. But they all had a similar effect, in creating a military elite, trained through years of more or less continuous warfare and able and accustomed to coerce ordinary peasants into paying taxes and other contributions.

The version of the ‘military explanation’ presented here is inspired by Norbert Elias’s analysis of the early modern period: struggles between centres of power, in which the strongest win, lead to centralisation. This applies to internal as well as external struggles. With some modification, military specialisation offered a competitive advantage. Once one country or region specialised, the others had to follow. Thus, within the Nordic region, the changes started in Germany then spread to Denmark, and from there to Sweden and to some extent Norway. However, the final result of this process was different from that of the age of absolutism. In contrast to the situation in the early modern period, medieval military specialisation did not favour a strong monarchy. The contemporary ‘military specialists’ did not belong to large and highly organised armies with expensive equipment; they fought in small groups or individually. A castle took a long time to build; but, once built, it could be defended by a small number of men. Thus, there was not much to prevent these military specialists from establishing themselves as local power holders in opposition to the king. Admittedly, the king retained control over most of the military forces until 1319, notably most of the castles, and in addition, he was able to use foreign mercenaries against his adversaries within the aristocracy. This, however, led to a financial crisis for the king and made him dependent on either German creditors or the great magnates, who increased their power by taking over the command of castles. The expansion of towns and trade in Scandinavia during our period was not able to provide the kings with sufficient cash revenues, as most of the surplus of this expansion went to German merchants and not to the Scandinavian kings.

Without trying to decide whether military specialisation can be regarded as

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10 For various versions of the ‘the military explanation’ of the social change in the high Middle Ages, see Lönnroth (1940), pp. 130ff, and (1964); Lunden (1978); Skovgaard-Petersen (1977), pp. 243ff, 262–3 (with further references); Paludan (1977), pp. 443ff, 466ff; Bohg, Würtz-Sørensen and Tvede-Jensen (1988); Lindkvist (1988); and Bagge (1989).


12 See Lönnroth (1940), pp. 137–71, which is based mainly on evidence from the second half of the fourteenth century onwards. However, the situation in Denmark in the first half of the century indicates the same situation then.
the ‘ultimate’ cause of the changes described in this chapter, or whether it in turn depended on demographic or ecological factors, this specialisation is clearly able to account for a number of important features of centralisation and elite formation and for some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Scandinavian states of the period. However, we also have to consider the peaceful dimension to this process, which is most obvious in the field of justice.

**Justice and legislation**

Earlier generations of scholars often described social change in the Scandinavian countries during our period as a transition from a ‘society of kindred’ to a ‘society of the state’. In recent years this idea has been criticised as being too simple. But some change did take place along these lines, with the emergence of public justice, maintained by the Church and the king. The early system appears most clearly in the extensive sources preserved from the Icelandic free state (before 1262).\(^\text{13}\) Iceland had an elaborate system of law but no public power to enforce it. The initiative in all cases, including those of homicide, lay with the parties themselves, and the outcome of such cases was generally determined by the strength of the parties and the support they were able to muster. Family and personal friendship were clearly decisive in such matters, though Icelandic society was not a ‘society of kindred’ in the sense that individuals belonged to extensive clans with well-defined claims on loyalty. The family structure of the Scandinavian countries still needs more research.\(^\text{14}\) There is general agreement that it was mainly bilateral, resulting in frequently divided loyalty even among close relatives, thus preventing the formation of large family clans, although their emergence was not impossible. The ties of kinship generally seem to have been more extensive in Denmark and Sweden, at least within the aristocracy, than in Norway, which more resembles Iceland.

As for the legal system, we cannot use twelfth- and thirteenth-century Iceland as a direct model for the early development of the other Scandinavian countries. But we can trace the emergence of a centralised public authority deciding conflicts between people, to some extent even prosecuting on its own behalf, and issuing law codes by virtue of its supreme right to govern the county. From fairly early on, the king must have demanded fines for certain offences and taken his share of the compensation paid as the result of a settlement. The Church took an important step forward in the twelfth century by introducing a number of ‘new’ offences which its own officials were respons-

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\(^\text{13}\) Byock (1982) and (1988); Miller (1990); Sigurðsson (1993).

ible for punishing, such as infringements of its rules on marriage and sexuality or on fasts and holidays. These were not offences against one particular person who then came forward to protect his own interests. They affected abstract principles, concerning the community as a whole. This meant new rules regarding evidence whether the offence had actually taken place. Further, the distinction between prosecution and judgement was not very sharp in traditional Scandinavian law, as the rules of evidence were formal. With the introduction of a new public authority to prosecute, it was a short step to the emergence of this authority as a new court of law, which was probably what happened gradually during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

As for substantial rules, the Church brought about numerous changes. The right of the kin or family to the property of its deceased members was circumscribed through the introduction of the right to leave a certain amount of one's property according to one's personal wishes – which of course conformed to the interests of the Church. The right of divorce – which had been fairly liberal in pre-Christian times – was abolished, while the free consent of the partners became necessary for a marriage to be valid. Earlier, the woman's consent was not necessary, though she may in practice have had some influence. There is evidence of marriages being declared invalid because of lack of consent, though in practice marriages mostly continued to be arranged by families. Still, the changes in this field are evidence of marriage ties becoming firmer and more important than family ties, and to some extent they are also evidence of a more prominent position for the individual in relation to the kin.

The Church also encouraged the king to come forward as the supreme judge of the realm and to punish violence and homicide and suppress feuds and private revenge. As in other European countries, the king first acted as the supreme legislator of the realm by issuing statutes regarding such matters. The oldest extant Scandinavian example of this is Knud VI of Denmark's statute on homicide of 1200, proclaiming the royal right to issue laws, while at the same time maintaining that in this case, he only revives an ancient but forgotten law. King Hákon of Norway expressed the same ideas in a similar context in 1260, and the main message of the great monument to political thought at Hákon's court, *The king's mirror*, is that the king is a judge on God's behalf, that he should imitate God's just judgements in the Old Testament, punish crimes and see that all men receive what is their due. In Sweden, royal peace legislation goes back to the mid-thirteenth century.

In the second phase, this new attitude was expressed in law codes, issued and promulgated by the king. Written laws have been preserved in Denmark,
Norway and Iceland from the twelfth and in Sweden from the thirteenth century. The oldest have traditionally been considered ‘popular’, based on ancient custom. This is probably exaggerated, and both the king and the Church may have been involved in their production. Still, they are different from the later laws, directly issued by the king, the oldest example of which is *The law of Jutland*, issued by King Valdemar II of Denmark in 1241. However, the Danish king did not issue a law for the whole country until 1683. By contrast, the king of Norway issued such a law in 1274–7, specifically for the countryside, as opposed to the contemporary law for the towns. The new law was a revision and harmonisation of the four older, regional laws. The royal codification of laws in Sweden began with the law of Uppland in 1296 and culminated in King Magnus Ericsson’s law for the whole country (in other words, the countryside) in 1350 and for the towns in 1352.

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There were practical consequences: the king of Norway managed to ban private revenge during the thirteenth century. Instead, if one man had killed another, he had to seek the king’s pardon, and settle his case by paying fines to the king and the relatives or heirs of the deceased. By doing so, he received extra protection from the king against attempts at revenge. As far as the sources permit us to draw conclusions, this system was actually practised during the following centuries, and we rarely hear of attempts at revenge. To judge from the laws and to some extent the sagas, it seems that already during the thirteenth century solidarity between family members was narrowing down to a small circle, directly connected to the household, and that this development continued during the later Middle Ages.

Norway is the clearest example of the expansion of royal justice and the social changes accompanying this process. The Danish king tried to carry out a similar reform but had to abandon it because of strong opposition from the aristocracy, whose members wanted to retain their right to feuds and solidarity within the kindred. The struggles over such questions, however, are evidence of the expansion of royal justice during the second half of the thirteenth century and the first decades of the fourteenth. While in the statute of the Diet of Nyborg in 1282, issued in favour of the aristocracy, the king promised to bring his cases before the ordinary, local courts, the statute issued by King Christopher II at his accession in 1320, which is equally aristocratic in its contents, takes a special royal court of law for granted. A royal court of law also developed in Sweden in connection with the peace legislation. As for Iceland, the main changes came with submission to the king of Norway, which led to new legislation, based on similar

18 Fenger (1971), pp. 428–65; Bogh (1987). Sjöholm (1988) gives a totally different interpretation of this development, mainly based on Swedish law, regarding the monarchy as the promoter of the judicial solidarity of the kindred. However, her conclusions have not gained wide acceptance. For a general survey of the numerous problems relating to the Scandinavian laws, see Norseng (1987).
principles to those in Norway (1271–3 and 1281), and on public justice administered by royal officials. But there were tendencies in this direction in the principalities formed by the great magnates in the first half of the century.

The emergence of public justice, organised by the Church as well as the monarchy, was an important factor in the political centralisation and in the development of the elite, by creating new officials and by transferring economic resources and political power from the peasants to the elite. In short, it worked in a similar way to the military specialisation. Should it then primarily be regarded as another means of exploiting the population more thoroughly, or was it a ‘service function’? Both points of view have had and still have their adherents. Public justice clearly served the interests of the monarchy and the elite. From the point of view of the people its main disadvantage could be corrupt royal officials and slow justice. As for its advantages, it is important to note that feuds were suppressed not primarily by prohibitions and punishment, but through alternative ways of solving conflicts. The existence of public justice made it easier to settle legal questions, while at the same time making it possible to abstain from revenge without losing face. It is difficult in this field to draw the line between exploitation and common interests. In any case, whether or not the evolution of public justice corresponded to the ‘objective’ interests of the people, the reason for its progress must be sought in ideology far more than in direct pressure from above, in contrast to the field of military specialisation. This appears from the fact that not only royal but also ecclesiastical jurisdiction expanded during our period, and that the expansion of public justice took place mainly in periods of internal peace and stability.

CULTURE AND IDEOLOGY

The formation of an elite can be traced in the cultural field as well as in the social, economic and political ones. A clerical aristocracy, based on the monasteries and the cathedral chapters, emerged during the twelfth century and became more closely linked to the international Church. Celibacy was a clear step in this direction. It was introduced relatively late in Scandinavia, not becoming compulsory in Norway and Sweden until the thirteenth century, and even later – and with less effect – in Iceland. Though it was hardly practised, in the sense that the clergy did not cease to live with women, it effectively prevented ecclesiastical offices from becoming hereditary, and it served to distinguish the ecclesiastical elite from the lay one.

Education was another distinctive mark. As is evident from the considerable

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20 For a subtle and nuanced discussion of this question, see Miller (1990), pp. 297–9.
bulk of ecclesiastical statutes, letters, theological and devotional literature and so forth, members of the higher clergy in Scandinavia were familiar with the Latin language and regarded themselves as belonging to an international educated elite. We meet a number of Danish and Norwegian students at prominent centres of learning, such as Paris, in the twelfth century, and the number grew during the thirteenth. It seems to have been fairly common for canons and other members of the higher clergy to have a period of study at a foreign university behind them. Around 1300 the number of university-educated people was apparently considerably higher in Denmark and Sweden than in Norway.21

A secular elite culture was built up around the court. As for Norway, *The king’s mirror* gives a vivid picture of the attempts to introduce courtly manners and European customs regarding dress, speech, ceremonial, ways of riding or sitting at the table and in particular rules intended to promote respect for the king.22 There are similar references in the literature from the other countries. The secular literature of the period can largely be regarded as a celebration of a royalist-aristocratic culture. The Icelandic and Norwegian kings’ sagas are to some extent an example of this, though the Icelandic family sagas, and partly even the kings’ sagas, reflect a less exclusively aristocratic society than the literature of the other countries. The great masterpiece among the kings’ sagas, *Heimskringla*, written by the Icelandic magnate Snorri Sturluson, most probably around 1230, is a clear expression of the decentralised and competitive Icelandic society of the first half of the thirteenth century, and its ideology stands in sharp contrast to the authoritarian and hierarchical one of the mid-thirteenth-century Norwegian sources.23 The slightly earlier Danish work, *Gesta Danorum*, by Saxo Grammaticus, written in learned and complicated Latin, combines European learning and a Christian interpretation of history with the celebration of Danish aristocratic virtues.24 The clearest examples of the new courtly culture in Scandinavia are the romances and ballads of the last three-quarters of the thirteenth century, directly or indirectly inspired by France.25

We know less well how the common people reacted to these innovations. There has been some discussion, particularly in Norway, as to whether the Scandinavian peoples were really converted to Christianity during the Middle Ages. Judging from external phenomena, such as the wealth and organisation of the Church, the number of clerics and the size, number, wealth and beauty of churches, there is nothing to suggest that these countries were any different from the rest of Europe. Consequently, recent discussion of broad trends in European Christianity applies to Scandinavia as well.26

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26 Van Engen (1986).
One of the most important aspects of high medieval culture is the way in which it served to distinguish the elite from the rest of the population and to emphasise its leading position in society. The cathedrals, which were often also centres of pilgrimage, were monuments to the glory of God and His Church, while religious art also served to bring home central points in the Christian message to an illiterate population. Royal and courtly culture was less visible to the common people, though the castles must have been quite impressive. Generally, however, this elite culture emphasises an important change in attitudes to power and authority. In earlier Norwegian and Icelandic society, to judge from the sagas, a man’s ability to gain respect and obedience depended very much on his personal performance. Either strictly personal abilities, such as prudence, courage, bodily strength and beauty, or particular favour with the gods or the supernatural powers (‘luck’) belonged by nature to some people or perhaps to some kin groups. Christianity introduced the notion of an office, with particular claims to obedience, combined with the idea of a sacrament, which gave the office holder special qualities. Consequently, it drew a sharper line of division between the elite and the common people. The sacramental functions of the priest and bishop are clear examples of this. These officials were then responsible for transmitting divine grace to the rest of the population in the shape of other sacraments, such as confession and eucharist.

The royal office was transformed in the same way through the introduction of royal unction and coronation, which took place for the first time in Norway in 1163. The first Danish coronation took place in 1170 and the first Swedish probably in 1210. In the course of the thirteenth century this ceremony became established custom in all three countries. From the mid-thirteenth century, not only the king but also the queen was crowned, and the dynasty as a whole acquired a new importance, the difference between the king and the aristocracy becoming more strongly underlined. Thus, the king only married members of other royal families, and even other members of the dynasty stopped marrying non-royal partners. The cult of the royal saints, St Olav in Norway, St Knud in Denmark and St Eric in Sweden, can be regarded in the same perspective. These saints and their cults date from the eleventh and thirteenth centuries but they played an important part in the relationship between the monarchy and the people during the following centuries. The king’s authority and the monarchy as an office, instituted by God, is celebrated in royal diplomas and statutes, and more explicitly in political treatises like The king’s mirror in Norway from the mid-thirteenth century, and On the government of kings and princes (largely an adaptation of De

regimine principum by Aegidius Romanus) in Sweden from the early fourteenth century.  

THE DIVISION OF POWER

The emergence of the elite was accompanied by considerable tension within this group. Since the interwar period it has been fashionable in Scandinavian historiography to regard the internal conflicts in Denmark and Sweden from the mid-thirteenth century onwards as ‘constitutional’ and to treat the political history of the region in the later Middle Ages as the expression of an opposition between two political programmes, dominium regale and regimen politicum. This opposition is expressed in the introduction of the håndfæstning, that is, a formal statute issued by the king and giving detailed promises how to rule the country (1282 and 1320) in Denmark; and it is further expressed in the conflicts over the question of hereditary or elective monarchy, with the victory of the latter in both Denmark and Sweden in 1320. The growth of central political institutions in all three countries points in the same direction. The rivalry of central political institutions in all three countries points in the same direction. The growth of central political institutions in all three countries points in the same direction.29 General political assemblies – as opposed to the regional ones – emerged during the twelfth century but became more frequent and politically important from the early thirteenth century in Norway, from around 1250 in Denmark, and in the second half of the century in Sweden. They were dominated by the aristocracy in all three countries, but less so in Norway, where the peasants took part fairly often until 1273. They seem originally to have been the result of the king’s initiative but then developed into an instrument of the aristocratic opposition in Denmark and Sweden. A more institutionalised royal council gradually emerged during the last decades of the thirteenth century in all three countries. The council was also originally an instrument of the king, and was to some extent used against the aristocratically dominated assemblies. The Norwegian council in many respects replaced the assemblies from the late thirteenth century. During the late Middle Ages, the Danish and to some extent Swedish assemblies were also replaced by the council, which had by then become dominated by the aristocracy. Though the Norwegian council eventually developed a more aristocratic character, Norway nevertheless forms a sharp contrast to its Nordic neighbours. Here there were no attempts to limit the king’s power before 1319, and hereditary monarchy was officially proclaimed in the laws of succession of 1260 and 1273, in which detailed rules for the succession were laid down, so that the possibility of an election became very remote.


29 For the following see Helle (1972), pp. 274–310, 536–58. Cf. also Riis (1977) and Schück (1985), pp. 7–15.
However, it remains doubtful whether the political struggles in Denmark and Sweden in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries can be explained as a conflict between two political programmes. Personal alliances, often changing frequently, patron/client patterns and dynastic interests may have been equally or more important.\textsuperscript{30} The emergence of a strong aristocracy with central representation and influence on government was the result of the military specialisation and political conflicts of the period, but not necessarily a deliberate policy of an aristocratic party fighting for \textit{regimen politicum}.

Like military specialisation, the growth of public justice also contributed to divisions and competition within the elite. As already mentioned, strong opposition from the Danish aristocracy limited the expansion of public justice in Denmark. As for the Church, it clearly had common interests with the king in this field. With the increase in the jurisdiction of both powers, however, the line of division between them became more difficult to draw. In the second half of the thirteenth century, jurisdiction became a disputed question between the two powers in Norway. The contemporary Danish struggle was less exclusively focused on this question, but illustrates the general constitutional problems arising from the expansion of the elite.

CONCLUSION: THE MAIN FACTORS IN THE SOCIAL CHANGE OF THE PERIOD

None of the four theories sketched above can give a full explanation for the developments that took place during this period. The one with the greatest explanatory power seems, however, to be the military one. Struggles between different centres of power from the Viking age to the thirteenth century eventually led to a centralisation of political power and a sharper distinction between the elite and the rest of the population. The weakness of this theory, in the form in which it has been propounded by Elias, is that it is only able to explain the emergence of this structure, not its continued existence. There are several examples throughout the world of large, centralised states emerging through the process described by Elias, which then disintegrate. An extension of Elias’ theory would be to point to the fact that in Europe, and by implication also in Scandinavia, we have to do with a whole area containing a large number of emerging states. Consequently, an established state cannot simply disintegrate; it must either continue its existence or succumb to a mightier neighbour.

Nevertheless, we have to consider the other explanations. Population growth must have played some part, particularly in changing the structure of landownership. Whether or not a Malthusian situation prevailed, a certain level

\textsuperscript{30} Examples of this approach to the struggles are Rosén (1939) and Horby (1977).
of population density within a particular country must be considered a necessary condition, though not a sufficient explanation, for state building and elite formation. Cultural and functional explanations may perhaps be more difficult to use as independent variables accounting for political centralisation and elite formation in the first place. But they are important in explaining how this process evolved, and in the long run, the success of the state or the Church to a considerable extent depended upon their ability to perform ‘service functions’ for its population and to convince it that loyalty and obedience are just and necessary. The bureaucratisation of religion and the sacramental concept of public office were important factors in this respect.

In weighing these factors, however, it is also necessary to distinguish between the different countries. Military specialisation accounted for most in Denmark and least in Norway, with Sweden in an intermediate position. From one point of view, Denmark was the most ‘advanced’ of the three countries and the one most similar to the European state of the high Middle Ages, with a sharper distinction between the elite and the rest of the population, and with the strongest state in the sense that it appropriated a larger part of the resources than was the case in the other countries. However, the difference between Denmark and Norway is not only a question of a more or less coherent state, or of more or less elite formation. Rather, it is the difference between a ‘hard’ and a ‘soft’ evolution. Norway was more successful in extending public justice and royal legislation, was able to develop a fairly successful military force by utilising the peasants, and developed an administration and an aristocracy more directly in the king’s service. Consequently, the functional aspect played a more important part in Norway than in Denmark. Admittedly, if we compare the contribution from the peasants to the elite in the form of land rent rather than taxes, the difference between Norway and Denmark diminishes. This may suggest that population pressure, at least towards the end of our period, played a relatively more important role in this country, with very little arable land, than in the neighbouring ones.

If we compare the three kingdoms in 1319, the Norwegian example suggests the advantage of poverty, which made the king and the aristocracy co-operate, and the king seek support from the peasant population. In the long run, however, the future lay with Denmark, which firmly established itself as the leading country in Scandinavia during the decades that were to follow.
CHAPTER 23(b)

THE MILITARY ORDERS IN THE BALTIC

Michael Burleigh

Any account of military religious Orders in the Baltic begins, of necessity, in the Levant, and must take into account circumstances in the rest of Christendom. Although Palestine was no tabula rasa, in terms of ancient Christian institutions, the newly conquered ‘Latin east’ required its own structure of archbishoprics, bishoprics, churches and monasteries. The large number of temporary visitors, crusaders, merchants and pilgrims, necessitated a network of hospitals and brotherhoods out of which grew the military religious Orders. Three major military Orders arose in Palestine during the earlier crusades: the Templars, the Order of St John and the German or Teutonic Order. While they owed their ethos to the Church’s wary accommodation with the warrior caste, their power stemmed from their ability to secure exemption from episcopal jurisdictions, and indeed in the case of the Teutonic Order, from the jurisdiction of the Order of St John itself. The Order also profited from the granting by Honorius III of the right to receive donations by way of commutation of crusading vows, which resulted in the steady accretion of a landed power base in northern Europe.

The Order’s extra-Levantine possessions were supposed to provide the wherewithal for the fight against the infidel in the east. Gradually, individual properties, assembled over many years, were grouped under the aegis of bailiwick commanders, who in turn were subordinate to provincial commanders, themselves subject to the German Master, the operational locum of a further hierarchy as yet still based in Palestine.

It is impossible to generalise about how the Order acquired its landed power base. As a mighty force on the capital market, the Order benefited in property from debts people could not pay; as a hospital it took in the elderly, who by signing over their property to the corporation were guaranteeing their own future care. Sometimes piety and baser motives went hand in glove. Elisabeth, the widow of Ludwig IV, landgrave of Thüringen-Hessen, founded a hospital outside Marburg which threatened financially to strap her relatives without
being viable in the long run. The prospect that the family’s rival, the archbishop of Mainz, might grant the hospital to the Order of St John, which would be an unwelcome extension of the archbishop’s power, led them to pursue the canonisation of the spendthrift Elisabeth with renewed vigour, a process expedited at Rome by Grand Master Hermann von Salza, whose Order soon received Elisabeth’s hospital at Marburg in perpetuity. Landgrave Konrad von Thüringen entered the Order, succeeding Hermann von Salza – a former ministerialis – as grand master in 1239. His death in 1240 and that of Frederick II in 1250 abruptly terminated their attempts to localise control of the Order in the hands of Thuringians and Hohenstaufen. If the motives for these donations were mixed, so too were the social origins of the men who joined the Order. In bailiwicks for which studies have been undertaken, such as Thuringia, there was a clear preponderance of brethren who were ministeriales or members of the lesser nobility, with an admixture from the urban patriciate who themselves turn out to be former ministeriales.

Since, as we have seen in the case of Hermann von Salza, social origins played little part in determining rank within the Order, one might argue that membership of the Order was a form of corporatist social mobility for the relatively disadvantaged. This contention can be graphically illustrated by considering the respective fortunes of the venerable abbey of Reichenau and the German Order house of Mainau which was founded much later by former ministeriales of the abbey. Eventually the erstwhile servants had bought out, piece by piece, their former masters, as if to erase physically all trace of their former lowly status. The social origins of the brethren also provide clues concerning where the Order was territorially most potent. Many of its brethren hailed from central and south-western Germany or the Rhineland, where the ministeriales were thick on the ground, and where the territorial state had not developed to the point where it could curtail the growth of powerful ecclesiastical enclaves, as was already the case in Austria or Bavaria.

Expansion beyond the Reich and Palestine came in the early thirteenth century. In 1211 King Andrew II of Hungary, the father of St Elisabeth, invited the Order to Transylvania notionally in order to fight the heathen Cumans. The Order accepted with alacrity since the region offered more scope for expansion than Palestine, where there were also two well-established rivals. They established a number of fortifications. The Order’s attempts to have the territory they were defending taken under papal protection resulted in their expulsion by the king in 1225. Their self-aggrandising activities were probably reflected in the description that ‘they are to the king like a fire in the breast, a mouse in the wallet and a viper in the bosom, which repay their hosts badly’.

At about the same time the Order received an invitation from one of the Piast rulers of northern Poland, Duke Conrad of Masovia, to protect – i.e.
expand – his frontier with the heathen Prussians, a Baltic people divided into a number of tribes. In addition to being the object of fitful missionary activities, from 1216 the Prussians found themselves numbered among the legitimate targets of crusades. Since crusades, led by rival Piast princes, were at best a temporary means of conquest, military religious Orders were introduced to secure what had been conquered in perpetuity. Thus, the Templars, the Order of St John and even the Iberian Order of Calatrava began to set up establishments in this remote corner of the world. The key question, from the point of view of the Teutonic Order, was how to prevent the territory they conquered from falling into the hands of either their Piast host or Christian, a former Cistercian abbot, who seems to have been intent upon creating a powerful episcopal principality along the lines already essayed by Adalbert of Riga.

So as to secure any potential conquests against the claims of Duke Conrad, the Order secured a general privilege from Frederick II – the so-called Golden Bull of Rimini – which granted the Order prospective rights in a territory airily deemed to be part of Frederick’s monarchia imperii. However, the Order failed to achieve corresponding sanction for an ambitious programme of conquest from the pope and so delayed the commencement of its conquest of Prussia. The resulting gap was temporarily and inadequately filled by Duke Conrad’s and Bishop Christian’s short-lived Order of Dobrzyń (Dobrin), consisting of crusaders from Mecklenburg who decided to stay in Prussia. In 1230 the Order secured the controversial Treaty of Kruschwitz from Duke Conrad, under which the latter assigned to the Order the territory of Kulm and any future conquests in Prussia. A further privilege, issued by the pope at Rieti in 1234, asserted papal hegemony over the territories the Order conquered, simultaneously rejecting both the actual rights of Duke Conrad and the pretensions of Frederick II. The Order, for its part, agreed to make provision for future bishops in Prussia, thus quietly passing over the rights of the present bishop Christian who at that time was languishing in pagan captivity. It made few efforts to secure his early release. Their third of conquered Prussian territory became, by an act of legerdemain, a third to be parcelled out by the episcopate. In 1235, the Teutonic Order quietly absorbed Bishop Christian’s Order of Dobrin. Armed with this array of mutually contradictory and competing privileges, the Order embarked upon the conquest of Prussia.

From 1231 onwards knights of the Order issued forth from their initial base at Thorn, establishing a line of timber fortresses along the Vistula, e.g. Kulm or Marienwerder, until they reached the coast at Elbing six years later. Fighting in this region normally took place place in winter, when the ground froze and the seas and rivers iced over. The object was to convert or destroy an enemy who was regarded as being on a lower level of material and spiritual civilisation than either the crusaders themselves or the Islamic foe in the Levant. The Order
simultaneously embarked upon the pacification of the interior, while extending their activities to Livonia by absorbing the rival Brethren of the Sword of Livonia. It proved impossible to conquer the territories between the Order’s developing Prussian and Livonian spheres of activity, because the indigenous tribes of Samaiten (Samogitians) were supported by the powerful Lithuanians. The hapless Bishop Christian, eventually liberated after five years in captivity, proved unable to assert his rights against the Order, and refusing the greatly diminished diocese on offer, literally disappeared from the historical record.

The disappearance of one enemy meant the appearance of others, particularly in view of the inevitable shifts in the balance of power attendant upon the Order’s Prussian conquests. The first major problems occurred with the neighbouring dukes of Pomerelia, the rulers of the territory around the city of Danzig (Gdańsk). Already semi-independent of the princely consortium that ruled Poland, the dukes of Pomerelia found their expansionary ambitions checked by the burgeoning military religious state east of the Vistula, and their own ranks divided by struggles over inheritances. The divided family sought outside allies: Duke Svantopolk with the Prussians, who used this increment in strength to throw off the lordship of the Order in a major rebellion in 1242. Latent papal suspicions of the missionary zeal of the Order were reflected in the Treaty of Christburg which a papal legate negotiated between the technically apostate and rebellious Prussians and the Order. The Treaty guaranteed the Prussians their customs and freedoms, including the right to be dubbed as knights or to take holy orders. These rights were conditional upon continued acceptance of Christianity and acknowledgement of the lordship of the Order, and were thus revocable if – as was the case in 1260 – further rebellions occurred. Thenceforth, the Order would be legally entitled to differentiate and discriminate between free and unfree Prussians, the sole criteria being conversion and recognition of its own lordship. The Prussians agreed to adopt the Christian custom of burial, and to abandon polygamy and the practice whereby fathers and sons acquired wives in common whom the son could then ‘inherit’ from the father. The suppression of this rebellion and the conquest of yet further territories continued until the 1280s, with the grim story of ambushes, raids and burning villages being related for the edification of the more sedentary successors of these warriors by the Königsberg chronicler of the Order, Peter von Duisburg.

Whether this gruesome activity resulted in anything more than the formal subscription to Christianity of the pagan Prussians who lived near the Order’s centres, with those in the interior left to practise paganism uninterrupted, is brought into doubt by the Order’s regular issuance of ordinances prohibiting pagan practices, and other evidence which shows that Christianisation was a product of the Reformation, that is, the period after the collapse of the Order’s
lordship. Neither the priest brethren of the Order nor the secular clergy seem to have exercised themselves with regard to their quasi-heathen subjects. With the exception of the Dominicans, there were few religious in Prussia since the Order was not keen to see the establishment of potential competitors. Thus, although Prussia was ruled by a religious corporation, it had fewer monastic houses than any other part of Germany. The few that did secure a foothold would in many cases become deeply critical of the Order’s treatment of its Prussian subjects.

The Order’s conquest of Prussia was an integral part of the more complex process of German settlement in the ‘east’, until recently a subject distorted by the influence of competing modern nationalisms upon the writing of history in both Germany and Poland. Persistent fictions included the idea that there had been no towns before ‘the Germans’ arrived, or that the migrants had been ‘driven’ by a shortage of ‘Lebensraum’.

Rapid population growth throughout Europe, and a developing division of labour, led to the expansion of settlement both within existing countries and further afield. The majority of migrants to Prussia were themselves from areas settled relatively recently: for example, from Lübeck, the Mark of Brandenburg and Silesia. In Prussia, peasant settlers received land consisting of two *Hufen*, or about thirty-three hectares, with a deferred period before payment of rent commenced and minimal conditions of service. Many of them were recruited by *Lokatoren*, who received four to six *Hufen* and usually became the village *Schulzen*, or mayors, responsible for mediating between peasants and lordship. These inducements and the existence of professional recruiting agents suggest that ‘pull’ factors were as important as those ‘pushing’ would-be settlers. The peasant properties were both alienable and heritable. The area measure used differed from the *Haken* unit of measurement applicable to the Prussian native peasantry, which was based on the land that could be ploughed by this primitive implement. The *Haken* consisted of approximately twenty hectares, with the occupants being obliged to perform considerable labour service, and inheritance restricted to eldest sons with no possibility of sale to third parties. Not all Prussians, however, were in this disadvantaged position. Those who had acknowledged the lordship of the Order of their own volition joined the ranks of the greater and lesser freemen, who had relatively larger landed holdings and whose service was military and hence honourable.

The greater freemen performed mounted military service and possessed correspondingly larger properties which they cultivated with the labour of their own dependent peasantry. Consisting of converted and hence assimilated Prussian as well as incoming German noblemen, the greater freemen sometimes had estates of over 1,000 *Hufen*. These were exceptions. The vast majority
possessed about fifteen *Hufen*; collectively they were known as the ‘worthy people’. Although many of them were from the same social class as brethren of the Order, gradually they would develop a sense of collective privilege and regional identity which would lead to grave conflicts with a lordship whose own ranks were replenished by outsiders. The final element in Prussian society was the inhabitants of towns. The Order founded, or in some cases refounded, towns, granting the citizenry charters of which the Kulmer *Handfeste* was prototypical. The citizens could elect their own judges, mayors and councillors, with the fruits of justice being divided between the Order and townspeople. The Order reserved patronage rights over urban churches. It also renounced the right to acquire urban property, while also leaving a loophole in the form of pious bequests and donations. Although these towns were not homogeneously German, mere pressure of numbers virtually ensured the swift assimilation of Poles and Prussians.

This heterogeneous society was ruled over by a military religious corporation ostensibly dedicated to vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. These vows were fleshed out by the Rule, Laws and Customs whose object was to destroy individual appetite and the submission of the individual will to the collective purpose: the annihilation of the enemies of the Faith, the reception of guests and pilgrims and the care of the sick. In the beginning the Order’s system of government was corporate, i.e. the decisive forum was the General Chapter representing all members and every far-flung territory of the organisation. However, almost right from the start, the statutes acknowledged practical realities in the form of the ‘wisen brudere rat’. Since it was not possible to summon General Chapters with any frequency, power went by default to the senior officers around the grand master or to the senior officers in the Order’s various provinces. The most powerful officers in the Order, including the grand masters, resided in Venice until 1309 when Grand Master Siegfried von Feuchtwangen decided to move the headquarters to the fortress town of Marienburg on the Vistula. The two most important officers were the great commander and the marshal. The former was responsible for both lay and priest brethren, servants, craftsmen, slaves, beasts of burden, provisions and so forth during times of peace. The marshal assumed most of these, and other military responsibilities during wartime. The other major officers were the Hospitaller, responsible for the Order’s entire provision for the sick and infirm, and the Trapier who was responsible for all matters to do with clothing.

In the mid-thirteenth century these four major offices were augmented by the Treßler, who assumed responsibility for the Order’s central treasury and auditing and accounting. In Palestine, these major officers were joined by the castellan of Montfort, the Order’s Latin headquarters. In Prussia, they would constitute the *Grosgebietiger*, that is the Order’s effective rulers. Postulants were
recruited in the bailiwicks in the Reich, from whence they were sent out to serve in Prussia or Livonia. They had to be over fourteen, free of obligations such as debts, serfdom or marriage vows, and neither members of other Orders nor suffering from contagious illnesses. There was no mention of national origin. Once sent eastwards, recruits were distributed among the various commanderies and lesser establishments, such as *Wald- or Pflegeamter*, with conditions varying considerably between the relative comforts of Danzig, Elbing or Königsberg, and the more primitive remoteness of Insterburg or Ragnit. Postings to the latter gradually assumed a punitive character. At all times, the singular will had to bend to the corporate purpose; whether on the battlefield where the knights appeared stripped of all chivalric fripperies, or in the humdrum business of accounting for the Order's extensive income. Judging by the voluminous surviving records, much of a brother's time seems to have been spent in inventorising and stock-taking. Although the far-flung territories of the Order gradually resulted in the crystallisation of territorial identities and interests, each major region was held together by, *inter alia*, a remarkably efficient postal system which availed itself of despatch riders and the logging of arrivals and departures.

Regular teams of visitors plagued the lives of the inefficient and lazy. Of course, what appears to have been a very advanced form of bureaucracy was in reality riven by social, and more importantly, inter-regional rivalries, with different regionally based factions vying for control of important offices in the corporation.

So far we have been considering the conquest of the southern shore of the Baltic region by the German Order. The situation further north was complicated by the competing interest of Danes, Germans, Swedes and Russians in conquering the indigenous tribes. Serious encroachments into these lands began following the decision of Celestine III and Innocent III to support the establishment of a missionary see at Riga on the lower Dvina. By 1230, Bishop Albert of Riga had conquered Livonia, or roughly the territory of the modern state of Latvia, with the aid of the Brethren of the Sword. The latter had been established in about 1202 by Bishop Albert from the more dedicated among transient crusaders as a form of episcopal garrison to protect his mission to the pagan Livs. In relation to the autonomous and highly privileged Teutonic Order these minor orders were severely disadvantaged. They were clearly under episcopal control, with practically no means of developing an independent territorial base, and without significant patronage from the major powers in Christendom.

Some 120 in number, the Brethren seem to have hailed from the area around Bremen and Lübeck, in other words from the same region as most of Bishop Albert’s extended family network. Their primary function was to act as
a permanently present military elite, securing territory which was then granted to one or other of Bishop Albert’s aristocratic relatives and associates, before moving on themselves to make further conquests. Alliances with native rulers against the far more powerful Lithuanians were usually the first step in the native rulers being drawn into the orbit of the wily bishop of Riga. Replenished by the cogs bringing matériel to Riga, which was then shipped up river in the direction of Polotsk, the Brethren operated out of grim stone blockhouses, making use of crossbows and ‘machines’ to subvert the less well-equipped earthworks of their opponents. The bishop and his Brethren also employed the strategy of divide et impera, by forming alliances with, for example, Livs against Estonians, or by rewarding the compliant through the effective German monopoly of incoming trade. Non-compliance and non-conversion meant no silver or weapons in return for the tribesmen’s sylvan produce. The desire of the Brethren of the Sword to carve out territories of the sort being assembled by the German Knights in Prussia was the source of their downfall. After failing to extort more revenue from their own subjects in Livonia, incidentally thus provoking a revolt in 1222, they turned their attention to Estonia which they seized from the king of Denmark. Their reputation in the highest quarters was not helped by their imprisonment of a papal legate who had been sent north to wrest Reval from their illicit control.

Rashly, in 1236 Master Folkwin decided to invade Lithuania with the assistance of the Russian ruler of Pskov. His forces stalled in the swamps and were annihilated by the Lithuanians, the most elusive and formidable warriors in the entire region. The fifty survivors were easy prey for the German Knights, particularly since their brutal and undiplomatic behaviour had alienated both the pope and the king of Denmark. Master Hermann Balk was despatched north to retrieve the situation for the German Order in Livonia. Handing back to the king of Denmark what was rightfully his, Balk set about pacifying Livonia. Aided by an alliance with King Mindaugas of Lithuania, Balk suppressed the Curonians, Semigallians and Samogitians, granting them a form of self-government in return for conversion to Christianity. This modus vivendi endured until 1259 when the Samogitians broke the truce and defeated the Order at Schoten in Curonia. Some of the Order’s allies, including the Lithuanians, changed sides, destroying the Order’s retreating forces at the battle of Durben. The Order’s loss of some 150 knights in this engagement led the Lithuanians and then the Prussians to attempt to overthrow the Order’s apparently enfeebled lordship. It took some thirty years of vicious fighting partially to restore the Order’s lost authority, although they never managed to restore control over some of the tribes in the more inaccessible areas.

The most formidable opponent of the Order for most of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was Lithuania. The Lithuanians belonged to the same
ethnic group as the Prussians and Letts, and consisted of a peasant class dominated by landowners later known as 'boyars'. By the mid-thirteenth century the Lithuanians found themselves threatened by a lengthening list of enemies: the Poles, Teutonic Knights, Alexander Nevskii's Novgorod and the Mongols of the Golden Horde. Disaster was averted by the ascendance of one dominant family, whose leading member Mindaugas in turn literally thinned out any possible rivals from among his own relatives. Mindaugas copied the tactics and equipment of his enemies, while diminishing their number through his conversion to Christianity and a series of alliances. Baptised in 1253, he concluded an alliance with the Order, a connection he broke in the early 1260s. His coronation was accompanied by the appointment of a priest brother of the Order as bishop of Lithuania, an appointment soon accompanied by attempts on the part of the Order to detach Lithuanian territory for itself. Nor was Mindaugas's conversion to Christianity anything other than superficial. As the Galician chronicler noted:

this christening was only for appearance. Secretly he made sacrifices to the gods – to Nenadey, Telyavel, Diveriks the hare-god, and Meidein. When Mindaugas rode out into the field, and a hare ran across his path, then he would not go into the grove, nor dared he break a twig. He made sacrifices to his god, burnt corpses, and conducted pagan rites in public.

The Prussian revolt affected virtually every part of the country with the exception of Culmerland and Pomerania. The Order's strongholds in the interior, such as Braunsberg, Heilsberg, or Bartenstein were quickly lost, and they only managed to cling on to Elbing, Balga and Königsberg by virtue of access by sea. Virtually the entire secular clergy departed, with the cathedral at Marienwerder being burned to the ground. This disastrous situation was only retrieved through massive outside intervention. Crusaders from the Rhineland and central Germany participated in the defence of Balga and Königsberg. Margrave Otto the Pious of Brandenburg and several of his kinsmen retook the entrance to the Frische Haff, establishing the fortress known henceforth as Brandenburg. Although bad weather meant that King Ottokar of Bohemia was unable to launch a large-scale expedition, his presence with a substantial force in Prussia at least offset the prospect of a further attack on the Order's territories by Duke Mestwin of Pomerelia. Expeditions like the one mounted by Margrave Dietrich of Meißen in 1272 gradually reduced the rebellious Prussians, who were now partially displaced by German peasant settlers. The generous terms on offer at Christburg in 1249 were not repeated.

Duke Mestwin of Pomerelia, the precarious primus inter pares of the clan which ruled the territory to the west of the Order's Prussian lands, decided through the Treaty of Arnswalde (1 April 1269) to secure his position by
enfeoffing his lands with the margrave of Brandenburg. The latter was to acquire the city of Danzig since Mestwin had expelled its ruler, his brother Wratislav. The latter’s death led Mestwin to revise his view of things. He concluded an alliance with the Boleslav of Greater Poland designed to stop Margrave Conrad from taking over Danzig. This did not affect Mestwin’s obligations to Margrave Conrad, who would inherit Mestwin’s Pomerelian territories should the latter die without male issue. Meanwhile, Mestwin’s uncle Sambor, the ruler of Dirschau, who had been excommunicated because of a dispute over territory with the monastery of Oliva, decided to make the Order his testamentary heirs. The resulting dispute between Mestwin and the Order was resolved by a papal legate in 1282, with the Order acquiring a toehold on the left bank of the Vistula in the form of the town of Mewe. An attempt by the margrave of Brandenburg to occupy Danzig in 1308 resulted in the Poles requesting the Order to defend the town. The Brandenburg forces broke off the siege; but the Order then expelled both the Poles and members of the Pomerelian nobility inside the town. When the Poles refused to accept monetary compensation, the Order resolved the ensuing conflict by conquering further towns such as Schwetz. Ignoring Polish claims, the Order entered into negotiations with Margrave Waldemar of Brandenburg regarding the future of Pomerelia.

Under the Treaty of Soldau of 13 September 1309, Waldemar granted the Order Danzig, Dirschau and Schwetz with their hinterlands in return for 10,000 silver marks. The acquisition of part of Pomerelia gave the Order control of the lower course of the Vistula and direct access to the Baltic through Danzig. Possession of Pomerelia also gave them a continuous route to the Reich. In the same year, the grand master relocated the Order’s headquarters from Venice to Marienburg. Although the Order had now successfully rounded off its Baltic territories, it had been done at the expense of the rulers of Poland, who from now on would be implacable enemies rather than occasional allies.

While the Order consolidated and expanded its grip on Pomerelia and Prussia, further north its power was contested by the secular clergy and the developing power of the townsmen. Power in Livonia was shared between the archbishop of Riga, the three bishops of Courland, Dorpat and Osel, the Order, and the patrician oligarchs of the city of Riga. The latter were virtually independent of the archbishop and the principal element in the federation of Livonian towns. The townsmen’s encroachments upon archiepiscopal property at a time when the Order was administering the latter in the archbishop’s absence led to a series of clashes between Order and patriciate. The archbishop took the side of the townsmen in order to add some substance to his notional claim to be their lord and master. The townsmen also found a further
ally in the form of the heathen Lithuanians who repeatedly devastated the Order’s properties in the area.

All parties in this dispute – with the exception of the Lithuanians – appealed to Rome. The townsmen, supported by the archbishop, accused the Order of failing to convert the heathen and of oppressing Christians, notably the citizens of Riga. They had imprisoned the archbishop of Riga for eight months, feeding him bread and water, and had despoiled the territories and goods of the bishops of Osel and Courland. Charges of cremation, killing their own wounded and witchcraft ensued, charges which were particularly dangerous at a time when the king of France was eradicating the Templars on trumped up charges of sorcery. The fall of Acre in 1291 had made the military religious Orders virtually supernumerary, potential victims of avaricious and predatory monarchs. The Order’s response to these accusations was that they had expended much blood and money on the fight against the heathen, and that they had only taken over the archbishop’s properties better to defend them. In 100 years they had won over 100,000 converts in Livonia, whereas in Estonia, Russia and Osel where the Knights had no power, ‘there was nothing but apostasy, schism and paganism’. The Order’s relocation of its headquarters from Venice to Marienburg in 1309 was less a question of ‘state formation’, than of reminding the world at large that in the north of Europe, at least, it still possessed a worthy raison d’être. This was a highly dubious claim, since its enemies in the longer term would be the indubitably Christian Poles and a ruler of Lithuania who had become a Christian.
among the Pannonians, therefore, three brothers were born to Pan, prince of the Pannonians. The first was named Lech, the second Rus and the third Czech. These three held the three kingdoms of the Lechites [Poles], Russians and Czechs (or Bohemians) . . . ‘Germo’ is a type of vehicle in which two oxen are yoked together to draw a plough or pull a cart, and so the Germans and the Slavs, having common borders, pull together; there is no people in the world so familiar and friendly to one another as the Slavs and Germans . . . We should not forget the Hungarians, who also are Slavs, named after a river called the Wkra.1

The mythical common descent of the founding fathers of the Slavonic nations, expounded here by the Chronicle of Greater Poland, composed around 1295, reflects an idea of a community of central European realms, which was informed by various relationships between Poland, Bohemia, (south-western) Rus’ and (non-Slavonic) Hungary throughout the central and later Middle Ages. Legendary unity became brief reality when Vaclav III of Bohemia (1305) was also king of Hungary (1301) and Poland (1306). In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Lithuano-Polish house of Jogaila (Jagiełło) would achieve a similar, and slightly less fragile, dynastic hegemony. The image of Germanic and Slavonic oxen ploughing a common furrow is particularly appropriate to a world where farmers, artisans and clergy from north-western Christendom and the empire settled on a considerable scale throughout central Europe.

The thirteenth century brought major developments for the whole of central Europe. The Přemyslid dukes of Bohemia (905–1306), acknowledged from 1198 as kings, presided over a period of economic, political and cultural

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1 ‘Ex hiis itaque Pannoniis tres fratres filii Pan principis Pannoniorum nati fuere quorum primogenitus Lech, alter Rus, tercius Czech nomine habuerunt. Et hii tres hec tria regna Lechitarum, Rutheniorum et Czechorum qui et Bohemi . . . Germo est quoddam instrumentum in quo duo boves simul iuncti trahendo aratrum seu plausterum incidunt, sic et Theutunici cum slavis regna contigua habentes simul conversacione incidunt, nec aliqua gens in mundo est sibi tam communis et familiaris veluti slavi et theutonici . . . Item de Hungaris qui et ipsi sunt slavi, non est obmittendum. Ungari enim dicuntur a quodam fluvio qui Uukra nominatur.’ Chronica Poloniae maioris, ed. Kürbis, pp. 4, 6, 7.
growth. Árpád Hungary underwent significant political reorientation as intermediary between the Byzantine and Catholic worlds: the twelfth-century emphasis on Byzantine ambitions gave way slowly to the consolidation of the kingdom as part of Catholic central Europe, where contacts with the Přemyslids and southern Piasts entwined the Hungarians in the internal affairs of Bohemia and Poland. The latter experienced political dissolution and reconstruction, competing with her neighbours for control of territories on her borders, compensating for losses to Brandenburg and Bohemia in Lubusz and Silesia with increased influence in south-western Rus’. Given the changes in European political geography since the thirteenth century, we should do well to clarify what we mean by the three central kingdoms.

The area controlled by Árpád kings (c. 900–1301) was somewhat larger than modern Hungary. Béla IV (1235–70) and his successors governed not only the Magyars of the central plain, but also the Vlachs in Transylvania, Bosnians and Croatians. Slovakia too formed part of the kingdom. Intermittently the northern provinces of Bulgaria and Serbia came under Árpád sway, bringing Orthodox Slavs into Catholic Hungary where they also encountered pagan Cuman (Polovtsian) immigrants from the Eurasian steppe.

The kingdom of Bohemia was girt by the Erzebirge mountains to the north-west and the Bohemian Forest in the south-west, while in the south-east the White Carpathians separated the dependent mark of Moravia from Slovakia. The trade route linking the Adriatic with the Baltic Sea passed through the ‘Moravian Gates’. Bishop Bruno von Schaumberg of Olomouc (1245–81) regarded the kingdom as ‘bordering on Hungary, Russia, Lithuania and Prussia’, for Bohemian rulers, the kin of Piast dukes, considered Poland part and parcel of their Přemyslid inheritance.

After 1138 Poland, once governed from Gniezno by one member of the house of Piast, divided into several territories, of which the majority were reunited gradually over two centuries or so from 1290. Over the thirteenth century Poland turned gradually increasing attention towards her eastern neighbours, the pagan Prussians and Lithuanians, and the Orthodox Christian duchies of south-western Rus’. The administrative infrastructure maintained by the archbishopric of Gniezno, like Bede’s united church of the divided English, acted as a shadow kingdom, keeping alive the possibility that the kingdom of the Polish gens might be rebuilt and expanded. However, the kingdom that would be restored in Cracow in 1320 was not the same as the realm which had divided in the twelfth century.

Two hundred or so years after conversion to Latin Christianity, the central European kingdoms differed much less politically, economically and ecclesiastically from their western counterparts than they had done in 1100. The thirteenth century brought a second and consolidatory round of ‘westernisation’
Map 13  The central European kingdoms
(b) The expansion of Bohemia under Ottokar II
to central Europe. Competition between crown and nobility, between king and
the lords spiritual prevailed throughout Catholic Christendom. Within the
region itself we find a common response to the need to improve the rural and
urban economy and provide an effective defence against the Tatars. Local intel-
lectuals such as Simon Kézai in Pest, Wincenty Kadłubek at Cracow and
Dalimil in Prague clearly appreciated their political community’s place in the
general classical, Catholic and barbarian context. If featuring in Dante’s Comedy
is an indication of having arrived on the continental scene, the Bohemian
kings, as imperial pretenders, had ‘made it’ by the end of the thirteenth century.
Ottokar II and (‘feckless’) Vaclav II are noted as having: ‘reigned in the land
where waters of the Vltava flow through oak groves to the Elbe, and the Elbe
flows into the sea’ (Purgatorio vii: 97–8).

In Hungary the ancient power base of the Magyar clans and the Árpád
monarchy gradually broadened to include new political groups. As in the
England of John and Henry III, attempts by baronial families to wrest judicial
and military power from the crown dominated the last Árpád century. Kings
such as Andrew II (1205–35) found it necessary to rely on the services of the
lesser nobility in their struggle with comital magnates. The counts (ispán), royal
officers owing military service to the crown (servientes regis) and knights (iobagiones) increased their hold on administrative duties and castles – which Andrew
II parcelled out as perpetuas hereditates. In this way the royal county gradually
became a noble county. In time the servientes emerged from royal control to
form a part of the noble estate, taking part in court sessions along with the
ispán by the end of the century. This growth in baronial power was stimulated
further by the Tatar invasions and internal crises such as Andrew II’s turbulent
accession (after nine years of civil war with his brother and nephew, Kings
Emeric (Henry) and Laszlo (Ladislas) III), and financial difficulties arising
from the failure of such foreign adventures as the Fifth Crusade (1217–18) and
campaigns in Russia which weakened royal power and prestige. Andrew’s
German wife, Queen Gertrude, was murdered by Emeric’s noble supporters in
1213, who blamed her for the king’s favourable stance towards German migra-
tion. In the second half of the century magnate families such as the
Henrikfiak, sons of Lord Henry of Nemetyvari (Danube region), Csák
(Slovakia), Aba and Borsca (in the east and north-east), acted independently of
the crown with the support of their own retinues.

The Golden Bull of 1222, issued under pressure from nobles grouped
around Andrew’s son, Béla, guaranteed that no lesser noble should be seized or
demoted in favour of a potentate, unless arraigned and convicted according to
proper procedures; nobles were to enjoy free disposal of their lands and were
not to be compelled to serve outside the kingdom, except at royal expense. The
higher nobility, including leading prelates, gained the right to question and resist
royal power (article 31). The king swore that foreigners would not be promoted to office except following consultation with nobles. Such a concession was particularly relevant to a community which encouraged large-scale specialist immigration. A count (in effect, a crown agent) who abused his office could be deposed and forced to pay compensation to his victims. Coinage was to be standardised on the basis of Béla III’s issues (1173–96), a process which took place in Bohemia in 1300 with the introduction of the Prague groat and began in Poland at the close of the century. Jews, whose settlement in Hungary was encouraged by the crown, were to be barred from financial office. Seven copies of the bull were made for deposition with the pope, the Knights Hospitaller and Templar, the king, the count palatine and the chapters of Esztergom and Kalocsa. The articles of the bull reflect developments elsewhere, such as the Magna Carta in England, the constitution of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem or the Cienia inauguration pact (1228) of Władysław Łaskonogi (Spindleshanks) as grand duke of Poland, promising to take advice from bishops and baronage. The persons and institutions entrusted with the custody of the text reveal the new general European order: military monks, reorganised cathedral chapters and a powerful high nobility. These privileges were confirmed by the Golden Bull of 1231 which established a meeting between the king and his nobles annually on the feast of the ‘sainted king’ (20 August), in St Stephen’s town of Székesfehérvár (Alba Regia). The opportunity acquired by the nobility to discuss and right wrongs in the king’s presence was thereby linked with the royal cult. The thirteenth century saw a further increase in official devotion to St Stephen and respect for the symbolism embodied in ‘his’ crown, the only diadem valid for a Magyar royal coronation. In 1267 kingship with counsel was further strengthened by Béla IV’s requirement that two or three nobles should represent each county in the annual assembly. In the dismembered kingdom of Poland the nobility enjoyed even greater influence and the royal crown was associated with a new ‘national’ hero, St Stanisław, the king-slain bishop of Cracow.

Perhaps the greatest impact on Hungary and on central Europe as a whole was made by the Tatar invasions. In the winter of 1240/1 the Tatars crossed from Rus’ where Khan Batu’s horde had razed the ancient political centre at Kiev. It was not long before he set his sights on the western end of the trade axis linking the western Slavonic kingdoms and Hungary with the eastern markets. Emperor Frederick II noted how their indefinable host advanced, dividing into three groups according to their damnable tactics . . . One group was sent across to Prussia and, on entering Poland, the prince and duke of that land were slain and later the whole region was ravaged by them. A second contingent crossed the frontiers of Bohemia and halted there, when it came face to face with the courageous opposition of the king and his paladins. The third sped through Hungary.
On Ash Wednesday, 10 March 1241 the Tatars ravaged Sandomierz and crossed the Vistula to Cracow. The dukes of Sandomierz and Opole joined battle briefly before turning tail and flying before superior forces. At Legnica (Liegnitz) the Silesian duke, Henry II (the Pious), intercepted the invaders only to perish with his knights. Vaclav I of Bohemia met the Tatars near Kotlina Klodzka. On May 9 they advanced to ravage Moravia. Khans Batu and Sübödei attacked Hungary in early March, joining battle in force at the Sajó river on 10–11 April. King Béla fled to Croatia and Pest was destroyed. During the winter of 1241/2 the Tatars attacked Esztergom and in March reached Split, Kotor and Dubrovnik (Ragusa). However, receiving news of the death of Khan Ögödei (November 1241), the Horde withdrew from central Europe to compete for supremacy in the steppes. The Tatars returned to ravage southern Poland again in 1259 and 1287 and the threat they posed dominated central and east European political and religious life for the next 200 years or so.

The Tatar invasion left its political and cultural mark on central Europe: in Hungary, as in southern Rus’, chroniclers wrote of events ‘before’ and ‘after’ the onslaught of the Horde; like the Russian Tale of the destruction of Riazan’, the Lament for the destruction of the kingdom of Hungary by the Tatars, which was composed in 1242 by a monk in Béla’s retinue, bears eloquent witness to the region’s plight: ‘Titles, ranks and honours tumble . . . / once the home of countless treasure, / glorious land of joy and pleasure, happy Hungary, thy power / stood unshaken like a tower! . . . / Land by valiant troops defended, / land where peace once reigned supreme / . . . Now the flood of dire disaster / bears thee downward ever faster’. In regional folklore the Tatar assumed the position of bogeyman, as the Cracow Corpus Christi ‘Lajkonik’ procession colourfully reminds one. Daily still in the heart of the former Polish capital, the beginning of each hour is marked by a bugle alarum (hejnal) from the tower of St Mary’s Church. The economic impact of the invasion was to encourage (re)settlement, the foundation of new towns and the granting of new charters to the old.

After Béla IV returned to his capital, following the Tatar retreat, he embarked on a programme of castle building to balance the handful of adequate fortifications which, significantly, had existed only on the Hungarian western border before 1241. The system of defensive cordons or gyepü had proved woefully inadequate. Between 1242 and 1270 fifty-five new castles (of which thirty-four were not royal) were built and thirteen rebuilt in stone. By 1300 only a quarter of the kingdom’s castles were held by the king, thereby storing up future troubles for the crown – not only for the native house of Árpád, but even more especially for the successor Angevin dynasty in the first turbulent years of its rule.

Stephen (Istvan) V (1270–2) and his son, Laszlo IV (the Cuman) (1272–90)
ruled a realm subject to squabbles of immigrant factions – pagan Cumans, ambitious Germans and Magyar barons. The presence of newcomers further exacerbated disputes between native lords and the king, as had been the case during Andrew II's reign. However, Laszlo relied heavily not on German newcomers but on the kin of his Cuman wife, adopting their practices and giving an impression of favouring their religion. His main significance for later Hungarian history is his marriage to an Angevin princess. His sister Maria married Charles II of Anjou. When Béla’s nephew, Andrew III (1290–1301) died suddenly on 14 January 1301 the dynasty perished with him and connections established by the Hungarians (and Bohemians) with Catholic Europe assumed added significance, since the Magyar nobility came to choose a successor to the Árpáds. After seven years of rule by foreign scions of Béla IV, including Vaclav of Bohemia (1301–5) and two of interregnum, the nobles chose Béla's great-great-grandson, Charles Robert of Anjou (Carobert) as king in 1310 and crowned him in Székesfehérvár. Under Angevin rule Hungary reached the pinnacle of her medieval power and glory.

While the Hungarian kingdom was consolidating her place in the Catholic world, Bohemia flourished as a stable, central European monarchy under the guidance of the Přemyslids, who had governed the realm as an imperial fief since the tenth century. During the thirteenth century, in common with other sparsely populated regions, central Bohemia and north-eastern Moravia, which, although restored to royal control by Ottokar I, was governed often by the king’s heir in competition with the ruler in Prague, underwent massive economic and demographic transformation as a result of German and Flemish settlement. Bohemia was strengthened by the discovery of silver during the reign of Vaclav I (1230–53) at Kutna Hora, Stríbrná and Příbram. Western-style sňceans were introduced into the realm during the reign of Ottokar II (1253–78) and his son Vaclav II (1283–1305). Vaclav’s reign was particularly prosperous and his son, the last male of the line of Přemysl, Vaclav III, also held the crowns of Poland and Hungary briefly, as a result of a dynastic marriage network.

As in Hungary, powerful magnates, the holders of royal offices, began to establish their own power bases in stone castles which imitated royal buildings. The lesser nobility resided in fortified manor houses. In the fourteenth century the castellans formed the higher ranks of the nobility, or pani, a term also used in Poland and Hungary. Along with leading prelates, these acted as royal counsellors. The new landed aristocrats enjoyed royal favour, whilst the older echelons sought support from the king’s rivals, as during the rebellion led by Margrave Ottokar of Moravia against his father Vaclav I in 1248–9.

Přemysl Ottokar I (1197–1230) exploited Bohemia’s advantage as the largest part of an empire weak after the death of Henry VI. He was kurfürst (‘cup-bearer’) and took part in imperial elections. In 1212 Frederick II confirmed his
rights as elector. His imperially sanctioned right to present episcopal candidates was surrendered to the bishop of Prague in 1222. In 1290 at Nuremberg Rudolf conceded to Vaclav II that the king of Bohemia should serve the king of the Romans and emperor in counsel as kurfürst, not as king. Ottokar II even came close to ascending the imperial throne itself after he gained control of southern Austria (Carantania) and Styria. Following the election of Rudolf von Habsburg as emperor in 1273, Ottokar competed with him openly for supremacy within the empire. In 1278 at Dürnkrut Ottokar was defeated and killed. In German verse the author of Cantilena de rege Bohemiae lamented how ‘the Bohemian king has fallen, / eyes weep and stream with grief . . . / the king died just like a knight, who always fought honourably’. Bohemia lost Moravia for a time and was removed from Styria and Carinthia for ever.

Ottokar II’s imperial dream had been somewhat different from that of the Hohenstaufen. It included an idea of western Slavonic unity which is echoed by the Czech Chronica aulae regiae in its account of the coronation of Vaclav II of Bohemia as king of Poland in 1300: ‘they shall rejoice in one prince . . . Those who speak one language embrace in bonds of closer love.’ This was a conscious harking back to the glories of the ninth-century west Slavonic empire of Great Moravia. Bishop Prandota of Cracow, speaking of the Prussian crusade of 1255, noted with Vergilian erudition that ‘those borders are close to us and we now see that our interest is undoubtedly at stake when that house burns’. While the Polish dukes struggled to maintain a kingdom outside the confines of the empire (especially where Silesia was concerned), the Czech rulers attempted to exploit their position inside the imperial borders. Ottokar sought to attract Polish support for ‘an indissoluble bond of treaty and friendship’ through ethnic argument and a common religious hero, St Stanislav, who, newly raised to the altars, was made patron of Ottokar’s crusade.

In 1254, Ottokar was crowned king, and took the cross, pledging Bishop Prandota assistance in Poland’s fight against the infidel. In 1255 he and Bishop Bruno of Olomouc led Bohemian and Moravian warriors to Prussia to fight alongside the Teutonic Order. Ottokar baptised two conquered Prussian leaders and founded the town of Königsberg. He planned another campaign for 1267. He intended to make all conquered lands fiefs of the Bohemian crown and subject their churches to the bishopric of Olomouc, aiming to establish that see as the thirteenth-century northern missionary metropolitanate for central and eastern Europe, the equivalent of Otto I’s Magdeburg. This would have competed directly with the Polish archbishop of Gniezno. Although he did not succeed in this ambitious project, his example became the inspiration of the fourteenth-century Luxemburg king of Bohemia Emperor Charles IV in his Polish and Lithuanian policies.
The Prussian mission and relations with the Teutonic Order which the Polish Duke Conrad of Mazovia invited to the southern Baltic littoral represented an opportunity for all three central European realms to flex their politico-religious muscle and demonstrate their religious modernity and loyalty to fashionable Catholic values. The Teutonic Knights were involved in the defence of the colonising frontier of Hungary (Burgenland) until Andrew II expelled them for fear of their political ambitions in 1226. They were invited almost immediately to north-western Poland by the Mazovian duke, Conrad, in the hope that they would defend his lands from Prussian attack. However, the Knights found more lasting support in Bohemia where, in 1222, Ottokar had taken their Bohemian and Moravian branches under his wing, thereby uniting both ecclesiastical areas in one. His devotion to the Order thus suited his wider policy of tying Moravia more closely to Prague.

From 1230 the Order dominated the Prussian mission which had been led earlier by the Cistercians of Greater Poland (Łechno). A Polish military Order was founded in 1228 under Cistercian influence, the Order of Dobrzyń (Dobrin), to aid local princes, but this was incorporated into the Teutonic Order in 1235.

Ottokar succeeded in forging closer links with Polish dukes, although some of the latter looked rather more towards Hungary for assistance. Ottokar II’s intervention in the 1259–60 Styrian noble rebellion against Béla IV may be taken as typical of regional conflicts. In 1260, Stephen of Hungary and his Cumans attacked Bohemia; Ottokar wrote to Pope Alexander IV seeking support in war against Stephen and Béla of Hungary, Daniil of Rus’ and his sons, the Tatars, Bolesław of Cracow, Leszek of Łęczyca, and various southern Slavonic peoples. The dukes of Opole and Silesia sided with Ottokar. However, the support evinced by the latter for the Teutonic Order in 1255 provoked further discontent in central Poland against Bohemia and her Silesian allies. At Kressenbrun in 1260 Bohemian troops defeated the Hungarians and Ottokar annexed Styria. Nine years later he became duke of Carantania. His usual style then became that of ‘fifth king of Bohemia, duke of Austria, Styria, Carantania, margrave of Moravia, lord of Carinthia, the mark of Cheb and Pordenone’. As an example of the boot on a Magyar foot, we may cite the contest between Ottokar II and Rudolf von Habsburg for the imperial throne when the Henrikfaak of Nemetyvari sided with the Czech king, the Csák with Rudolf.

After Ottokar II’s death (1278), Bohemia was governed by the late king’s brother-in-law, the Margrave Otto of Brandenburg (c. 1244–98), regent for Vaclav II. In 1284 the Brandenburg regent was expelled and his place taken by local nobles, headed by the second husband of Ottokar’s widow, Zaviš of Falkenstein, and Bishop Tobias Bechun of Prague.
In 1289 Casimir of Opole granted his lands to Vaclav II; in 1290 Emperor Rudolf confirmed that after the death of Henry IV, Silesia should escheat to Vaclav of Bohemia. Henry died, Vaclav inherited. Further Polish territories fell to Vaclav in 1291 when the dowager duchess of Cracow, Gryfina, Vaclav’s sister-in-law, bequeathed Cracow and Sandomierz to him and promptly died.

In 1300 Polish envoys offered the throne to Vaclav II who was crowned subsequently in Gniezno. When Andrew III of Hungary died without issue the following year, the Hungarians summoned Vaclav II’s son, Vaclav, whose great-grandmother was Andrew’s sister, to be crowned king of Hungary. In 1305 he succeeded his father as ruler of Poland. When Vaclav III and II died in 1306, the Bohemians faced a choice of several foreign pretenders. After four years they elected the late ruler’s brother-in-law, John of Luxemburg, king in the face of continued internal dispute.

In 1138 King Bolesław III Wrymouth (Krzywousty) of Poland died, bequeathing his realm to his four sons to share between them with the eldest, Władysław, taking possession of Cracow and Pomorze in his capacity of princeps or grand duke, and holding Sieradz, Łęczyca and Silesia (see map 13) as his own patrimony. Each of the other sons received his own portion of the kingdom: Mazovia–Kujawy–Chełmno; Gniezno–Poznań–Kalisz; Sandomierz–Lublin. Twelfth- and thirteenth-century Poland saw the number of her separate duchies increase: in 1202 there were five; in 1250, nine; by 1288, internal adjustments by the various branches of the Piast dynasty had formed seventeen separate but dynastically intertwined duchies. Kadłubek noted in his Chronicle how it was ‘impossible to deny the Pole his right to elect a prince, for it makes no difference whether he gets a useless one or none at all’. An anonymous annotation in the margin of a fourteenth-century manuscript of this text reads that ‘from ancient times the Poles have played with their lords as with painted eggs’.

The principate system, conceived so as to avoid the egg syndrome, began to collapse notably from the late twelfth century. In a dynastic council held at Łęczyca in 1180 it was agreed that Casimir the Just should be succeeded by his son, Leszek the White (Biały), but when Casimir died in 1194, power (that is, Cracow) was taken by the senior Piast, Mieszko the Elder. In 1206, Leszek took the principate of Cracow by main force and granted Mazovia and Kujawy to his brother Conrad. He was opposed by other dukes including Władysław Spindleshanks of Greater Poland, who the previous year had repelled a Danish invasion (temporarily) from western Pomorze; the position of the powerful Silesian ruler, Henry the Bearded (Brodaty) (1201–38) is unclear. In 1207 Innocent III recognised Leszek, who surrendered right of presentation to bishoprics. After Leszek’s death in 1227 Spindleshanks sought the Cracow throne, but the local nobles preferred Leszek’s widow to govern in the name of
her son, Bolesław the Chaste (Wstydliwy). In fact, this role fell to Conrad of Mazovia. The nobles agreed to allow Spindleshanks to rule if he made Bolesław heir to Greater Poland. When Conrad and a Rus’ian army attacked Greater Poland, Spindleshanks fled to Opole, Henry became Bolesław’s guardian and Spindleshanks bequeathed Greater Poland to Henry. This pattern is typical: dynastic conflict over Cracow was mixed with domestic competition in the localities and in Cracow itself, and with an appeal to the Holy See, Poland’s official overlord, for confirmation. In 1232 Henry expelled Conrad from Cracow before taking control of Greater Poland, aided by a revolt of local nobles against Władysław Odonic (1233). Thus between 1232 and 1234 Henry came to hold most of the Polish lands and perhaps wanted the crown, but this is not clear; his son and heir Henry II the Pious (Pobozny), however, certainly did. In 1241 the Tatars ravaged Poland, especially Henry’s Silesian lands. Following the Tatar invasions the individual duchies fragmented further: in 1247 Greater Poland split into two smaller duchies; Silesia fragmented into Wrocław, Legnica, Głogów. Following the death of Conrad of Mazovia in 1247, his lands divided into Kujawy–Łęczyca–Sieradz and Mazovia. What sustained the idea of a united kingdom were the links between knightly families of various regions, contacts between merchants whose routes spanned the whole of Polish territory and ecclesiastical structures whose borders were often not the same as those of constantly modified political units.

The impetus for reuniting the realm came from the Silesian duke, Henry IV the Just of Wrocław, assigned to Cracow by Bolesław the Chaste, and confirmed by Bolesław’s son Leszek the Black in 1288. It is not surprising that this westernmost duchy, which exploited the advantages of the new technology, a thriving economic base and ideological framework, led the general ambitions for reuniﬁcation. In 1289 Henry took possession of Cracow and requested the pope to approve his ‘bearing the sceptre, crown and title of king’, but he died a year later. Przemyśl II (1273–96) of Greater Poland united his lands with Gdańsk Pomorze and was crowned king of Poland in Gniezno in 1295 by Archbishop Jakub Świnka. Meanwhile, the Czech king, Vaclav II, had control of Little Poland. In 1296 Przemyśl was murdered by nobles allied with Brandenburg. In 1300 Vaclav took northern and western Poland and was crowned king. However, pretenders still existed, including Leszek the Black’s brother, Władysław Łokietek, who assumed control of most of Poland between 1306 and his coronation in 1320.

The gradual reunion of the kingdom, whose separate duchies developed their political and economic potential at different rates, is reﬂected by the growth of Polish heraldry. During the thirteenth century this came closer to the western tradition, when local dukes adopted personal devices, beginning with the Silesian Piasts in the 1220s. In Greater Poland the lion was adopted,
whilst the Kujawy dukes dimidiated the lion and eagle. In the second half of the thirteenth century and at the beginning of the fourteenth, the city of Cracow, Vaclav II and I of Bohemia and Poland and Henry IV of Silesia employed the eagle. On his 1295 coronation seal, Przemysł II swapped his lion for the crowned eagle charge, adding the legend *Reddit ipse potens victoria signa Polonis*: ‘The Almighty has restored the trappings of victory to the Poles.’ The imagery is not only powerful in its own right, but also reflects other aspects of Polish (and, in part, Bohemian) ‘regnal’ consciousness. The eagle had been used in Bohemia by Sobeslav of Moravia in 1228; it also recalls Kadłubek’s legend of eagles keeping guard over the remains of St Stanisław, whose butchered and restored corpse was held to symbolise the dismembered kingdom of Poland to be restored through the sainted bishop’s intercession.

The Polish bearings, *herby*, were borrowed from Germany (*Erbe*) via Bohemia, and present a good example of the adaptation of western phenomena to central European reality. Heraldic charges such as beasts, flowers and celestial bodies were adopted, but unlike western practice, Polish heraldry used a war-cry or *proclamation* adapted from names (Pałuki), nicknames (Świnka: piggy) or device (prawda: castle and lion) alongside the charge. Coats of arms were held by clans rather than individuals. The development of heraldry accompanied the growth of a knightly class or *szlachtą*, whose name too was taken from the Czech, *slechtá*, borrowed in turn from German *Geschlecht*. Kadłubek refers to them in his chronicle by a Hungaro-Latin term (*jobaggy*, *jobagiones*) which he pseudo-Graecises as *eubagiones*. During the thirteenth century certain old magnate families, such as the Labędzie and Awdancy, declined whilst others, for example the Zaręby in Greater Poland and the Lelity in the south grew in influence. Silesia was dominated even by some recent immigrants, the likes of the Kietliczes, Pretwiczès, Wezenborgs and Korczborks. A similar period of social mobility typifies Bohemia, where the chronicler Dalimil lamented that ‘nobles rise from peasant stock and the sons of nobles are called peasant; hard silver and trade goods make a noble and often poverty ordains who will be a peasant’.

Genealogical accounts included in various local chronicles such as the *Polish-Silesian chronicle* (*c.* 1285/7), the work of Dzierza (written in Cracow *c.* 1305), and the *Chronicle of Greater Poland* appear not only to chart the descent of local Piasts but to stress the importance of a common descent from Krak, the eponymous founder of Cracow, promoting the idea of a united kingdom centred on that metropolitan city. The Dominican hagiographer Wincenty of Kielce, emphasising the glory of eleventh-century Poland in his expanded *Life of St Stanisław*, noted that ‘even now the royal insignia, namely crown, orb and sceptre are preserved in the treasury of the Church of Cracow, which is the city and head of the kingdom’.
Cracow rather than Gniezno became the main goal of those with pretensions to royal estate. Its aquiline charge was adopted by the future kings of Poland and the city propagated itself as the heart of polonicity. Here the relics of St Stanisław (national successor to St Adalbert (Wojciech) whose remains were the focus of a cult in the former capital and Cracow’s rival, Gniezno) attracted pilgrims, as did the shrines of the new missionary hero of Polish ecclesiastical expansion in Prussia and Lithuania, St Wit, and his fellow Dominican, St Jacek. The tomb of the Piast queen of Hungary, Blessed Salomea, drew pilgrims from Hungary, including the king himself, Stephen V, in 1269–70.

While the western and southern Polish dukes concentrated their attentions primarily on relations with Bohemia and Hungary, the Mazovian Piasts stood further aloof from western alliances. Colonisation took place on a smaller scale there, while preoccupations with pagan neighbours to the north and east were more practical, developed and intense. It was a Mazovian duke, Conrad, who invited the Teutonic Order to Polish territory and the Mazovian Piasts took the strongest dynastic interest in south-western Rus’ and Lithuania. These two preoccupations, Rus’ian trade and Baltic missions, brought the nascent grand duchy of Lithuania into the central European sphere effectively for the first time.

The formation of Lithuania in the mesopotamian heartland circumscribed by the Dvina and Nemunas trade routes is essentially a thirteenth-century phenomenon, just as its fourteenth-century political consolidation is comparable with the development of other ‘new’ central European monarchies. It represents a confederation of various Baltic (non-Slavonic) warlords who consolidated their fledgling polity in the fusion of martial and commercial needs that dominated western Rus’ian trade routes and urban centres (Polotsk, Novgorodok, Grodno) and new mercantile, military and religious colonies in Livonia (and later, Prussia). Lithuanian dukes began to interfere with greater consistency in south-west Rus’ian politics, thereby bringing themselves into closer contact with similarly intervention-inclined Poles and Hungarians. Their pagan religion attracted the attention of missionary clergy in the service of Polish dukes and the merchants and migrants who came to settle the southern and eastern Baltic littoral. What Poland and Bohemia had been for the emperors in neophyte tenth-century Saxony, Lithuania (and Prussia and Livonia) was to the western Slavs in the thirteenth century.

In the early years of the century Leszek the White of Little Poland had supported Prince Roman Mstislavich of Vladimir (in southern Rus’) in his attempts to separate his lands from the duchies of north-eastern Rus’. In return Roman supported Leszek’s attempts to become grand duke in Cracow. After Roman’s death in 1205, Andrew II of Hungary and Leszek both tried to
appropriate Galicia and Volyn from Roman’s sons; local nobles invited various princes from across Rus’. The Treaty of Zips (1214) settled the marriage of Leszek’s daughter Salomea to Andrew’s son Koloman who was recognised as prince of Rus’. The two fathers-in-law confirmed this agreement in 1219, but Daniil Romanovich opposed the idea, making an alliance that year with the Lithuanians whom he encouraged to ransack eastern Poland in 1220. This alliance marks a watershed in Lithuanian political development, providing the first evidence of a consolidation of domestic power in the hands of five senior clans which was to develop over the century into the rule of the house of Pukuver and Gediminas from c. 1290. It also represents the first serious inclusion of Lithuania in central European politics. In 1231 Daniil married the niece of the newly (and, as it turned out, temporarily) converted and crowned Catholic Lithuanian king, Mindaugas.

Mindaugas opened up his lands to western (German) merchants and clergy, in an attempt to use them to maintain a balance in his relations with internal rivals and external competition in Livonia, Rus’ and Poland. Following the king’s apostasy and murder (1261–3) and almost a decade of domestic war made worse than civil by Polish and south-west Rus’ian intervention, Grand Duke Traidenis (c. 1270–82) managed to stabilise the grand duchy. In 1279 he married off his daughter, Gaudemunda, to the Mazovian ruler, Bolesław II, thereby laying the foundation for a tradition of dynastic alliance against the Teutonic Order, and in part against the Polish crown, which extended through the fourteenth century and well into the days of the Jagiellonian monarchy.

**Religious Developments**

Political developments in central Europe were attended by religious and economic changes which transformed the central kingdoms from mere transit points or passive recipients of alien culture into active members of Latin Christendom and propagators of her values. In 1204 King Emeric was robbed of Zadar (Zara) by soldiers of the Fourth Crusade, but he himself had taken the cross in 1196. In August 1217 Andrew II and knights and bishops from the empire and Hungary gathered at Split for the Fifth Crusade, from which they returned early in 1218. In contrast Ottokar of Bohemia adapted his crusading zeal to more immediate local needs. The anonymous author of the *Alexandried* (1290–1300) prayed God: ‘listen and reveal to His Christian people a Czech king such as him; I hope that before long, the Lithuanians, Tatars, Turks, Prussians and the schismatic Russians will experience such terror that they will adopt the Christian faith and relinquish their idols’. As regards domestic religious developments, the arrival or consolidation of Cistercian houses as mission stations and settlement nexuses (especially in rural areas) ceded
prominence gradually to the activity of locally founded orders such as the Pauline hermits, military Orders from Spain and the Holy Land (especially useful as a means of defence against pagan attack or in the expansion of state territory) and most significantly of all for urban development and for its cultural implications, the mendicant friars.

The Hungarian Church reflected the polyethnic structure of medieval Hungary. In 1204 the pope reminded the king that ‘it is neither novel nor ridiculous for convents of diverse nations to live together under one lord and one rule’. Cistercian foundations were established by French and Austrian mother houses: Clairvaux, for instance had sister foundations at Pilis (1184), Saint-Gotthard (1184) and Topuszko (1205); the Austrian monastery of Heiligenkreuz colonised Borsmonostora (1224).

The Order of Hermits of St Paul, founded 1262, was neither monastic nor mendicant. The French Cluniac bishop of Pecs, Bartholomew, formed his first hermit cells on Mount Mecsek in 1225; Eusebius of Esztergom established a group of recluses near Pilis (1246). Pauline convents were founded mostly in the northern mountains by noblemen and princes who made such houses their necropolis. Although often they were founded on the edges of towns (as St Laurence’s near Buda), these houses had no urban apostolate. This role was left to the new ‘international’ Orders.

The mendicants, both Dominican and Franciscan, were more active in the new towns. The Dominican, Paulus Hungarus, returned to Hungary from his studies at Bologna to found Györ at the western end of the Danube route from Esztergom to Vienna c. 1221. The friars were supported by the future Béla IV and Archbishop Robert of Esztergom, who despatched them to evangelise the Cumans in Hungary (1227). In 1254 Béla married a Cuman princess in the Dominican church in Buda. The preachers were very popular. However, their growth was severely curtailed when Béla’s daughter Margaret followed her Dominican confessor’s counsel and refused to marry. The furious king transferred his patronage to the Franciscans. In 1277 the Order of Preachers had thirty-two houses (two for women), thirty-five in 1303, thirty-eight in 1350; a century later there were thirty-nine Hungarian houses, mostly in urban centres.

Some time between 1228 and 1232 the Franciscans became established in Hungary. In 1228 Giovanni di Piano Carpini, head of the Order’s Teutonia province, sent brethren to Poland, Bohemia, Hungary, Denmark and Norway. By the time of the Tatar invasion, they already had houses in immigrant centres such as Eger, Győr, Nagyszombat (Tirnau), Székesfehérvár, Sarospatak and Zagreb. In 1265 a Franciscan, Brother Paul, was the royal confessor. Minorite friaries were built in Buda, Pest, Pecs, Sopron, Bratislava, Nitra, Lipsce, Beszterce, Verőce and Poszega. Béla IV was buried not by the archbishop of Esztergom, as was established custom, but by the Franciscans. The friars
minor took over from the Dominicans in the Cuman mission too; their increase was as sharp as the Dominican stagnation. Between 1300 and 1500 the number of their convents rose from 41 to 115.

The Franciscans arrived first in Bohemia around 1228 and within two years there was a warden in Olomouc. The first house in Prague was built by Vaclav I around 1232 near the church of St James. A second, ‘Na Františku’, was founded shortly afterwards by Vaclav’s sister, (St) Agnes, alongside a house of Poor Clares. In the thirteenth century there were fourteen minorite friaries in Bohemia and four in Moravia. The secular Church, as in Hungary and Poland, also strengthened its position in Bohemian society. In 1222, following the lifting of a papal interdict, Bishop Andrew of Prague (1215–24) succeeded in gaining Ottokar I’s recognition of benefit of clergy, the collection of tithes and increased episcopal authority. In 1257 Ottokar II consented to the presence of an inquisitor in his realms.

In 1215 a Polish delegation comprising Archbishop Henryk Kietlicz of Gniezno (1199–1219), Bishop Wincenty Kadłubek of Cracow and his brother bishops of Wrocław, Włocławek and Lubusz attended the ecumenical council convened by Innocent III in the cathedral at Rome. Lateran IV was the first ecumenical council in which Polish prelates took full part.

The Polish Church reorganised its internal structures in the second half of the thirteenth century, increasing the number of its archdeaneries and parishes. Of the latter by 1300 there were around 3,000. With the new parish organisation came schools (teaching rudimentary learning in Polish) and hospitals. Kietlicz introduced statutes guaranteeing (in theory) free episcopal election by chapter (Wrocław, 1201, Cracow, 1207). In common with other prelates he condemned married clergy, encouraged lay weddings in church, forged new relations between the Church and the dukes and promoted learning. He sent out missions to the Prussians and Jatwings, obtaining a papal legature for Prussia in 1210. Diocesan synods became more frequent. A synod headed by a papal legate at Wrocław in 1267 decreed that cases involving clerics should be reserved for episcopal courts. The legate’s synod convened at Buda in 1279 issued directives which were binding not only in Hungary, but also in Poland. In mid-century the western dioceses of Wrocław and Poznań introduced the office of auxiliary bishop. Episcopal electoral reform strengthened the political independence of the Church and the increase in the number of parishes led to closer contacts between the hierarchy and grass-roots Christians. Bishops assumed the role of representatives of local interests, taking part in local wiec or council meetings alongside the lords temporal. The support of leading prelates such as that given in 1295 to Przemysł II rather than Łokietek by Archbishop Jakub Świnka of Gniezno could make or break ducal pretensions to royal estate.
In 1248 the papal legate, Giacomo Pantaleone (later Pope Urban IV) urged the Silesian Church assembled at Wrocław to reform its praxis and serve the faithful more successfully by imitating certain mendicant methods, enjoining them ‘to say the Lord’s Prayer and the Creed publicly in the vernacular after the Gospel, or at least the Lord’s Prayer in Latin and the Creed in the vernacular’ because he had noticed ‘hundreds of people who do not know at all how to express what they believe’.

The first Hungarian vernacular poem, devoted to the Virgin Mary (O-magyar Maria-siralom) and the Czech ‘Life of St Mary’, have a late thirteenth-century Polish counterpart, the renowned and impressively sombre Marian hymn ‘Bogurodzica’ which was sung before the battle of Grunwald in 1410: ‘Mother of God, Maiden, God-glorified Mary! Lady Mary, chosen mother assist us before your Son, aid us! Kyrie Eleison’.

The increase in the number of Polish saints venerated from the thirteenth century reflects not only the invigorated state of the local church, its contacts with the papacy and its more effective propagation of the faith by both the secular and new regular clergy, but also the general life of the community. We find new saints from across the duchies, the Franciscan Jan of Lobdowa; the Dominicans, Jacek (c. 1200–57) and Wit (d. 1268); bishops Blessed Wincenty Kadłubek, Blessed Jan Prandota, St Stanisław. Female members of ruling ducal families were raised to the altars: in Silesia: Jadwiga, widow of Henry the Bearded, a Cistercian, at Trzebnica (canonised 1267); Poor Clares such as: Blessed Salomea, queen of Hungary, at Skalo near Cracow (c. 1211–68); Blessed Kinga (1234–92), in Nowy Sącz; Blessed Jolanta (c. 1244–98) of Kalisz, in Gniezno. The cult of Duchess Jadwiga which thrived locally and spread throughout Poland also became established in Bohemia as part of Ottokar II’s hopes to support his claims to the Polish throne. However, the cult which became most firmly established in Poland was that of St Stanisław, murdered by Bolesław II in 1079. His severed and restored body symbolised Poland, and the hymn sung on his feastday, Gaude, mater Polonia, gained wide popularity. It is significant that despite the profusion of dynastic saints, it was a bishop who took the place of a national patron: a patron of all estates and a critic of the crown if it acted without consultation.

In Poland the Dominicans settled in newly chartered towns. In Cracow they gained the support of the local bishop, Iwo Odrowąż, himself a graduate of the new University of Paris. The Polish province included, in addition to Polish duchies, the neighbouring lands of Bohemia, Moravia, Western Pomorze and Prussia. The Dominicans were concentrated most densely in Silesia and Little Poland. According to 1303 figures, of thirty-two houses in the Polish province, fifteen were in those southern regions (the Franciscans show a similar tendency with twenty-three of forty friaries being founded in the south). The
Silesian concentration was not due solely to German settlement in the area. Dominican houses were often founded in the old towns under the control of Polish castellans and their recruitment was largely Polish.

The Franciscans came originally from the Order’s German province, but formed their own Polish-Bohemian province, congruous with the Dominican province (minus Western Pomorze) around 1239. In Poland the first friaries were established in Wrocław and Cracow – close to Bohemia, and new commercial centres which were controlled by favourable princes. The Minorites were particularly popular among female Piasts (as they were with the Árpád and Přemyslid women). At least thirty duchesses like Kinga and Jolanta became Poor Clares, and more than sixty Piasts were buried in Franciscan churches. By the beginning of the fourteenth century there were over 200 thriving mendicant houses in Poland, Bohemia and Hungary. In central Europe the mendicants led the way in the evangelisation of heathens (Cumans, Prussians, Lithuanians – whose second titular bishop was a Dominican, St Wit) and in the implementation of Church reform, supporting the local church and its interests – when other ambitions permitted.

On 16 December 1273 Bishop Bruno of Olomouc, a royal counsellor, wrote a confidential report on the state of the Church in central Europe for the pope. His letter reflects the concern felt by secular prelates throughout western Christendom at the growing popularity of the mendicants. He condemned the friars for attracting people away from parish churches on holy days and Sundays, offering a simpler mass in preference to the elaborate celebrations of the cathedrals and old monasteries, and for bestowing special indulgences which posed a threat to local churches and also to Rome (as a pilgrim centre). They undermined, he claimed, the bishop’s right to reserve absolution for himself. The antagonism which prevailed in Moravia had not yet reached the same scale in Poland – perhaps due to the support of local dukes and bishops and the less dense spread of mendicant houses in that land. Nevertheless, disputes between the two groups intensified in the fourteenth century.

Thirteenth-century Church reforms were adapted to local conditions in the continent’s heartlands. The new science, arts and architecture made their appearance in the region, for example the Romanesque Cistercian house at Trzebiecna patronised by Henry the Bearded and his sainted wife, the churches of Ják and Lebeny in Hungarian Danubia (Dunántúl) or Buchlov Castle, a mixture of Czech Romanesque and Gothic styles. Students from Poland, Bohemia and Hungary studied in the universities of Italy and France and local prelates collected basic philosophical, historical and theological texts which became the heart of chapter libraries. A Polish scientist, Witelo (c. 1230–c. 1314), son of a Thuringian immigrant and a Silesian mother, composed a work on perspective, Ἡπερὶ δπτικης (‘On optics’) (1270–3), which gained widespread
The mendicants with their strong provincial organisation and centralised apparatus formed structures for the central European Church, which was then turning her attention to pagan and Orthodox areas in the south (Hungarian Balkans), north (Baltic) and east (Rus'). In 1200 in Poland, Bohemia and Hungary there were about 150 monasteries, by 1300, 700.

**Economic Developments**

Despite the added incentive provided by the Tatar attacks for the renewal and expansion of urban settlement in Hungary, Poland, Bohemia and Rus', the process of colonisation of empty regions began earlier than 1241/2. It was a pan-continental phenomenon, answering the needs of overpopulated northern and western regions, just as in the reconquered Spanish territories.

Local dukes began to invite settlers. Under Béla IV's stewardship Hungary experienced a growth in the foundation of castles, towns and villages. The twelfth-century royal and episcopal towns of the castrum (citadel) and suburbium (commercial/artisan district) type, which we find throughout central and eastern Europe, were replaced by conglomerative settlements of trading and mercantile quarters, endowed mainly with German Law. A network of small towns is more typical of the region than large urban concentrations. German ('Nemény'), and French and Walloon settlers ('Olaszi:' 'Latini') brought their skills in husbandry, viticulture and artisanry to new settlements largely in the north-western region of the country around Zips (Szepesseg) and in the south in Transylvania, where toponyms betray their presence. The best Hungarian wines, the *vina seremiensia* of Francavilla, came from the vineyards of the newcomers. In 1224 Andrew II issued a charter (*privilegium Andreanum*) establishing a Saxon community in the Siebenburg district (lasting until 1945), and exempting new settlers from dues throughout Hungary in return for a payment of 500 silver marks and the provision of 500 armed soldiers.

In Silesia Bolesław the Tall (Wysoki) brought miners from Misnia/Goslar to Zlotoryja. His son, Henry the Bearded continued the policy and was imitated by the bishops of Wrocław and Cracow. There were attempts to restrict German Law to foreign newcomers, but in 1229 Henry granted German Law to Polish settlers too. This process, *locatio*, involved certain technical requirements such as organised, measured field layout in planned villages; in the towns this led to the founding of a new street network on a chess board pattern, with an open, usually rectangular new market place, cemetery, parish church, specialist quarters, town boundaries, defence works (ditches and walls). Such new towns were endowed with a charter. The first *locatores* were usually foreign (especially in the beginning), of urban origin, familiar with German law at home, and able to profit from contacts in Germany and a certain amount of
capital. As a reward for finding colonists, the *locator* gained the position of local judge, hearing cases in the lord’s stead: *scultetus/soltys/schultheiß* or *wójt/advocatus*. The latter title was more common in Bohemia, the former in Poland and Moravia. It is still in use. Nobles and knights also founded new villages under new law, acting as *soltys* themselves, drawing on dues or also appointing a trusted peasant to that office. A *soltys* would gain between two and ten *fæn*² of land, according to the size of his village. This would be exempt from dues, with fishing and hunting rights, as well as rights over inns and in some cases mills. He had a right to a sixth part of the dues owed by settlers to the lord, and a third of court fines. The *soltys* owed military service to the crown.

As for urban settlements, these new foundations were contemporary with the new villages. Wrocław (Breslau) gained German Law before 1214; Cracow before 1228, with a new foundation following in 1257. Duke Barnim I granted Magdeburg Law to Szczecin (Stettin) in 1243. In 1223 Środa gained its charter, a modified version of Magdeburg Law which was later adopted as a model by other Polish towns as *ins fori sredense*; Gniezno was reordered before 1239, and Płock in 1237. New towns were established usually outside old ones or close by because the founding landowner had difficulty buying up all the land in old centres from the local gentry and church. For example Sącz was an old castellan centre on the river Dunajec (a southern tributary of the Vistula), which supervised trade with Hungary. Duchess Kinga transferred the town to new land before 1273, and 1292 saw the foundation of Nowy Sącz. Prague gained German Law in 1232–4 and a new town, Malá Strana, was built opposite the old city on the left bank of the Vltava in 1257.

The new towns reinvigorated the old trade routes which traversed the Baltic–Carpathian regions via Silesia, and Bohemia–Pomorze along the Oder through Moravia and Greater Poland. Merchants from the lower Vistula towns travelled via Great Poland to the Baltic ports; a major Hansa route was formed by the Vistula–Bug riverway to Galicia which was connected with Wrocław; note should also be taken of the Novgorod–Lübeck route. Most of the pure silver used instead of coin was circulated in the great towns which also had mints – Cracow, Sandomierz, Wrocław. This was used mainly for large purchases of property, even though in Silesia the local bracteate was used for such transactions. The Prague groat, first minted in Kutná Hora from new silver mines under Václav II, became the major coin of central Europe.

At the end of the thirteenth century in Silesia, thirty-five of the ninety-six chartered towns had more than 1,000 inhabitants; the figure for Little Poland is ten of thirty-seven, eight out of thirty-nine in Greater Poland; two out of four in Mazovia; four out of fourteen in Kujawy; two out of nineteen in

² 1 Flemish *fæn* (*lanœs*) covered 16 ha, the Franconian *fæn*, 24 ha.
Sieradz–Łęczyca; five out of seven in western Pomorze. Cracow burghers had closer links with Hungary, Silesia and Bohemia than with northern Poland – hence their support for Leszek the Black against Conrad II, or for Henry IV and Vaclav against Łokietek or Przemysł II. The Cracow wójć, Albert, who led a rebellion against Łokietek in 1311–12, had links with Silesia and the Luxemburgers. The citizens of Poznań were more interested in developing contacts with Silesia than with Cracow. These figures reflect the varied rates of economic growth throughout Polish territory and the diverse political tendencies dominating individual duchies.

An important aspect of the general immigration of German, Flemish and Italian settlers into the empty heartlands of Europe is the encouragement of Jewish settlement in the region which left its impact on Magyar and Slavonic society until the savageries of the mid-twentieth century. Rabbi Eliezer of Prague complained to Yehuda Ha-Hassid of Regensburg (d. 1217) about the poverty of Polish and Hungarian Jews. Jews received charters in Austria (1244), Hungary (1251) and Bohemia (1254). In 1264 Bolesław the Pious enfranchised the Jews of Greater Poland, equating them with members of other estates, designating them servi camerae, the duke’s men, and guaranteeing them personal liberty, freedom of religion and self-organisation as members of a Kahal attached to the synagogue (schola judaeorum), headed by the cantor (episcopus judaeorum). The Kahal also acted as a court to try cases involving Jews. Similar charters were issued by Henry IV of Silesia, Bolesław I of Świdnica–Jawor (1295) and Henry III of Głogów (1299). In the newly chartered towns the Jews established their own organisational infrastructure and enjoyed urban privileges. Their use of the German language connected them with other, gentile, new arrivals. Ducal protection helped to restrict the local civic authority’s intervention in Jewish affairs.

Relations between the Poles, Czechs and Germans inside and outside Bohemia and Poland were much more complex than modern clichés of ‘Teuton’ and ‘Slav’ imply. Reaction to Germans in Bohemia and Poland reflects relations between neighbours: sometimes in Bohemian texts they are compared angrily or jealously with Judas (‘The Apocryphal legend of Judas’) or Pontius Pilate, while their fashionable culture was lapped up greedily in royal and baronial halls. An interesting side-slant on ‘ethnic’ relations comes from the Austrian satirist Seifried Hellbling who mocked his fellow countrymen for imitating Czech mannerisms. In Poland chroniclers could stress how Poles and Germans get on courteously, but when temporary local need arose, all that was remembered (for the duration) was the bogus ‘natural hatred’ of ‘Slav’ for ‘Teuton’. The historiographical adage, current from the Middle Ages until as recently as the 1970s, that there were no Poles, only Germans in the towns of medieval Poland, cannot be sustained by the evidence. Such ‘German’ names
as Conrad or Hermann, used to support such pseudo-scholarly claims, were common in Poland before the mass migrations; second-generation immigrants often took Polish names, such as comes Albertus cognominatus Lyka3 from Henryków. The assimilation of newcomers took place reasonably quickly, albeit not completely, through mixed marriages and local migration. A Cistercian of the house at Lubiąż prided himself that

this silvan land lay without cultivation and the poor people of Poland were hardly efficient, ploughing the sandy furrow with a wooden plough without iron and they did not know how to plough with two cows or oxen. That people had neither salt, nor iron, coin nor metal, no fine apparel or shoes; they kept only oxen; monks were the first to discover this wonderful land; and the whole land was uncovered by them.

This is not a simple statement of fact, but the exaggeration which local pride inspires. In the fifteenth century the Poles (and others) would apply similar descriptions to the Lithuanians. Cultural amalgams occurred on an institutional level when Conrad of Mazovia chartered Płock in 1237, combining elements of German Law (autonomous jurisdiction under the sótys) with Polish knights’ law which had been granted to merchants earlier.

The cultural influence of the newcomers is reflected by language: German terms were adopted for objects, concepts, occupations, tools. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Poles were not familiar with such matters before the Teutonic light shined upon them. It is a fact that Polish terminology was supplanted in certain areas, thus schwager (Schwager) replaced dziewerz (brother-in-law), małżenstwo, swadę (marriage), and tańcze (tanzen) took the place of plasac (dance). The (still popular) śmigus-dyngus, or custom of dousing women with water on Easter Monday, was adopted by the Poles under German influence, even though the practice itself originated much further west.

Courtly culture thrived in Cracow, Poznań and Wrocław. The Chronicle of Greater Poland includes a legend of nuptial infidelity based on the Nibelungenlied motif: the native romance of a certain Walterus Robustus (qui in polonico vocabatur Wdaly Walczerz) and Helgunda. Henry IV of Silesia gained renown for the tourneys arranged at his court.

**Written sources**

The Hungarian chronicle, compiled between 1282 and 1285 by Simon Kézai, a cleric at the court of Laszlo IV, drew on earlier compositions, the Hunnish Chronicle and the Gesta Ungarorum. The old idea that a Hungarian was a person born in the kingdom of Hungary, subject to the sainted king, Stephen, whose conversion of the Magyars provided a historical conceptual link between the

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3 Count Albert, surnamed ‘Bast’.
legendary Huns and the Christian world, was complemented by Kézai with the idea of a common descent and a common language. The Huns of Attila, represented as the ancestors of the Magyars, justified the Árpád ‘historic’ right to rule over the _puszta_. It would be churlish to point out that the Huns were not connected in the least with the ‘Hungarians’. According to Kézai, the _natio hungarica_ comprised mainly the nobility, whose rights were based on performance of military services for the crown.

The Polish bishop-chronicler-propagandist, Kadłubek, also attempted to fit the history and prehistory of the community of his realm into a classical milieu, inventing letters from Alexander the Great to Aristotle which discuss Polish matters. According to the bishop, one Prince Leszek defeated Julius Caesar and then married the Roman dictator’s sister. This is also the time of Martinus Polonus, a Silesian Dominican and renowned world-historian who studied in Prague, served in the papal curia and died as archbishop-elect of Gniezno. In mid-century the Hungaro-Polish chronicle made use of data from earlier works of both countries, describing events up to the end of the eleventh century and stressing the links between Poland and Hungary. According to this text Attila the Hun conquered Lithuania, prefiguring thirteenth-century Magyar and Polish political ambitions.

In Bohemia the nobility supported clerical _litterati_ writing in both Latin and the vernacular. German poets also were invited to Bohemia in an attempt to transform Prague into a centre of imperial culture. Vaclav I invited the Minnesinger, Reinmar von Zweten, to serve at his court. The most prolific writer at the court of Ottokar II and Vaclav II, Ulrich von Eschenbach, wrote warmly of his new country, his ‘saelegen lande’, as a blessed home: ‘Beheim, be daz diutet _beatus_, heim, _domus_ oder _mansio_.’

Dalimil’s chronicle composed in Czech verse by a member of the native lesser nobility between 1282 and 1314 stresses the community (obec) of the realm, reinterpreting the past and Czech legends to serve his political message, and condemning chivalric escapades (jousts, _amour courtois_) and new-fangled (imported) noble pastimes such as card playing. Along with the Latin _Chronica Aulae Regiae (Kronika zbraslawska)_), Dalimil’s text figures among the best sources for thirteenth-century Bohemian history. The former was composed by Peter of Žytawa, a Cistercian of German descent from the monastery founded in Zbraslav (1232) by Vaclav I.

In short, during the thirteenth century the central European realms faced a series of choices on which depended their international status and future: to embrace Romance culture in full, mainly through German and other migrant mediation, as was the case with Bohemia and the western duchies of Poland; to import the Romance model and adapt it to domestic conditions, as we see in Hungary, most of Poland and, for one decade in mid-century, Lithuania; or to
attempt survival in the stale coffin-air of a closed community – the hapless fate of the Lusatian Sorbs and Carpathian Ruthenians. We may speak for the first time of central European politics, culture and economics where ‘modern’ reforms in Church, state and the arts were adopted or adapted from northern and western Europe to local realities.

We began with etymological and other linguistic explanations of a common past, Latin terminology summoned to illuminate local realia and local words. Classical Pannonia was connected to the Slavonic word for ‘lord’, pan; ‘germo’ was taken to explain the Slav–Teuton relationship. We can sense the Polish, Bohemian and Hungarian sense of belonging to a common Christian and classical tradition, feeling at home in ‘Europe’. The web of dynastic ties between Hungary, Poland and Bohemia and the links established by Árpád, Piast and Przemyslid with French, Byzantine and Rus’ian houses would be spun again, after the extinction of those houses, in fifteenth-century central Europe by the thirteenth-century Lithuanian house of Jogaila.
It is widely accepted that the fall of Constantinople in 1204 brought to its knees an empire which was already on its way to dissolution, notably on its Balkan edges. Three peoples displayed new vigour: the Bulgars, the Serbs and the Albanians, the frontiers between their lands remaining still fluid, especially those between Bulgaria and Serbia. Each of these peoples can be observed at a different stage in its evolution towards political and cultural autonomy. Bulgaria under the Asen dynasty, which broke with the Byzantines in 1185–7, and which gained Byzantine recognition, in 1202, of its mastery over the lands from Belgrade to Sofia, represented the resurgence of an older state, though with rather different territorial boundaries; even after two centuries of submission to Byzantium, it remained the home of distinctive political and cultural traditions which asserted its role as the major power in the Balkans, and, in consequence, implied Bulgarian rights even over Constantinople.

In Serbia, Stefan Nemanja (1170–96) had recently brought together the two old power centres of Raška and Diokleia (which corresponded to Zeta, and to modern Montenegro). Zeta, it is true, retained a strong particularist tendency, and internecine strife within the family of the Nemanjids only made this worse. On the coast, Italian influences by way of Dalmatia resulted in the temporary appearance of communes, of which the best example is that of Kotor (Cattaro), which could barely withstand the attempts of the Serb princes to absorb them in their realms. In any event, Nemanja directed a push southwards from 1183 which enabled him to place pressure beyond Niš in Macedonia; at the same time he held on to his influence on the Dalmatian coast north of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), which oscillated between Byzantine and Norman Sicilian overlordship, and southwards along the coast as far as the Mati estuary, in northern Albania. He thus hemmed in the coast of

Montenegro; there, a further challenge was the attempt by the Church of Rome to extend its influence in the region, from the archiepiscopal seat at Antivari (Bar) into Albania. Although it seems that Serbia had already attained an awareness of its ethnic identity, it would still be excessive to see in Serbia a properly constituted ‘state’. Remaining within the Byzantine orbit, Serbia was already fully able to keep its distance from Constantinople, while not succumbing to Roman temptations either; in 1200 the young King Stefan II repudiated his wife, Eudochia, the daughter of Emperor Alexios III, and she went off to Dyrachium.

As for Albania, its separate identity was real enough, even though it had not truly broken with Constantinople; all the same, the rulers of Arbanon around 1190, Progon and his sons Dhimitër and Gjin, based at Kruja, retained a considerable degree of autonomy, even though Progon bore no title grander than ἀρχων (archon); and the title of πανύπερσεβαστός (panhypersebastos), borne by Dhimitër at the start of the thirteenth century, can only be seen as a sign of his dependence on the Byzantines. Even so, the earliest inscription to mention Progon and Dhimitër, from Gëziq, in the hinterland of Lezhë, is written in Latin, calling them judices and noting their dependence on Vladin and George, princes of Zeta. This adds up to a vivid illustration of the political and cultural convergences that were taking place in Arbanon. This Arbanon, the Raban of the Life of Stefan Nemanja, was a land without direct access to the sea, even though the coasts of Epiros, despite their control by Serbs and Greeks, remained primarily inhabited by Albanians, as did the mountain areas which rose above the eastern shore of Lake Shkodër (Scutari), in Latin Polatum, in Slavonic Pilot. These lands were gained by the Roman Church in the twelfth century, but the lower reaches were increasingly populated by Albanians, as was the ancient Dardania (modern Kosova), which lay open to Albania by way of the river system of the Drin, and which stood some way from the Serbian power centres of Raška and Zeta. It is hard to see what case can be made for a diffusion of Albanians down from the mountains towards the shores of the lake if one does not accept their earlier expansion from the other side of the mountain, towards Gjakova and Prizren. There was certainly a religious fron-

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4 Djurović (1970), pp. 15–27, and map on p. 16.
5 On religious factors in Serbian unification, see Kačić (1979); on the Serbian threat and the breach of 1200, see Choniates, Historia, p. 705; Ostrogorsky (1956), p. 432; and Ducellier (1981b), pp. 123 and n. 17, 152.
8 Corovčić (ed.), Spisi sv. Save, Zitije Stefana Nemanja; Cirković (1988), a notably courageous work.
9 The question of Illyrian continuity was already addressed by Jireček, (1916), pp. 69–70, and, in the same collection, pp. 127–8, admitting that the territory occupied by the Albanians extended, prior to Slav expansion, from Scutari to Valona and from Prizren to Ohrid, utilising in particular the correspondence of Demetrios Chomatenos; Cirković (1988), p. 347; cf. Mirdita (1981).
tier in the region, but it would be wrong to exaggerate its impermeability, particularly when the Bulgarian and Serbian kings were prepared to make known their readiness to be crowned by the pope.\textsuperscript{10} It was not as any sort of punishment, but rather in recognition of the continual accretion of population, that in 1348 Stefan Dušan required Latin priests (\textit{latinski popovi}) from Pilot to pay their taxes to the Orthodox bishop of Prizren, a suffragan of Ohrid.\textsuperscript{11} It is also apparent from a charter granted to Dubrovnik in 1230 by Ivan II Asen that the Albanians dominated the central regions of what is now the Albanian republic, in the areas which are drained by the Devollit river.\textsuperscript{12} It is not, then, a question of an Albania that possessed political or territorial unity; on the other hand the imperial government addressed the ethnic character of the region when the former theme of Dyrrhachion (\textit{Δυρράχιον}) acquired the name of \textit{provintia Dirrachii et Arbani}, if the \textit{partitio Romanie} is to be believed (and it probably does reflect pre-\textit{1204} realities). Such a name would reflect the existence of two main centres of Albanian settlement, Arbanon (\textit{Αρβανών})–Raban and Ivan Asen’s Devol.\textsuperscript{13}

It goes without saying that in 1204 each of these different entities reacted in a different way. For Bulgaria, the \textit{partitio Romanie} was a direct challenge, since the frontier regions around Plovdiv (Philippopolis) and Adrianople were granted out to Latins, despite lasting claims by the Bulgars enshrined in the treaty of 1202. Renier de Trit held Plovdiv from autumn 1204 to June 1205, when Kalojan retook the town, on his way back from an expedition to Thessalonika;\textsuperscript{14} and in 1206 Venice granted Adrianople to the ‘collaborationist’ Greek \textit{archon} Theodore Branas.\textsuperscript{15} This blocked Bulgarian aspirations to dominate the Maritsa valley and to gain long desired access thereby to the Aegean.\textsuperscript{16} The Bulgarians were bound also to be disquieted by the fact that the \textit{partitio} granted Venice, in addition to the Albanian coastline, the province of Kolônea, between Kastoria and Korça (Koritsa), for expansion towards the Adriatic was another constant concern.\textsuperscript{17}

Tsar Kalojan (1197–1207), who managed to put an end to separatist tendencies within Bulgaria, not merely had access to considerable military resources,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Cf. the conclusions of Cirković (1988), pp. 346–9, who, while insisting on the religious frontier along the heights of Dukagin, admits the descent of the Albanians towards the lower levels around Lake Shkodër, without taking into account their expansion on the eastern side of the mountain range nor (which is more surprising) the obvious use by them of the Drin valley, which leads straight to Prizren.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Novaković (1912), pp. 691–2; Maksimović (1981), pp. 175–9; Cirković (1988), p. 348.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Stojanović (1934), no. 790, p. 205; Cirković (1988), p. 349.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ducellier (1981b), pp. 97–8.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Asdracha (1976), pp. 236–7; Vlachos (1970), pp. 277–8, with further references.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Tafel and Thomas, \textit{Urkunden}, ii, pp. 17–19; Villehardouin (1961), ii, p. 403; Thiriet (1919), p. 80; Asdracha (1976), p. 239.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Asdracha (1982).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Archivio di Stato, Venezia, Liber Albus, fol. 34; Carile (1961), p. 220; Ducellier (1981b), p. 98 and n. 53.
\end{itemize}
rooted in the peasantry of the Danube valley; he was also well aware of the international setting, so that by rejecting the terms of the partitio he hoped to take advantage of the unexpected collapse of Byzantium.\(^\text{18}\) He was soon discouraged by his preliminary contacts with the crusaders, which appear to have taken place even before the fall of Constantinople; he saw in Innocent III (himself unenthusiastic about the course the Fourth Crusade was taking) a guarantee against the aggressive ambitions of the crusaders.\(^\text{19}\) For Rome this was an unhoped for opportunity, offering the chance to bring Bulgaria within the Roman confession. Neither the Bulgars nor the inhabitants of Serbia and Bosnia had lifted a finger to aid Zadar (Zara), whose enforced submission to Hungary during the crusade ensured that it would remain a Catholic city. Indeed, the Bosnians, allied with the Hungarians, took the opportunity to reconcile themselves with Rome in 1203, promising solemnly that they would battle against the Bogomil heresy,\(^\text{20}\) of which Bosnia was regarded as a main bastion.\(^\text{21}\) Certainly, Kalojan obtained recognition of his claim to hold the imperial title of ‘tsar’, and asked Rome to nominate a patriarch as head of the Bulgarian Church. Such demands led negotiations to drag on, and in the end Kalojan had to be realistic and accept more modest titles for the ruler and the senior bishop, who were to bear the relatively modest titles of ‘king’ and ‘primate’. But the result was that at Târnovo on 7 November 1204 he received a royal crown from a Roman cardinal, and thus he came in principle at least under the protecting wing of the pope.\(^\text{22}\) In reality, of course, his approach was purely tactical, and he never renounced his Orthodox faith nor his imperial ambitions.\(^\text{23}\) Up to the end of the second Bulgarian empire, the titles tsar and patriarch continued to be employed, a point which emerges from the adoption at Târnovo in 1211 by the usurper Boril of a Synodikon which, without renouncing obedience to Rome, also reaffirmed Bulgarian Orthodoxy, at the same time as it reasserted the traditional struggle of the Bulgarian tsars against Bogomilism.\(^\text{24}\) This heresy had never been extirpated from the Bulgarian lands, as is plain from events at Plovdiv in 1204–5: Villehardouin describes the quarter of the city inhabited by the heretics, burned by the paltry army of Renier de Trit.\(^\text{25}\)

\(^{18}\) It is unfortunately impossible to date exactly Kalojan’s embassy to the crusaders; see \textit{Innocentii \ III \ papa \ gesta}, \textit{PL}, 214, ch. 108, p. cxlvii, but both Clari and Villehardouin place it after the first fall of Constantinople on 18 July 1203, and it evidently preceded the Bulgar–Latin rupture of August 1204; cf. Hendricks (1970), doc. 17 (xxxviii), pp. 135–6; also Wolff (1952), pp. 281–322.\\n
\(^{19}\) Dujčev (1942), nos. ii, ix, xv, xvii; C. Asdracha (1976), p. 237.\\n
\(^{20}\) Cirković (1964), pp. 48–9.\\n
\(^{23}\) Dujčev (1962), p. 43.\\n
\(^{25}\) Villehardouin (1961), ii, pp. 345–6; Asdracha (1976), pp. 60–2 (rich in further references) and 237;
Kalojan also had the advantage of offers of service coming from the Thracian archontes who had been rebuffed by the intransigent attitude of the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Baldwin I, and who despaired of ever reaching a modus vivendi with the Latins. These archontes were even prepared, at the beginning of 1205, to offer the imperial crown to the Bulgarian tsar. The intrigues of a Bulgaro-Vlach, Šišman, caused uproar in Thessalonika in May and June, and Boniface of Montferrat, its lord, was obliged to lift his siege of Nauplion so that he could try to rescue his wife Maria of Hungary, a prisoner in the acropolis of Thessalonika. 26

In the short term at least, Bulgarian policy produced results; on 14 April 1205 the Greco-Bulgar coalition, backed up by a formidable squadron of Cuman horsemen, 27 wiped out the Latin army at Adrianople, and captured the Latin emperor himself. 28 This Bulgarian action posed such a threat to Constantinople itself that Theodore Laskaris was left with a free hand to build his own power in Asia Minor, where he was actively building the rump state of Nicaea. Kalojan made plain too early what his real ambitions were, and reintroduced into Thrace traditional Byzantine techniques, so that from 1205 to 1207 his armies lived off the land, while local manpower and livestock was carried off towards the Danube regions which were short of men and of animals. 29 Indeed, his reputation was already that of a ‘killer of Romans’ (that is, Greeks: Ρωμαιοκτόνος) as a result of earlier coercion of the Greeks, for whom he would also remain ‘John the Dog’ (Κυνωάννης). 30 It is no surprise that the Greeks adopted a hostile attitude to the Bulgars, all the more so when the new Latin emperor, Henry, abandoned his brother’s brutal policy towards the Greek aristocracy. The provincial archontes thus did not hesitate to enter a rapprochement with the Latins, with whom some had indeed made marriage alliances. A case in point is Theodore Branas, the husband of Agnes of France, herself the sister of King Philip Augustus. It is a moot point where Kalojan would have gone next if he had not been suddenly killed, in October 1207,


Villehardouin speaks only of 14,000 ‘Turks’, but an account of the battle sent to Innocent III says that Kalojan attacked the Latins ‘cum Turcis et ceteris Crucis Christi inimicis’, Theiner, Vetera monumenta slavorum meridionalium, p. 41; this has led to the supposition that an alliance was created between the tsar and the Bogomils; see, e.g., Derzavin (1946), p. 150; cf. Angelov (1961), pp. 251–2, who rightly shows that this was an attempt to discredit Kalojan in the pope’s eyes; Hansen-Love (1971), fasc. 3, pp. 102–12.


under the walls of Thessalonika. In any event, his death was a comfort to the Latins empire, which, under Henry, was able to hold on to the extreme north-west of Asia Minor. Bulgaria reverted to internal dissension after Boril’s usurpation in place of Kalojan’s son, Ivan Ašen, and its neighbours only encouraged this trend: in the west, between Vardar and Struma, while the Latins received the submission of Slav prince of Melnik, the young Serb leader Stefan II recognised the authority of Prince Strez over the region around Prosek and Strumica.

The age of Serbia had now commenced, even though western interference in Dalmatia, expressed most notably by the assertion of at least nominal lordship over Dubrovnik by the Venetians, in 1205, tended to push back the centre of gravity of the Serbian empire into the continental recesses; under threat from an aggressive Hungary and aware of the aspirations of the papacy under Honorius III, Stefan II revived the policies pursued fifteen years earlier by Kalojan, receiving a royal crown from the papal legate in 1217. Henceforth he would bear the sobriquet prvovenčani, ‘the first crowned’, but the equivocal outlook of the Serbs is clear from the way that in 1219 the king’s brother, Sava, who was an Athonite monk, approached the autocephalous archbishop of Nicaea in order to obtain his own consecration as autocephalous archbishop of Serbia. Thus it was not simply a question of remaining firmly Orthodox, but of seeing in Nicaea the only authentic remnant of the old empire. Indeed, Sava and Stefan II well knew that the normal practice would have been to respect the authority in Serbia of the archbishop of Ohrid, which would have brought them within the sphere of the despots of Epiros, who were was excessively powerful neighbours with an apparently unstoppable programme of expansion into Macedonia; Stefan had already had to provide guarantees to the Epirots when Stefan Radoslav, heir to Serbia, became betrothed to the daughter of the Epirote ruler Theodore Angelos Doukas, who himself gained Thessalonika in 1224. The Bulgars were not to forget this alliance with their worst enemy. The alliance between Serbia and Epiros appeared on the face of things to be sealed when after the succession of Stefan Radoslav the Serbian Church did accept submission to the powerful archbishop of Ohrid, Demetrios Chomatenos, thus overturning the defiance of 1219. However, Epirote expansion could only irritate the Serbs, who, like the Bulgars, were bewitched by the dream of eventually being able to set foot on the shores of

33 Nicol (1957), p. 60, and ref. nn. 34–5, p. 73, who distorts the course of events by talking of ‘friendship’ between Epiros and Serbia.
34 Nicol (1957), pp. 62–3, with further references; Longnon (1950), pp. 141–2; Sinogowitz (1952), p. 28.
the Aegean and the Adriatic; around the time of his coronation Stefan Prvovecani annexed the area of Pec-Peja, even though the Serbs were not yet able to establish their rule throughout what is now Kosova, where an Illyrian-Albanian population had lived since ancient times. Otherwise, Theodore managed in 1225 to push the Latins out of all of eastern Macedonia, while respecting the small Bulgarian principality of Melnik, and he swept from victory to victory along the coast of Thrace, gaining control of Kavalla, Xanthi, Gratianopolis, Mosynopolis, then on to Didymoteichos and even as far as Adrianople, whence he chased the Nicaeans who had only just succeeded in gaining control of the city. As a neighbour now of the Bulgarian kingdom, he had no doubts that the Bulgars constituted a great danger in his rear which would stand in the way of his great design, the capture of Constantinople itself. He schemed towards a tactical alliance with Ivan Ašen of Bulgaria who had recovered the reins of power in 1218 and who gave his blessing to the union of an illegitimate daughter, Maria Beloslava, with Theodore's brother Manuel. This meant that Epiros and Bulgaria developed a common interest in opposition to Nicaea, but also, indirectly, in opposition to Serbia.

Quite different was the situation of Albania after the partition of Romania; Venice was assigned, in addition to Dyrrachium and its dependencies, the chartolarates of Glavinista and of Vagenetia, regions which the Venetians made no real effort to hold, and which passed by 1205 into the hands of the first of the rulers of Epiros, Michael Angelos Doukas. With the rise of Epiros and the emergence of new Slav powers, there were serious repercussions for Albania; the great trans-Balkan routes which utilised Albania as means of access to the west, the Via de Zanta and the Via Egnatia, were seriously disrupted by the incessant strife in the area and lost their classic role as outlets for eastern goods, setting in train the irreversible decline of the Epirote and Albanian ports, notably Dyrrachium. In July to August 1205 the Venetian expedition on its way to Constantinople to install as patriarch Doge Tommaso Morosini took the chance to take over Dyrrachium, where a petty duchy was established from which Venice sought to draw some economic benefit, though this proved small compensation for the tensions with Epiros and Serbia which its existence tended to create.

Albania thus found itself squeezed between several forces, including the Latin archbishopric of Antivari (Tivar, Bar) which was engaged in an attempt

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37 Ducellier (1981b), pp. 75–84 and 151.
at the Catholicisation of the region, even though, as has been seen, this was not regarded as incompatible with traditional Orthodoxy.39 However, owing to the proximity of a Serbia in full expansion and of the Epirote princes, little Arbanon, shut away in the hinterland, with its main political centre at Kruja, opted for a continuing attachment to the Orthodox tradition and for subjection to Epiros, as well as alliance with Serbia.40 Even if it is hard to identify the outlook of Prince Gjin, the son of Progon, who died in 1208, it is clear that his successor, Dhimitër, saw Venice as the main enemy, all the more so when the Venetians allied themselves on 3 July 1208 with the prince of Zeta, George, the nephew of the Serbian ruler Stefan II, with whom George maintained a troublesome relationship: a clause in the treaty of 1208 even insisted that Zeta would support Venice if the Albanian prince rebelled against the republic.41 Dhimitër, who revealed here his diplomatic skills, could thus only seek to make alliances in mirror image of those of his foes, marrying the daughter of Nemanja and of Eudocia, Komnena, and building excellent ties with Epiros.42 Venice too was constrained to make an agreement with the Epirotes, in 1210, under which Michael Angelos appeared to accept the position of a vassal of the republic, in return for having his control of the Shkumbi valley as far as Naupaktos recognised as legitimate.43 By 1212 Venice had resolved to leave behind the Albanian wasps’ nest, abandoning its useless and awkwardly placed duchy to Michael Angelos, in circumstances that remain very uncertain.44 Just the same, Arbanon remained attached to its traditional allegiances, Byzantine, Serbian, Orthodox; when Dhimitër died, probably in 1215, his successor, the Greco-Albanian lord Gregorios Kamonas, who had earlier been married to Gjin’s daughter, now took Komnena as his second wife, after requesting canonical dispensation from Demetrios Chomatenos, the chartophylax of Ohrid and a major power in Epiros;45 at the same time, ties were strengthened with Serbia, with which ties had been weakened by a Slav assault on Shkodër (Scutari) following the collapse of the Venetian duchy of Durazzo (Dyrrachium).46 It was against this ‘Orthodox bloc’ that the new Latin emperor of Constantinople, Peter de Courtenay, launched himself in 1217; on his way to his capital city he took Durazzo by stealth, only to disappear, lock, stock and

39 After 1187, the bishopric of Kruja seems to have passed into Catholic hands: Ducellier (1987d), pp. 3–4; Cirković (1988), pp. 148–9.
barrel, in the ‘Albanian mountain passes’, where Theodore Doukas was awaiting him.48

This complex network of ties, presupposing an effective danger from the Latins, and based on the accord between the Bulgarians and the Epirotes, could not be more than an opportunistic alliance, since Bulgaria, strong again under Ivan Asˇen, never hid its own ambition to acquire Constantinople, and Constantinople was equally the target of the ruler of Epiros in his contest with his rival of Nicaea. The Bulgars, with an eye on the Adriatic as well, could not forget that their ambassadors to the pope had been able to proceed no further than Durazzo.49 The death of Emperor Henry in 1216, and the defeat of Peter de Courtenay the following year, stimulated into new life the three elements which sought to recover Constantinople: Nicaea, Epiros and Bulgaria, which, under Ivan Asˇen II (1218–41) experienced its last period of medieval greatness; henceforth its role would be that of trying, through shifting alliances, to weaken the Greek competitors for Constantinople. The capital itself was almost within their sights by 1225, and the death of the Latin emperor Robert de Courtenay in 1228, leaving a minor, Baldwin II, prompted the Latins to seek a Bulgarian alliance. A plan was set in train for a marriage alliance between Baldwin and Ivan’s daughter Helena. For Ivan the great bonus was the offer of the regency of the Latin empire, setting aside promises already made in April 1229 to the elderly John of Brienne; but such plans only resulted in a breach with Theodore Doukas of Epiros.50

In spring 1230, taking the view that he could not march on Constantinople without having first of all removed the Bulgarian threat from his rear,51 Theodore Doukas attacked the Bulgars but was crushed in battle by them at Klokotnitsa, in the Maritsa valley;52 he was captured and blinded, a defeat which really sealed the fate of the westernmost of the Greek rump states.53 In April 1230, Ivan Asˇen launched himself on a sweeping counter-offensive,
gaining Adrianople, Didymoteichos, Boleros, Serres, Pelagonia and Prilep, as well as Thessaly (Greater Vlachia) and Albania up to the gates of Durazzo, which itself seems to have escaped his control. It is not certain that the Bulgarians had been able to realise their dream of joining the Adriatic to the Aegean, since in an agreement with Dubrovnik the same year, 1230, Ivan mentions Skopje, Prilep, Devol (Deabolis), acquisitions blocking Serbian access to Macedonia, and even Thessalonika, while no Albanian port is mentioned. In any case, the document bears witness to a revival of trans-Balkan trade to the advantage of one of the Slav powers, as economic facts caught up with the military ones, and this helped counterbalance the overweening Italian presence in the region’s trade.

Akropolites’s favourable picture of Ivan Ašen’s attitude to his Greek subjects was probably created so as the more decisively to condemn Theodore Doukas, the chronicler’s bugbear, for his actions; in any case, Ivan did not make the mistakes of Kalojan and seems to have been regarded favourably by his new subjects, to whom his new title of ‘tsar of the Bulgars and of the Greeks’ offered some sort of guarantee. This title he hoped to make even more real by conquering Constantinople from the Latins. He had barely won his victory at Klokotnitsa when he visited Mount Athos, showering gifts upon its monasteries, but also expressing symbolically his place as supposed successor to the Byzantine emperors. His conquests also permitted him to intervene in the affairs of his neighbour Serbia, a potent rival whose alliance with Epiros he found it hard to forgive. Bulgarian operations resulted in the fall of the Serbian tsar Stefan Radoslav, who was obliged to withdraw to Dubrovnik, and then to Durazzo.

However, Ivan was a realist and he knew he could not take Constantinople on his own; he thus welded together an Orthodox league, comprising the emperor of Nicaea, John Vatatzes and even Theodore’s brother Manuel, who was Ivan’s unfaithful brother-in-law and who had just abandoned, at Thessalonika in 1232, a scheme for rapprochement with Rome and with

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55 With justice, since Manuel Doukas, son-in-law of Ivan, only ruled by grace of the Bulgarian tsar who, at the same time, was happy to submit the archiepiscopal see to that of Târnovo, Nicol (1917), pp. 114–15.
56 On the policy of restoring fortifications, see for example Stenimachos, with a commemorative inscription of Ivan II; Zlatarski (1911/12), pp. 231–2; Asdracha (1976), p. 242.
57 Stojanović (1934), no. 790, p. 203; van Thaliočzy, Jireček and Sifflay (eds.), Acta et diplomata res Albaniae, pp. 50–1; Nicol (1957), p. 113 (with citation of the source); Ducellier (1981b), p. 166.
58 Such is the signature on the Ragusan privilege: Nicol (1917), p. 111.
60 Documents in Miklosich and Muller, Acta et diplomata graeca, iiii, pp. 65–7; Jireček (1911), i, pp. 304–5; Marković (1932), pp. 211–19.
Frederick II. This league gave Ivan the chance to renounce the nominal allegiance offered by Kalojan to the pope, from which he hoped to gain an immediate benefit in the transformation of the office of primate in Bulgaria into a full patriarchate. It is likely that, from 1233, the relationship with Nicaea was close enough to force the ‘unionist’ archbishop of Tarnovo to abandon his see and retire to Mount Athos, which itself suggests that he had been reconciled to Orthodoxy by the patriarch of Nicaea. In spring 1235, the Greek–Bulgarian alliance was further strengthened at Gallipoli by the marriage of the future Theodore II Laskaris with the daughter of the Bulgarian tsar, previously betrothed to Baldwin II and, after lengthy negotiations with the patriarchs of Nicaea and of the east, by the recognition as patriarch of the new Bulgarian primate, Ioakim, who went to Nicaea for his consecration. However, for the Bulgars this alliance clearly signified the abandonment of any claim to the Byzantine throne, for the price paid for the patriarchal title included the renunciation by Ivan of his patronage over Mount Athos.

From then onwards, the attitude of the Bulgarians becomes somewhat incoherent: Ivan Asen had not become Vatatzes’s ally in order solely to acquire a patriarchate, and he was surely not unaware of the danger posed by Nicaea to him; so, after a brief attempt at a joint siege of Constantinople in 1235–6, the tsar did an about turn and entered into a Latin alliance, breaking with Nicaea at the end of 1237 following a terrible pestilence at Tarnovo which carried off his wife, one of his children and the new patriarch. The tsar had the sense that he was being punished for not keeping his word; writings of this period from the Bulgarian territories are full of eschatological references to brilliant triumphs and also to exemplary punishment for sins. As if to confirm these prophecies, Ivan II died in 1241, and, soon after, the land was ravaged by a terrible Mongol and Cuman army which put an end for a long time to its imperial ambitions. Nicaea even benefited as a result of the settlement of numerous Cumans on the frontiers of Asia and Europe. However, the outer edges of Bulgaria remained very sensitive, inhabited mainly by Bulgars and ready to take up arms whenever other Bulgars attempted action,

63 Tarnanidis (1975), pp. 34–5.
66 Tarnanidis (1975), pp. 46–9 and 52.
as occurred, though with long-term results, after the death of Vatatzes in 1254.70

The Bulgars had, however, drawn Niccaea towards Thrace, with the result that Epiros, and with it Arbanon, gained some freedom of movement, especially after the death of Ivan II; under Michael II, who assured himself of control of all of Thessaly,71 Durazzo passed again under Epirot control,72 even though Michael had to soothe Niccaea by allowing free passage to the ambassadors of Vatatzes bound in 1250 for Italy; this reveals that Durazzo had not lost its traditional role as a transit point linking the Balkans to western Europe.73 It was, however, now that a decisive economic change occurred within Albania; the Italians became more and more frequent visitors, including many Venetians, with whom Epiros was not on good terms; the Ragusans were also very active, coming in search of cereals, wood, animal products and so on, and conferring on the coast of Albania a high degree of economic independence from the hinterland, with which ancient ties were increasingly severed. Not just these groups increased in importance, thanks to the favours granted by Michael I and Dhimitër of Arbanon (renewed by Michael II in 1237 and 1251),74 but also a local merchant class developed, dominated by Slavs;75 a degree of acculturation between Italians and Dalmatians is attested, visible not merely in language and law but also in the easy co-existence of the Latin and Orthodox cults, noted around 1230 by Demetrios Chomatenos.76 In northern Albania the relationship remained a cruder one; the celebrated Giovanni da Pian Carpini, who was archbishop of Antivari around 1250, was thus able to profit from the powerlessness of the Slavs and Epirotes in the face of Nicaean conquests, which resulted in the cession by Michael II to Vatatzes of Prilep, Veles and even Kruja, the capital of Arbanon. He sought, with the help of the friars, to assure himself of the loyalty of Arbanon, but this brought him face to face with the metropolitan of Ohrid, so that he was not able to gain influence over the border bishoprics of Chounavia and Polatum, which (in admittedly obscure circumstances) joined the Orthodox camp.77 But even so the Catholic

70 Acropolita (1903), pp. 108–9; Asdracha (1976), pp. 64 and 243. On the ethnic make-up of the local population, Apostolides (1941/2), pp. 93 and 97, and p. 79; Asdracha (1976), p. 64.
75 Šušay (1916), p. 211; von Thalloczy, Jireček and Šušay (eds.), Acta et diplomata res Albaniae, no. 164, p. 51; Karpozilos, (1973), pp. 46–69; Ducellier (1981b), p. 206, and (1987d), pp. 5–6. After the death of Demetrios Chomatenos, the see of Ochrida was occupied by two Bulgarians, but in 1252 it was the Greek Constantine Kabasilas, lately of Dyrrachion, who held office there; Gelzer (1903), p. 12.
conquest of the region proceeded apace. As for Arbanon proper, its own prince, Gulam, had abandoned Michael II to join the Nicaean camp, no doubt seeing in Nicaea a more effective bulwark against the Catholic Church. At the same time, Vatatzes renewed the privileges that Kruja had received from Manuel Komnenos, even though it is uncertain who at this point was in control of the town; in 1282 Andronikos would renew this grant, as would Stefan Dušan in 1342.

Such an offensive damaged the interests both of the Bulgars and of the Serbs; despite his own weakness and thanks to the death of Vatatzes, the Bulgarian tsar Michael Ašen was able in 1254 to recover western Macedonia up to the Dibra, occupying Skopje among other places, though the Nicaeans won it back in 1256. A dangerous understanding between Michael II and the Serbian tsar Stefan Uroš II (1242–76), another candidate for the control of Macedonia, came into existence, and it was only in 1256 that Theodore II succeeded at last in gaining control of the route leading towards the Adriatic, capturing the lost strongholds in Macedonia and even Durazzo. It was not for nothing that the Basileus boasted of controlling Sofia, Plovdiv, Veles, Skopje and even Serbia, thanks to his latest acquisitions. In the winter of 1256–7, George Akropolites, exercising authority over the newly acquired provinces, felt free to travel around the region, after bringing together at Durazzo the ‘notables’ of Arbanon, among them, no doubt, Prince Gulam (of whom subsequently no more would be heard); he thus annexed without a murmur the statelet in which he was able to install a civil, military and fiscal administration which was thoroughly Byzantine. Akropolites speaks of these ‘notables’ (ἐκρίτοι), who would later on be known as princes, and who would dominate an Albania which would fail to achieve unity before modern times. It was they who, while remaining faithful to Michael II, would involve the Albanians in a great revolt, resulting in Michael’s siege of Akropolites in Dibra, Ohrid and even Prilep, regions which ever after remained centres of Albanian settlement. However, the revolt passed by Albania proper and Epiros, whose ally, Stefan Uroš’s Serbia, was able to take full advantage by advancing into central Macedonia and taking Skopje, as well as pushing as far as Kicava and Prilep. Meanwhile, following in Norman

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81 Acropolita (1903), p. 142; Jireček (1911), 1, p. 317; Balascv (1911); Nicol (1957), pp. 158–9; Ducellier (1981b), pp. 169–70.
85 Frashëri (1982), pp. 208–9; on modern problems, see Roux (1992), pp. 73–4 and map, p. 77.
footsteps, Manfred of Hohenstaufen profited from the troubles in the region to seize control (probably around the end of 1257) of part of central Albania, controlling Durazzo, Berat, Vlorë, Spinarizza and their surroundings, which served as the basis for a marriage alliance with Helena, the daughter of the despot of Epiros, who, in the face of defeat, was forced to recognise his right to a dowry of these lands, adding for good measure Corfu and the southern coast of Albania (Himara, Sopot, Butrint).87 The Nicaeans re-established themselves in western Macedonia thanks to the campaigns of John Palaiologos, in spring 1259,88 later confirmed by the victory of Michael VIII Palaiologos at Pelagonia that same summer.89 However, Skopje seems to have remained in Serbian hands until the offensive launched by the Bulgarian tsar Constantin Tis (1265–70), when the city returned somehow into the Byzantine sphere,90 but it is unclear what is meant by Stefan Milutin when he talks, in 1303, of the loss of the city by the Serbs.91 In any case, after 1241 Bulgaria was not in real danger; Michael VIII could take over, in 1262, the coastal towns of Anchilaos and Mesembria (Nesebar), promising them as a dowry to his niece Maria, with the stated intention of never giving them back to the Bulgars. A Bulgarian counter-attack in 1272 was easily checked, proving the weakness of what was now a divided kingdom, subject throughout the rest of the century to political instability, and behind which it faced the formidable allies of the Greek emperors, the Kipchak Mongols.92 It would be wrong, however, to suppose that Bulgaria was passing through a cultural vacuum. Iakov, the Bulgarian archbishop, was still capable in the middle of the century of writing passable Greek poems in hexameters, something only Planudes could rival;93 and there were lively manuscript workshops where the Slav–Hellenic tradition was maintained (as also in Serbia), as can be seen in the psalters of Radomir and Karadimov, without which it would


92 Pachymeres, Ρωμαϊκή ιστορία, 1, pp. 2–5; Ostrogorsky (1936), pp. 475 and 482; on Michael VIII’s grand alliance of Kapchale–Byzantium–Egypt see Geanakoplos (1959); Mansuri (1992a) and (1992b), pp. 117–24.

be hard to make sense of the efflorescence that occurred in the fourteenth century, represented by the chronicle of Manasses and the Tomić psalter. New forms emerged, such as the ‘teratological’ letter designs that adorn the thirteenth-century manuscripts. However, on the fringes of the restored empire, there still weighed two dangers: the alliance between Naples and Epiros, leading up to Angevin intervention later on, and the conquering aims of Serbia in Macedonia.

Among the clauses of the Treaty of Viterbo, of 1267, the king of Naples had taken care to include mention of his right to succeed Manfred in Albania, but it took him a while to make real his claim, first of all because of his participation in the Tunis Crusade, then, after 1271, because he was uncertain how Michael II would react. It was thus only after Michael’s death that he took charge of Durazzo, which had just been wracked by a terrible earthquake. There he had himself proclaimed king of Albania on 21 February 1272, he then also gained Vlorë, whence Hohenstaufen supporters were only excluded in 1274. Michael VIII was clearly well aware of the danger posed by this Latin coup, and this helped push him more enthusiastically towards the Union of the two Churches at Lyons in 1274. This tied Charles of Anjou’s hands, because he would now be attacking a true Christian, whatever the terms of the Viterbo treaty, while Michael could justify his own resistance in Albania, which became the theatre for Greek–Latin conflict from 1272 to 1284, culminating in the Angevin defeat at Berat (spring, 1281), which suggests local enthusiasm for the Byzantine initiatives. By 1284 the Angevins had, as a result, lost virtually all their conquests, including Durazzo and Vlorë, and held only a small part of the extreme south of the Albanian coastline, with Butrint and Sopot, ceded to them by the despot Nikephoros of Epiros in 1279. As a symbol of his repossession of the region, Michael VIII probably chose this moment to have painted the fresco that adorns the exonarthex of the church of Santa Maria of Apollonia (Pojani), where he appears with the future emperors Andronikos II and Michael IX. Up to the mid-fourteenth century, however, the Angevins

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95 Djourova (1977), pp. 36–99, and plates iii, p. 57, xxi, p. 75, xxiii, p. 77, and xxv, p. 79 (Evangelium and Radomir, Zographou, Mount Athos), xxvii, p. 81 (Parimeinikos of Belgrade), xxviii, p. 82 (Oktoecchos of Zagreb), etc.
98 Ducellier (1981b), pp. 234–6; despite the observations of A. Failler in his edition of Pachymeres’s text one cannot date this earthquake to 1273, since the town was already in ruins before the Angevins took over; Pachymeres, Ρωμαϊκή ἱστορία, i, p. 358; Ducellier (1981b), p. 177.
103 Buschhausen and Buschhausen (1976), pp. 143–4 and tables xxi–xxii.
continued to try to gain control of Albania, but without ever being able to install themselves in any real sense. They were even tempted to give Albania away in exchange for Aragonese Sicily, an offer which was not unnaturally refused.

The Angevin conquest of Albania does, however, reveal the process of aristocratisation of the country, where the archontes willingly took on Byzantine or Slav titles, some looking towards the new master, others remaining faithful to the traditional Greek alliance, and in some cases paying the price of deportation to Apulia. On the coasts, the heavy-handed fiscal policy of the Angevins discouraged merchants, among whom the Ragusans stole a lead over the Venetians, from coming to supply themselves in the major ports, which underwent a serious decline, turning into small staging posts where the princes traded in grain, wood, salt, skins and dried fish. The Albanians themselves became a majority in the land, even though the Greek and Slav minorities were not overwhelmed. Pachymeres himself shows us the process of repopulation by Albanians after the Durazzo earthquake. The rupture between the coast and the interior was deepened; trans-Balkan relations would remain disrupted until the coming of the Ottoman new order. Thus a social and political instability was injected into the area, unravelling old clan ties and resulting in migrations overland towards Macedonia and Thessaly, the precursors of the migrations into Italy at the end of the Middle Ages. Such factors would long impede the ability of Albania to acquire any national unity.

In Macedonia, on the other hand, it was a people who had a more clearly etched national identity, the Serbs, who gained the ascendancy, despite internal dynastic difficulties, Bulgarian competition and, above all, the new Byzantine revival. The local nobility, the vlastela, sought its own territorial advantage, while the imperial hankerings of the Nemanjid dynasty found its most illustrious representative in the kral Stefan Milutin, a warrior and also a statesman who knew how to keep his nobles content, adopting the Byzantine system of pronia (pronija in Serbian), which allowed him both to strengthen the nobility and to curb its excesses. Serbia had evolved a long way during the thirteenth century, thanks to the cultural osmosis that took place in a kingdom that

retained many Greek elements and drew on the school of Constantinople: beginning with St Sava, the liturgical and hagiographical literature of the Serbs provides us with one of its major works in the ‘Panegyric’ of Mileševa.\textsuperscript{113} There is a whole world between the rustic condition in which the Greek ambassadors found the court of Stefan Uroš in 1266 and the love of ceremonial and costumes, all Byzantine, identified by Theodore Metochites during the negotiations leading up to a Serbian–Greek pact in 1299. This peace gave Serbia the advantage of seventeen years of war which, in two successive phases, transferred the Serbian–Greek frontier from a line to the south of Prizren and Lipljan to the outskirts of Dibra and Veles, almost within sight of Prilep and Ohrid.\textsuperscript{114} From 1282, Skopje was definitively in Serbian hands, and Milutin realised his great dream the same year, reaching the Aegean Sea where he gained Kavalla, dangerously near to Thessalonika.\textsuperscript{115} But Milutin did not simply push southwards; he also bore in mind his ancestors’ ancient ambitions in the Adriatic, profiting from the death, in 1296, of those who stood in his way: the Epirot despot Nikephoros and the Sebastokrator John of Thessaly. The same year, Durazzo passed into his hands, and he kept hold of it until at least 1304.\textsuperscript{116} From there, the kral posed a threat, as his predecessors had once done, to Dubrovnik and southern Dalmatia, anticipating the future expansion of Stefan Dušan towards the Adriatic.\textsuperscript{117} In 1299, Andronikos II had no further choice: he had to acknowledge the fait accompli and accord to Milutin the hand of his small daughter Simonis, for whom the Serbian conquests were to serve as dowry.\textsuperscript{118} A chrysobull he granted in 1303 to the monasteries of Hilander and Pyrgos on Mount Athos boasts of this achievement.\textsuperscript{119}

Serbian expansion was henceforth irresistible, leading the region’s inhabitants to ignore for too long the Turkish menace which now threatened Byzantium, once again caught between two foes.

\textsuperscript{113} Sathas (1872), p. 173; Apostolović (1902).
\textsuperscript{118} Simonis was only six years old, and the patriarch was unhappy about such a union; Pachymeres, \textit{Ῥωμαϊκή ἱστορία}, 11, pp. 272–6 and 285–6; Gregoras (1829–30), 1, pp. 203–4; Laskaris (1926), pp. 53–5; Kravari (1989), p. 49 n. 135.
All periods are transitional, but some are more transitional than others. In the autumn of 1237 the armies of Batu, grandson of Chinggis Khan, commenced their conquest of the lands of the eastern Slavs. By convention this event marks the symbolic divide between two epochs: the final extinction of the old, strained, but once-glorious ‘Kievan Rus’, and the beginning of the dark age of oppression under the ‘Tartar yoke’. The convention is of course too crude, though not entirely inappropriate. In the thirteenth century Rus’ existed either no longer or not yet. It was neither a polity nor a place; or rather, it was various polities and places which had less and less relationship with one another. The very idea of a thirteenth-century Rus’ (or Russia) is a modern chronological and geographical convenience, not a coherent historical entity.

This is one reading of events. According to an alternative version the impact of the Mongol invasions, while outwardly traumatic, was superficial, and should not be allowed to obscure an underlying political, social and cultural continuity: changes in thirteenth-century Rus’ were perhaps accelerated by the Mongols, but the Mongols were not the principal cause. The pendulum of interpretation swings back and forth between theories of continuity and theories of catastrophic disruption. A brief political survey of the lands of the Rus’ians in the thirteenth century can do little more than indicate some of the main points along its path.

The Riurikid Principalities, 1200–37

On first narration a political history of the pre-conquest decades seems to have the relentless and somewhat aimless drama of a soap-opera, with a cast of

1 Russia was an early Latin designation for the lands of the Rus’ians, but those lands covered much of the area of modern Ukraine and Belarus as well as modern European Russia.

2 For a summary see Kargalov (1967), pp. 219–55; also Cherepnin (1977); contrast Fennell (1983), pp. 86–90.
hundreds and a plot almost too intricate to be summarised. It is a tale of four
families, four branches of a single dynasty. The dynasty is that of the Riurikids,
supposedly descended from the ninth-century Scandinavian Varangian whose
clan was summoned from across the seas to rule over the fractious tribes
around Novgorod, and whose progeny later established their capital in Kiev.
Novgorod and Kiev, at the northern and southern ends of the forest and
forest–steppe section of the trading and raiding route ‘from the Varangians to
the Greeks’, were the richest and most prestigious cities of the early Riurikid
lands, with populations reaching perhaps 30,000–40,000.3 The Kiev–
Novgorod axis was the main artery of Kievan Rus’ in its Golden Age from the
late tenth to the early twelfth century.

Over the twelfth century prosperity spread east and west to the rapidly
growing regional principalities. A proliferation of princelings nurtured their
ever more autonomous patrimonies. Patterns of internal alliance and alle-
giance shifted continually. Foreign policies were conducted separately.
Cohesion of a sort was retained through the clan, as power in all the principalities
remained a Riurikid monopoly. And cohesion of a sort was retained
through the Church, as all the principalities remained within the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction of a single metropolitan of Rhosia, whose seat was the cathedral of
St Sophia in Kiev. Nevertheless, by the early thirteenth century protestations of
Riurikid unity and common purpose had become rare and hollow.

The dominant branches of the dynasty, operating from their respective pat-
rimonies, were the Iur’evichi in the north-east, with the lands of Vladimir,
Rostov and Suzdal; in the south the Olgovichi of Chernigov; in the west the
Iziaslavichi of Volyn and Galicia (now western Ukraine); and in the centre the
Rostislavichi of Smolensk. Kiev and Novgorod themselves were outside or
above the system of regional patrimonies: a shared inheritance claimed with
varying degrees of plausibility (according to an elaborate and often ambiguous
principle of collateral succession)4 by representatives of most branches of the
clan. They were the prizes over which the regional princes fought: Kiev for its
prestige, its crafts and its ancient wealth; Novgorod for its vast fur-bearing hin-
terland and its commercial links with north-west Europe.

If a political analyst were asked to report on the Rus’ians in 1200, he might
reasonably have concluded that a new and potentially stable order was emerg-
ing, based on a take-over of the centre by the periphery. In north-eastern
Vladimir Prince Vsevolod Iur’evich ‘Big Nest’ had ruled for twenty-five years,
and his seniority and authority were acknowledged both by the Olgovichi of

3 Goehrke (1973) calculates 25,000–30,000 for Novgorod and accepts Tolochko’s figure of over
40,000 for Kiev. For the range of reasonable estimates see Tolochko (1983), pp. 182–92; Mezentsev
Chernigov and by the Rostislavichi of Smolensk. On 1 January 1200 Vsevolod’s three-year-old son Iaroslav was accepted by the Novgorodians as their prince. At the same time in the south-west Roman Mstislavich (of the Volynian Iziaslavichi) was forming a parallel empire. In 1199 he annexed the lands of Galicia, in 1200 he took Kiev, and between 1197 and 1204 he launched three successful campaigns against the Polovtsian nomads of the steppes.\(^5\)

If the same observer had returned five years later he would soon have discovered the fickleness of appearances in Riurikid politics. In 1203 Roman lost Kiev, which was taken and sacked by Riurik Rostislavich of Smolensk with help from the Chernigovan Olgovichi and the Polovtsians. In 1205 Roman died (in Poland, still vainly fighting beyond his borders). His children were all in their infancy, the union of Galicia and Volyn fell apart, and for fifteen years Galicia was occupied and reoccupied in turn by Poles, Hungarians and the Chernigovan Olgovichi. Between 1205 and 1212 Riurik Rostislavich and the senior Olgovich (Vsevolod Chermnyi) took and retook Kiev from each other at least six times. Briefly in 1206 Vsevolod Chermnyi enjoyed notional authority throughout the south and south-west: over southern Pereyaslavl, Kiev, Volyn and Galicia, as well as his native Chernigov. But no order was stable and no political map would have remained valid for much longer than the time it took to be sketched.

In 1212 the two Vsevolods – Vsevolod Chermnyi of Chernigov and Vsevolod ‘Big Nest’ of Vladimir – both died, and again the configuration of family forces changed. Quite against precedent Vladimir and Suzdal (where power had been held almost without challenge for over ninety years by a succession of just three princes) relapsed into small-scale in-fighting. In the south it was the turn of the Smolensk Rostislavichi, whose tentacles turned out to be long and surprisingly tenacious. Rostislavichi ruled in Kiev from 1212 to 1235, in Novgorod from 1209 to 1221, and in Galicia from 1219 until 1227. At the start of the 1220s, therefore, the Rostislavichi controlled a huge network of territories which included Smolensk, Novgorod, Kiev and Galicia, while the Chernigovan Olgovichi and the Volynian Iziaslavichi had shrunk back within their own patrimonies.

By now our notional visiting analyst knows that his eyes are never quite to be believed. The break in north-eastern continuity was brief: from 1218 Iurii, son of Vsevolod ‘Big Nest’, ruled in Vladimir for twenty years until his own death in battle against the Mongols. In the south the ascendancy of the Rostislavichi collapsed in the late 1220s. Hungarians once more tussled with Volynian Iziaslavichi for control over Galicia, and the ambitions of the Chernigovan

Olgovichi were revived by Mikhail, son of Vsevolod Chermnyi. Mikhail managed to keep the southern principalities preoccupied by civil war for most of the late 1230s. Kiev changed hands every few months, periodically controlled by members of all four main branches of the Riurikid dynasty. Mikhail held Galicia with more success and with Hungarian support, but here also he was eventually forced out by Daniil Romanovich. None of this constituted ideal preparation for resistance to the Mongol onslaught.

Such is the superficial course of internal Riurikid politics up to 1240. On the surface the vicissitudes seem to depend on clan rivalries and on the qualities or ambitions of individual princes. However, behind the seemingly random pattern of family in-fighting lies a more consistent pattern of regional economic and commercial interests.

The north-eastern princes of Vladimir and Suzdal were primarily concerned with maintaining access to the trade routes between the Volga and the Baltic. Their persistent and ultimately successful policy was to secure control over both ends of the route. In 1221 Iurii Vsevolodovich founded the town of Nizhnyi Novgorod at the confluence of the Volga and the Oka, and from the 1230s the Vsevolodovichi had a virtual monopoly over the appointment of princes to Novgorod itself. In the south-west Galicians and Volynians were often uncertain (and sometimes violently divided) as to where the real interests of the region lay: with the old Rus’ north of the steppes, or with the kingdoms to the west around the Carpathians. The pro-Hungarian lobby was strong, and periods of Hungarian rule cannot always fairly be called foreign occupation. The true Riurikid traditionalists were the princes of Smolensk and Chernigov in the centre and the south. This was not due to sentiment or temperament. Without the old unified Rus’ – without access at least to Novgorod and preferably to Galicia and Volyn as well – they could not hope to thrive. These differences in regional interests and regional identity not only lay behind the seemingly random inter-Riurikid conflicts of the early decades of the thirteenth century: they also helped to determine the different responses of the Rus’ princes to the Mongol invasions.

**THE MONGOL CONQUEST AND ITS CONSEQUENCES**

The Mongols first appeared over the horizons of the steppes in 1223. At this stage they were threatening the Polovtsians rather than the Rus’ians, but the southern princes nevertheless felt alarmed enough to take pre-emptive action. A coalition of Olgovichi and Rostislavichi joined with the Polovtsians and

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6 Including, for the first time in sixty years, a prince from the north-east: Iaroslav, son of Vsevolod ‘Big Nest’.
marched south. The combined army was comprehensively defeated at the battle of the river Kalka. Polovtsian power was destroyed, but, to the relief and mystification of the Rus’, the Mongols then disappeared.

The relief was premature. On 16 December 1237 the forces of Batu laid siege to Riazan. Five days later the city was taken and sacked and its prince was killed. Moscow was next. Then, on 7 February 1238, after a siege of only four days, Batu took Vladimir, the main city of north-eastern Rus’. Two of Prince Iurii Vsevolodovich’s sons were killed, and the bishop and several of the princesses were burned to death after taking refuge in the cathedral. On 4 March Iurii himself was decapitated at the battle of the river Sit’. The Mongols went on to deal with other towns of the north-east, and they probed as far as the Novgorodian outpost of Torzhok, and to Kozelsk on the northern fringe of the lands of Chernigov. In their next campaign, which began in the spring of 1239, they took Chernigov and southern Pereyaslavl. Kiev itself fell in the following year’s offensive, on 6 December 1240. The great tithe church, built at the end of the tenth century by Prince Vladimir Sviatoslavich when he first declared his land to be Christian, collapsed with the sheer weight of people crowding into it for sanctuary. Moving westwards, via an almost desultory conquest of Galicia and Volyn early in 1241, Batu turned his attention to Catholic eastern Europe.

Why did the lands of the Rus’ians fall so rapidly to the Mongols? Causes often mentioned include poor intelligence, political fragmentation, weight of numbers, inferior tactics and inferior technology. Yet one should probably not look for specific local reasons. After all, the Rus’ians were not alone: everybody from China to Croatia fell rapidly to the Mongols, and an analysis of the causes would have to range far beyond the scope of this survey. More important here than the causes are the effects.

The immediate physical impact of the invasions was patchy. Native chronicles speak in apocalyptic formulae of universal slaughter, while Giovanni di Pian Carpini, who travelled through southern Rus’ in 1245 on a mission from the pope to the Horde, says that Batu destroyed ‘the whole of Russia’ and that in Kiev barely 200 houses remained. Most modern accounts reckon the destruction to have been somewhere on a scale from the substantial to the catastrophic. However, the chronicles speak in hyperbolic clichés; Giovanni’s

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9 See Halperin (1986) on factual and ideological distortions in native accounts. For a literary reaction see e.g. the Tale of the destruction of the land of the Rus’, in Begunov, Pamiatnik russkoi literatury XIII v., pp.
view was limited, and words like ‘substantial’ are vague. We cannot at this distance conduct a body-count. Through much of the vast land most people perhaps never even saw a Mongol during these years. Of the major cities, Novgorod and Smolensk were untouched. For those in the south and east who found themselves in the invaders’ path the experience was doubtless exceedingly unpleasant.

If the details of physical destruction depend on a mixture of guesswork and sentiment, the economic impact is more tangible. The Mongol invasions put a sudden brake on the urban economies of the east and south. Though Kiev had long ceased to expand, still in the early thirteenth century it remained a populous and wealthy city: wealthy in money, in the splendour of its buildings, in its busy crafts and trades. After 1240 Kievan craft production both for local use and for export (ceramics, beads, amulets, bracelets) virtually disappears. The disruption of trade and markets also retarded the economies of cities which had not themselves been attacked. In Smolensk, for example, a flourishing programme of public building came to an abrupt end after the invasions.

Nevertheless, the economy was not utterly destroyed. Urban life continued and in some areas was soon regenerated; the ravaged countryside recovered. It was not the Mongols’ intention to erase the Rus’ians and all their possessions from the face of the earth. The Mongols invaded for power and profit, and it was not in their interests to parch the source from which the profits might flow, whether as tribute or in trade.

Mongol force was demonstrated rapidly, but the political consequences of the invasions were not instantly clear even to those who were directly affected by them. Mongol rule was established in stages over two decades, extending gradually into the different regions and over the various social groups. Rus’ responses, too, were piecemeal. In the middle years of the century there is a sense of pervasive uncertainty, of improvisation, as each region and group tried either to avoid facing directly what with hindsight we assume to have been the facts, or tried to twist those facts to its own advantage.

The first requirement of the victors was that the Riurikid princes acknowledge that they ruled by Mongol consent. Each prince had to travel to the


Horde to receive his iarlyk, or patent, which granted him rule in his principality. Thus instead of dismantling the political system the Mongols turned the Riurikid princes into their agents and appointees. For the princes this was the relatively easy stage, the decision made simpler by the fact that the penalty for refusal was death. By 1246 all the main princes had made the journey to Sarai.

The paths to compliance, however, were uneven, both before and after 1246. The variations between princely policies for the period are often evaluated according to one rather crude criterion: the degree of acquiescence, or reluctance, with which they bowed to their new masters. However, their responses can better be understood in a regional, rather than a ‘heroic’ perspective. Regional interests were not abolished by the conquest. Indeed, regional rivalries became perhaps even more acute since the Mongols could either grant or take away more power than mere in-fighting could achieve.

Daniil of Galicia spent the early 1240s securing his position against the local boyars and looking for ways to out-manoeuvre his fellow princes. He managed to get his own man, Kirill, installed as metropolitan of Kiev, still the head of the Church throughout the Riurikid lands despite the eclipse of the city itself. In 1245–6 Daniil kept the Mongols at bay (and warded off his southern rival Mikhail of Chernigov) by going to the Horde for his iarlyk. But Galicia still faced west as well as east, and his submission to the Mongols was at this stage largely nominal. In 1252 Daniil’s son was married to a niece of the duke of Austria, and two years later Daniil accepted a crown from Pope Innocent IV. He even felt secure enough to resist, with some success, incursions by a Mongol detachment. Thus for nearly twenty years after the invasion Daniil managed to carry on ‘business as usual’, treating the Mongols merely as an additional complication.

Mikhail of Chernigov had fled in 1240 and tried to organise resistance from abroad. By 1246, isolated and outflanked by the rival families, he too made the trip to Sarai. Here he was put to death: according to instant legend, because of his proud defiance, though one suspects also the back-room dealings of Daniil of Galicia or of Grand Prince Iaroslav. Mikhail’s career is a shining example of thirteenth-century Riurikid futility. In the 1220s his target was Novgorod, and in ten years of fighting the Suzdalians for the city he failed. In the 1230s he was constantly at war with the Rostislavichi and Iziaslavichi for Kiev and Galicia, and again he failed. In the 1240s he agitated against the Mongols, and failed. He was the last of the battling Olgovichi, a chronically ambitious traditionalist marooned in old Rus’. Without the periphery, with a reduced Black Sea trade, and with Kiev impoverished, there was scarcely any

reason for the principality of Chernigov to exist. After Mikhail's death Chernigov declined into insignificance, while Mikhail himself took up a more successful posthumous career as a saint.  

By contrast with Galician prevarication and Chernigovan gesticulation, the north-eastern princes of Vladimir and Suzdal co-operated fully with the Mongols from the very beginning. In the ten years from 1242 there are nineteen recorded visits of Suzdalian princes to the Horde, and among the earliest were Iaroslav Vsevolodovich and his son Aleksandr or Alexander (then prince of Novgorod). In 1248–9 Aleksandr and his younger brother Andrei travelled beyond Sarai to the Great Horde at Karakorum to renegotiate the division of lands after their father's death. The result was curious: the younger brother was made grand prince of Vladimir, while Aleksandr himself was named prince of 'Kiev and All Rus'. The claim represented in the title was not territorial (rule in Kiev was worthless, and Aleksandr stayed in the north-east), but symbolic and honorific. Mongol rule had, paradoxically, restored a kind of unity to the Riurikid lands, inasmuch as all acknowledged one overlord. Aleksandr's Kievan title was a probably a device by which to give formal recognition to the north-east as the new focus, as the successor to old Rus'. It was a clumsy artifice, and Aleksandr was not happy with it for long. In 1252, after a change of power at the Horde, he persuaded the Mongols to help him remove his brother Andrei from Vladimir and to install himself as grand prince. Andrei had been forming a suspect alliance with Daniil of Galicia.

Some praise Aleksandr for realism, others blame him for craveness. As we shall see, the mutual co-operation between him and the Mongols did not end with the removal of his younger brother. For the Church (for whom he is a saint) and in cinematographic legends (where, through Sergei Eisenstein's classic film, he is a super-hero) Aleksandr's main achievement was to have saved his land from the predatory Latins while he was still prince of Novgorod: the Teutonic Knights at the battle on the ice of Lake Peipus in 1242, and the Swedes at the battle of the Neva in 1240 – for which he became known as Aleksandr Nevskii. Again, however, the regional perspective is perhaps more revealing. In essence, Aleksandr Nevskii merely pursued the traditional policies of his kin in the north and north-east: to keep the local boyars in order; to

15 For a more appreciative assessment see Dimnik (1981).
assert the pre-eminence of the prince of Vladimir; to secure and retain the Suzdalian presence in Novgorod; to keep open the Volga–Baltic route. Like his predecessors over the course of a century, he was generally successful. And like his predecessors he tried to stay on reasonable terms with whoever controlled the middle Volga.

So long as Mongol rule was limited to a regulatory role in the power-games of princes, its impact was superficial. For the Mongols, however, the princes were but instruments. The point was to extract tribute and men, and in order to calculate the amount of tribute and men they required censuses of the population, and in order to oversee the smooth administration of – and compliance with – the censuses they installed their own agents (the basaqeqs). This was the next stage in the establishment of Mongol rule: the stage at which it became a tangible fact for vast numbers of people, the time when responses had to become definitive rather than just expedient.

In 1252 Khan Möngke instigated a general census throughout the Mongol empire. This was a massive administrative undertaking, made especially complex in Rus’ by the lack of appropriate local or central bureaucratic institutions of government. By the early thirteenth century in Rus’ one can begin to perceive – albeit dimly – a gradual spread of documentary procedures and intrusive administration.19 But by comparison with, for example, England or China or Byzantium the native bureaucracy was primitive. Indeed, one social consequence of Mongol rule in Rus’ may have been to serve as a catalyst for the eventual emergence of bureaucratic government.20

Systematic work on the census in Rus’ commenced in 1257.21 Its enforcement, culminating in the collection of dues and the levying of troops, took five years. The far west and north-west, where direct disruption due to the Mongols had hitherto been minimal, were at last faced with a demand for real rather than formal submission. In 1258 the Mongol general Burunday appeared for the second time in Galicia. His main business was with Lithuania, but high on his agenda was Galician compliance with the census. For years Daniil had been cultivating his relationship with his western neighbours, but at the critical moment his efforts at equivocation turned out to have been wasted. His papal

20 E.g. Vernadsky (1953), pp. 214–33, 344–66. Note, however, that evidence for local adoption of Mongol terms relates to a later period.
21 Alisen (1981). The first native reference to the presence of a basaqeq dates from the mid-1250s: Ipat’evskiaia letopis’, col. 829, s.a. 6763 (=1254–5); English translation in Perfecky, The Hypatian Codex, p. 68. Note that this basaqeq is actually a local man. On the term see Vásáry (1978). Carpini (van den Wyngaert (ed.), Sinica franciscana, pp. 86–7; Dawson (ed.), The Mongol mission, p. 40) describes the basaqeq system slightly earlier, but not with specific reference to the lands of the Rus’. The millenarius encountered by Carpini in Kiev (Van den Wyngaert (ed.), Sinica franciscana, p. 104; Dawson (ed.), The Mongol mission, p. 12) is a different kind of official (and may here also be local).
honours failed to secure him papal troops. He fled to Poland, then to Hungary, but here too there was no relief. When Burunday ordered that all the fortified towns in his region be destroyed, Daniil had to submit. From 1260 until his death in 1264 he was a loyal servant of the Mongols.22

Over the first half of the century Novgorod had become increasingly detached even from the Riurikids, setting strict conditions for its princes. In 1255 it had almost severed its ties with Aleksandr Nevskii. The idea of a Mongol census was an affront, and for three years the Novgorodians refused to have anything to do with it. Neither Aleksandr nor the Mongols could let Novgorod go its own way, and in 1260 their joint forces compelled the city to admit the census officials. Thus, almost a generation after the invasions, Novgorod submitted to Mongol rule.

Resistance to the census did not come only from the outlying regions. In 1262 the tax-collectors were expelled, sometimes with violence, from cities in the north-east, home territory for Aleksandr Nevskii and his family: from Rostov, Vladimir, Suzdal and Iaroslavl. This display of popular resistance (which of course failed eventually) prompted Aleksandr’s final trip to the Golden Horde, undertaken perhaps in order to persuade the Mongols to be moderate in their reprisals. He died in November 1263 on the return journey. A second census of some areas was conducted around 1273–5, perhaps as an offshoot of the census ordered by Qubilai Khan in China. There is no record of active objection.

In the aftermath of the Mongol invasions of 1237–40 the Riurikid princes found various ways of reaching a political accommodation with their conquerors. But the age of true subjugation, of the real ‘Tartar yoke’, began in 1257–62 when all the lands of the Rus’ians were brought under Mongol administrative and fiscal control through being made to comply with the census.

THE RIURIKID PRINCIPALITIES, 1262–1300

Even after the censuses Mongol control remained mostly indirect, as it was exercised through the existing political structure. Mongol agents sometimes intervened, but internal Riurikid politics can give the appearance of continuity. Thus after the death of Daniil Romanovich, Galicia and Volyn went through yet another cycle of division (between Daniil’s sons Lev, Shvarn and Mstislav) and reunification (under Lev’s son Iurii, around 1300). The Danilovichi paid their dues to the Mongols, but their everyday diplomacy was still directed more at Poland and Hungary. A new element was the incipient expansionism of

22 Zdan (1957) argues that Galicia became tributary to the Mongols only after Daniil’s death, and that there the basqaq system was never imposed.
pagan Lithuania, but this did not become a major threat until the fourteenth century. In the north-east, after the death of Aleksandr Nevskii the title of grand prince passed to his younger brothers Iaroslav of Tver (d. 1271) and Vasili of Kostroma (d. 1277), then to his sons Dmitrii (d. 1294) and Andrei (d. 1304). On the surface, therefore, the old system of collateral succession functioned just as smoothly or as messily (that is, with sporadic civil war) as it had before the invasions. At times, indeed, it seemed that the Mongols had adapted to local political custom, rather than vice versa, as rival Mongol generals took opposite sides in struggles between rival north-eastern princes in the 1280s.

The intricacies of adjustment to Mongol rule are perhaps best illustrated in the case of Novgorod. The Mongol tribute drained resources; the city had ceased to be an object of Riurikid rivalry and instead routinely acknowledged the grand prince as approved by the khan; the economy was undermined by the development of the Suzdalian outpost of Ustiug which supplied furs directly to the Volga trade routes, bypassing Novgorod. The German community at St Peter’s Court in Novgorod had been established in 1191–2, trading jewellery, weapons, pottery, cloth, silver ingots and salt in return for furs and wax. Periodic wars between the Germans and Novgorod barely impeded the growth of business. The first extant Schra, with rules for the self-government of the German community, probably dates from the second quarter of the thirteenth century. A series of detailed proposals and counter-proposals between 1259 and 1269 testifies to the concern for developing and protecting Baltic trade at precisely the period when the Mongol census was being imposed. Novgorod’s policy was to establish a monopoly for itself: Germans were not allowed to do business with anyone but Novgorodians, and the grand prince was forbidden to do business directly with the Germans. After a brief lull, Novgorod thus enhanced its commercial and institutional autonomy, even as it affirmed its fiscal and political subordination.

In the north-east, Vladimir retained its primacy in notional honour, but – as in Kievan Rus’ as a whole in the twelfth century – regional development led to a diversification of power. Eventually, but only after 1300, Tver and Moscow emerged as the main contenders for the succession.

Even before 1237 there had been a fairly clear ‘north–south divide’ between the Riurikid principalities. In the Mongol era this divide was widened into a virtually unbridgeable chasm, because of the destruction and the neutralisation of the centre. With the Kievan economy wrecked the old rivalries between Olgovichi, Rostislavichi and Iziaslavichi lost their purpose. Almost nothing is known of Kiev or Chernigov in the last quarter of the century. In Smolensk, unravaged by the Mongols, the Rostislavichi abandoned all their extra-territorial ambitions. Thus although Mongol rule for the first time united the lands of Suzdal and the lands of Galicia as parts of a single empire, nevertheless for most practical purposes — in their relations, or lack of relations, with one another — the north-east and the south-west had become separate countries, while Novgorod, despite formal submission, was becoming still more distinctive. It is difficult to speak of Russia or the lands of the Rus’ians as a coherent political concept even when referring to the beginning of the thirteenth century; when referring to the end of the thirteenth century it would seem close to senseless.

Yet there was one institution which had to try to make sense even of the senseless. This was the Church. All the Riurikid principalities remained under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Kiev, and the Church’s efforts at adaptation show that patterns of Riurikid community and diversity were more subtle than can be revealed by politics alone. And the man whose extraordinarily long and influential career best illustrates and exemplifies the Church’s response to the traumas of the mid-thirteenth century is Metropolitan Kirill II. Kirill was nominated in 1242 or 1243, in the aftermath of the invasions. He died in 1281 or 1282, when the invasions were the distant memories of old men.

Mongol rule was profitable for the Church and for the people who worked in it and for it, for the Church and all ‘Church people’ were granted exemption from the census dues and levies. This was standard Mongol practice with regard to local religions: whether through fear of the wrath of local deities or as a bribe to influence the opinions of local moral and spiritual leaders. The cynical view of Kirill is that, like Aleksandr Nevskii (with whom he came to be closely associated), he traded privileges for compliance. The eulogistic view is that he was the wise shepherd to his flock, for which the only alternatives to compliance were either annihilation or — worse still — submission to the ‘Latins’. Both cynicism and eulogy are in this case easily available by-products

of ignorance, for Kirill’s motives are lost behind an inadequacy of evidence. More tangible are his actions. For nearly forty years Kirill worked with considerable success against the apparent tide of the times, to sustain and even to extend the pan-Russian role and functions of the Kievan Church.

Kirill was a peripatetic leader, spanning the principalities like none of his predecessors. Appointed under the patronage of Daniil of Galicia, he was a regular visitor to Suzdal and Vladimir and travelled also to Novgorod, yet throughout his term of office he stayed loyal to Kiev and St Sophia as his ceremonial seat in practice as well as in theory. In 1261 Kirill stretched his ecclesiastical province into the Mongol heartlands: he expanded the see of southern Pereyaslavl to include Sarai. In 1273 a council in Kiev approved a revised version of the Greek Nomokanon, sent to Kirill (in Slavonic translation) from Bulgaria, and Kirill set about overseeing the production of a new and definitive compilation of ecclesiastical and secular law. The clearest sign of the metropolitan’s pan-Russian authority is the fact that, within a very few years, this legal compilation was accepted and copied in all the extremities of the old Riurikid lands: in Volyn, in Novgorod, in the north-east.27

During these decades it seemed feasible that Kiev and its metropolitan might acquire among the east Slavs an enhanced authority after the Mongol invasions similar to that accrued in the west by the bishop of Rome after the barbarian invasions. But Kirill created a role which subsequent incumbents could not sustain. In 1299 or 1300 his successor, Maksim, swimming with the political current, moved his residence (de facto, though not yet de iure) from Kiev north-east to Vladimir, seat of the grand prince. The old Rus’ — Kievan Rus’ — died many times in many ways: through the rise of the regional principalities, through the wars between the Riurikid families, through the decline of the north–south trade axis from the Baltic to the Black Sea, through the sack of the city by the Mongol invaders, through Aleksandr Nevskii’s abandonment of his phoney Kievan title. When the metropolis, the ‘mother of the cities of Rus’ (as it was called by an early chronicler),28 was deserted even by its metropolitan, then Kievan Rus’ — as a pan-Riurikid community with Kiev as a focus (even if only ceremonial) — was finally dead.

28 Ipat evskaiia letopis’, col. 17.
The justification for treating the political history of Wales, Ireland and Scotland in the thirteenth century in the same chapter lies neither in the geographical proximity of the three regions nor in any supposedly Celtic social structure to be found in all three, but in the fact that they all faced a common external pressure in the period and responded to it in significantly different ways. That pressure came of course, from the looming presence of a rich, powerful and united kingdom of England to the south and east. The thirteenth century was a crucial period in the history of the relations between each of these regions and their aggressive neighbour. Wales was conquered and incorporated, Scotland entered that bloody and heroic phase which was to culminate in the successful assertion of its independence as a kingdom, while in Ireland it became clear that the division between English and Gaelic Ireland was to characterise the indefinite future. Outcomes were thus radically different. Dilemmas were shared. Wales, Ireland and Scotland all exhibited a cultural, linguistic and social dualism between an anglicised and urbanised south and east and a Celtic-speaking, less populous north and west. All had simultaneously to negotiate a relationship with the English crown and to establish an internal balance or at least a modus vivendi between separate and conflicting powers and populations. In each case geography, social structure, past history, political will and chance shaped the result.

Wales

At the beginning of the thirteenth century the coastal plain of south Wales was controlled reasonably securely by the Anglo-Norman Marcher lords. The earldom of Pembroke in the extreme west, held until 1245 by the Marshall family, had been heavily colonised by a rural and urban population of English and Flemish settlers. In the south-east the extensive lordship of Glamorgan, which came into the hands of the Clare earls of Gloucester and Hereford in
Map 14  The Celtic lands of the British Isles

(a) Scotland  (b) Wales  (c) Ireland
1217, included a southern portion studded with castles and boroughs as well as an upland region under the authority of native Welsh lords. North of Glamorgan lay a cluster of lordships, like Brecon, Abergavenny and Builth, which the de Braose family had accumulated, forming avenues of penetration into the interior of Wales up the valleys of the Usk and the Wye. North and west Wales, on the other hand, was still under the rule of native Welsh princes. The most important were the many petty dynasts of Deheubarth, the principality based in the valleys of the Tywi and the Teifi; the rulers of Powys, which was located in north-east Wales, bordering Cheshire and Shropshire, and for long divided between a northern and a southern branch of the family; and Gwynedd. The political history of Wales in the thirteenth century was dominated by the rise of the house of Gwynedd, the attempt by its members to create an autonomous principality of Wales and their catastrophic defeat at the hands of their opponents, notably the king of England, who annexed most of their lands as an appanage of the English crown.

Gwynedd’s strength lay partly in its strategic and geographical position, possessing as it did both the rich farmlands of Anglesey, ‘the mother of Wales’, and the fastnesses of Snowdonia, and partly in the personalities of a remarkable series of rulers from its native princely dynasty. This family, which had its ancient seat at Aberffraw in Anglesey, was headed in the year 1200 by Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. He gradually struggled his way to a position of dominance, allying with uncles and cousins against other uncles and cousins, disinheriting his allies’ heirs and eventually gaining possession of the lands of his rival Gwenwynwyn of south Powys. His success alarmed King John, who led two expeditions against him in 1211, with Gwenwynwyn and other Welsh princes in his train, and Llywelyn was forced to submit, but the following year seized the opportunity of John’s internal difficulties to go on to the offensive again. Throughout the civil war of the final years of John’s reign and the minority of Henry III, Llywelyn expanded his territorial and military power. In 1215 he led a winter campaign which resulted in the capture of the important royal centres of Carmarthen and Cardigan and in the following year he presided over an assembly of princes and learned men of Aberdovey, where the territorial arrangements for south Wales were agreed. In 1218, as the English civil war ended, he was able to secure most of his gains by making peace with the English royal government. He performed homage, but kept Cardigan and Carmarthen as royal custodian and retained the lands of Gwenwynwyn, who had died in 1216, during the minority of that prince’s heirs.

Llywelyn had to fight many times during the remaining twenty-two years of

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his rule, but he was never decisively beaten back from the position of dominance he had acquired by 1218. In the 1220s and early 1230s he faced the aggressive power building of the Marshall earls of Pembroke and of Hubert de Burgh, the dominant figure of Henry III’s minority, and had to give some ground (notably Carmarthen); but he was able to maintain his territories and his overlordship virtually undiminished and in the early 1230s could march the breadth of Glamorgan and the whole line of the Middle and Northern March, burning and plundering from Kidwelly, south of Carmarthen, to Oswestry on the borders of Shropshire. After 1234 he was at peace with the king of England and concentrated on securing the succession of his son Dafydd, born to him by Joan, illegitimate daughter of King John, and excluding Gruffudd, his elder son born of another woman. In 1238 ‘all the princes of Wales swore allegiance to Dafydd ap Llywelyn ap Iorwerth at Strata Florida’ and two years later Llywelyn, ‘a man whose deeds it were difficult to relate’, died.2

The aftermath of Llywelyn’s death shows clearly how Welsh inheritance practices could lead to political instability. The Marcher lordships followed English rules of succession, so that male primogeniture ensured the integrity of the lordship. The Clare lordship of Glamorgan, for example, passed from father to son over five generations between 1217 and 1314. Only when no sons and several daughters survived did partition take place, as in the case of the Marshall estates in 1245 or the main de Braose line, after Llywelyn hanged William de Braose in 1230 for finding him in bed with his wife Joan. Welsh law, on the other hand, acknowledged the rights of all sons, including those of various mothers. Hence, after Llywelyn’s death in 1240, his son Gruffudd could make a very plausible case for his own claim and sought the help of the king of England to have ‘the judgement of his court according to Welsh law . . . on the portion which pertains to him of the inheritance of Llywelyn, his father, which Dafydd ap Llywelyn unjustly detains’.3 Welsh partible inheritance was a door for intervention by the English kings if they had the strength or inclination to enter.

The period between the death of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth in 1240 and the beginnings of the military and political conquests of his grandson and namesake Llywelyn ap Gruffudd in 1256 was marked by an extension of royal and Marcher power in Wales. Henry III led armies along the north Welsh coast in 1241 and 1245, fortified the castles of Diserth and Degannwy, the latter on the river Conwy itself, and received the cession of Perfeddwlad, that part of Gwynedd east of the Conwy. Royal and Marcher troops secured the restoration of Gruffudd ap Gwawrwyyn to south Powys and the re-establishment of a series of strong royal bases in south and central Wales. After the death of

Dafydd ap Llywelyn in 1246, Gwynedd west of the Conwy was divided between his sons Owain and Llywelyn. By the year 1250 the power of the native Welsh princes appeared hopelessly fragmented and the direct rule of the English crown reached to within sight of Snowdonia.

The house of Gwynedd began its final bid for hegemony in Wales in 1256. In the previous year Llywelyn ap Gruffudd had defeated his brothers in battle and become sole ruler of Gwynedd west of Conwy. The Welsh inhabitants were finding English rule in Perfeddwlad oppressive. Geoffrey de Langley, the representative of the English king in Wales, ‘boasted before the king and queen that he had all the Welsh in his grip’. The response was explosive. ‘The Welsh, coming out of their own territory, gathered a great army, headed by Llywelyn II, a handsome man and vigorous in war, who had, as it were, collected together all the Welsh to himself.’ Within a week Perfeddwlad was in Llywelyn’s hands. Over the next decade his series of military and political successes was continuous. In campaigns reminiscent of those of his grandfather, he expelled Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn of south Powys, raided as far south as Pembrokeshire and made a succession of conquests on the Middle March at the expense of Marchers like the Mortimers, taking Builth and Brecon. In 1258 ‘an assembly of the magnates of Wales gave an oath of allegiance to Llywelyn ap Gruffudd’ and in 1264, the Brut records, ‘the Welsh lived in peace with the English, with Llywelyn ap Gruffudd prince over all Wales’. The Peace of Montgomery between Llywelyn and the English crown, made in 1267, ceded to the prince virtually all his conquests, the title ‘prince of Wales’ and the fealty and homage ‘of all the Welsh barons of Wales, so that those barons shall hold their lands in chief from the prince and his heirs’. The princely dynasty of Gwynedd was thus recognised as the sole channel linking the native Welsh chiefs and the English crown.

In the course of three generations the family of Llywelyn ap Iorwerth had thus seen its power expand to every corner of Wales and also contract to the tiny core of Snowdonia, had virtually dictated terms to the king of England and also submitted humbly to him. This pendulum rhythm of Gwynedd power in the thirteenth century was determined partly by personalities and partly by wider political circumstances. The most dramatic periods of expansion occurred when forceful rulers, like Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, were able to take advantage of internal dissension within the kingdom of England, such as marked the civil war of 1215–17 or the Montfortian period. During these years alliances with the baronial opposition to the English crown could have direct results: in 1215 Llywelyn ap Iorwerth

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5 Brut y Tywysogyon, ed. and trans. Jones, p. 255.
and the disaffected de Braose family co-operated in the Marches of Wales, while in 1264 joint operations against the Mortimers were undertaken by the de Montforts and Llywelyn ap Gruffydd. Besides offering a potentially advantageous realignment of baronial loyalties, such political conjunctures also removed the threat of royal manipulation of native Welsh rivalries. In the days of his political stability, King John was able to play upon the rivalry between Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Gwenwynwyn as he wished, alternately expelling and restoring the prince of Powys. When Llywelyn expelled Gwenwynwyn in 1216, however, neither John nor his son’s regency government could do much about it. In the absence of the countervailing power of the king of England, the princes of Powys or Deheubarth might well make the calculation that taking the spoils of the Marcher lordships under Gwynedd’s leadership was preferable to fighting for their own autonomy. Hence when the English aristocracy was divided and the English crown consequently weakened, the princes of Gwynedd found themselves marching at the head of other Welsh princes, instead of having them at their throats.

It is also clear that when a strong king of England turned his attention to Wales, the possibility of sustained resistance by the princes of Gwynedd was slight. Supply problems often impeded English royal expeditions, and there were fruitless campaigns like John’s first of 1211 or Henry III’s and Hubert de Burgh’s of 1228, but the overall impression is that Edward I simply did, in a characteristically ruthless way, what his father and grandfather already had the capacity to do. John and Henry III had both marched along the coast of north Wales to build castles to contain the Welsh and both had been able, on occasion, to dictate terms. Even considering the political and military high points in the careers of the Llywelyns, it seems doubtful whether Gwynedd would ever have attained the kind of independence that some other small lordships in Europe did achieve, some with a regal title, like Navarre, others without it, like Brandenburg. Although the evidence of such incipient statehood in Gwynedd is mixed, it is not evenly balanced. On the one hand, its rulers obtained a princely title, took the fealty and homage of the chief men of Wales, created a privileged ministerial group, intensified the exactions they could draw from their subjects, built stone castles and claimed some kind of legal autonomy and superiority. One text of the Welsh laws associated with Gwynedd boldly asserts ‘all the kings of Wales ought to receive their lands from the king of Aberffraw [i.e. the prince of Gwynedd] . . . and his word stands against all kings but not their word against him.’ On the other hand, they lacked the regal title, did not mint coins, recognised the superiority of the king of England and never established an enduring territorial base outside Anglesey and Snow-
donia. Yet there was nothing inevitable about the spectacularly thorough way Gwynedd’s autonomy in fact ended.

In September 1275 Edward I ‘came from London to Chester; and he summoned to him Prince Llywelyn to do him homage. And the prince summoned to him all the barons of Wales. And by common counsel he did not go to the king because the king harboured his fugitives, namely, Dafydd ap Gruffudd and Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn.’8 The issue of harbouring one’s enemies was a vexed one. Llywelyn’s grandfather, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, had argued as a talisman of sovereignty that he had the right to receive enemies of the king of England ‘for we are of no less liberty than the king of Scotland, who receives outlaws from England with impunity’.9 Frequently peace agreements contained provisions on the mutual non-harbouring of enemies and just such bilateral clauses were included in the Peace of Montgomery of 1267, where it was explicitly stated ‘the lord king and his heirs will not harbour or aid against the prince an enemy or adversary of the prince or his heirs’.10 Llywelyn thus had a reasonable case when he saw his estranged brother and his old rival, who in 1274 had conspired to assassinate him, living in England with the royal consent. Legal considerations, however, were very soon overshadowed by military ones. Edward decided that Llywelyn’s persistent refusal to perform homage constituted a *casus belli*.

The war of 1276–7 involved two phases. In the first period three armies, based on Chester, Montgomery and Carmarthen, seized the lands around Gwynnedd that Llywelyn had conquered in the previous two decades. The native Welsh princes of Deheubarth and northern Powys submitted. The second phase of the war began with the king’s arrival at Chester in the summer of 1277. His plan was to advance slowly along the north Wales coast, clearing wide swaths through the forest and securing bases as he moved forward. He relied heavily on footsoldiers, whose numbers reached over 15,000 at one point, and had more than 1,500 labourers felling trees between Flint and Rhuddlan in August. At the same time he sent troops to Anglesey to prevent its rich harvest being transported to Snowdonia. With no allies, large numbers of English troops on every side and the prospect of starvation, Llywelyn submitted.

The settlement of 1277 reduced Llywelyn’s lands to the old core of Gwynnedd. Perfeddwlad was divided between the king and Llywelyn’s brother David, Gruffudd of Powys was restored, the king and the Marchers occupied or reoccupied central Wales. Llywelyn went to London to perform homage and was allowed to retain the title prince of Wales. At Worcester in October, 1278, he married Eleanor de Montfort, his betrothed bride whom the king had been

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9 *Royal and other historical letters*, ed. Shirley, i, p. 229, no. 201 (1224).
10 *Littere Wallie*, ed. Edwards, no. 1, p. 3.
keeping in detention, and Edward joined the festivities and paid for the wedding. It looked as if cordial relations could be achieved if only the proper amount of subordination were shown. As later in the case of John Balliol in Scotland, however, even the most pliant of vassals might find Edward I’s concept of his rights intrusive. Just as in the Balliol case, it was Edward’s judicial practices that proved finally unpalatable. In 1277 it had been agreed that if Llywelyn claimed that he should rightfully have lands of which he had been dispossessed ‘the lord king will show him full justice, according to the laws and customs of those parts in which those lands are situated’. The dispute over Arwystli, which Llywelyn claimed from Gruffudd ap Gwenwynwyn in a prolonged law suit between 1278 and 1281, and which involved the delicate issue of the status of native Welsh law, eventually seems to have convinced Llywelyn that ‘full justice’ was the last thing he could expect from Edward I.

At the same time as Llywelyn was banging his head against Edwardian justice, his brother David was finding the prize he had won by co-operation with the English less than satisfactory. Throughout Wales the rule of new alien officials and the harassment of native landholders by the royal judicial machinery created discontent which eventually led to the outbreak of March 1282, when David seized Hawarden, Oswestry was burned and Aberystwyth captured. Llywelyn had not initiated the rising, but put himself at its head. Edward I decided ‘to put an end finally to the matter’. Determination, sea-power and vastly superior wealth and manpower were applied to this goal. Royal commanders and Marcher lords struggled to subdue the Welsh in southern and central Wales while Edward, as in 1277, marched west from Chester, with a large army supported by a fleet. He determined to continue the campaign throughout the winter, and by December his troops were in Anglesey and on the east bank of the Conwy. At this moment Llywelyn was killed in fighting near Builth. The war was not over, but its outcome was not in doubt. The first six months of 1283 saw the conquest of Gwynedd, the defeat of Welsh resistance elsewhere and the capture of Llywelyn’s brother David, who was soon executed. At a cost of £100,000 the house of Gwynedd had been destroyed.

The Edwardian conquest was followed by a thoroughgoing reorganisation and restructuring of the political and military map of Wales. Llywelyn’s principality of Gwynedd was divided into three shires (Anglesey, Caernarvonshire and Merioneth) which, together with the shires of Cardigan and Carmarthen, formed a bloc of royal territory that extended over 100 miles from north to south; it is conventionally known as the Principality of Wales and, from 1301, formed the usual apanage of the heir to the English throne. Its administration, with sheriffs, shire courts, coroners and exchequers, was modelled on contem-

porary English practice. In other parts of conquered Wales new Marcher lordships were created for Edward’s military leaders. Reginald Grey, for example, who occupied Ruthin in Perfeddwlad in the war of 1282–3, was immediately granted it and its appurtenant lands as a fief. In the rest of the March existing lords were left undisturbed. A very few Welsh chiefs survived the war of 1282–3, but several of these were expropriated after later risings, or saw their inheritance going to English lords through marriage. By the early fourteenth century there was no longer a higher aristocracy of Welsh descent. The top strata of native society had been sheared off by foreign conquest.

IRELAND

At the beginning of the thirteenth century it still seemed possible that the Anglo-Norman lords and settlers who acknowledged the authority of the king of England might attain political control of the whole of Ireland. They possessed all the important coastal towns and were firmly established in their great lordships of Ulster, Meath and Leinster. From centres in Cork and Limerick they were gradually occupying parts of Munster and Connacht. Important native dynasties continued to rule, of course, notably the O’Briens in Thomond, the MacCarthys in Desmond and the O’Connors in Connacht, as well as the ruling families of the various Ulster kingdoms, but their elimination or assimilation were not unthinkable. Indeed, the history of Connacht in the first half of the thirteenth century would seem to suggest the likelihood of such an outcome.

Connacht was the last of the provinces of Ireland to be touched by Anglo-Norman expropriation. The dominant regal family was the O’Connors, who had held the title of high king in the previous century, but from the late twelfth century the Anglo-Norman de Burghs had cast ambitious eyes on it and William de Burgh, first head of the family in Ireland, apparently received some sort of grant of Connacht. He acted as a virtual kingmaker during the incessant wars among the descendants of Turlough O’Connor for the kingship, but after his death in 1205 de Burgh claims were quiescent during the minority of his son Richard. In 1215 King John issued two charters on the same day granting ‘the whole land of Connacht’, one in favour of Richard de Burgh, the other for the O’Connor king, Cathal Crobderg. It seems that the de Burgh grant was held in threatening reserve, while the O’Connor grant was designed as a clear sign of the subordination of the O’Connor king to the king of England, since Connacht was granted ‘to be had and held by him and his heirs . . . so long as they serve us well’.13 This proviso was invoked after Cathal Crobderg’s death in

13 Rotuli chartarum, ed. Hardy, pp. 218–19.
His son Aed was dispossessed and Connacht given to Richard de Burgh. The politics of the next decade were highly complex. While various O’Connor claimants struggled for the kingship, de Burgh’s fortunes rose and fell with those of his uncle Hubert, Henry III’s chief minister. After Hubert’s fall in 1232 Richard was out of favour for some years but by 1235 was once again leading large-scale expeditions into Connacht and beginning to settle his Anglo-Irish allies and followers there. After 1235 Connacht was divided. The O’Connors were permitted to retain five cantreds centred in modern County Roscommon, which had previously been appurtenant to the royal castle of Athlone, and for them they paid rent to the crown. The rest of Connacht was de Burgh’s and he initiated a policy of subinfeudation and settlement. De Burgh demesne lands were concentrated in southern Connacht, where there was a major centre at Loughrea, while in the north Sligo was held by a branch of the fitzGeralds, and even in the western peninsulas of Mayo lesser settler families such as the Barretts established themselves.

The history of Connacht in the first half of the thirteenth century thus suggests a pattern in which English royal power and foreign settlement would eventually make native political authority entirely negligible. Such was not, in fact, to be the outcome. By 1300 it was quite clear that the native dynasties were not only to survive, but to revive, and that the limits of ‘English’ Ireland were to be both circumscribed and vulnerable. From the thirteenth century Irish history has been characterised by that political dualism that still marks it today. The history of English and Irish Ireland in the thirteenth century is thus composed of two distinct though interweaving stories. On the one hand, there were the native kingdoms, societies that suffered the shock of alien attack and expropriation, but gradually came to terms with the foreign presence, stabilised themselves and, by the end of the century, began to regain lost ground. On the other hand, there is English Ireland, the history of which is a colonial tale, for the lordship of Ireland was arguably the nearest thing to a colony, in the modern sense, that medieval Europe produced, more so even than the ‘Ireland of Italy’, Sardinia. It was tied indissolubly to the English crown from 1254, its institutions and laws were closely modelled on those of England and its taxes funded the king of England’s wars.

Although no English king visited Ireland in this period after King John’s expedition of 1210, the replication of English institutions and laws in English Ireland was early, explicit and thorough. The Anglo-Normans who settled in Ireland in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries came from a society which was already accustomed to executive and judicial specialisation, formal administrative procedures and bureaucratic methods; and it is no surprise that the government they erected in Ireland was marked by the same characteristics. There was a county court in Dublin in the 1190s and over the next century a
total of eleven royal shires came into existence, administered by the normal English officers, such as sheriffs and coroners. The laws of the English settler population were explicitly those of the English common law: ‘the laws of our land of Ireland and of England are and should be identical’, wrote the English royal government in 1223.14 The offices and organs of central government were miniature versions of those in England, with appropriate modifications to take account of permanent royal absence. The government was headed by a justiciar, who was sometimes a local Anglo-Irish magnate, sometimes an English bureaucrat, and there was a chancery, an exchequer and central law courts. Some of the records produced by these bodies have survived, for example, an Irish pipe roll for 1211–12 and rolls of the justiciar’s court from the 1290s. The first Irish parliament was held in 1264 and thereafter meetings were regular, there being ten in the 1290s, usually at Dublin, less frequently at Kilkenny.

English Ireland cannot, however, simply be equated with the delegated royal government and its associated lands and institutions. The coming of the Anglo-Normans involved freelance aristocratic land-grabbing and the heirs of the original adventurers, or late-comers of the same stamp, gave a wilder and more particularist colour to immigrant society than concentration on the records of the Dublin government might suggest. Great magnate families ran their own liberties, lordships enjoying special privileges and standing outside the shire system. The earldom of Ulster (Ireland’s only earldom at this period) was held by de Lacy and, later, de Burghs, Meath by de Lacy and their heirs, notably the vigorous international warrior Geoffrey de Genneville (1252–1308); Leinster belonged to the Marshall earls of Pembroke until their extinction in 1245, whereupon the lordship was divided into four liberties, usually held by absentee magnates. These large, contiguous territories were run by aristocratic administrative and military machines, with their own customs, courts and chanceries. In addition to these technically privileged lords, there were many powerful settler families, like the fitzGeralds and Butlers, who possessed military might, wide lands and active affinities. As the thirteenth century progressed, Anglo-Irish ‘nations’ began to form: clan-like groups of relatives, bearing the same name, extremely numerous (presumably because of acceptance of the illegitimate), united in military and political action. The social and political groupings of English Ireland had begun to diverge significantly from those of England.

Until the middle of the century English Ireland seemed to be an expanding society, a colonial venture in which further expropriation and new settlement had no foreseeable limit before the ocean. Gradually this sense changed, but

14 Rotuli litterarum ed. Hardy, i, p. 497.
the stress must be on the word ‘gradually’. There was no series of dramatic battles or notable political incidents marking the high-water-mark of Anglo-Norman conquest and settlement in Ireland. Although the battle of Callann, 1261, in which Fineen MacCarthy defeated an army led against him by the justiciar, and the (abortive) revival of the high kingship by Brian O’Neill in 1258 have sometimes been presented in this way, it is unlikely that contemporaries would have seen in such events anything other than the endless play of military fortune and political realignment that had characterised the history of Ireland since the first coming of the Anglo-Normans (and, of course, well before). One reason colonial Ireland fits so uncomfortably into a model of ‘conquest’ and ‘resistance’ is the absence of unitary leadership among either the native Irish or the English settlers. The Irish kings were rivals as often as they were allies. Within each regal dynasty competitors arose from excluded branches of the family. Among the English, the institution of the justiciarship and existence of the royal government centred on Dublin might seem to imply a degree of political co-ordination, but the reality of power lay in the hands of the great Anglo-Irish families, like the de Burghs and fitzGerals, who sought to develop regional power bases, allied with native rulers when convenient, and fought each other if it promised advantage. Hence the annals of thirteenth-century Ireland present a baffling succession of raids, ambushes and plundering expeditions in which native and settler ally and compete in seemingly chaotic repatternings.

Nevertheless, it is the case that a shift of balance is discernible over the course of the century. Areas that were not seized or settled by the English before 1250 were unlikely to be occupied thereafter. The catalogue of new castles, new lordships and new boroughs that characterises the colony in the years 1170–1250 begins to thin, and the erection of an unprecedented intrusive seigneury, like the grant of Thomond to Edward I’s favourite, Thomas de Clare, in 1276, is quite exceptional. It became clear that north-west Ulster and south-west Munster, for example, were never going to be incorporated into English Ireland. The threat from the Wicklow mountains, whence Irish bands came down to devastate royal manors in the vale of Dublin, remained permanent. The vulnerability of the settler villages is recorded in a monotonous series of complaints at how ‘the king’s lieges were daily killed, their houses burned and intolerable depredations were made’.15

Among the native dynasties that survived the initial onslaught of the Anglo-Normans in the later twelfth century there was, despite incessant competition both within and between the families, a fair amount of continuity. The main ruling kindreds of 1300 were descended from those of 1200 and dominated

15 Calendar of documents relating to Ireland (1171–1307), ed. Sweetman, iii, no. 559, p. 271.
approximately the same regions as their ancestors had done. Because the east coast was now in English hands, none of them could hope to emulate the Irish kings of the eleventh and twelfth centuries who had sometimes attained authority over virtually the whole island, but gradually some, like the O’Neills of Tyrone, began to reshape and expand their political and military resources. One innovation was the employment of gallowglasses (‘foreign vassals’), bands of fighting men from western Scotland and the Hebrides. In the early phase of Anglo-Norman penetration the lords of Galloway and western Scotland had fought against the native Irish and received fiefs in Ulster from the English king, but as the thirteenth century progressed they tended to reverse this alignment. In 1247 ‘MacSorley, king of Argyle’ died alongside the O’Donnell king of Tyrconnell fighting against a joint fitzGerald–O’Connor force,\(^\text{16}\) and by the last decades of the century it was standard practice of the northern Irish kings to employ gallowglasses.

Most of the fighting undertaken by the Irish rulers of the thirteenth century was, however, traditional in its methods and goals. The exercise of power by military demonstration, cattle raiding and the taking of hostages was what created lordships of more than local scope. Persistent rivals could be removed from the stage by customary forms of mutilation. Tadc Dall O’Connor, the grandson of Cathal Crobdberg of Connacht, who had himself made a violent and active start in the world of dynastic struggle, was captured by his rivals the O’Reillys in the autumn of 1243, kept in captivity for the winter, then blinded and castrated when spring came. He survived for another twenty-eight years, to be mourned by the annalist in his obituary as ‘the most eligible successor to the kingship in his province, till he was blinded’.\(^\text{17}\) For native rulers English and settler power represented a political force which might be best opposed, used or recognised as occasion demanded. Feelim O’Connor of Connacht went to the extreme of leading troops to serve Henry III in his Welsh campaign of 1245 and as a result, at least in the judgement of the native annalist, ‘was held in honour by the king’\(^\text{18}\). His son, Aed (d. 1274), was a violent opponent of the Anglo-Irish, who fought the de Burghs, ravaged the royal centre of Roscommon, put war fleets on Lough Ree and was eulogised on his death as ‘the king most dreaded and triumphant of all the kings of Ireland of his day’.\(^\text{19}\) The career of Brian O’Neill, king of Tyrone, also shows a sense of opportunism, but it was marked more clearly by a strain of overtly nationalist feeling. He had been installed as king by the Anglo-Normans, and initially his main opponents were the rival line of the MacLoughlins, whom he virtually destroyed in battle in 1241. Thereafter, however, he fought repeatedly against


\(^{\text{17}}\) *Annals of Connacht*, ed. Freeman, 1272.4, p. 159.

\(^{\text{18}}\) *Annals of Connacht*, ed. Freeman, 1245.5, p. 85.

the fitzGerals and other settler powers. In the 1250s he was raiding the lands of the earldom of Ulster and in 1258, at a meeting at Cael Uisce, Aed O’Connor of Connacht and Teig O’Brien of Thomond gave him ‘the kingship of the Gaels of Ireland’.\textsuperscript{20} His ambitions came to a catastrophic end in 1260 when he was defeated and killed by the local levies of Down and his head sent to London – ‘Brian’s head in a foreign land beneath cold clay.’\textsuperscript{21}

In 1300 Ireland remained a land of war, dominated by regional powers, like the O’Neills, de Burghs or fitzGerals. In the east and south a machinery of English government existed, but its power was limited and contracting. By this period there had emerged in the island the violent, localised, ethnically mixed pattern that was to characterise it throughout the late medieval and Tudor period.

**SCOTLAND**

Of the three regions considered in this chapter, it was Scotland that exhibited a political structure most like that of England. By the beginning of the thirteenth century it was a unitary, hereditary monarchy, with an aristocracy that was increasingly Anglo-French both in personnel and in style. Money-striking, castle-building, charter-issuing kings sought ties with (and found wives among) their counterparts south of the border, rather than cultivating the Celtic traditions of Scottish kingship. Justiciars and sheriffs provided the framework of a royal judicial and administrative machinery. The boroughs and many of the religious houses of the kingdom were English in culture and royalist in sentiment. Everywhere it is the picture of a small feudal kingdom that first strikes the eye.

This was not, however, the whole picture. Certain aspects of Scottish royal ceremonial came from the pre-feudal past; native magnate families continued to hold most of the ancient territorial earldoms, and large parts of the country were Gaelic in speech and culture. Moreover, it appears that some descendants of the old royal family did not accept the pruning of the dynasty to exclude collateral branches which the main lineage was determined to enforce. In particular, the MacWilliams, descendants of King Duncan II (1094) and possibly also of the old Moray line of kings best known in the person of Macbeth (1040–57), continued to put forward regal claims. In 1215, while Alexander II, the teenage king of Scots, was still in the first years of his reign, ‘the lord king of Scotland’s enemies entered Moray, namely Donald Bán, the son of MacWilliam, and Kenneth MacHeth and the son of a certain king of

\textsuperscript{20} Annals of Connacht, ed. Freeman, 1258, 9, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{21} Giolla Brighde Mac Con Midhe, Poems, ed. and trans. Williams, xiii, 1, p. 137.
Ireland with a numerous band of malignants’. A local magnate defeated them, ‘cut off their heads and presented them as new gifts to the new king’. Another MacWilliam rising is recorded in 1230, though this too was ruthlessly suppressed.

The destruction of rival lines was accompanied by a slow extension of Scottish royal power within north Britain, as autonomous parts of the kingdom were subjected to increasing control and lands beyond the realm were incorporated within it. Galloway provides a perfect example of a region which was formally subject to the king of Scots but had its own line of rulers, sometimes titled ‘kings’ by non-Scottish sources, and a tradition of separatism. The death of Alan, ruler of Galloway, in 1234, provided the opportunity to exert royal authority and implement Anglo-French rules of succession. Alan left three daughters and, according to feudal custom, his estate would be divided equally between them. Despite the resistance of the native Galwegians and the claims of an illegitimate son of Alan’s, this is exactly what happened. Since each of the daughters was married to a magnate of Anglo-French descent, Galloway would in future clearly constitute a possession of the cross-Border aristocracy rather than a native provincial subkingdom.

Galloway was not the only autonomous region of the western seaboard. Lordship over the Hebrides was also in dispute. In the first half of the twelfth century the Western Isles, from Lewis to Man, had formed one kingdom, but from the 1150s power over the islands had been divided between the descendants of Godfrey of Man (d. 1187) and the MacSorleys, descendants of Somerled of Argyll (d. 1164). These two dynasties were themselves split into various branches, with different local power bases and sometimes competing aspirations to regality. Their basic orientation was Atlantic, for although the kings of Man were on occasion in the thirteenth century knighted by the king of England, English power was not systematically focused on this part of the British Isles before the reign of Edward I. What was more usual was to see the rulers of Man or the various branches of the MacSorleys (the MacDougals, MacDonalds and MacRuairi) raiding off the coast of Connacht, fighting each other fiercely in Skye or Man and lobbying for preference at the court of the kings of Norway. For theoretical supremacy over the Western Isles (as with Orkney and Shetland) lay with Norway, and the bishop of the Isles (or Sodor and Man) was subject to the archbishop of Trondheim.

From the 1240s there is evidence of a desire on the part of the Scottish kings to replace Norwegian suzerainty over the Isles with their own. At first the incentive was monetary, but Hákon IV of Norway (1217–63) reportedly responded ‘that he did not know he was so much in want of silver that he

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needed to sell lands for it’. Subsequently the Scottish kings tried more direct means and Alexander II actually died (1249) at Kerrera in Argyll after he had ‘prepared a large navy with the intention of subduing all the Isles to his rule’. His successor had more luck. After the last great demonstration of Norse power in the Western Isles by Hákon IV in 1263, the effects of which were blunted at the battle of Largs and obliterated by Hákon’s death in the Orkneys, the kings of Scotland and Norway negotiated the transfer of the islands from Norse to Scottish lordship. According to the Treaty of Perth of 1266 the inhabitants of the Isles passed under the authority of the king of Scots. The Norwegian king, Magnus, received in return some of the silver that his father had disdained. Nine years later an attempt by an illegitimate son of the last king of Man to re-establish the dynasty was bloodily defeated and the verdict of the chronicler ratified: ‘kings ceased to reign in Man’. Overall the thirteenth century thus witnessed a wide-ranging extension of Scottish royal authority in the west, which was paralleled in the north, where Caithness and Ross felt the military power of the Scots kings, although Orkney and Shetland remained under Norwegian overlordship until the fifteenth century.

In the west and north the Scottish kings faced Scandinavian claims, island dynasties and the Gaelic and Galwegian world. To the south they faced the kingdom of England, a political unit of a scale and population unique within the British Isles. In this period relations between the two kingdoms were, until the very end of the century, usually peaceful and even smooth. Two issues, the territorial delimitation of the two realms and the exact legal relationship of the two kings, could provoke discord, but they rarely led to bloodshed. In the Treaty of York of 1237 Alexander II renounced his claim to the northern counties of England, a territorial ambition that had been a subordinate part of the policies of the kings of the Scots since the eleventh century, and which he had himself tried to enforce by war in the early years of his reign (1215–17). More delicate than the problem of demarcation was that of relationship. The kings of Scotland did homage to the kings of England, but it was a matter of dispute whether this homage was for the kingdom of Scotland or simply for the lands they held in England (as the kings of England themselves did homage to the king of France for their lands in France). According to one account of the homage offered by Alexander III to Edward I in 1278, the king of Scots explicitly reserved his kingdom when performing the act; an English bishop responded by reserving the king of England’s right to homage for the kingdom; and Alexander made the stirring

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24 Chronicle of the kings of Mann and the Isles, ed. and trans. Broderick, p. 78.
25 ‘Continuation of William of Newburgh’, p. 549.
statement: ‘no one but God has the right to the homage of my kingdom of Scotland’.26

Whatever the legal technicalities, the paternalism of the kings of England towards the kings of the Scots is clear. Both Alexander II and Alexander III were knighted in England by the English king and both married daughters of English kings. In particular the minority of Alexander III from 1249 to 1260 gave an opportunity, and the marriage between Alexander and Henry III’s daughter offered a pretext, for intervention by the English monarchy in Scottish political affairs. As was usual during minorities, aristocratic rivalries focused on control of the monarch’s person and on domination of the regency council. There was tension between the powerful aristocratic family of Comyn, whose members held two earldoms at this time, and Alan Durward, justiciar of Scotland north of the Forth, a man ambitious for an earldom of his own. The 1250s were marked by recurrent coups in which rival factions called on the help of the English king. In 1255 Henry III came to Scotland and supervised the replacement of a council dominated by the Comyns with one including Durward and other rivals of theirs. In 1257 the Comyns staged a counter-coup, kidnapping the king, sending Durward to England in flight and making overtures to Llywelyn of Wales. Eventually, the following year, a compromise was reached. The events of the minority certainly foreshadow the intrusive role of the English king in the period after 1286, but they also show the way noble rivalries could be contained and indicate the basic stability of the Scottish monarchy as long as the succession was smooth.

The thirteenth-century kings of the Scots were continental rather than Celtic in the way they avoided the partible inheritance and segmentary competition of their contemporaries in Wales and Ireland. The advantages of royal primogeniture for the consolidation of power over generations and the inhibition of dynastic disputes were manifest and most European kingdoms and principalities adopted the system during the course of the Middle Ages. There was a price to pay, however, in the genetic vulnerability of the new, streamlined lineage. The kings of the Scots had battered away at potential rivals and collateral kin throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; but by 1286 they had honed the lineage to such a fine point that there was no heir in the male line. At that moment Alexander III broke his neck falling from his horse in the dark. The precariousness of the general European system of royal inheritance could hardly be more vividly illustrated – no contemporary Irish kingdom would have been so incommoded by the sudden loss of its incumbent.

The succession crisis that began in 1286 stimulated two important political developments. The first was the formation of committees of magnates and

26 Stones (ed.), Anglo-Scottish relations 1174–1328, p. 80 [40].
leading ecclesiastics to provide provisional government in the absence of an active monarch. Some experience of such arrangements had been gathered during earlier minorities, notably that of Alexander III himself. Guardians were appointed, chosen from the earls, bishops and barons, and claiming to represent ‘the community of the realm’. Such aristocratic junta ran the country during the absentee reign of Alexander III’s grand-daughter, Margaret of Norway (1286–90), the following interregnum (1290–2) and the acephalous years after 1296. The second major development was a newly intrusive interest in Scotland on the part of the English king. This was at first not entirely unwelcome to the Scottish governing classes, some of whom saw Edward I as an arbiter and protector able to prevent magnate rivalries destroying the kingdom. Edward, however, was a master in taking advantage of a situation, and he used the first approach of the Scottish leaders as an occasion to negotiate a marriage between Margaret of Norway and his son and heir, an arrangement which would have resulted in a union of the crowns; and he used the second approach, when asked to arbitrate between rival claimants to the throne, as an opportunity to extract an unambiguous recognition of his rights of overlordship from the claimants. Hence, when John Balliol was enthroned in 1296, with the backing of the powerful Comyn family and at the expense of the aspirations of the Bruces, he had already conceded more to the English king than any Scottish monarch of the previous hundred years.

Edward I’s dealings with the Scottish king in the 1290s bear a striking resemblance to his dealings with Llywelyn in the 1270s and 1280s. In both cases his insistent legalism exerted a relentless pressure on a subordinate ruler, until the vassal monarch found himself forced to choose between abject juridical dependence and resort to force. As in the case of Llywelyn, Balliol and his advisers and allies eventually made the latter choice and were quickly destroyed militarily. Incensed in particular by the Franco-Scottish alliance of 1295, Edward marched up the east coast, stormed Berwick, Scotland’s major trading city, and sent troops on ahead who defeated and captured a large number of the leading Scottish magnates at Dunbar. Balliol resigned the kingdom; Edward ordered the breaking of the Scottish seal, the removal of the Stone of Scone, on which Scottish kings had traditionally been enthroned, and established an occupation government whose effective head was the hardfisted bureaucrat Hugh of Cressingham.

Before 1296 there had been armed conflict between England and Scotland only once in the thirteenth century, during the troubled years of the English civil war of 1215–17. Thereafter, down to the mid-sixteenth century, warfare was endemic. This crisis thus marked a clear turning point in the history of political relations within Britain. The issue was political independence. In 1296 it is probable that Edward I presumed that issue had been decided and that
henceforth Britain would contain only one king. He was wrong because a national opposition to annexation was mobilised. The breadth of this feeling was revealed particularly in 1297, when most of the Scottish magnates were still in captivity and a guerrilla resistance began under William Wallace, a landowner of much lower rank. ‘The common people of the land followed him as their leader and chief’, and under his leadership Scottish pikemen were able to defeat an army of English cavalry and footmen at Stirling Bridge in 1297, in the first of that series of infantry victories that marks a military revolution in the years around 1300. Hugh of Cressingham was killed, flayed and his skin cut into numerous pieces.

The Scottish Wars of Independence were to continue for decades. Edward I inflicted a heavy defeat on Wallace at Falkirk in 1298 and over the following years seemed likely to effect a complete reconquest. It was the resistance of Robert Bruce in 1306 that set in momentum events that were to lead to the decisive Scottish victory at Bannockburn (1314) and English recognition of the Bruce kingship in 1328. The kingdom of Scotland did not disappear like Gwynedd, but continued for four more centuries, and a new nationalist mythology was born.

The thirteenth-century political fortunes of ‘the Celtic lands’ were indeed divergent. For Scotland and Wales the reign of Edward I of England marked a decisive moment. Native Welsh political power was destroyed and, despite the revolt of Owen Glendower in the early fifteenth century, that destruction proved to be permanent, paving the way for the final incorporation of the whole of Wales into the unified Tudor state. In Anglo-Scottish affairs, the 1290s marked the end of two centuries of mainly harmonious relations and the beginning of 250 years of conflict and warfare that divided the two kingdoms and turned the border counties of both countries into perilous militarised zones. There was no such critical development in the history of thirteenth-century Ireland, but by 1300 it was clear that neither Anglo-Irish settler society nor native Irish society would completely absorb or dominate the other. English colonial regimes thus came to dominate in Wales, survive in constant conflict in Ireland and meet violent rebuff in Scotland. The political developments of the later Middle Ages and the early modern period were to be deeply influenced by these different paths taken in the thirteenth century.

APPENDIX: GENEALOGICAL TABLES

Philip II Augustus d.1223

Louis VIII d.1226 = Blanche of Castile

Louis IX king of France
d.1270

Alphonse of Poitiers

Jeanne of Toulouse

Charles I
king of Sicily

d.1285

Isabella = Philip III
of Aragon
king of France

d.1285

Philip IV
king of France

d.1314

Charles of Valois
d.1328

Philip VI
king of France

d.1350

Charles II
king of Naples

d.1309

Table 1 France
**Roger II**  
king of Sicily  
d.1154

| Roger | William I  
king of Sicily  
d.1186 |
|-------|------------------|
| Tancred | William II  
king of Sicily  
d.1189 |

**Frederick I Barbarossa**  
German emperor  
d.1189

| Constance | Henry VI  
queen of Sicily  
d.1198 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frederick II</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
king of Sicily  
German emperor etc. etc.  
d.1250 |

| Roger | William III  
king of Sicily  
d.1194 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry (VII)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
king of the Romans  
d.1242 |
| Conrad IV |  
king of Sicily  
d.1254 |
| Enzo |  
king of Sardinia  
d.1272 |
| Manfred |  
king of Sicily  
d.1266 |

| Conradian | Peter III  
king of Aragon  
d.1268 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peter III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Constance  
queen of Sicily  
d.1302 |

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**Table 2**  
Hohenstaufen Germany and Sicily
### Appendix: genealogical tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td>king of England</td>
<td>d.1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry III</td>
<td>king of England</td>
<td>d.1272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard</td>
<td>earl of Cornwall</td>
<td>d.1272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanna</td>
<td>= Alexander II of the Scots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabella</td>
<td>= Frederick II German emperor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eleanor</td>
<td>= 1. William Marshal earl of Pembroke</td>
<td>d.1231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>= 2. Simon de Montfort earl of Leicester</td>
<td>d.1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Almayne</td>
<td></td>
<td>d.1270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward I</td>
<td>king of England</td>
<td>d.1307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margaret</td>
<td>= Alexander III of the Scots</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatrice</td>
<td>= John duke of Brittany</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edmund</td>
<td>earl of Lancaster titular king of Sicily</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catherine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John</td>
<td></td>
<td>d.1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td></td>
<td>d.1274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alphonso</td>
<td></td>
<td>d.1284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward II</td>
<td>king of England</td>
<td>d.1327</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3  England
Appendix: genealogical tables

Table 4  Aragon-Catalonia
Appendix: genealogical tables

Table 3: The dynasties of central and eastern Europe
Table 6 Scotland

Appendix: genealogical tables

David
king of the Scots
d.1153

Henry d.1152

Malcolm IV
king of the Scots
d.1165

William I the Lion
king of the Scots
d.1214

David

Margaret = Allan of Galloway

Isabella = Robert Bruce V

Ada = Florence III count of Holland

Robert Bruce VI d.1295

Robert Bruce VII d.1304

Robert I
king of the Scots
d.1329

Margaret = Eric II
king of Norway

Margaret
‘The Maid of Norway’
d.1290

Robert Balliol
king of the Scots (1292–6) d.1313

John Balliol

Devorguilla = John Balliol

Margaret

Margaret

Margaret

William I the Lion
king of the Scots

d.1249

William I the Lion
king of the Scots

d.1286

Ada = Florence III count of Holland

Robert Bruce VI d.1295

Robert Bruce VII d.1304

Robert I
king of the Scots
d.1329

Margaret = Eric II
king of Norway

Margaret
‘The Maid of Norway’
d.1290

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It is obviously impossible to provide an exhaustive inventory of sources, books and articles. Two criteria have been used to determine my invidious but necessary choices: listing those documents which were most useful in writing this chapter, and indicating the general or more specialist works which in turn refer to a great number of sources or diverse writings.

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The chancery

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have nearly all been published, either *in extenso* or in English calendar, by the Commissioners of Public Records (in the first half of the nineteenth century) and (from the end of the nineteenth century) by HMSO. These are fully discussed in Carpenter (1997).

**The exchequer**
The pipe rolls, the annual record of the exchequer’s audit of money owed the king, have been published by the Pipe Roll Society down to 1222. Thereafter (apart from the rolls of 1230 and 1242) they remain unpublished in the PRO, as do the exchequer’s memoranda, receipt and issue rolls, apart from a few published likewise by the Pipe Roll Society.

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*Compiled by David Abulaifa*

*Note:* the editor of this volume is much indebted for help with this bibliography to the bibliographies of the first and second editions of E. Christiansen’s now classic work on *The northern crusades*, listed below.

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